From 8c0b118bcc1662043189c9acd09cfca6e6408086 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nikita Zhandarovich Date: Wed, 24 Jul 2024 10:51:58 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] f2fs: avoid potential int overflow in sanity_check_area_boundary() commit 50438dbc483ca6a133d2bce9d5d6747bcee38371 upstream. While calculating the end addresses of main area and segment 0, u32 may be not enough to hold the result without the danger of int overflow. Just in case, play it safe and cast one of the operands to a wider type (u64). Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with static analysis tool SVACE. Fixes: fd694733d523 ("f2fs: cover large section in sanity check of super") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Nikita Zhandarovich Reviewed-by: Chao Yu Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/f2fs/super.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/f2fs/super.c b/fs/f2fs/super.c index 401bc0e7f6eb..da51474596ef 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/super.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/super.c @@ -2488,9 +2488,9 @@ static inline bool sanity_check_area_boundary(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, u32 segment_count = le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count); u32 log_blocks_per_seg = le32_to_cpu(raw_super->log_blocks_per_seg); u64 main_end_blkaddr = main_blkaddr + - (segment_count_main << log_blocks_per_seg); + ((u64)segment_count_main << log_blocks_per_seg); u64 seg_end_blkaddr = segment0_blkaddr + - (segment_count << log_blocks_per_seg); + ((u64)segment_count << log_blocks_per_seg); if (segment0_blkaddr != cp_blkaddr) { f2fs_info(sbi, "Mismatch start address, segment0(%u) cp_blkaddr(%u)",