From aabba1b100751ac54da34c313784abb141dbf73b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Erik Ekman Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2020 20:51:18 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 01/68] USB: serial: qcserial: add EM7305 QDL product ID commit d2a4309c1ab6df424b2239fe2920d6f26f808d17 upstream. When running qmi-firmware-update on the Sierra Wireless EM7305 in a Toshiba laptop, it changed product ID to 0x9062 when entering QDL mode: usb 2-4: new high-speed USB device number 78 using xhci_hcd usb 2-4: New USB device found, idVendor=1199, idProduct=9062, bcdDevice= 0.00 usb 2-4: New USB device strings: Mfr=1, Product=2, SerialNumber=0 usb 2-4: Product: EM7305 usb 2-4: Manufacturer: Sierra Wireless, Incorporated The upgrade could complete after running # echo 1199 9062 > /sys/bus/usb-serial/drivers/qcserial/new_id qcserial 2-4:1.0: Qualcomm USB modem converter detected usb 2-4: Qualcomm USB modem converter now attached to ttyUSB0 Signed-off-by: Erik Ekman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200717185118.3640219-1-erik@kryo.se Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/serial/qcserial.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/qcserial.c b/drivers/usb/serial/qcserial.c index d147feae83e6..0f60363c1bbc 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/serial/qcserial.c +++ b/drivers/usb/serial/qcserial.c @@ -155,6 +155,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id id_table[] = { {DEVICE_SWI(0x1199, 0x9056)}, /* Sierra Wireless Modem */ {DEVICE_SWI(0x1199, 0x9060)}, /* Sierra Wireless Modem */ {DEVICE_SWI(0x1199, 0x9061)}, /* Sierra Wireless Modem */ + {DEVICE_SWI(0x1199, 0x9062)}, /* Sierra Wireless EM7305 QDL */ {DEVICE_SWI(0x1199, 0x9063)}, /* Sierra Wireless EM7305 */ {DEVICE_SWI(0x1199, 0x9070)}, /* Sierra Wireless MC74xx */ {DEVICE_SWI(0x1199, 0x9071)}, /* Sierra Wireless MC74xx */ From 68a2350376b137f98f41a4f153c416282a16531e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Thu, 5 Mar 2020 13:38:51 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 02/68] perf/core: Fix endless multiplex timer commit 90c91dfb86d0ff545bd329d3ddd72c147e2ae198 upstream. Kan and Andi reported that we fail to kill rotation when the flexible events go empty, but the context does not. XXX moar Fixes: fd7d55172d1e ("perf/cgroups: Don't rotate events for cgroups unnecessarily") Reported-by: Andi Kleen Reported-by: Kan Liang Tested-by: Kan Liang Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200305123851.GX2596@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net Cc: Robin Murphy Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- kernel/events/core.c | 20 ++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c index aaaf50b25cc9..db1f5aa755f2 100644 --- a/kernel/events/core.c +++ b/kernel/events/core.c @@ -2171,6 +2171,7 @@ __perf_remove_from_context(struct perf_event *event, if (!ctx->nr_events && ctx->is_active) { ctx->is_active = 0; + ctx->rotate_necessary = 0; if (ctx->task) { WARN_ON_ONCE(cpuctx->task_ctx != ctx); cpuctx->task_ctx = NULL; @@ -3047,12 +3048,6 @@ static void ctx_sched_out(struct perf_event_context *ctx, if (!ctx->nr_active || !(is_active & EVENT_ALL)) return; - /* - * If we had been multiplexing, no rotations are necessary, now no events - * are active. - */ - ctx->rotate_necessary = 0; - perf_pmu_disable(ctx->pmu); if (is_active & EVENT_PINNED) { list_for_each_entry_safe(event, tmp, &ctx->pinned_active, active_list) @@ -3062,6 +3057,13 @@ static void ctx_sched_out(struct perf_event_context *ctx, if (is_active & EVENT_FLEXIBLE) { list_for_each_entry_safe(event, tmp, &ctx->flexible_active, active_list) group_sched_out(event, cpuctx, ctx); + + /* + * Since we cleared EVENT_FLEXIBLE, also clear + * rotate_necessary, is will be reset by + * ctx_flexible_sched_in() when needed. + */ + ctx->rotate_necessary = 0; } perf_pmu_enable(ctx->pmu); } @@ -3800,6 +3802,12 @@ ctx_event_to_rotate(struct perf_event_context *ctx) typeof(*event), group_node); } + /* + * Unconditionally clear rotate_necessary; if ctx_flexible_sched_in() + * finds there are unschedulable events, it will set it again. + */ + ctx->rotate_necessary = 0; + return event; } From 7173ac5c07bb59d9e2bd153a3ffcdf3ae0cffad8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Sun, 26 Jul 2020 11:49:39 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 03/68] USB: iowarrior: fix up report size handling for some devices commit 17a82716587e9d7c3b246a789add490b2b5dcab6 upstream. In previous patches that added support for new iowarrior devices, the handling of the report size was not done correct. Fix that up and update the copyright date for the driver Reworked from an original patch written by Christoph Jung. Fixes: bab5417f5f01 ("USB: misc: iowarrior: add support for the 100 device") Fixes: 5f6f8da2d7b5 ("USB: misc: iowarrior: add support for the 28 and 28L devices") Fixes: 461d8deb26a7 ("USB: misc: iowarrior: add support for 2 OEMed devices") Cc: stable Reported-by: Christoph Jung Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200726094939.1268978-1-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/misc/iowarrior.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/misc/iowarrior.c b/drivers/usb/misc/iowarrior.c index dce20301e367..103c69c692ba 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/misc/iowarrior.c +++ b/drivers/usb/misc/iowarrior.c @@ -2,8 +2,9 @@ /* * Native support for the I/O-Warrior USB devices * - * Copyright (c) 2003-2005 Code Mercenaries GmbH - * written by Christian Lucht + * Copyright (c) 2003-2005, 2020 Code Mercenaries GmbH + * written by Christian Lucht and + * Christoph Jung * * based on @@ -802,14 +803,28 @@ static int iowarrior_probe(struct usb_interface *interface, /* we have to check the report_size often, so remember it in the endianness suitable for our machine */ dev->report_size = usb_endpoint_maxp(dev->int_in_endpoint); - if ((dev->interface->cur_altsetting->desc.bInterfaceNumber == 0) && - ((dev->product_id == USB_DEVICE_ID_CODEMERCS_IOW56) || - (dev->product_id == USB_DEVICE_ID_CODEMERCS_IOW56AM) || - (dev->product_id == USB_DEVICE_ID_CODEMERCS_IOW28) || - (dev->product_id == USB_DEVICE_ID_CODEMERCS_IOW28L) || - (dev->product_id == USB_DEVICE_ID_CODEMERCS_IOW100))) - /* IOWarrior56 has wMaxPacketSize different from report size */ - dev->report_size = 7; + + /* + * Some devices need the report size to be different than the + * endpoint size. + */ + if (dev->interface->cur_altsetting->desc.bInterfaceNumber == 0) { + switch (dev->product_id) { + case USB_DEVICE_ID_CODEMERCS_IOW56: + case USB_DEVICE_ID_CODEMERCS_IOW56AM: + dev->report_size = 7; + break; + + case USB_DEVICE_ID_CODEMERCS_IOW28: + case USB_DEVICE_ID_CODEMERCS_IOW28L: + dev->report_size = 4; + break; + + case USB_DEVICE_ID_CODEMERCS_IOW100: + dev->report_size = 13; + break; + } + } /* create the urb and buffer for reading */ dev->int_in_urb = usb_alloc_urb(0, GFP_KERNEL); From e7ad225ba4ef39d1a8c52db511ac59806b13aa86 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Forest Crossman Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2020 23:24:07 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 04/68] usb: xhci: define IDs for various ASMedia host controllers commit 1841cb255da41e87bed9573915891d056f80e2e7 upstream. Not all ASMedia host controllers have a device ID that matches its part number. #define some of these IDs to make it clearer at a glance which chips require what quirks. Acked-by: Mathias Nyman Signed-off-by: Forest Crossman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200728042408.180529-2-cyrozap@gmail.com Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/host/xhci-pci.c | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-pci.c b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-pci.c index 07741ab9a46a..204c5a82a3c0 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-pci.c +++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-pci.c @@ -55,7 +55,9 @@ #define PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_PROMONTORYA_3 0x43ba #define PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_PROMONTORYA_2 0x43bb #define PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_PROMONTORYA_1 0x43bc +#define PCI_DEVICE_ID_ASMEDIA_1042_XHCI 0x1042 #define PCI_DEVICE_ID_ASMEDIA_1042A_XHCI 0x1142 +#define PCI_DEVICE_ID_ASMEDIA_2142_XHCI 0x2142 static const char hcd_name[] = "xhci_hcd"; @@ -245,13 +247,13 @@ static void xhci_pci_quirks(struct device *dev, struct xhci_hcd *xhci) xhci->quirks |= XHCI_BROKEN_STREAMS; if (pdev->vendor == PCI_VENDOR_ID_ASMEDIA && - pdev->device == 0x1042) + pdev->device == PCI_DEVICE_ID_ASMEDIA_1042_XHCI) xhci->quirks |= XHCI_BROKEN_STREAMS; if (pdev->vendor == PCI_VENDOR_ID_ASMEDIA && - pdev->device == 0x1142) + pdev->device == PCI_DEVICE_ID_ASMEDIA_1042A_XHCI) xhci->quirks |= XHCI_TRUST_TX_LENGTH; if (pdev->vendor == PCI_VENDOR_ID_ASMEDIA && - pdev->device == 0x2142) + pdev->device == PCI_DEVICE_ID_ASMEDIA_2142_XHCI) xhci->quirks |= XHCI_NO_64BIT_SUPPORT; if (pdev->vendor == PCI_VENDOR_ID_ASMEDIA && From 67afa25456d01f6e53c57a75e0242bb21ce9e649 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Forest Crossman Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2020 23:24:08 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 05/68] usb: xhci: Fix ASMedia ASM1142 DMA addressing commit ec37198acca7b4c17b96247697406e47aafe0605 upstream. I've confirmed that the ASMedia ASM1142 has the same problem as the ASM2142/ASM3142, in that it too reports that it supports 64-bit DMA addresses when in fact it does not. As with the ASM2142/ASM3142, this can cause problems on systems where the upper bits matter, and adding the XHCI_NO_64BIT_SUPPORT quirk completely fixes the issue. Acked-by: Mathias Nyman Signed-off-by: Forest Crossman Cc: stable Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200728042408.180529-3-cyrozap@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/host/xhci-pci.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-pci.c b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-pci.c index 204c5a82a3c0..bbd616324faa 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-pci.c +++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-pci.c @@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ #define PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_PROMONTORYA_1 0x43bc #define PCI_DEVICE_ID_ASMEDIA_1042_XHCI 0x1042 #define PCI_DEVICE_ID_ASMEDIA_1042A_XHCI 0x1142 +#define PCI_DEVICE_ID_ASMEDIA_1142_XHCI 0x1242 #define PCI_DEVICE_ID_ASMEDIA_2142_XHCI 0x2142 static const char hcd_name[] = "xhci_hcd"; @@ -253,7 +254,8 @@ static void xhci_pci_quirks(struct device *dev, struct xhci_hcd *xhci) pdev->device == PCI_DEVICE_ID_ASMEDIA_1042A_XHCI) xhci->quirks |= XHCI_TRUST_TX_LENGTH; if (pdev->vendor == PCI_VENDOR_ID_ASMEDIA && - pdev->device == PCI_DEVICE_ID_ASMEDIA_2142_XHCI) + (pdev->device == PCI_DEVICE_ID_ASMEDIA_1142_XHCI || + pdev->device == PCI_DEVICE_ID_ASMEDIA_2142_XHCI)) xhci->quirks |= XHCI_NO_64BIT_SUPPORT; if (pdev->vendor == PCI_VENDOR_ID_ASMEDIA && From a4d61e66ee4a66cca7c94d41fab474cd554edda7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jens Axboe Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2020 12:34:09 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 06/68] io_uring: prevent re-read of sqe->opcode Liu reports that he can trigger a NULL pointer dereference with IORING_OP_SENDMSG, by changing the sqe->opcode after we've validated that the previous opcode didn't need a file and didn't assign one. Ensure we validate and read the opcode only once. Reported-by: Liu Yong Tested-by: Liu Yong Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/io_uring.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++------------------------------ 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c index e0200406765c..8bb5e19b7c3c 100644 --- a/fs/io_uring.c +++ b/fs/io_uring.c @@ -279,6 +279,7 @@ struct sqe_submit { bool has_user; bool needs_lock; bool needs_fixed_file; + u8 opcode; }; /* @@ -505,7 +506,7 @@ static inline void io_queue_async_work(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, int rw = 0; if (req->submit.sqe) { - switch (req->submit.sqe->opcode) { + switch (req->submit.opcode) { case IORING_OP_WRITEV: case IORING_OP_WRITE_FIXED: rw = !(req->rw.ki_flags & IOCB_DIRECT); @@ -1254,23 +1255,15 @@ static int io_import_fixed(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, int rw, } static ssize_t io_import_iovec(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, int rw, - const struct sqe_submit *s, struct iovec **iovec, + struct io_kiocb *req, struct iovec **iovec, struct iov_iter *iter) { - const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe = s->sqe; + const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe = req->submit.sqe; void __user *buf = u64_to_user_ptr(READ_ONCE(sqe->addr)); size_t sqe_len = READ_ONCE(sqe->len); u8 opcode; - /* - * We're reading ->opcode for the second time, but the first read - * doesn't care whether it's _FIXED or not, so it doesn't matter - * whether ->opcode changes concurrently. The first read does care - * about whether it is a READ or a WRITE, so we don't trust this read - * for that purpose and instead let the caller pass in the read/write - * flag. - */ - opcode = READ_ONCE(sqe->opcode); + opcode = req->submit.opcode; if (opcode == IORING_OP_READ_FIXED || opcode == IORING_OP_WRITE_FIXED) { ssize_t ret = io_import_fixed(ctx, rw, sqe, iter); @@ -1278,7 +1271,7 @@ static ssize_t io_import_iovec(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, int rw, return ret; } - if (!s->has_user) + if (!req->submit.has_user) return -EFAULT; #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT @@ -1425,7 +1418,7 @@ static int io_read(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct sqe_submit *s, if (unlikely(!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ))) return -EBADF; - ret = io_import_iovec(req->ctx, READ, s, &iovec, &iter); + ret = io_import_iovec(req->ctx, READ, req, &iovec, &iter); if (ret < 0) return ret; @@ -1490,7 +1483,7 @@ static int io_write(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct sqe_submit *s, if (unlikely(!(file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE))) return -EBADF; - ret = io_import_iovec(req->ctx, WRITE, s, &iovec, &iter); + ret = io_import_iovec(req->ctx, WRITE, req, &iovec, &iter); if (ret < 0) return ret; @@ -2109,15 +2102,14 @@ static int io_req_defer(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, struct io_kiocb *req, static int __io_submit_sqe(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, struct io_kiocb *req, const struct sqe_submit *s, bool force_nonblock) { - int ret, opcode; + int ret; req->user_data = READ_ONCE(s->sqe->user_data); if (unlikely(s->index >= ctx->sq_entries)) return -EINVAL; - opcode = READ_ONCE(s->sqe->opcode); - switch (opcode) { + switch (req->submit.opcode) { case IORING_OP_NOP: ret = io_nop(req, req->user_data); break; @@ -2181,10 +2173,10 @@ static int __io_submit_sqe(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, struct io_kiocb *req, return 0; } -static struct async_list *io_async_list_from_sqe(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, - const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe) +static struct async_list *io_async_list_from_req(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, + struct io_kiocb *req) { - switch (sqe->opcode) { + switch (req->submit.opcode) { case IORING_OP_READV: case IORING_OP_READ_FIXED: return &ctx->pending_async[READ]; @@ -2196,12 +2188,10 @@ static struct async_list *io_async_list_from_sqe(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, } } -static inline bool io_sqe_needs_user(const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe) +static inline bool io_req_needs_user(struct io_kiocb *req) { - u8 opcode = READ_ONCE(sqe->opcode); - - return !(opcode == IORING_OP_READ_FIXED || - opcode == IORING_OP_WRITE_FIXED); + return !(req->submit.opcode == IORING_OP_READ_FIXED || + req->submit.opcode == IORING_OP_WRITE_FIXED); } static void io_sq_wq_submit_work(struct work_struct *work) @@ -2217,7 +2207,7 @@ static void io_sq_wq_submit_work(struct work_struct *work) int ret; old_cred = override_creds(ctx->creds); - async_list = io_async_list_from_sqe(ctx, req->submit.sqe); + async_list = io_async_list_from_req(ctx, req); allow_kernel_signal(SIGINT); restart: @@ -2239,7 +2229,7 @@ restart: } ret = 0; - if (io_sqe_needs_user(sqe) && !cur_mm) { + if (io_req_needs_user(req) && !cur_mm) { if (!mmget_not_zero(ctx->sqo_mm)) { ret = -EFAULT; } else { @@ -2387,11 +2377,9 @@ static bool io_add_to_prev_work(struct async_list *list, struct io_kiocb *req) return ret; } -static bool io_op_needs_file(const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe) +static bool io_op_needs_file(struct io_kiocb *req) { - int op = READ_ONCE(sqe->opcode); - - switch (op) { + switch (req->submit.opcode) { case IORING_OP_NOP: case IORING_OP_POLL_REMOVE: case IORING_OP_TIMEOUT: @@ -2419,7 +2407,7 @@ static int io_req_set_file(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, const struct sqe_submit *s, */ req->sequence = s->sequence; - if (!io_op_needs_file(s->sqe)) + if (!io_op_needs_file(req)) return 0; if (flags & IOSQE_FIXED_FILE) { @@ -2460,7 +2448,7 @@ static int __io_queue_sqe(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, struct io_kiocb *req, s->sqe = sqe_copy; memcpy(&req->submit, s, sizeof(*s)); - list = io_async_list_from_sqe(ctx, s->sqe); + list = io_async_list_from_req(ctx, req); if (!io_add_to_prev_work(list, req)) { if (list) atomic_inc(&list->cnt); @@ -2582,7 +2570,7 @@ err: req->user_data = s->sqe->user_data; #if defined(CONFIG_NET) - switch (READ_ONCE(s->sqe->opcode)) { + switch (req->submit.opcode) { case IORING_OP_SENDMSG: case IORING_OP_RECVMSG: spin_lock(¤t->fs->lock); @@ -2697,6 +2685,7 @@ static bool io_get_sqring(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, struct sqe_submit *s) if (head < ctx->sq_entries) { s->index = head; s->sqe = &ctx->sq_sqes[head]; + s->opcode = READ_ONCE(s->sqe->opcode); s->sequence = ctx->cached_sq_head; ctx->cached_sq_head++; return true; From e8053c68337ec5566be00fd0eed74273e6852b04 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Guoyu Huang Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2020 13:10:25 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 07/68] io_uring: Fix use-after-free in io_sq_wq_submit_work() when ctx->sqo_mm is zero, io_sq_wq_submit_work() frees 'req' without deleting it from 'task_list'. After that, 'req' is accessed in io_ring_ctx_wait_and_kill() which lead to a use-after-free. Signed-off-by: Guoyu Huang Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/io_uring.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c index 8bb5e19b7c3c..be3d595a607f 100644 --- a/fs/io_uring.c +++ b/fs/io_uring.c @@ -2232,6 +2232,7 @@ restart: if (io_req_needs_user(req) && !cur_mm) { if (!mmget_not_zero(ctx->sqo_mm)) { ret = -EFAULT; + goto end_req; } else { cur_mm = ctx->sqo_mm; use_mm(cur_mm); From 864468a7a63b79476652be757b98e3cc597788c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hui Wang Date: Mon, 3 Aug 2020 14:46:38 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 08/68] Revert "ALSA: hda: call runtime_allow() for all hda controllers" commit 07c9983b567d0ef33aefc063299de95a987e12a8 upstream. This reverts commit 9a6418487b56 ("ALSA: hda: call runtime_allow() for all hda controllers"). The reverted patch already introduced some regressions on some machines: - on gemini-lake machines, the error of "azx_get_response timeout" happens in the hda driver. - on the machines with alc662 codec, the audio jack detection doesn't work anymore. Fixes: 9a6418487b56 ("ALSA: hda: call runtime_allow() for all hda controllers") BugLink: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=208511 Cc: Signed-off-by: Hui Wang Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200803064638.6139-1-hui.wang@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c b/sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c index 95b0fdffc504..7353d2ec359a 100644 --- a/sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c +++ b/sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c @@ -2306,7 +2306,6 @@ static int azx_probe_continue(struct azx *chip) if (azx_has_pm_runtime(chip)) { pm_runtime_use_autosuspend(&pci->dev); - pm_runtime_allow(&pci->dev); pm_runtime_put_autosuspend(&pci->dev); } From 1d05ad79e1ddbe1f8fbe23f09d14c35b1ac19bce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Huacai Chen Date: Sun, 2 Aug 2020 17:26:40 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 09/68] ALSA: hda/realtek: Add alc269/alc662 pin-tables for Loongson-3 laptops commit f1ec5be17b9aafbc5f573da023850566b43d8e5e upstream. There are several Loongson-3 based laptops produced by CZC or Lemote, they use alc269/alc662 codecs and need specific pin-tables, this patch add their pin-tables. Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen Cc: Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1596360400-32425-1-git-send-email-chenhc@lemote.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 114 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 114 insertions(+) diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c index f50d71da1226..ea25b8d0350d 100644 --- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c +++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c @@ -6131,6 +6131,11 @@ enum { ALC289_FIXUP_ASUS_GA502, ALC256_FIXUP_ACER_MIC_NO_PRESENCE, ALC285_FIXUP_HP_GPIO_AMP_INIT, + ALC269_FIXUP_CZC_B20, + ALC269_FIXUP_CZC_TMI, + ALC269_FIXUP_CZC_L101, + ALC269_FIXUP_LEMOTE_A1802, + ALC269_FIXUP_LEMOTE_A190X, }; static const struct hda_fixup alc269_fixups[] = { @@ -7369,6 +7374,89 @@ static const struct hda_fixup alc269_fixups[] = { .chained = true, .chain_id = ALC285_FIXUP_HP_GPIO_LED }, + [ALC269_FIXUP_CZC_B20] = { + .type = HDA_FIXUP_PINS, + .v.pins = (const struct hda_pintbl[]) { + { 0x12, 0x411111f0 }, + { 0x14, 0x90170110 }, /* speaker */ + { 0x15, 0x032f1020 }, /* HP out */ + { 0x17, 0x411111f0 }, + { 0x18, 0x03ab1040 }, /* mic */ + { 0x19, 0xb7a7013f }, + { 0x1a, 0x0181305f }, + { 0x1b, 0x411111f0 }, + { 0x1d, 0x411111f0 }, + { 0x1e, 0x411111f0 }, + { } + }, + .chain_id = ALC269_FIXUP_DMIC, + }, + [ALC269_FIXUP_CZC_TMI] = { + .type = HDA_FIXUP_PINS, + .v.pins = (const struct hda_pintbl[]) { + { 0x12, 0x4000c000 }, + { 0x14, 0x90170110 }, /* speaker */ + { 0x15, 0x0421401f }, /* HP out */ + { 0x17, 0x411111f0 }, + { 0x18, 0x04a19020 }, /* mic */ + { 0x19, 0x411111f0 }, + { 0x1a, 0x411111f0 }, + { 0x1b, 0x411111f0 }, + { 0x1d, 0x40448505 }, + { 0x1e, 0x411111f0 }, + { 0x20, 0x8000ffff }, + { } + }, + .chain_id = ALC269_FIXUP_DMIC, + }, + [ALC269_FIXUP_CZC_L101] = { + .type = HDA_FIXUP_PINS, + .v.pins = (const struct hda_pintbl[]) { + { 0x12, 0x40000000 }, + { 0x14, 0x01014010 }, /* speaker */ + { 0x15, 0x411111f0 }, /* HP out */ + { 0x16, 0x411111f0 }, + { 0x18, 0x01a19020 }, /* mic */ + { 0x19, 0x02a19021 }, + { 0x1a, 0x0181302f }, + { 0x1b, 0x0221401f }, + { 0x1c, 0x411111f0 }, + { 0x1d, 0x4044c601 }, + { 0x1e, 0x411111f0 }, + { } + }, + .chain_id = ALC269_FIXUP_DMIC, + }, + [ALC269_FIXUP_LEMOTE_A1802] = { + .type = HDA_FIXUP_PINS, + .v.pins = (const struct hda_pintbl[]) { + { 0x12, 0x40000000 }, + { 0x14, 0x90170110 }, /* speaker */ + { 0x17, 0x411111f0 }, + { 0x18, 0x03a19040 }, /* mic1 */ + { 0x19, 0x90a70130 }, /* mic2 */ + { 0x1a, 0x411111f0 }, + { 0x1b, 0x411111f0 }, + { 0x1d, 0x40489d2d }, + { 0x1e, 0x411111f0 }, + { 0x20, 0x0003ffff }, + { 0x21, 0x03214020 }, + { } + }, + .chain_id = ALC269_FIXUP_DMIC, + }, + [ALC269_FIXUP_LEMOTE_A190X] = { + .type = HDA_FIXUP_PINS, + .v.pins = (const struct hda_pintbl[]) { + { 0x14, 0x99130110 }, /* speaker */ + { 0x15, 0x0121401f }, /* HP out */ + { 0x18, 0x01a19c20 }, /* rear mic */ + { 0x19, 0x99a3092f }, /* front mic */ + { 0x1b, 0x0201401f }, /* front lineout */ + { } + }, + .chain_id = ALC269_FIXUP_DMIC, + }, }; static const struct snd_pci_quirk alc269_fixup_tbl[] = { @@ -7658,9 +7746,14 @@ static const struct snd_pci_quirk alc269_fixup_tbl[] = { SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x3bf8, "Quanta FL1", ALC269_FIXUP_PCM_44K), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x9e54, "LENOVO NB", ALC269_FIXUP_LENOVO_EAPD), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x19e5, 0x3204, "Huawei MACH-WX9", ALC256_FIXUP_HUAWEI_MACH_WX9_PINS), + SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1b35, 0x1235, "CZC B20", ALC269_FIXUP_CZC_B20), + SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1b35, 0x1236, "CZC TMI", ALC269_FIXUP_CZC_TMI), + SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1b35, 0x1237, "CZC L101", ALC269_FIXUP_CZC_L101), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1b7d, 0xa831, "Ordissimo EVE2 ", ALC269VB_FIXUP_ORDISSIMO_EVE2), /* Also known as Malata PC-B1303 */ SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1d72, 0x1901, "RedmiBook 14", ALC256_FIXUP_ASUS_HEADSET_MIC), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x10ec, 0x118c, "Medion EE4254 MD62100", ALC256_FIXUP_MEDION_HEADSET_NO_PRESENCE), + SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1c06, 0x2013, "Lemote A1802", ALC269_FIXUP_LEMOTE_A1802), + SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1c06, 0x2015, "Lemote A190X", ALC269_FIXUP_LEMOTE_A190X), #if 0 /* Below is a quirk table taken from the old code. @@ -8945,6 +9038,7 @@ enum { ALC662_FIXUP_LED_GPIO1, ALC662_FIXUP_IDEAPAD, ALC272_FIXUP_MARIO, + ALC662_FIXUP_CZC_ET26, ALC662_FIXUP_CZC_P10T, ALC662_FIXUP_SKU_IGNORE, ALC662_FIXUP_HP_RP5800, @@ -9014,6 +9108,25 @@ static const struct hda_fixup alc662_fixups[] = { .type = HDA_FIXUP_FUNC, .v.func = alc272_fixup_mario, }, + [ALC662_FIXUP_CZC_ET26] = { + .type = HDA_FIXUP_PINS, + .v.pins = (const struct hda_pintbl[]) { + {0x12, 0x403cc000}, + {0x14, 0x90170110}, /* speaker */ + {0x15, 0x411111f0}, + {0x16, 0x411111f0}, + {0x18, 0x01a19030}, /* mic */ + {0x19, 0x90a7013f}, /* int-mic */ + {0x1a, 0x01014020}, + {0x1b, 0x0121401f}, + {0x1c, 0x411111f0}, + {0x1d, 0x411111f0}, + {0x1e, 0x40478e35}, + {} + }, + .chained = true, + .chain_id = ALC662_FIXUP_SKU_IGNORE + }, [ALC662_FIXUP_CZC_P10T] = { .type = HDA_FIXUP_VERBS, .v.verbs = (const struct hda_verb[]) { @@ -9397,6 +9510,7 @@ static const struct snd_pci_quirk alc662_fixup_tbl[] = { SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1849, 0x5892, "ASRock B150M", ALC892_FIXUP_ASROCK_MOBO), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x19da, 0xa130, "Zotac Z68", ALC662_FIXUP_ZOTAC_Z68), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1b0a, 0x01b8, "ACER Veriton", ALC662_FIXUP_ACER_VERITON), + SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1b35, 0x1234, "CZC ET26", ALC662_FIXUP_CZC_ET26), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1b35, 0x2206, "CZC P10T", ALC662_FIXUP_CZC_P10T), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1025, 0x0566, "Acer Aspire Ethos 8951G", ALC669_FIXUP_ACER_ASPIRE_ETHOS), From 87775770635ab72ce57bc808a68270a55ab9e033 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Connor McAdams Date: Sun, 2 Aug 2020 20:29:26 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 10/68] ALSA: hda/ca0132 - Add new quirk ID for Recon3D. commit cc5edb1bd3f7bfe450f767b12423f6673822427b upstream. Add a new quirk ID for the Recon3D, as tested by me. Signed-off-by: Connor McAdams Cc: Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200803002928.8638-2-conmanx360@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/pci/hda/patch_ca0132.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/patch_ca0132.c b/sound/pci/hda/patch_ca0132.c index 1e904dd15ab3..d909db23a7eb 100644 --- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_ca0132.c +++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_ca0132.c @@ -1182,6 +1182,7 @@ static const struct snd_pci_quirk ca0132_quirks[] = { SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1458, 0xA036, "Gigabyte GA-Z170X-Gaming 7", QUIRK_R3DI), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x3842, 0x1038, "EVGA X99 Classified", QUIRK_R3DI), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1102, 0x0013, "Recon3D", QUIRK_R3D), + SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1102, 0x0018, "Recon3D", QUIRK_R3D), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1102, 0x0051, "Sound Blaster AE-5", QUIRK_AE5), {} }; From b8ce0756b312bf7b52338d7ac515ecbaebfaba81 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Connor McAdams Date: Sun, 2 Aug 2020 20:29:25 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 11/68] ALSA: hda/ca0132 - Fix ZxR Headphone gain control get value. commit a00dc409de455b64e6cb2f6d40cdb8237cdb2e83 upstream. When the ZxR headphone gain control was added, the ca0132_switch_get function was not updated, which meant that the changes to the control state were not saved when entering/exiting alsamixer. Signed-off-by: Connor McAdams Cc: Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200803002928.8638-1-conmanx360@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/pci/hda/patch_ca0132.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/patch_ca0132.c b/sound/pci/hda/patch_ca0132.c index d909db23a7eb..f250ae0a8cb2 100644 --- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_ca0132.c +++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_ca0132.c @@ -5748,6 +5748,11 @@ static int ca0132_switch_get(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, return 0; } + if (nid == ZXR_HEADPHONE_GAIN) { + *valp = spec->zxr_gain_set; + return 0; + } + return 0; } From 3ebdc7b61906aa804b0464f55ca423dea1c75674 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Connor McAdams Date: Sun, 2 Aug 2020 20:29:27 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 12/68] ALSA: hda/ca0132 - Fix AE-5 microphone selection commands. commit 7fe3530427e52dd53cd7366914864e29215180a4 upstream. The ca0113 command had the wrong group_id, 0x48 when it should've been 0x30. The front microphone selection should now work. Signed-off-by: Connor McAdams Cc: Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200803002928.8638-3-conmanx360@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/pci/hda/patch_ca0132.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/patch_ca0132.c b/sound/pci/hda/patch_ca0132.c index f250ae0a8cb2..6aa39339db0a 100644 --- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_ca0132.c +++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_ca0132.c @@ -4671,7 +4671,7 @@ static int ca0132_alt_select_in(struct hda_codec *codec) tmp = FLOAT_ONE; break; case QUIRK_AE5: - ca0113_mmio_command_set(codec, 0x48, 0x28, 0x00); + ca0113_mmio_command_set(codec, 0x30, 0x28, 0x00); tmp = FLOAT_THREE; break; default: @@ -4717,7 +4717,7 @@ static int ca0132_alt_select_in(struct hda_codec *codec) r3di_gpio_mic_set(codec, R3DI_REAR_MIC); break; case QUIRK_AE5: - ca0113_mmio_command_set(codec, 0x48, 0x28, 0x00); + ca0113_mmio_command_set(codec, 0x30, 0x28, 0x00); break; default: break; @@ -4756,7 +4756,7 @@ static int ca0132_alt_select_in(struct hda_codec *codec) tmp = FLOAT_ONE; break; case QUIRK_AE5: - ca0113_mmio_command_set(codec, 0x48, 0x28, 0x3f); + ca0113_mmio_command_set(codec, 0x30, 0x28, 0x3f); tmp = FLOAT_THREE; break; default: From 4d81a7bdd3b28a8604f2a22ebff47a8ca8b54761 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Takashi Iwai Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2020 20:58:15 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 13/68] ALSA: seq: oss: Serialize ioctls commit 80982c7e834e5d4e325b6ce33757012ecafdf0bb upstream. Some ioctls via OSS sequencer API may race and lead to UAF when the port create and delete are performed concurrently, as spotted by a couple of syzkaller cases. This patch is an attempt to address it by serializing the ioctls with the existing register_mutex. Basically OSS sequencer API is an obsoleted interface and was designed without much consideration of the concurrency. There are very few applications with it, and the concurrent performance isn't asked, hence this "big hammer" approach should be good enough. Reported-by: syzbot+1a54a94bd32716796edd@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+9d2abfef257f3e2d4713@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Suggested-by: Hillf Danton Cc: Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200804185815.2453-1-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss.c b/sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss.c index 17f913657304..c8b9c0b315d8 100644 --- a/sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss.c +++ b/sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss.c @@ -168,10 +168,16 @@ static long odev_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) { struct seq_oss_devinfo *dp; + long rc; + dp = file->private_data; if (snd_BUG_ON(!dp)) return -ENXIO; - return snd_seq_oss_ioctl(dp, cmd, arg); + + mutex_lock(®ister_mutex); + rc = snd_seq_oss_ioctl(dp, cmd, arg); + mutex_unlock(®ister_mutex); + return rc; } #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT From 6a7626c4798db91b6681bf8e89a4a55d29bbcc52 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Suren Baghdasaryan Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2020 12:26:32 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 14/68] staging: android: ashmem: Fix lockdep warning for write operation commit 3e338d3c95c735dc3265a86016bb4c022ec7cadc upstream. syzbot report [1] describes a deadlock when write operation against an ashmem fd executed at the time when ashmem is shrinking its cache results in the following lock sequence: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(fs_reclaim); lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#13); lock(fs_reclaim); lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#13); kswapd takes fs_reclaim and then inode_lock while generic_perform_write takes inode_lock and then fs_reclaim. However ashmem does not support writing into backing shmem with a write syscall. The only way to change its content is to mmap it and operate on mapped memory. Therefore the race that lockdep is warning about is not valid. Resolve this by introducing a separate lockdep class for the backing shmem inodes. [1]: https://lkml.kernel.org/lkml/0000000000000b5f9d059aa2037f@google.com/ Reported-by: syzbot+7a0d9d0b26efefe61780@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan Cc: stable Reviewed-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200730192632.3088194-1-surenb@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c b/drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c index c6695354b123..19b0cc5ea33f 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c +++ b/drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c @@ -95,6 +95,15 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(ashmem_mutex); static struct kmem_cache *ashmem_area_cachep __read_mostly; static struct kmem_cache *ashmem_range_cachep __read_mostly; +/* + * A separate lockdep class for the backing shmem inodes to resolve the lockdep + * warning about the race between kswapd taking fs_reclaim before inode_lock + * and write syscall taking inode_lock and then fs_reclaim. + * Note that such race is impossible because ashmem does not support write + * syscalls operating on the backing shmem. + */ +static struct lock_class_key backing_shmem_inode_class; + static inline unsigned long range_size(struct ashmem_range *range) { return range->pgend - range->pgstart + 1; @@ -396,6 +405,7 @@ static int ashmem_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma) if (!asma->file) { char *name = ASHMEM_NAME_DEF; struct file *vmfile; + struct inode *inode; if (asma->name[ASHMEM_NAME_PREFIX_LEN] != '\0') name = asma->name; @@ -407,6 +417,8 @@ static int ashmem_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma) goto out; } vmfile->f_mode |= FMODE_LSEEK; + inode = file_inode(vmfile); + lockdep_set_class(&inode->i_rwsem, &backing_shmem_inode_class); asma->file = vmfile; /* * override mmap operation of the vmfile so that it can't be From af707d9d7f44a7b2bc6ded700c83a27a42dd1031 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Rustam Kovhaev Date: Thu, 16 Jul 2020 08:13:26 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 15/68] staging: rtl8712: handle firmware load failure commit b4383c971bc5263efe2b0915ba67ebf2bf3f1ee5 upstream. when firmware fails to load we should not call unregister_netdev() this patch fixes a race condition between rtl871x_load_fw_cb() and r871xu_dev_remove() and fixes the bug reported by syzbot Reported-by: syzbot+80899a8a8efe8968cde7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=80899a8a8efe8968cde7 Signed-off-by: Rustam Kovhaev Cc: stable Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200716151324.1036204-1-rkovhaev@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/staging/rtl8712/hal_init.c | 3 ++- drivers/staging/rtl8712/usb_intf.c | 11 ++++++++--- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8712/hal_init.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8712/hal_init.c index 40145c0338e4..42c0a3c947f1 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/rtl8712/hal_init.c +++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8712/hal_init.c @@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ static void rtl871x_load_fw_cb(const struct firmware *firmware, void *context) { struct _adapter *adapter = context; - complete(&adapter->rtl8712_fw_ready); if (!firmware) { struct usb_device *udev = adapter->dvobjpriv.pusbdev; struct usb_interface *usb_intf = adapter->pusb_intf; @@ -41,11 +40,13 @@ static void rtl871x_load_fw_cb(const struct firmware *firmware, void *context) dev_err(&udev->dev, "r8712u: Firmware request failed\n"); usb_put_dev(udev); usb_set_intfdata(usb_intf, NULL); + complete(&adapter->rtl8712_fw_ready); return; } adapter->fw = firmware; /* firmware available - start netdev */ register_netdev(adapter->pnetdev); + complete(&adapter->rtl8712_fw_ready); } static const char firmware_file[] = "rtlwifi/rtl8712u.bin"; diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8712/usb_intf.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8712/usb_intf.c index a87562f632a7..2fcd65260f4c 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/rtl8712/usb_intf.c +++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8712/usb_intf.c @@ -595,13 +595,17 @@ static void r871xu_dev_remove(struct usb_interface *pusb_intf) if (pnetdev) { struct _adapter *padapter = netdev_priv(pnetdev); - usb_set_intfdata(pusb_intf, NULL); - release_firmware(padapter->fw); /* never exit with a firmware callback pending */ wait_for_completion(&padapter->rtl8712_fw_ready); + pnetdev = usb_get_intfdata(pusb_intf); + usb_set_intfdata(pusb_intf, NULL); + if (!pnetdev) + goto firmware_load_fail; + release_firmware(padapter->fw); if (drvpriv.drv_registered) padapter->surprise_removed = true; - unregister_netdev(pnetdev); /* will call netdev_close() */ + if (pnetdev->reg_state != NETREG_UNINITIALIZED) + unregister_netdev(pnetdev); /* will call netdev_close() */ flush_scheduled_work(); udelay(1); /* Stop driver mlme relation timer */ @@ -614,6 +618,7 @@ static void r871xu_dev_remove(struct usb_interface *pusb_intf) */ usb_put_dev(udev); } +firmware_load_fail: /* If we didn't unplug usb dongle and remove/insert module, driver * fails on sitesurvey for the first time when device is up. * Reset usb port for sitesurvey fail issue. From a8b8b535c588be26f3375e84e75185c0199a9904 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dinghao Liu Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2020 15:21:51 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 16/68] Staging: rtl8188eu: rtw_mlme: Fix uninitialized variable authmode commit 11536442a3b4e1de6890ea5e805908debb74f94a upstream. The variable authmode can be uninitialized. The danger would be if it equals to _WPA_IE_ID_ (0xdd) or _WPA2_IE_ID_ (0x33). We can avoid this by setting it to zero instead. This is the approach that was used in the rtl8723bs driver. Fixes: 7b464c9fa5cc ("staging: r8188eu: Add files for new driver - part 4") Co-developed-by: Dan Carpenter Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter Signed-off-by: Dinghao Liu Cc: stable Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200728072153.9202-1-dinghao.liu@zju.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/core/rtw_mlme.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/core/rtw_mlme.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/core/rtw_mlme.c index 1ec3b237212e..7cee7b4d5270 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/core/rtw_mlme.c +++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/core/rtw_mlme.c @@ -1729,9 +1729,11 @@ int rtw_restruct_sec_ie(struct adapter *adapter, u8 *in_ie, u8 *out_ie, uint in_ if ((ndisauthmode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA) || (ndisauthmode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPAPSK)) authmode = _WPA_IE_ID_; - if ((ndisauthmode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2) || + else if ((ndisauthmode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2) || (ndisauthmode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK)) authmode = _WPA2_IE_ID_; + else + authmode = 0x0; if (check_fwstate(pmlmepriv, WIFI_UNDER_WPS)) { memcpy(out_ie+ielength, psecuritypriv->wps_ie, psecuritypriv->wps_ie_len); From c26eaaf547b785ae98fa08607b599c7df0da51bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peilin Ye Date: Fri, 10 Jul 2020 12:09:15 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 17/68] Bluetooth: Fix slab-out-of-bounds read in hci_extended_inquiry_result_evt() commit 51c19bf3d5cfaa66571e4b88ba2a6f6295311101 upstream. Check upon `num_rsp` is insufficient. A malformed event packet with a large `num_rsp` number makes hci_extended_inquiry_result_evt() go out of bounds. Fix it. This patch fixes the following syzbot bug: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=4bf11aa05c4ca51ce0df86e500fce486552dc8d2 Reported-by: syzbot+d8489a79b781849b9c46@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Peilin Ye Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/bluetooth/hci_event.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c index 44385252d7b6..c7e4496b243e 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c @@ -4270,7 +4270,7 @@ static void hci_extended_inquiry_result_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, BT_DBG("%s num_rsp %d", hdev->name, num_rsp); - if (!num_rsp) + if (!num_rsp || skb->len < num_rsp * sizeof(*info) + 1) return; if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_PERIODIC_INQ)) From 70d1e884edc4c049e6fc0b6915d8a167b8988e59 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peilin Ye Date: Fri, 10 Jul 2020 17:39:18 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 18/68] Bluetooth: Prevent out-of-bounds read in hci_inquiry_result_evt() commit 75bbd2ea50ba1c5d9da878a17e92eac02fe0fd3a upstream. Check `num_rsp` before using it as for-loop counter. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Peilin Ye Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/bluetooth/hci_event.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c index c7e4496b243e..33c3c5b0fef0 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c @@ -2444,7 +2444,7 @@ static void hci_inquiry_result_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb) BT_DBG("%s num_rsp %d", hdev->name, num_rsp); - if (!num_rsp) + if (!num_rsp || skb->len < num_rsp * sizeof(*info) + 1) return; if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_PERIODIC_INQ)) From b78763e0a247f501ec809c30864f60f04c8c921f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peilin Ye Date: Fri, 10 Jul 2020 17:45:26 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 19/68] Bluetooth: Prevent out-of-bounds read in hci_inquiry_result_with_rssi_evt() commit 629b49c848ee71244203934347bd7730b0ddee8d upstream. Check `num_rsp` before using it as for-loop counter. Add `unlock` label. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Peilin Ye Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/bluetooth/hci_event.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c index 33c3c5b0fef0..7bf6860fed78 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c @@ -4067,6 +4067,9 @@ static void hci_inquiry_result_with_rssi_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct inquiry_info_with_rssi_and_pscan_mode *info; info = (void *) (skb->data + 1); + if (skb->len < num_rsp * sizeof(*info) + 1) + goto unlock; + for (; num_rsp; num_rsp--, info++) { u32 flags; @@ -4088,6 +4091,9 @@ static void hci_inquiry_result_with_rssi_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, } else { struct inquiry_info_with_rssi *info = (void *) (skb->data + 1); + if (skb->len < num_rsp * sizeof(*info) + 1) + goto unlock; + for (; num_rsp; num_rsp--, info++) { u32 flags; @@ -4108,6 +4114,7 @@ static void hci_inquiry_result_with_rssi_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, } } +unlock: hci_dev_unlock(hdev); } From da47eae4e165ef5ac22a975133809667b4efe195 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Adam Ford Date: Tue, 30 Jun 2020 13:26:36 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 20/68] omapfb: dss: Fix max fclk divider for omap36xx commit 254503a2b186caa668a188dbbd7ab0d25149c0a5 upstream. The drm/omap driver was fixed to correct an issue where using a divider of 32 breaks the DSS despite the TRM stating 32 is a valid number. Through experimentation, it appears that 31 works, and it is consistent with the value used by the drm/omap driver. This patch fixes the divider for fbdev driver instead of the drm. Fixes: f76ee892a99e ("omapfb: copy omapdss & displays for omapfb") Cc: #4.5+ Signed-off-by: Adam Ford Reviewed-by: Tomi Valkeinen Cc: Dave Airlie Cc: Rob Clark [b.zolnierkie: mark patch as applicable to stable 4.5+ (was 4.9+)] Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20200630182636.439015-1-aford173@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/video/fbdev/omap2/omapfb/dss/dss.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/video/fbdev/omap2/omapfb/dss/dss.c b/drivers/video/fbdev/omap2/omapfb/dss/dss.c index 7252d22dd117..bfc5c4c5a26a 100644 --- a/drivers/video/fbdev/omap2/omapfb/dss/dss.c +++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/omap2/omapfb/dss/dss.c @@ -833,7 +833,7 @@ static const struct dss_features omap34xx_dss_feats = { }; static const struct dss_features omap3630_dss_feats = { - .fck_div_max = 32, + .fck_div_max = 31, .dss_fck_multiplier = 1, .parent_clk_name = "dpll4_ck", .dpi_select_source = &dss_dpi_select_source_omap2_omap3, From c5665cafbedd2e2a523fe933e452391a02d3adb3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jann Horn Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2020 14:04:24 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 21/68] binder: Prevent context manager from incrementing ref 0 commit 4b836a1426cb0f1ef2a6e211d7e553221594f8fc upstream. Binder is designed such that a binder_proc never has references to itself. If this rule is violated, memory corruption can occur when a process sends a transaction to itself; see e.g. . There is a remaining edgecase through which such a transaction-to-self can still occur from the context of a task with BINDER_SET_CONTEXT_MGR access: - task A opens /dev/binder twice, creating binder_proc instances P1 and P2 - P1 becomes context manager - P2 calls ACQUIRE on the magic handle 0, allocating index 0 in its handle table - P1 dies (by closing the /dev/binder fd and waiting a bit) - P2 becomes context manager - P2 calls ACQUIRE on the magic handle 0, allocating index 1 in its handle table [this triggers a warning: "binder: 1974:1974 tried to acquire reference to desc 0, got 1 instead"] - task B opens /dev/binder once, creating binder_proc instance P3 - P3 calls P2 (via magic handle 0) with (void*)1 as argument (two-way transaction) - P2 receives the handle and uses it to call P3 (two-way transaction) - P3 calls P2 (via magic handle 0) (two-way transaction) - P2 calls P2 (via handle 1) (two-way transaction) And then, if P2 does *NOT* accept the incoming transaction work, but instead closes the binder fd, we get a crash. Solve it by preventing the context manager from using ACQUIRE on ref 0. There shouldn't be any legitimate reason for the context manager to do that. Additionally, print a warning if someone manages to find another way to trigger a transaction-to-self bug in the future. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 457b9a6f09f0 ("Staging: android: add binder driver") Acked-by: Todd Kjos Signed-off-by: Jann Horn Reviewed-by: Martijn Coenen Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200727120424.1627555-1-jannh@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/android/binder.c | 15 ++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c index 5e6586af21b7..110dd4c2977f 100644 --- a/drivers/android/binder.c +++ b/drivers/android/binder.c @@ -2984,6 +2984,12 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc, goto err_dead_binder; } e->to_node = target_node->debug_id; + if (WARN_ON(proc == target_proc)) { + return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY; + return_error_param = -EINVAL; + return_error_line = __LINE__; + goto err_invalid_target_handle; + } if (security_binder_transaction(proc->tsk, target_proc->tsk) < 0) { return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY; @@ -3637,10 +3643,17 @@ static int binder_thread_write(struct binder_proc *proc, struct binder_node *ctx_mgr_node; mutex_lock(&context->context_mgr_node_lock); ctx_mgr_node = context->binder_context_mgr_node; - if (ctx_mgr_node) + if (ctx_mgr_node) { + if (ctx_mgr_node->proc == proc) { + binder_user_error("%d:%d context manager tried to acquire desc 0\n", + proc->pid, thread->pid); + mutex_unlock(&context->context_mgr_node_lock); + return -EINVAL; + } ret = binder_inc_ref_for_node( proc, ctx_mgr_node, strong, NULL, &rdata); + } mutex_unlock(&context->context_mgr_node_lock); } if (ret) From 5f5fb7cea82859673397ff07fa2bca4e9dfd3a97 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2020 13:15:20 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 22/68] Smack: fix use-after-free in smk_write_relabel_self() commit beb4ee6770a89646659e6a2178538d2b13e2654e upstream. smk_write_relabel_self() frees memory from the task's credentials with no locking, which can easily cause a use-after-free because multiple tasks can share the same credentials structure. Fix this by using prepare_creds() and commit_creds() to correctly modify the task's credentials. Reproducer for "BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in smk_write_relabel_self": #include #include #include static void *thrproc(void *arg) { int fd = open("/sys/fs/smackfs/relabel-self", O_WRONLY); for (;;) write(fd, "foo", 3); } int main() { pthread_t t; pthread_create(&t, NULL, thrproc, NULL); thrproc(NULL); } Reported-by: syzbot+e6416dabb497a650da40@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 38416e53936e ("Smack: limited capability for changing process label") Cc: # v4.4+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- security/smack/smackfs.c | 13 +++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c index c21b656b3263..840a192e9337 100644 --- a/security/smack/smackfs.c +++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c @@ -2720,7 +2720,6 @@ static int smk_open_relabel_self(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) static ssize_t smk_write_relabel_self(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { - struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred()); char *data; int rc; LIST_HEAD(list_tmp); @@ -2745,11 +2744,21 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_relabel_self(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, kfree(data); if (!rc || (rc == -EINVAL && list_empty(&list_tmp))) { + struct cred *new; + struct task_smack *tsp; + + new = prepare_creds(); + if (!new) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + tsp = smack_cred(new); smk_destroy_label_list(&tsp->smk_relabel); list_splice(&list_tmp, &tsp->smk_relabel); + commit_creds(new); return count; } - +out: smk_destroy_label_list(&list_tmp); return rc; } From 1ae21e97d5d366bfc2f0ca3f34eee8b4f916b964 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matthias Maennich Date: Thu, 4 Jun 2020 18:41:45 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 23/68] scripts: add dummy report mode to add_namespace.cocci commit 55c7549819e438f40a3ef1d8ac5c38b73390bcb7 upstream. When running `make coccicheck` in report mode using the add_namespace.cocci file, it will fail for files that contain MODULE_LICENSE. Those match the replacement precondition, but spatch errors out as virtual.ns is not set. In order to fix that, add the virtual rule nsdeps and only do search and replace if that rule has been explicitly requested. In order to make spatch happy in report mode, we also need a dummy rule, as otherwise it errors out with "No rules apply". Using a script:python rule appears unrelated and odd, but this is the shortest I could come up with. Adjust scripts/nsdeps accordingly to set the nsdeps rule when run trough `make nsdeps`. Suggested-by: Julia Lawall Fixes: c7c4e29fb5a4 ("scripts: add_namespace: Fix coccicheck failed") Cc: YueHaibing Cc: jeyu@kernel.org Cc: cocci@systeme.lip6.fr Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Matthias Maennich Reported-by: Shuah Khan Acked-by: Julia Lawall Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200604164145.173925-1-maennich@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- scripts/coccinelle/misc/add_namespace.cocci | 8 +++++++- scripts/nsdeps | 2 +- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/scripts/coccinelle/misc/add_namespace.cocci b/scripts/coccinelle/misc/add_namespace.cocci index 99e93a6c2e24..cbf1614163cb 100644 --- a/scripts/coccinelle/misc/add_namespace.cocci +++ b/scripts/coccinelle/misc/add_namespace.cocci @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ /// add a missing namespace tag to a module source file. /// +virtual nsdeps virtual report @has_ns_import@ @@ -16,10 +17,15 @@ MODULE_IMPORT_NS(ns); // Add missing imports, but only adjacent to a MODULE_LICENSE statement. // That ensures we are adding it only to the main module source file. -@do_import depends on !has_ns_import@ +@do_import depends on !has_ns_import && nsdeps@ declarer name MODULE_LICENSE; expression license; identifier virtual.ns; @@ MODULE_LICENSE(license); + MODULE_IMPORT_NS(ns); + +// Dummy rule for report mode that would otherwise be empty and make spatch +// fail ("No rules apply.") +@script:python depends on report@ +@@ diff --git a/scripts/nsdeps b/scripts/nsdeps index 04cea0921673..e547f33b96a6 100644 --- a/scripts/nsdeps +++ b/scripts/nsdeps @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ fi generate_deps_for_ns() { $SPATCH --very-quiet --in-place --sp-file \ - $srctree/scripts/coccinelle/misc/add_namespace.cocci -D ns=$1 $2 + $srctree/scripts/coccinelle/misc/add_namespace.cocci -D nsdeps -D ns=$1 $2 } generate_deps() { From 8c3215a0426c404f4b7b02a1e0fdb0f7f4f1e6d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yunhai Zhang Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2020 09:58:03 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 24/68] vgacon: Fix for missing check in scrollback handling MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit ebfdfeeae8c01fcb2b3b74ffaf03876e20835d2d upstream. vgacon_scrollback_update() always leaves enbough room in the scrollback buffer for the next call, but if the console size changed that room might not actually be enough, and so we need to re-check. The check should be in the loop since vgacon_scrollback_cur->tail is updated in the loop and count may be more than 1 when triggered by CSI M, as Jiri's PoC: #include #include #include #include #include #include #include int main(int argc, char** argv) { int fd = open("/dev/tty1", O_RDWR); unsigned short size[3] = {25, 200, 0}; ioctl(fd, 0x5609, size); // VT_RESIZE write(fd, "\e[1;1H", 6); for (int i = 0; i < 30; i++) write(fd, "\e[10M", 5); } It leads to various crashes as vgacon_scrollback_update writes out of the buffer: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc900001752a0 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page RIP: 0010:mutex_unlock+0x13/0x30 ... Call Trace: n_tty_write+0x1a0/0x4d0 tty_write+0x1a0/0x2e0 Or to KASAN reports: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in vgacon_scroll+0x57a/0x8ed This fixes CVE-2020-14331. Reported-by: 张云海 Reported-by: Yang Yingliang Reported-by: Kyungtae Kim Fixes: 15bdab959c9b ([PATCH] vgacon: Add support for soft scrollback) Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-fbdev@vger.kernel.org Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Solar Designer Cc: "Srivatsa S. Bhat" Cc: Anthony Liguori Cc: Yang Yingliang Cc: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz Cc: Jiri Slaby Signed-off-by: Yunhai Zhang Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/9fb43895-ca91-9b07-ebfd-808cf854ca95@nsfocus.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/video/console/vgacon.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/video/console/vgacon.c b/drivers/video/console/vgacon.c index bfaa9ec4bc1f..e079b910feb2 100644 --- a/drivers/video/console/vgacon.c +++ b/drivers/video/console/vgacon.c @@ -251,6 +251,10 @@ static void vgacon_scrollback_update(struct vc_data *c, int t, int count) p = (void *) (c->vc_origin + t * c->vc_size_row); while (count--) { + if ((vgacon_scrollback_cur->tail + c->vc_size_row) > + vgacon_scrollback_cur->size) + vgacon_scrollback_cur->tail = 0; + scr_memcpyw(vgacon_scrollback_cur->data + vgacon_scrollback_cur->tail, p, c->vc_size_row); From 9a53e8bd59d9f070505e51d3fd19606a270e6b93 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Thu, 16 Jul 2020 13:53:46 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 25/68] mtd: properly check all write ioctls for permissions commit f7e6b19bc76471ba03725fe58e0c218a3d6266c3 upstream. When doing a "write" ioctl call, properly check that we have permissions to do so before copying anything from userspace or anything else so we can "fail fast". This includes also covering the MEMWRITE ioctl which previously missed checking for this. Cc: Miquel Raynal Cc: Richard Weinberger Cc: Vignesh Raghavendra Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman [rw: Fixed locking issue] Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/mtd/mtdchar.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 47 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/mtd/mtdchar.c b/drivers/mtd/mtdchar.c index 975aed94f06c..48832f9b215c 100644 --- a/drivers/mtd/mtdchar.c +++ b/drivers/mtd/mtdchar.c @@ -354,9 +354,6 @@ static int mtdchar_writeoob(struct file *file, struct mtd_info *mtd, uint32_t retlen; int ret = 0; - if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)) - return -EPERM; - if (length > 4096) return -EINVAL; @@ -641,6 +638,48 @@ static int mtdchar_ioctl(struct file *file, u_int cmd, u_long arg) pr_debug("MTD_ioctl\n"); + /* + * Check the file mode to require "dangerous" commands to have write + * permissions. + */ + switch (cmd) { + /* "safe" commands */ + case MEMGETREGIONCOUNT: + case MEMGETREGIONINFO: + case MEMGETINFO: + case MEMREADOOB: + case MEMREADOOB64: + case MEMLOCK: + case MEMUNLOCK: + case MEMISLOCKED: + case MEMGETOOBSEL: + case MEMGETBADBLOCK: + case MEMSETBADBLOCK: + case OTPSELECT: + case OTPGETREGIONCOUNT: + case OTPGETREGIONINFO: + case OTPLOCK: + case ECCGETLAYOUT: + case ECCGETSTATS: + case MTDFILEMODE: + case BLKPG: + case BLKRRPART: + break; + + /* "dangerous" commands */ + case MEMERASE: + case MEMERASE64: + case MEMWRITEOOB: + case MEMWRITEOOB64: + case MEMWRITE: + if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)) + return -EPERM; + break; + + default: + return -ENOTTY; + } + switch (cmd) { case MEMGETREGIONCOUNT: if (copy_to_user(argp, &(mtd->numeraseregions), sizeof(int))) @@ -688,9 +727,6 @@ static int mtdchar_ioctl(struct file *file, u_int cmd, u_long arg) { struct erase_info *erase; - if(!(file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)) - return -EPERM; - erase=kzalloc(sizeof(struct erase_info),GFP_KERNEL); if (!erase) ret = -ENOMEM; @@ -983,9 +1019,6 @@ static int mtdchar_ioctl(struct file *file, u_int cmd, u_long arg) ret = 0; break; } - - default: - ret = -ENOTTY; } return ret; @@ -1029,6 +1062,11 @@ static long mtdchar_compat_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, struct mtd_oob_buf32 buf; struct mtd_oob_buf32 __user *buf_user = argp; + if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)) { + ret = -EPERM; + break; + } + if (copy_from_user(&buf, argp, sizeof(buf))) ret = -EFAULT; else From 635f8fcc2ee39d3c7e707ee5f7b2c55c6e277f4b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johan Hovold Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2020 15:39:49 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 26/68] leds: wm831x-status: fix use-after-free on unbind commit 47a459ecc800a17109d0c496a4e21e478806ee40 upstream. Several MFD child drivers register their class devices directly under the parent device. This means you cannot blindly do devres conversions so that deregistration ends up being tied to the parent device, something which leads to use-after-free on driver unbind when the class device is released while still being registered. Fixes: 8d3b6a4001ce ("leds: wm831x-status: Use devm_led_classdev_register") Cc: stable # 4.6 Cc: Amitoj Kaur Chawla Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Signed-off-by: Pavel Machek Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/leds/leds-wm831x-status.c | 14 +++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/leds/leds-wm831x-status.c b/drivers/leds/leds-wm831x-status.c index 082df7f1dd90..67f4235cb28a 100644 --- a/drivers/leds/leds-wm831x-status.c +++ b/drivers/leds/leds-wm831x-status.c @@ -269,12 +269,23 @@ static int wm831x_status_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) drvdata->cdev.blink_set = wm831x_status_blink_set; drvdata->cdev.groups = wm831x_status_groups; - ret = devm_led_classdev_register(wm831x->dev, &drvdata->cdev); + ret = led_classdev_register(wm831x->dev, &drvdata->cdev); if (ret < 0) { dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Failed to register LED: %d\n", ret); return ret; } + platform_set_drvdata(pdev, drvdata); + + return 0; +} + +static int wm831x_status_remove(struct platform_device *pdev) +{ + struct wm831x_status *drvdata = platform_get_drvdata(pdev); + + led_classdev_unregister(&drvdata->cdev); + return 0; } @@ -283,6 +294,7 @@ static struct platform_driver wm831x_status_driver = { .name = "wm831x-status", }, .probe = wm831x_status_probe, + .remove = wm831x_status_remove, }; module_platform_driver(wm831x_status_driver); From bde8f23c030c77917b61eeaa5824e3743da7e679 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johan Hovold Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2020 15:39:48 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 27/68] leds: lm36274: fix use-after-free on unbind commit a0972fff09479dd09b731360a3a0b09e4fb4d415 upstream. Several MFD child drivers register their class devices directly under the parent device. This means you cannot use devres so that deregistration ends up being tied to the parent device, something which leads to use-after-free on driver unbind when the class device is released while still being registered. Fixes: 11e1bbc116a7 ("leds: lm36274: Introduce the TI LM36274 LED driver") Cc: stable # 5.3 Cc: Dan Murphy Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Signed-off-by: Pavel Machek Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/leds/leds-lm36274.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/leds/leds-lm36274.c b/drivers/leds/leds-lm36274.c index 836b60c9a2b8..db842eeb7ca2 100644 --- a/drivers/leds/leds-lm36274.c +++ b/drivers/leds/leds-lm36274.c @@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ static int lm36274_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) lm36274_data->pdev = pdev; lm36274_data->dev = lmu->dev; lm36274_data->regmap = lmu->regmap; - dev_set_drvdata(&pdev->dev, lm36274_data); + platform_set_drvdata(pdev, lm36274_data); ret = lm36274_parse_dt(lm36274_data); if (ret) { @@ -147,8 +147,16 @@ static int lm36274_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) return ret; } - return devm_led_classdev_register(lm36274_data->dev, - &lm36274_data->led_dev); + return led_classdev_register(lm36274_data->dev, &lm36274_data->led_dev); +} + +static int lm36274_remove(struct platform_device *pdev) +{ + struct lm36274 *lm36274_data = platform_get_drvdata(pdev); + + led_classdev_unregister(&lm36274_data->led_dev); + + return 0; } static const struct of_device_id of_lm36274_leds_match[] = { @@ -159,6 +167,7 @@ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(of, of_lm36274_leds_match); static struct platform_driver lm36274_driver = { .probe = lm36274_probe, + .remove = lm36274_remove, .driver = { .name = "lm36274-leds", }, From 385c1ae9ddb936033cf76a9ed62d8e3e5a5a85e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johan Hovold Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2020 15:39:46 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 28/68] leds: da903x: fix use-after-free on unbind commit 6f4aa35744f69ed9b0bf5a736c9ca9b44bc1dcea upstream. Several MFD child drivers register their class devices directly under the parent device. This means you cannot blindly do devres conversions so that deregistration ends up being tied to the parent device, something which leads to use-after-free on driver unbind when the class device is released while still being registered. Fixes: eed16255d66b ("leds: da903x: Use devm_led_classdev_register") Cc: stable # 4.6 Cc: Amitoj Kaur Chawla Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Signed-off-by: Pavel Machek Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/leds/leds-da903x.c | 14 +++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/leds/leds-da903x.c b/drivers/leds/leds-da903x.c index ed1b303f699f..2b5fb00438a2 100644 --- a/drivers/leds/leds-da903x.c +++ b/drivers/leds/leds-da903x.c @@ -110,12 +110,23 @@ static int da903x_led_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) led->flags = pdata->flags; led->master = pdev->dev.parent; - ret = devm_led_classdev_register(led->master, &led->cdev); + ret = led_classdev_register(led->master, &led->cdev); if (ret) { dev_err(&pdev->dev, "failed to register LED %d\n", id); return ret; } + platform_set_drvdata(pdev, led); + + return 0; +} + +static int da903x_led_remove(struct platform_device *pdev) +{ + struct da903x_led *led = platform_get_drvdata(pdev); + + led_classdev_unregister(&led->cdev); + return 0; } @@ -124,6 +135,7 @@ static struct platform_driver da903x_led_driver = { .name = "da903x-led", }, .probe = da903x_led_probe, + .remove = da903x_led_remove, }; module_platform_driver(da903x_led_driver); From 3564cddefb5bd0de65510cd17da2253808eef6e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johan Hovold Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2020 15:39:47 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 29/68] leds: lm3533: fix use-after-free on unbind commit d584221e683bbd173738603b83a315f27d27d043 upstream. Several MFD child drivers register their class devices directly under the parent device. This means you cannot blindly do devres conversions so that deregistration ends up being tied to the parent device, something which leads to use-after-free on driver unbind when the class device is released while still being registered. Fixes: 50154e29e5cc ("leds: lm3533: Use devm_led_classdev_register") Cc: stable # 4.6 Cc: Amitoj Kaur Chawla Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Signed-off-by: Pavel Machek Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/leds/leds-lm3533.c | 12 +++++++++--- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/leds/leds-lm3533.c b/drivers/leds/leds-lm3533.c index 9504ad405aef..b3edee703193 100644 --- a/drivers/leds/leds-lm3533.c +++ b/drivers/leds/leds-lm3533.c @@ -694,7 +694,7 @@ static int lm3533_led_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) platform_set_drvdata(pdev, led); - ret = devm_led_classdev_register(pdev->dev.parent, &led->cdev); + ret = led_classdev_register(pdev->dev.parent, &led->cdev); if (ret) { dev_err(&pdev->dev, "failed to register LED %d\n", pdev->id); return ret; @@ -704,13 +704,18 @@ static int lm3533_led_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) ret = lm3533_led_setup(led, pdata); if (ret) - return ret; + goto err_deregister; ret = lm3533_ctrlbank_enable(&led->cb); if (ret) - return ret; + goto err_deregister; return 0; + +err_deregister: + led_classdev_unregister(&led->cdev); + + return ret; } static int lm3533_led_remove(struct platform_device *pdev) @@ -720,6 +725,7 @@ static int lm3533_led_remove(struct platform_device *pdev) dev_dbg(&pdev->dev, "%s\n", __func__); lm3533_ctrlbank_disable(&led->cb); + led_classdev_unregister(&led->cdev); return 0; } From fe6402e0e66cfeb957bf9c25a37df392028fcf4f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johan Hovold Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2020 15:39:45 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 30/68] leds: 88pm860x: fix use-after-free on unbind commit eca21c2d8655387823d695b26e6fe78cf3975c05 upstream. Several MFD child drivers register their class devices directly under the parent device. This means you cannot blindly do devres conversions so that deregistration ends up being tied to the parent device, something which leads to use-after-free on driver unbind when the class device is released while still being registered. Fixes: 375446df95ee ("leds: 88pm860x: Use devm_led_classdev_register") Cc: stable # 4.6 Cc: Amitoj Kaur Chawla Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Signed-off-by: Pavel Machek Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/leds/leds-88pm860x.c | 14 +++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/leds/leds-88pm860x.c b/drivers/leds/leds-88pm860x.c index b3044c9a8120..465c3755cf2e 100644 --- a/drivers/leds/leds-88pm860x.c +++ b/drivers/leds/leds-88pm860x.c @@ -203,21 +203,33 @@ static int pm860x_led_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) data->cdev.brightness_set_blocking = pm860x_led_set; mutex_init(&data->lock); - ret = devm_led_classdev_register(chip->dev, &data->cdev); + ret = led_classdev_register(chip->dev, &data->cdev); if (ret < 0) { dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Failed to register LED: %d\n", ret); return ret; } pm860x_led_set(&data->cdev, 0); + + platform_set_drvdata(pdev, data); + return 0; } +static int pm860x_led_remove(struct platform_device *pdev) +{ + struct pm860x_led *data = platform_get_drvdata(pdev); + + led_classdev_unregister(&data->cdev); + + return 0; +} static struct platform_driver pm860x_led_driver = { .driver = { .name = "88pm860x-led", }, .probe = pm860x_led_probe, + .remove = pm860x_led_remove, }; module_platform_driver(pm860x_led_driver); From e0c47a51fc62a20392b394e7b5e9436988930b7b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christoph Hellwig Date: Fri, 10 Jul 2020 10:57:22 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 31/68] net/9p: validate fds in p9_fd_open [ Upstream commit a39c46067c845a8a2d7144836e9468b7f072343e ] p9_fd_open just fgets file descriptors passed in from userspace, but doesn't verify that they are valid for read or writing. This gets cought down in the VFS when actually attempting a read or write, but a new warning added in linux-next upsets syzcaller. Fix this by just verifying the fds early on. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200710085722.435850-1-hch@lst.de Reported-by: syzbot+e6f77e16ff68b2434a2c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig [Dominique: amend goto as per Doug Nazar's review] Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/9p/trans_fd.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/9p/trans_fd.c b/net/9p/trans_fd.c index 3f67803123be..12ecacf0c55f 100644 --- a/net/9p/trans_fd.c +++ b/net/9p/trans_fd.c @@ -816,20 +816,28 @@ static int p9_fd_open(struct p9_client *client, int rfd, int wfd) return -ENOMEM; ts->rd = fget(rfd); + if (!ts->rd) + goto out_free_ts; + if (!(ts->rd->f_mode & FMODE_READ)) + goto out_put_rd; ts->wr = fget(wfd); - if (!ts->rd || !ts->wr) { - if (ts->rd) - fput(ts->rd); - if (ts->wr) - fput(ts->wr); - kfree(ts); - return -EIO; - } + if (!ts->wr) + goto out_put_rd; + if (!(ts->wr->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)) + goto out_put_wr; client->trans = ts; client->status = Connected; return 0; + +out_put_wr: + fput(ts->wr); +out_put_rd: + fput(ts->rd); +out_free_ts: + kfree(ts); + return -EIO; } static int p9_socket_open(struct p9_client *client, struct socket *csocket) From 5955ccb5a46d992e42051cd1b76085b77bb9f170 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ben Skeggs Date: Fri, 24 Jul 2020 17:01:39 +1000 Subject: [PATCH 32/68] drm/nouveau/fbcon: fix module unload when fbcon init has failed for some reason [ Upstream commit 498595abf5bd51f0ae074cec565d888778ea558f ] Stale pointer was tripping up the unload path. Signed-off-by: Ben Skeggs Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_fbcon.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_fbcon.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_fbcon.c index f439f0a5b43a..141cc8998124 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_fbcon.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_fbcon.c @@ -592,6 +592,7 @@ fini: drm_fb_helper_fini(&fbcon->helper); free: kfree(fbcon); + drm->fbcon = NULL; return ret; } From 802df1e3f40cab749cfd9467d3f3027149a386cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ben Skeggs Date: Fri, 24 Jul 2020 17:02:48 +1000 Subject: [PATCH 33/68] drm/nouveau/fbcon: zero-initialise the mode_cmd2 structure [ Upstream commit 15fbc3b938534cc8eaac584a7b0c1183fc968b86 ] This is tripping up the format modifier patches. Signed-off-by: Ben Skeggs Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_fbcon.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_fbcon.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_fbcon.c index 141cc8998124..5cf2381f667e 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_fbcon.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_fbcon.c @@ -315,7 +315,7 @@ nouveau_fbcon_create(struct drm_fb_helper *helper, struct nouveau_framebuffer *fb; struct nouveau_channel *chan; struct nouveau_bo *nvbo; - struct drm_mode_fb_cmd2 mode_cmd; + struct drm_mode_fb_cmd2 mode_cmd = {}; int ret; mode_cmd.width = sizes->surface_width; From 8e6af828a3329170ce20d9c718485c352840558e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kai-Heng Feng Date: Fri, 24 Jul 2020 01:29:10 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 34/68] nvme-pci: prevent SK hynix PC400 from using Write Zeroes command [ Upstream commit 5611ec2b9814bc91f7b0a8d804c1fc152e2025d9 ] After commit 6e02318eaea5 ("nvme: add support for the Write Zeroes command"), SK hynix PC400 becomes very slow with the following error message: [ 224.567695] blk_update_request: operation not supported error, dev nvme1n1, sector 499384320 op 0x9:(WRITE_ZEROES) flags 0x1000000 phys_seg 0 prio class 0] SK Hynix PC400 has a buggy firmware that treats NLB as max value instead of a range, so the NLB passed isn't a valid value to the firmware. According to SK hynix there are three commands are affected: - Write Zeroes - Compare - Write Uncorrectable Right now only Write Zeroes is implemented, so disable it completely on SK hynix PC400. BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1872383 Cc: kyounghwan sohn Signed-off-by: Kai-Heng Feng Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/nvme/host/pci.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c b/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c index a13cae190196..ee7669f23cff 100644 --- a/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c @@ -3140,6 +3140,8 @@ static const struct pci_device_id nvme_id_table[] = { { PCI_DEVICE(0x1cc1, 0x8201), /* ADATA SX8200PNP 512GB */ .driver_data = NVME_QUIRK_NO_DEEPEST_PS | NVME_QUIRK_IGNORE_DEV_SUBNQN, }, + { PCI_DEVICE(0x1c5c, 0x1504), /* SK Hynix PC400 */ + .driver_data = NVME_QUIRK_DISABLE_WRITE_ZEROES, }, { PCI_DEVICE_CLASS(PCI_CLASS_STORAGE_EXPRESS, 0xffffff) }, { PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_APPLE, 0x2001), .driver_data = NVME_QUIRK_SINGLE_VECTOR }, From 4bba72b72c36f12e5946e609bcf21cc9c89261ef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sam Ravnborg Date: Thu, 9 Jul 2020 21:30:16 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 35/68] drm/drm_fb_helper: fix fbdev with sparc64 [ Upstream commit 2a1658bf922ffd9b7907e270a7d9cdc9643fc45d ] Recent kernels have been reported to panic using the bochs_drm framebuffer under qemu-system-sparc64 which was bisected to commit 7a0483ac4ffc ("drm/bochs: switch to generic drm fbdev emulation"). The backtrace indicates that the shadow framebuffer copy in drm_fb_helper_dirty_blit_real() is trying to access the real framebuffer using a virtual address rather than use an IO access typically implemented using a physical (ASI_PHYS) access on SPARC. The fix is to replace the memcpy with memcpy_toio() from io.h. memcpy_toio() uses writeb() where the original fbdev code used sbus_memcpy_toio(). The latter uses sbus_writeb(). The difference between writeb() and sbus_memcpy_toio() is that writeb() writes bytes in little-endian, where sbus_writeb() writes bytes in big-endian. As endian does not matter for byte writes they are the same. So we can safely use memcpy_toio() here. Note that this only fixes bochs, in general fbdev helpers still have issues with mixing up system memory and __iomem space. Fixing that will require a lot more work. v3: - Improved changelog (Daniel) - Added FIXME to fbdev_use_iomem (Daniel) v2: - Added missing __iomem cast (kernel test robot) - Made changelog readable and fix typos (Mark) - Add flag to select iomem - and set it in the bochs driver Signed-off-by: Sam Ravnborg Reported-by: Mark Cave-Ayland Reported-by: kernel test robot Tested-by: Mark Cave-Ayland Reviewed-by: Daniel Vetter Cc: Mark Cave-Ayland Cc: Thomas Zimmermann Cc: Gerd Hoffmann Cc: "David S. Miller" Cc: sparclinux@vger.kernel.org Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20200709193016.291267-1-sam@ravnborg.org Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20200725191012.GA434957@ravnborg.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/gpu/drm/bochs/bochs_kms.c | 1 + drivers/gpu/drm/drm_fb_helper.c | 6 +++++- include/drm/drm_mode_config.h | 12 ++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/bochs/bochs_kms.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/bochs/bochs_kms.c index 02a9c1ed165b..fa50ab2523d4 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/bochs/bochs_kms.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/bochs/bochs_kms.c @@ -194,6 +194,7 @@ int bochs_kms_init(struct bochs_device *bochs) bochs->dev->mode_config.preferred_depth = 24; bochs->dev->mode_config.prefer_shadow = 0; bochs->dev->mode_config.prefer_shadow_fbdev = 1; + bochs->dev->mode_config.fbdev_use_iomem = true; bochs->dev->mode_config.quirk_addfb_prefer_host_byte_order = true; bochs->dev->mode_config.funcs = &bochs_mode_funcs; diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_fb_helper.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_fb_helper.c index 8d193a58363d..6b8502bcf0fd 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_fb_helper.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_fb_helper.c @@ -390,7 +390,11 @@ static void drm_fb_helper_dirty_blit_real(struct drm_fb_helper *fb_helper, unsigned int y; for (y = clip->y1; y < clip->y2; y++) { - memcpy(dst, src, len); + if (!fb_helper->dev->mode_config.fbdev_use_iomem) + memcpy(dst, src, len); + else + memcpy_toio((void __iomem *)dst, src, len); + src += fb->pitches[0]; dst += fb->pitches[0]; } diff --git a/include/drm/drm_mode_config.h b/include/drm/drm_mode_config.h index 3bcbe30339f0..198b9d060008 100644 --- a/include/drm/drm_mode_config.h +++ b/include/drm/drm_mode_config.h @@ -865,6 +865,18 @@ struct drm_mode_config { */ bool prefer_shadow_fbdev; + /** + * @fbdev_use_iomem: + * + * Set to true if framebuffer reside in iomem. + * When set to true memcpy_toio() is used when copying the framebuffer in + * drm_fb_helper.drm_fb_helper_dirty_blit_real(). + * + * FIXME: This should be replaced with a per-mapping is_iomem + * flag (like ttm does), and then used everywhere in fbdev code. + */ + bool fbdev_use_iomem; + /** * @quirk_addfb_prefer_xbgr_30bpp: * From fa0195d83a49dfb6da81459bc396b8fbd3940b9f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wolfram Sang Date: Sat, 25 Jul 2020 21:50:52 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 36/68] i2c: slave: improve sanity check when registering [ Upstream commit 1b1be3bf27b62f5abcf85c6f3214bdb9c7526685 ] Add check for ERR_PTR and simplify code while here. Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang Reviewed-by: Alain Volmat Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/i2c/i2c-core-slave.c | 4 +--- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-slave.c b/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-slave.c index 5427f047faf0..549751347e6c 100644 --- a/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-slave.c +++ b/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-slave.c @@ -18,10 +18,8 @@ int i2c_slave_register(struct i2c_client *client, i2c_slave_cb_t slave_cb) { int ret; - if (!client || !slave_cb) { - WARN(1, "insufficient data\n"); + if (WARN(IS_ERR_OR_NULL(client) || !slave_cb, "insufficient data\n")) return -EINVAL; - } if (!(client->flags & I2C_CLIENT_SLAVE)) dev_warn(&client->dev, "%s: client slave flag not set. You might see address collisions\n", From 871b5a5a3be968a2412e11b98fe402dcbc2f0d0a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wolfram Sang Date: Sat, 25 Jul 2020 21:50:53 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 37/68] i2c: slave: add sanity check when unregistering [ Upstream commit 8808981baf96e1b3dea1f08461e4d958aa0dbde1 ] Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang Reviewed-by: Alain Volmat Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/i2c/i2c-core-slave.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-slave.c b/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-slave.c index 549751347e6c..1589179d5eb9 100644 --- a/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-slave.c +++ b/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-slave.c @@ -58,6 +58,9 @@ int i2c_slave_unregister(struct i2c_client *client) { int ret; + if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(client)) + return -EINVAL; + if (!client->adapter->algo->unreg_slave) { dev_err(&client->dev, "%s: not supported by adapter\n", __func__); return -EOPNOTSUPP; From fd601f38f59d69cd00138a5ea415a1ad48a0625f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Rustam Kovhaev Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2020 23:42:17 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 38/68] usb: hso: check for return value in hso_serial_common_create() [ Upstream commit e911e99a0770f760377c263bc7bac1b1593c6147 ] in case of an error tty_register_device_attr() returns ERR_PTR(), add IS_ERR() check Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+67b2bd0e34f952d0321e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=67b2bd0e34f952d0321e Signed-off-by: Rustam Kovhaev Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/usb/hso.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/hso.c b/drivers/net/usb/hso.c index 66a8b835aa94..7449b97a3c89 100644 --- a/drivers/net/usb/hso.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/hso.c @@ -2260,12 +2260,14 @@ static int hso_serial_common_create(struct hso_serial *serial, int num_urbs, minor = get_free_serial_index(); if (minor < 0) - goto exit; + goto exit2; /* register our minor number */ serial->parent->dev = tty_port_register_device_attr(&serial->port, tty_drv, minor, &serial->parent->interface->dev, serial->parent, hso_serial_dev_groups); + if (IS_ERR(serial->parent->dev)) + goto exit2; /* fill in specific data for later use */ serial->minor = minor; @@ -2310,6 +2312,7 @@ static int hso_serial_common_create(struct hso_serial *serial, int num_urbs, return 0; exit: hso_serial_tty_unregister(serial); +exit2: hso_serial_common_free(serial); return -1; } From eb96e4f71f5999ca8f4b5c2e0cb9d126ed363ef8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Ren=C3=A9=20van=20Dorst?= Date: Thu, 23 Jul 2020 20:07:10 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 39/68] net: ethernet: mtk_eth_soc: Always call mtk_gmac0_rgmii_adjust() for mt7623 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit 19016d93bfc335f0c158c0d9e3b9d06c4dd53d39 ] Modify mtk_gmac0_rgmii_adjust() so it can always be called. mtk_gmac0_rgmii_adjust() sets-up the TRGMII clocks. Signed-off-by: René van Dorst Signed-off-By: David Woodhouse Tested-by: Frank Wunderlich Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/mediatek/mtk_eth_soc.c | 19 ++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mediatek/mtk_eth_soc.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mediatek/mtk_eth_soc.c index 997dc811382a..be390c7e43b2 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mediatek/mtk_eth_soc.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mediatek/mtk_eth_soc.c @@ -171,11 +171,21 @@ static int mt7621_gmac0_rgmii_adjust(struct mtk_eth *eth, return 0; } -static void mtk_gmac0_rgmii_adjust(struct mtk_eth *eth, int speed) +static void mtk_gmac0_rgmii_adjust(struct mtk_eth *eth, + phy_interface_t interface, int speed) { u32 val; int ret; + if (interface == PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_TRGMII) { + mtk_w32(eth, TRGMII_MODE, INTF_MODE); + val = 500000000; + ret = clk_set_rate(eth->clks[MTK_CLK_TRGPLL], val); + if (ret) + dev_err(eth->dev, "Failed to set trgmii pll: %d\n", ret); + return; + } + val = (speed == SPEED_1000) ? INTF_MODE_RGMII_1000 : INTF_MODE_RGMII_10_100; mtk_w32(eth, val, INTF_MODE); @@ -262,10 +272,9 @@ static void mtk_mac_config(struct phylink_config *config, unsigned int mode, state->interface)) goto err_phy; } else { - if (state->interface != - PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_TRGMII) - mtk_gmac0_rgmii_adjust(mac->hw, - state->speed); + mtk_gmac0_rgmii_adjust(mac->hw, + state->interface, + state->speed); /* mt7623_pad_clk_setup */ for (i = 0 ; i < NUM_TRGMII_CTRL; i++) From 01fdcb848611dc5e17efebd4f9141dfecce2350f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ranjani Sridharan Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2020 16:10:11 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 40/68] ALSA: hda: fix NULL pointer dereference during suspend [ Upstream commit 7fcd9bb5acd01250bcae1ecc0cb8b8d4bb5b7e63 ] When the ASoC card registration fails and the codec component driver never probes, the codec device is not initialized and therefore memory for codec->wcaps is not allocated. This results in a NULL pointer dereference when the codec driver suspend callback is invoked during system suspend. Fix this by returning without performing any actions during codec suspend/resume if the card was not registered successfully. Reviewed-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart Signed-off-by: Ranjani Sridharan Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200728231011.1454066-1-ranjani.sridharan@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- sound/pci/hda/hda_codec.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/hda_codec.c b/sound/pci/hda/hda_codec.c index 07c03c32715a..801abf0fc98b 100644 --- a/sound/pci/hda/hda_codec.c +++ b/sound/pci/hda/hda_codec.c @@ -2924,6 +2924,10 @@ static int hda_codec_runtime_suspend(struct device *dev) struct hda_codec *codec = dev_to_hda_codec(dev); unsigned int state; + /* Nothing to do if card registration fails and the component driver never probes */ + if (!codec->card) + return 0; + cancel_delayed_work_sync(&codec->jackpoll_work); state = hda_call_codec_suspend(codec); if (codec->link_down_at_suspend || @@ -2938,6 +2942,10 @@ static int hda_codec_runtime_resume(struct device *dev) { struct hda_codec *codec = dev_to_hda_codec(dev); + /* Nothing to do if card registration fails and the component driver never probes */ + if (!codec->card) + return 0; + codec_display_power(codec, true); snd_hdac_codec_link_up(&codec->core); hda_call_codec_resume(codec); From 83ea63708a298d8cb7ccffae83e400ec95f9156b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Qiushi Wu Date: Sat, 13 Jun 2020 14:05:33 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 41/68] firmware: Fix a reference count leak. [ Upstream commit fe3c60684377d5ad9b0569b87ed3e26e12c8173b ] kobject_init_and_add() takes reference even when it fails. If this function returns an error, kobject_put() must be called to properly clean up the memory associated with the object. Callback function fw_cfg_sysfs_release_entry() in kobject_put() can handle the pointer "entry" properly. Signed-off-by: Qiushi Wu Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200613190533.15712-1-wu000273@umn.edu Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/firmware/qemu_fw_cfg.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/firmware/qemu_fw_cfg.c b/drivers/firmware/qemu_fw_cfg.c index 039e0f91dba8..6945c3c96637 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/qemu_fw_cfg.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/qemu_fw_cfg.c @@ -605,8 +605,10 @@ static int fw_cfg_register_file(const struct fw_cfg_file *f) /* register entry under "/sys/firmware/qemu_fw_cfg/by_key/" */ err = kobject_init_and_add(&entry->kobj, &fw_cfg_sysfs_entry_ktype, fw_cfg_sel_ko, "%d", entry->select); - if (err) - goto err_register; + if (err) { + kobject_put(&entry->kobj); + return err; + } /* add raw binary content access */ err = sysfs_create_bin_file(&entry->kobj, &fw_cfg_sysfs_attr_raw); @@ -622,7 +624,6 @@ static int fw_cfg_register_file(const struct fw_cfg_file *f) err_add_raw: kobject_del(&entry->kobj); -err_register: kfree(entry); return err; } From 7c8a863ba3cbbfdd5358c63c51f07681973babde Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Julian Squires Date: Mon, 6 Jul 2020 17:13:53 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 42/68] cfg80211: check vendor command doit pointer before use [ Upstream commit 4052d3d2e8f47a15053320bbcbe365d15610437d ] In the case where a vendor command does not implement doit, and has no flags set, doit would not be validated and a NULL pointer dereference would occur, for example when invoking the vendor command via iw. I encountered this while developing new vendor commands. Perhaps in practice it is advisable to always implement doit along with dumpit, but it seems reasonable to me to always check doit anyway, not just when NEED_WDEV. Signed-off-by: Julian Squires Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200706211353.2366470-1-julian@cipht.net Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/wireless/nl80211.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/wireless/nl80211.c b/net/wireless/nl80211.c index a34bbca80f49..ec559dbad56e 100644 --- a/net/wireless/nl80211.c +++ b/net/wireless/nl80211.c @@ -12949,13 +12949,13 @@ static int nl80211_vendor_cmd(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) if (!wdev_running(wdev)) return -ENETDOWN; } - - if (!vcmd->doit) - return -EOPNOTSUPP; } else { wdev = NULL; } + if (!vcmd->doit) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + if (info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_VENDOR_DATA]) { data = nla_data(info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_VENDOR_DATA]); len = nla_len(info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_VENDOR_DATA]); From 5414f27048e5fa13143b49651d97ec9f5d2f062e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Francesco Ruggeri Date: Thu, 2 Jul 2020 15:39:06 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 43/68] igb: reinit_locked() should be called with rtnl_lock [ Upstream commit 024a8168b749db7a4aa40a5fbdfa04bf7e77c1c0 ] We observed two panics involving races with igb_reset_task. The first panic is caused by this race condition: kworker reboot -f igb_reset_task igb_reinit_locked igb_down napi_synchronize __igb_shutdown igb_clear_interrupt_scheme igb_free_q_vectors igb_free_q_vector adapter->q_vector[v_idx] = NULL; napi_disable Panics trying to access adapter->q_vector[v_idx].napi_state The second panic (a divide error) is caused by this race: kworker reboot -f tx packet igb_reset_task __igb_shutdown rtnl_lock() ... igb_clear_interrupt_scheme igb_free_q_vectors adapter->num_tx_queues = 0 ... rtnl_unlock() rtnl_lock() igb_reinit_locked igb_down igb_up netif_tx_start_all_queues dev_hard_start_xmit igb_xmit_frame igb_tx_queue_mapping Panics on r_idx % adapter->num_tx_queues This commit applies to igb_reset_task the same changes that were applied to ixgbe in commit 2f90b8657ec9 ("ixgbe: this patch adds support for DCB to the kernel and ixgbe driver"), commit 8f4c5c9fb87a ("ixgbe: reinit_locked() should be called with rtnl_lock") and commit 88adce4ea8f9 ("ixgbe: fix possible race in reset subtask"). Signed-off-by: Francesco Ruggeri Tested-by: Aaron Brown Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c index ed7e667d7eb2..3e41b20ed8eb 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c @@ -6194,9 +6194,18 @@ static void igb_reset_task(struct work_struct *work) struct igb_adapter *adapter; adapter = container_of(work, struct igb_adapter, reset_task); + rtnl_lock(); + /* If we're already down or resetting, just bail */ + if (test_bit(__IGB_DOWN, &adapter->state) || + test_bit(__IGB_RESETTING, &adapter->state)) { + rtnl_unlock(); + return; + } + igb_dump(adapter); netdev_err(adapter->netdev, "Reset adapter\n"); igb_reinit_locked(adapter); + rtnl_unlock(); } /** From 414f10532c14f8d0c2254f3654414ee2dc7209b5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xin Xiong Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2020 21:06:59 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 44/68] atm: fix atm_dev refcnt leaks in atmtcp_remove_persistent [ Upstream commit 51875dad43b44241b46a569493f1e4bfa0386d86 ] atmtcp_remove_persistent() invokes atm_dev_lookup(), which returns a reference of atm_dev with increased refcount or NULL if fails. The refcount leaks issues occur in two error handling paths. If dev_data->persist is zero or PRIV(dev)->vcc isn't NULL, the function returns 0 without decreasing the refcount kept by a local variable, resulting in refcount leaks. Fix the issue by adding atm_dev_put() before returning 0 both when dev_data->persist is zero or PRIV(dev)->vcc isn't NULL. Signed-off-by: Xin Xiong Signed-off-by: Xiyu Yang Signed-off-by: Xin Tan Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/atm/atmtcp.c | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/atm/atmtcp.c b/drivers/atm/atmtcp.c index d9fd70280482..7f814da3c2d0 100644 --- a/drivers/atm/atmtcp.c +++ b/drivers/atm/atmtcp.c @@ -433,9 +433,15 @@ static int atmtcp_remove_persistent(int itf) return -EMEDIUMTYPE; } dev_data = PRIV(dev); - if (!dev_data->persist) return 0; + if (!dev_data->persist) { + atm_dev_put(dev); + return 0; + } dev_data->persist = 0; - if (PRIV(dev)->vcc) return 0; + if (PRIV(dev)->vcc) { + atm_dev_put(dev); + return 0; + } kfree(dev_data); atm_dev_put(dev); atm_dev_deregister(dev); From 3429579045f1e867c5edb10ec0060a85a7bb651e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Philippe Duplessis-Guindon Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2020 11:02:36 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 45/68] tools lib traceevent: Fix memory leak in process_dynamic_array_len [ Upstream commit e24c6447ccb7b1a01f9bf0aec94939e6450c0b4d ] I compiled with AddressSanitizer and I had these memory leaks while I was using the tep_parse_format function: Direct leak of 28 byte(s) in 4 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fb07db49ffe in __interceptor_realloc (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x10dffe) #1 0x7fb07a724228 in extend_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:985 #2 0x7fb07a724c21 in __read_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1140 #3 0x7fb07a724f78 in read_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1206 #4 0x7fb07a725191 in __read_expect_type /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1291 #5 0x7fb07a7251df in read_expect_type /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1299 #6 0x7fb07a72e6c8 in process_dynamic_array_len /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:2849 #7 0x7fb07a7304b8 in process_function /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3161 #8 0x7fb07a730900 in process_arg_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3207 #9 0x7fb07a727c0b in process_arg /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1786 #10 0x7fb07a731080 in event_read_print_args /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3285 #11 0x7fb07a731722 in event_read_print /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3369 #12 0x7fb07a740054 in __tep_parse_format /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:6335 #13 0x7fb07a74047a in __parse_event /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:6389 #14 0x7fb07a740536 in tep_parse_format /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:6431 #15 0x7fb07a785acf in parse_event ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:251 #16 0x7fb07a785ccd in parse_systems ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:284 #17 0x7fb07a786fb3 in read_metadata ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:593 #18 0x7fb07a78760e in ftrace_fs_source_init ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:727 #19 0x7fb07d90c19c in add_component_with_init_method_data ../../../../src/lib/graph/graph.c:1048 #20 0x7fb07d90c87b in add_source_component_with_initialize_method_data ../../../../src/lib/graph/graph.c:1127 #21 0x7fb07d90c92a in bt_graph_add_source_component ../../../../src/lib/graph/graph.c:1152 #22 0x55db11aa632e in cmd_run_ctx_create_components_from_config_components ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2252 #23 0x55db11aa6fda in cmd_run_ctx_create_components ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2347 #24 0x55db11aa780c in cmd_run ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2461 #25 0x55db11aa8a7d in main ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2673 #26 0x7fb07d5460b2 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x270b2) The token variable in the process_dynamic_array_len function is allocated in the read_expect_type function, but is not freed before calling the read_token function. Free the token variable before calling read_token in order to plug the leak. Signed-off-by: Philippe Duplessis-Guindon Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-devel/20200730150236.5392-1-pduplessis@efficios.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c b/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c index 798284f511f1..4559a15e6657 100644 --- a/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c +++ b/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c @@ -2861,6 +2861,7 @@ process_dynamic_array_len(struct tep_event *event, struct tep_print_arg *arg, if (read_expected(TEP_EVENT_DELIM, ")") < 0) goto out_err; + free_token(token); type = read_token(&token); *tok = token; From 6059000e145feb0c0399717f34a70b8d74fe030d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dexuan Cui Date: Sun, 19 Jan 2020 15:29:22 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 46/68] Drivers: hv: vmbus: Ignore CHANNELMSG_TL_CONNECT_RESULT(23) [ Upstream commit ddc9d357b991838c2d975e8d7e4e9db26f37a7ff ] When a Linux hv_sock app tries to connect to a Service GUID on which no host app is listening, a recent host (RS3+) sends a CHANNELMSG_TL_CONNECT_RESULT (23) message to Linux and this triggers such a warning: unknown msgtype=23 WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 0 at drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c:1031 vmbus_on_msg_dpc Actually Linux can safely ignore the message because the Linux app's connect() will time out in 2 seconds: see VSOCK_DEFAULT_CONNECT_TIMEOUT and vsock_stream_connect(). We don't bother to make use of the message because: 1) it's only supported on recent hosts; 2) a non-trivial effort is required to use the message in Linux, but the benefit is small. So, let's not see the warning by silently ignoring the message. Signed-off-by: Dexuan Cui Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/hv/channel_mgmt.c | 21 +++++++-------------- drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c | 4 ++++ include/linux/hyperv.h | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/hv/channel_mgmt.c b/drivers/hv/channel_mgmt.c index c8296d5e74c3..501c43c5851d 100644 --- a/drivers/hv/channel_mgmt.c +++ b/drivers/hv/channel_mgmt.c @@ -1354,6 +1354,8 @@ channel_message_table[CHANNELMSG_COUNT] = { { CHANNELMSG_19, 0, NULL }, { CHANNELMSG_20, 0, NULL }, { CHANNELMSG_TL_CONNECT_REQUEST, 0, NULL }, + { CHANNELMSG_22, 0, NULL }, + { CHANNELMSG_TL_CONNECT_RESULT, 0, NULL }, }; /* @@ -1365,25 +1367,16 @@ void vmbus_onmessage(void *context) { struct hv_message *msg = context; struct vmbus_channel_message_header *hdr; - int size; hdr = (struct vmbus_channel_message_header *)msg->u.payload; - size = msg->header.payload_size; trace_vmbus_on_message(hdr); - if (hdr->msgtype >= CHANNELMSG_COUNT) { - pr_err("Received invalid channel message type %d size %d\n", - hdr->msgtype, size); - print_hex_dump_bytes("", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, - (unsigned char *)msg->u.payload, size); - return; - } - - if (channel_message_table[hdr->msgtype].message_handler) - channel_message_table[hdr->msgtype].message_handler(hdr); - else - pr_err("Unhandled channel message type %d\n", hdr->msgtype); + /* + * vmbus_on_msg_dpc() makes sure the hdr->msgtype here can not go + * out of bound and the message_handler pointer can not be NULL. + */ + channel_message_table[hdr->msgtype].message_handler(hdr); } /* diff --git a/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c b/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c index 160ff640485b..24c38e44ed3b 100644 --- a/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c +++ b/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c @@ -1073,6 +1073,10 @@ void vmbus_on_msg_dpc(unsigned long data) } entry = &channel_message_table[hdr->msgtype]; + + if (!entry->message_handler) + goto msg_handled; + if (entry->handler_type == VMHT_BLOCKING) { ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx), GFP_ATOMIC); if (ctx == NULL) diff --git a/include/linux/hyperv.h b/include/linux/hyperv.h index b4a017093b69..67d9b5a37460 100644 --- a/include/linux/hyperv.h +++ b/include/linux/hyperv.h @@ -423,6 +423,8 @@ enum vmbus_channel_message_type { CHANNELMSG_19 = 19, CHANNELMSG_20 = 20, CHANNELMSG_TL_CONNECT_REQUEST = 21, + CHANNELMSG_22 = 22, + CHANNELMSG_TL_CONNECT_RESULT = 23, CHANNELMSG_COUNT }; From 11e64146dc698f6543706d2865fb01cfea7e7b42 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Frank van der Linden Date: Tue, 23 Jun 2020 22:39:18 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 47/68] xattr: break delegations in {set,remove}xattr commit 08b5d5014a27e717826999ad20e394a8811aae92 upstream. set/removexattr on an exported filesystem should break NFS delegations. This is true in general, but also for the upcoming support for RFC 8726 (NFSv4 extended attribute support). Make sure that they do. Additionally, they need to grow a _locked variant, since callers might call this with i_rwsem held (like the NFS server code). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.9+ Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Al Viro Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/xattr.c | 84 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- include/linux/xattr.h | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/xattr.c b/fs/xattr.c index 90dd78f0eb27..f2854570d411 100644 --- a/fs/xattr.c +++ b/fs/xattr.c @@ -204,10 +204,22 @@ int __vfs_setxattr_noperm(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, return error; } - +/** + * __vfs_setxattr_locked: set an extended attribute while holding the inode + * lock + * + * @dentry - object to perform setxattr on + * @name - xattr name to set + * @value - value to set @name to + * @size - size of @value + * @flags - flags to pass into filesystem operations + * @delegated_inode - on return, will contain an inode pointer that + * a delegation was broken on, NULL if none. + */ int -vfs_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value, - size_t size, int flags) +__vfs_setxattr_locked(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, + const void *value, size_t size, int flags, + struct inode **delegated_inode) { struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; int error; @@ -216,15 +228,40 @@ vfs_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value, if (error) return error; - inode_lock(inode); error = security_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); if (error) goto out; + error = try_break_deleg(inode, delegated_inode); + if (error) + goto out; + error = __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, name, value, size, flags); out: + return error; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__vfs_setxattr_locked); + +int +vfs_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value, + size_t size, int flags) +{ + struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; + struct inode *delegated_inode = NULL; + int error; + +retry_deleg: + inode_lock(inode); + error = __vfs_setxattr_locked(dentry, name, value, size, flags, + &delegated_inode); inode_unlock(inode); + + if (delegated_inode) { + error = break_deleg_wait(&delegated_inode); + if (!error) + goto retry_deleg; + } return error; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vfs_setxattr); @@ -378,8 +415,18 @@ __vfs_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__vfs_removexattr); +/** + * __vfs_removexattr_locked: set an extended attribute while holding the inode + * lock + * + * @dentry - object to perform setxattr on + * @name - name of xattr to remove + * @delegated_inode - on return, will contain an inode pointer that + * a delegation was broken on, NULL if none. + */ int -vfs_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) +__vfs_removexattr_locked(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, + struct inode **delegated_inode) { struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; int error; @@ -388,11 +435,14 @@ vfs_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) if (error) return error; - inode_lock(inode); error = security_inode_removexattr(dentry, name); if (error) goto out; + error = try_break_deleg(inode, delegated_inode); + if (error) + goto out; + error = __vfs_removexattr(dentry, name); if (!error) { @@ -401,12 +451,32 @@ vfs_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) } out: + return error; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__vfs_removexattr_locked); + +int +vfs_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) +{ + struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; + struct inode *delegated_inode = NULL; + int error; + +retry_deleg: + inode_lock(inode); + error = __vfs_removexattr_locked(dentry, name, &delegated_inode); inode_unlock(inode); + + if (delegated_inode) { + error = break_deleg_wait(&delegated_inode); + if (!error) + goto retry_deleg; + } + return error; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vfs_removexattr); - /* * Extended attribute SET operations */ diff --git a/include/linux/xattr.h b/include/linux/xattr.h index 6dad031be3c2..3a71ad716da5 100644 --- a/include/linux/xattr.h +++ b/include/linux/xattr.h @@ -51,8 +51,10 @@ ssize_t vfs_getxattr(struct dentry *, const char *, void *, size_t); ssize_t vfs_listxattr(struct dentry *d, char *list, size_t size); int __vfs_setxattr(struct dentry *, struct inode *, const char *, const void *, size_t, int); int __vfs_setxattr_noperm(struct dentry *, const char *, const void *, size_t, int); +int __vfs_setxattr_locked(struct dentry *, const char *, const void *, size_t, int, struct inode **); int vfs_setxattr(struct dentry *, const char *, const void *, size_t, int); int __vfs_removexattr(struct dentry *, const char *); +int __vfs_removexattr_locked(struct dentry *, const char *, struct inode **); int vfs_removexattr(struct dentry *, const char *); ssize_t generic_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size); From ceff42e6c1fcf7553a11420695ff07b32838c59b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christophe Leroy Date: Thu, 2 Jul 2020 11:52:02 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 48/68] Revert "powerpc/kasan: Fix shadow pages allocation failure" commit b506923ee44ae87fc9f4de16b53feb313623e146 upstream. This reverts commit d2a91cef9bbdeb87b7449fdab1a6be6000930210. This commit moved too much work in kasan_init(). The allocation of shadow pages has to be moved for the reason explained in that patch, but the allocation of page tables still need to be done before switching to the final hash table. First revert the incorrect commit, following patch redoes it properly. Fixes: d2a91cef9bbd ("powerpc/kasan: Fix shadow pages allocation failure") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Erhard F. Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=208181 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/3667deb0911affbf999b99f87c31c77d5e870cd2.1593690707.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/powerpc/include/asm/kasan.h | 2 ++ arch/powerpc/mm/init_32.c | 2 ++ arch/powerpc/mm/kasan/kasan_init_32.c | 4 +--- 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/kasan.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/kasan.h index b68eeff77806..6db06f58deed 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/kasan.h +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/kasan.h @@ -27,9 +27,11 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN void kasan_early_init(void); +void kasan_mmu_init(void); void kasan_init(void); #else static inline void kasan_init(void) { } +static inline void kasan_mmu_init(void) { } #endif #endif /* __ASSEMBLY */ diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/init_32.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/init_32.c index 68f7446193d1..b04896a88d79 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/mm/init_32.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/init_32.c @@ -175,6 +175,8 @@ void __init MMU_init(void) btext_unmap(); #endif + kasan_mmu_init(); + setup_kup(); /* Shortly after that, the entire linear mapping will be available */ diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/kasan/kasan_init_32.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/kasan/kasan_init_32.c index b01d4b72eccf..1cfe57b51d7e 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/mm/kasan/kasan_init_32.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/kasan/kasan_init_32.c @@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ static void __init kasan_remap_early_shadow_ro(void) flush_tlb_kernel_range(KASAN_SHADOW_START, KASAN_SHADOW_END); } -static void __init kasan_mmu_init(void) +void __init kasan_mmu_init(void) { int ret; struct memblock_region *reg; @@ -156,8 +156,6 @@ static void __init kasan_mmu_init(void) void __init kasan_init(void) { - kasan_mmu_init(); - kasan_remap_early_shadow_ro(); clear_page(kasan_early_shadow_page); From 4913f71e64aba21062a1fc631034017ec49cfc2b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nicolas Chauvet Date: Sat, 18 Jul 2020 12:07:10 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 49/68] PCI: tegra: Revert tegra124 raw_violation_fixup commit e7b856dfcec6d3bf028adee8c65342d7035914a1 upstream. As reported in https://bugzilla.kernel.org/206217 , raw_violation_fixup is causing more harm than good in some common use-cases. This patch is a partial revert of commit: 191cd6fb5d2c ("PCI: tegra: Add SW fixup for RAW violations") and fixes the following regression since then. * Description: When both the NIC and MMC are used one can see the following message: NETDEV WATCHDOG: enp1s0 (r8169): transmit queue 0 timed out and pcieport 0000:00:02.0: AER: Uncorrected (Non-Fatal) error received: 0000:01:00.0 r8169 0000:01:00.0: AER: PCIe Bus Error: severity=Uncorrected (Non-Fatal), type=Transaction Layer, (Requester ID) r8169 0000:01:00.0: AER: device [10ec:8168] error status/mask=00004000/00400000 r8169 0000:01:00.0: AER: [14] CmpltTO (First) r8169 0000:01:00.0: AER: can't recover (no error_detected callback) pcieport 0000:00:02.0: AER: device recovery failed After that, the ethernet NIC is not functional anymore even after reloading the r8169 module. After a reboot, this is reproducible by copying a large file over the NIC to the MMC. For some reason this is not reproducible when files are copied to a tmpfs. * Little background on the fixup, by Manikanta Maddireddy: "In the internal testing with dGPU on Tegra124, CmplTO is reported by dGPU. This happened because FIFO queue in AFI(AXI to PCIe) module get full by upstream posted writes. Back to back upstream writes interleaved with infrequent reads, triggers RAW violation and CmpltTO. This is fixed by reducing the posted write credits and by changing updateFC timer frequency. These settings are fixed after stress test. In the current case, RTL NIC is also reporting CmplTO. These settings seems to be aggravating the issue instead of fixing it." Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200718100710.15398-1-kwizart@gmail.com Fixes: 191cd6fb5d2c ("PCI: tegra: Add SW fixup for RAW violations") Signed-off-by: Nicolas Chauvet Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi Reviewed-by: Manikanta Maddireddy Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/pci/controller/pci-tegra.c | 32 ------------------------------ 1 file changed, 32 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/pci/controller/pci-tegra.c b/drivers/pci/controller/pci-tegra.c index ac93f5a0398e..b71e753419c2 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/controller/pci-tegra.c +++ b/drivers/pci/controller/pci-tegra.c @@ -181,13 +181,6 @@ #define AFI_PEXBIAS_CTRL_0 0x168 -#define RP_PRIV_XP_DL 0x00000494 -#define RP_PRIV_XP_DL_GEN2_UPD_FC_TSHOLD (0x1ff << 1) - -#define RP_RX_HDR_LIMIT 0x00000e00 -#define RP_RX_HDR_LIMIT_PW_MASK (0xff << 8) -#define RP_RX_HDR_LIMIT_PW (0x0e << 8) - #define RP_ECTL_2_R1 0x00000e84 #define RP_ECTL_2_R1_RX_CTLE_1C_MASK 0xffff @@ -323,7 +316,6 @@ struct tegra_pcie_soc { bool program_uphy; bool update_clamp_threshold; bool program_deskew_time; - bool raw_violation_fixup; bool update_fc_timer; bool has_cache_bars; struct { @@ -669,23 +661,6 @@ static void tegra_pcie_apply_sw_fixup(struct tegra_pcie_port *port) writel(value, port->base + RP_VEND_CTL0); } - /* Fixup for read after write violation. */ - if (soc->raw_violation_fixup) { - value = readl(port->base + RP_RX_HDR_LIMIT); - value &= ~RP_RX_HDR_LIMIT_PW_MASK; - value |= RP_RX_HDR_LIMIT_PW; - writel(value, port->base + RP_RX_HDR_LIMIT); - - value = readl(port->base + RP_PRIV_XP_DL); - value |= RP_PRIV_XP_DL_GEN2_UPD_FC_TSHOLD; - writel(value, port->base + RP_PRIV_XP_DL); - - value = readl(port->base + RP_VEND_XP); - value &= ~RP_VEND_XP_UPDATE_FC_THRESHOLD_MASK; - value |= soc->update_fc_threshold; - writel(value, port->base + RP_VEND_XP); - } - if (soc->update_fc_timer) { value = readl(port->base + RP_VEND_XP); value &= ~RP_VEND_XP_UPDATE_FC_THRESHOLD_MASK; @@ -2511,7 +2486,6 @@ static const struct tegra_pcie_soc tegra20_pcie = { .program_uphy = true, .update_clamp_threshold = false, .program_deskew_time = false, - .raw_violation_fixup = false, .update_fc_timer = false, .has_cache_bars = true, .ectl.enable = false, @@ -2541,7 +2515,6 @@ static const struct tegra_pcie_soc tegra30_pcie = { .program_uphy = true, .update_clamp_threshold = false, .program_deskew_time = false, - .raw_violation_fixup = false, .update_fc_timer = false, .has_cache_bars = false, .ectl.enable = false, @@ -2554,8 +2527,6 @@ static const struct tegra_pcie_soc tegra124_pcie = { .pads_pll_ctl = PADS_PLL_CTL_TEGRA30, .tx_ref_sel = PADS_PLL_CTL_TXCLKREF_BUF_EN, .pads_refclk_cfg0 = 0x44ac44ac, - /* FC threshold is bit[25:18] */ - .update_fc_threshold = 0x03fc0000, .has_pex_clkreq_en = true, .has_pex_bias_ctrl = true, .has_intr_prsnt_sense = true, @@ -2565,7 +2536,6 @@ static const struct tegra_pcie_soc tegra124_pcie = { .program_uphy = true, .update_clamp_threshold = true, .program_deskew_time = false, - .raw_violation_fixup = true, .update_fc_timer = false, .has_cache_bars = false, .ectl.enable = false, @@ -2589,7 +2559,6 @@ static const struct tegra_pcie_soc tegra210_pcie = { .program_uphy = true, .update_clamp_threshold = true, .program_deskew_time = true, - .raw_violation_fixup = false, .update_fc_timer = true, .has_cache_bars = false, .ectl = { @@ -2631,7 +2600,6 @@ static const struct tegra_pcie_soc tegra186_pcie = { .program_uphy = false, .update_clamp_threshold = false, .program_deskew_time = false, - .raw_violation_fixup = false, .update_fc_timer = false, .has_cache_bars = false, .ectl.enable = false, From 9b37a7bcdd8a55453daec94b84415e6c2f064d54 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ido Schimmel Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2020 11:37:13 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 50/68] ipv4: Silence suspicious RCU usage warning [ Upstream commit 83f3522860f702748143e022f1a546547314c715 ] fib_trie_unmerge() is called with RTNL held, but not from an RCU read-side critical section. This leads to the following warning [1] when the FIB alias list in a leaf is traversed with hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(). Since the function is always called with RTNL held and since modification of the list is protected by RTNL, simply use hlist_for_each_entry() and silence the warning. [1] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 5.8.0-rc4-custom-01520-gc1f937f3f83b #30 Not tainted ----------------------------- net/ipv4/fib_trie.c:1867 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 1 lock held by ip/164: #0: ffffffff85a27850 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x49a/0xbd0 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 164 Comm: ip Not tainted 5.8.0-rc4-custom-01520-gc1f937f3f83b #30 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x100/0x184 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x153/0x15d fib_trie_unmerge+0x608/0xdb0 fib_unmerge+0x44/0x360 fib4_rule_configure+0xc8/0xad0 fib_nl_newrule+0x37a/0x1dd0 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x4f7/0xbd0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x17a/0x480 rtnetlink_rcv+0x22/0x30 netlink_unicast+0x5ae/0x890 netlink_sendmsg+0x98a/0xf40 ____sys_sendmsg+0x879/0xa00 ___sys_sendmsg+0x122/0x190 __sys_sendmsg+0x103/0x1d0 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x7d/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x54/0xa0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x7fc80a234e97 Code: Bad RIP value. RSP: 002b:00007ffef8b66798 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fc80a234e97 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffef8b66800 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 000000005f141b1c R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00007fc80a2a8ac0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffef8b67008 R15: 0000556fccb10020 Fixes: 0ddcf43d5d4a ("ipv4: FIB Local/MAIN table collapse") Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/ipv4/fib_trie.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/fib_trie.c b/net/ipv4/fib_trie.c index 1b851fd82613..47b6d73d30e5 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/fib_trie.c +++ b/net/ipv4/fib_trie.c @@ -1751,7 +1751,7 @@ struct fib_table *fib_trie_unmerge(struct fib_table *oldtb) while ((l = leaf_walk_rcu(&tp, key)) != NULL) { struct key_vector *local_l = NULL, *local_tp; - hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(fa, &l->leaf, fa_list) { + hlist_for_each_entry(fa, &l->leaf, fa_list) { struct fib_alias *new_fa; if (local_tb->tb_id != fa->tb_id) From 89c12bc36262e99f1d02f4b208699fa65866ff36 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Cong Wang Date: Sat, 25 Jul 2020 15:40:53 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 51/68] ipv6: fix memory leaks on IPV6_ADDRFORM path [ Upstream commit 8c0de6e96c9794cb523a516c465991a70245da1c ] IPV6_ADDRFORM causes resource leaks when converting an IPv6 socket to IPv4, particularly struct ipv6_ac_socklist. Similar to struct ipv6_mc_socklist, we should just close it on this path. This bug can be easily reproduced with the following C program: #include #include #include #include #include int main() { int s, value; struct sockaddr_in6 addr; struct ipv6_mreq m6; s = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_DGRAM, 0); addr.sin6_family = AF_INET6; addr.sin6_port = htons(5000); inet_pton(AF_INET6, "::ffff:192.168.122.194", &addr.sin6_addr); connect(s, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)); inet_pton(AF_INET6, "fe80::AAAA", &m6.ipv6mr_multiaddr); m6.ipv6mr_interface = 5; setsockopt(s, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_JOIN_ANYCAST, &m6, sizeof(m6)); value = AF_INET; setsockopt(s, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_ADDRFORM, &value, sizeof(value)); close(s); return 0; } Reported-by: ch3332xr@gmail.com Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Cong Wang Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/net/addrconf.h | 1 + net/ipv6/anycast.c | 17 ++++++++++++----- net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c | 1 + 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/addrconf.h b/include/net/addrconf.h index 3f62b347b04a..ab8b3eb53d4b 100644 --- a/include/net/addrconf.h +++ b/include/net/addrconf.h @@ -273,6 +273,7 @@ int ipv6_sock_ac_join(struct sock *sk, int ifindex, const struct in6_addr *addr); int ipv6_sock_ac_drop(struct sock *sk, int ifindex, const struct in6_addr *addr); +void __ipv6_sock_ac_close(struct sock *sk); void ipv6_sock_ac_close(struct sock *sk); int __ipv6_dev_ac_inc(struct inet6_dev *idev, const struct in6_addr *addr); diff --git a/net/ipv6/anycast.c b/net/ipv6/anycast.c index fed91ab7ec46..cf3a88a10ddd 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/anycast.c +++ b/net/ipv6/anycast.c @@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ int ipv6_sock_ac_drop(struct sock *sk, int ifindex, const struct in6_addr *addr) return 0; } -void ipv6_sock_ac_close(struct sock *sk) +void __ipv6_sock_ac_close(struct sock *sk) { struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk); struct net_device *dev = NULL; @@ -191,10 +191,7 @@ void ipv6_sock_ac_close(struct sock *sk) struct net *net = sock_net(sk); int prev_index; - if (!np->ipv6_ac_list) - return; - - rtnl_lock(); + ASSERT_RTNL(); pac = np->ipv6_ac_list; np->ipv6_ac_list = NULL; @@ -211,6 +208,16 @@ void ipv6_sock_ac_close(struct sock *sk) sock_kfree_s(sk, pac, sizeof(*pac)); pac = next; } +} + +void ipv6_sock_ac_close(struct sock *sk) +{ + struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk); + + if (!np->ipv6_ac_list) + return; + rtnl_lock(); + __ipv6_sock_ac_close(sk); rtnl_unlock(); } diff --git a/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c b/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c index 5af97b4f5df3..5352c7e68c42 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c @@ -205,6 +205,7 @@ static int do_ipv6_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname, fl6_free_socklist(sk); __ipv6_sock_mc_close(sk); + __ipv6_sock_ac_close(sk); /* * Sock is moving from IPv6 to IPv4 (sk_prot), so From bd68177f26e4450d717f94363385ace914d0b671 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xiyu Yang Date: Sat, 25 Jul 2020 16:02:18 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 52/68] ipv6: Fix nexthop refcnt leak when creating ipv6 route info [ Upstream commit 706ec919164622ff5ce822065472d0f30a9e9dd2 ] ip6_route_info_create() invokes nexthop_get(), which increases the refcount of the "nh". When ip6_route_info_create() returns, local variable "nh" becomes invalid, so the refcount should be decreased to keep refcount balanced. The reference counting issue happens in one exception handling path of ip6_route_info_create(). When nexthops can not be used with source routing, the function forgets to decrease the refcnt increased by nexthop_get(), causing a refcnt leak. Fix this issue by pulling up the error source routing handling when nexthops can not be used with source routing. Fixes: f88d8ea67fbd ("ipv6: Plumb support for nexthop object in a fib6_info") Signed-off-by: Xiyu Yang Signed-off-by: Xin Tan Reviewed-by: David Ahern Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/ipv6/route.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv6/route.c b/net/ipv6/route.c index 94ade43d5a45..46df6345bb99 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/route.c +++ b/net/ipv6/route.c @@ -3686,14 +3686,14 @@ static struct fib6_info *ip6_route_info_create(struct fib6_config *cfg, rt->fib6_src.plen = cfg->fc_src_len; #endif if (nh) { - if (!nexthop_get(nh)) { - NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Nexthop has been deleted"); - goto out; - } if (rt->fib6_src.plen) { NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Nexthops can not be used with source routing"); goto out; } + if (!nexthop_get(nh)) { + NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Nexthop has been deleted"); + goto out; + } rt->nh = nh; fib6_nh = nexthop_fib6_nh(rt->nh); } else { From 6f9354702ca5aa059978d27c7279f98fbe431490 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Landen Chao Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2020 10:15:17 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 53/68] net: ethernet: mtk_eth_soc: fix MTU warnings [ Upstream commit 555a893303872e044fb86f0a5834ce78d41ad2e2 ] in recent kernel versions there are warnings about incorrect MTU size like these: eth0: mtu greater than device maximum mtk_soc_eth 1b100000.ethernet eth0: error -22 setting MTU to include DSA overhead Fixes: bfcb813203e6 ("net: dsa: configure the MTU for switch ports") Fixes: 72579e14a1d3 ("net: dsa: don't fail to probe if we couldn't set the MTU") Fixes: 7a4c53bee332 ("net: report invalid mtu value via netlink extack") Signed-off-by: Landen Chao Signed-off-by: Frank Wunderlich Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/ethernet/mediatek/mtk_eth_soc.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mediatek/mtk_eth_soc.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mediatek/mtk_eth_soc.c index be390c7e43b2..d01b3a1b40f4 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mediatek/mtk_eth_soc.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mediatek/mtk_eth_soc.c @@ -2878,6 +2878,8 @@ static int mtk_add_mac(struct mtk_eth *eth, struct device_node *np) eth->netdev[id]->irq = eth->irq[0]; eth->netdev[id]->dev.of_node = np; + eth->netdev[id]->max_mtu = MTK_MAX_RX_LENGTH - MTK_RX_ETH_HLEN; + return 0; free_netdev: From 106b415d5139c44d1042c9d1205d122530cd9361 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Howells Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2020 00:03:56 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 54/68] rxrpc: Fix race between recvmsg and sendmsg on immediate call failure [ Upstream commit 65550098c1c4db528400c73acf3e46bfa78d9264 ] There's a race between rxrpc_sendmsg setting up a call, but then failing to send anything on it due to an error, and recvmsg() seeing the call completion occur and trying to return the state to the user. An assertion fails in rxrpc_recvmsg() because the call has already been released from the socket and is about to be released again as recvmsg deals with it. (The recvmsg_q queue on the socket holds a ref, so there's no problem with use-after-free.) We also have to be careful not to end up reporting an error twice, in such a way that both returns indicate to userspace that the user ID supplied with the call is no longer in use - which could cause the client to malfunction if it recycles the user ID fast enough. Fix this by the following means: (1) When sendmsg() creates a call after the point that the call has been successfully added to the socket, don't return any errors through sendmsg(), but rather complete the call and let recvmsg() retrieve them. Make sendmsg() return 0 at this point. Further calls to sendmsg() for that call will fail with ESHUTDOWN. Note that at this point, we haven't send any packets yet, so the server doesn't yet know about the call. (2) If sendmsg() returns an error when it was expected to create a new call, it means that the user ID wasn't used. (3) Mark the call disconnected before marking it completed to prevent an oops in rxrpc_release_call(). (4) recvmsg() will then retrieve the error and set MSG_EOR to indicate that the user ID is no longer known by the kernel. An oops like the following is produced: kernel BUG at net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c:605! ... RIP: 0010:rxrpc_recvmsg+0x256/0x5ae ... Call Trace: ? __init_waitqueue_head+0x2f/0x2f ____sys_recvmsg+0x8a/0x148 ? import_iovec+0x69/0x9c ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x5c/0x86 ___sys_recvmsg+0x72/0xaa ? __fget_files+0x22/0x57 ? __fget_light+0x46/0x51 ? fdget+0x9/0x1b do_recvmmsg+0x15e/0x232 ? _raw_spin_unlock+0xa/0xb ? vtime_delta+0xf/0x25 __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x2c/0x2f do_syscall_64+0x4c/0x78 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Fixes: 357f5ef64628 ("rxrpc: Call rxrpc_release_call() on error in rxrpc_new_client_call()") Reported-by: syzbot+b54969381df354936d96@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: David Howells Reviewed-by: Marc Dionne Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/rxrpc/call_object.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++-------- net/rxrpc/conn_object.c | 8 +++++--- net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c | 2 +- net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c | 3 +++ 4 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/rxrpc/call_object.c b/net/rxrpc/call_object.c index f07970207b54..38a46167523f 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/call_object.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/call_object.c @@ -288,7 +288,7 @@ struct rxrpc_call *rxrpc_new_client_call(struct rxrpc_sock *rx, */ ret = rxrpc_connect_call(rx, call, cp, srx, gfp); if (ret < 0) - goto error; + goto error_attached_to_socket; trace_rxrpc_call(call->debug_id, rxrpc_call_connected, atomic_read(&call->usage), here, NULL); @@ -308,18 +308,29 @@ struct rxrpc_call *rxrpc_new_client_call(struct rxrpc_sock *rx, error_dup_user_ID: write_unlock(&rx->call_lock); release_sock(&rx->sk); - ret = -EEXIST; - -error: __rxrpc_set_call_completion(call, RXRPC_CALL_LOCAL_ERROR, - RX_CALL_DEAD, ret); + RX_CALL_DEAD, -EEXIST); trace_rxrpc_call(call->debug_id, rxrpc_call_error, - atomic_read(&call->usage), here, ERR_PTR(ret)); + atomic_read(&call->usage), here, ERR_PTR(-EEXIST)); rxrpc_release_call(rx, call); mutex_unlock(&call->user_mutex); rxrpc_put_call(call, rxrpc_call_put); - _leave(" = %d", ret); - return ERR_PTR(ret); + _leave(" = -EEXIST"); + return ERR_PTR(-EEXIST); + + /* We got an error, but the call is attached to the socket and is in + * need of release. However, we might now race with recvmsg() when + * completing the call queues it. Return 0 from sys_sendmsg() and + * leave the error to recvmsg() to deal with. + */ +error_attached_to_socket: + trace_rxrpc_call(call->debug_id, rxrpc_call_error, + atomic_read(&call->usage), here, ERR_PTR(ret)); + set_bit(RXRPC_CALL_DISCONNECTED, &call->flags); + __rxrpc_set_call_completion(call, RXRPC_CALL_LOCAL_ERROR, + RX_CALL_DEAD, ret); + _leave(" = c=%08x [err]", call->debug_id); + return call; } /* diff --git a/net/rxrpc/conn_object.c b/net/rxrpc/conn_object.c index 19e141eeed17..8cbe0bf20ed5 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/conn_object.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/conn_object.c @@ -212,9 +212,11 @@ void rxrpc_disconnect_call(struct rxrpc_call *call) call->peer->cong_cwnd = call->cong_cwnd; - spin_lock_bh(&conn->params.peer->lock); - hlist_del_rcu(&call->error_link); - spin_unlock_bh(&conn->params.peer->lock); + if (!hlist_unhashed(&call->error_link)) { + spin_lock_bh(&call->peer->lock); + hlist_del_rcu(&call->error_link); + spin_unlock_bh(&call->peer->lock); + } if (rxrpc_is_client_call(call)) return rxrpc_disconnect_client_call(call); diff --git a/net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c b/net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c index 6896a33ef842..4f48e3bdd4b4 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c @@ -541,7 +541,7 @@ try_again: goto error_unlock_call; } - if (msg->msg_name) { + if (msg->msg_name && call->peer) { struct sockaddr_rxrpc *srx = msg->msg_name; size_t len = sizeof(call->peer->srx); diff --git a/net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c b/net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c index 49d03c8c64da..1a340eb0abf7 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c @@ -683,6 +683,9 @@ int rxrpc_do_sendmsg(struct rxrpc_sock *rx, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len) if (IS_ERR(call)) return PTR_ERR(call); /* ... and we have the call lock. */ + ret = 0; + if (READ_ONCE(call->state) == RXRPC_CALL_COMPLETE) + goto out_put_unlock; } else { switch (READ_ONCE(call->state)) { case RXRPC_CALL_UNINITIALISED: From 31489ed8c20cfb73a76cd9e9a7ec5fd50386854e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ido Schimmel Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2020 11:34:36 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 55/68] vxlan: Ensure FDB dump is performed under RCU [ Upstream commit b5141915b5aec3b29a63db869229e3741ebce258 ] The commit cited below removed the RCU read-side critical section from rtnl_fdb_dump() which means that the ndo_fdb_dump() callback is invoked without RCU protection. This results in the following warning [1] in the VXLAN driver, which relied on the callback being invoked from an RCU read-side critical section. Fix this by calling rcu_read_lock() in the VXLAN driver, as already done in the bridge driver. [1] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 5.8.0-rc4-custom-01521-g481007553ce6 #29 Not tainted ----------------------------- drivers/net/vxlan.c:1379 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 1 lock held by bridge/166: #0: ffffffff85a27850 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: netlink_dump+0xea/0x1090 stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 166 Comm: bridge Not tainted 5.8.0-rc4-custom-01521-g481007553ce6 #29 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x100/0x184 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x153/0x15d vxlan_fdb_dump+0x51e/0x6d0 rtnl_fdb_dump+0x4dc/0xad0 netlink_dump+0x540/0x1090 __netlink_dump_start+0x695/0x950 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x802/0xbd0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x17a/0x480 rtnetlink_rcv+0x22/0x30 netlink_unicast+0x5ae/0x890 netlink_sendmsg+0x98a/0xf40 __sys_sendto+0x279/0x3b0 __x64_sys_sendto+0xe6/0x1a0 do_syscall_64+0x54/0xa0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x7fe14fa2ade0 Code: Bad RIP value. RSP: 002b:00007fff75bb5b88 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005614b1ba0020 RCX: 00007fe14fa2ade0 RDX: 000000000000011c RSI: 00007fff75bb5b90 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007fff75bb5b90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005614b1b89160 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Fixes: 5e6d24358799 ("bridge: netlink dump interface at par with brctl") Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/vxlan.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/vxlan.c b/drivers/net/vxlan.c index b49b6f0cee50..401fb9697495 100644 --- a/drivers/net/vxlan.c +++ b/drivers/net/vxlan.c @@ -1225,6 +1225,7 @@ static int vxlan_fdb_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb, for (h = 0; h < FDB_HASH_SIZE; ++h) { struct vxlan_fdb *f; + rcu_read_lock(); hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(f, &vxlan->fdb_head[h], hlist) { struct vxlan_rdst *rd; @@ -1237,12 +1238,15 @@ static int vxlan_fdb_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb, cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq, RTM_NEWNEIGH, NLM_F_MULTI, rd); - if (err < 0) + if (err < 0) { + rcu_read_unlock(); goto out; + } skip: *idx += 1; } } + rcu_read_unlock(); } out: return err; From 3787b5a3ac67a1eb79629ba4fd19cc840b2a0f03 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johan Hovold Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2020 14:10:31 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 56/68] net: lan78xx: replace bogus endpoint lookup [ Upstream commit ea060b352654a8de1e070140d25fe1b7e4d50310 ] Drop the bogus endpoint-lookup helper which could end up accepting interfaces based on endpoints belonging to unrelated altsettings. Note that the returned bulk pipes and interrupt endpoint descriptor were never actually used. Instead the bulk-endpoint numbers are hardcoded to 1 and 2 (matching the specification), while the interrupt- endpoint descriptor was assumed to be the third descriptor created by USB core. Try to bring some order to this by dropping the bogus lookup helper and adding the missing endpoint sanity checks while keeping the interrupt- descriptor assumption for now. Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c | 117 ++++++++++---------------------------- 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 87 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c b/drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c index 1da99abc6ed1..71cc5b63d8ce 100644 --- a/drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c @@ -377,10 +377,6 @@ struct lan78xx_net { struct tasklet_struct bh; struct delayed_work wq; - struct usb_host_endpoint *ep_blkin; - struct usb_host_endpoint *ep_blkout; - struct usb_host_endpoint *ep_intr; - int msg_enable; struct urb *urb_intr; @@ -2868,78 +2864,12 @@ lan78xx_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *net) return NETDEV_TX_OK; } -static int -lan78xx_get_endpoints(struct lan78xx_net *dev, struct usb_interface *intf) -{ - int tmp; - struct usb_host_interface *alt = NULL; - struct usb_host_endpoint *in = NULL, *out = NULL; - struct usb_host_endpoint *status = NULL; - - for (tmp = 0; tmp < intf->num_altsetting; tmp++) { - unsigned ep; - - in = NULL; - out = NULL; - status = NULL; - alt = intf->altsetting + tmp; - - for (ep = 0; ep < alt->desc.bNumEndpoints; ep++) { - struct usb_host_endpoint *e; - int intr = 0; - - e = alt->endpoint + ep; - switch (e->desc.bmAttributes) { - case USB_ENDPOINT_XFER_INT: - if (!usb_endpoint_dir_in(&e->desc)) - continue; - intr = 1; - /* FALLTHROUGH */ - case USB_ENDPOINT_XFER_BULK: - break; - default: - continue; - } - if (usb_endpoint_dir_in(&e->desc)) { - if (!intr && !in) - in = e; - else if (intr && !status) - status = e; - } else { - if (!out) - out = e; - } - } - if (in && out) - break; - } - if (!alt || !in || !out) - return -EINVAL; - - dev->pipe_in = usb_rcvbulkpipe(dev->udev, - in->desc.bEndpointAddress & - USB_ENDPOINT_NUMBER_MASK); - dev->pipe_out = usb_sndbulkpipe(dev->udev, - out->desc.bEndpointAddress & - USB_ENDPOINT_NUMBER_MASK); - dev->ep_intr = status; - - return 0; -} - static int lan78xx_bind(struct lan78xx_net *dev, struct usb_interface *intf) { struct lan78xx_priv *pdata = NULL; int ret; int i; - ret = lan78xx_get_endpoints(dev, intf); - if (ret) { - netdev_warn(dev->net, "lan78xx_get_endpoints failed: %d\n", - ret); - return ret; - } - dev->data[0] = (unsigned long)kzalloc(sizeof(*pdata), GFP_KERNEL); pdata = (struct lan78xx_priv *)(dev->data[0]); @@ -3708,6 +3638,7 @@ static void lan78xx_stat_monitor(struct timer_list *t) static int lan78xx_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, const struct usb_device_id *id) { + struct usb_host_endpoint *ep_blkin, *ep_blkout, *ep_intr; struct lan78xx_net *dev; struct net_device *netdev; struct usb_device *udev; @@ -3756,6 +3687,34 @@ static int lan78xx_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, mutex_init(&dev->stats.access_lock); + if (intf->cur_altsetting->desc.bNumEndpoints < 3) { + ret = -ENODEV; + goto out2; + } + + dev->pipe_in = usb_rcvbulkpipe(udev, BULK_IN_PIPE); + ep_blkin = usb_pipe_endpoint(udev, dev->pipe_in); + if (!ep_blkin || !usb_endpoint_is_bulk_in(&ep_blkin->desc)) { + ret = -ENODEV; + goto out2; + } + + dev->pipe_out = usb_sndbulkpipe(udev, BULK_OUT_PIPE); + ep_blkout = usb_pipe_endpoint(udev, dev->pipe_out); + if (!ep_blkout || !usb_endpoint_is_bulk_out(&ep_blkout->desc)) { + ret = -ENODEV; + goto out2; + } + + ep_intr = &intf->cur_altsetting->endpoint[2]; + if (!usb_endpoint_is_int_in(&ep_intr->desc)) { + ret = -ENODEV; + goto out2; + } + + dev->pipe_intr = usb_rcvintpipe(dev->udev, + usb_endpoint_num(&ep_intr->desc)); + ret = lan78xx_bind(dev, intf); if (ret < 0) goto out2; @@ -3767,23 +3726,7 @@ static int lan78xx_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, netdev->max_mtu = MAX_SINGLE_PACKET_SIZE; netif_set_gso_max_size(netdev, MAX_SINGLE_PACKET_SIZE - MAX_HEADER); - if (intf->cur_altsetting->desc.bNumEndpoints < 3) { - ret = -ENODEV; - goto out3; - } - - dev->ep_blkin = (intf->cur_altsetting)->endpoint + 0; - dev->ep_blkout = (intf->cur_altsetting)->endpoint + 1; - dev->ep_intr = (intf->cur_altsetting)->endpoint + 2; - - dev->pipe_in = usb_rcvbulkpipe(udev, BULK_IN_PIPE); - dev->pipe_out = usb_sndbulkpipe(udev, BULK_OUT_PIPE); - - dev->pipe_intr = usb_rcvintpipe(dev->udev, - dev->ep_intr->desc.bEndpointAddress & - USB_ENDPOINT_NUMBER_MASK); - period = dev->ep_intr->desc.bInterval; - + period = ep_intr->desc.bInterval; maxp = usb_maxpacket(dev->udev, dev->pipe_intr, 0); buf = kmalloc(maxp, GFP_KERNEL); if (buf) { From 5a963aa72107e8c779ce2adde41d475c709c3c52 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vincent Duvert Date: Sun, 2 Aug 2020 07:06:51 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 57/68] appletalk: Fix atalk_proc_init() return path [ Upstream commit d0f6ba2ef2c1c95069509e71402e7d6d43452512 ] Add a missing return statement to atalk_proc_init so it doesn't return -ENOMEM when successful. This allows the appletalk module to load properly. Fixes: e2bcd8b0ce6e ("appletalk: use remove_proc_subtree to simplify procfs code") Link: https://www.downtowndougbrown.com/2020/08/hacking-up-a-fix-for-the-broken-appletalk-kernel-module-in-linux-5-1-and-newer/ Reported-by: Christopher KOBAYASHI Reported-by: Doug Brown Signed-off-by: Vincent Duvert [lukas: add missing tags] Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.1+ Cc: Yue Haibing Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/appletalk/atalk_proc.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/appletalk/atalk_proc.c b/net/appletalk/atalk_proc.c index 550c6ca007cc..9c1241292d1d 100644 --- a/net/appletalk/atalk_proc.c +++ b/net/appletalk/atalk_proc.c @@ -229,6 +229,8 @@ int __init atalk_proc_init(void) sizeof(struct aarp_iter_state), NULL)) goto out; + return 0; + out: remove_proc_subtree("atalk", init_net.proc_net); return -ENOMEM; From 3a82f4bfd20a2c8a559ccae08cb0606b74036f1d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: YueHaibing Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2020 21:26:43 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 58/68] dpaa2-eth: Fix passing zero to 'PTR_ERR' warning [ Upstream commit 02afa9c66bb954c6959877c70d9e128dcf0adce7 ] Fix smatch warning: drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/dpaa2/dpaa2-eth.c:2419 alloc_channel() warn: passing zero to 'ERR_PTR' setup_dpcon() should return ERR_PTR(err) instead of zero in error handling case. Fixes: d7f5a9d89a55 ("dpaa2-eth: defer probe on object allocate") Signed-off-by: YueHaibing Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/dpaa2/dpaa2-eth.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/dpaa2/dpaa2-eth.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/dpaa2/dpaa2-eth.c index 3177dd8ede8e..7a248cc1055a 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/dpaa2/dpaa2-eth.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/dpaa2/dpaa2-eth.c @@ -2090,7 +2090,7 @@ close: free: fsl_mc_object_free(dpcon); - return NULL; + return ERR_PTR(err); } static void free_dpcon(struct dpaa2_eth_priv *priv, @@ -2114,8 +2114,8 @@ alloc_channel(struct dpaa2_eth_priv *priv) return NULL; channel->dpcon = setup_dpcon(priv); - if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(channel->dpcon)) { - err = PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(channel->dpcon); + if (IS_ERR(channel->dpcon)) { + err = PTR_ERR(channel->dpcon); goto err_setup; } From 5d791d36a49b82c7deb75db8b261d53337cafb00 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stephen Hemminger Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2020 09:54:15 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 59/68] hv_netvsc: do not use VF device if link is down [ Upstream commit 7c9864bbccc23e1812ac82966555d68c13ea4006 ] If the accelerated networking SRIOV VF device has lost carrier use the synthetic network device which is available as backup path. This is a rare case since if VF link goes down, normally the VMBus device will also loose external connectivity as well. But if the communication is between two VM's on the same host the VMBus device will still work. Reported-by: "Shah, Ashish N" Fixes: 0c195567a8f6 ("netvsc: transparent VF management") Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger Reviewed-by: Haiyang Zhang Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc_drv.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc_drv.c b/drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc_drv.c index ca16ae8c8332..24bb721a12bc 100644 --- a/drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc_drv.c +++ b/drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc_drv.c @@ -531,12 +531,13 @@ static int netvsc_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *net) u32 hash; struct hv_page_buffer pb[MAX_PAGE_BUFFER_COUNT]; - /* if VF is present and up then redirect packets - * already called with rcu_read_lock_bh + /* If VF is present and up then redirect packets to it. + * Skip the VF if it is marked down or has no carrier. + * If netpoll is in uses, then VF can not be used either. */ vf_netdev = rcu_dereference_bh(net_device_ctx->vf_netdev); if (vf_netdev && netif_running(vf_netdev) && - !netpoll_tx_running(net)) + netif_carrier_ok(vf_netdev) && !netpoll_tx_running(net)) return netvsc_vf_xmit(net, vf_netdev, skb); /* We will atmost need two pages to describe the rndis From 786a9368be8cf862f1c290edb17c1a7ae363c059 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lorenzo Bianconi Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2020 20:12:05 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 60/68] net: gre: recompute gre csum for sctp over gre tunnels [ Upstream commit 622e32b7d4a6492cf5c1f759ef833f817418f7b3 ] The GRE tunnel can be used to transport traffic that does not rely on a Internet checksum (e.g. SCTP). The issue can be triggered creating a GRE or GRETAP tunnel and transmitting SCTP traffic ontop of it where CRC offload has been disabled. In order to fix the issue we need to recompute the GRE csum in gre_gso_segment() not relying on the inner checksum. The issue is still present when we have the CRC offload enabled. In this case we need to disable the CRC offload if we require GRE checksum since otherwise skb_checksum() will report a wrong value. Fixes: 90017accff61 ("sctp: Add GSO support") Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Bianconi Reviewed-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/ipv4/gre_offload.c | 13 +++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/gre_offload.c b/net/ipv4/gre_offload.c index 4de7e962d3da..c840141876bc 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/gre_offload.c +++ b/net/ipv4/gre_offload.c @@ -15,12 +15,12 @@ static struct sk_buff *gre_gso_segment(struct sk_buff *skb, netdev_features_t features) { int tnl_hlen = skb_inner_mac_header(skb) - skb_transport_header(skb); + bool need_csum, need_recompute_csum, gso_partial; struct sk_buff *segs = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); u16 mac_offset = skb->mac_header; __be16 protocol = skb->protocol; u16 mac_len = skb->mac_len; int gre_offset, outer_hlen; - bool need_csum, gso_partial; if (!skb->encapsulation) goto out; @@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *gre_gso_segment(struct sk_buff *skb, skb->protocol = skb->inner_protocol; need_csum = !!(skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_GRE_CSUM); + need_recompute_csum = skb->csum_not_inet; skb->encap_hdr_csum = need_csum; features &= skb->dev->hw_enc_features; @@ -98,7 +99,15 @@ static struct sk_buff *gre_gso_segment(struct sk_buff *skb, } *(pcsum + 1) = 0; - *pcsum = gso_make_checksum(skb, 0); + if (need_recompute_csum && !skb_is_gso(skb)) { + __wsum csum; + + csum = skb_checksum(skb, gre_offset, + skb->len - gre_offset, 0); + *pcsum = csum_fold(csum); + } else { + *pcsum = gso_make_checksum(skb, 0); + } } while ((skb = skb->next)); out: return segs; From ba729a97ae54effd84ed44f66ddf2594a244c107 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xin Long Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2020 15:02:30 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 61/68] net: thunderx: use spin_lock_bh in nicvf_set_rx_mode_task() [ Upstream commit bab9693a9a8c6dd19f670408ec1e78e12a320682 ] A dead lock was triggered on thunderx driver: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- [01] lock(&(&nic->rx_mode_wq_lock)->rlock); [11] lock(&(&mc->mca_lock)->rlock); [12] lock(&(&nic->rx_mode_wq_lock)->rlock); [02] lock(&(&mc->mca_lock)->rlock); The path for each is: [01] worker_thread() -> process_one_work() -> nicvf_set_rx_mode_task() [02] mld_ifc_timer_expire() [11] ipv6_add_dev() -> ipv6_dev_mc_inc() -> igmp6_group_added() -> [12] dev_mc_add() -> __dev_set_rx_mode() -> nicvf_set_rx_mode() To fix it, it needs to disable bh on [1], so that the timer on [2] wouldn't be triggered until rx_mode_wq_lock is released. So change to use spin_lock_bh() instead of spin_lock(). Thanks to Paolo for helping with this. v1->v2: - post to netdev. Reported-by: Rafael P. Tested-by: Dean Nelson Fixes: 469998c861fa ("net: thunderx: prevent concurrent data re-writing by nicvf_set_rx_mode") Signed-off-by: Xin Long Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/thunder/nicvf_main.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/thunder/nicvf_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/thunder/nicvf_main.c index 40a44dcb3d9b..f414f5651dbd 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/thunder/nicvf_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/thunder/nicvf_main.c @@ -2047,11 +2047,11 @@ static void nicvf_set_rx_mode_task(struct work_struct *work_arg) /* Save message data locally to prevent them from * being overwritten by next ndo_set_rx_mode call(). */ - spin_lock(&nic->rx_mode_wq_lock); + spin_lock_bh(&nic->rx_mode_wq_lock); mode = vf_work->mode; mc = vf_work->mc; vf_work->mc = NULL; - spin_unlock(&nic->rx_mode_wq_lock); + spin_unlock_bh(&nic->rx_mode_wq_lock); __nicvf_set_rx_mode_task(mode, mc, nic); } From daff7f09f3419b6703dfe59c1de7283bbc4b9de3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peilin Ye Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2020 00:48:38 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 62/68] openvswitch: Prevent kernel-infoleak in ovs_ct_put_key() [ Upstream commit 9aba6c5b49254d5bee927d81593ed4429e91d4ae ] ovs_ct_put_key() is potentially copying uninitialized kernel stack memory into socket buffers, since the compiler may leave a 3-byte hole at the end of `struct ovs_key_ct_tuple_ipv4` and `struct ovs_key_ct_tuple_ipv6`. Fix it by initializing `orig` with memset(). Fixes: 9dd7f8907c37 ("openvswitch: Add original direction conntrack tuple to sw_flow_key.") Suggested-by: Dan Carpenter Signed-off-by: Peilin Ye Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/openvswitch/conntrack.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c b/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c index 8b70298857e3..c86e404cd65b 100644 --- a/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c +++ b/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c @@ -276,10 +276,6 @@ void ovs_ct_fill_key(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct sw_flow_key *key) ovs_ct_update_key(skb, NULL, key, false, false); } -#define IN6_ADDR_INITIALIZER(ADDR) \ - { (ADDR).s6_addr32[0], (ADDR).s6_addr32[1], \ - (ADDR).s6_addr32[2], (ADDR).s6_addr32[3] } - int ovs_ct_put_key(const struct sw_flow_key *swkey, const struct sw_flow_key *output, struct sk_buff *skb) { @@ -301,24 +297,30 @@ int ovs_ct_put_key(const struct sw_flow_key *swkey, if (swkey->ct_orig_proto) { if (swkey->eth.type == htons(ETH_P_IP)) { - struct ovs_key_ct_tuple_ipv4 orig = { - output->ipv4.ct_orig.src, - output->ipv4.ct_orig.dst, - output->ct.orig_tp.src, - output->ct.orig_tp.dst, - output->ct_orig_proto, - }; + struct ovs_key_ct_tuple_ipv4 orig; + + memset(&orig, 0, sizeof(orig)); + orig.ipv4_src = output->ipv4.ct_orig.src; + orig.ipv4_dst = output->ipv4.ct_orig.dst; + orig.src_port = output->ct.orig_tp.src; + orig.dst_port = output->ct.orig_tp.dst; + orig.ipv4_proto = output->ct_orig_proto; + if (nla_put(skb, OVS_KEY_ATTR_CT_ORIG_TUPLE_IPV4, sizeof(orig), &orig)) return -EMSGSIZE; } else if (swkey->eth.type == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) { - struct ovs_key_ct_tuple_ipv6 orig = { - IN6_ADDR_INITIALIZER(output->ipv6.ct_orig.src), - IN6_ADDR_INITIALIZER(output->ipv6.ct_orig.dst), - output->ct.orig_tp.src, - output->ct.orig_tp.dst, - output->ct_orig_proto, - }; + struct ovs_key_ct_tuple_ipv6 orig; + + memset(&orig, 0, sizeof(orig)); + memcpy(orig.ipv6_src, output->ipv6.ct_orig.src.s6_addr32, + sizeof(orig.ipv6_src)); + memcpy(orig.ipv6_dst, output->ipv6.ct_orig.dst.s6_addr32, + sizeof(orig.ipv6_dst)); + orig.src_port = output->ct.orig_tp.src; + orig.dst_port = output->ct.orig_tp.dst; + orig.ipv6_proto = output->ct_orig_proto; + if (nla_put(skb, OVS_KEY_ATTR_CT_ORIG_TUPLE_IPV6, sizeof(orig), &orig)) return -EMSGSIZE; From b8f2d34f6bb5f743c9b8c35b81a140c078325d10 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hangbin Liu Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2020 10:41:31 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 63/68] Revert "vxlan: fix tos value before xmit" [ Upstream commit a0dced17ad9dc08b1b25e0065b54c97a318e6e8b ] This reverts commit 71130f29979c7c7956b040673e6b9d5643003176. In commit 71130f29979c ("vxlan: fix tos value before xmit") we want to make sure the tos value are filtered by RT_TOS() based on RFC1349. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+ | PRECEDENCE | TOS | MBZ | +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+ But RFC1349 has been obsoleted by RFC2474. The new DSCP field defined like 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+ | DS FIELD, DSCP | ECN FIELD | +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+ So with IPTOS_TOS_MASK 0x1E RT_TOS(tos) ((tos)&IPTOS_TOS_MASK) the first 3 bits DSCP info will get lost. To take all the DSCP info in xmit, we should revert the patch and just push all tos bits to ip_tunnel_ecn_encap(), which will handling ECN field later. Fixes: 71130f29979c ("vxlan: fix tos value before xmit") Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu Acked-by: Guillaume Nault Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/vxlan.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/vxlan.c b/drivers/net/vxlan.c index 401fb9697495..f9edc76580d9 100644 --- a/drivers/net/vxlan.c +++ b/drivers/net/vxlan.c @@ -2550,7 +2550,7 @@ static void vxlan_xmit_one(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, ndst = &rt->dst; skb_tunnel_check_pmtu(skb, ndst, VXLAN_HEADROOM); - tos = ip_tunnel_ecn_encap(RT_TOS(tos), old_iph, skb); + tos = ip_tunnel_ecn_encap(tos, old_iph, skb); ttl = ttl ? : ip4_dst_hoplimit(&rt->dst); err = vxlan_build_skb(skb, ndst, sizeof(struct iphdr), vni, md, flags, udp_sum); @@ -2590,7 +2590,7 @@ static void vxlan_xmit_one(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, skb_tunnel_check_pmtu(skb, ndst, VXLAN6_HEADROOM); - tos = ip_tunnel_ecn_encap(RT_TOS(tos), old_iph, skb); + tos = ip_tunnel_ecn_encap(tos, old_iph, skb); ttl = ttl ? : ip6_dst_hoplimit(ndst); skb_scrub_packet(skb, xnet); err = vxlan_build_skb(skb, ndst, sizeof(struct ipv6hdr), From 848e15a8c8f68d4ce9195c329847204d8153c53d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Willem de Bruijn Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2020 04:40:45 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 64/68] selftests/net: relax cpu affinity requirement in msg_zerocopy test [ Upstream commit 16f6458f2478b55e2b628797bc81a4455045c74e ] The msg_zerocopy test pins the sender and receiver threads to separate cores to reduce variance between runs. But it hardcodes the cores and skips core 0, so it fails on machines with the selected cores offline, or simply fewer cores. The test mainly gives code coverage in automated runs. The throughput of zerocopy ('-z') and non-zerocopy runs is logged for manual inspection. Continue even when sched_setaffinity fails. Just log to warn anyone interpreting the data. Fixes: 07b65c5b31ce ("test: add msg_zerocopy test") Reported-by: Colin Ian King Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn Acked-by: Colin Ian King Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- tools/testing/selftests/net/msg_zerocopy.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/msg_zerocopy.c b/tools/testing/selftests/net/msg_zerocopy.c index 4b02933cab8a..bdc03a2097e8 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/msg_zerocopy.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/msg_zerocopy.c @@ -125,9 +125,8 @@ static int do_setcpu(int cpu) CPU_ZERO(&mask); CPU_SET(cpu, &mask); if (sched_setaffinity(0, sizeof(mask), &mask)) - error(1, 0, "setaffinity %d", cpu); - - if (cfg_verbose) + fprintf(stderr, "cpu: unable to pin, may increase variance.\n"); + else if (cfg_verbose) fprintf(stderr, "cpu: %u\n", cpu); return 0; From fb264505b39510801e9a9184e83b162614e97be2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jianfeng Wang Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2020 23:49:16 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 65/68] tcp: apply a floor of 1 for RTT samples from TCP timestamps [ Upstream commit 730e700e2c19d87e578ff0e7d8cb1d4a02b036d2 ] For retransmitted packets, TCP needs to resort to using TCP timestamps for computing RTT samples. In the common case where the data and ACK fall in the same 1-millisecond interval, TCP senders with millisecond- granularity TCP timestamps compute a ca_rtt_us of 0. This ca_rtt_us of 0 propagates to rs->rtt_us. This value of 0 can cause performance problems for congestion control modules. For example, in BBR, the zero min_rtt sample can bring the min_rtt and BDP estimate down to 0, reduce snd_cwnd and result in a low throughput. It would be hard to mitigate this with filtering in the congestion control module, because the proper floor to apply would depend on the method of RTT sampling (using timestamp options or internally-saved transmission timestamps). This fix applies a floor of 1 for the RTT sample delta from TCP timestamps, so that seq_rtt_us, ca_rtt_us, and rs->rtt_us will be at least 1 * (USEC_PER_SEC / TCP_TS_HZ). Note that the receiver RTT computation in tcp_rcv_rtt_measure() and min_rtt computation in tcp_update_rtt_min() both already apply a floor of 1 timestamp tick, so this commit makes the code more consistent in avoiding this edge case of a value of 0. Signed-off-by: Jianfeng Wang Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Acked-by: Kevin Yang Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index 5040f7ca37ec..ab5358281000 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -2944,6 +2944,8 @@ static bool tcp_ack_update_rtt(struct sock *sk, const int flag, u32 delta = tcp_time_stamp(tp) - tp->rx_opt.rcv_tsecr; if (likely(delta < INT_MAX / (USEC_PER_SEC / TCP_TS_HZ))) { + if (!delta) + delta = 1; seq_rtt_us = delta * (USEC_PER_SEC / TCP_TS_HZ); ca_rtt_us = seq_rtt_us; } From df6aeb5235e982ef2facc81922fb8393dc1bc814 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Bruno Meneguele Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2020 13:48:30 -0300 Subject: [PATCH 66/68] ima: move APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM dependency on ARCH_POLICY to runtime MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 311aa6aafea446c2f954cc19d66425bfed8c4b0b upstream. The IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM config allows enabling different "ima_appraise=" modes - log, fix, enforce - at run time, but not when IMA architecture specific policies are enabled.  This prevents properly labeling the filesystem on systems where secure boot is supported, but not enabled on the platform.  Only when secure boot is actually enabled should these IMA appraise modes be disabled. This patch removes the compile time dependency and makes it a runtime decision, based on the secure boot state of that platform. Test results as follows: -> x86-64 with secure boot enabled [ 0.015637] Kernel command line: <...> ima_policy=appraise_tcb ima_appraise=fix [ 0.015668] ima: Secure boot enabled: ignoring ima_appraise=fix boot parameter option -> powerpc with secure boot disabled [ 0.000000] Kernel command line: <...> ima_policy=appraise_tcb ima_appraise=fix [ 0.000000] Secure boot mode disabled -> Running the system without secure boot and with both options set: CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM=y CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY=y Audit prompts "missing-hash" but still allow execution and, consequently, filesystem labeling: type=INTEGRITY_DATA msg=audit(07/09/2020 12:30:27.778:1691) : pid=4976 uid=root auid=root ses=2 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=appraise_data cause=missing-hash comm=bash name=/usr/bin/evmctl dev="dm-0" ino=493150 res=no Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: d958083a8f64 ("x86/ima: define arch_get_ima_policy() for x86") Signed-off-by: Bruno Meneguele Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.0 Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 6 ++++++ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig index 838476d780e5..d2054bec4909 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig @@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ config IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_POLICY_SIGS config IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM bool "ima_appraise boot parameter" - depends on IMA_APPRAISE && !IMA_ARCH_POLICY + depends on IMA_APPRAISE default y help This option enables the different "ima_appraise=" modes diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 136ae4e0ee92..23b04c6521b2 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -18,6 +18,12 @@ static int __init default_appraise_setup(char *str) { #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM + if (arch_ima_get_secureboot()) { + pr_info("Secure boot enabled: ignoring ima_appraise=%s boot parameter option", + str); + return 1; + } + if (strncmp(str, "off", 3) == 0) ima_appraise = 0; else if (strncmp(str, "log", 3) == 0) From 512570b17807ec4f7d0e2f0bd349445e33c051db Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chuck Lever Date: Mon, 2 Mar 2020 14:45:53 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 67/68] nfsd: Fix NFSv4 READ on RDMA when using readv commit 412055398b9e67e07347a936fc4a6adddabe9cf4 upstream. svcrdma expects that the payload falls precisely into the xdr_buf page vector. This does not seem to be the case for nfsd4_encode_readv(). This code is called only when fops->splice_read is missing or when RQ_SPLICE_OK is clear, so it's not a noticeable problem in many common cases. Add new transport method: ->xpo_read_payload so that when a READ payload does not fit exactly in rq_res's page vector, the XDR encoder can inform the RPC transport exactly where that payload is, without the payload's XDR pad. That way, when a Write chunk is present, the transport knows what byte range in the Reply message is supposed to be matched with the chunk. Note that the Linux NFS server implementation of NFS/RDMA can currently handle only one Write chunk per RPC-over-RDMA message. This simplifies the implementation of this fix. Fixes: b04209806384 ("nfsd4: allow exotic read compounds") Buglink: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=198053 Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever Cc: Timo Rothenpieler Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 20 ++++++------ include/linux/sunrpc/svc.h | 3 ++ include/linux/sunrpc/svc_rdma.h | 8 ++++- include/linux/sunrpc/svc_xprt.h | 2 ++ net/sunrpc/svc.c | 16 ++++++++++ net/sunrpc/svcsock.c | 8 +++++ net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/svc_rdma_recvfrom.c | 1 + net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/svc_rdma_rw.c | 30 +++++++++++------- net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/svc_rdma_sendto.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++- net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/svc_rdma_transport.c | 1 + 10 files changed, 106 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c index 533d0fc3c96b..d6f244559e75 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c @@ -3530,17 +3530,17 @@ static __be32 nfsd4_encode_readv(struct nfsd4_compoundres *resp, u32 zzz = 0; int pad; + /* + * svcrdma requires every READ payload to start somewhere + * in xdr->pages. + */ + if (xdr->iov == xdr->buf->head) { + xdr->iov = NULL; + xdr->end = xdr->p; + } + len = maxcount; v = 0; - - thislen = min_t(long, len, ((void *)xdr->end - (void *)xdr->p)); - p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, (thislen+3)&~3); - WARN_ON_ONCE(!p); - resp->rqstp->rq_vec[v].iov_base = p; - resp->rqstp->rq_vec[v].iov_len = thislen; - v++; - len -= thislen; - while (len) { thislen = min_t(long, len, PAGE_SIZE); p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, (thislen+3)&~3); @@ -3559,6 +3559,8 @@ static __be32 nfsd4_encode_readv(struct nfsd4_compoundres *resp, read->rd_length = maxcount; if (nfserr) return nfserr; + if (svc_encode_read_payload(resp->rqstp, starting_len + 8, maxcount)) + return nfserr_io; xdr_truncate_encode(xdr, starting_len + 8 + ((maxcount+3)&~3)); tmp = htonl(eof); diff --git a/include/linux/sunrpc/svc.h b/include/linux/sunrpc/svc.h index 1afe38eb33f7..82665ff360fd 100644 --- a/include/linux/sunrpc/svc.h +++ b/include/linux/sunrpc/svc.h @@ -517,6 +517,9 @@ void svc_wake_up(struct svc_serv *); void svc_reserve(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, int space); struct svc_pool * svc_pool_for_cpu(struct svc_serv *serv, int cpu); char * svc_print_addr(struct svc_rqst *, char *, size_t); +int svc_encode_read_payload(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, + unsigned int offset, + unsigned int length); unsigned int svc_fill_write_vector(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct page **pages, struct kvec *first, size_t total); diff --git a/include/linux/sunrpc/svc_rdma.h b/include/linux/sunrpc/svc_rdma.h index fddad9f5b390..26f282e5e082 100644 --- a/include/linux/sunrpc/svc_rdma.h +++ b/include/linux/sunrpc/svc_rdma.h @@ -137,6 +137,8 @@ struct svc_rdma_recv_ctxt { unsigned int rc_page_count; unsigned int rc_hdr_count; u32 rc_inv_rkey; + unsigned int rc_read_payload_offset; + unsigned int rc_read_payload_length; struct page *rc_pages[RPCSVC_MAXPAGES]; }; @@ -171,7 +173,9 @@ extern int svc_rdma_recv_read_chunk(struct svcxprt_rdma *rdma, struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_rdma_recv_ctxt *head, __be32 *p); extern int svc_rdma_send_write_chunk(struct svcxprt_rdma *rdma, - __be32 *wr_ch, struct xdr_buf *xdr); + __be32 *wr_ch, struct xdr_buf *xdr, + unsigned int offset, + unsigned long length); extern int svc_rdma_send_reply_chunk(struct svcxprt_rdma *rdma, __be32 *rp_ch, bool writelist, struct xdr_buf *xdr); @@ -190,6 +194,8 @@ extern int svc_rdma_map_reply_msg(struct svcxprt_rdma *rdma, struct svc_rdma_send_ctxt *ctxt, struct xdr_buf *xdr, __be32 *wr_lst); extern int svc_rdma_sendto(struct svc_rqst *); +extern int svc_rdma_read_payload(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, unsigned int offset, + unsigned int length); /* svc_rdma_transport.c */ extern int svc_rdma_create_listen(struct svc_serv *, int, struct sockaddr *); diff --git a/include/linux/sunrpc/svc_xprt.h b/include/linux/sunrpc/svc_xprt.h index ea6f46be9cb7..9e1e046de176 100644 --- a/include/linux/sunrpc/svc_xprt.h +++ b/include/linux/sunrpc/svc_xprt.h @@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ struct svc_xprt_ops { int (*xpo_has_wspace)(struct svc_xprt *); int (*xpo_recvfrom)(struct svc_rqst *); int (*xpo_sendto)(struct svc_rqst *); + int (*xpo_read_payload)(struct svc_rqst *, unsigned int, + unsigned int); void (*xpo_release_rqst)(struct svc_rqst *); void (*xpo_detach)(struct svc_xprt *); void (*xpo_free)(struct svc_xprt *); diff --git a/net/sunrpc/svc.c b/net/sunrpc/svc.c index d11b70552c33..f0dcb6d14bbb 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/svc.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/svc.c @@ -1634,6 +1634,22 @@ u32 svc_max_payload(const struct svc_rqst *rqstp) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(svc_max_payload); +/** + * svc_encode_read_payload - mark a range of bytes as a READ payload + * @rqstp: svc_rqst to operate on + * @offset: payload's byte offset in rqstp->rq_res + * @length: size of payload, in bytes + * + * Returns zero on success, or a negative errno if a permanent + * error occurred. + */ +int svc_encode_read_payload(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, unsigned int offset, + unsigned int length) +{ + return rqstp->rq_xprt->xpt_ops->xpo_read_payload(rqstp, offset, length); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(svc_encode_read_payload); + /** * svc_fill_write_vector - Construct data argument for VFS write call * @rqstp: svc_rqst to operate on diff --git a/net/sunrpc/svcsock.c b/net/sunrpc/svcsock.c index 4260924ad9db..d52abde51f1b 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/svcsock.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/svcsock.c @@ -279,6 +279,12 @@ out: return len; } +static int svc_sock_read_payload(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, unsigned int offset, + unsigned int length) +{ + return 0; +} + /* * Report socket names for nfsdfs */ @@ -655,6 +661,7 @@ static const struct svc_xprt_ops svc_udp_ops = { .xpo_create = svc_udp_create, .xpo_recvfrom = svc_udp_recvfrom, .xpo_sendto = svc_udp_sendto, + .xpo_read_payload = svc_sock_read_payload, .xpo_release_rqst = svc_release_udp_skb, .xpo_detach = svc_sock_detach, .xpo_free = svc_sock_free, @@ -1175,6 +1182,7 @@ static const struct svc_xprt_ops svc_tcp_ops = { .xpo_create = svc_tcp_create, .xpo_recvfrom = svc_tcp_recvfrom, .xpo_sendto = svc_tcp_sendto, + .xpo_read_payload = svc_sock_read_payload, .xpo_release_rqst = svc_release_skb, .xpo_detach = svc_tcp_sock_detach, .xpo_free = svc_sock_free, diff --git a/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/svc_rdma_recvfrom.c b/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/svc_rdma_recvfrom.c index b8ee91ffedda..0ce4e75b2981 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/svc_rdma_recvfrom.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/svc_rdma_recvfrom.c @@ -193,6 +193,7 @@ svc_rdma_recv_ctxt_get(struct svcxprt_rdma *rdma) out: ctxt->rc_page_count = 0; + ctxt->rc_read_payload_length = 0; return ctxt; out_empty: diff --git a/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/svc_rdma_rw.c b/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/svc_rdma_rw.c index a59912e2666d..066af6b2eb01 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/svc_rdma_rw.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/svc_rdma_rw.c @@ -481,18 +481,19 @@ static int svc_rdma_send_xdr_kvec(struct svc_rdma_write_info *info, vec->iov_len); } -/* Send an xdr_buf's page list by itself. A Write chunk is - * just the page list. a Reply chunk is the head, page list, - * and tail. This function is shared between the two types - * of chunk. +/* Send an xdr_buf's page list by itself. A Write chunk is just + * the page list. A Reply chunk is @xdr's head, page list, and + * tail. This function is shared between the two types of chunk. */ static int svc_rdma_send_xdr_pagelist(struct svc_rdma_write_info *info, - struct xdr_buf *xdr) + struct xdr_buf *xdr, + unsigned int offset, + unsigned long length) { info->wi_xdr = xdr; - info->wi_next_off = 0; + info->wi_next_off = offset - xdr->head[0].iov_len; return svc_rdma_build_writes(info, svc_rdma_pagelist_to_sg, - xdr->page_len); + length); } /** @@ -500,6 +501,8 @@ static int svc_rdma_send_xdr_pagelist(struct svc_rdma_write_info *info, * @rdma: controlling RDMA transport * @wr_ch: Write chunk provided by client * @xdr: xdr_buf containing the data payload + * @offset: payload's byte offset in @xdr + * @length: size of payload, in bytes * * Returns a non-negative number of bytes the chunk consumed, or * %-E2BIG if the payload was larger than the Write chunk, @@ -509,19 +512,20 @@ static int svc_rdma_send_xdr_pagelist(struct svc_rdma_write_info *info, * %-EIO if rdma_rw initialization failed (DMA mapping, etc). */ int svc_rdma_send_write_chunk(struct svcxprt_rdma *rdma, __be32 *wr_ch, - struct xdr_buf *xdr) + struct xdr_buf *xdr, + unsigned int offset, unsigned long length) { struct svc_rdma_write_info *info; int ret; - if (!xdr->page_len) + if (!length) return 0; info = svc_rdma_write_info_alloc(rdma, wr_ch); if (!info) return -ENOMEM; - ret = svc_rdma_send_xdr_pagelist(info, xdr); + ret = svc_rdma_send_xdr_pagelist(info, xdr, offset, length); if (ret < 0) goto out_err; @@ -530,7 +534,7 @@ int svc_rdma_send_write_chunk(struct svcxprt_rdma *rdma, __be32 *wr_ch, goto out_err; trace_svcrdma_encode_write(xdr->page_len); - return xdr->page_len; + return length; out_err: svc_rdma_write_info_free(info); @@ -570,7 +574,9 @@ int svc_rdma_send_reply_chunk(struct svcxprt_rdma *rdma, __be32 *rp_ch, * client did not provide Write chunks. */ if (!writelist && xdr->page_len) { - ret = svc_rdma_send_xdr_pagelist(info, xdr); + ret = svc_rdma_send_xdr_pagelist(info, xdr, + xdr->head[0].iov_len, + xdr->page_len); if (ret < 0) goto out_err; consumed += xdr->page_len; diff --git a/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/svc_rdma_sendto.c b/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/svc_rdma_sendto.c index 93ff7967389a..217106c66a13 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/svc_rdma_sendto.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/svc_rdma_sendto.c @@ -856,7 +856,18 @@ int svc_rdma_sendto(struct svc_rqst *rqstp) if (wr_lst) { /* XXX: Presume the client sent only one Write chunk */ - ret = svc_rdma_send_write_chunk(rdma, wr_lst, xdr); + unsigned long offset; + unsigned int length; + + if (rctxt->rc_read_payload_length) { + offset = rctxt->rc_read_payload_offset; + length = rctxt->rc_read_payload_length; + } else { + offset = xdr->head[0].iov_len; + length = xdr->page_len; + } + ret = svc_rdma_send_write_chunk(rdma, wr_lst, xdr, offset, + length); if (ret < 0) goto err2; svc_rdma_xdr_encode_write_list(rdma_resp, wr_lst, ret); @@ -891,3 +902,30 @@ int svc_rdma_sendto(struct svc_rqst *rqstp) set_bit(XPT_CLOSE, &xprt->xpt_flags); return -ENOTCONN; } + +/** + * svc_rdma_read_payload - special processing for a READ payload + * @rqstp: svc_rqst to operate on + * @offset: payload's byte offset in @xdr + * @length: size of payload, in bytes + * + * Returns zero on success. + * + * For the moment, just record the xdr_buf location of the READ + * payload. svc_rdma_sendto will use that location later when + * we actually send the payload. + */ +int svc_rdma_read_payload(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, unsigned int offset, + unsigned int length) +{ + struct svc_rdma_recv_ctxt *rctxt = rqstp->rq_xprt_ctxt; + + /* XXX: Just one READ payload slot for now, since our + * transport implementation currently supports only one + * Write chunk. + */ + rctxt->rc_read_payload_offset = offset; + rctxt->rc_read_payload_length = length; + + return 0; +} diff --git a/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/svc_rdma_transport.c b/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/svc_rdma_transport.c index 889220f11a70..89a12676c59d 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/svc_rdma_transport.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/svc_rdma_transport.c @@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ static const struct svc_xprt_ops svc_rdma_ops = { .xpo_create = svc_rdma_create, .xpo_recvfrom = svc_rdma_recvfrom, .xpo_sendto = svc_rdma_sendto, + .xpo_read_payload = svc_rdma_read_payload, .xpo_release_rqst = svc_rdma_release_rqst, .xpo_detach = svc_rdma_detach, .xpo_free = svc_rdma_free, From cad17feaf0d05e60f7fe3c29908f9e2d07fbb7ee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2020 15:33:42 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 68/68] Linux 5.4.58 Tested-by: Shuah Khan Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Makefile | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index dd753ef637fd..29948bc4a0d2 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 VERSION = 5 PATCHLEVEL = 4 -SUBLEVEL = 57 +SUBLEVEL = 58 EXTRAVERSION = NAME = Kleptomaniac Octopus