CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the core kernel

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
This commit is contained in:
David Howells 2008-11-14 10:39:12 +11:00 • committed by James Morris
commit 76aac0e9a1
15 changed files with 72 additions and 52 deletions

View file

@ -123,16 +123,19 @@ int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
* because setting up the necessary parent/child relationship
* or halting the specified task is impossible.
*/
uid_t uid;
gid_t gid;
int dumpable = 0;
/* Don't let security modules deny introspection */
if (task == current)
return 0;
if (((current->uid != task->euid) ||
(current->uid != task->suid) ||
(current->uid != task->uid) ||
(current->gid != task->egid) ||
(current->gid != task->sgid) ||
(current->gid != task->gid)) && !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid);
if ((uid != task->euid ||
uid != task->suid ||
uid != task->uid ||
gid != task->egid ||
gid != task->sgid ||
gid != task->gid) && !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
return -EPERM;
smp_rmb();
if (task->mm)