Merge branch 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

Pull integrity updates from James Morris:
 "This contains a mixture of bug fixes, code cleanup, and new
  functionality. Of note is the integrity cache locking fix, file change
  detection, and support for a new EVM portable and immutable signature
  type.

  The re-introduction of the integrity cache lock (iint) fixes the
  problem of attempting to take the i_rwsem shared a second time, when
  it was previously taken exclusively. Defining atomic flags resolves
  the original iint/i_rwsem circular locking - accessing the file data
  vs. modifying the file metadata. Although it fixes the O_DIRECT
  problem as well, a subsequent patch is needed to remove the explicit
  O_DIRECT prevention.

  For performance reasons, detecting when a file has changed and needs
  to be re-measured, re-appraised, and/or re-audited, was limited to
  after the last writer has closed, and only if the file data has
  changed. Detecting file change is based on i_version. For filesystems
  that do not support i_version, remote filesystems, or userspace
  filesystems, the file was measured, appraised and/or audited once and
  never re-evaluated. Now local filesystems, which do not support
  i_version or are not mounted with the i_version option, assume the
  file has changed and are required to re-evaluate the file. This change
  does not address detecting file change on remote or userspace
  filesystems.

  Unlike file data signatures, which can be included and distributed in
  software packages (eg. rpm, deb), the existing EVM signature, which
  protects the file metadata, could not be included in software
  packages, as it includes file system specific information (eg. i_ino,
  possibly the UUID). This pull request defines a new EVM portable and
  immutable file metadata signature format, which can be included in
  software packages"

* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
  ima/policy: fix parsing of fsuuid
  ima: Use i_version only when filesystem supports it
  integrity: remove unneeded initializations in integrity_iint_cache entries
  ima: log message to module appraisal error
  ima: pass filename to ima_rdwr_violation_check()
  ima: Fix line continuation format
  ima: support new "hash" and "dont_hash" policy actions
  ima: re-introduce own integrity cache lock
  EVM: Add support for portable signature format
  EVM: Allow userland to permit modification of EVM-protected metadata
  ima: relax requiring a file signature for new files with zero length

Documentation/ABI/testing/evm

@@ -14,30 +14,46 @@ Description:
 		generated either locally or remotely using an
 		asymmetric key. These keys are loaded onto root's
 		keyring using keyctl, and EVM is then enabled by
-		echoing a value to <securityfs>/evm:
+		echoing a value to <securityfs>/evm made up of the
+		following bits:
 
-		1: enable HMAC validation and creation
-		2: enable digital signature validation
-		3: enable HMAC and digital signature validation and HMAC
-		   creation
+		Bit	  Effect
+		0	  Enable HMAC validation and creation
+		1	  Enable digital signature validation
+		2	  Permit modification of EVM-protected metadata at
+			  runtime. Not supported if HMAC validation and
+			  creation is enabled.
+		31	  Disable further runtime modification of EVM policy
 
-		Further writes will be blocked if HMAC support is enabled or
-		if bit 32 is set:
+		For example:
 
-		echo 0x80000002 ><securityfs>/evm
+		echo 1 ><securityfs>/evm
 
-		will enable digital signature validation and block
-		further writes to <securityfs>/evm.
+		will enable HMAC validation and creation
 
-		Until this is done, EVM can not create or validate the
-		'security.evm' xattr, but returns INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN.
-		Loading keys and signaling EVM should be done as early
-		as possible.  Normally this is done in the initramfs,
-		which has already been measured as part of the trusted
-		boot.  For more information on creating and loading
-		existing trusted/encrypted keys, refer to:
+		echo 0x80000003 ><securityfs>/evm
 
-		Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst. Both dracut
-		(via 97masterkey and 98integrity) and systemd (via
+		will enable HMAC and digital signature validation and
+		HMAC creation and disable all further modification of policy.
+
+		echo 0x80000006 ><securityfs>/evm
+
+		will enable digital signature validation, permit
+		modification of EVM-protected metadata and
+		disable all further modification of policy
+
+		Note that once a key has been loaded, it will no longer be
+		possible to enable metadata modification.
+
+		Until key loading has been signaled EVM can not create
+		or validate the 'security.evm' xattr, but returns
+		INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN.  Loading keys and signaling EVM
+		should be done as early as possible.  Normally this is
+		done in the initramfs, which has already been measured
+		as part of the trusted boot.  For more information on
+		creating and loading existing trusted/encrypted keys,
+		refer to:
+		Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst. Both
+		dracut (via 97masterkey and 98integrity) and systemd (via
 		core/ima-setup) have support for loading keys at boot
 		time.

Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy

@@ -17,7 +17,8 @@ Description:
 
 		rule format: action [condition ...]
 
-		action: measure | dont_measure | appraise | dont_appraise | audit
+		action: measure | dont_measure | appraise | dont_appraise |
+			audit | hash | dont_hash
 		condition:= base | lsm  [option]
 			base:	[[func=] [mask=] [fsmagic=] [fsuuid=] [uid=]
 				[euid=] [fowner=]]