Merge "Merge android11-5.4.210+ (7e6cbbe) into msm-5.4"

This commit is contained in:
qctecmdr 2022-10-21 08:03:20 -07:00 • committed by Gerrit - the friendly Code Review server
commit 37d1d82783
921 changed files with 111103 additions and 105226 deletions

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@ -107,13 +107,14 @@ Description:
described in ATA8 7.16 and 7.17. Only valid if
the device is not a PM.
pio_mode: (RO) Transfer modes supported by the device when
in PIO mode. Mostly used by PATA device.
pio_mode: (RO) PIO transfer mode used by the device.
Mostly used by PATA devices.
xfer_mode: (RO) Current transfer mode
xfer_mode: (RO) Current transfer mode. Mostly used by
PATA devices.
dma_mode: (RO) Transfer modes supported by the device when
in DMA mode. Mostly used by PATA device.
dma_mode: (RO) DMA transfer mode used by the device.
Mostly used by PATA devices.
class: (RO) Device class. Can be "ata" for disk,
"atapi" for packet device, "pmp" for PM, or

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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
What: /sys/bus/iio/devices/iio:deviceX/conversion_mode
What: /sys/bus/iio/devices/iio:deviceX/in_conversion_mode
KernelVersion: 4.2
Contact: linux-iio@vger.kernel.org
Description:

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@ -489,6 +489,7 @@ What: /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/itlb_multihit
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mmio_stale_data
Date: January 2018
Contact: Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Description: Information about CPU vulnerabilities

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@ -15,3 +15,4 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
tsx_async_abort
multihit.rst
special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst
processor_mmio_stale_data.rst

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@ -0,0 +1,246 @@
=========================================
Processor MMIO Stale Data Vulnerabilities
=========================================
Processor MMIO Stale Data Vulnerabilities are a class of memory-mapped I/O
(MMIO) vulnerabilities that can expose data. The sequences of operations for
exposing data range from simple to very complex. Because most of the
vulnerabilities require the attacker to have access to MMIO, many environments
are not affected. System environments using virtualization where MMIO access is
provided to untrusted guests may need mitigation. These vulnerabilities are
not transient execution attacks. However, these vulnerabilities may propagate
stale data into core fill buffers where the data can subsequently be inferred
by an unmitigated transient execution attack. Mitigation for these
vulnerabilities includes a combination of microcode update and software
changes, depending on the platform and usage model. Some of these mitigations
are similar to those used to mitigate Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) or
those used to mitigate Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS).
Data Propagators
================
Propagators are operations that result in stale data being copied or moved from
one microarchitectural buffer or register to another. Processor MMIO Stale Data
Vulnerabilities are operations that may result in stale data being directly
read into an architectural, software-visible state or sampled from a buffer or
register.
Fill Buffer Stale Data Propagator (FBSDP)
-----------------------------------------
Stale data may propagate from fill buffers (FB) into the non-coherent portion
of the uncore on some non-coherent writes. Fill buffer propagation by itself
does not make stale data architecturally visible. Stale data must be propagated
to a location where it is subject to reading or sampling.
Sideband Stale Data Propagator (SSDP)
-------------------------------------
The sideband stale data propagator (SSDP) is limited to the client (including
Intel Xeon server E3) uncore implementation. The sideband response buffer is
shared by all client cores. For non-coherent reads that go to sideband
destinations, the uncore logic returns 64 bytes of data to the core, including
both requested data and unrequested stale data, from a transaction buffer and
the sideband response buffer. As a result, stale data from the sideband
response and transaction buffers may now reside in a core fill buffer.
Primary Stale Data Propagator (PSDP)
------------------------------------
The primary stale data propagator (PSDP) is limited to the client (including
Intel Xeon server E3) uncore implementation. Similar to the sideband response
buffer, the primary response buffer is shared by all client cores. For some
processors, MMIO primary reads will return 64 bytes of data to the core fill
buffer including both requested data and unrequested stale data. This is
similar to the sideband stale data propagator.
Vulnerabilities
===============
Device Register Partial Write (DRPW) (CVE-2022-21166)
-----------------------------------------------------
Some endpoint MMIO registers incorrectly handle writes that are smaller than
the register size. Instead of aborting the write or only copying the correct
subset of bytes (for example, 2 bytes for a 2-byte write), more bytes than
specified by the write transaction may be written to the register. On
processors affected by FBSDP, this may expose stale data from the fill buffers
of the core that created the write transaction.
Shared Buffers Data Sampling (SBDS) (CVE-2022-21125)
----------------------------------------------------
After propagators may have moved data around the uncore and copied stale data
into client core fill buffers, processors affected by MFBDS can leak data from
the fill buffer. It is limited to the client (including Intel Xeon server E3)
uncore implementation.
Shared Buffers Data Read (SBDR) (CVE-2022-21123)
------------------------------------------------
It is similar to Shared Buffer Data Sampling (SBDS) except that the data is
directly read into the architectural software-visible state. It is limited to
the client (including Intel Xeon server E3) uncore implementation.
Affected Processors
===================
Not all the CPUs are affected by all the variants. For instance, most
processors for the server market (excluding Intel Xeon E3 processors) are
impacted by only Device Register Partial Write (DRPW).
Below is the list of affected Intel processors [#f1]_:
=================== ============ =========
Common name Family_Model Steppings
=================== ============ =========
HASWELL_X 06_3FH 2,4
SKYLAKE_L 06_4EH 3
BROADWELL_X 06_4FH All
SKYLAKE_X 06_55H 3,4,6,7,11
BROADWELL_D 06_56H 3,4,5
SKYLAKE 06_5EH 3
ICELAKE_X 06_6AH 4,5,6
ICELAKE_D 06_6CH 1
ICELAKE_L 06_7EH 5
ATOM_TREMONT_D 06_86H All
LAKEFIELD 06_8AH 1
KABYLAKE_L 06_8EH 9 to 12
ATOM_TREMONT 06_96H 1
ATOM_TREMONT_L 06_9CH 0
KABYLAKE 06_9EH 9 to 13
COMETLAKE 06_A5H 2,3,5
COMETLAKE_L 06_A6H 0,1
ROCKETLAKE 06_A7H 1
=================== ============ =========
If a CPU is in the affected processor list, but not affected by a variant, it
is indicated by new bits in MSR IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES. As described in a later
section, mitigation largely remains the same for all the variants, i.e. to
clear the CPU fill buffers via VERW instruction.
New bits in MSRs
================
Newer processors and microcode update on existing affected processors added new
bits to IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR. These bits can be used to enumerate
specific variants of Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities and mitigation
capability.
MSR IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES
--------------------------
Bit 13 - SBDR_SSDP_NO - When set, processor is not affected by either the
Shared Buffers Data Read (SBDR) vulnerability or the sideband stale
data propagator (SSDP).
Bit 14 - FBSDP_NO - When set, processor is not affected by the Fill Buffer
Stale Data Propagator (FBSDP).
Bit 15 - PSDP_NO - When set, processor is not affected by Primary Stale Data
Propagator (PSDP).
Bit 17 - FB_CLEAR - When set, VERW instruction will overwrite CPU fill buffer
values as part of MD_CLEAR operations. Processors that do not
enumerate MDS_NO (meaning they are affected by MDS) but that do
enumerate support for both L1D_FLUSH and MD_CLEAR implicitly enumerate
FB_CLEAR as part of their MD_CLEAR support.
Bit 18 - FB_CLEAR_CTRL - Processor supports read and write to MSR
IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL[FB_CLEAR_DIS]. On such processors, the FB_CLEAR_DIS
bit can be set to cause the VERW instruction to not perform the
FB_CLEAR action. Not all processors that support FB_CLEAR will support
FB_CLEAR_CTRL.
MSR IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL
---------------------
Bit 3 - FB_CLEAR_DIS - When set, VERW instruction does not perform the FB_CLEAR
action. This may be useful to reduce the performance impact of FB_CLEAR in
cases where system software deems it warranted (for example, when performance
is more critical, or the untrusted software has no MMIO access). Note that
FB_CLEAR_DIS has no impact on enumeration (for example, it does not change
FB_CLEAR or MD_CLEAR enumeration) and it may not be supported on all processors
that enumerate FB_CLEAR.
Mitigation
==========
Like MDS, all variants of Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities have the
same mitigation strategy to force the CPU to clear the affected buffers before
an attacker can extract the secrets.
This is achieved by using the otherwise unused and obsolete VERW instruction in
combination with a microcode update. The microcode clears the affected CPU
buffers when the VERW instruction is executed.
Kernel reuses the MDS function to invoke the buffer clearing:
mds_clear_cpu_buffers()
On MDS affected CPUs, the kernel already invokes CPU buffer clear on
kernel/userspace, hypervisor/guest and C-state (idle) transitions. No
additional mitigation is needed on such CPUs.
For CPUs not affected by MDS or TAA, mitigation is needed only for the attacker
with MMIO capability. Therefore, VERW is not required for kernel/userspace. For
virtualization case, VERW is only needed at VMENTER for a guest with MMIO
capability.
Mitigation points
-----------------
Return to user space
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Same mitigation as MDS when affected by MDS/TAA, otherwise no mitigation
needed.
C-State transition
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Control register writes by CPU during C-state transition can propagate data
from fill buffer to uncore buffers. Execute VERW before C-state transition to
clear CPU fill buffers.
Guest entry point
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Same mitigation as MDS when processor is also affected by MDS/TAA, otherwise
execute VERW at VMENTER only for MMIO capable guests. On CPUs not affected by
MDS/TAA, guest without MMIO access cannot extract secrets using Processor MMIO
Stale Data vulnerabilities, so there is no need to execute VERW for such guests.
Mitigation control on the kernel command line
---------------------------------------------
The kernel command line allows to control the Processor MMIO Stale Data
mitigations at boot time with the option "mmio_stale_data=". The valid
arguments for this option are:
========== =================================================================
full If the CPU is vulnerable, enable mitigation; CPU buffer clearing
on exit to userspace and when entering a VM. Idle transitions are
protected as well. It does not automatically disable SMT.
full,nosmt Same as full, with SMT disabled on vulnerable CPUs. This is the
complete mitigation.
off Disables mitigation completely.
========== =================================================================
If the CPU is affected and mmio_stale_data=off is not supplied on the kernel
command line, then the kernel selects the appropriate mitigation.
Mitigation status information
-----------------------------
The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current
vulnerability status of the system: whether the system is vulnerable, and
which mitigations are active. The relevant sysfs file is:
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mmio_stale_data
The possible values in this file are:
.. list-table::
* - 'Not affected'
- The processor is not vulnerable
* - 'Vulnerable'
- The processor is vulnerable, but no mitigation enabled
* - 'Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode'
- The processor is vulnerable, but microcode is not updated. The
mitigation is enabled on a best effort basis.
* - 'Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers'
- The processor is vulnerable and the CPU buffer clearing mitigation is
enabled.
If the processor is vulnerable then the following information is appended to
the above information:
======================== ===========================================
'SMT vulnerable' SMT is enabled
'SMT disabled' SMT is disabled
'SMT Host state unknown' Kernel runs in a VM, Host SMT state unknown
======================== ===========================================
References
----------
.. [#f1] Affected Processors
https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/topic-technology/software-security-guidance/processors-affected-consolidated-product-cpu-model.html

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@ -422,6 +422,14 @@ The possible values in this file are:
'RSB filling' Protection of RSB on context switch enabled
============= ===========================================
- EIBRS Post-barrier Return Stack Buffer (PBRSB) protection status:
=========================== =======================================================
'PBRSB-eIBRS: SW sequence' CPU is affected and protection of RSB on VMEXIT enabled
'PBRSB-eIBRS: Vulnerable' CPU is vulnerable
'PBRSB-eIBRS: Not affected' CPU is not affected by PBRSB
=========================== =======================================================
Full mitigation might require a microcode update from the CPU
vendor. When the necessary microcode is not available, the kernel will
report vulnerability.

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@ -2690,6 +2690,7 @@
kvm.nx_huge_pages=off [X86]
no_entry_flush [PPC]
no_uaccess_flush [PPC]
mmio_stale_data=off [X86]
Exceptions:
This does not have any effect on
@ -2711,6 +2712,7 @@
Equivalent to: l1tf=flush,nosmt [X86]
mds=full,nosmt [X86]
tsx_async_abort=full,nosmt [X86]
mmio_stale_data=full,nosmt [X86]
mminit_loglevel=
[KNL] When CONFIG_DEBUG_MEMORY_INIT is set, this
@ -2720,6 +2722,40 @@
log everything. Information is printed at KERN_DEBUG
so loglevel=8 may also need to be specified.
mmio_stale_data=
[X86,INTEL] Control mitigation for the Processor
MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities.
Processor MMIO Stale Data is a class of
vulnerabilities that may expose data after an MMIO
operation. Exposed data could originate or end in
the same CPU buffers as affected by MDS and TAA.
Therefore, similar to MDS and TAA, the mitigation
is to clear the affected CPU buffers.
This parameter controls the mitigation. The
options are:
full - Enable mitigation on vulnerable CPUs
full,nosmt - Enable mitigation and disable SMT on
vulnerable CPUs.
off - Unconditionally disable mitigation
On MDS or TAA affected machines,
mmio_stale_data=off can be prevented by an active
MDS or TAA mitigation as these vulnerabilities are
mitigated with the same mechanism so in order to
disable this mitigation, you need to specify
mds=off and tsx_async_abort=off too.
Not specifying this option is equivalent to
mmio_stale_data=full.
For details see:
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst
module.sig_enforce
[KNL] When CONFIG_MODULE_SIG is set, this means that
modules without (valid) signatures will fail to load.
@ -3821,6 +3857,12 @@
fully seed the kernel's CRNG. Default is controlled
by CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU.
random.trust_bootloader={on,off}
[KNL] Enable or disable trusting the use of a
seed passed by the bootloader (if available) to
fully seed the kernel's CRNG. Default is controlled
by CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER.
ras=option[,option,...] [KNL] RAS-specific options
cec_disable [X86]

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@ -862,9 +862,40 @@ The kernel command line parameter printk.devkmsg= overrides this and is
a one-time setting until next reboot: once set, it cannot be changed by
this sysctl interface anymore.
pty
===
randomize_va_space:
===================
See Documentation/filesystems/devpts.rst.
random
======
This is a directory, with the following entries:
* ``boot_id``: a UUID generated the first time this is retrieved, and
unvarying after that;
* ``uuid``: a UUID generated every time this is retrieved (this can
thus be used to generate UUIDs at will);
* ``entropy_avail``: the pool's entropy count, in bits;
* ``poolsize``: the entropy pool size, in bits;
* ``urandom_min_reseed_secs``: obsolete (used to determine the minimum
number of seconds between urandom pool reseeding). This file is
writable for compatibility purposes, but writing to it has no effect
on any RNG behavior;
* ``write_wakeup_threshold``: when the entropy count drops below this
(as a number of bits), processes waiting to write to ``/dev/random``
are woken up. This file is writable for compatibility purposes, but
writing to it has no effect on any RNG behavior.
randomize_va_space
==================
This option can be used to select the type of process address
space randomization that is used in the system, for architectures

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@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ finally:
#
# This is also used if you do content translation via gettext catalogs.
# Usually you set "language" from the command line for these cases.
language = None
language = 'en'
# There are two options for replacing |today|: either, you set today to some
# non-false value, then it is used:

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@ -876,7 +876,7 @@ cipso_cache_enable - BOOLEAN
cipso_cache_bucket_size - INTEGER
The CIPSO label cache consists of a fixed size hash table with each
hash bucket containing a number of cache entries. This variable limits
the number of entries in each hash bucket; the larger the value the
the number of entries in each hash bucket; the larger the value is, the
more CIPSO label mappings that can be cached. When the number of
entries in a given hash bucket reaches this limit adding new entries
causes the oldest entry in the bucket to be removed to make room.
@ -966,7 +966,7 @@ ip_nonlocal_bind - BOOLEAN
which can be quite useful - but may break some applications.
Default: 0
ip_dynaddr - BOOLEAN
ip_dynaddr - INTEGER
If set non-zero, enables support for dynamic addresses.
If set to a non-zero value larger than 1, a kernel log
message will be printed when dynamic address rewriting
@ -2297,7 +2297,14 @@ sctp_rmem - vector of 3 INTEGERs: min, default, max
Default: 4K
sctp_wmem - vector of 3 INTEGERs: min, default, max
Currently this tunable has no effect.
Only the first value ("min") is used, "default" and "max" are
ignored.
min: Minimum size of send buffer that can be used by SCTP sockets.
It is guaranteed to each SCTP socket (but not association) even
under moderate memory pressure.
Default: 4K
addr_scope_policy - INTEGER
Control IPv4 address scoping - draft-stewart-tsvwg-sctp-ipv4-00

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@ -13647,6 +13647,7 @@ F: arch/mips/configs/generic/board-ranchu.config
RANDOM NUMBER DRIVER
M: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
M: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
S: Maintained
F: drivers/char/random.c

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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
VERSION = 5
PATCHLEVEL = 4
SUBLEVEL = 197
SUBLEVEL = 210
EXTRAVERSION =
NAME = Kleptomaniac Octopus
@ -1162,7 +1162,7 @@ PHONY += autoksyms_recursive
ifdef CONFIG_TRIM_UNUSED_KSYMS
autoksyms_recursive: descend modules.order
$(Q)$(CONFIG_SHELL) $(srctree)/scripts/adjust_autoksyms.sh \
"$(MAKE) -f $(srctree)/Makefile vmlinux"
"$(MAKE) -f $(srctree)/Makefile autoksyms_recursive"
endif
# For the kernel to actually contain only the needed exported symbols,

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@ -1 +1 @@
LTS_5.4.197_26eb689452c8
LTS_5.4.210_7e6cbbe7e59a

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load diff

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@ -227,6 +227,7 @@
ktime_get_mono_fast_ns
__list_add_valid
__list_del_entry_valid
__local_bh_enable_ip
mbox_client_txdone
mbox_free_channel
mbox_request_channel
@ -366,8 +367,7 @@
_raw_spin_unlock_irq
_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore
rdev_get_drvdata
refcount_dec_and_test_checked
refcount_inc_checked
refcount_warn_saturate
register_reboot_notifier
__register_rpmsg_driver
regmap_bulk_read
@ -584,7 +584,6 @@
__kfifo_free
kmalloc_order_trace
ktime_get_with_offset
__local_bh_enable_ip
memmove
param_ops_ulong
pskb_expand_head
@ -1129,8 +1128,9 @@
usb_create_hcd
# required by phy-qcom-qmp.ko
of_clk_get_by_name
devm_get_clk_from_child
__of_reset_control_get
reset_control_put
# required by phy-qcom-qusb2.ko
devm_nvmem_cell_get
@ -1307,7 +1307,6 @@
_raw_write_lock_bh
_raw_write_unlock_bh
refcount_dec_and_mutex_lock
refcount_dec_checked
release_sock
rtnl_is_locked
rtnl_register_module

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@ -1943,6 +1943,7 @@
refcount_dec_not_one
refcount_inc_checked
refcount_inc_not_zero_checked
refcount_warn_saturate
__refrigerator
regcache_cache_bypass
regcache_cache_only

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@ -1021,27 +1021,6 @@ config STRICT_MODULE_RWX
config ARCH_HAS_PHYS_TO_DMA
bool
config ARCH_HAS_REFCOUNT
bool
help
An architecture selects this when it has implemented refcount_t
using open coded assembly primitives that provide an optimized
refcount_t implementation, possibly at the expense of some full
refcount state checks of CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL=y.
The refcount overflow check behavior, however, must be retained.
Catching overflows is the primary security concern for protecting
against bugs in reference counts.
config REFCOUNT_FULL
bool "Perform full reference count validation at the expense of speed"
help
Enabling this switches the refcounting infrastructure from a fast
unchecked atomic_t implementation to a fully state checked
implementation, which can be (slightly) slower but provides protections
against various use-after-free conditions that can be used in
security flaw exploits.
config HAVE_ARCH_COMPILER_H
bool
help

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@ -28,5 +28,6 @@ static inline cycles_t get_cycles (void)
__asm__ __volatile__ ("rpcc %0" : "=r"(ret));
return ret;
}
#define get_cycles get_cycles
#endif

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@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ srmcons_do_receive_chars(struct tty_port *port)
} while((result.bits.status & 1) && (++loops < 10));
if (count)
tty_schedule_flip(port);
tty_flip_buffer_push(port);
return count;
}

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@ -120,7 +120,6 @@ config ARM
select OLD_SIGSUSPEND3
select PCI_SYSCALL if PCI
select PERF_USE_VMALLOC
select REFCOUNT_FULL
select RTC_LIB
select SYS_SUPPORTS_APM_EMULATION
select IOMMU_DMA if IOMMU_SUPPORT

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@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
* size immediately following the kernel, we could build this into
* a binary blob, and concatenate the zImage using the cat command.
*/
.section .start,#alloc,#execinstr
.section .start, "ax"
.type _start, #function
.globl _start

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@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
* Author: Nicolas Pitre
*/
.section ".start", #alloc, #execinstr
.section ".start", "ax"
mrc p15, 0, r0, c1, c0, 0 @ read control reg
orr r0, r0, #(1 << 7) @ enable big endian mode

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@ -140,7 +140,7 @@
#endif
.endm
.section ".start", #alloc, #execinstr
.section ".start", "ax"
/*
* sort out different calling conventions
*/
@ -1274,7 +1274,7 @@ iflush:
__armv5tej_mmu_cache_flush:
tst r4, #1
movne pc, lr
1: mrc p15, 0, r15, c7, c14, 3 @ test,clean,invalidate D cache
1: mrc p15, 0, APSR_nzcv, c7, c14, 3 @ test,clean,invalidate D cache
bne 1b
mcr p15, 0, r0, c7, c5, 0 @ flush I cache
mcr p15, 0, r0, c7, c10, 4 @ drain WB

View file

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
.section .piggydata,#alloc
.section .piggydata, "a"
.globl input_data
input_data:
.incbin "arch/arm/boot/compressed/piggy_data"

View file

@ -53,18 +53,17 @@
"GPIO18",
"NC", /* GPIO19 */
"NC", /* GPIO20 */
"GPIO21",
"CAM_GPIO0",
"GPIO22",
"GPIO23",
"GPIO24",
"GPIO25",
"NC", /* GPIO26 */
"CAM_GPIO0",
/* Binary number representing build/revision */
"CONFIG0",
"CONFIG1",
"CONFIG2",
"CONFIG3",
"GPIO27",
"GPIO28",
"GPIO29",
"GPIO30",
"GPIO31",
"NC", /* GPIO32 */
"NC", /* GPIO33 */
"NC", /* GPIO34 */

View file

@ -74,16 +74,18 @@
"GPIO27",
"SDA0",
"SCL0",
"NC", /* GPIO30 */
"NC", /* GPIO31 */
"NC", /* GPIO32 */
"NC", /* GPIO33 */
"NC", /* GPIO34 */
"NC", /* GPIO35 */
"NC", /* GPIO36 */
"NC", /* GPIO37 */
"NC", /* GPIO38 */
"NC", /* GPIO39 */
/* Used by BT module */
"CTS0",
"RTS0",
"TXD0",
"RXD0",
/* Used by Wifi */
"SD1_CLK",
"SD1_CMD",
"SD1_DATA0",
"SD1_DATA1",
"SD1_DATA2",
"SD1_DATA3",
"CAM_GPIO1", /* GPIO40 */
"WL_ON", /* GPIO41 */
"NC", /* GPIO42 */

View file

@ -43,7 +43,7 @@
#gpio-cells = <2>;
gpio-line-names = "BT_ON",
"WL_ON",
"STATUS_LED_R",
"PWR_LED_R",
"LAN_RUN",
"",
"CAM_GPIO0",

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@ -63,8 +63,8 @@
"GPIO43",
"GPIO44",
"GPIO45",
"GPIO46",
"GPIO47",
"SMPS_SCL",
"SMPS_SDA",
/* Used by eMMC */
"SD_CLK_R",
"SD_CMD_R",

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@ -128,7 +128,7 @@
samsung,i2c-max-bus-freq = <20000>;
eeprom@50 {
compatible = "samsung,s524ad0xd1";
compatible = "samsung,s524ad0xd1", "atmel,24c128";
reg = <0x50>;
};
@ -287,7 +287,7 @@
samsung,i2c-max-bus-freq = <20000>;
eeprom@51 {
compatible = "samsung,s524ad0xd1";
compatible = "samsung,s524ad0xd1", "atmel,24c128";
reg = <0x51>;
};

View file

@ -226,7 +226,7 @@
reg = <0x28>;
#gpio-cells = <2>;
gpio-controller;
ngpio = <32>;
ngpios = <62>;
};
sgtl5000: codec@a {

View file

@ -766,7 +766,7 @@
regulator-name = "vddpu";
regulator-min-microvolt = <725000>;
regulator-max-microvolt = <1450000>;
regulator-enable-ramp-delay = <150>;
regulator-enable-ramp-delay = <380>;
anatop-reg-offset = <0x140>;
anatop-vol-bit-shift = <9>;
anatop-vol-bit-width = <5>;

View file

@ -287,7 +287,7 @@
clocks = <&armclk>;
};
gic: gic@1000 {
gic: interrupt-controller@1000 {
compatible = "arm,arm11mp-gic";
interrupt-controller;
#interrupt-cells = <3>;

View file

@ -933,7 +933,7 @@
clocks = <&pmc PMC_TYPE_PERIPHERAL 55>, <&pmc PMC_TYPE_GCK 55>;
clock-names = "pclk", "gclk";
assigned-clocks = <&pmc PMC_TYPE_CORE PMC_I2S1_MUX>;
assigned-parrents = <&pmc PMC_TYPE_GCK 55>;
assigned-clock-parents = <&pmc PMC_TYPE_GCK 55>;
status = "disabled";
};

View file

@ -515,7 +515,7 @@
compatible = "st,stm32-cec";
reg = <0x40016000 0x400>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 94 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
clocks = <&rcc CEC_K>, <&clk_lse>;
clocks = <&rcc CEC_K>, <&rcc CEC>;
clock-names = "cec", "hdmi-cec";
status = "disabled";
};

View file

@ -169,7 +169,7 @@
flash@0 {
#address-cells = <1>;
#size-cells = <1>;
compatible = "mxicy,mx25l1606e", "winbond,w25q128";
compatible = "mxicy,mx25l1606e", "jedec,spi-nor";
reg = <0>;
spi-max-frequency = <40000000>;
};

View file

@ -104,8 +104,10 @@
wdt: watchdog@1c20ca0 {
compatible = "allwinner,suniv-f1c100s-wdt",
"allwinner,sun4i-a10-wdt";
"allwinner,sun6i-a31-wdt";
reg = <0x01c20ca0 0x20>;
interrupts = <16>;
clocks = <&osc32k>;
};
uart0: serial@1c25000 {

View file

@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ config CRYPTO_SHA1_ARM_NEON
config CRYPTO_SHA1_ARM_CE
tristate "SHA1 digest algorithm (ARM v8 Crypto Extensions)"
depends on KERNEL_MODE_NEON
depends on KERNEL_MODE_NEON && (CC_IS_CLANG || GCC_VERSION >= 40800)
select CRYPTO_SHA1_ARM
select CRYPTO_HASH
help
@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ config CRYPTO_SHA1_ARM_CE
config CRYPTO_SHA2_ARM_CE
tristate "SHA-224/256 digest algorithm (ARM v8 Crypto Extensions)"
depends on KERNEL_MODE_NEON
depends on KERNEL_MODE_NEON && (CC_IS_CLANG || GCC_VERSION >= 40800)
select CRYPTO_SHA256_ARM
select CRYPTO_HASH
help
@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ config CRYPTO_AES_ARM_BS
config CRYPTO_AES_ARM_CE
tristate "Accelerated AES using ARMv8 Crypto Extensions"
depends on KERNEL_MODE_NEON
depends on KERNEL_MODE_NEON && (CC_IS_CLANG || GCC_VERSION >= 40800)
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
select CRYPTO_LIB_AES
select CRYPTO_SIMD
@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ config CRYPTO_AES_ARM_CE
config CRYPTO_GHASH_ARM_CE
tristate "PMULL-accelerated GHASH using NEON/ARMv8 Crypto Extensions"
depends on KERNEL_MODE_NEON
depends on KERNEL_MODE_NEON && (CC_IS_CLANG || GCC_VERSION >= 40800)
select CRYPTO_HASH
select CRYPTO_CRYPTD
select CRYPTO_GF128MUL
@ -137,12 +137,14 @@ config CRYPTO_GHASH_ARM_CE
config CRYPTO_CRCT10DIF_ARM_CE
tristate "CRCT10DIF digest algorithm using PMULL instructions"
depends on KERNEL_MODE_NEON && CRC_T10DIF
depends on KERNEL_MODE_NEON && (CC_IS_CLANG || GCC_VERSION >= 40800)
depends on CRC_T10DIF
select CRYPTO_HASH
config CRYPTO_CRC32_ARM_CE
tristate "CRC32(C) digest algorithm using CRC and/or PMULL instructions"
depends on KERNEL_MODE_NEON && CRC32
depends on KERNEL_MODE_NEON && (CC_IS_CLANG || GCC_VERSION >= 40800)
depends on CRC32
select CRYPTO_HASH
config CRYPTO_CHACHA20_NEON

View file

@ -10,36 +10,17 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA1_ARM_NEON) += sha1-arm-neon.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA256_ARM) += sha256-arm.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA512_ARM) += sha512-arm.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_ARM) += blake2s-arm.o
obj-$(if $(CONFIG_CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_ARM),y) += libblake2s-arm.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_BLAKE2B_NEON) += blake2b-neon.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CHACHA20_NEON) += chacha-neon.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_NHPOLY1305_NEON) += nhpoly1305-neon.o
ce-obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_AES_ARM_CE) += aes-arm-ce.o
ce-obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA1_ARM_CE) += sha1-arm-ce.o
ce-obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA2_ARM_CE) += sha2-arm-ce.o
ce-obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_GHASH_ARM_CE) += ghash-arm-ce.o
ce-obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CRCT10DIF_ARM_CE) += crct10dif-arm-ce.o
crc-obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CRC32_ARM_CE) += crc32-arm-ce.o
ifneq ($(crc-obj-y)$(crc-obj-m),)
ifeq ($(call as-instr,.arch armv8-a\n.arch_extension crc,y,n),y)
ce-obj-y += $(crc-obj-y)
ce-obj-m += $(crc-obj-m)
else
$(warning These CRC Extensions modules need binutils 2.23 or higher)
$(warning $(crc-obj-y) $(crc-obj-m))
endif
endif
ifneq ($(ce-obj-y)$(ce-obj-m),)
ifeq ($(call as-instr,.fpu crypto-neon-fp-armv8,y,n),y)
obj-y += $(ce-obj-y)
obj-m += $(ce-obj-m)
else
$(warning These ARMv8 Crypto Extensions modules need binutils 2.23 or higher)
$(warning $(ce-obj-y) $(ce-obj-m))
endif
endif
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_AES_ARM_CE) += aes-arm-ce.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA1_ARM_CE) += sha1-arm-ce.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA2_ARM_CE) += sha2-arm-ce.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_GHASH_ARM_CE) += ghash-arm-ce.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CRCT10DIF_ARM_CE) += crct10dif-arm-ce.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CRC32_ARM_CE) += crc32-arm-ce.o
aes-arm-y := aes-cipher-core.o aes-cipher-glue.o
aes-arm-bs-y := aes-neonbs-core.o aes-neonbs-glue.o
@ -49,7 +30,8 @@ sha256-arm-neon-$(CONFIG_KERNEL_MODE_NEON) := sha256_neon_glue.o
sha256-arm-y := sha256-core.o sha256_glue.o $(sha256-arm-neon-y)
sha512-arm-neon-$(CONFIG_KERNEL_MODE_NEON) := sha512-neon-glue.o
sha512-arm-y := sha512-core.o sha512-glue.o $(sha512-arm-neon-y)
blake2s-arm-y := blake2s-core.o blake2s-glue.o
blake2s-arm-y := blake2s-shash.o
libblake2s-arm-y:= blake2s-core.o blake2s-glue.o
blake2b-neon-y := blake2b-neon-core.o blake2b-neon-glue.o
sha1-arm-ce-y := sha1-ce-core.o sha1-ce-glue.o
sha2-arm-ce-y := sha2-ce-core.o sha2-ce-glue.o

View file

@ -167,8 +167,8 @@
.endm
//
// void blake2s_compress_arch(struct blake2s_state *state,
// const u8 *block, size_t nblocks, u32 inc);
// void blake2s_compress(struct blake2s_state *state,
// const u8 *block, size_t nblocks, u32 inc);
//
// Only the first three fields of struct blake2s_state are used:
// u32 h[8]; (inout)
@ -176,7 +176,7 @@
// u32 f[2]; (in)
//
.align 5
ENTRY(blake2s_compress_arch)
ENTRY(blake2s_compress)
push {r0-r2,r4-r11,lr} // keep this an even number
.Lnext_block:
@ -303,4 +303,4 @@ ENTRY(blake2s_compress_arch)
str r3, [r12], #4
bne 1b
b .Lcopy_block_done
ENDPROC(blake2s_compress_arch)
ENDPROC(blake2s_compress)

View file

@ -1,78 +1,7 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
/*
* BLAKE2s digest algorithm, ARM scalar implementation
*
* Copyright 2020 Google LLC
*/
#include <crypto/internal/blake2s.h>
#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
/* defined in blake2s-core.S */
EXPORT_SYMBOL(blake2s_compress_arch);
static int crypto_blake2s_update_arm(struct shash_desc *desc,
const u8 *in, unsigned int inlen)
{
return crypto_blake2s_update(desc, in, inlen, blake2s_compress_arch);
}
static int crypto_blake2s_final_arm(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
{
return crypto_blake2s_final(desc, out, blake2s_compress_arch);
}
#define BLAKE2S_ALG(name, driver_name, digest_size) \
{ \
.base.cra_name = name, \
.base.cra_driver_name = driver_name, \
.base.cra_priority = 200, \
.base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY, \
.base.cra_blocksize = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE, \
.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct blake2s_tfm_ctx), \
.base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, \
.digestsize = digest_size, \
.setkey = crypto_blake2s_setkey, \
.init = crypto_blake2s_init, \
.update = crypto_blake2s_update_arm, \
.final = crypto_blake2s_final_arm, \
.descsize = sizeof(struct blake2s_state), \
}
static struct shash_alg blake2s_arm_algs[] = {
BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-128", "blake2s-128-arm", BLAKE2S_128_HASH_SIZE),
BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-160", "blake2s-160-arm", BLAKE2S_160_HASH_SIZE),
BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-224", "blake2s-224-arm", BLAKE2S_224_HASH_SIZE),
BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-256", "blake2s-256-arm", BLAKE2S_256_HASH_SIZE),
};
static int __init blake2s_arm_mod_init(void)
{
return IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH) ?
crypto_register_shashes(blake2s_arm_algs,
ARRAY_SIZE(blake2s_arm_algs)) : 0;
}
static void __exit blake2s_arm_mod_exit(void)
{
if (IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH))
crypto_unregister_shashes(blake2s_arm_algs,
ARRAY_SIZE(blake2s_arm_algs));
}
module_init(blake2s_arm_mod_init);
module_exit(blake2s_arm_mod_exit);
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("BLAKE2s digest algorithm, ARM scalar implementation");
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
MODULE_AUTHOR("Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-128");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-128-arm");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-160");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-160-arm");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-224");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-224-arm");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-256");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-256-arm");
EXPORT_SYMBOL(blake2s_compress);

View file

@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
/*
* BLAKE2s digest algorithm, ARM scalar implementation
*
* Copyright 2020 Google LLC
*/
#include <crypto/internal/blake2s.h>
#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
static int crypto_blake2s_update_arm(struct shash_desc *desc,
const u8 *in, unsigned int inlen)
{
return crypto_blake2s_update(desc, in, inlen, false);
}
static int crypto_blake2s_final_arm(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
{
return crypto_blake2s_final(desc, out, false);
}
#define BLAKE2S_ALG(name, driver_name, digest_size) \
{ \
.base.cra_name = name, \
.base.cra_driver_name = driver_name, \
.base.cra_priority = 200, \
.base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY, \
.base.cra_blocksize = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE, \
.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct blake2s_tfm_ctx), \
.base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, \
.digestsize = digest_size, \
.setkey = crypto_blake2s_setkey, \
.init = crypto_blake2s_init, \
.update = crypto_blake2s_update_arm, \
.final = crypto_blake2s_final_arm, \
.descsize = sizeof(struct blake2s_state), \
}
static struct shash_alg blake2s_arm_algs[] = {
BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-128", "blake2s-128-arm", BLAKE2S_128_HASH_SIZE),
BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-160", "blake2s-160-arm", BLAKE2S_160_HASH_SIZE),
BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-224", "blake2s-224-arm", BLAKE2S_224_HASH_SIZE),
BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-256", "blake2s-256-arm", BLAKE2S_256_HASH_SIZE),
};
static int __init blake2s_arm_mod_init(void)
{
return IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH) ?
crypto_register_shashes(blake2s_arm_algs,
ARRAY_SIZE(blake2s_arm_algs)) : 0;
}
static void __exit blake2s_arm_mod_exit(void)
{
if (IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH))
crypto_unregister_shashes(blake2s_arm_algs,
ARRAY_SIZE(blake2s_arm_algs));
}
module_init(blake2s_arm_mod_init);
module_exit(blake2s_arm_mod_exit);
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("BLAKE2s digest algorithm, ARM scalar implementation");
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
MODULE_AUTHOR("Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-128");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-128-arm");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-160");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-160-arm");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-224");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-224-arm");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-256");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-256-arm");

View file

@ -72,7 +72,7 @@
#endif
.text
.arch armv7-a
.arch armv8-a
.fpu crypto-neon-fp-armv8
init_crc .req r0

View file

@ -8,6 +8,9 @@
#include <linux/linkage.h>
#include <asm/assembler.h>
.arch armv8-a
.fpu crypto-neon-fp-armv8
SHASH .req q0
T1 .req q1
XL .req q2
@ -88,7 +91,6 @@
T3_H .req d17
.text
.fpu crypto-neon-fp-armv8
.macro __pmull_p64, rd, rn, rm, b1, b2, b3, b4
vmull.p64 \rd, \rn, \rm

View file

@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#include <asm/assembler.h>
.text
.arch armv8-a
.fpu crypto-neon-fp-armv8
k0 .req q0

View file

@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#include <asm/assembler.h>
.text
.arch armv8-a
.fpu crypto-neon-fp-armv8
k0 .req q7

View file

@ -175,7 +175,6 @@ $code=<<___;
#else
.syntax unified
# ifdef __thumb2__
# define adrl adr
.thumb
# else
.code 32
@ -471,7 +470,8 @@ sha256_block_data_order_neon:
stmdb sp!,{r4-r12,lr}
sub $H,sp,#16*4+16
adrl $Ktbl,K256
adr $Ktbl,.Lsha256_block_data_order
sub $Ktbl,$Ktbl,#.Lsha256_block_data_order-K256
bic $H,$H,#15 @ align for 128-bit stores
mov $t2,sp
mov sp,$H @ alloca

View file

@ -56,7 +56,6 @@
#else
.syntax unified
# ifdef __thumb2__
# define adrl adr
.thumb
# else
.code 32
@ -1885,7 +1884,8 @@ sha256_block_data_order_neon:
stmdb sp!,{r4-r12,lr}
sub r11,sp,#16*4+16
adrl r14,K256
adr r14,.Lsha256_block_data_order
sub r14,r14,#.Lsha256_block_data_order-K256
bic r11,r11,#15 @ align for 128-bit stores
mov r12,sp
mov sp,r11 @ alloca

View file

@ -212,7 +212,6 @@ $code=<<___;
#else
.syntax unified
# ifdef __thumb2__
# define adrl adr
.thumb
# else
.code 32
@ -602,7 +601,8 @@ sha512_block_data_order_neon:
dmb @ errata #451034 on early Cortex A8
add $len,$inp,$len,lsl#7 @ len to point at the end of inp
VFP_ABI_PUSH
adrl $Ktbl,K512
adr $Ktbl,.Lsha512_block_data_order
sub $Ktbl,$Ktbl,.Lsha512_block_data_order-K512
vldmia $ctx,{$A-$H} @ load context
.Loop_neon:
___

View file

@ -79,7 +79,6 @@
#else
.syntax unified
# ifdef __thumb2__
# define adrl adr
.thumb
# else
.code 32
@ -543,7 +542,8 @@ sha512_block_data_order_neon:
dmb @ errata #451034 on early Cortex A8
add r2,r1,r2,lsl#7 @ len to point at the end of inp
VFP_ABI_PUSH
adrl r3,K512
adr r3,.Lsha512_block_data_order
sub r3,r3,.Lsha512_block_data_order-K512
vldmia r0,{d16-d23} @ load context
.Loop_neon:
vshr.u64 d24,d20,#14 @ 0

View file

@ -279,10 +279,9 @@
.endif ;\
.popsection
#define ALT_UP_B(label) \
.equ up_b_offset, label - 9998b ;\
.pushsection ".alt.smp.init", "a" ;\
.long 9998b ;\
W(b) . + up_b_offset ;\
W(b) . + (label - 9998b) ;\
.popsection
#else
#define ALT_SMP(instr...)

View file

@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ enum {
MT_HIGH_VECTORS,
MT_MEMORY_RWX,
MT_MEMORY_RW,
MT_MEMORY_RO,
MT_ROM,
MT_MEMORY_RWX_NONCACHED,
MT_MEMORY_RW_DTCM,

View file

@ -164,5 +164,31 @@ static inline unsigned long user_stack_pointer(struct pt_regs *regs)
((current_stack_pointer | (THREAD_SIZE - 1)) - 7) - 1; \
})
/*
* Update ITSTATE after normal execution of an IT block instruction.
*
* The 8 IT state bits are split into two parts in CPSR:
* ITSTATE<1:0> are in CPSR<26:25>
* ITSTATE<7:2> are in CPSR<15:10>
*/
static inline unsigned long it_advance(unsigned long cpsr)
{
if ((cpsr & 0x06000400) == 0) {
/* ITSTATE<2:0> == 0 means end of IT block, so clear IT state */
cpsr &= ~PSR_IT_MASK;
} else {
/* We need to shift left ITSTATE<4:0> */
const unsigned long mask = 0x06001c00; /* Mask ITSTATE<4:0> */
unsigned long it = cpsr & mask;
it <<= 1;
it |= it >> (27 - 10); /* Carry ITSTATE<2> to correct place */
it &= mask;
cpsr &= ~mask;
cpsr |= it;
}
return cpsr;
}
#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
#endif

View file

@ -11,5 +11,6 @@
typedef unsigned long cycles_t;
#define get_cycles() ({ cycles_t c; read_current_timer(&c) ? 0 : c; })
#define random_get_entropy() (((unsigned long)get_cycles()) ?: random_get_entropy_fallback())
#endif

View file

@ -19,23 +19,25 @@
@ read all the working registers back into the VFP
.macro VFPFLDMIA, base, tmp
.fpu vfpv2
#if __LINUX_ARM_ARCH__ < 6
LDC p11, cr0, [\base],#33*4 @ FLDMIAX \base!, {d0-d15}
fldmiax \base!, {d0-d15}
#else
LDC p11, cr0, [\base],#32*4 @ FLDMIAD \base!, {d0-d15}
vldmia \base!, {d0-d15}
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_VFPv3
.fpu vfpv3
#if __LINUX_ARM_ARCH__ <= 6
ldr \tmp, =elf_hwcap @ may not have MVFR regs
ldr \tmp, [\tmp, #0]
tst \tmp, #HWCAP_VFPD32
ldclne p11, cr0, [\base],#32*4 @ FLDMIAD \base!, {d16-d31}
vldmiane \base!, {d16-d31}
addeq \base, \base, #32*4 @ step over unused register space
#else
VFPFMRX \tmp, MVFR0 @ Media and VFP Feature Register 0
and \tmp, \tmp, #MVFR0_A_SIMD_MASK @ A_SIMD field
cmp \tmp, #2 @ 32 x 64bit registers?
ldcleq p11, cr0, [\base],#32*4 @ FLDMIAD \base!, {d16-d31}
vldmiaeq \base!, {d16-d31}
addne \base, \base, #32*4 @ step over unused register space
#endif
#endif
@ -44,22 +46,23 @@
@ write all the working registers out of the VFP
.macro VFPFSTMIA, base, tmp
#if __LINUX_ARM_ARCH__ < 6
STC p11, cr0, [\base],#33*4 @ FSTMIAX \base!, {d0-d15}
fstmiax \base!, {d0-d15}
#else
STC p11, cr0, [\base],#32*4 @ FSTMIAD \base!, {d0-d15}
vstmia \base!, {d0-d15}
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_VFPv3
.fpu vfpv3
#if __LINUX_ARM_ARCH__ <= 6
ldr \tmp, =elf_hwcap @ may not have MVFR regs
ldr \tmp, [\tmp, #0]
tst \tmp, #HWCAP_VFPD32
stclne p11, cr0, [\base],#32*4 @ FSTMIAD \base!, {d16-d31}
vstmiane \base!, {d16-d31}
addeq \base, \base, #32*4 @ step over unused register space
#else
VFPFMRX \tmp, MVFR0 @ Media and VFP Feature Register 0
and \tmp, \tmp, #MVFR0_A_SIMD_MASK @ A_SIMD field
cmp \tmp, #2 @ 32 x 64bit registers?
stcleq p11, cr0, [\base],#32*4 @ FSTMIAD \base!, {d16-d31}
vstmiaeq \base!, {d16-d31}
addne \base, \base, #32*4 @ step over unused register space
#endif
#endif

View file

@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#include <asm/thread_info.h>
#include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
#include <asm/assembler.h>
#include "iwmmxt.h"
#if defined(CONFIG_CPU_PJ4) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_PJ4B)
#define PJ4(code...) code
@ -113,33 +114,33 @@ concan_save:
concan_dump:
wstrw wCSSF, [r1, #MMX_WCSSF]
wstrw wCASF, [r1, #MMX_WCASF]
wstrw wCGR0, [r1, #MMX_WCGR0]
wstrw wCGR1, [r1, #MMX_WCGR1]
wstrw wCGR2, [r1, #MMX_WCGR2]
wstrw wCGR3, [r1, #MMX_WCGR3]
wstrw wCSSF, r1, MMX_WCSSF
wstrw wCASF, r1, MMX_WCASF
wstrw wCGR0, r1, MMX_WCGR0
wstrw wCGR1, r1, MMX_WCGR1
wstrw wCGR2, r1, MMX_WCGR2
wstrw wCGR3, r1, MMX_WCGR3
1: @ MUP? wRn
tst r2, #0x2
beq 2f
wstrd wR0, [r1, #MMX_WR0]
wstrd wR1, [r1, #MMX_WR1]
wstrd wR2, [r1, #MMX_WR2]
wstrd wR3, [r1, #MMX_WR3]
wstrd wR4, [r1, #MMX_WR4]
wstrd wR5, [r1, #MMX_WR5]
wstrd wR6, [r1, #MMX_WR6]
wstrd wR7, [r1, #MMX_WR7]
wstrd wR8, [r1, #MMX_WR8]
wstrd wR9, [r1, #MMX_WR9]
wstrd wR10, [r1, #MMX_WR10]
wstrd wR11, [r1, #MMX_WR11]
wstrd wR12, [r1, #MMX_WR12]
wstrd wR13, [r1, #MMX_WR13]
wstrd wR14, [r1, #MMX_WR14]
wstrd wR15, [r1, #MMX_WR15]
wstrd wR0, r1, MMX_WR0
wstrd wR1, r1, MMX_WR1
wstrd wR2, r1, MMX_WR2
wstrd wR3, r1, MMX_WR3
wstrd wR4, r1, MMX_WR4
wstrd wR5, r1, MMX_WR5
wstrd wR6, r1, MMX_WR6
wstrd wR7, r1, MMX_WR7
wstrd wR8, r1, MMX_WR8
wstrd wR9, r1, MMX_WR9
wstrd wR10, r1, MMX_WR10
wstrd wR11, r1, MMX_WR11
wstrd wR12, r1, MMX_WR12
wstrd wR13, r1, MMX_WR13
wstrd wR14, r1, MMX_WR14
wstrd wR15, r1, MMX_WR15
2: teq r0, #0 @ anything to load?
reteq lr @ if not, return
@ -147,30 +148,30 @@ concan_dump:
concan_load:
@ Load wRn
wldrd wR0, [r0, #MMX_WR0]
wldrd wR1, [r0, #MMX_WR1]
wldrd wR2, [r0, #MMX_WR2]
wldrd wR3, [r0, #MMX_WR3]
wldrd wR4, [r0, #MMX_WR4]
wldrd wR5, [r0, #MMX_WR5]
wldrd wR6, [r0, #MMX_WR6]
wldrd wR7, [r0, #MMX_WR7]
wldrd wR8, [r0, #MMX_WR8]
wldrd wR9, [r0, #MMX_WR9]
wldrd wR10, [r0, #MMX_WR10]
wldrd wR11, [r0, #MMX_WR11]
wldrd wR12, [r0, #MMX_WR12]
wldrd wR13, [r0, #MMX_WR13]
wldrd wR14, [r0, #MMX_WR14]
wldrd wR15, [r0, #MMX_WR15]
wldrd wR0, r0, MMX_WR0
wldrd wR1, r0, MMX_WR1
wldrd wR2, r0, MMX_WR2
wldrd wR3, r0, MMX_WR3
wldrd wR4, r0, MMX_WR4
wldrd wR5, r0, MMX_WR5
wldrd wR6, r0, MMX_WR6
wldrd wR7, r0, MMX_WR7
wldrd wR8, r0, MMX_WR8
wldrd wR9, r0, MMX_WR9
wldrd wR10, r0, MMX_WR10
wldrd wR11, r0, MMX_WR11
wldrd wR12, r0, MMX_WR12
wldrd wR13, r0, MMX_WR13
wldrd wR14, r0, MMX_WR14
wldrd wR15, r0, MMX_WR15
@ Load wCx
wldrw wCSSF, [r0, #MMX_WCSSF]
wldrw wCASF, [r0, #MMX_WCASF]
wldrw wCGR0, [r0, #MMX_WCGR0]
wldrw wCGR1, [r0, #MMX_WCGR1]
wldrw wCGR2, [r0, #MMX_WCGR2]
wldrw wCGR3, [r0, #MMX_WCGR3]
wldrw wCSSF, r0, MMX_WCSSF
wldrw wCASF, r0, MMX_WCASF
wldrw wCGR0, r0, MMX_WCGR0
wldrw wCGR1, r0, MMX_WCGR1
wldrw wCGR2, r0, MMX_WCGR2
wldrw wCGR3, r0, MMX_WCGR3
@ clear CUP/MUP (only if r1 != 0)
teq r1, #0

47
arch/arm/kernel/iwmmxt.h Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
#ifndef __IWMMXT_H__
#define __IWMMXT_H__
.irp b, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
.set .LwR\b, \b
.set .Lr\b, \b
.endr
.set .LwCSSF, 0x2
.set .LwCASF, 0x3
.set .LwCGR0, 0x8
.set .LwCGR1, 0x9
.set .LwCGR2, 0xa
.set .LwCGR3, 0xb
.macro wldrd, reg:req, base:req, offset:req
.inst 0xedd00100 | (.L\reg << 12) | (.L\base << 16) | (\offset >> 2)
.endm
.macro wldrw, reg:req, base:req, offset:req
.inst 0xfd900100 | (.L\reg << 12) | (.L\base << 16) | (\offset >> 2)
.endm
.macro wstrd, reg:req, base:req, offset:req
.inst 0xedc00100 | (.L\reg << 12) | (.L\base << 16) | (\offset >> 2)
.endm
.macro wstrw, reg:req, base:req, offset:req
.inst 0xfd800100 | (.L\reg << 12) | (.L\base << 16) | (\offset >> 2)
.endm
#ifdef __clang__
#define wCon c1
.macro tmrc, dest:req, control:req
mrc p1, 0, \dest, \control, c0, 0
.endm
.macro tmcr, control:req, src:req
mcr p1, 0, \src, \control, c0, 0
.endm
#endif
#endif

View file

@ -26,8 +26,9 @@ MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
* While older versions of GCC do not generate incorrect code, they fail to
* recognize the parallel nature of these functions, and emit plain ARM code,
* which is known to be slower than the optimized ARM code in asm-arm/xor.h.
*
* #warning This code requires at least version 4.6 of GCC
*/
#warning This code requires at least version 4.6 of GCC
#endif
#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wunused-variable"

View file

@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ static const struct wakeup_source_info ws_info[] = {
static const struct of_device_id sama5d2_ws_ids[] = {
{ .compatible = "atmel,sama5d2-gem", .data = &ws_info[0] },
{ .compatible = "atmel,at91rm9200-rtc", .data = &ws_info[1] },
{ .compatible = "atmel,sama5d2-rtc", .data = &ws_info[1] },
{ .compatible = "atmel,sama5d3-udc", .data = &ws_info[2] },
{ .compatible = "atmel,at91rm9200-ohci", .data = &ws_info[2] },
{ .compatible = "usb-ohci", .data = &ws_info[2] },
@ -114,12 +114,12 @@ static const struct of_device_id sama5d2_ws_ids[] = {
};
static const struct of_device_id sam9x60_ws_ids[] = {
{ .compatible = "atmel,at91sam9x5-rtc", .data = &ws_info[1] },
{ .compatible = "microchip,sam9x60-rtc", .data = &ws_info[1] },
{ .compatible = "atmel,at91rm9200-ohci", .data = &ws_info[2] },
{ .compatible = "usb-ohci", .data = &ws_info[2] },
{ .compatible = "atmel,at91sam9g45-ehci", .data = &ws_info[2] },
{ .compatible = "usb-ehci", .data = &ws_info[2] },
{ .compatible = "atmel,at91sam9260-rtt", .data = &ws_info[4] },
{ .compatible = "microchip,sam9x60-rtt", .data = &ws_info[4] },
{ .compatible = "cdns,sam9x60-macb", .data = &ws_info[5] },
{ /* sentinel */ }
};

View file

@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ static int axxia_boot_secondary(unsigned int cpu, struct task_struct *idle)
return -ENOENT;
syscon = of_iomap(syscon_np, 0);
of_node_put(syscon_np);
if (!syscon)
return -ENOMEM;

View file

@ -376,6 +376,7 @@ static void __init cns3xxx_init(void)
/* De-Asscer SATA Reset */
cns3xxx_pwr_soft_rst(CNS3XXX_PWR_SOFTWARE_RST(SATA));
}
of_node_put(dn);
dn = of_find_compatible_node(NULL, NULL, "cavium,cns3420-sdhci");
if (of_device_is_available(dn)) {
@ -389,6 +390,7 @@ static void __init cns3xxx_init(void)
cns3xxx_pwr_clk_en(CNS3XXX_PWR_CLK_EN(SDIO));
cns3xxx_pwr_soft_rst(CNS3XXX_PWR_SOFTWARE_RST(SDIO));
}
of_node_put(dn);
pm_power_off = cns3xxx_power_off;

View file

@ -136,6 +136,7 @@ static void exynos_map_pmu(void)
np = of_find_matching_node(NULL, exynos_dt_pmu_match);
if (np)
pmu_base_addr = of_iomap(np, 0);
of_node_put(np);
}
static void __init exynos_init_irq(void)

View file

@ -67,14 +67,17 @@ static void __init hi3xxx_smp_prepare_cpus(unsigned int max_cpus)
}
ctrl_base = of_iomap(np, 0);
if (!ctrl_base) {
of_node_put(np);
pr_err("failed to map address\n");
return;
}
if (of_property_read_u32(np, "smp-offset", &offset) < 0) {
of_node_put(np);
pr_err("failed to find smp-offset property\n");
return;
}
ctrl_base += offset;
of_node_put(np);
}
}
@ -160,6 +163,7 @@ static int hip01_boot_secondary(unsigned int cpu, struct task_struct *idle)
if (WARN_ON(!node))
return -1;
ctrl_base = of_iomap(node, 0);
of_node_put(node);
/* set the secondary core boot from DDR */
remap_reg_value = readl_relaxed(ctrl_base + REG_SC_CTRL);

View file

@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ config MACH_MT7623
config MACH_MT7629
bool "MediaTek MT7629 SoCs support"
default ARCH_MEDIATEK
select HAVE_ARM_ARCH_TIMER
config MACH_MT8127
bool "MediaTek MT8127 SoCs support"

View file

@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ static void __init meson_smp_prepare_cpus(const char *scu_compatible,
}
sram_base = of_iomap(node, 0);
of_node_put(node);
if (!sram_base) {
pr_err("Couldn't map SRAM registers\n");
return;
@ -91,6 +92,7 @@ static void __init meson_smp_prepare_cpus(const char *scu_compatible,
}
scu_base = of_iomap(node, 0);
of_node_put(node);
if (!scu_base) {
pr_err("Couldn't map SCU registers\n");
return;

View file

@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(clockfw_lock);
unsigned long omap1_uart_recalc(struct clk *clk)
{
unsigned int val = __raw_readl(clk->enable_reg);
return val & clk->enable_bit ? 48000000 : 12000000;
return val & 1 << clk->enable_bit ? 48000000 : 12000000;
}
unsigned long omap1_sossi_recalc(struct clk *clk)

View file

@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ ENTRY(enable_omap3630_toggle_l2_on_restore)
stmfd sp!, {lr} @ save registers on stack
/* Setup so that we will disable and enable l2 */
mov r1, #0x1
adrl r3, l2dis_3630_offset @ may be too distant for plain adr
adr r3, l2dis_3630_offset
ldr r2, [r3] @ value for offset
str r1, [r2, r3] @ write to l2dis_3630
ldmfd sp!, {pc} @ restore regs and return

View file

@ -355,13 +355,13 @@ static struct platform_device cm_x300_spi_gpio = {
static struct gpiod_lookup_table cm_x300_spi_gpiod_table = {
.dev_id = "spi_gpio",
.table = {
GPIO_LOOKUP("gpio-pxa", GPIO_LCD_SCL,
GPIO_LOOKUP("pca9555.1", GPIO_LCD_SCL - GPIO_LCD_BASE,
"sck", GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH),
GPIO_LOOKUP("gpio-pxa", GPIO_LCD_DIN,
GPIO_LOOKUP("pca9555.1", GPIO_LCD_DIN - GPIO_LCD_BASE,
"mosi", GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH),
GPIO_LOOKUP("gpio-pxa", GPIO_LCD_DOUT,
GPIO_LOOKUP("pca9555.1", GPIO_LCD_DOUT - GPIO_LCD_BASE,
"miso", GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH),
GPIO_LOOKUP("gpio-pxa", GPIO_LCD_CS,
GPIO_LOOKUP("pca9555.1", GPIO_LCD_CS - GPIO_LCD_BASE,
"cs", GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH),
{ },
},

View file

@ -675,7 +675,7 @@ static struct platform_device bq24022 = {
static struct gpiod_lookup_table bq24022_gpiod_table = {
.dev_id = "gpio-regulator",
.table = {
GPIO_LOOKUP("gpio-pxa", EGPIO_MAGICIAN_BQ24022_ISET2,
GPIO_LOOKUP("htc-egpio-0", EGPIO_MAGICIAN_BQ24022_ISET2 - MAGICIAN_EGPIO_BASE,
NULL, GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH),
GPIO_LOOKUP("gpio-pxa", GPIO30_MAGICIAN_BQ24022_nCHARGE_EN,
"enable", GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW),

View file

@ -295,9 +295,9 @@ static struct gpiod_lookup_table tosa_mci_gpio_table = {
.table = {
GPIO_LOOKUP("gpio-pxa", TOSA_GPIO_nSD_DETECT,
"cd", GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW),
GPIO_LOOKUP("gpio-pxa", TOSA_GPIO_SD_WP,
GPIO_LOOKUP("sharp-scoop.0", TOSA_GPIO_SD_WP - TOSA_SCOOP_GPIO_BASE,
"wp", GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW),
GPIO_LOOKUP("gpio-pxa", TOSA_GPIO_PWR_ON,
GPIO_LOOKUP("sharp-scoop.0", TOSA_GPIO_PWR_ON - TOSA_SCOOP_GPIO_BASE,
"power", GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH),
{ },
},

View file

@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ static int __init dcscb_init(void)
if (!node)
return -ENODEV;
dcscb_base = of_iomap(node, 0);
of_node_put(node);
if (!dcscb_base)
return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
cfg = readl_relaxed(dcscb_base + DCS_CFG_R);

View file

@ -935,6 +935,9 @@ do_alignment(unsigned long addr, unsigned int fsr, struct pt_regs *regs)
if (type == TYPE_LDST)
do_alignment_finish_ldst(addr, instr, regs, offset);
if (thumb_mode(regs))
regs->ARM_cpsr = it_advance(regs->ARM_cpsr);
return 0;
bad_or_fault:

View file

@ -316,6 +316,13 @@ static struct mem_type mem_types[] __ro_after_init = {
.prot_sect = PMD_TYPE_SECT | PMD_SECT_AP_WRITE,
.domain = DOMAIN_KERNEL,
},
[MT_MEMORY_RO] = {
.prot_pte = L_PTE_PRESENT | L_PTE_YOUNG | L_PTE_DIRTY |
L_PTE_XN | L_PTE_RDONLY,
.prot_l1 = PMD_TYPE_TABLE,
.prot_sect = PMD_TYPE_SECT,
.domain = DOMAIN_KERNEL,
},
[MT_ROM] = {
.prot_sect = PMD_TYPE_SECT,
.domain = DOMAIN_KERNEL,
@ -515,6 +522,7 @@ static void __init build_mem_type_table(void)
/* Also setup NX memory mapping */
mem_types[MT_MEMORY_RW].prot_sect |= PMD_SECT_XN;
mem_types[MT_MEMORY_RO].prot_sect |= PMD_SECT_XN;
}
if (cpu_arch >= CPU_ARCH_ARMv7 && (cr & CR_TRE)) {
/*
@ -597,6 +605,7 @@ static void __init build_mem_type_table(void)
mem_types[MT_ROM].prot_sect |= PMD_SECT_APX|PMD_SECT_AP_WRITE;
mem_types[MT_MINICLEAN].prot_sect |= PMD_SECT_APX|PMD_SECT_AP_WRITE;
mem_types[MT_CACHECLEAN].prot_sect |= PMD_SECT_APX|PMD_SECT_AP_WRITE;
mem_types[MT_MEMORY_RO].prot_sect |= PMD_SECT_APX|PMD_SECT_AP_WRITE;
#endif
/*
@ -617,6 +626,8 @@ static void __init build_mem_type_table(void)
mem_types[MT_MEMORY_RWX].prot_pte |= L_PTE_SHARED;
mem_types[MT_MEMORY_RW].prot_sect |= PMD_SECT_S;
mem_types[MT_MEMORY_RW].prot_pte |= L_PTE_SHARED;
mem_types[MT_MEMORY_RO].prot_sect |= PMD_SECT_S;
mem_types[MT_MEMORY_RO].prot_pte |= L_PTE_SHARED;
mem_types[MT_MEMORY_DMA_READY].prot_pte |= L_PTE_SHARED;
mem_types[MT_MEMORY_RWX_NONCACHED].prot_sect |= PMD_SECT_S;
mem_types[MT_MEMORY_RWX_NONCACHED].prot_pte |= L_PTE_SHARED;
@ -680,6 +691,8 @@ static void __init build_mem_type_table(void)
mem_types[MT_MEMORY_RWX].prot_pte |= kern_pgprot;
mem_types[MT_MEMORY_RW].prot_sect |= ecc_mask | cp->pmd;
mem_types[MT_MEMORY_RW].prot_pte |= kern_pgprot;
mem_types[MT_MEMORY_RO].prot_sect |= ecc_mask | cp->pmd;
mem_types[MT_MEMORY_RO].prot_pte |= kern_pgprot;
mem_types[MT_MEMORY_DMA_READY].prot_pte |= kern_pgprot;
mem_types[MT_MEMORY_RWX_NONCACHED].prot_sect |= ecc_mask;
mem_types[MT_ROM].prot_sect |= cp->pmd;
@ -1361,7 +1374,7 @@ static void __init devicemaps_init(const struct machine_desc *mdesc)
map.pfn = __phys_to_pfn(__atags_pointer & SECTION_MASK);
map.virtual = FDT_FIXED_BASE;
map.length = FDT_FIXED_SIZE;
map.type = MT_ROM;
map.type = MT_MEMORY_RO;
create_mapping(&map);
}

View file

@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ cpu_arm1020_name:
.align
.section ".proc.info.init", #alloc
.section ".proc.info.init", "a"
.type __arm1020_proc_info,#object
__arm1020_proc_info:

View file

@ -449,7 +449,7 @@ arm1020e_crval:
.align
.section ".proc.info.init", #alloc
.section ".proc.info.init", "a"
.type __arm1020e_proc_info,#object
__arm1020e_proc_info:

View file

@ -443,7 +443,7 @@ arm1022_crval:
.align
.section ".proc.info.init", #alloc
.section ".proc.info.init", "a"
.type __arm1022_proc_info,#object
__arm1022_proc_info:

View file

@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ ENTRY(arm1026_flush_kern_cache_all)
mov ip, #0
__flush_whole_cache:
#ifndef CONFIG_CPU_DCACHE_DISABLE
1: mrc p15, 0, r15, c7, c14, 3 @ test, clean, invalidate
1: mrc p15, 0, APSR_nzcv, c7, c14, 3 @ test, clean, invalidate
bne 1b
#endif
tst r2, #VM_EXEC
@ -363,7 +363,7 @@ ENTRY(cpu_arm1026_switch_mm)
#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
mov r1, #0
#ifndef CONFIG_CPU_DCACHE_DISABLE
1: mrc p15, 0, r15, c7, c14, 3 @ test, clean, invalidate
1: mrc p15, 0, APSR_nzcv, c7, c14, 3 @ test, clean, invalidate
bne 1b
#endif
#ifndef CONFIG_CPU_ICACHE_DISABLE
@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ arm1026_crval:
string cpu_arm1026_name, "ARM1026EJ-S"
.align
.section ".proc.info.init", #alloc
.section ".proc.info.init", "a"
.type __arm1026_proc_info,#object
__arm1026_proc_info:

View file

@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ arm720_crval:
* See <asm/procinfo.h> for a definition of this structure.
*/
.section ".proc.info.init", #alloc
.section ".proc.info.init", "a"
.macro arm720_proc_info name:req, cpu_val:req, cpu_mask:req, cpu_name:req, cpu_flush:req
.type __\name\()_proc_info,#object

View file

@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ __arm740_setup:
.align
.section ".proc.info.init", #alloc
.section ".proc.info.init", "a"
.type __arm740_proc_info,#object
__arm740_proc_info:
.long 0x41807400

View file

@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ __arm7tdmi_setup:
.align
.section ".proc.info.init", #alloc
.section ".proc.info.init", "a"
.macro arm7tdmi_proc_info name:req, cpu_val:req, cpu_mask:req, cpu_name:req, \
extra_hwcaps=0

View file

@ -434,7 +434,7 @@ arm920_crval:
.align
.section ".proc.info.init", #alloc
.section ".proc.info.init", "a"
.type __arm920_proc_info,#object
__arm920_proc_info:

View file

@ -412,7 +412,7 @@ arm922_crval:
.align
.section ".proc.info.init", #alloc
.section ".proc.info.init", "a"
.type __arm922_proc_info,#object
__arm922_proc_info:

View file

@ -477,7 +477,7 @@ arm925_crval:
.align
.section ".proc.info.init", #alloc
.section ".proc.info.init", "a"
.macro arm925_proc_info name:req, cpu_val:req, cpu_mask:req, cpu_name:req, cache
.type __\name\()_proc_info,#object

View file

@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ __flush_whole_cache:
#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_DCACHE_WRITETHROUGH
mcr p15, 0, ip, c7, c6, 0 @ invalidate D cache
#else
1: mrc p15, 0, r15, c7, c14, 3 @ test,clean,invalidate
1: mrc p15, 0, APSR_nzcv, c7, c14, 3 @ test,clean,invalidate
bne 1b
#endif
tst r2, #VM_EXEC
@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ ENTRY(cpu_arm926_switch_mm)
mcr p15, 0, ip, c7, c6, 0 @ invalidate D cache
#else
@ && 'Clean & Invalidate whole DCache'
1: mrc p15, 0, r15, c7, c14, 3 @ test,clean,invalidate
1: mrc p15, 0, APSR_nzcv, c7, c14, 3 @ test,clean,invalidate
bne 1b
#endif
mcr p15, 0, ip, c7, c5, 0 @ invalidate I cache
@ -460,7 +460,7 @@ arm926_crval:
.align
.section ".proc.info.init", #alloc
.section ".proc.info.init", "a"
.type __arm926_proc_info,#object
__arm926_proc_info:

View file

@ -340,7 +340,7 @@ __arm940_setup:
.align
.section ".proc.info.init", #alloc
.section ".proc.info.init", "a"
.type __arm940_proc_info,#object
__arm940_proc_info:

View file

@ -395,7 +395,7 @@ __arm946_setup:
.align
.section ".proc.info.init", #alloc
.section ".proc.info.init", "a"
.type __arm946_proc_info,#object
__arm946_proc_info:
.long 0x41009460

View file

@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ __arm9tdmi_setup:
.align
.section ".proc.info.init", #alloc
.section ".proc.info.init", "a"
.macro arm9tdmi_proc_info name:req, cpu_val:req, cpu_mask:req, cpu_name:req
.type __\name\()_proc_info, #object

View file

@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ fa526_cr1_set:
.align
.section ".proc.info.init", #alloc
.section ".proc.info.init", "a"
.type __fa526_proc_info,#object
__fa526_proc_info:

View file

@ -571,7 +571,7 @@ feroceon_crval:
.align
.section ".proc.info.init", #alloc
.section ".proc.info.init", "a"
.macro feroceon_proc_info name:req, cpu_val:req, cpu_mask:req, cpu_name:req, cache:req
.type __\name\()_proc_info,#object

View file

@ -416,7 +416,7 @@ mohawk_crval:
.align
.section ".proc.info.init", #alloc
.section ".proc.info.init", "a"
.type __88sv331x_proc_info,#object
__88sv331x_proc_info:

View file

@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ sa110_crval:
.align
.section ".proc.info.init", #alloc
.section ".proc.info.init", "a"
.type __sa110_proc_info,#object
__sa110_proc_info:

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@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ sa1100_crval:
.align
.section ".proc.info.init", #alloc
.section ".proc.info.init", "a"
.macro sa1100_proc_info name:req, cpu_val:req, cpu_mask:req, cpu_name:req
.type __\name\()_proc_info,#object

View file

@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ v6_crval:
string cpu_elf_name, "v6"
.align
.section ".proc.info.init", #alloc
.section ".proc.info.init", "a"
/*
* Match any ARMv6 processor core.

View file

@ -109,8 +109,7 @@ static unsigned int spectre_v2_install_workaround(unsigned int method)
#else
static unsigned int spectre_v2_install_workaround(unsigned int method)
{
pr_info("CPU%u: Spectre V2: workarounds disabled by configuration\n",
smp_processor_id());
pr_info_once("Spectre V2: workarounds disabled by configuration\n");
return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE;
}
@ -222,10 +221,10 @@ static int spectre_bhb_install_workaround(int method)
return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE;
spectre_bhb_method = method;
}
pr_info("CPU%u: Spectre BHB: using %s workaround\n",
smp_processor_id(), spectre_bhb_method_name(method));
pr_info("CPU%u: Spectre BHB: enabling %s workaround for all CPUs\n",
smp_processor_id(), spectre_bhb_method_name(method));
}
return SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
}

View file

@ -644,7 +644,7 @@ __v7_setup_stack:
string cpu_elf_name, "v7"
.align
.section ".proc.info.init", #alloc
.section ".proc.info.init", "a"
/*
* Standard v7 proc info content

View file

@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ ENTRY(cpu_cm7_proc_fin)
ret lr
ENDPROC(cpu_cm7_proc_fin)
.section ".init.text", #alloc, #execinstr
.section ".init.text", "ax"
__v7m_cm7_setup:
mov r8, #(V7M_SCB_CCR_DC | V7M_SCB_CCR_IC| V7M_SCB_CCR_BP)
@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ ENDPROC(__v7m_setup)
string cpu_elf_name "v7m"
string cpu_v7m_name "ARMv7-M"
.section ".proc.info.init", #alloc
.section ".proc.info.init", "a"
.macro __v7m_proc name, initfunc, cache_fns = nop_cache_fns, hwcaps = 0, proc_fns = v7m_processor_functions
.long 0 /* proc_info_list.__cpu_mm_mmu_flags */

View file

@ -496,7 +496,7 @@ xsc3_crval:
.align
.section ".proc.info.init", #alloc
.section ".proc.info.init", "a"
.macro xsc3_proc_info name:req, cpu_val:req, cpu_mask:req
.type __\name\()_proc_info,#object

View file

@ -610,7 +610,7 @@ xscale_crval:
.align
.section ".proc.info.init", #alloc
.section ".proc.info.init", "a"
.macro xscale_proc_info name:req, cpu_val:req, cpu_mask:req, cpu_name:req, cache
.type __\name\()_proc_info,#object

View file

@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/stddef.h>
#include <asm/probes.h>
#include <asm/ptrace.h>
#include <asm/kprobes.h>
void __init arm_probes_decode_init(void);
@ -35,31 +36,6 @@ void __init find_str_pc_offset(void);
#endif
/*
* Update ITSTATE after normal execution of an IT block instruction.
*
* The 8 IT state bits are split into two parts in CPSR:
* ITSTATE<1:0> are in CPSR<26:25>
* ITSTATE<7:2> are in CPSR<15:10>
*/
static inline unsigned long it_advance(unsigned long cpsr)
{
if ((cpsr & 0x06000400) == 0) {
/* ITSTATE<2:0> == 0 means end of IT block, so clear IT state */
cpsr &= ~PSR_IT_MASK;
} else {
/* We need to shift left ITSTATE<4:0> */
const unsigned long mask = 0x06001c00; /* Mask ITSTATE<4:0> */
unsigned long it = cpsr & mask;
it <<= 1;
it |= it >> (27 - 10); /* Carry ITSTATE<2> to correct place */
it &= mask;
cpsr &= ~mask;
cpsr |= it;
}
return cpsr;
}
static inline void __kprobes bx_write_pc(long pcv, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
long cpsr = regs->ARM_cpsr;

View file

@ -8,6 +8,4 @@
# ccflags-y := -DDEBUG
# asflags-y := -DDEBUG
KBUILD_AFLAGS :=$(KBUILD_AFLAGS:-msoft-float=-Wa,-mfpu=softvfp+vfp -mfloat-abi=soft)
obj-y += vfpmodule.o entry.o vfphw.o vfpsingle.o vfpdouble.o

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