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Bug fixes for ext4; most of which relate to vulnerabilities where a
maliciously crafted file system image can result in a kernel OOPS or hang. At least one fix addresses an inline data bug could be triggered by userspace without the need of a crafted file system (although it does require that the inline data feature be enabled). -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQEzBAABCAAdFiEEK2m5VNv+CHkogTfJ8vlZVpUNgaMFAltBmcYACgkQ8vlZVpUN gaPDJgf/cEa9QuiYTbNOmcOMorK9LEk5XO8qsiJdUVNQtLsHZfl0QowbkF9/F/W5 andTJzNpFvXeLADMTTjpsDnQ90i8LKD11Kol3dPJcMhJhELtQsjxUBguxpQBP86R dvHuCl2/AaqX7rr6Co80yYSinRCquqkzJNhdM5/MLNGziSpkQL3dPSs93rmV+YbU 8DkUwmhDhoiToLBTLaldrAsAzKvor3uyjNPJ3qhxeE2kXrnuI1V4XfstBGjhVKFB /5aYWexDZkL5qiCo+lZnqdITqUnPx3uAkUdBn0dj7V+nDow+/R/8nApvlvJu6usF OfMoKr098/pmPAjE5aZ8QpBNVtLFpg== =njzR -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'ext4_for_linus_stable' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4 Pull ext4 bugfixes from Ted Ts'o: "Bug fixes for ext4; most of which relate to vulnerabilities where a maliciously crafted file system image can result in a kernel OOPS or hang. At least one fix addresses an inline data bug could be triggered by userspace without the need of a crafted file system (although it does require that the inline data feature be enabled)" * tag 'ext4_for_linus_stable' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4: ext4: check superblock mapped prior to committing ext4: add more mount time checks of the superblock ext4: add more inode number paranoia checks ext4: avoid running out of journal credits when appending to an inline file jbd2: don't mark block as modified if the handle is out of credits ext4: never move the system.data xattr out of the inode body ext4: clear i_data in ext4_inode_info when removing inline data ext4: include the illegal physical block in the bad map ext4_error msg ext4: verify the depth of extent tree in ext4_find_extent() ext4: only look at the bg_flags field if it is valid ext4: make sure bitmaps and the inode table don't overlap with bg descriptors ext4: always check block group bounds in ext4_init_block_bitmap() ext4: always verify the magic number in xattr blocks ext4: add corruption check in ext4_xattr_set_entry() ext4: add warn_on_error mount option
This commit is contained in:
commit
70a2dc6abc
11 changed files with 155 additions and 96 deletions
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@ -1361,6 +1361,13 @@ int jbd2_journal_dirty_metadata(handle_t *handle, struct buffer_head *bh)
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if (jh->b_transaction == transaction &&
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jh->b_jlist != BJ_Metadata) {
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jbd_lock_bh_state(bh);
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if (jh->b_transaction == transaction &&
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jh->b_jlist != BJ_Metadata)
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pr_err("JBD2: assertion failure: h_type=%u "
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"h_line_no=%u block_no=%llu jlist=%u\n",
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handle->h_type, handle->h_line_no,
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(unsigned long long) bh->b_blocknr,
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jh->b_jlist);
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J_ASSERT_JH(jh, jh->b_transaction != transaction ||
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jh->b_jlist == BJ_Metadata);
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jbd_unlock_bh_state(bh);
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@ -1380,11 +1387,11 @@ int jbd2_journal_dirty_metadata(handle_t *handle, struct buffer_head *bh)
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* of the transaction. This needs to be done
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* once a transaction -bzzz
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*/
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jh->b_modified = 1;
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if (handle->h_buffer_credits <= 0) {
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ret = -ENOSPC;
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goto out_unlock_bh;
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}
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jh->b_modified = 1;
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handle->h_buffer_credits--;
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}
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