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UPSTREAM: x86/speculation: Include unprivileged eBPF status in Spectre v2 mitigation reporting

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commit 44a3918c8245ab10c6c9719dd12e7a8d291980d8 upstream.

With unprivileged eBPF enabled, eIBRS (without retpoline) is vulnerable
to Spectre v2 BHB-based attacks.

When both are enabled, print a warning message and report it in the
'spectre_v2' sysfs vulnerabilities file.

Bug: 215557547
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
[fllinden@amazon.com: backported to 5.4]
Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@google.com>
Change-Id: Ie9ee8c137729aadb4f9ef2be346a86d71eca363b
This commit is contained in:
Josh Poimboeuf 2022-02-18 11:49:08 -08:00 • committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
commit 4e9fffdc89
3 changed files with 49 additions and 6 deletions
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8
kernel/sysctl.c
View file

@ -252,6 +252,11 @@ static int sysrq_sysctl_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
void __weak unpriv_ebpf_notify(int new_state)
{
}
static int bpf_unpriv_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
@ -269,6 +274,9 @@ static int bpf_unpriv_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
return -EPERM;
*(int *)table->data = unpriv_enable;
}
unpriv_ebpf_notify(unpriv_enable);
return ret;
}
#endif