mm: Rename SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU to SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU

A group of Linux kernel hackers reported chasing a bug that resulted
from their assumption that SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU provided an existence
guarantee, that is, that no block from such a slab would be reallocated
during an RCU read-side critical section.  Of course, that is not the
case.  Instead, SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU only prevents freeing of an entire
slab of blocks.

However, there is a phrase for this, namely "type safety".  This commit
therefore renames SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU to SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU in order
to avoid future instances of this sort of confusion.

Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <[email protected]>
Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
[ paulmck: Add comments mentioning the old name, as requested by Eric
  Dumazet, in order to help people familiar with the old name find
  the new one. ]
Acked-by: David Rientjes <[email protected]>
This commit is contained in:
Paul E. McKenney 2017-01-18 02:53:44 -08:00
commit 5f0d5a3ae7
30 changed files with 57 additions and 54 deletions

View file

@ -1687,7 +1687,7 @@ static void rcu_free_slab(struct rcu_head *h)
static void free_slab(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page)
{
if (unlikely(s->flags & SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU)) {
if (unlikely(s->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU)) {
struct rcu_head *head;
if (need_reserve_slab_rcu) {
@ -2963,7 +2963,7 @@ static __always_inline void slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page,
* slab_free_freelist_hook() could have put the items into quarantine.
* If so, no need to free them.
*/
if (s->flags & SLAB_KASAN && !(s->flags & SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU))
if (s->flags & SLAB_KASAN && !(s->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU))
return;
do_slab_free(s, page, head, tail, cnt, addr);
}
@ -3433,7 +3433,7 @@ static int calculate_sizes(struct kmem_cache *s, int forced_order)
* the slab may touch the object after free or before allocation
* then we should never poison the object itself.
*/
if ((flags & SLAB_POISON) && !(flags & SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU) &&
if ((flags & SLAB_POISON) && !(flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU) &&
!s->ctor)
s->flags |= __OBJECT_POISON;
else
@ -3455,7 +3455,7 @@ static int calculate_sizes(struct kmem_cache *s, int forced_order)
*/
s->inuse = size;
if (((flags & (SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU | SLAB_POISON)) ||
if (((flags & (SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_POISON)) ||
s->ctor)) {
/*
* Relocate free pointer after the object if it is not
@ -3537,7 +3537,7 @@ static int kmem_cache_open(struct kmem_cache *s, unsigned long flags)
s->flags = kmem_cache_flags(s->size, flags, s->name, s->ctor);
s->reserved = 0;
if (need_reserve_slab_rcu && (s->flags & SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU))
if (need_reserve_slab_rcu && (s->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU))
s->reserved = sizeof(struct rcu_head);
if (!calculate_sizes(s, -1))
@ -5042,7 +5042,7 @@ SLAB_ATTR_RO(cache_dma);
static ssize_t destroy_by_rcu_show(struct kmem_cache *s, char *buf)
{
return sprintf(buf, "%d\n", !!(s->flags & SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU));
return sprintf(buf, "%d\n", !!(s->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU));
}
SLAB_ATTR_RO(destroy_by_rcu);