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file capabilities: don't prevent signaling setuid root programs
An unprivileged process must be able to kill a setuid root program started by the same user. This is legacy behavior needed for instance for xinit to kill X when the window manager exits. When an unprivileged user runs a setuid root program in !SECURE_NOROOT mode, fP, fI, and fE are set full on, so pP' and pE' are full on. Then cap_task_kill() prevents the user from signaling the setuid root task. This is a change in behavior compared to when !CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES. This patch introduces a special check into cap_task_kill() just to check whether a non-root user is signaling a setuid root program started by the same user. If so, then signal is allowed. Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]> Cc: Andrew Morgan <[email protected]> Cc: Stephen Smalley <[email protected]> Cc: Chris Wright <[email protected]> Cc: James Morris <[email protected]> Cc: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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@ -526,6 +526,15 @@ int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
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if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special(info) || SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
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return 0;
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/*
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* Running a setuid root program raises your capabilities.
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* Killing your own setuid root processes was previously
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* allowed.
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* We must preserve legacy signal behavior in this case.
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*/
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if (p->euid == 0 && p->uid == current->uid)
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return 0;
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/* sigcont is permitted within same session */
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if (sig == SIGCONT && (task_session_nr(current) == task_session_nr(p)))
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return 0;
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