sunrpc: use constant time memory comparison for mac

Otherwise, we enable a MAC forgery via timing attack.

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <[email protected]>
Cc: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
Cc: Anna Schumaker <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <[email protected]>
This commit is contained in:
Jason A. Donenfeld 2017-06-10 04:59:07 +02:00 • committed by Anna Schumaker
commit 15a8b93fd5

View file

@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
* WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
*/
#include <crypto/algapi.h>
#include <crypto/hash.h>
#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
@ -927,7 +928,7 @@ gss_krb5_aes_decrypt(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset, struct xdr_buf *buf,
if (ret)
goto out_err;
if (memcmp(pkt_hmac, our_hmac, kctx->gk5e->cksumlength) != 0) {
if (crypto_memneq(pkt_hmac, our_hmac, kctx->gk5e->cksumlength) != 0) {
ret = GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
goto out_err;
}