chelsio/chtls: prevent potential integer overflow on 32bit

commit fbbd84af6ba70334335bdeba3ae536cf751c14c6 upstream.

The "gl->tot_len" variable is controlled by the user.  It comes from
process_responses().  On 32bit systems, the "gl->tot_len +
sizeof(struct cpl_pass_accept_req) + sizeof(struct rss_header)" addition
could have an integer wrapping bug.  Use size_add() to prevent this.

Fixes: a089439478 ("crypto: chtls - Register chtls with net tls")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
This commit is contained in:
Dan Carpenter 2024-12-13 12:47:27 +03:00 • committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
commit 8e9f1f405a

View file

@ -339,8 +339,9 @@ static struct sk_buff *copy_gl_to_skb_pkt(const struct pkt_gl *gl,
* driver. Once driver synthesizes cpl_pass_accpet_req the skb will go
* through the regular cpl_pass_accept_req processing in TOM.
*/
skb = alloc_skb(gl->tot_len + sizeof(struct cpl_pass_accept_req)
- pktshift, GFP_ATOMIC);
skb = alloc_skb(size_add(gl->tot_len,
sizeof(struct cpl_pass_accept_req)) -
pktshift, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (unlikely(!skb))
return NULL;
__skb_put(skb, gl->tot_len + sizeof(struct cpl_pass_accept_req)