proc: maps protection

The /proc/pid/ "maps", "smaps", and "numa_maps" files contain sensitive
information about the memory location and usage of processes.  Issues:

- maps should not be world-readable, especially if programs expect any
  kind of ASLR protection from local attackers.
- maps cannot just be 0400 because "-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 -O2" makes glibc
  check the maps when %n is in a *printf call, and a setuid(getuid())
  process wouldn't be able to read its own maps file.  (For reference
  see http://lkml.org/lkml/2006/1/22/150)
- a system-wide toggle is needed to allow prior behavior in the case of
  non-root applications that depend on access to the maps contents.

This change implements a check using "ptrace_may_attach" before allowing
access to read the maps contents.  To control this protection, the new knob
/proc/sys/kernel/maps_protect has been added, with corresponding updates to
the procfs documentation.

[[email protected]: build fixes]
[[email protected]: New sysctl numbers are old hat]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>

CREDITS

@@ -661,7 +661,7 @@ N: Kees Cook
 E: [email protected]
 W: http://outflux.net/
 P: 1024D/17063E6D 9FA3 C49C 23C9 D1BC 2E30  1975 1FFF 4BA9 1706 3E6D
-D: Minor updates to SCSI code for the Communications type
+D: Minor updates to SCSI types, added /proc/pid/maps protection
 S: (ask for current address)
 S: USA