Merge branch 'master' into next

Conflicts:
	include/linux/capability.h

Manually resolve merge conflict w/ thanks to Stephen Rothwell.

Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
This commit is contained in:
James Morris 2011-05-19 18:51:57 +10:00
commit 12a5a2621b
809 changed files with 8481 additions and 4481 deletions

View file

@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ static int cap_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry,
return 0;
}
static int cap_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
static int cap_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, unsigned flags)
{
return 0;
}

View file

@ -518,16 +518,14 @@ int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
return 0;
return security_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask);
return security_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask, 0);
}
int security_inode_exec_permission(struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
return 0;
if (flags)
return -ECHILD;
return security_ops->inode_permission(inode, MAY_EXEC);
return security_ops->inode_permission(inode, MAY_EXEC, flags);
}
int security_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)

View file

@ -471,6 +471,7 @@ static void avc_audit_post_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
* @avd: access vector decisions
* @result: result from avc_has_perm_noaudit
* @a: auxiliary audit data
* @flags: VFS walk flags
*
* Audit the granting or denial of permissions in accordance
* with the policy. This function is typically called by
@ -481,9 +482,10 @@ static void avc_audit_post_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
* be performed under a lock, to allow the lock to be released
* before calling the auditing code.
*/
void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 tclass, u32 requested,
struct av_decision *avd, int result, struct common_audit_data *a)
struct av_decision *avd, int result, struct common_audit_data *a,
unsigned flags)
{
struct common_audit_data stack_data;
u32 denied, audited;
@ -515,11 +517,24 @@ void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
else
audited = requested & avd->auditallow;
if (!audited)
return;
return 0;
if (!a) {
a = &stack_data;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(a, NONE);
}
/*
* When in a RCU walk do the audit on the RCU retry. This is because
* the collection of the dname in an inode audit message is not RCU
* safe. Note this may drop some audits when the situation changes
* during retry. However this is logically just as if the operation
* happened a little later.
*/
if ((a->type == LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS) &&
(flags & IPERM_FLAG_RCU))
return -ECHILD;
a->selinux_audit_data.tclass = tclass;
a->selinux_audit_data.requested = requested;
a->selinux_audit_data.ssid = ssid;
@ -529,6 +544,7 @@ void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
a->lsm_pre_audit = avc_audit_pre_callback;
a->lsm_post_audit = avc_audit_post_callback;
common_lsm_audit(a);
return 0;
}
/**
@ -793,6 +809,7 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
* @tclass: target security class
* @requested: requested permissions, interpreted based on @tclass
* @auditdata: auxiliary audit data
* @flags: VFS walk flags
*
* Check the AVC to determine whether the @requested permissions are granted
* for the SID pair (@ssid, @tsid), interpreting the permissions
@ -802,14 +819,19 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
* permissions are granted, -%EACCES if any permissions are denied, or
* another -errno upon other errors.
*/
int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
u32 requested, struct common_audit_data *auditdata)
int avc_has_perm_flags(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
u32 requested, struct common_audit_data *auditdata,
unsigned flags)
{
struct av_decision avd;
int rc;
int rc, rc2;
rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, 0, &avd);
avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc, auditdata);
rc2 = avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc, auditdata,
flags);
if (rc2)
return rc2;
return rc;
}

View file

@ -1446,8 +1446,11 @@ static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
}
rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT)
avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) {
int rc2 = avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad, 0);
if (rc2)
return rc2;
}
return rc;
}
@ -1467,7 +1470,8 @@ static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
struct inode *inode,
u32 perms,
struct common_audit_data *adp)
struct common_audit_data *adp,
unsigned flags)
{
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
struct common_audit_data ad;
@ -1487,7 +1491,7 @@ static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
}
return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
return avc_has_perm_flags(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp, flags);
}
/* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
@ -1504,7 +1508,7 @@ static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
}
/* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
@ -1540,7 +1544,7 @@ static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
/* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
rc = 0;
if (av)
rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
out:
return rc;
@ -1574,7 +1578,8 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
return rc;
if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass, NULL, &newsid);
rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
&dentry->d_name, &newsid);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
@ -2103,7 +2108,7 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
file = file_priv->file;
inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
if (inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL, 0)) {
drop_tty = 1;
}
}
@ -2635,7 +2640,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *na
return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
}
static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, unsigned flags)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
struct common_audit_data ad;
@ -2657,7 +2662,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, perms, &ad);
return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, perms, &ad, flags);
}
static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
@ -3205,7 +3210,7 @@ static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
* new inode label or new policy.
* This check is not redundant - do not remove.
*/
return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), NULL);
return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), NULL, 0);
}
/* task security operations */

View file

@ -54,11 +54,11 @@ struct avc_cache_stats {
void __init avc_init(void);
void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 tclass, u32 requested,
struct av_decision *avd,
int result,
struct common_audit_data *a);
struct common_audit_data *a, unsigned flags);
#define AVC_STRICT 1 /* Ignore permissive mode. */
int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
@ -66,9 +66,17 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
unsigned flags,
struct av_decision *avd);
int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 tclass, u32 requested,
struct common_audit_data *auditdata);
int avc_has_perm_flags(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 tclass, u32 requested,
struct common_audit_data *auditdata,
unsigned);
static inline int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 tclass, u32 requested,
struct common_audit_data *auditdata)
{
return avc_has_perm_flags(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, auditdata, 0);
}
u32 avc_policy_seqno(void);

View file

@ -502,7 +502,7 @@ static int policydb_index(struct policydb *p)
goto out;
rc = flex_array_prealloc(p->type_val_to_struct_array, 0,
p->p_types.nprim - 1, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
p->p_types.nprim, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
if (rc)
goto out;
@ -519,7 +519,7 @@ static int policydb_index(struct policydb *p)
goto out;
rc = flex_array_prealloc(p->sym_val_to_name[i],
0, p->symtab[i].nprim - 1,
0, p->symtab[i].nprim,
GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
if (rc)
goto out;
@ -1819,8 +1819,6 @@ static int filename_trans_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
goto out;
nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
printk(KERN_ERR "%s: nel=%d\n", __func__, nel);
last = p->filename_trans;
while (last && last->next)
last = last->next;
@ -1857,8 +1855,6 @@ static int filename_trans_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
goto out;
name[len] = 0;
printk(KERN_ERR "%s: ft=%p ft->name=%p ft->name=%s\n", __func__, ft, ft->name, ft->name);
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 4);
if (rc)
goto out;
@ -2375,7 +2371,7 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
goto bad;
/* preallocate so we don't have to worry about the put ever failing */
rc = flex_array_prealloc(p->type_attr_map_array, 0, p->p_types.nprim - 1,
rc = flex_array_prealloc(p->type_attr_map_array, 0, p->p_types.nprim,
GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
if (rc)
goto bad;

View file

@ -686,7 +686,7 @@ static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode,
*
* Returns 0 if access is permitted, -EACCES otherwise
*/
static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, unsigned flags)
{
struct smk_audit_info ad;
@ -696,6 +696,10 @@ static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
*/
if (mask == 0)
return 0;
/* May be droppable after audit */
if (flags & IPERM_FLAG_RCU)
return -ECHILD;
smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, inode);
return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), mask, &ad);