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userns: Require CAP_SYS_ADMIN for most uses of setns.
Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> found a nasty little bug in the permissions of setns. With unprivileged user namespaces it became possible to create new namespaces without privilege. However the setns calls were relaxed to only require CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the user nameapce of the targed namespace. Which made the following nasty sequence possible. pid = clone(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNS); if (pid == 0) { /* child */ system("mount --bind /home/me/passwd /etc/passwd"); } else if (pid != 0) { /* parent */ char path[PATH_MAX]; snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "/proc/%u/ns/mnt"); fd = open(path, O_RDONLY); setns(fd, 0); system("su -"); } Prevent this possibility by requiring CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the current user namespace when joing all but the user namespace. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
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5 changed files with 10 additions and 5 deletions
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@ -170,7 +170,8 @@ static void ipcns_put(void *ns)
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static int ipcns_install(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, void *new)
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{
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struct ipc_namespace *ns = new;
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if (!ns_capable(ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
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if (!ns_capable(ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
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!nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
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return -EPERM;
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/* Ditch state from the old ipc namespace */
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