From 1c6cfb9e8a5c97f6a4c51745635ea2e90b580868 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Niklas Cassel Date: Thu, 14 Apr 2022 11:10:18 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0001/1091] binfmt_flat: do not stop relocating GOT entries prematurely on riscv commit 6045ab5fea4c849153ebeb0acb532da5f29d69c4 upstream. bFLT binaries are usually created using elf2flt. The linker script used by elf2flt has defined the .data section like the following for the last 19 years: .data : { _sdata = . ; __data_start = . ; data_start = . ; *(.got.plt) *(.got) FILL(0) ; . = ALIGN(0x20) ; LONG(-1) . = ALIGN(0x20) ; ... } It places the .got.plt input section before the .got input section. The same is true for the default linker script (ld --verbose) on most architectures except x86/x86-64. The binfmt_flat loader should relocate all GOT entries until it encounters a -1 (the LONG(-1) in the linker script). The problem is that the .got.plt input section starts with a GOTPLT header (which has size 16 bytes on elf64-riscv and 8 bytes on elf32-riscv), where the first word is set to -1. See the binutils implementation for riscv [1]. This causes the binfmt_flat loader to stop relocating GOT entries prematurely and thus causes the application to crash when running. Fix this by skipping the whole GOTPLT header, since the whole GOTPLT header is reserved for the dynamic linker. The GOTPLT header will only be skipped for bFLT binaries with flag FLAT_FLAG_GOTPIC set. This flag is unconditionally set by elf2flt if the supplied ELF binary has the symbol _GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_ defined. ELF binaries without a .got input section should thus remain unaffected. Tested on RISC-V Canaan Kendryte K210 and RISC-V QEMU nommu_virt_defconfig. [1] https://sourceware.org/git/?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=blob;f=bfd/elfnn-riscv.c;hb=binutils-2_38#l3275 Cc: Signed-off-by: Niklas Cassel Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220414091018.896737-1-niklas.cassel@wdc.com Fixed-by: kernel test robot Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/202204182333.OIUOotK8-lkp@intel.com Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/binfmt_flat.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/binfmt_flat.c b/fs/binfmt_flat.c index 196f9f64d075..c999bc0c0691 100644 --- a/fs/binfmt_flat.c +++ b/fs/binfmt_flat.c @@ -422,6 +422,30 @@ static void old_reloc(unsigned long rl) /****************************************************************************/ +static inline u32 __user *skip_got_header(u32 __user *rp) +{ + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RISCV)) { + /* + * RISC-V has a 16 byte GOT PLT header for elf64-riscv + * and 8 byte GOT PLT header for elf32-riscv. + * Skip the whole GOT PLT header, since it is reserved + * for the dynamic linker (ld.so). + */ + u32 rp_val0, rp_val1; + + if (get_user(rp_val0, rp)) + return rp; + if (get_user(rp_val1, rp + 1)) + return rp; + + if (rp_val0 == 0xffffffff && rp_val1 == 0xffffffff) + rp += 4; + else if (rp_val0 == 0xffffffff) + rp += 2; + } + return rp; +} + static int load_flat_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct lib_info *libinfo, int id, unsigned long *extra_stack) { @@ -769,7 +793,8 @@ static int load_flat_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, * image. */ if (flags & FLAT_FLAG_GOTPIC) { - for (rp = (u32 __user *)datapos; ; rp++) { + rp = skip_got_header((u32 __user *) datapos); + for (; ; rp++) { u32 addr, rp_val; if (get_user(rp_val, rp)) return -EFAULT; From 6b3ecb2d92a01da961b79ec79179b0abbb0e447d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Marios Levogiannis Date: Mon, 30 May 2022 10:41:31 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 0002/1091] ALSA: hda/realtek - Fix microphone noise on ASUS TUF B550M-PLUS commit 9bfa7b36343c7d84370bc61c9ed774635b05e4eb upstream. Set microphone pins 0x18 (rear) and 0x19 (front) to VREF_50 to fix the microphone noise on ASUS TUF B550M-PLUS which uses the ALCS1200A codec. The initial value was VREF_80. The same issue is also present on Windows using both the default Windows driver and all tested Realtek drivers before version 6.0.9049.1. Comparing Realtek driver 6.0.9049.1 (the first one without the microphone noise) to Realtek driver 6.0.9047.1 (the last one with the microphone noise) revealed that the fix is the result of setting pins 0x18 and 0x19 to VREF_50. This fix may also work for other boards that have been reported to have the same microphone issue and use the ALC1150 and ALCS1200A codecs, since these codecs are similar and the fix in the Realtek driver on Windows is common for both. However, it is currently enabled only for ASUS TUF B550M-PLUS as this is the only board that could be tested. Signed-off-by: Marios Levogiannis Cc: Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220530074131.12258-1-marios.levogiannis@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+) diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c index 78b5a0f22a41..8a221866ab01 100644 --- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c +++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c @@ -1932,6 +1932,7 @@ enum { ALC1220_FIXUP_CLEVO_PB51ED_PINS, ALC887_FIXUP_ASUS_AUDIO, ALC887_FIXUP_ASUS_HMIC, + ALCS1200A_FIXUP_MIC_VREF, }; static void alc889_fixup_coef(struct hda_codec *codec, @@ -2477,6 +2478,14 @@ static const struct hda_fixup alc882_fixups[] = { .chained = true, .chain_id = ALC887_FIXUP_ASUS_AUDIO, }, + [ALCS1200A_FIXUP_MIC_VREF] = { + .type = HDA_FIXUP_PINCTLS, + .v.pins = (const struct hda_pintbl[]) { + { 0x18, PIN_VREF50 }, /* rear mic */ + { 0x19, PIN_VREF50 }, /* front mic */ + {} + } + }, }; static const struct snd_pci_quirk alc882_fixup_tbl[] = { @@ -2514,6 +2523,7 @@ static const struct snd_pci_quirk alc882_fixup_tbl[] = { SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1043, 0x835f, "Asus Eee 1601", ALC888_FIXUP_EEE1601), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1043, 0x84bc, "ASUS ET2700", ALC887_FIXUP_ASUS_BASS), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1043, 0x8691, "ASUS ROG Ranger VIII", ALC882_FIXUP_GPIO3), + SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1043, 0x8797, "ASUS TUF B550M-PLUS", ALCS1200A_FIXUP_MIC_VREF), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x104d, 0x9043, "Sony Vaio VGC-LN51JGB", ALC882_FIXUP_NO_PRIMARY_HP), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x104d, 0x9044, "Sony VAIO AiO", ALC882_FIXUP_NO_PRIMARY_HP), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x104d, 0x9047, "Sony Vaio TT", ALC889_FIXUP_VAIO_TT), From 7c5a52dd4d916b31c9769c3b63c5456b513c7053 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Carl=20Yin=28=E6=AE=B7=E5=BC=A0=E6=88=90=29?= Date: Thu, 19 May 2022 02:34:43 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0003/1091] USB: serial: option: add Quectel BG95 modem commit 33b7af2f459df453feb0d44628d820c47fefe7a8 upstream. The BG95 modem has 3 USB configurations that are configurable via the AT command AT+QCFGEXT="usbnet",["ecm"|"modem"|"rmnet"] which make the modem enumerate with the following interfaces, respectively: "modem": Diag + GNSS + Modem + Modem "ecm" : Diag + GNSS + Modem + ECM "rmnet": Diag + GNSS + Modem + QMI Don't support Full QMI messages (e.g WDS_START_NETWORK_INTERFACE) A detailed description of the USB configuration for each mode follows: +QCFGEXT: "usbnet","modem" -------------------------- T: Bus=01 Lev=02 Prnt=02 Port=01 Cnt=01 Dev#= 3 Spd=480 MxCh= 0 D: Ver= 2.00 Cls=00(>ifc ) Sub=00 Prot=00 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1 P: Vendor=2c7c ProdID=0700 Rev= 0.00 S: Manufacturer=Quectel, Incorporated S: Product=Quectel LPWA Module S: SerialNumber=884328a2 C:* #Ifs= 4 Cfg#= 1 Atr=e0 MxPwr=500mA I:* If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option E: Ad=81(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=01(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms I:* If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option E: Ad=82(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=02(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms I:* If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option E: Ad=83(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 64 Ivl=2ms E: Ad=84(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=03(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms I:* If#= 4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=fe Prot=ff Driver=option E: Ad=85(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 64 Ivl=2ms E: Ad=86(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=04(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms +QCFGEXT: "usbnet","ecm" ------------------------ T: Bus=01 Lev=02 Prnt=02 Port=01 Cnt=01 Dev#= 4 Spd=480 MxCh= 0 D: Ver= 2.00 Cls=ef(misc ) Sub=02 Prot=01 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1 P: Vendor=2c7c ProdID=0700 Rev= 0.00 S: Manufacturer=Quectel, Incorporated S: Product=Quectel LPWA Module S: SerialNumber=884328a2 C:* #Ifs= 5 Cfg#= 1 Atr=e0 MxPwr=500mA A: FirstIf#= 3 IfCount= 2 Cls=02(comm.) Sub=00 Prot=00 I:* If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option E: Ad=81(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=01(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms I:* If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option E: Ad=82(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=02(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms I:* If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option E: Ad=83(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 64 Ivl=2ms E: Ad=84(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=03(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms I:* If#= 3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=02(comm.) Sub=06 Prot=00 Driver=cdc_ether E: Ad=85(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 64 Ivl=2ms I: If#= 4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 0 Cls=0a(data ) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=cdc_ether I:* If#= 4 Alt= 1 #EPs= 2 Cls=0a(data ) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=cdc_ether E: Ad=86(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=04(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms +QCFGEXT: "usbnet","rmnet" -------------------------- T: Bus=01 Lev=02 Prnt=02 Port=01 Cnt=01 Dev#= 4 Spd=480 MxCh= 0 D: Ver= 2.00 Cls=00(>ifc ) Sub=00 Prot=00 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1 P: Vendor=2c7c ProdID=0700 Rev= 0.00 S: Manufacturer=Quectel, Incorporated S: Product=Quectel LPWA Module S: SerialNumber=884328a2 C:* #Ifs= 4 Cfg#= 1 Atr=e0 MxPwr=500mA I:* If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option E: Ad=81(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=01(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms I:* If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option E: Ad=82(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=02(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms I:* If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option E: Ad=83(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 64 Ivl=2ms E: Ad=84(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=03(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms I:* If#= 3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=qmi_wwan E: Ad=85(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 64 Ivl=2ms E: Ad=86(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=04(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms Signed-off-by: Carl Yin Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/serial/option.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/option.c b/drivers/usb/serial/option.c index 1ba4a72047dc..62f79fd5257b 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/serial/option.c +++ b/drivers/usb/serial/option.c @@ -1137,6 +1137,8 @@ static const struct usb_device_id option_ids[] = { { USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(QUECTEL_VENDOR_ID, QUECTEL_PRODUCT_EM12, 0xff, 0, 0) }, { USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(QUECTEL_VENDOR_ID, 0x0620, 0xff, 0xff, 0x30) }, /* EM160R-GL */ { USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(QUECTEL_VENDOR_ID, 0x0620, 0xff, 0, 0) }, + { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(QUECTEL_VENDOR_ID, 0x0700, 0xff), /* BG95 */ + .driver_info = RSVD(3) | ZLP }, { USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(QUECTEL_VENDOR_ID, QUECTEL_PRODUCT_RM500Q, 0xff, 0xff, 0x30) }, { USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(QUECTEL_VENDOR_ID, QUECTEL_PRODUCT_RM500Q, 0xff, 0, 0) }, { USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(QUECTEL_VENDOR_ID, QUECTEL_PRODUCT_RM500Q, 0xff, 0xff, 0x10), From 11479087639329fac9607356139649e66eb5281f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Monish Kumar R Date: Fri, 20 May 2022 18:30:44 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 0004/1091] USB: new quirk for Dell Gen 2 devices commit 97fa5887cf283bb75ffff5f6b2c0e71794c02400 upstream. Add USB_QUIRK_NO_LPM and USB_QUIRK_RESET_RESUME quirks for Dell usb gen 2 device to not fail during enumeration. Found this bug on own testing Signed-off-by: Monish Kumar R Cc: stable Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220520130044.17303-1-monish.kumar.r@intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/core/quirks.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/core/quirks.c b/drivers/usb/core/quirks.c index d5f233fa6f3b..f8f2de7899a9 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/core/quirks.c +++ b/drivers/usb/core/quirks.c @@ -511,6 +511,9 @@ static const struct usb_device_id usb_quirk_list[] = { /* DJI CineSSD */ { USB_DEVICE(0x2ca3, 0x0031), .driver_info = USB_QUIRK_NO_LPM }, + /* DELL USB GEN2 */ + { USB_DEVICE(0x413c, 0xb062), .driver_info = USB_QUIRK_NO_LPM | USB_QUIRK_RESET_RESUME }, + /* VCOM device */ { USB_DEVICE(0x4296, 0x7570), .driver_info = USB_QUIRK_CONFIG_INTF_STRINGS }, From 1b767500d151e4a32eb6ec51a6df511ecde05d7a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kishon Vijay Abraham I Date: Tue, 10 May 2022 14:46:29 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 0005/1091] usb: core: hcd: Add support for deferring roothub registration commit a44623d9279086c89f631201d993aa332f7c9e66 upstream. It has been observed with certain PCIe USB cards (like Inateck connected to AM64 EVM or J7200 EVM) that as soon as the primary roothub is registered, port status change is handled even before xHC is running leading to cold plug USB devices not detected. For such cases, registering both the root hubs along with the second HCD is required. Add support for deferring roothub registration in usb_add_hcd(), so that both primary and secondary roothubs are registered along with the second HCD. This patch has been added and reverted earier as it triggered a race in usb device enumeration. That race is now fixed in 5.16-rc3, and in stable back to 5.4 commit 6cca13de26ee ("usb: hub: Fix locking issues with address0_mutex") commit 6ae6dc22d2d1 ("usb: hub: Fix usb enumeration issue due to address0 race") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+ Suggested-by: Mathias Nyman Tested-by: Chris Chiu Acked-by: Alan Stern Signed-off-by: Kishon Vijay Abraham I Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220510091630.16564-2-kishon@ti.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/core/hcd.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------- include/linux/usb/hcd.h | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/core/hcd.c b/drivers/usb/core/hcd.c index 39203f2ce6a1..fde211519a97 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/core/hcd.c +++ b/drivers/usb/core/hcd.c @@ -2657,6 +2657,7 @@ int usb_add_hcd(struct usb_hcd *hcd, { int retval; struct usb_device *rhdev; + struct usb_hcd *shared_hcd; if (!hcd->skip_phy_initialization && usb_hcd_is_primary_hcd(hcd)) { hcd->phy_roothub = usb_phy_roothub_alloc(hcd->self.sysdev); @@ -2813,13 +2814,26 @@ int usb_add_hcd(struct usb_hcd *hcd, goto err_hcd_driver_start; } - /* starting here, usbcore will pay attention to this root hub */ - retval = register_root_hub(hcd); - if (retval != 0) - goto err_register_root_hub; + /* starting here, usbcore will pay attention to the shared HCD roothub */ + shared_hcd = hcd->shared_hcd; + if (!usb_hcd_is_primary_hcd(hcd) && shared_hcd && HCD_DEFER_RH_REGISTER(shared_hcd)) { + retval = register_root_hub(shared_hcd); + if (retval != 0) + goto err_register_root_hub; - if (hcd->uses_new_polling && HCD_POLL_RH(hcd)) - usb_hcd_poll_rh_status(hcd); + if (shared_hcd->uses_new_polling && HCD_POLL_RH(shared_hcd)) + usb_hcd_poll_rh_status(shared_hcd); + } + + /* starting here, usbcore will pay attention to this root hub */ + if (!HCD_DEFER_RH_REGISTER(hcd)) { + retval = register_root_hub(hcd); + if (retval != 0) + goto err_register_root_hub; + + if (hcd->uses_new_polling && HCD_POLL_RH(hcd)) + usb_hcd_poll_rh_status(hcd); + } return retval; @@ -2862,6 +2876,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(usb_add_hcd); void usb_remove_hcd(struct usb_hcd *hcd) { struct usb_device *rhdev = hcd->self.root_hub; + bool rh_registered; dev_info(hcd->self.controller, "remove, state %x\n", hcd->state); @@ -2872,6 +2887,7 @@ void usb_remove_hcd(struct usb_hcd *hcd) dev_dbg(hcd->self.controller, "roothub graceful disconnect\n"); spin_lock_irq (&hcd_root_hub_lock); + rh_registered = hcd->rh_registered; hcd->rh_registered = 0; spin_unlock_irq (&hcd_root_hub_lock); @@ -2881,7 +2897,8 @@ void usb_remove_hcd(struct usb_hcd *hcd) cancel_work_sync(&hcd->died_work); mutex_lock(&usb_bus_idr_lock); - usb_disconnect(&rhdev); /* Sets rhdev to NULL */ + if (rh_registered) + usb_disconnect(&rhdev); /* Sets rhdev to NULL */ mutex_unlock(&usb_bus_idr_lock); /* diff --git a/include/linux/usb/hcd.h b/include/linux/usb/hcd.h index 712b2a603645..c0eb85b2981e 100644 --- a/include/linux/usb/hcd.h +++ b/include/linux/usb/hcd.h @@ -124,6 +124,7 @@ struct usb_hcd { #define HCD_FLAG_RH_RUNNING 5 /* root hub is running? */ #define HCD_FLAG_DEAD 6 /* controller has died? */ #define HCD_FLAG_INTF_AUTHORIZED 7 /* authorize interfaces? */ +#define HCD_FLAG_DEFER_RH_REGISTER 8 /* Defer roothub registration */ /* The flags can be tested using these macros; they are likely to * be slightly faster than test_bit(). @@ -134,6 +135,7 @@ struct usb_hcd { #define HCD_WAKEUP_PENDING(hcd) ((hcd)->flags & (1U << HCD_FLAG_WAKEUP_PENDING)) #define HCD_RH_RUNNING(hcd) ((hcd)->flags & (1U << HCD_FLAG_RH_RUNNING)) #define HCD_DEAD(hcd) ((hcd)->flags & (1U << HCD_FLAG_DEAD)) +#define HCD_DEFER_RH_REGISTER(hcd) ((hcd)->flags & (1U << HCD_FLAG_DEFER_RH_REGISTER)) /* * Specifies if interfaces are authorized by default From 00c93ce2665c3e81535a726b8d24fd74dbfa6105 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kan Liang Date: Wed, 25 May 2022 06:39:52 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0006/1091] perf/x86/intel: Fix event constraints for ICL commit 86dca369075b3e310c3c0adb0f81e513c562b5e4 upstream. According to the latest event list, the event encoding 0x55 INST_DECODED.DECODERS and 0x56 UOPS_DECODED.DEC0 are only available on the first 4 counters. Add them into the event constraints table. Fixes: 6017608936c1 ("perf/x86/intel: Add Icelake support") Signed-off-by: Kan Liang Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220525133952.1660658-1-kan.liang@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/events/intel/core.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c index b33540e1efa8..f2976204e8b5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c @@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ static struct event_constraint intel_icl_event_constraints[] = { INTEL_EVENT_CONSTRAINT_RANGE(0x03, 0x0a, 0xf), INTEL_EVENT_CONSTRAINT_RANGE(0x1f, 0x28, 0xf), INTEL_EVENT_CONSTRAINT(0x32, 0xf), /* SW_PREFETCH_ACCESS.* */ - INTEL_EVENT_CONSTRAINT_RANGE(0x48, 0x54, 0xf), + INTEL_EVENT_CONSTRAINT_RANGE(0x48, 0x56, 0xf), INTEL_EVENT_CONSTRAINT_RANGE(0x60, 0x8b, 0xf), INTEL_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT(0x04a3, 0xff), /* CYCLE_ACTIVITY.STALLS_TOTAL */ INTEL_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT(0x10a3, 0xff), /* CYCLE_ACTIVITY.CYCLES_MEM_ANY */ From e10356eae1c2a82ff4c382d0ab29adb73b827c8b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Eric W. Biederman" Date: Tue, 26 Apr 2022 16:30:17 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 0007/1091] ptrace/um: Replace PT_DTRACE with TIF_SINGLESTEP commit c200e4bb44e80b343c09841e7caaaca0aac5e5fa upstream. User mode linux is the last user of the PT_DTRACE flag. Using the flag to indicate single stepping is a little confusing and worse changing tsk->ptrace without locking could potentionally cause problems. So use a thread info flag with a better name instead of flag in tsk->ptrace. Remove the definition PT_DTRACE as uml is the last user. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Johannes Berg Tested-by: Kees Cook Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220505182645.497868-3-ebiederm@xmission.com Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/um/include/asm/thread_info.h | 2 ++ arch/um/kernel/exec.c | 2 +- arch/um/kernel/process.c | 2 +- arch/um/kernel/ptrace.c | 8 ++++---- arch/um/kernel/signal.c | 4 ++-- include/linux/ptrace.h | 1 - 6 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/um/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/um/include/asm/thread_info.h index 4c19ce4c49f1..66ab6a07330b 100644 --- a/arch/um/include/asm/thread_info.h +++ b/arch/um/include/asm/thread_info.h @@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ static inline struct thread_info *current_thread_info(void) #define TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK 7 #define TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME 8 #define TIF_SECCOMP 9 /* secure computing */ +#define TIF_SINGLESTEP 10 /* single stepping userspace */ #define _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE (1 << TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) #define _TIF_SIGPENDING (1 << TIF_SIGPENDING) @@ -70,5 +71,6 @@ static inline struct thread_info *current_thread_info(void) #define _TIF_MEMDIE (1 << TIF_MEMDIE) #define _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT (1 << TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT) #define _TIF_SECCOMP (1 << TIF_SECCOMP) +#define _TIF_SINGLESTEP (1 << TIF_SINGLESTEP) #endif diff --git a/arch/um/kernel/exec.c b/arch/um/kernel/exec.c index e8fd5d540b05..7f7a74c82abb 100644 --- a/arch/um/kernel/exec.c +++ b/arch/um/kernel/exec.c @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ void start_thread(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long eip, unsigned long esp) { PT_REGS_IP(regs) = eip; PT_REGS_SP(regs) = esp; - current->ptrace &= ~PT_DTRACE; + clear_thread_flag(TIF_SINGLESTEP); #ifdef SUBARCH_EXECVE1 SUBARCH_EXECVE1(regs->regs); #endif diff --git a/arch/um/kernel/process.c b/arch/um/kernel/process.c index 17045e7211bf..d71dd7725bef 100644 --- a/arch/um/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/um/kernel/process.c @@ -380,7 +380,7 @@ int singlestepping(void * t) { struct task_struct *task = t ? t : current; - if (!(task->ptrace & PT_DTRACE)) + if (!test_thread_flag(TIF_SINGLESTEP)) return 0; if (task->thread.singlestep_syscall) diff --git a/arch/um/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/um/kernel/ptrace.c index b425f47bddbb..d37802ced563 100644 --- a/arch/um/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/arch/um/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ void user_enable_single_step(struct task_struct *child) { - child->ptrace |= PT_DTRACE; + set_tsk_thread_flag(child, TIF_SINGLESTEP); child->thread.singlestep_syscall = 0; #ifdef SUBARCH_SET_SINGLESTEPPING @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ void user_enable_single_step(struct task_struct *child) void user_disable_single_step(struct task_struct *child) { - child->ptrace &= ~PT_DTRACE; + clear_tsk_thread_flag(child, TIF_SINGLESTEP); child->thread.singlestep_syscall = 0; #ifdef SUBARCH_SET_SINGLESTEPPING @@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ static void send_sigtrap(struct uml_pt_regs *regs, int error_code) } /* - * XXX Check PT_DTRACE vs TIF_SINGLESTEP for singlestepping check and + * XXX Check TIF_SINGLESTEP for singlestepping check and * PT_PTRACED vs TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE for syscall tracing check */ int syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) @@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ void syscall_trace_leave(struct pt_regs *regs) audit_syscall_exit(regs); /* Fake a debug trap */ - if (ptraced & PT_DTRACE) + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SINGLESTEP)) send_sigtrap(®s->regs, 0); if (!test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)) diff --git a/arch/um/kernel/signal.c b/arch/um/kernel/signal.c index 3d57c71c532e..01628195ae52 100644 --- a/arch/um/kernel/signal.c +++ b/arch/um/kernel/signal.c @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ static void handle_signal(struct ksignal *ksig, struct pt_regs *regs) unsigned long sp; int err; - if ((current->ptrace & PT_DTRACE) && (current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)) + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SINGLESTEP) && (current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)) singlestep = 1; /* Did we come from a system call? */ @@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ void do_signal(struct pt_regs *regs) * on the host. The tracing thread will check this flag and * PTRACE_SYSCALL if necessary. */ - if (current->ptrace & PT_DTRACE) + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SINGLESTEP)) current->thread.singlestep_syscall = is_syscall(PT_REGS_IP(¤t->thread.regs)); diff --git a/include/linux/ptrace.h b/include/linux/ptrace.h index 2a9df80ea887..468bb073c993 100644 --- a/include/linux/ptrace.h +++ b/include/linux/ptrace.h @@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ extern int ptrace_access_vm(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long addr, #define PT_SEIZED 0x00010000 /* SEIZE used, enable new behavior */ #define PT_PTRACED 0x00000001 -#define PT_DTRACE 0x00000002 /* delayed trace (used on m68k, i386) */ #define PT_OPT_FLAG_SHIFT 3 /* PT_TRACE_* event enable flags */ From f5faa24137d7db82afa758845d618ab315e7b22a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Eric W. Biederman" Date: Tue, 26 Apr 2022 16:45:37 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 0008/1091] ptrace/xtensa: Replace PT_SINGLESTEP with TIF_SINGLESTEP commit 4a3d2717d140401df7501a95e454180831a0c5af upstream. xtensa is the last user of the PT_SINGLESTEP flag. Changing tsk->ptrace in user_enable_single_step and user_disable_single_step without locking could potentiallly cause problems. So use a thread info flag instead of a flag in tsk->ptrace. Use TIF_SINGLESTEP that xtensa already had defined but unused. Remove the definitions of PT_SINGLESTEP and PT_BLOCKSTEP as they have no more users. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Max Filippov Tested-by: Kees Cook Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220505182645.497868-4-ebiederm@xmission.com Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/xtensa/kernel/ptrace.c | 4 ++-- arch/xtensa/kernel/signal.c | 4 ++-- include/linux/ptrace.h | 6 ------ 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/xtensa/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/xtensa/kernel/ptrace.c index 145742d70a9f..998b4249065a 100644 --- a/arch/xtensa/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/arch/xtensa/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -225,12 +225,12 @@ const struct user_regset_view *task_user_regset_view(struct task_struct *task) void user_enable_single_step(struct task_struct *child) { - child->ptrace |= PT_SINGLESTEP; + set_tsk_thread_flag(child, TIF_SINGLESTEP); } void user_disable_single_step(struct task_struct *child) { - child->ptrace &= ~PT_SINGLESTEP; + clear_tsk_thread_flag(child, TIF_SINGLESTEP); } /* diff --git a/arch/xtensa/kernel/signal.c b/arch/xtensa/kernel/signal.c index dae83cddd6ca..cf2bd960b30d 100644 --- a/arch/xtensa/kernel/signal.c +++ b/arch/xtensa/kernel/signal.c @@ -465,7 +465,7 @@ static void do_signal(struct pt_regs *regs) /* Set up the stack frame */ ret = setup_frame(&ksig, sigmask_to_save(), regs); signal_setup_done(ret, &ksig, 0); - if (current->ptrace & PT_SINGLESTEP) + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SINGLESTEP)) task_pt_regs(current)->icountlevel = 1; return; @@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ static void do_signal(struct pt_regs *regs) /* If there's no signal to deliver, we just restore the saved mask. */ restore_saved_sigmask(); - if (current->ptrace & PT_SINGLESTEP) + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SINGLESTEP)) task_pt_regs(current)->icountlevel = 1; return; } diff --git a/include/linux/ptrace.h b/include/linux/ptrace.h index 468bb073c993..ae7dbdfa3d83 100644 --- a/include/linux/ptrace.h +++ b/include/linux/ptrace.h @@ -46,12 +46,6 @@ extern int ptrace_access_vm(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long addr, #define PT_EXITKILL (PTRACE_O_EXITKILL << PT_OPT_FLAG_SHIFT) #define PT_SUSPEND_SECCOMP (PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP << PT_OPT_FLAG_SHIFT) -/* single stepping state bits (used on ARM and PA-RISC) */ -#define PT_SINGLESTEP_BIT 31 -#define PT_SINGLESTEP (1< Date: Fri, 29 Apr 2022 09:23:55 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 0009/1091] ptrace: Reimplement PTRACE_KILL by always sending SIGKILL commit 6a2d90ba027adba528509ffa27097cffd3879257 upstream. The current implementation of PTRACE_KILL is buggy and has been for many years as it assumes it's target has stopped in ptrace_stop. At a quick skim it looks like this assumption has existed since ptrace support was added in linux v1.0. While PTRACE_KILL has been deprecated we can not remove it as a quick search with google code search reveals many existing programs calling it. When the ptracee is not stopped at ptrace_stop some fields would be set that are ignored except in ptrace_stop. Making the userspace visible behavior of PTRACE_KILL a noop in those case. As the usual rules are not obeyed it is not clear what the consequences are of calling PTRACE_KILL on a running process. Presumably userspace does not do this as it achieves nothing. Replace the implementation of PTRACE_KILL with a simple send_sig_info(SIGKILL) followed by a return 0. This changes the observable user space behavior only in that PTRACE_KILL on a process not stopped in ptrace_stop will also kill it. As that has always been the intent of the code this seems like a reasonable change. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Al Viro Suggested-by: Al Viro Tested-by: Kees Cook Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220505182645.497868-7-ebiederm@xmission.com Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kernel/step.c | 3 +-- kernel/ptrace.c | 5 ++--- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/step.c b/arch/x86/kernel/step.c index 60d2c3798ba2..2f97d1a1032f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/step.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/step.c @@ -175,8 +175,7 @@ void set_task_blockstep(struct task_struct *task, bool on) * * NOTE: this means that set/clear TIF_BLOCKSTEP is only safe if * task is current or it can't be running, otherwise we can race - * with __switch_to_xtra(). We rely on ptrace_freeze_traced() but - * PTRACE_KILL is not safe. + * with __switch_to_xtra(). We rely on ptrace_freeze_traced(). */ local_irq_disable(); debugctl = get_debugctlmsr(); diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c index d99f73f83bf5..aab480e24bd6 100644 --- a/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -1219,9 +1219,8 @@ int ptrace_request(struct task_struct *child, long request, return ptrace_resume(child, request, data); case PTRACE_KILL: - if (child->exit_state) /* already dead */ - return 0; - return ptrace_resume(child, request, SIGKILL); + send_sig_info(SIGKILL, SEND_SIG_NOINFO, child); + return 0; #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK case PTRACE_GETREGSET: From 622ced791ed836100cb4350d7e24831903c900cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Qu Wenruo Date: Tue, 10 May 2022 15:10:18 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0010/1091] btrfs: add "0x" prefix for unsupported optional features commit d5321a0fa8bc49f11bea0b470800962c17d92d8f upstream. The following error message lack the "0x" obviously: cannot mount because of unsupported optional features (4000) Add the prefix to make it less confusing. This can happen on older kernels that try to mount a filesystem with newer features so it makes sense to backport to older trees. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+ Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo Reviewed-by: David Sterba Signed-off-by: David Sterba Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/btrfs/disk-io.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c b/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c index f18c6d97932e..a4b3e6f6bf02 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c @@ -2927,7 +2927,7 @@ int open_ctree(struct super_block *sb, ~BTRFS_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_SUPP; if (features) { btrfs_err(fs_info, - "cannot mount because of unsupported optional features (%llx)", + "cannot mount because of unsupported optional features (0x%llx)", features); err = -EINVAL; goto fail_csum; @@ -2965,7 +2965,7 @@ int open_ctree(struct super_block *sb, ~BTRFS_FEATURE_COMPAT_RO_SUPP; if (!sb_rdonly(sb) && features) { btrfs_err(fs_info, - "cannot mount read-write because of unsupported optional features (%llx)", + "cannot mount read-write because of unsupported optional features (0x%llx)", features); err = -EINVAL; goto fail_csum; From 670f5e40d7b372a1dc18148e1767a400a62b4d50 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Qu Wenruo Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2022 15:05:53 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0011/1091] btrfs: repair super block num_devices automatically MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit d201238ccd2f30b9bfcfadaeae0972e3a486a176 upstream. [BUG] There is a report that a btrfs has a bad super block num devices. This makes btrfs to reject the fs completely. BTRFS error (device sdd3): super_num_devices 3 mismatch with num_devices 2 found here BTRFS error (device sdd3): failed to read chunk tree: -22 BTRFS error (device sdd3): open_ctree failed [CAUSE] During btrfs device removal, chunk tree and super block num devs are updated in two different transactions: btrfs_rm_device() |- btrfs_rm_dev_item(device) | |- trans = btrfs_start_transaction() | | Now we got transaction X | | | |- btrfs_del_item() | | Now device item is removed from chunk tree | | | |- btrfs_commit_transaction() | Transaction X got committed, super num devs untouched, | but device item removed from chunk tree. | (AKA, super num devs is already incorrect) | |- cur_devices->num_devices--; |- cur_devices->total_devices--; |- btrfs_set_super_num_devices() All those operations are not in transaction X, thus it will only be written back to disk in next transaction. So after the transaction X in btrfs_rm_dev_item() committed, but before transaction X+1 (which can be minutes away), a power loss happen, then we got the super num mismatch. This has been fixed by commit bbac58698a55 ("btrfs: remove device item and update super block in the same transaction"). [FIX] Make the super_num_devices check less strict, converting it from a hard error to a warning, and reset the value to a correct one for the current or next transaction commit. As the number of device items is the critical information where the super block num_devices is only a cached value (and also useful for cross checking), it's safe to automatically update it. Other device related problems like missing device are handled after that and may require other means to resolve, like degraded mount. With this fix, potentially affected filesystems won't fail mount and require the manual repair by btrfs check. Reported-by: Luca Béla Palkovics Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/CA+8xDSpvdm_U0QLBAnrH=zqDq_cWCOH5TiV46CKmp3igr44okQ@mail.gmail.com/ CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+ Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo Reviewed-by: David Sterba Signed-off-by: David Sterba Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/btrfs/volumes.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/btrfs/volumes.c b/fs/btrfs/volumes.c index 8898682c9103..c7706a769de1 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/volumes.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/volumes.c @@ -7383,12 +7383,12 @@ int btrfs_read_chunk_tree(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info) * do another round of validation checks. */ if (total_dev != fs_info->fs_devices->total_devices) { - btrfs_err(fs_info, - "super_num_devices %llu mismatch with num_devices %llu found here", + btrfs_warn(fs_info, +"super block num_devices %llu mismatch with DEV_ITEM count %llu, will be repaired on next transaction commit", btrfs_super_num_devices(fs_info->super_copy), total_dev); - ret = -EINVAL; - goto error; + fs_info->fs_devices->total_devices = total_dev; + btrfs_set_super_num_devices(fs_info->super_copy, total_dev); } if (btrfs_super_total_bytes(fs_info->super_copy) < fs_info->fs_devices->total_rw_bytes) { From f85cb059fad03a3b33a50023be91e944bb065ae8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Liu Zixian Date: Tue, 22 Mar 2022 17:17:30 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0012/1091] drm/virtio: fix NULL pointer dereference in virtio_gpu_conn_get_modes [ Upstream commit 194d250cdc4a40ccbd179afd522a9e9846957402 ] drm_cvt_mode may return NULL and we should check it. This bug is found by syzkaller: FAULT_INJECTION stacktrace: [ 168.567394] FAULT_INJECTION: forcing a failure. name failslab, interval 1, probability 0, space 0, times 1 [ 168.567403] CPU: 1 PID: 6425 Comm: syz Kdump: loaded Not tainted 4.19.90-vhulk2201.1.0.h1035.kasan.eulerosv2r10.aarch64 #1 [ 168.567406] Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 [ 168.567408] Call trace: [ 168.567414] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x310 [ 168.567418] show_stack+0x28/0x38 [ 168.567423] dump_stack+0xec/0x15c [ 168.567427] should_fail+0x3ac/0x3d0 [ 168.567437] __should_failslab+0xb8/0x120 [ 168.567441] should_failslab+0x28/0xc0 [ 168.567445] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x50/0x640 [ 168.567454] drm_mode_create+0x40/0x90 [ 168.567458] drm_cvt_mode+0x48/0xc78 [ 168.567477] virtio_gpu_conn_get_modes+0xa8/0x140 [virtio_gpu] [ 168.567485] drm_helper_probe_single_connector_modes+0x3a4/0xd80 [ 168.567492] drm_mode_getconnector+0x2e0/0xa70 [ 168.567496] drm_ioctl_kernel+0x11c/0x1d8 [ 168.567514] drm_ioctl+0x558/0x6d0 [ 168.567522] do_vfs_ioctl+0x160/0xf30 [ 168.567525] ksys_ioctl+0x98/0xd8 [ 168.567530] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x50/0xc8 [ 168.567536] el0_svc_common+0xc8/0x320 [ 168.567540] el0_svc_handler+0xf8/0x160 [ 168.567544] el0_svc+0x10/0x218 KASAN stacktrace: [ 168.567561] BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in virtio_gpu_conn_get_modes+0xb4/0x140 [virtio_gpu] [ 168.567565] Read of size 4 at addr 0000000000000054 by task syz/6425 [ 168.567566] [ 168.567571] CPU: 1 PID: 6425 Comm: syz Kdump: loaded Not tainted 4.19.90-vhulk2201.1.0.h1035.kasan.eulerosv2r10.aarch64 #1 [ 168.567573] Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 [ 168.567575] Call trace: [ 168.567578] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x310 [ 168.567582] show_stack+0x28/0x38 [ 168.567586] dump_stack+0xec/0x15c [ 168.567591] kasan_report+0x244/0x2f0 [ 168.567594] __asan_load4+0x58/0xb0 [ 168.567607] virtio_gpu_conn_get_modes+0xb4/0x140 [virtio_gpu] [ 168.567612] drm_helper_probe_single_connector_modes+0x3a4/0xd80 [ 168.567617] drm_mode_getconnector+0x2e0/0xa70 [ 168.567621] drm_ioctl_kernel+0x11c/0x1d8 [ 168.567624] drm_ioctl+0x558/0x6d0 [ 168.567628] do_vfs_ioctl+0x160/0xf30 [ 168.567632] ksys_ioctl+0x98/0xd8 [ 168.567636] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x50/0xc8 [ 168.567641] el0_svc_common+0xc8/0x320 [ 168.567645] el0_svc_handler+0xf8/0x160 [ 168.567649] el0_svc+0x10/0x218 Signed-off-by: Liu Zixian Link: http://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20220322091730.1653-1-liuzixian4@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/gpu/drm/virtio/virtgpu_display.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/virtio/virtgpu_display.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/virtio/virtgpu_display.c index e622485ae826..7e34307eb075 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/virtio/virtgpu_display.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/virtio/virtgpu_display.c @@ -174,6 +174,8 @@ static int virtio_gpu_conn_get_modes(struct drm_connector *connector) DRM_DEBUG("add mode: %dx%d\n", width, height); mode = drm_cvt_mode(connector->dev, width, height, 60, false, false, false); + if (!mode) + return count; mode->type |= DRM_MODE_TYPE_PREFERRED; drm_mode_probed_add(connector, mode); count++; From 92225d3c2241650491603b17b2ae9573e1625dd5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Niels Dossche Date: Mon, 21 Mar 2022 23:55:16 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0013/1091] mwifiex: add mutex lock for call in mwifiex_dfs_chan_sw_work_queue [ Upstream commit 3e12968f6d12a34b540c39cbd696a760cc4616f0 ] cfg80211_ch_switch_notify uses ASSERT_WDEV_LOCK to assert that net_device->ieee80211_ptr->mtx (which is the same as priv->wdev.mtx) is held during the function's execution. mwifiex_dfs_chan_sw_work_queue is one of its callers, which does not hold that lock, therefore violating the assertion. Add a lock around the call. Disclaimer: I am currently working on a static analyser to detect missing locks. This was a reported case. I manually verified the report by looking at the code, so that I do not send wrong information or patches. After concluding that this seems to be a true positive, I created this patch. However, as I do not in fact have this particular hardware, I was unable to test it. Reviewed-by: Brian Norris Signed-off-by: Niels Dossche Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220321225515.32113-1-dossche.niels@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/11h.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/11h.c b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/11h.c index 238accfe4f41..c4176e357b22 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/11h.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/11h.c @@ -303,5 +303,7 @@ void mwifiex_dfs_chan_sw_work_queue(struct work_struct *work) mwifiex_dbg(priv->adapter, MSG, "indicating channel switch completion to kernel\n"); + mutex_lock(&priv->wdev.mtx); cfg80211_ch_switch_notify(priv->netdev, &priv->dfs_chandef); + mutex_unlock(&priv->wdev.mtx); } From 60d515fd87974faa35395ed42e3de9ed4db10da7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Haowen Bai Date: Fri, 25 Mar 2022 18:17:13 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0014/1091] b43legacy: Fix assigning negative value to unsigned variable [ Upstream commit 3f6b867559b3d43a7ce1b4799b755e812fc0d503 ] fix warning reported by smatch: drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/b43legacy/phy.c:1181 b43legacy_phy_lo_b_measure() warn: assigning (-772) to unsigned variable 'fval' Signed-off-by: Haowen Bai Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1648203433-8736-1-git-send-email-baihaowen@meizu.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/b43legacy/phy.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/b43legacy/phy.c b/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/b43legacy/phy.c index a659259bc51a..6e76055e136d 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/b43legacy/phy.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/b43legacy/phy.c @@ -1123,7 +1123,7 @@ void b43legacy_phy_lo_b_measure(struct b43legacy_wldev *dev) struct b43legacy_phy *phy = &dev->phy; u16 regstack[12] = { 0 }; u16 mls; - u16 fval; + s16 fval; int i; int j; From 303380919df76bd7533b5fb045f007433f19c695 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Haowen Bai Date: Fri, 25 Mar 2022 18:15:15 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0015/1091] b43: Fix assigning negative value to unsigned variable [ Upstream commit 11800d893b38e0e12d636c170c1abc19c43c730c ] fix warning reported by smatch: drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/b43/phy_n.c:585 b43_nphy_adjust_lna_gain_table() warn: assigning (-2) to unsigned variable '*(lna_gain[0])' Signed-off-by: Haowen Bai Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1648203315-28093-1-git-send-email-baihaowen@meizu.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/b43/phy_n.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/b43/phy_n.c b/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/b43/phy_n.c index 32ce1b42ce08..0ef62ef77af6 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/b43/phy_n.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/b43/phy_n.c @@ -582,7 +582,7 @@ static void b43_nphy_adjust_lna_gain_table(struct b43_wldev *dev) u16 data[4]; s16 gain[2]; u16 minmax[2]; - static const u16 lna_gain[4] = { -2, 10, 19, 25 }; + static const s16 lna_gain[4] = { -2, 10, 19, 25 }; if (nphy->hang_avoid) b43_nphy_stay_in_carrier_search(dev, 1); From 8fb1b9beb085bb767ae43e441db5ac6fcd66a04d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Haowen Bai Date: Fri, 1 Apr 2022 15:10:54 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0016/1091] ipw2x00: Fix potential NULL dereference in libipw_xmit() [ Upstream commit e8366bbabe1d207cf7c5b11ae50e223ae6fc278b ] crypt and crypt->ops could be null, so we need to checking null before dereference Signed-off-by: Haowen Bai Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1648797055-25730-1-git-send-email-baihaowen@meizu.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/wireless/intel/ipw2x00/libipw_tx.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/ipw2x00/libipw_tx.c b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/ipw2x00/libipw_tx.c index d9baa2fa603b..e4c60caa6543 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/ipw2x00/libipw_tx.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/ipw2x00/libipw_tx.c @@ -383,7 +383,7 @@ netdev_tx_t libipw_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev) /* Each fragment may need to have room for encryption * pre/postfix */ - if (host_encrypt) + if (host_encrypt && crypt && crypt->ops) bytes_per_frag -= crypt->ops->extra_mpdu_prefix_len + crypt->ops->extra_mpdu_postfix_len; From 4460066eb2480b9e203c73755e12e2efc820a27e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Niels Dossche Date: Mon, 4 Apr 2022 01:15:24 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0017/1091] ipv6: fix locking issues with loops over idev->addr_list [ Upstream commit 51454ea42c1ab4e0c2828bb0d4d53957976980de ] idev->addr_list needs to be protected by idev->lock. However, it is not always possible to do so while iterating and performing actions on inet6_ifaddr instances. For example, multiple functions (like addrconf_{join,leave}_anycast) eventually call down to other functions that acquire the idev->lock. The current code temporarily unlocked the idev->lock during the loops, which can cause race conditions. Moving the locks up is also not an appropriate solution as the ordering of lock acquisition will be inconsistent with for example mc_lock. This solution adds an additional field to inet6_ifaddr that is used to temporarily add the instances to a temporary list while holding idev->lock. The temporary list can then be traversed without holding idev->lock. This change was done in two places. In addrconf_ifdown, the list_for_each_entry_safe variant of the list loop is also no longer necessary as there is no deletion within that specific loop. Suggested-by: Paolo Abeni Signed-off-by: Niels Dossche Acked-by: Paolo Abeni Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220403231523.45843-1-dossche.niels@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- include/net/if_inet6.h | 8 ++++++++ net/ipv6/addrconf.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 2 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/if_inet6.h b/include/net/if_inet6.h index a01981d7108f..f6d614926e9e 100644 --- a/include/net/if_inet6.h +++ b/include/net/if_inet6.h @@ -64,6 +64,14 @@ struct inet6_ifaddr { struct hlist_node addr_lst; struct list_head if_list; + /* + * Used to safely traverse idev->addr_list in process context + * if the idev->lock needed to protect idev->addr_list cannot be held. + * In that case, add the items to this list temporarily and iterate + * without holding idev->lock. + * See addrconf_ifdown and dev_forward_change. + */ + struct list_head if_list_aux; struct list_head tmp_list; struct inet6_ifaddr *ifpub; diff --git a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c index 92b32d131e1c..efea88fb3cd5 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c +++ b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c @@ -789,6 +789,7 @@ static void dev_forward_change(struct inet6_dev *idev) { struct net_device *dev; struct inet6_ifaddr *ifa; + LIST_HEAD(tmp_addr_list); if (!idev) return; @@ -807,14 +808,24 @@ static void dev_forward_change(struct inet6_dev *idev) } } + read_lock_bh(&idev->lock); list_for_each_entry(ifa, &idev->addr_list, if_list) { if (ifa->flags&IFA_F_TENTATIVE) continue; + list_add_tail(&ifa->if_list_aux, &tmp_addr_list); + } + read_unlock_bh(&idev->lock); + + while (!list_empty(&tmp_addr_list)) { + ifa = list_first_entry(&tmp_addr_list, + struct inet6_ifaddr, if_list_aux); + list_del(&ifa->if_list_aux); if (idev->cnf.forwarding) addrconf_join_anycast(ifa); else addrconf_leave_anycast(ifa); } + inet6_netconf_notify_devconf(dev_net(dev), RTM_NEWNETCONF, NETCONFA_FORWARDING, dev->ifindex, &idev->cnf); @@ -3713,7 +3724,8 @@ static int addrconf_ifdown(struct net_device *dev, int how) unsigned long event = how ? NETDEV_UNREGISTER : NETDEV_DOWN; struct net *net = dev_net(dev); struct inet6_dev *idev; - struct inet6_ifaddr *ifa, *tmp; + struct inet6_ifaddr *ifa; + LIST_HEAD(tmp_addr_list); bool keep_addr = false; bool was_ready; int state, i; @@ -3805,16 +3817,23 @@ restart: write_lock_bh(&idev->lock); } - list_for_each_entry_safe(ifa, tmp, &idev->addr_list, if_list) { + list_for_each_entry(ifa, &idev->addr_list, if_list) + list_add_tail(&ifa->if_list_aux, &tmp_addr_list); + write_unlock_bh(&idev->lock); + + while (!list_empty(&tmp_addr_list)) { struct fib6_info *rt = NULL; bool keep; + ifa = list_first_entry(&tmp_addr_list, + struct inet6_ifaddr, if_list_aux); + list_del(&ifa->if_list_aux); + addrconf_del_dad_work(ifa); keep = keep_addr && (ifa->flags & IFA_F_PERMANENT) && !addr_is_local(&ifa->addr); - write_unlock_bh(&idev->lock); spin_lock_bh(&ifa->lock); if (keep) { @@ -3845,15 +3864,14 @@ restart: addrconf_leave_solict(ifa->idev, &ifa->addr); } - write_lock_bh(&idev->lock); if (!keep) { + write_lock_bh(&idev->lock); list_del_rcu(&ifa->if_list); + write_unlock_bh(&idev->lock); in6_ifa_put(ifa); } } - write_unlock_bh(&idev->lock); - /* Step 5: Discard anycast and multicast list */ if (how) { ipv6_ac_destroy_dev(idev); From c7b41fd76ce27893de447325b9b8ae17b20e00a1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Vetter Date: Tue, 5 Apr 2022 23:03:31 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0018/1091] fbcon: Consistently protect deferred_takeover with console_lock() [ Upstream commit 43553559121ca90965b572cf8a1d6d0fd618b449 ] This shouldn't be a problem in practice since until we've actually taken over the console there's nothing we've registered with the console/vt subsystem, so the exit/unbind path that check this can't do the wrong thing. But it's confusing, so fix it by moving it a tad later. Acked-by: Sam Ravnborg Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter Cc: Daniel Vetter Cc: Du Cheng Cc: Tetsuo Handa Cc: Claudio Suarez Cc: Thomas Zimmermann Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20220405210335.3434130-14-daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c index 75b770514067..1decded4845f 100644 --- a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c +++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c @@ -3286,6 +3286,9 @@ static void fbcon_register_existing_fbs(struct work_struct *work) console_lock(); + deferred_takeover = false; + logo_shown = FBCON_LOGO_DONTSHOW; + for_each_registered_fb(i) fbcon_fb_registered(registered_fb[i]); @@ -3303,8 +3306,6 @@ static int fbcon_output_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb, pr_info("fbcon: Taking over console\n"); dummycon_unregister_output_notifier(&fbcon_output_nb); - deferred_takeover = false; - logo_shown = FBCON_LOGO_DONTSHOW; /* We may get called in atomic context */ schedule_work(&fbcon_deferred_takeover_work); From 8ded0af90e973be92dc46e7c73f85f8679e54110 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" Date: Wed, 6 Apr 2022 02:29:38 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 0019/1091] ACPICA: Avoid cache flush inside virtual machines [ Upstream commit e2efb6359e620521d1e13f69b2257de8ceaa9475 ] While running inside virtual machine, the kernel can bypass cache flushing. Changing sleep state in a virtual machine doesn't affect the host system sleep state and cannot lead to data loss. Before entering sleep states, the ACPI code flushes caches to prevent data loss using the WBINVD instruction. This mechanism is required on bare metal. But, any use WBINVD inside of a guest is worthless. Changing sleep state in a virtual machine doesn't affect the host system sleep state and cannot lead to data loss, so most hypervisors simply ignore it. Despite this, the ACPI code calls WBINVD unconditionally anyway. It's useless, but also normally harmless. In TDX guests, though, WBINVD stops being harmless; it triggers a virtualization exception (#VE). If the ACPI cache-flushing WBINVD were left in place, TDX guests would need handling to recover from the exception. Avoid using WBINVD whenever running under a hypervisor. This both removes the useless WBINVDs and saves TDX from implementing WBINVD handling. Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen Reviewed-by: Dan Williams Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220405232939.73860-30-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/x86/include/asm/acenv.h | 14 +++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/acenv.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/acenv.h index 9aff97f0de7f..d937c55e717e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/acenv.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/acenv.h @@ -13,7 +13,19 @@ /* Asm macros */ -#define ACPI_FLUSH_CPU_CACHE() wbinvd() +/* + * ACPI_FLUSH_CPU_CACHE() flushes caches on entering sleep states. + * It is required to prevent data loss. + * + * While running inside virtual machine, the kernel can bypass cache flushing. + * Changing sleep state in a virtual machine doesn't affect the host system + * sleep state and cannot lead to data loss. + */ +#define ACPI_FLUSH_CPU_CACHE() \ +do { \ + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) \ + wbinvd(); \ +} while (0) int __acpi_acquire_global_lock(unsigned int *lock); int __acpi_release_global_lock(unsigned int *lock); From aea748501d0923c5d793a86aa39e65b3538dac64 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Liviu Dudau Date: Thu, 2 Dec 2021 17:00:33 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0020/1091] drm/komeda: return early if drm_universal_plane_init() fails. [ Upstream commit c8f76c37cc3668ee45e081e76a15f24a352ebbdd ] If drm_universal_plane_init() fails early we jump to the common cleanup code that calls komeda_plane_destroy() which in turn could access the uninitalised drm_plane and crash. Return early if an error is detected without going through the common code. Reported-by: Steven Price Reviewed-by: Steven Price Signed-off-by: Liviu Dudau Link: https://lore.kernel.org/dri-devel/20211203100946.2706922-1-liviu.dudau@arm.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/gpu/drm/arm/display/komeda/komeda_plane.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/arm/display/komeda/komeda_plane.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/arm/display/komeda/komeda_plane.c index 98e915e325dd..a5f57b38d193 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/arm/display/komeda/komeda_plane.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/arm/display/komeda/komeda_plane.c @@ -274,8 +274,10 @@ static int komeda_plane_add(struct komeda_kms_dev *kms, komeda_put_fourcc_list(formats); - if (err) - goto cleanup; + if (err) { + kfree(kplane); + return err; + } drm_plane_helper_add(plane, &komeda_plane_helper_funcs); From f68bed124c7699e23ffb4ce4fcc84671e9193cde Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Amadeusz=20S=C5=82awi=C5=84ski?= Date: Tue, 12 Apr 2022 11:16:28 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0021/1091] ALSA: jack: Access input_dev under mutex MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit 1b6a6fc5280e97559287b61eade2d4b363e836f2 ] It is possible when using ASoC that input_dev is unregistered while calling snd_jack_report, which causes NULL pointer dereference. In order to prevent this serialize access to input_dev using mutex lock. Signed-off-by: Amadeusz Sławiński Reviewed-by: Cezary Rojewski Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220412091628.3056922-1-amadeuszx.slawinski@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- include/sound/jack.h | 1 + sound/core/jack.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/sound/jack.h b/include/sound/jack.h index 9eb2b5ec1ec4..78f3619f3de9 100644 --- a/include/sound/jack.h +++ b/include/sound/jack.h @@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ struct snd_jack { const char *id; #ifdef CONFIG_SND_JACK_INPUT_DEV struct input_dev *input_dev; + struct mutex input_dev_lock; int registered; int type; char name[100]; diff --git a/sound/core/jack.c b/sound/core/jack.c index b00ae6f39f05..e7ac82d46821 100644 --- a/sound/core/jack.c +++ b/sound/core/jack.c @@ -34,8 +34,11 @@ static int snd_jack_dev_disconnect(struct snd_device *device) #ifdef CONFIG_SND_JACK_INPUT_DEV struct snd_jack *jack = device->device_data; - if (!jack->input_dev) + mutex_lock(&jack->input_dev_lock); + if (!jack->input_dev) { + mutex_unlock(&jack->input_dev_lock); return 0; + } /* If the input device is registered with the input subsystem * then we need to use a different deallocator. */ @@ -44,6 +47,7 @@ static int snd_jack_dev_disconnect(struct snd_device *device) else input_free_device(jack->input_dev); jack->input_dev = NULL; + mutex_unlock(&jack->input_dev_lock); #endif /* CONFIG_SND_JACK_INPUT_DEV */ return 0; } @@ -82,8 +86,11 @@ static int snd_jack_dev_register(struct snd_device *device) snprintf(jack->name, sizeof(jack->name), "%s %s", card->shortname, jack->id); - if (!jack->input_dev) + mutex_lock(&jack->input_dev_lock); + if (!jack->input_dev) { + mutex_unlock(&jack->input_dev_lock); return 0; + } jack->input_dev->name = jack->name; @@ -108,6 +115,7 @@ static int snd_jack_dev_register(struct snd_device *device) if (err == 0) jack->registered = 1; + mutex_unlock(&jack->input_dev_lock); return err; } #endif /* CONFIG_SND_JACK_INPUT_DEV */ @@ -228,9 +236,11 @@ int snd_jack_new(struct snd_card *card, const char *id, int type, return -ENOMEM; } - /* don't creat input device for phantom jack */ - if (!phantom_jack) { #ifdef CONFIG_SND_JACK_INPUT_DEV + mutex_init(&jack->input_dev_lock); + + /* don't create input device for phantom jack */ + if (!phantom_jack) { int i; jack->input_dev = input_allocate_device(); @@ -248,8 +258,8 @@ int snd_jack_new(struct snd_card *card, const char *id, int type, input_set_capability(jack->input_dev, EV_SW, jack_switch_types[i]); -#endif /* CONFIG_SND_JACK_INPUT_DEV */ } +#endif /* CONFIG_SND_JACK_INPUT_DEV */ err = snd_device_new(card, SNDRV_DEV_JACK, jack, &ops); if (err < 0) @@ -289,10 +299,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(snd_jack_new); void snd_jack_set_parent(struct snd_jack *jack, struct device *parent) { WARN_ON(jack->registered); - if (!jack->input_dev) + mutex_lock(&jack->input_dev_lock); + if (!jack->input_dev) { + mutex_unlock(&jack->input_dev_lock); return; + } jack->input_dev->dev.parent = parent; + mutex_unlock(&jack->input_dev_lock); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(snd_jack_set_parent); @@ -340,6 +354,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(snd_jack_set_key); /** * snd_jack_report - Report the current status of a jack + * Note: This function uses mutexes and should be called from a + * context which can sleep (such as a workqueue). * * @jack: The jack to report status for * @status: The current status of the jack @@ -359,8 +375,11 @@ void snd_jack_report(struct snd_jack *jack, int status) status & jack_kctl->mask_bits); #ifdef CONFIG_SND_JACK_INPUT_DEV - if (!jack->input_dev) + mutex_lock(&jack->input_dev_lock); + if (!jack->input_dev) { + mutex_unlock(&jack->input_dev_lock); return; + } for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(jack->key); i++) { int testbit = SND_JACK_BTN_0 >> i; @@ -379,6 +398,7 @@ void snd_jack_report(struct snd_jack *jack, int status) } input_sync(jack->input_dev); + mutex_unlock(&jack->input_dev_lock); #endif /* CONFIG_SND_JACK_INPUT_DEV */ } EXPORT_SYMBOL(snd_jack_report); From 6266ab1f31fa4564378b035d6998dc720cecface Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Biju Das Date: Mon, 11 Apr 2022 18:31:15 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0022/1091] spi: spi-rspi: Remove setting {src,dst}_{addr,addr_width} based on DMA direction [ Upstream commit 6f381481a5b236cb53d6de2c49c6ef83a4d0f432 ] The direction field in the DMA config is deprecated. The rspi driver sets {src,dst}_{addr,addr_width} based on the DMA direction and it results in dmaengine_slave_config() failure as RZ DMAC driver validates {src,dst}_addr_width values independent of DMA direction. This patch fixes the issue by passing both {src,dst}_{addr,addr_width} values independent of DMA direction. Signed-off-by: Biju Das Suggested-by: Vinod Koul Reviewed-by: Vinod Koul Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven Tested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220411173115.6619-1-biju.das.jz@bp.renesas.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/spi/spi-rspi.c | 15 ++++++--------- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/spi/spi-rspi.c b/drivers/spi/spi-rspi.c index 7222c7689c3c..0524741d73b9 100644 --- a/drivers/spi/spi-rspi.c +++ b/drivers/spi/spi-rspi.c @@ -1044,14 +1044,11 @@ static struct dma_chan *rspi_request_dma_chan(struct device *dev, } memset(&cfg, 0, sizeof(cfg)); + cfg.dst_addr = port_addr + RSPI_SPDR; + cfg.src_addr = port_addr + RSPI_SPDR; + cfg.dst_addr_width = DMA_SLAVE_BUSWIDTH_1_BYTE; + cfg.src_addr_width = DMA_SLAVE_BUSWIDTH_1_BYTE; cfg.direction = dir; - if (dir == DMA_MEM_TO_DEV) { - cfg.dst_addr = port_addr; - cfg.dst_addr_width = DMA_SLAVE_BUSWIDTH_1_BYTE; - } else { - cfg.src_addr = port_addr; - cfg.src_addr_width = DMA_SLAVE_BUSWIDTH_1_BYTE; - } ret = dmaengine_slave_config(chan, &cfg); if (ret) { @@ -1082,12 +1079,12 @@ static int rspi_request_dma(struct device *dev, struct spi_controller *ctlr, } ctlr->dma_tx = rspi_request_dma_chan(dev, DMA_MEM_TO_DEV, dma_tx_id, - res->start + RSPI_SPDR); + res->start); if (!ctlr->dma_tx) return -ENODEV; ctlr->dma_rx = rspi_request_dma_chan(dev, DMA_DEV_TO_MEM, dma_rx_id, - res->start + RSPI_SPDR); + res->start); if (!ctlr->dma_rx) { dma_release_channel(ctlr->dma_tx); ctlr->dma_tx = NULL; From 7bd0ac1e23453c61ddbe808dd7cff00bbd6f5cda Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Len Brown Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2022 21:06:56 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 0023/1091] tools/power turbostat: fix ICX DRAM power numbers [ Upstream commit 6397b6418935773a34b533b3348b03f4ce3d7050 ] ICX (and its duplicates) require special hard-coded DRAM RAPL units, rather than using the generic RAPL energy units. Reported-by: Srinivas Pandruvada Signed-off-by: Len Brown Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- tools/power/x86/turbostat/turbostat.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/tools/power/x86/turbostat/turbostat.c b/tools/power/x86/turbostat/turbostat.c index 988326b67a91..8bf6b01b3560 100644 --- a/tools/power/x86/turbostat/turbostat.c +++ b/tools/power/x86/turbostat/turbostat.c @@ -3865,6 +3865,7 @@ rapl_dram_energy_units_probe(int model, double rapl_energy_units) case INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X: /* HSX */ case INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X: /* BDX */ case INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNL: /* KNL */ + case INTEL_FAM6_ICELAKE_X: /* ICX */ return (rapl_dram_energy_units = 15.3 / 1000000); default: return (rapl_energy_units); From af832028af6f44c6c45645757079c4ed6884ade5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Keita Suzuki Date: Tue, 19 Apr 2022 10:37:19 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0024/1091] drm/amd/pm: fix double free in si_parse_power_table() [ Upstream commit f3fa2becf2fc25b6ac7cf8d8b1a2e4a86b3b72bd ] In function si_parse_power_table(), array adev->pm.dpm.ps and its member is allocated. If the allocation of each member fails, the array itself is freed and returned with an error code. However, the array is later freed again in si_dpm_fini() function which is called when the function returns an error. This leads to potential double free of the array adev->pm.dpm.ps, as well as leak of its array members, since the members are not freed in the allocation function and the array is not nulled when freed. In addition adev->pm.dpm.num_ps, which keeps track of the allocated array member, is not updated until the member allocation is successfully finished, this could also lead to either use after free, or uninitialized variable access in si_dpm_fini(). Fix this by postponing the free of the array until si_dpm_fini() and increment adev->pm.dpm.num_ps everytime the array member is allocated. Signed-off-by: Keita Suzuki Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/si_dpm.c | 8 +++----- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/si_dpm.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/si_dpm.c index 4cb4c891120b..9931d5c17cfb 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/si_dpm.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/si_dpm.c @@ -7250,17 +7250,15 @@ static int si_parse_power_table(struct amdgpu_device *adev) if (!adev->pm.dpm.ps) return -ENOMEM; power_state_offset = (u8 *)state_array->states; - for (i = 0; i < state_array->ucNumEntries; i++) { + for (adev->pm.dpm.num_ps = 0, i = 0; i < state_array->ucNumEntries; i++) { u8 *idx; power_state = (union pplib_power_state *)power_state_offset; non_clock_array_index = power_state->v2.nonClockInfoIndex; non_clock_info = (struct _ATOM_PPLIB_NONCLOCK_INFO *) &non_clock_info_array->nonClockInfo[non_clock_array_index]; ps = kzalloc(sizeof(struct si_ps), GFP_KERNEL); - if (ps == NULL) { - kfree(adev->pm.dpm.ps); + if (ps == NULL) return -ENOMEM; - } adev->pm.dpm.ps[i].ps_priv = ps; si_parse_pplib_non_clock_info(adev, &adev->pm.dpm.ps[i], non_clock_info, @@ -7282,8 +7280,8 @@ static int si_parse_power_table(struct amdgpu_device *adev) k++; } power_state_offset += 2 + power_state->v2.ucNumDPMLevels; + adev->pm.dpm.num_ps++; } - adev->pm.dpm.num_ps = state_array->ucNumEntries; /* fill in the vce power states */ for (i = 0; i < adev->pm.dpm.num_of_vce_states; i++) { From de16cdf0b73d8855bfb4a4d26fa2e84374091dd1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Thibaut=20VAR=C3=88NE?= Date: Sun, 17 Apr 2022 16:51:45 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0025/1091] ath9k: fix QCA9561 PA bias level MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit e999a5da28a0e0f7de242d841ef7d5e48f4646ae ] This patch fixes an invalid TX PA DC bias level on QCA9561, which results in a very low output power and very low throughput as devices are further away from the AP (compared to other 2.4GHz APs). This patch was suggested by Felix Fietkau, who noted[1]: "The value written to that register is wrong, because while the mask definition AR_CH0_TOP2_XPABIASLVL uses a different value for 9561, the shift definition AR_CH0_TOP2_XPABIASLVL_S is hardcoded to 12, which is wrong for 9561." In real life testing, without this patch the 2.4GHz throughput on Yuncore XD3200 is around 10Mbps sitting next to the AP, and closer to practical maximum with the patch applied. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/91c58969-c60e-2f41-00ac-737786d435ae@nbd.name Signed-off-by: Thibaut VARÈNE Acked-by: Felix Fietkau Acked-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220417145145.1847-1-hacks+kernel@slashdirt.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/ar9003_phy.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/ar9003_phy.h b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/ar9003_phy.h index a171dbb29fbb..ad949eb02f3d 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/ar9003_phy.h +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/ar9003_phy.h @@ -720,7 +720,7 @@ #define AR_CH0_TOP2 (AR_SREV_9300(ah) ? 0x1628c : \ (AR_SREV_9462(ah) ? 0x16290 : 0x16284)) #define AR_CH0_TOP2_XPABIASLVL (AR_SREV_9561(ah) ? 0x1e00 : 0xf000) -#define AR_CH0_TOP2_XPABIASLVL_S 12 +#define AR_CH0_TOP2_XPABIASLVL_S (AR_SREV_9561(ah) ? 9 : 12) #define AR_CH0_XTAL (AR_SREV_9300(ah) ? 0x16294 : \ ((AR_SREV_9462(ah) || AR_SREV_9565(ah)) ? 0x16298 : \ From 0ac84ab50712879eac3c1dd2598440652a85d3d0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Luca Weiss Date: Fri, 14 Jan 2022 11:02:26 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0026/1091] media: venus: hfi: avoid null dereference in deinit [ Upstream commit 86594f6af867b5165d2ba7b5a71fae3a5961e56c ] If venus_probe fails at pm_runtime_put_sync the error handling first calls hfi_destroy and afterwards hfi_core_deinit. As hfi_destroy sets core->ops to NULL, hfi_core_deinit cannot call the core_deinit function anymore. Avoid this null pointer derefence by skipping the call when necessary. Signed-off-by: Luca Weiss Signed-off-by: Stanimir Varbanov Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/media/platform/qcom/venus/hfi.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/media/platform/qcom/venus/hfi.c b/drivers/media/platform/qcom/venus/hfi.c index 3d8b1284d1f3..68964a80fe61 100644 --- a/drivers/media/platform/qcom/venus/hfi.c +++ b/drivers/media/platform/qcom/venus/hfi.c @@ -104,6 +104,9 @@ int hfi_core_deinit(struct venus_core *core, bool blocking) mutex_lock(&core->lock); } + if (!core->ops) + goto unlock; + ret = core->ops->core_deinit(core); if (!ret) From fa636e9ee4442215cd9a2e079cd5a8e1fe0cb8ba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zheyu Ma Date: Sun, 10 Apr 2022 08:34:41 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0027/1091] media: pci: cx23885: Fix the error handling in cx23885_initdev() [ Upstream commit e8123311cf06d7dae71e8c5fe78e0510d20cd30b ] When the driver fails to call the dma_set_mask(), the driver will get the following splat: [ 55.853884] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __process_removed_driver+0x3c/0x240 [ 55.854486] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88810de60408 by task modprobe/590 [ 55.856822] Call Trace: [ 55.860327] __process_removed_driver+0x3c/0x240 [ 55.861347] bus_for_each_dev+0x102/0x160 [ 55.861681] i2c_del_driver+0x2f/0x50 This is because the driver has initialized the i2c related resources in cx23885_dev_setup() but not released them in error handling, fix this bug by modifying the error path that jumps after failing to call the dma_set_mask(). Signed-off-by: Zheyu Ma Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/media/pci/cx23885/cx23885-core.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/media/pci/cx23885/cx23885-core.c b/drivers/media/pci/cx23885/cx23885-core.c index ead0acb7807c..6747ecb4911b 100644 --- a/drivers/media/pci/cx23885/cx23885-core.c +++ b/drivers/media/pci/cx23885/cx23885-core.c @@ -2154,7 +2154,7 @@ static int cx23885_initdev(struct pci_dev *pci_dev, err = pci_set_dma_mask(pci_dev, 0xffffffff); if (err) { pr_err("%s/0: Oops: no 32bit PCI DMA ???\n", dev->name); - goto fail_ctrl; + goto fail_dma_set_mask; } err = request_irq(pci_dev->irq, cx23885_irq, @@ -2162,7 +2162,7 @@ static int cx23885_initdev(struct pci_dev *pci_dev, if (err < 0) { pr_err("%s: can't get IRQ %d\n", dev->name, pci_dev->irq); - goto fail_irq; + goto fail_dma_set_mask; } switch (dev->board) { @@ -2184,7 +2184,7 @@ static int cx23885_initdev(struct pci_dev *pci_dev, return 0; -fail_irq: +fail_dma_set_mask: cx23885_dev_unregister(dev); fail_ctrl: v4l2_ctrl_handler_free(hdl); From 222292930c8ecc3516e03ec1f9fa8448be7ff496 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zheyu Ma Date: Sun, 10 Apr 2022 08:44:09 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0028/1091] media: cx25821: Fix the warning when removing the module [ Upstream commit 2203436a4d24302871617373a7eb21bc17e38762 ] When removing the module, we will get the following warning: [ 14.746697] remove_proc_entry: removing non-empty directory 'irq/21', leaking at least 'cx25821[1]' [ 14.747449] WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 368 at fs/proc/generic.c:717 remove_proc_entry+0x389/0x3f0 [ 14.751611] RIP: 0010:remove_proc_entry+0x389/0x3f0 [ 14.759589] Call Trace: [ 14.759792] [ 14.759975] unregister_irq_proc+0x14c/0x170 [ 14.760340] irq_free_descs+0x94/0xe0 [ 14.760640] mp_unmap_irq+0xb6/0x100 [ 14.760937] acpi_unregister_gsi_ioapic+0x27/0x40 [ 14.761334] acpi_pci_irq_disable+0x1d3/0x320 [ 14.761688] pci_disable_device+0x1ad/0x380 [ 14.762027] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x2d/0x60 [ 14.762442] ? cx25821_shutdown+0x20/0x9f0 [cx25821] [ 14.762848] cx25821_finidev+0x48/0xc0 [cx25821] [ 14.763242] pci_device_remove+0x92/0x240 Fix this by freeing the irq before call pci_disable_device(). Signed-off-by: Zheyu Ma Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/media/pci/cx25821/cx25821-core.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/media/pci/cx25821/cx25821-core.c b/drivers/media/pci/cx25821/cx25821-core.c index 44839a6461e8..534829e352d1 100644 --- a/drivers/media/pci/cx25821/cx25821-core.c +++ b/drivers/media/pci/cx25821/cx25821-core.c @@ -1340,11 +1340,11 @@ static void cx25821_finidev(struct pci_dev *pci_dev) struct cx25821_dev *dev = get_cx25821(v4l2_dev); cx25821_shutdown(dev); - pci_disable_device(pci_dev); /* unregister stuff */ if (pci_dev->irq) free_irq(pci_dev->irq, dev); + pci_disable_device(pci_dev); cx25821_dev_unregister(dev); v4l2_device_unregister(v4l2_dev); From 0959aa00f9765bd8c654b1365012e41b51c733cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Heming Zhao Date: Fri, 1 Apr 2022 10:13:16 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0029/1091] md/bitmap: don't set sb values if can't pass sanity check [ Upstream commit e68cb83a57a458b01c9739e2ad9cb70b04d1e6d2 ] If bitmap area contains invalid data, kernel will crash then mdadm triggers "Segmentation fault". This is cluster-md speical bug. In non-clustered env, mdadm will handle broken metadata case. In clustered array, only kernel space handles bitmap slot info. But even this bug only happened in clustered env, current sanity check is wrong, the code should be changed. How to trigger: (faulty injection) dd if=/dev/zero bs=1M count=1 oflag=direct of=/dev/sda dd if=/dev/zero bs=1M count=1 oflag=direct of=/dev/sdb mdadm -C /dev/md0 -b clustered -e 1.2 -n 2 -l mirror /dev/sda /dev/sdb mdadm -Ss echo aaa > magic.txt == below modifying slot 2 bitmap data == dd if=magic.txt of=/dev/sda seek=16384 bs=1 count=3 <== destroy magic dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/sda seek=16436 bs=1 count=4 <== ZERO chunksize mdadm -A /dev/md0 /dev/sda /dev/sdb == kernel crashes. mdadm outputs "Segmentation fault" == Reason of kernel crash: In md_bitmap_read_sb (called by md_bitmap_create), bad bitmap magic didn't block chunksize assignment, and zero value made DIV_ROUND_UP_SECTOR_T() trigger "divide error". Crash log: kernel: md: md0 stopped. kernel: md/raid1:md0: not clean -- starting background reconstruction kernel: md/raid1:md0: active with 2 out of 2 mirrors kernel: dlm: ... ... kernel: md-cluster: Joined cluster 44810aba-38bb-e6b8-daca-bc97a0b254aa slot 1 kernel: md0: invalid bitmap file superblock: bad magic kernel: md_bitmap_copy_from_slot can't get bitmap from slot 2 kernel: md-cluster: Could not gather bitmaps from slot 2 kernel: divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI kernel: CPU: 0 PID: 1603 Comm: mdadm Not tainted 5.14.6-1-default kernel: Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996) kernel: RIP: 0010:md_bitmap_create+0x1d1/0x850 [md_mod] kernel: RSP: 0018:ffffc22ac0843ba0 EFLAGS: 00010246 kernel: ... ... kernel: Call Trace: kernel: ? dlm_lock_sync+0xd0/0xd0 [md_cluster 77fe..7a0] kernel: md_bitmap_copy_from_slot+0x2c/0x290 [md_mod 24ea..d3a] kernel: load_bitmaps+0xec/0x210 [md_cluster 77fe..7a0] kernel: md_bitmap_load+0x81/0x1e0 [md_mod 24ea..d3a] kernel: do_md_run+0x30/0x100 [md_mod 24ea..d3a] kernel: md_ioctl+0x1290/0x15a0 [md_mod 24ea....d3a] kernel: ? mddev_unlock+0xaa/0x130 [md_mod 24ea..d3a] kernel: ? blkdev_ioctl+0xb1/0x2b0 kernel: block_ioctl+0x3b/0x40 kernel: __x64_sys_ioctl+0x7f/0xb0 kernel: do_syscall_64+0x59/0x80 kernel: ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1ab/0x230 kernel: ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x18/0x40 kernel: ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x80 kernel: entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae kernel: RIP: 0033:0x7f4a15fa722b kernel: ... ... kernel: ---[ end trace 8afa7612f559c868 ]--- kernel: RIP: 0010:md_bitmap_create+0x1d1/0x850 [md_mod] Reported-by: kernel test robot Reported-by: Dan Carpenter Acked-by: Guoqing Jiang Signed-off-by: Heming Zhao Signed-off-by: Song Liu Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/md/md-bitmap.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/md/md-bitmap.c b/drivers/md/md-bitmap.c index d7eef5292ae2..a95e20c3d0d4 100644 --- a/drivers/md/md-bitmap.c +++ b/drivers/md/md-bitmap.c @@ -642,14 +642,6 @@ re_read: daemon_sleep = le32_to_cpu(sb->daemon_sleep) * HZ; write_behind = le32_to_cpu(sb->write_behind); sectors_reserved = le32_to_cpu(sb->sectors_reserved); - /* Setup nodes/clustername only if bitmap version is - * cluster-compatible - */ - if (sb->version == cpu_to_le32(BITMAP_MAJOR_CLUSTERED)) { - nodes = le32_to_cpu(sb->nodes); - strlcpy(bitmap->mddev->bitmap_info.cluster_name, - sb->cluster_name, 64); - } /* verify that the bitmap-specific fields are valid */ if (sb->magic != cpu_to_le32(BITMAP_MAGIC)) @@ -671,6 +663,16 @@ re_read: goto out; } + /* + * Setup nodes/clustername only if bitmap version is + * cluster-compatible + */ + if (sb->version == cpu_to_le32(BITMAP_MAJOR_CLUSTERED)) { + nodes = le32_to_cpu(sb->nodes); + strlcpy(bitmap->mddev->bitmap_info.cluster_name, + sb->cluster_name, 64); + } + /* keep the array size field of the bitmap superblock up to date */ sb->sync_size = cpu_to_le64(bitmap->mddev->resync_max_sectors); @@ -703,9 +705,9 @@ re_read: out: kunmap_atomic(sb); - /* Assigning chunksize is required for "re_read" */ - bitmap->mddev->bitmap_info.chunksize = chunksize; if (err == 0 && nodes && (bitmap->cluster_slot < 0)) { + /* Assigning chunksize is required for "re_read" */ + bitmap->mddev->bitmap_info.chunksize = chunksize; err = md_setup_cluster(bitmap->mddev, nodes); if (err) { pr_warn("%s: Could not setup cluster service (%d)\n", @@ -716,18 +718,18 @@ out: goto re_read; } - out_no_sb: - if (test_bit(BITMAP_STALE, &bitmap->flags)) - bitmap->events_cleared = bitmap->mddev->events; - bitmap->mddev->bitmap_info.chunksize = chunksize; - bitmap->mddev->bitmap_info.daemon_sleep = daemon_sleep; - bitmap->mddev->bitmap_info.max_write_behind = write_behind; - bitmap->mddev->bitmap_info.nodes = nodes; - if (bitmap->mddev->bitmap_info.space == 0 || - bitmap->mddev->bitmap_info.space > sectors_reserved) - bitmap->mddev->bitmap_info.space = sectors_reserved; - if (err) { + if (err == 0) { + if (test_bit(BITMAP_STALE, &bitmap->flags)) + bitmap->events_cleared = bitmap->mddev->events; + bitmap->mddev->bitmap_info.chunksize = chunksize; + bitmap->mddev->bitmap_info.daemon_sleep = daemon_sleep; + bitmap->mddev->bitmap_info.max_write_behind = write_behind; + bitmap->mddev->bitmap_info.nodes = nodes; + if (bitmap->mddev->bitmap_info.space == 0 || + bitmap->mddev->bitmap_info.space > sectors_reserved) + bitmap->mddev->bitmap_info.space = sectors_reserved; + } else { md_bitmap_print_sb(bitmap); if (bitmap->cluster_slot < 0) md_cluster_stop(bitmap->mddev); From 7923f95997a79cef2ad161a2facae64c25a0bca0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Aidan MacDonald Date: Mon, 11 Apr 2022 16:37:53 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0030/1091] mmc: jz4740: Apply DMA engine limits to maximum segment size [ Upstream commit afadb04f1d6e74b18a253403f5274cde5e3fd7bd ] Do what is done in other DMA-enabled MMC host drivers (cf. host/mmci.c) and limit the maximum segment size based on the DMA engine's capabilities. This is needed to avoid warnings like the following with CONFIG_DMA_API_DEBUG=y. ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 21 at kernel/dma/debug.c:1162 debug_dma_map_sg+0x2f4/0x39c DMA-API: jz4780-dma 13420000.dma-controller: mapping sg segment longer than device claims to support [len=98304] [max=65536] CPU: 0 PID: 21 Comm: kworker/0:1H Not tainted 5.18.0-rc1 #19 Workqueue: kblockd blk_mq_run_work_fn Stack : 81575aec 00000004 80620000 80620000 80620000 805e7358 00000009 801537ac 814c832c 806276e3 806e34b4 80620000 81575aec 00000001 81575ab8 09291444 00000000 00000000 805e7358 81575958 ffffffea 8157596c 00000000 636f6c62 6220646b 80387a70 0000000f 6d5f6b6c 80620000 00000000 81575ba4 00000009 805e170c 80896640 00000001 00010000 00000000 00000000 00006098 806e0000 ... Call Trace: [<80107670>] show_stack+0x84/0x120 [<80528cd8>] __warn+0xb8/0xec [<80528d78>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x6c/0xb8 [<8016f1d4>] debug_dma_map_sg+0x2f4/0x39c [<80169d4c>] __dma_map_sg_attrs+0xf0/0x118 [<8016a27c>] dma_map_sg_attrs+0x14/0x28 [<804f66b4>] jz4740_mmc_prepare_dma_data+0x74/0xa4 [<804f6714>] jz4740_mmc_pre_request+0x30/0x54 [<804f4ff4>] mmc_blk_mq_issue_rq+0x6e0/0x7bc [<804f5590>] mmc_mq_queue_rq+0x220/0x2d4 [<8038b2c0>] blk_mq_dispatch_rq_list+0x480/0x664 [<80391040>] blk_mq_do_dispatch_sched+0x2dc/0x370 [<80391468>] __blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0xec/0x164 [<80391540>] blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0x44/0x94 [<80387900>] __blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0xb0/0xcc [<80134c14>] process_one_work+0x1b8/0x264 [<80134ff8>] worker_thread+0x2ec/0x3b8 [<8013b13c>] kthread+0x104/0x10c [<80101dcc>] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x14/0x1c ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Signed-off-by: Aidan MacDonald Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220411153753.50443-1-aidanmacdonald.0x0@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/mmc/host/jz4740_mmc.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/mmc/host/jz4740_mmc.c b/drivers/mmc/host/jz4740_mmc.c index f816c06ef916..a316c912a118 100644 --- a/drivers/mmc/host/jz4740_mmc.c +++ b/drivers/mmc/host/jz4740_mmc.c @@ -224,6 +224,26 @@ static int jz4740_mmc_acquire_dma_channels(struct jz4740_mmc_host *host) return PTR_ERR(host->dma_rx); } + /* + * Limit the maximum segment size in any SG entry according to + * the parameters of the DMA engine device. + */ + if (host->dma_tx) { + struct device *dev = host->dma_tx->device->dev; + unsigned int max_seg_size = dma_get_max_seg_size(dev); + + if (max_seg_size < host->mmc->max_seg_size) + host->mmc->max_seg_size = max_seg_size; + } + + if (host->dma_rx) { + struct device *dev = host->dma_rx->device->dev; + unsigned int max_seg_size = dma_get_max_seg_size(dev); + + if (max_seg_size < host->mmc->max_seg_size) + host->mmc->max_seg_size = max_seg_size; + } + return 0; } From e1599ced6be19966793fb78cbe9307096219128a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lv Ruyi Date: Mon, 18 Apr 2022 10:57:55 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0031/1091] scsi: megaraid: Fix error check return value of register_chrdev() [ Upstream commit c5acd61dbb32b6bda0f3a354108f2b8dcb788985 ] If major equals 0, register_chrdev() returns an error code when it fails. This function dynamically allocates a major and returns its number on success, so we should use "< 0" to check it instead of "!". Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220418105755.2558828-1-lv.ruyi@zte.com.cn Reported-by: Zeal Robot Signed-off-by: Lv Ruyi Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/scsi/megaraid.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/megaraid.c b/drivers/scsi/megaraid.c index ff6d4aa92421..8b1ba690039b 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/megaraid.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/megaraid.c @@ -4635,7 +4635,7 @@ static int __init megaraid_init(void) * major number allocation. */ major = register_chrdev(0, "megadev_legacy", &megadev_fops); - if (!major) { + if (major < 0) { printk(KERN_WARNING "megaraid: failed to register char device\n"); } From 1e29d829ad51d1472dd035487953a6724b56fc33 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Price Date: Fri, 3 Dec 2021 10:28:15 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0032/1091] drm/plane: Move range check for format_count earlier [ Upstream commit 4b674dd69701c2e22e8e7770c1706a69f3b17269 ] While the check for format_count > 64 in __drm_universal_plane_init() shouldn't be hit (it's a WARN_ON), in its current position it will then leak the plane->format_types array and fail to call drm_mode_object_unregister() leaking the modeset identifier. Move it to the start of the function to avoid allocating those resources in the first place. Signed-off-by: Steven Price Signed-off-by: Liviu Dudau Link: https://lore.kernel.org/dri-devel/20211203102815.38624-1-steven.price@arm.com/ Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/gpu/drm/drm_plane.c | 14 +++++++------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_plane.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_plane.c index d6ad60ab0d38..6bdebcca5690 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_plane.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_plane.c @@ -186,6 +186,13 @@ int drm_universal_plane_init(struct drm_device *dev, struct drm_plane *plane, if (WARN_ON(config->num_total_plane >= 32)) return -EINVAL; + /* + * First driver to need more than 64 formats needs to fix this. Each + * format is encoded as a bit and the current code only supports a u64. + */ + if (WARN_ON(format_count > 64)) + return -EINVAL; + WARN_ON(drm_drv_uses_atomic_modeset(dev) && (!funcs->atomic_destroy_state || !funcs->atomic_duplicate_state)); @@ -207,13 +214,6 @@ int drm_universal_plane_init(struct drm_device *dev, struct drm_plane *plane, return -ENOMEM; } - /* - * First driver to need more than 64 formats needs to fix this. Each - * format is encoded as a bit and the current code only supports a u64. - */ - if (WARN_ON(format_count > 64)) - return -EINVAL; - if (format_modifiers) { const uint64_t *temp_modifiers = format_modifiers; while (*temp_modifiers++ != DRM_FORMAT_MOD_INVALID) From a610cfe56c38d098bce7f4540189377c4f454e62 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Evan Quan Date: Mon, 25 Apr 2022 10:16:46 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0033/1091] drm/amd/pm: fix the compile warning [ Upstream commit 555238d92ac32dbad2d77ad2bafc48d17391990c ] Fix the compile warning below: drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/../pm/legacy-dpm/kv_dpm.c:1641 kv_get_acp_boot_level() warn: always true condition '(table->entries[i]->clk >= 0) => (0-u32max >= 0)' Reported-by: kernel test robot CC: Alex Deucher Signed-off-by: Evan Quan Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/kv_dpm.c | 14 +------------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/kv_dpm.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/kv_dpm.c index 4b3faaccecb9..c8a5a5698edd 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/kv_dpm.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/kv_dpm.c @@ -1609,19 +1609,7 @@ static int kv_update_samu_dpm(struct amdgpu_device *adev, bool gate) static u8 kv_get_acp_boot_level(struct amdgpu_device *adev) { - u8 i; - struct amdgpu_clock_voltage_dependency_table *table = - &adev->pm.dpm.dyn_state.acp_clock_voltage_dependency_table; - - for (i = 0; i < table->count; i++) { - if (table->entries[i].clk >= 0) /* XXX */ - break; - } - - if (i >= table->count) - i = table->count - 1; - - return i; + return 0; } static void kv_update_acp_boot_level(struct amdgpu_device *adev) From efd183d988b416fcdf6f7c298a17ced4859ca77d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexandru Elisei Date: Mon, 25 Apr 2022 12:44:41 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0034/1091] arm64: compat: Do not treat syscall number as ESR_ELx for a bad syscall [ Upstream commit 3fed9e551417b84038b15117732ea4505eee386b ] If a compat process tries to execute an unknown system call above the __ARM_NR_COMPAT_END number, the kernel sends a SIGILL signal to the offending process. Information about the error is printed to dmesg in compat_arm_syscall() -> arm64_notify_die() -> arm64_force_sig_fault() -> arm64_show_signal(). arm64_show_signal() interprets a non-zero value for current->thread.fault_code as an exception syndrome and displays the message associated with the ESR_ELx.EC field (bits 31:26). current->thread.fault_code is set in compat_arm_syscall() -> arm64_notify_die() with the bad syscall number instead of a valid ESR_ELx value. This means that the ESR_ELx.EC field has the value that the user set for the syscall number and the kernel can end up printing bogus exception messages*. For example, for the syscall number 0x68000000, which evaluates to ESR_ELx.EC value of 0x1A (ESR_ELx_EC_FPAC) the kernel prints this error: [ 18.349161] syscall[300]: unhandled exception: ERET/ERETAA/ERETAB, ESR 0x68000000, Oops - bad compat syscall(2) in syscall[10000+50000] [ 18.350639] CPU: 2 PID: 300 Comm: syscall Not tainted 5.18.0-rc1 #79 [ 18.351249] Hardware name: Pine64 RockPro64 v2.0 (DT) [..] which is misleading, as the bad compat syscall has nothing to do with pointer authentication. Stop arm64_show_signal() from printing exception syndrome information by having compat_arm_syscall() set the ESR_ELx value to 0, as it has no meaning for an invalid system call number. The example above now becomes: [ 19.935275] syscall[301]: unhandled exception: Oops - bad compat syscall(2) in syscall[10000+50000] [ 19.936124] CPU: 1 PID: 301 Comm: syscall Not tainted 5.18.0-rc1-00005-g7e08006d4102 #80 [ 19.936894] Hardware name: Pine64 RockPro64 v2.0 (DT) [..] which although shows less information because the syscall number, wrongfully advertised as the ESR value, is missing, it is better than showing plainly wrong information. The syscall number can be easily obtained with strace. *A 32-bit value above or equal to 0x8000_0000 is interpreted as a negative integer in compat_arm_syscal() and the condition scno < __ARM_NR_COMPAT_END evaluates to true; the syscall will exit to userspace in this case with the ENOSYS error code instead of arm64_notify_die() being called. Signed-off-by: Alexandru Elisei Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220425114444.368693-3-alexandru.elisei@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/arm64/kernel/sys_compat.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/sys_compat.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/sys_compat.c index 3c18c2454089..51274bab2565 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/sys_compat.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/sys_compat.c @@ -115,6 +115,6 @@ long compat_arm_syscall(struct pt_regs *regs, int scno) (compat_thumb_mode(regs) ? 2 : 4); arm64_notify_die("Oops - bad compat syscall(2)", regs, - SIGILL, ILL_ILLTRP, addr, scno); + SIGILL, ILL_ILLTRP, addr, 0); return 0; } From b507f067e9fc98e27d0e5f90ea6a78c0432c04c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lv Ruyi Date: Sun, 24 Apr 2022 03:19:59 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0035/1091] drm: msm: fix error check return value of irq_of_parse_and_map() [ Upstream commit b9e4f1d2b505df8e2439b63e67afaa287c1c43e2 ] The irq_of_parse_and_map() function returns 0 on failure, and does not return an negative value. Reported-by: Zeal Robot Signed-off-by: Lv Ruyi Reviewed-by: Dmitry Baryshkov Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/483175/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220424031959.3172406-1-lv.ruyi@zte.com.cn Signed-off-by: Dmitry Baryshkov Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/mdp5/mdp5_kms.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/mdp5/mdp5_kms.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/mdp5/mdp5_kms.c index 77823ccdd0f8..39d0082eedcc 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/mdp5/mdp5_kms.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/mdp5/mdp5_kms.c @@ -698,9 +698,9 @@ struct msm_kms *mdp5_kms_init(struct drm_device *dev) pdev = mdp5_kms->pdev; irq = irq_of_parse_and_map(pdev->dev.of_node, 0); - if (irq < 0) { - ret = irq; - DRM_DEV_ERROR(&pdev->dev, "failed to get irq: %d\n", ret); + if (!irq) { + ret = -EINVAL; + DRM_DEV_ERROR(&pdev->dev, "failed to get irq\n"); goto fail; } From f857855a8a831f965fc843fef03b4e13813b41cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: jianghaoran Date: Fri, 29 Apr 2022 13:38:02 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0036/1091] ipv6: Don't send rs packets to the interface of ARPHRD_TUNNEL [ Upstream commit b52e1cce31ca721e937d517411179f9196ee6135 ] ARPHRD_TUNNEL interface can't process rs packets and will generate TX errors ex: ip tunnel add ethn mode ipip local 192.168.1.1 remote 192.168.1.2 ifconfig ethn x.x.x.x ethn: flags=209 mtu 1480 inet x.x.x.x netmask 255.255.255.255 destination x.x.x.x inet6 fe80::5efe:ac1e:3cdb prefixlen 64 scopeid 0x20 tunnel txqueuelen 1000 (IPIP Tunnel) RX packets 0 bytes 0 (0.0 B) RX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 frame 0 TX packets 0 bytes 0 (0.0 B) TX errors 3 dropped 0 overruns 0 carrier 0 collisions 0 Signed-off-by: jianghaoran Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220429053802.246681-1-jianghaoran@kylinos.cn Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/ipv6/addrconf.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c index efea88fb3cd5..e29553e4f4ee 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c +++ b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c @@ -4202,7 +4202,8 @@ static void addrconf_dad_completed(struct inet6_ifaddr *ifp, bool bump_id, send_rs = send_mld && ipv6_accept_ra(ifp->idev) && ifp->idev->cnf.rtr_solicits != 0 && - (dev->flags&IFF_LOOPBACK) == 0; + (dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK) == 0 && + (dev->type != ARPHRD_TUNNEL); read_unlock_bh(&ifp->idev->lock); /* While dad is in progress mld report's source address is in6_addrany. From 430af81135d5ae53d04f1a20a9c79fd6c8ecfb4c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mark Bloch Date: Tue, 15 Mar 2022 11:23:40 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0037/1091] net/mlx5: fs, delete the FTE when there are no rules attached to it [ Upstream commit 7b0c6338597613f465d131bd939a51844a00455a ] When an FTE has no children is means all the rules where removed and the FTE can be deleted regardless of the dests_size value. While dests_size should be 0 when there are no children be extra careful not to leak memory or get firmware syndrome if the proper bookkeeping of dests_size wasn't done. Signed-off-by: Mark Bloch Reviewed-by: Maor Gottlieb Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/fs_core.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/fs_core.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/fs_core.c index 5baf2c666d29..8c8b68e7abb4 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/fs_core.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/fs_core.c @@ -1937,16 +1937,16 @@ void mlx5_del_flow_rules(struct mlx5_flow_handle *handle) down_write_ref_node(&fte->node, false); for (i = handle->num_rules - 1; i >= 0; i--) tree_remove_node(&handle->rule[i]->node, true); - if (fte->dests_size) { - if (fte->modify_mask) - modify_fte(fte); - up_write_ref_node(&fte->node, false); - } else if (list_empty(&fte->node.children)) { + if (list_empty(&fte->node.children)) { del_hw_fte(&fte->node); /* Avoid double call to del_hw_fte */ fte->node.del_hw_func = NULL; up_write_ref_node(&fte->node, false); tree_put_node(&fte->node, false); + } else if (fte->dests_size) { + if (fte->modify_mask) + modify_fte(fte); + up_write_ref_node(&fte->node, false); } else { up_write_ref_node(&fte->node, false); } From 121f56a9a832ad48cd3514e6a133f2603cd4bcd4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mark Brown Date: Thu, 28 Apr 2022 17:18:32 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0038/1091] ASoC: dapm: Don't fold register value changes into notifications [ Upstream commit ad685980469b9f9b99d4d6ea05f4cb8f57cb2234 ] DAPM tracks and reports the value presented to the user from DAPM controls separately to the register value, these may diverge during initialisation or when an autodisable control is in use. When writing DAPM controls we currently report that a change has occurred if either the DAPM value or the value stored in the register has changed, meaning that if the two are out of sync we may appear to report a spurious event to userspace. Since we use this folded in value for nothing other than the value reported to userspace simply drop the folding in of the register change. Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220428161833.3690050-1-broonie@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- sound/soc/soc-dapm.c | 2 -- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/soc-dapm.c b/sound/soc/soc-dapm.c index 1c09dfb0c0f0..56c9c4189f26 100644 --- a/sound/soc/soc-dapm.c +++ b/sound/soc/soc-dapm.c @@ -3421,7 +3421,6 @@ int snd_soc_dapm_put_volsw(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, update.val = val; card->update = &update; } - change |= reg_change; ret = soc_dapm_mixer_update_power(card, kcontrol, connect, rconnect); @@ -3527,7 +3526,6 @@ int snd_soc_dapm_put_enum_double(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, update.val = val; card->update = &update; } - change |= reg_change; ret = soc_dapm_mux_update_power(card, kcontrol, item[0], e); From 2317f3bfda6dbdf1928c76bb75fc0d78bd0209fd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Petr Machata Date: Wed, 4 May 2022 09:29:05 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 0039/1091] mlxsw: spectrum_dcb: Do not warn about priority changes [ Upstream commit b6b584562cbe7dc357083459d6dd5b171e12cadb ] The idea behind the warnings is that the user would get warned in case when more than one priority is configured for a given DSCP value on a netdevice. The warning is currently wrong, because dcb_ieee_getapp_mask() returns the first matching entry, not all of them, and the warning will then claim that some priority is "current", when in fact it is not. But more importantly, the warning is misleading in general. Consider the following commands: # dcb app flush dev swp19 dscp-prio # dcb app add dev swp19 dscp-prio 24:3 # dcb app replace dev swp19 dscp-prio 24:2 The last command will issue the following warning: mlxsw_spectrum3 0000:07:00.0 swp19: Ignoring new priority 2 for DSCP 24 in favor of current value of 3 The reason is that the "replace" command works by first adding the new value, and then removing all old values. This is the only way to make the replacement without causing the traffic to be prioritized to whatever the chip defaults to. The warning is issued in response to adding the new priority, and then no warning is shown when the old priority is removed. The upshot is that the canonical way to change traffic prioritization always produces a warning about ignoring the new priority, but what gets configured is in fact what the user intended. An option to just emit warning every time that the prioritization changes just to make it clear that it happened is obviously unsatisfactory. Therefore, in this patch, remove the warnings. Reported-by: Maksym Yaremchuk Signed-off-by: Petr Machata Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_dcb.c | 13 ------------- 1 file changed, 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_dcb.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_dcb.c index 21296fa7f7fb..bf51ed94952c 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_dcb.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_dcb.c @@ -227,8 +227,6 @@ static int mlxsw_sp_dcbnl_ieee_setets(struct net_device *dev, static int mlxsw_sp_dcbnl_app_validate(struct net_device *dev, struct dcb_app *app) { - int prio; - if (app->priority >= IEEE_8021QAZ_MAX_TCS) { netdev_err(dev, "APP entry with priority value %u is invalid\n", app->priority); @@ -242,17 +240,6 @@ static int mlxsw_sp_dcbnl_app_validate(struct net_device *dev, app->protocol); return -EINVAL; } - - /* Warn about any DSCP APP entries with the same PID. */ - prio = fls(dcb_ieee_getapp_mask(dev, app)); - if (prio--) { - if (prio < app->priority) - netdev_warn(dev, "Choosing priority %d for DSCP %d in favor of previously-active value of %d\n", - app->priority, app->protocol, prio); - else if (prio > app->priority) - netdev_warn(dev, "Ignoring new priority %d for DSCP %d in favor of current value of %d\n", - app->priority, app->protocol, prio); - } break; case IEEE_8021QAZ_APP_SEL_ETHERTYPE: From 0d7074792bb986ea1e51095a2b0e642a6f36ee31 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alice Wong Date: Mon, 2 May 2022 11:40:18 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 0040/1091] drm/amdgpu/ucode: Remove firmware load type check in amdgpu_ucode_free_bo [ Upstream commit ab0cd4a9ae5b4679b714d8dbfedc0901fecdce9f ] When psp_hw_init failed, it will set the load_type to AMDGPU_FW_LOAD_DIRECT. During amdgpu_device_ip_fini, amdgpu_ucode_free_bo checks that load_type is AMDGPU_FW_LOAD_DIRECT and skips deallocating fw_buf causing memory leak. Remove load_type check in amdgpu_ucode_free_bo. Signed-off-by: Alice Wong Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_ucode.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_ucode.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_ucode.c index 3a6115ad0196..f3250db7f9c2 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_ucode.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_ucode.c @@ -568,8 +568,7 @@ int amdgpu_ucode_create_bo(struct amdgpu_device *adev) void amdgpu_ucode_free_bo(struct amdgpu_device *adev) { - if (adev->firmware.load_type != AMDGPU_FW_LOAD_DIRECT) - amdgpu_bo_free_kernel(&adev->firmware.fw_buf, + amdgpu_bo_free_kernel(&adev->firmware.fw_buf, &adev->firmware.fw_buf_mc, &adev->firmware.fw_buf_ptr); } From 00771de7cc28e405f5ae19ca46facd83a534bb8f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dongliang Mu Date: Fri, 6 May 2022 15:24:25 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0041/1091] HID: bigben: fix slab-out-of-bounds Write in bigben_probe [ Upstream commit fc4ef9d5724973193bfa5ebed181dba6de3a56db ] There is a slab-out-of-bounds Write bug in hid-bigbenff driver. The problem is the driver assumes the device must have an input but some malicious devices violate this assumption. Fix this by checking hid_device's input is non-empty before its usage. Reported-by: syzkaller Signed-off-by: Dongliang Mu Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/hid/hid-bigbenff.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-bigbenff.c b/drivers/hid/hid-bigbenff.c index 74ad8bf98bfd..e8c5e3ac9fff 100644 --- a/drivers/hid/hid-bigbenff.c +++ b/drivers/hid/hid-bigbenff.c @@ -347,6 +347,12 @@ static int bigben_probe(struct hid_device *hid, bigben->report = list_entry(report_list->next, struct hid_report, list); + if (list_empty(&hid->inputs)) { + hid_err(hid, "no inputs found\n"); + error = -ENODEV; + goto error_hw_stop; + } + hidinput = list_first_entry(&hid->inputs, struct hid_input, list); set_bit(FF_RUMBLE, hidinput->input->ffbit); From 890b16b4709dda03563ba8786815247d6ce5e677 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Charles Keepax Date: Wed, 4 May 2022 18:08:52 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0042/1091] ASoC: tscs454: Add endianness flag in snd_soc_component_driver [ Upstream commit ff69ec96b87dccb3a29edef8cec5d4fefbbc2055 ] The endianness flag is used on the CODEC side to specify an ambivalence to endian, typically because it is lost over the hardware link. This device receives audio over an I2S DAI and as such should have endianness applied. A fixup is also required to use the width directly rather than relying on the format in hw_params, now both little and big endian would be supported. It is worth noting this changes the behaviour of S24_LE to use a word length of 24 rather than 32. This would appear to be a correction since the fact S24_LE is stored as 32 bits should not be presented over the bus. Signed-off-by: Charles Keepax Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220504170905.332415-26-ckeepax@opensource.cirrus.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- sound/soc/codecs/tscs454.c | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/tscs454.c b/sound/soc/codecs/tscs454.c index c3587af9985c..3d981441b8d1 100644 --- a/sound/soc/codecs/tscs454.c +++ b/sound/soc/codecs/tscs454.c @@ -3128,18 +3128,17 @@ static int set_aif_sample_format(struct snd_soc_component *component, unsigned int width; int ret; - switch (format) { - case SNDRV_PCM_FORMAT_S16_LE: + switch (snd_pcm_format_width(format)) { + case 16: width = FV_WL_16; break; - case SNDRV_PCM_FORMAT_S20_3LE: + case 20: width = FV_WL_20; break; - case SNDRV_PCM_FORMAT_S24_3LE: + case 24: width = FV_WL_24; break; - case SNDRV_PCM_FORMAT_S24_LE: - case SNDRV_PCM_FORMAT_S32_LE: + case 32: width = FV_WL_32; break; default: @@ -3337,6 +3336,7 @@ static const struct snd_soc_component_driver soc_component_dev_tscs454 = { .num_dapm_routes = ARRAY_SIZE(tscs454_intercon), .controls = tscs454_snd_controls, .num_controls = ARRAY_SIZE(tscs454_snd_controls), + .endianness = 1, }; #define TSCS454_RATES SNDRV_PCM_RATE_8000_96000 From 1651a95517fb6da32ed7174ef61719933f95b456 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Heiko Carstens Date: Fri, 6 May 2022 11:33:19 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0043/1091] s390/preempt: disable __preempt_count_add() optimization for PROFILE_ALL_BRANCHES MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit 63678eecec57fc51b778be3da35a397931287170 ] gcc 12 does not (always) optimize away code that should only be generated if parameters are constant and within in a certain range. This depends on various obscure kernel config options, however in particular PROFILE_ALL_BRANCHES can trigger this compile error: In function ‘__atomic_add_const’, inlined from ‘__preempt_count_add.part.0’ at ./arch/s390/include/asm/preempt.h:50:3: ./arch/s390/include/asm/atomic_ops.h:80:9: error: impossible constraint in ‘asm’ 80 | asm volatile( \ | ^~~ Workaround this by simply disabling the optimization for PROFILE_ALL_BRANCHES, since the kernel will be so slow, that this optimization won't matter at all. Reported-by: Thomas Richter Reviewed-by: Sven Schnelle Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/s390/include/asm/preempt.h | 15 +++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/preempt.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/preempt.h index b5ea9e14c017..3dcd8ab3db73 100644 --- a/arch/s390/include/asm/preempt.h +++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/preempt.h @@ -52,10 +52,17 @@ static inline bool test_preempt_need_resched(void) static inline void __preempt_count_add(int val) { - if (__builtin_constant_p(val) && (val >= -128) && (val <= 127)) - __atomic_add_const(val, &S390_lowcore.preempt_count); - else - __atomic_add(val, &S390_lowcore.preempt_count); + /* + * With some obscure config options and CONFIG_PROFILE_ALL_BRANCHES + * enabled, gcc 12 fails to handle __builtin_constant_p(). + */ + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PROFILE_ALL_BRANCHES)) { + if (__builtin_constant_p(val) && (val >= -128) && (val <= 127)) { + __atomic_add_const(val, &S390_lowcore.preempt_count); + return; + } + } + __atomic_add(val, &S390_lowcore.preempt_count); } static inline void __preempt_count_sub(int val) From 6583d0d6ad6d488930125328080a02b98154aa72 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Patrice Chotard Date: Wed, 11 May 2022 09:46:42 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0044/1091] spi: stm32-qspi: Fix wait_cmd timeout in APM mode [ Upstream commit d83d89ea68b4726700fa87b22db075e4217e691c ] In APM mode, TCF and TEF flags are not set. To avoid timeout in stm32_qspi_wait_cmd(), don't check if TCF/TEF are set. Signed-off-by: Patrice Chotard Reported-by: eberhard.stoll@kontron.de Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220511074644.558874-2-patrice.chotard@foss.st.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/spi/spi-stm32-qspi.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/spi/spi-stm32-qspi.c b/drivers/spi/spi-stm32-qspi.c index ea77d915216a..8070b7420217 100644 --- a/drivers/spi/spi-stm32-qspi.c +++ b/drivers/spi/spi-stm32-qspi.c @@ -293,7 +293,8 @@ static int stm32_qspi_wait_cmd(struct stm32_qspi *qspi, if (!op->data.nbytes) goto wait_nobusy; - if (readl_relaxed(qspi->io_base + QSPI_SR) & SR_TCF) + if ((readl_relaxed(qspi->io_base + QSPI_SR) & SR_TCF) || + qspi->fmode == CCR_FMODE_APM) goto out; reinit_completion(&qspi->data_completion); From 5a71f14a9b2e9054228dd105eceb58ca79beb025 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mikulas Patocka Date: Tue, 10 May 2022 13:17:32 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 0045/1091] dma-debug: change allocation mode from GFP_NOWAIT to GFP_ATIOMIC [ Upstream commit 84bc4f1dbbbb5f8aa68706a96711dccb28b518e5 ] We observed the error "cacheline tracking ENOMEM, dma-debug disabled" during a light system load (copying some files). The reason for this error is that the dma_active_cacheline radix tree uses GFP_NOWAIT allocation - so it can't access the emergency memory reserves and it fails as soon as anybody reaches the watermark. This patch changes GFP_NOWAIT to GFP_ATOMIC, so that it can access the emergency memory reserves. Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- kernel/dma/debug.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/dma/debug.c b/kernel/dma/debug.c index 4dc3bbfd3e3f..1c133f610f59 100644 --- a/kernel/dma/debug.c +++ b/kernel/dma/debug.c @@ -450,7 +450,7 @@ void debug_dma_dump_mappings(struct device *dev) * At any time debug_dma_assert_idle() can be called to trigger a * warning if any cachelines in the given page are in the active set. */ -static RADIX_TREE(dma_active_cacheline, GFP_NOWAIT); +static RADIX_TREE(dma_active_cacheline, GFP_ATOMIC); static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(radix_lock); #define ACTIVE_CACHELINE_MAX_OVERLAP ((1 << RADIX_TREE_MAX_TAGS) - 1) #define CACHELINE_PER_PAGE_SHIFT (PAGE_SHIFT - L1_CACHE_SHIFT) From 17cfc9455830064528c3327b6338312d6b34d936 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mario Limonciello Date: Tue, 10 May 2022 08:11:36 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 0046/1091] ACPI: PM: Block ASUS B1400CEAE from suspend to idle by default [ Upstream commit d52848620de00cde4a3a5df908e231b8c8868250 ] ASUS B1400CEAE fails to resume from suspend to idle by default. This was bisected back to commit df4f9bc4fb9c ("nvme-pci: add support for ACPI StorageD3Enable property") but this is a red herring to the problem. Before this commit the system wasn't getting into deepest sleep state. Presumably this commit is allowing entry into deepest sleep state as advertised by firmware, but there are some other problems related to the wakeup. As it is confirmed the system works properly with S3, set the default for this system to S3. Reported-by: Jian-Hong Pan Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=215742 Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello Tested-by: Jian-Hong Pan Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/acpi/sleep.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/acpi/sleep.c b/drivers/acpi/sleep.c index b0e23e3fe0d5..34966128293b 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/sleep.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/sleep.c @@ -374,6 +374,18 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id acpisleep_dmi_table[] __initconst = { DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "20GGA00L00"), }, }, + /* + * ASUS B1400CEAE hangs on resume from suspend (see + * https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=215742). + */ + { + .callback = init_default_s3, + .ident = "ASUS B1400CEAE", + .matches = { + DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "ASUSTeK COMPUTER INC."), + DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "ASUS EXPERTBOOK B1400CEAE"), + }, + }, {}, }; From 2064a1eab2ec872faf77079d1b6c992d8a49e4ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Corey Minyard Date: Fri, 1 Apr 2022 07:44:53 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 0047/1091] ipmi:ssif: Check for NULL msg when handling events and messages [ Upstream commit 7602b957e2404e5f98d9a40b68f1fd27f0028712 ] Even though it's not possible to get into the SSIF_GETTING_MESSAGES and SSIF_GETTING_EVENTS states without a valid message in the msg field, it's probably best to be defensive here and check and print a log, since that means something else went wrong. Also add a default clause to that switch statement to release the lock and print a log, in case the state variable gets messed up somehow. Reported-by: Haowen Bai Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_ssif.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_ssif.c b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_ssif.c index bb42a1c92cae..60fb6c62f224 100644 --- a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_ssif.c +++ b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_ssif.c @@ -845,6 +845,14 @@ static void msg_done_handler(struct ssif_info *ssif_info, int result, break; case SSIF_GETTING_EVENTS: + if (!msg) { + /* Should never happen, but just in case. */ + dev_warn(&ssif_info->client->dev, + "No message set while getting events\n"); + ipmi_ssif_unlock_cond(ssif_info, flags); + break; + } + if ((result < 0) || (len < 3) || (msg->rsp[2] != 0)) { /* Error getting event, probably done. */ msg->done(msg); @@ -869,6 +877,14 @@ static void msg_done_handler(struct ssif_info *ssif_info, int result, break; case SSIF_GETTING_MESSAGES: + if (!msg) { + /* Should never happen, but just in case. */ + dev_warn(&ssif_info->client->dev, + "No message set while getting messages\n"); + ipmi_ssif_unlock_cond(ssif_info, flags); + break; + } + if ((result < 0) || (len < 3) || (msg->rsp[2] != 0)) { /* Error getting event, probably done. */ msg->done(msg); @@ -892,6 +908,13 @@ static void msg_done_handler(struct ssif_info *ssif_info, int result, deliver_recv_msg(ssif_info, msg); } break; + + default: + /* Should never happen, but just in case. */ + dev_warn(&ssif_info->client->dev, + "Invalid state in message done handling: %d\n", + ssif_info->ssif_state); + ipmi_ssif_unlock_cond(ssif_info, flags); } flags = ipmi_ssif_lock_cond(ssif_info, &oflags); From 2d966c94adce2b405234d403b13bf3d41901949e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Corey Minyard Date: Fri, 15 Apr 2022 07:23:32 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 0048/1091] ipmi: Fix pr_fmt to avoid compilation issues [ Upstream commit 2ebaf18a0b7fb764bba6c806af99fe868cee93de ] The was it was wouldn't work in some situations, simplify it. What was there was unnecessary complexity. Reported-by: kernel test robot Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c index ad2e6d55d4a5..736970312bbc 100644 --- a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c +++ b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c @@ -11,8 +11,8 @@ * Copyright 2002 MontaVista Software Inc. */ -#define pr_fmt(fmt) "%s" fmt, "IPMI message handler: " -#define dev_fmt pr_fmt +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "IPMI message handler: " fmt +#define dev_fmt(fmt) pr_fmt(fmt) #include #include From 8f2a5721cdc3641037bf1568591b0129b270401b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dongliang Mu Date: Wed, 11 May 2022 09:44:52 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0049/1091] rtlwifi: Use pr_warn instead of WARN_ONCE [ Upstream commit ad732da434a2936128769216eddaece3b1af4588 ] This memory allocation failure can be triggered by fault injection or high pressure testing, resulting a WARN. Fix this by replacing WARN with pr_warn. Reported-by: syzkaller Signed-off-by: Dongliang Mu Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220511014453.1621366-1-dzm91@hust.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/usb.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/usb.c b/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/usb.c index bad06939a247..9bcb187d37dc 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/usb.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/usb.c @@ -1013,7 +1013,7 @@ int rtl_usb_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, hw = ieee80211_alloc_hw(sizeof(struct rtl_priv) + sizeof(struct rtl_usb_priv), &rtl_ops); if (!hw) { - WARN_ONCE(true, "rtl_usb: ieee80211 alloc failed\n"); + pr_warn("rtl_usb: ieee80211 alloc failed\n"); return -ENOMEM; } rtlpriv = hw->priv; From 4172a34ef93f3dd61d5ee1f658ff75c2dcd8ccae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Philipp Zabel Date: Tue, 26 Apr 2022 11:15:55 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0050/1091] media: coda: limit frame interval enumeration to supported encoder frame sizes [ Upstream commit 67e33dd957880879e785cfea83a3aa24bd5c5577 ] Let VIDIOC_ENUM_FRAMEINTERVALS return -EINVAL if userspace queries frame intervals for frame sizes unsupported by the encoder. Fixes the following v4l2-compliance failure: fail: v4l2-test-formats.cpp(123): found frame intervals for invalid size 47x16 fail: v4l2-test-formats.cpp(282): node->codec_mask & STATEFUL_ENCODER test VIDIOC_ENUM_FMT/FRAMESIZES/FRAMEINTERVALS: FAIL [hverkuil: drop incorrect 'For decoder devices, return -ENOTTY.' in the commit log] Signed-off-by: Philipp Zabel Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/media/platform/coda/coda-common.c | 20 ++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/media/platform/coda/coda-common.c b/drivers/media/platform/coda/coda-common.c index 0adc54832657..fb469340634b 100644 --- a/drivers/media/platform/coda/coda-common.c +++ b/drivers/media/platform/coda/coda-common.c @@ -1192,7 +1192,8 @@ static int coda_enum_frameintervals(struct file *file, void *fh, struct v4l2_frmivalenum *f) { struct coda_ctx *ctx = fh_to_ctx(fh); - int i; + struct coda_q_data *q_data; + const struct coda_codec *codec; if (f->index) return -EINVAL; @@ -1201,12 +1202,19 @@ static int coda_enum_frameintervals(struct file *file, void *fh, if (!ctx->vdoa && f->pixel_format == V4L2_PIX_FMT_YUYV) return -EINVAL; - for (i = 0; i < CODA_MAX_FORMATS; i++) { - if (f->pixel_format == ctx->cvd->src_formats[i] || - f->pixel_format == ctx->cvd->dst_formats[i]) - break; + if (coda_format_normalize_yuv(f->pixel_format) == V4L2_PIX_FMT_YUV420) { + q_data = get_q_data(ctx, V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_CAPTURE); + codec = coda_find_codec(ctx->dev, f->pixel_format, + q_data->fourcc); + } else { + codec = coda_find_codec(ctx->dev, V4L2_PIX_FMT_YUV420, + f->pixel_format); } - if (i == CODA_MAX_FORMATS) + if (!codec) + return -EINVAL; + + if (f->width < MIN_W || f->width > codec->max_w || + f->height < MIN_H || f->height > codec->max_h) return -EINVAL; f->type = V4L2_FRMIVAL_TYPE_CONTINUOUS; From 67fb49438858b23fdcc8c3f27e8c4efa30282d09 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hans Verkuil Date: Fri, 6 May 2022 09:43:25 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0051/1091] media: cec-adap.c: fix is_configuring state [ Upstream commit 59267fc34f4900dcd2ec3295f6be04b79aee2186 ] If an adapter is trying to claim a free logical address then it is in the 'is_configuring' state. If during that process the cable is disconnected (HPD goes low, which in turn invalidates the physical address), then cec_adap_unconfigure() is called, and that set the is_configuring boolean to false, even though the thread that's trying to claim an LA is still running. Don't touch the is_configuring bool in cec_adap_unconfigure(), it will eventually be cleared by the thread. By making that change the cec_config_log_addr() function also had to change: it was aborting if is_configuring became false (since that is what cec_adap_unconfigure() did), but that no longer works. Instead check if the physical address is invalid. That is a much more appropriate check anyway. This fixes a bug where the the adapter could be disabled even though the device was still configuring. This could cause POLL transmits to time out. Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/media/cec/cec-adap.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/media/cec/cec-adap.c b/drivers/media/cec/cec-adap.c index 56857ac0a0be..c665f7d20c44 100644 --- a/drivers/media/cec/cec-adap.c +++ b/drivers/media/cec/cec-adap.c @@ -1263,7 +1263,7 @@ static int cec_config_log_addr(struct cec_adapter *adap, * While trying to poll the physical address was reset * and the adapter was unconfigured, so bail out. */ - if (!adap->is_configuring) + if (adap->phys_addr == CEC_PHYS_ADDR_INVALID) return -EINTR; if (err) @@ -1321,7 +1321,6 @@ static void cec_adap_unconfigure(struct cec_adapter *adap) adap->phys_addr != CEC_PHYS_ADDR_INVALID) WARN_ON(adap->ops->adap_log_addr(adap, CEC_LOG_ADDR_INVALID)); adap->log_addrs.log_addr_mask = 0; - adap->is_configuring = false; adap->is_configured = false; memset(adap->phys_addrs, 0xff, sizeof(adap->phys_addrs)); cec_flush(adap); @@ -1514,9 +1513,10 @@ unconfigure: for (i = 0; i < las->num_log_addrs; i++) las->log_addr[i] = CEC_LOG_ADDR_INVALID; cec_adap_unconfigure(adap); + adap->is_configuring = false; adap->kthread_config = NULL; - mutex_unlock(&adap->lock); complete(&adap->config_completion); + mutex_unlock(&adap->lock); return 0; } From 69edf28d2c42318df18ada9dcd4119901f269eee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Sat, 23 Apr 2022 21:11:41 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0052/1091] openrisc: start CPU timer early in boot [ Upstream commit 516dd4aacd67a0f27da94f3fe63fe0f4dbab6e2b ] In order to measure the boot process, the timer should be switched on as early in boot as possible. As well, the commit defines the get_cycles macro, like the previous patches in this series, so that generic code is aware that it's implemented by the platform, as is done on other archs. Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Arnd Bergmann Cc: Jonas Bonn Cc: Stefan Kristiansson Acked-by: Stafford Horne Reported-by: Guenter Roeck Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/openrisc/include/asm/timex.h | 1 + arch/openrisc/kernel/head.S | 9 +++++++++ 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/openrisc/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/openrisc/include/asm/timex.h index d52b4e536e3f..5487fa93dd9b 100644 --- a/arch/openrisc/include/asm/timex.h +++ b/arch/openrisc/include/asm/timex.h @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ static inline cycles_t get_cycles(void) { return mfspr(SPR_TTCR); } +#define get_cycles get_cycles /* This isn't really used any more */ #define CLOCK_TICK_RATE 1000 diff --git a/arch/openrisc/kernel/head.S b/arch/openrisc/kernel/head.S index b0dc974f9a74..ffbbf639b7f9 100644 --- a/arch/openrisc/kernel/head.S +++ b/arch/openrisc/kernel/head.S @@ -521,6 +521,15 @@ _start: l.ori r3,r0,0x1 l.mtspr r0,r3,SPR_SR + /* + * Start the TTCR as early as possible, so that the RNG can make use of + * measurements of boot time from the earliest opportunity. Especially + * important is that the TTCR does not return zero by the time we reach + * rand_initialize(). + */ + l.movhi r3,hi(SPR_TTMR_CR) + l.mtspr r0,r3,SPR_TTMR + CLEAR_GPR(r1) CLEAR_GPR(r2) CLEAR_GPR(r3) From f76729662650cd7bc8f8194e057af381370349a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Smith, Kyle Miller (Nimble Kernel)" Date: Fri, 22 Apr 2022 14:40:32 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0053/1091] nvme-pci: fix a NULL pointer dereference in nvme_alloc_admin_tags [ Upstream commit da42761181627e9bdc37d18368b827948a583929 ] In nvme_alloc_admin_tags, the admin_q can be set to an error (typically -ENOMEM) if the blk_mq_init_queue call fails to set up the queue, which is checked immediately after the call. However, when we return the error message up the stack, to nvme_reset_work the error takes us to nvme_remove_dead_ctrl() nvme_dev_disable() nvme_suspend_queue(&dev->queues[0]). Here, we only check that the admin_q is non-NULL, rather than not an error or NULL, and begin quiescing a queue that never existed, leading to bad / NULL pointer dereference. Signed-off-by: Kyle Smith Reviewed-by: Chaitanya Kulkarni Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/nvme/host/pci.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c b/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c index af516c35afe6..10fe7a7a2163 100644 --- a/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c @@ -1674,6 +1674,7 @@ static int nvme_alloc_admin_tags(struct nvme_dev *dev) dev->ctrl.admin_q = blk_mq_init_queue(&dev->admin_tagset); if (IS_ERR(dev->ctrl.admin_q)) { blk_mq_free_tag_set(&dev->admin_tagset); + dev->ctrl.admin_q = NULL; return -ENOMEM; } if (!blk_get_queue(dev->ctrl.admin_q)) { From abe7554da62cb489712a54de69ef5665c250e564 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lin Ma Date: Mon, 16 May 2022 17:20:35 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0054/1091] ASoC: rt5645: Fix errorenous cleanup order [ Upstream commit 2def44d3aec59e38d2701c568d65540783f90f2f ] There is a logic error when removing rt5645 device as the function rt5645_i2c_remove() first cancel the &rt5645->jack_detect_work and delete the &rt5645->btn_check_timer latter. However, since the timer handler rt5645_btn_check_callback() will re-queue the jack_detect_work, this cleanup order is buggy. That is, once the del_timer_sync in rt5645_i2c_remove is concurrently run with the rt5645_btn_check_callback, the canceled jack_detect_work will be rescheduled again, leading to possible use-after-free. This patch fix the issue by placing the del_timer_sync function before the cancel_delayed_work_sync. Signed-off-by: Lin Ma Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220516092035.28283-1-linma@zju.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- sound/soc/codecs/rt5645.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/rt5645.c b/sound/soc/codecs/rt5645.c index c83f7f5da96b..a66e93a3af74 100644 --- a/sound/soc/codecs/rt5645.c +++ b/sound/soc/codecs/rt5645.c @@ -4074,9 +4074,14 @@ static int rt5645_i2c_remove(struct i2c_client *i2c) if (i2c->irq) free_irq(i2c->irq, rt5645); + /* + * Since the rt5645_btn_check_callback() can queue jack_detect_work, + * the timer need to be delted first + */ + del_timer_sync(&rt5645->btn_check_timer); + cancel_delayed_work_sync(&rt5645->jack_detect_work); cancel_delayed_work_sync(&rt5645->rcclock_work); - del_timer_sync(&rt5645->btn_check_timer); regulator_bulk_disable(ARRAY_SIZE(rt5645->supplies), rt5645->supplies); From 9d1764b9266b7c10f40ed930a1fde86b8c331d5f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xie Yongji Date: Tue, 22 Mar 2022 16:06:39 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0055/1091] nbd: Fix hung on disconnect request if socket is closed before [ Upstream commit 491bf8f236fdeec698fa6744993f1ecf3fafd1a5 ] When userspace closes the socket before sending a disconnect request, the following I/O requests will be blocked in wait_for_reconnect() until dead timeout. This will cause the following disconnect request also hung on blk_mq_quiesce_queue(). That means we have no way to disconnect a nbd device if there are some I/O requests waiting for reconnecting until dead timeout. It's not expected. So let's wake up the thread waiting for reconnecting directly when a disconnect request is sent. Reported-by: Xu Jianhai Signed-off-by: Xie Yongji Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220322080639.142-1-xieyongji@bytedance.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/block/nbd.c | 13 +++++++++---- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/block/nbd.c b/drivers/block/nbd.c index 25e81b1a59a5..510e75435c43 100644 --- a/drivers/block/nbd.c +++ b/drivers/block/nbd.c @@ -865,11 +865,15 @@ static int wait_for_reconnect(struct nbd_device *nbd) struct nbd_config *config = nbd->config; if (!config->dead_conn_timeout) return 0; - if (test_bit(NBD_RT_DISCONNECTED, &config->runtime_flags)) + + if (!wait_event_timeout(config->conn_wait, + test_bit(NBD_RT_DISCONNECTED, + &config->runtime_flags) || + atomic_read(&config->live_connections) > 0, + config->dead_conn_timeout)) return 0; - return wait_event_timeout(config->conn_wait, - atomic_read(&config->live_connections) > 0, - config->dead_conn_timeout) > 0; + + return !test_bit(NBD_RT_DISCONNECTED, &config->runtime_flags); } static int nbd_handle_cmd(struct nbd_cmd *cmd, int index) @@ -2014,6 +2018,7 @@ static void nbd_disconnect_and_put(struct nbd_device *nbd) mutex_lock(&nbd->config_lock); nbd_disconnect(nbd); sock_shutdown(nbd); + wake_up(&nbd->config->conn_wait); /* * Make sure recv thread has finished, so it does not drop the last * config ref and try to destroy the workqueue from inside the work From 1e5fbfc2a6f384e3195446c14bbd3bc298eb88c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Fabio Estevam Date: Fri, 13 May 2022 08:46:12 -0300 Subject: [PATCH 0056/1091] net: phy: micrel: Allow probing without .driver_data [ Upstream commit f2ef6f7539c68c6bd6c32323d8845ee102b7c450 ] Currently, if the .probe element is present in the phy_driver structure and the .driver_data is not, a NULL pointer dereference happens. Allow passing .probe without .driver_data by inserting NULL checks for priv->type. Signed-off-by: Fabio Estevam Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220513114613.762810-1-festevam@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/phy/micrel.c | 11 ++++++----- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/phy/micrel.c b/drivers/net/phy/micrel.c index 18cc5e4280e8..721153dcfd15 100644 --- a/drivers/net/phy/micrel.c +++ b/drivers/net/phy/micrel.c @@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ static int kszphy_config_reset(struct phy_device *phydev) } } - if (priv->led_mode >= 0) + if (priv->type && priv->led_mode >= 0) kszphy_setup_led(phydev, priv->type->led_mode_reg, priv->led_mode); return 0; @@ -298,10 +298,10 @@ static int kszphy_config_init(struct phy_device *phydev) type = priv->type; - if (type->has_broadcast_disable) + if (type && type->has_broadcast_disable) kszphy_broadcast_disable(phydev); - if (type->has_nand_tree_disable) + if (type && type->has_nand_tree_disable) kszphy_nand_tree_disable(phydev); return kszphy_config_reset(phydev); @@ -939,7 +939,7 @@ static int kszphy_probe(struct phy_device *phydev) priv->type = type; - if (type->led_mode_reg) { + if (type && type->led_mode_reg) { ret = of_property_read_u32(np, "micrel,led-mode", &priv->led_mode); if (ret) @@ -960,7 +960,8 @@ static int kszphy_probe(struct phy_device *phydev) unsigned long rate = clk_get_rate(clk); bool rmii_ref_clk_sel_25_mhz; - priv->rmii_ref_clk_sel = type->has_rmii_ref_clk_sel; + if (type) + priv->rmii_ref_clk_sel = type->has_rmii_ref_clk_sel; rmii_ref_clk_sel_25_mhz = of_property_read_bool(np, "micrel,rmii-reference-clock-select-25-mhz"); From 3cf43978ffd10d1985bcdf5906434d4701302078 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kwanghoon Son Date: Wed, 27 Apr 2022 03:16:45 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0057/1091] media: exynos4-is: Fix compile warning [ Upstream commit e080f5c1f2b6d02c02ee5d674e0e392ccf63bbaf ] Declare static on function 'fimc_isp_video_device_unregister'. When VIDEO_EXYNOS4_ISP_DMA_CAPTURE=n, compiler warns about warning: no previous prototype for function [-Wmissing-prototypes] Reported-by: kernel test robot Signed-off-by: Kwanghoon Son Signed-off-by: Sakari Ailus Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/media/platform/exynos4-is/fimc-isp-video.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/media/platform/exynos4-is/fimc-isp-video.h b/drivers/media/platform/exynos4-is/fimc-isp-video.h index edcb3a5e3cb9..2dd4ddbc748a 100644 --- a/drivers/media/platform/exynos4-is/fimc-isp-video.h +++ b/drivers/media/platform/exynos4-is/fimc-isp-video.h @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ static inline int fimc_isp_video_device_register(struct fimc_isp *isp, return 0; } -void fimc_isp_video_device_unregister(struct fimc_isp *isp, +static inline void fimc_isp_video_device_unregister(struct fimc_isp *isp, enum v4l2_buf_type type) { } From a7a41dd4730303bc9579f11090e88371d72662a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pierre-Louis Bossart Date: Tue, 17 May 2022 12:26:46 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 0058/1091] ASoC: max98357a: remove dependency on GPIOLIB MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit 21ca3274333f5c1cbbf9d91e5b33f4f2463859b2 ] commit dcc2c012c7691 ("ASoC: Fix gpiolib dependencies") removed a series of unnecessary dependencies on GPIOLIB when the gpio was optional. A similar simplification seems valid for max98357a, so remove the dependency as well. This will avoid the following warning WARNING: unmet direct dependencies detected for SND_SOC_MAX98357A Depends on [n]: SOUND [=y] && !UML && SND [=y] && SND_SOC [=y] && GPIOLIB [=n] Selected by [y]: - SND_SOC_INTEL_SOF_CS42L42_MACH [=y] && SOUND [=y] && !UML && SND [=y] && SND_SOC [=y] && SND_SOC_INTEL_MACH [=y] && (SND_SOC_SOF_HDA_LINK [=y] || SND_SOC_SOF_BAYTRAIL [=n]) && I2C [=y] && ACPI [=y] && SND_HDA_CODEC_HDMI [=y] && SND_SOC_SOF_HDA_AUDIO_CODEC [=y] && (MFD_INTEL_LPSS [=y] || COMPILE_TEST [=n]) Reported-by: kernel test robot Signed-off-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart Reviewed-by: Péter Ujfalusi Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220517172647.468244-2-pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- sound/soc/codecs/Kconfig | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/Kconfig b/sound/soc/codecs/Kconfig index 466dc67799f4..dfc536cd9d2f 100644 --- a/sound/soc/codecs/Kconfig +++ b/sound/soc/codecs/Kconfig @@ -759,7 +759,6 @@ config SND_SOC_MAX98095 config SND_SOC_MAX98357A tristate "Maxim MAX98357A CODEC" - depends on GPIOLIB config SND_SOC_MAX98371 tristate From 1ec0bc72f5dab3ab367ae5230cf6f212d805a225 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Guenter Roeck Date: Wed, 11 May 2022 06:22:51 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0059/1091] hwmon: Make chip parameter for with_info API mandatory [ Upstream commit ddaefa209c4ac791c1262e97c9b2d0440c8ef1d5 ] Various attempts were made recently to "convert" the old hwmon_device_register() API to devm_hwmon_device_register_with_info() by just changing the function name without actually converting the driver. Prevent this from happening by making the 'chip' parameter of devm_hwmon_device_register_with_info() mandatory. Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- Documentation/hwmon/hwmon-kernel-api.rst | 2 +- drivers/hwmon/hwmon.c | 16 +++++++--------- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/hwmon/hwmon-kernel-api.rst b/Documentation/hwmon/hwmon-kernel-api.rst index c41eb6108103..23f27fe78e37 100644 --- a/Documentation/hwmon/hwmon-kernel-api.rst +++ b/Documentation/hwmon/hwmon-kernel-api.rst @@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ hwmon_device_register_with_info is the most comprehensive and preferred means to register a hardware monitoring device. It creates the standard sysfs attributes in the hardware monitoring core, letting the driver focus on reading from and writing to the chip instead of having to bother with sysfs attributes. -The parent device parameter cannot be NULL with non-NULL chip info. Its +The parent device parameter as well as the chip parameter must not be NULL. Its parameters are described in more detail below. devm_hwmon_device_register_with_info is similar to diff --git a/drivers/hwmon/hwmon.c b/drivers/hwmon/hwmon.c index a2175394cd25..c73b93b9bb87 100644 --- a/drivers/hwmon/hwmon.c +++ b/drivers/hwmon/hwmon.c @@ -715,11 +715,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hwmon_device_register_with_groups); /** * hwmon_device_register_with_info - register w/ hwmon - * @dev: the parent device - * @name: hwmon name attribute - * @drvdata: driver data to attach to created device - * @chip: pointer to hwmon chip information + * @dev: the parent device (mandatory) + * @name: hwmon name attribute (mandatory) + * @drvdata: driver data to attach to created device (optional) + * @chip: pointer to hwmon chip information (mandatory) * @extra_groups: pointer to list of additional non-standard attribute groups + * (optional) * * hwmon_device_unregister() must be called when the device is no * longer needed. @@ -732,13 +733,10 @@ hwmon_device_register_with_info(struct device *dev, const char *name, const struct hwmon_chip_info *chip, const struct attribute_group **extra_groups) { - if (!name) + if (!dev || !name || !chip) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); - if (chip && (!chip->ops || !chip->ops->is_visible || !chip->info)) - return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); - - if (chip && !dev) + if (!chip->ops || !chip->ops->is_visible || !chip->info) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); return __hwmon_device_register(dev, name, drvdata, chip, extra_groups); From 88d730463e9bf49dbd3fc96c4800ef5dc2a477f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Howells Date: Sat, 21 May 2022 08:45:41 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0060/1091] rxrpc: Return an error to sendmsg if call failed [ Upstream commit 4ba68c5192554876bd8c3afd904e3064d2915341 ] If at the end of rxrpc sendmsg() or rxrpc_kernel_send_data() the call that was being given data was aborted remotely or otherwise failed, return an error rather than returning the amount of data buffered for transmission. The call (presumably) did not complete, so there's not much point continuing with it. AF_RXRPC considers it "complete" and so will be unwilling to do anything else with it - and won't send a notification for it, deeming the return from sendmsg sufficient. Not returning an error causes afs to incorrectly handle a StoreData operation that gets interrupted by a change of address due to NAT reconfiguration. This doesn't normally affect most operations since their request parameters tend to fit into a single UDP packet and afs_make_call() returns before the server responds; StoreData is different as it involves transmission of a lot of data. This can be triggered on a client by doing something like: dd if=/dev/zero of=/afs/example.com/foo bs=1M count=512 at one prompt, and then changing the network address at another prompt, e.g.: ifconfig enp6s0 inet 192.168.6.2 && route add 192.168.6.1 dev enp6s0 Tracing packets on an Auristor fileserver looks something like: 192.168.6.1 -> 192.168.6.3 RX 107 ACK Idle Seq: 0 Call: 4 Source Port: 7000 Destination Port: 7001 192.168.6.3 -> 192.168.6.1 AFS (RX) 1482 FS Request: Unknown(64538) (64538) 192.168.6.3 -> 192.168.6.1 AFS (RX) 1482 FS Request: Unknown(64538) (64538) 192.168.6.1 -> 192.168.6.3 RX 107 ACK Idle Seq: 0 Call: 4 Source Port: 7000 Destination Port: 7001 192.168.6.2 -> 192.168.6.1 AFS (RX) 1482 FS Request: Unknown(0) (0) 192.168.6.2 -> 192.168.6.1 AFS (RX) 1482 FS Request: Unknown(0) (0) 192.168.6.1 -> 192.168.6.2 RX 107 ACK Exceeds Window Seq: 0 Call: 4 Source Port: 7000 Destination Port: 7001 192.168.6.1 -> 192.168.6.2 RX 74 ABORT Seq: 0 Call: 4 Source Port: 7000 Destination Port: 7001 192.168.6.1 -> 192.168.6.2 RX 74 ABORT Seq: 29321 Call: 4 Source Port: 7000 Destination Port: 7001 The Auristor fileserver logs code -453 (RXGEN_SS_UNMARSHAL), but the abort code received by kafs is -5 (RX_PROTOCOL_ERROR) as the rx layer sees the condition and generates an abort first and the unmarshal error is a consequence of that at the application layer. Reported-by: Marc Dionne Signed-off-by: David Howells cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org Link: http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/linux-afs/2021-December/004810.html # v1 Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c b/net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c index 1a340eb0abf7..22f020099214 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c @@ -463,6 +463,12 @@ static int rxrpc_send_data(struct rxrpc_sock *rx, success: ret = copied; + if (READ_ONCE(call->state) == RXRPC_CALL_COMPLETE) { + read_lock_bh(&call->state_lock); + if (call->error < 0) + ret = call->error; + read_unlock_bh(&call->state_lock); + } out: call->tx_pending = skb; _leave(" = %d", ret); From 063d945795a096432545c44a1197e2ae0e3c4b1d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jakub Kicinski Date: Fri, 20 May 2022 12:56:05 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0061/1091] eth: tg3: silence the GCC 12 array-bounds warning MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit 9dec850fd7c210a04b4707df8e6c95bfafdd6a4b ] GCC 12 currently generates a rather inconsistent warning: drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/tg3.c:17795:51: warning: array subscript 5 is above array bounds of ‘struct tg3_napi[5]’ [-Warray-bounds] 17795 | struct tg3_napi *tnapi = &tp->napi[i]; | ~~~~~~~~^~~ i is guaranteed < tp->irq_max which in turn is either 1 or 5. There are more loops like this one in the driver, but strangely GCC 12 dislikes only this single one. Silence this silliness for now. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/Makefile | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/Makefile b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/Makefile index 7046ad6d3d0e..ac50da49ca77 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/Makefile +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/Makefile @@ -16,3 +16,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_BGMAC_BCMA) += bgmac-bcma.o bgmac-bcma-mdio.o obj-$(CONFIG_BGMAC_PLATFORM) += bgmac-platform.o obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEMPORT) += bcmsysport.o obj-$(CONFIG_BNXT) += bnxt/ + +# FIXME: temporarily silence -Warray-bounds on non W=1+ builds +ifndef KBUILD_EXTRA_WARN +CFLAGS_tg3.o += -Wno-array-bounds +endif From 56fd9dcfe10c067a316aeb301b3debf9d45f3390 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yonghong Song Date: Mon, 23 May 2022 08:20:44 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0062/1091] selftests/bpf: fix btf_dump/btf_dump due to recent clang change [ Upstream commit 4050764cbaa25760aab40857f723393c07898474 ] Latest llvm-project upstream had a change of behavior related to qualifiers on function return type ([1]). This caused selftests btf_dump/btf_dump failure. The following example shows what changed. $ cat t.c typedef const char * const (* const (* const fn_ptr_arr2_t[5])())(char * (*)(int)); struct t { int a; fn_ptr_arr2_t l; }; int foo(struct t *arg) { return arg->a; } Compiled with latest upstream llvm15, $ clang -O2 -g -target bpf -S -emit-llvm t.c The related generated debuginfo IR looks like: !16 = !DIDerivedType(tag: DW_TAG_typedef, name: "fn_ptr_arr2_t", file: !1, line: 1, baseType: !17) !17 = !DICompositeType(tag: DW_TAG_array_type, baseType: !18, size: 320, elements: !32) !18 = !DIDerivedType(tag: DW_TAG_const_type, baseType: !19) !19 = !DIDerivedType(tag: DW_TAG_pointer_type, baseType: !20, size: 64) !20 = !DISubroutineType(types: !21) !21 = !{!22, null} !22 = !DIDerivedType(tag: DW_TAG_pointer_type, baseType: !23, size: 64) !23 = !DISubroutineType(types: !24) !24 = !{!25, !28} !25 = !DIDerivedType(tag: DW_TAG_pointer_type, baseType: !26, size: 64) !26 = !DIDerivedType(tag: DW_TAG_const_type, baseType: !27) !27 = !DIBasicType(name: "char", size: 8, encoding: DW_ATE_signed_char) You can see two intermediate const qualifier to pointer are dropped in debuginfo IR. With llvm14, we have following debuginfo IR: !16 = !DIDerivedType(tag: DW_TAG_typedef, name: "fn_ptr_arr2_t", file: !1, line: 1, baseType: !17) !17 = !DICompositeType(tag: DW_TAG_array_type, baseType: !18, size: 320, elements: !34) !18 = !DIDerivedType(tag: DW_TAG_const_type, baseType: !19) !19 = !DIDerivedType(tag: DW_TAG_pointer_type, baseType: !20, size: 64) !20 = !DISubroutineType(types: !21) !21 = !{!22, null} !22 = !DIDerivedType(tag: DW_TAG_const_type, baseType: !23) !23 = !DIDerivedType(tag: DW_TAG_pointer_type, baseType: !24, size: 64) !24 = !DISubroutineType(types: !25) !25 = !{!26, !30} !26 = !DIDerivedType(tag: DW_TAG_const_type, baseType: !27) !27 = !DIDerivedType(tag: DW_TAG_pointer_type, baseType: !28, size: 64) !28 = !DIDerivedType(tag: DW_TAG_const_type, baseType: !29) !29 = !DIBasicType(name: "char", size: 8, encoding: DW_ATE_signed_char) All const qualifiers are preserved. To adapt the selftest to both old and new llvm, this patch removed the intermediate const qualifier in const-to-ptr types, to make the test succeed again. [1] https://reviews.llvm.org/D125919 Reported-by: Mykola Lysenko Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220523152044.3905809-1-yhs@fb.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/btf_dump_test_case_syntax.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/btf_dump_test_case_syntax.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/btf_dump_test_case_syntax.c index d4a02fe44a12..0620580a5c16 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/btf_dump_test_case_syntax.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/btf_dump_test_case_syntax.c @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ typedef void (* (*signal_t)(int, void (*)(int)))(int); typedef char * (*fn_ptr_arr1_t[10])(int **); -typedef char * (* const (* const fn_ptr_arr2_t[5])())(char * (*)(int)); +typedef char * (* (* const fn_ptr_arr2_t[5])())(char * (*)(int)); struct struct_w_typedefs { int_t a; From 58e55f4f5a2ade73c5090fb570fc56c11ab866a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Niels Dossche Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2022 20:51:44 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0063/1091] IB/rdmavt: add missing locks in rvt_ruc_loopback [ Upstream commit 22cbc6c2681a0a4fe76150270426e763d52353a4 ] The documentation of the function rvt_error_qp says both r_lock and s_lock need to be held when calling that function. It also asserts using lockdep that both of those locks are held. rvt_error_qp is called form rvt_send_cq, which is called from rvt_qp_complete_swqe, which is called from rvt_send_complete, which is called from rvt_ruc_loopback in two places. Both of these places do not hold r_lock. Fix this by acquiring a spin_lock of r_lock in both of these places. The r_lock acquiring cannot be added in rvt_qp_complete_swqe because some of its other callers already have r_lock acquired. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220228195144.71946-1-dossche.niels@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Niels Dossche Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/infiniband/sw/rdmavt/qp.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rdmavt/qp.c b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rdmavt/qp.c index 48e8612c1bc8..e97c13967174 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rdmavt/qp.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rdmavt/qp.c @@ -2812,7 +2812,7 @@ void rvt_qp_iter(struct rvt_dev_info *rdi, EXPORT_SYMBOL(rvt_qp_iter); /* - * This should be called with s_lock held. + * This should be called with s_lock and r_lock held. */ void rvt_send_complete(struct rvt_qp *qp, struct rvt_swqe *wqe, enum ib_wc_status status) @@ -3171,7 +3171,9 @@ send_comp: rvp->n_loop_pkts++; flush_send: sqp->s_rnr_retry = sqp->s_rnr_retry_cnt; + spin_lock(&sqp->r_lock); rvt_send_complete(sqp, wqe, send_status); + spin_unlock(&sqp->r_lock); if (local_ops) { atomic_dec(&sqp->local_ops_pending); local_ops = 0; @@ -3225,7 +3227,9 @@ serr: spin_unlock_irqrestore(&qp->r_lock, flags); serr_no_r_lock: spin_lock_irqsave(&sqp->s_lock, flags); + spin_lock(&sqp->r_lock); rvt_send_complete(sqp, wqe, send_status); + spin_unlock(&sqp->r_lock); if (sqp->ibqp.qp_type == IB_QPT_RC) { int lastwqe; From 1995a60be7cb73164b1425c51746e6612d64e377 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Krzysztof Kozlowski Date: Thu, 7 Apr 2022 21:29:59 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0064/1091] ARM: dts: ox820: align interrupt controller node name with dtschema [ Upstream commit fbcd5ad7a419ad40644a0bb8b4152bc660172d8a ] Fixes dtbs_check warnings like: gic@1000: $nodename:0: 'gic@1000' does not match '^interrupt-controller(@[0-9a-f,]+)*$' Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski Acked-by: Neil Armstrong Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220317115705.450427-1-krzysztof.kozlowski@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/arm/boot/dts/ox820.dtsi | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/ox820.dtsi b/arch/arm/boot/dts/ox820.dtsi index 90846a7655b4..dde4364892bf 100644 --- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/ox820.dtsi +++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/ox820.dtsi @@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ clocks = <&armclk>; }; - gic: gic@1000 { + gic: interrupt-controller@1000 { compatible = "arm,arm11mp-gic"; interrupt-controller; #interrupt-cells = <3>; From a0180e324a9a63de8f770da300477b48cb4a53f1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Brian Norris Date: Tue, 8 Mar 2022 11:08:59 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 0065/1091] PM / devfreq: rk3399_dmc: Disable edev on remove() [ Upstream commit 2fccf9e6050e0e3b8b4cd275d41daf7f7fa22804 ] Otherwise we hit an unablanced enable-count when unbinding the DFI device: [ 1279.659119] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 1279.659179] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 5638 at drivers/devfreq/devfreq-event.c:360 devfreq_event_remove_edev+0x84/0x8c ... [ 1279.659352] Hardware name: Google Kevin (DT) [ 1279.659363] pstate: 80400005 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--) [ 1279.659371] pc : devfreq_event_remove_edev+0x84/0x8c [ 1279.659380] lr : devm_devfreq_event_release+0x1c/0x28 ... [ 1279.659571] Call trace: [ 1279.659582] devfreq_event_remove_edev+0x84/0x8c [ 1279.659590] devm_devfreq_event_release+0x1c/0x28 [ 1279.659602] release_nodes+0x1cc/0x244 [ 1279.659611] devres_release_all+0x44/0x60 [ 1279.659621] device_release_driver_internal+0x11c/0x1ac [ 1279.659629] device_driver_detach+0x20/0x2c [ 1279.659641] unbind_store+0x7c/0xb0 [ 1279.659650] drv_attr_store+0x2c/0x40 [ 1279.659663] sysfs_kf_write+0x44/0x58 [ 1279.659672] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0xf4/0x190 [ 1279.659684] vfs_write+0x2b0/0x2e4 [ 1279.659693] ksys_write+0x80/0xec [ 1279.659701] __arm64_sys_write+0x24/0x30 [ 1279.659714] el0_svc_common+0xf0/0x1d8 [ 1279.659724] do_el0_svc_compat+0x28/0x3c [ 1279.659738] el0_svc_compat+0x10/0x1c [ 1279.659746] el0_sync_compat_handler+0xa8/0xcc [ 1279.659758] el0_sync_compat+0x188/0x1c0 [ 1279.659768] ---[ end trace cec200e5094155b4 ]--- Signed-off-by: Brian Norris Signed-off-by: Chanwoo Choi Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/devfreq/rk3399_dmc.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/devfreq/rk3399_dmc.c b/drivers/devfreq/rk3399_dmc.c index 027769e39f9b..a491dcfa1dd0 100644 --- a/drivers/devfreq/rk3399_dmc.c +++ b/drivers/devfreq/rk3399_dmc.c @@ -485,6 +485,8 @@ static int rk3399_dmcfreq_remove(struct platform_device *pdev) { struct rk3399_dmcfreq *dmcfreq = dev_get_drvdata(&pdev->dev); + devfreq_event_disable_edev(dmcfreq->edev); + /* * Before remove the opp table we need to unregister the opp notifier. */ From e54fd01178ebd5b13ef9e2fc0f3006765f37ee3c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zixuan Fu Date: Mon, 11 Apr 2022 18:45:34 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0066/1091] fs: jfs: fix possible NULL pointer dereference in dbFree() [ Upstream commit 0d4837fdb796f99369cf7691d33de1b856bcaf1f ] In our fault-injection testing, the variable "nblocks" in dbFree() can be zero when kmalloc_array() fails in dtSearch(). In this case, the variable "mp" in dbFree() would be NULL and then it is dereferenced in "write_metapage(mp)". The failure log is listed as follows: [ 13.824137] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000020 ... [ 13.827416] RIP: 0010:dbFree+0x5f7/0x910 [jfs] [ 13.834341] Call Trace: [ 13.834540] [ 13.834713] txFreeMap+0x7b4/0xb10 [jfs] [ 13.835038] txUpdateMap+0x311/0x650 [jfs] [ 13.835375] jfs_lazycommit+0x5f2/0xc70 [jfs] [ 13.835726] ? sched_dynamic_update+0x1b0/0x1b0 [ 13.836092] kthread+0x3c2/0x4a0 [ 13.836355] ? txLockFree+0x160/0x160 [jfs] [ 13.836763] ? kthread_unuse_mm+0x160/0x160 [ 13.837106] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 13.837402] ... This patch adds a NULL check of "mp" before "write_metapage(mp)" is called. Reported-by: TOTE Robot Signed-off-by: Zixuan Fu Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c b/fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c index 79f3440e204b..d3cb27487c70 100644 --- a/fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c +++ b/fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c @@ -385,7 +385,8 @@ int dbFree(struct inode *ip, s64 blkno, s64 nblocks) } /* write the last buffer. */ - write_metapage(mp); + if (mp) + write_metapage(mp); IREAD_UNLOCK(ipbmap); From 41c7096286aada3ec29abd18a6c6f880e23e5947 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Janusz Krzysztofik Date: Sun, 10 Apr 2022 15:07:54 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0067/1091] ARM: OMAP1: clock: Fix UART rate reporting algorithm [ Upstream commit 338d5d476cde853dfd97378d20496baabc2ce3c0 ] Since its introduction to the mainline kernel, omap1_uart_recalc() helper makes incorrect use of clk->enable_bit as a ready to use bitmap mask while it only provides the bit number. Fix it. Signed-off-by: Janusz Krzysztofik Acked-by: Tony Lindgren Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/arm/mach-omap1/clock.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-omap1/clock.c b/arch/arm/mach-omap1/clock.c index bd5be82101f3..d89bda12bf3c 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mach-omap1/clock.c +++ b/arch/arm/mach-omap1/clock.c @@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(clockfw_lock); unsigned long omap1_uart_recalc(struct clk *clk) { unsigned int val = __raw_readl(clk->enable_reg); - return val & clk->enable_bit ? 48000000 : 12000000; + return val & 1 << clk->enable_bit ? 48000000 : 12000000; } unsigned long omap1_sossi_recalc(struct clk *clk) From 60ce637c194b4def437b80396cf4f5baaabf0ca7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hari Bathini Date: Wed, 21 Apr 2021 23:20:52 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 0068/1091] powerpc/fadump: Fix fadump to work with a different endian capture kernel [ Upstream commit b74196af372f7cb4902179009265fe63ac81824f ] Dump capture would fail if capture kernel is not of the endianess as the production kernel, because the in-memory data structure (struct opal_fadump_mem_struct) shared across production kernel and capture kernel assumes the same endianess for both the kernels, which doesn't have to be true always. Fix it by having a well-defined endianess for struct opal_fadump_mem_struct. Signed-off-by: Hari Bathini Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161902744901.86147.14719228311655123526.stgit@hbathini Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-fadump.c | 94 +++++++++++--------- arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-fadump.h | 10 +-- 2 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-fadump.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-fadump.c index d361d37d975f..f5cea068f0bd 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-fadump.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-fadump.c @@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ void __init opal_fadump_dt_scan(struct fw_dump *fadump_conf, u64 node) addr = be64_to_cpu(addr); pr_debug("Kernel metadata addr: %llx\n", addr); opal_fdm_active = (void *)addr; - if (opal_fdm_active->registered_regions == 0) + if (be16_to_cpu(opal_fdm_active->registered_regions) == 0) return; ret = opal_mpipl_query_tag(OPAL_MPIPL_TAG_BOOT_MEM, &addr); @@ -95,17 +95,17 @@ static int opal_fadump_unregister(struct fw_dump *fadump_conf); static void opal_fadump_update_config(struct fw_dump *fadump_conf, const struct opal_fadump_mem_struct *fdm) { - pr_debug("Boot memory regions count: %d\n", fdm->region_cnt); + pr_debug("Boot memory regions count: %d\n", be16_to_cpu(fdm->region_cnt)); /* * The destination address of the first boot memory region is the * destination address of boot memory regions. */ - fadump_conf->boot_mem_dest_addr = fdm->rgn[0].dest; + fadump_conf->boot_mem_dest_addr = be64_to_cpu(fdm->rgn[0].dest); pr_debug("Destination address of boot memory regions: %#016llx\n", fadump_conf->boot_mem_dest_addr); - fadump_conf->fadumphdr_addr = fdm->fadumphdr_addr; + fadump_conf->fadumphdr_addr = be64_to_cpu(fdm->fadumphdr_addr); } /* @@ -126,9 +126,9 @@ static void opal_fadump_get_config(struct fw_dump *fadump_conf, fadump_conf->boot_memory_size = 0; pr_debug("Boot memory regions:\n"); - for (i = 0; i < fdm->region_cnt; i++) { - base = fdm->rgn[i].src; - size = fdm->rgn[i].size; + for (i = 0; i < be16_to_cpu(fdm->region_cnt); i++) { + base = be64_to_cpu(fdm->rgn[i].src); + size = be64_to_cpu(fdm->rgn[i].size); pr_debug("\t[%03d] base: 0x%lx, size: 0x%lx\n", i, base, size); fadump_conf->boot_mem_addr[i] = base; @@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ static void opal_fadump_get_config(struct fw_dump *fadump_conf, * Start address of reserve dump area (permanent reservation) for * re-registering FADump after dump capture. */ - fadump_conf->reserve_dump_area_start = fdm->rgn[0].dest; + fadump_conf->reserve_dump_area_start = be64_to_cpu(fdm->rgn[0].dest); /* * Rarely, but it can so happen that system crashes before all @@ -155,13 +155,14 @@ static void opal_fadump_get_config(struct fw_dump *fadump_conf, * Hope the memory that could not be preserved only has pages * that are usually filtered out while saving the vmcore. */ - if (fdm->region_cnt > fdm->registered_regions) { + if (be16_to_cpu(fdm->region_cnt) > be16_to_cpu(fdm->registered_regions)) { pr_warn("Not all memory regions were saved!!!\n"); pr_warn(" Unsaved memory regions:\n"); - i = fdm->registered_regions; - while (i < fdm->region_cnt) { + i = be16_to_cpu(fdm->registered_regions); + while (i < be16_to_cpu(fdm->region_cnt)) { pr_warn("\t[%03d] base: 0x%llx, size: 0x%llx\n", - i, fdm->rgn[i].src, fdm->rgn[i].size); + i, be64_to_cpu(fdm->rgn[i].src), + be64_to_cpu(fdm->rgn[i].size)); i++; } @@ -170,7 +171,7 @@ static void opal_fadump_get_config(struct fw_dump *fadump_conf, } fadump_conf->boot_mem_top = (fadump_conf->boot_memory_size + hole_size); - fadump_conf->boot_mem_regs_cnt = fdm->region_cnt; + fadump_conf->boot_mem_regs_cnt = be16_to_cpu(fdm->region_cnt); opal_fadump_update_config(fadump_conf, fdm); } @@ -178,35 +179,38 @@ static void opal_fadump_get_config(struct fw_dump *fadump_conf, static void opal_fadump_init_metadata(struct opal_fadump_mem_struct *fdm) { fdm->version = OPAL_FADUMP_VERSION; - fdm->region_cnt = 0; - fdm->registered_regions = 0; - fdm->fadumphdr_addr = 0; + fdm->region_cnt = cpu_to_be16(0); + fdm->registered_regions = cpu_to_be16(0); + fdm->fadumphdr_addr = cpu_to_be64(0); } static u64 opal_fadump_init_mem_struct(struct fw_dump *fadump_conf) { u64 addr = fadump_conf->reserve_dump_area_start; + u16 reg_cnt; int i; opal_fdm = __va(fadump_conf->kernel_metadata); opal_fadump_init_metadata(opal_fdm); /* Boot memory regions */ + reg_cnt = be16_to_cpu(opal_fdm->region_cnt); for (i = 0; i < fadump_conf->boot_mem_regs_cnt; i++) { - opal_fdm->rgn[i].src = fadump_conf->boot_mem_addr[i]; - opal_fdm->rgn[i].dest = addr; - opal_fdm->rgn[i].size = fadump_conf->boot_mem_sz[i]; + opal_fdm->rgn[i].src = cpu_to_be64(fadump_conf->boot_mem_addr[i]); + opal_fdm->rgn[i].dest = cpu_to_be64(addr); + opal_fdm->rgn[i].size = cpu_to_be64(fadump_conf->boot_mem_sz[i]); - opal_fdm->region_cnt++; + reg_cnt++; addr += fadump_conf->boot_mem_sz[i]; } + opal_fdm->region_cnt = cpu_to_be16(reg_cnt); /* * Kernel metadata is passed to f/w and retrieved in capture kerenl. * So, use it to save fadump header address instead of calculating it. */ - opal_fdm->fadumphdr_addr = (opal_fdm->rgn[0].dest + - fadump_conf->boot_memory_size); + opal_fdm->fadumphdr_addr = cpu_to_be64(be64_to_cpu(opal_fdm->rgn[0].dest) + + fadump_conf->boot_memory_size); opal_fadump_update_config(fadump_conf, opal_fdm); @@ -269,18 +273,21 @@ static u64 opal_fadump_get_bootmem_min(void) static int opal_fadump_register(struct fw_dump *fadump_conf) { s64 rc = OPAL_PARAMETER; + u16 registered_regs; int i, err = -EIO; - for (i = 0; i < opal_fdm->region_cnt; i++) { + registered_regs = be16_to_cpu(opal_fdm->registered_regions); + for (i = 0; i < be16_to_cpu(opal_fdm->region_cnt); i++) { rc = opal_mpipl_update(OPAL_MPIPL_ADD_RANGE, - opal_fdm->rgn[i].src, - opal_fdm->rgn[i].dest, - opal_fdm->rgn[i].size); + be64_to_cpu(opal_fdm->rgn[i].src), + be64_to_cpu(opal_fdm->rgn[i].dest), + be64_to_cpu(opal_fdm->rgn[i].size)); if (rc != OPAL_SUCCESS) break; - opal_fdm->registered_regions++; + registered_regs++; } + opal_fdm->registered_regions = cpu_to_be16(registered_regs); switch (rc) { case OPAL_SUCCESS: @@ -291,7 +298,8 @@ static int opal_fadump_register(struct fw_dump *fadump_conf) case OPAL_RESOURCE: /* If MAX regions limit in f/w is hit, warn and proceed. */ pr_warn("%d regions could not be registered for MPIPL as MAX limit is reached!\n", - (opal_fdm->region_cnt - opal_fdm->registered_regions)); + (be16_to_cpu(opal_fdm->region_cnt) - + be16_to_cpu(opal_fdm->registered_regions))); fadump_conf->dump_registered = 1; err = 0; break; @@ -312,7 +320,7 @@ static int opal_fadump_register(struct fw_dump *fadump_conf) * If some regions were registered before OPAL_MPIPL_ADD_RANGE * OPAL call failed, unregister all regions. */ - if ((err < 0) && (opal_fdm->registered_regions > 0)) + if ((err < 0) && (be16_to_cpu(opal_fdm->registered_regions) > 0)) opal_fadump_unregister(fadump_conf); return err; @@ -328,7 +336,7 @@ static int opal_fadump_unregister(struct fw_dump *fadump_conf) return -EIO; } - opal_fdm->registered_regions = 0; + opal_fdm->registered_regions = cpu_to_be16(0); fadump_conf->dump_registered = 0; return 0; } @@ -563,19 +571,20 @@ static void opal_fadump_region_show(struct fw_dump *fadump_conf, else fdm_ptr = opal_fdm; - for (i = 0; i < fdm_ptr->region_cnt; i++) { + for (i = 0; i < be16_to_cpu(fdm_ptr->region_cnt); i++) { /* * Only regions that are registered for MPIPL * would have dump data. */ if ((fadump_conf->dump_active) && - (i < fdm_ptr->registered_regions)) - dumped_bytes = fdm_ptr->rgn[i].size; + (i < be16_to_cpu(fdm_ptr->registered_regions))) + dumped_bytes = be64_to_cpu(fdm_ptr->rgn[i].size); seq_printf(m, "DUMP: Src: %#016llx, Dest: %#016llx, ", - fdm_ptr->rgn[i].src, fdm_ptr->rgn[i].dest); + be64_to_cpu(fdm_ptr->rgn[i].src), + be64_to_cpu(fdm_ptr->rgn[i].dest)); seq_printf(m, "Size: %#llx, Dumped: %#llx bytes\n", - fdm_ptr->rgn[i].size, dumped_bytes); + be64_to_cpu(fdm_ptr->rgn[i].size), dumped_bytes); } /* Dump is active. Show reserved area start address. */ @@ -624,6 +633,7 @@ void __init opal_fadump_dt_scan(struct fw_dump *fadump_conf, u64 node) { const __be32 *prop; unsigned long dn; + __be64 be_addr; u64 addr = 0; int i, len; s64 ret; @@ -680,13 +690,13 @@ void __init opal_fadump_dt_scan(struct fw_dump *fadump_conf, u64 node) if (!prop) return; - ret = opal_mpipl_query_tag(OPAL_MPIPL_TAG_KERNEL, &addr); - if ((ret != OPAL_SUCCESS) || !addr) { + ret = opal_mpipl_query_tag(OPAL_MPIPL_TAG_KERNEL, &be_addr); + if ((ret != OPAL_SUCCESS) || !be_addr) { pr_err("Failed to get Kernel metadata (%lld)\n", ret); return; } - addr = be64_to_cpu(addr); + addr = be64_to_cpu(be_addr); pr_debug("Kernel metadata addr: %llx\n", addr); opal_fdm_active = __va(addr); @@ -697,14 +707,14 @@ void __init opal_fadump_dt_scan(struct fw_dump *fadump_conf, u64 node) } /* Kernel regions not registered with f/w for MPIPL */ - if (opal_fdm_active->registered_regions == 0) { + if (be16_to_cpu(opal_fdm_active->registered_regions) == 0) { opal_fdm_active = NULL; return; } - ret = opal_mpipl_query_tag(OPAL_MPIPL_TAG_CPU, &addr); - if (addr) { - addr = be64_to_cpu(addr); + ret = opal_mpipl_query_tag(OPAL_MPIPL_TAG_CPU, &be_addr); + if (be_addr) { + addr = be64_to_cpu(be_addr); pr_debug("CPU metadata addr: %llx\n", addr); opal_cpu_metadata = __va(addr); } diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-fadump.h b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-fadump.h index f1e9ecf548c5..3f715efb0aa6 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-fadump.h +++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-fadump.h @@ -31,14 +31,14 @@ * OPAL FADump kernel metadata * * The address of this structure will be registered with f/w for retrieving - * and processing during crash dump. + * in the capture kernel to process the crash dump. */ struct opal_fadump_mem_struct { u8 version; u8 reserved[3]; - u16 region_cnt; /* number of regions */ - u16 registered_regions; /* Regions registered for MPIPL */ - u64 fadumphdr_addr; + __be16 region_cnt; /* number of regions */ + __be16 registered_regions; /* Regions registered for MPIPL */ + __be64 fadumphdr_addr; struct opal_mpipl_region rgn[FADUMP_MAX_MEM_REGS]; } __packed; @@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ static inline void opal_fadump_read_regs(char *bufp, unsigned int regs_cnt, for (i = 0; i < regs_cnt; i++, bufp += reg_entry_size) { reg_entry = (struct hdat_fadump_reg_entry *)bufp; val = (cpu_endian ? be64_to_cpu(reg_entry->reg_val) : - reg_entry->reg_val); + (u64)(reg_entry->reg_val)); opal_fadump_set_regval_regnum(regs, be32_to_cpu(reg_entry->reg_type), be32_to_cpu(reg_entry->reg_num), From fd48cf8f972f38b79b1b6c26ae9236b2e9cde160 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: OGAWA Hirofumi Date: Fri, 29 Apr 2022 14:38:02 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0069/1091] fat: add ratelimit to fat*_ent_bread() [ Upstream commit 183c3237c928109d2008c0456dff508baf692b20 ] fat*_ent_bread() can be the cause of too many report on I/O error path. So use fat_msg_ratelimit() instead. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87bkxogfeq.fsf@mail.parknet.co.jp Signed-off-by: OGAWA Hirofumi Reported-by: qianfan Tested-by: qianfan Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/fat/fatent.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/fat/fatent.c b/fs/fat/fatent.c index 3647c65a0f48..0191eb1dc7f6 100644 --- a/fs/fat/fatent.c +++ b/fs/fat/fatent.c @@ -93,7 +93,8 @@ static int fat12_ent_bread(struct super_block *sb, struct fat_entry *fatent, err_brelse: brelse(bhs[0]); err: - fat_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "FAT read failed (blocknr %llu)", (llu)blocknr); + fat_msg_ratelimit(sb, KERN_ERR, "FAT read failed (blocknr %llu)", + (llu)blocknr); return -EIO; } @@ -106,8 +107,8 @@ static int fat_ent_bread(struct super_block *sb, struct fat_entry *fatent, fatent->fat_inode = MSDOS_SB(sb)->fat_inode; fatent->bhs[0] = sb_bread(sb, blocknr); if (!fatent->bhs[0]) { - fat_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "FAT read failed (blocknr %llu)", - (llu)blocknr); + fat_msg_ratelimit(sb, KERN_ERR, "FAT read failed (blocknr %llu)", + (llu)blocknr); return -EIO; } fatent->nr_bhs = 1; From fcd1999ba97445a12cc394f5f42ffd9116bf0185 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peng Wu Date: Fri, 29 Apr 2022 01:03:56 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0070/1091] ARM: versatile: Add missing of_node_put in dcscb_init [ Upstream commit 23b44f9c649bbef10b45fa33080cd8b4166800ae ] The device_node pointer is returned by of_find_compatible_node with refcount incremented. We should use of_node_put() to avoid the refcount leak. Signed-off-by: Peng Wu Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220428230356.69418-1-linus.walleij@linaro.org' Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/arm/mach-vexpress/dcscb.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-vexpress/dcscb.c b/arch/arm/mach-vexpress/dcscb.c index 46a903c88c6a..f553cde614f9 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mach-vexpress/dcscb.c +++ b/arch/arm/mach-vexpress/dcscb.c @@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ static int __init dcscb_init(void) if (!node) return -ENODEV; dcscb_base = of_iomap(node, 0); + of_node_put(node); if (!dcscb_base) return -EADDRNOTAVAIL; cfg = readl_relaxed(dcscb_base + DCS_CFG_R); From 2f46a955b6f524153575a67523192455291e5b4a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Krzysztof Kozlowski Date: Tue, 26 Apr 2022 20:34:43 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0071/1091] ARM: dts: exynos: add atmel,24c128 fallback to Samsung EEPROM [ Upstream commit f038e8186fbc5723d7d38c6fa1d342945107347e ] The Samsung s524ad0xd1 EEPROM should use atmel,24c128 fallback, according to the AT24 EEPROM bindings. Reported-by: Rob Herring Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220426183443.243113-1-krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos5250-smdk5250.dts | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos5250-smdk5250.dts b/arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos5250-smdk5250.dts index fa5dd992e327..c7e350ea03fe 100644 --- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos5250-smdk5250.dts +++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos5250-smdk5250.dts @@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ samsung,i2c-max-bus-freq = <20000>; eeprom@50 { - compatible = "samsung,s524ad0xd1"; + compatible = "samsung,s524ad0xd1", "atmel,24c128"; reg = <0x50>; }; @@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ samsung,i2c-max-bus-freq = <20000>; eeprom@51 { - compatible = "samsung,s524ad0xd1"; + compatible = "samsung,s524ad0xd1", "atmel,24c128"; reg = <0x51>; }; From e109058165137ef42841abd989f080adfefa14fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peng Wu Date: Thu, 28 Apr 2022 10:43:06 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0072/1091] ARM: hisi: Add missing of_node_put after of_find_compatible_node [ Upstream commit 9bc72e47d4630d58a840a66a869c56b29554cfe4 ] of_find_compatible_node will increment the refcount of the returned device_node. Calling of_node_put() to avoid the refcount leak Signed-off-by: Peng Wu Signed-off-by: Wei Xu Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/arm/mach-hisi/platsmp.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-hisi/platsmp.c b/arch/arm/mach-hisi/platsmp.c index da7a09c1dae5..1cd1d9b0aabf 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mach-hisi/platsmp.c +++ b/arch/arm/mach-hisi/platsmp.c @@ -67,14 +67,17 @@ static void __init hi3xxx_smp_prepare_cpus(unsigned int max_cpus) } ctrl_base = of_iomap(np, 0); if (!ctrl_base) { + of_node_put(np); pr_err("failed to map address\n"); return; } if (of_property_read_u32(np, "smp-offset", &offset) < 0) { + of_node_put(np); pr_err("failed to find smp-offset property\n"); return; } ctrl_base += offset; + of_node_put(np); } } @@ -160,6 +163,7 @@ static int hip01_boot_secondary(unsigned int cpu, struct task_struct *idle) if (WARN_ON(!node)) return -1; ctrl_base = of_iomap(node, 0); + of_node_put(node); /* set the secondary core boot from DDR */ remap_reg_value = readl_relaxed(ctrl_base + REG_SC_CTRL); From c9a81f9ed6ae3554621d6a50220b1bc74b67d81e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yicong Yang Date: Mon, 4 Apr 2022 14:25:39 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0073/1091] PCI: Avoid pci_dev_lock() AB/BA deadlock with sriov_numvfs_store() [ Upstream commit a91ee0e9fca9d7501286cfbced9b30a33e52740a ] The sysfs sriov_numvfs_store() path acquires the device lock before the config space access lock: sriov_numvfs_store device_lock # A (1) acquire device lock sriov_configure vfio_pci_sriov_configure # (for example) vfio_pci_core_sriov_configure pci_disable_sriov sriov_disable pci_cfg_access_lock pci_wait_cfg # B (4) wait for dev->block_cfg_access == 0 Previously, pci_dev_lock() acquired the config space access lock before the device lock: pci_dev_lock pci_cfg_access_lock dev->block_cfg_access = 1 # B (2) set dev->block_cfg_access = 1 device_lock # A (3) wait for device lock Any path that uses pci_dev_lock(), e.g., pci_reset_function(), may deadlock with sriov_numvfs_store() if the operations occur in the sequence (1) (2) (3) (4). Avoid the deadlock by reversing the order in pci_dev_lock() so it acquires the device lock before the config space access lock, the same as the sriov_numvfs_store() path. [bhelgaas: combined and adapted commit log from Jay Zhou's independent subsequent posting: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220404062539.1710-1-jianjay.zhou@huawei.com] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-pci/1583489997-17156-1-git-send-email-yangyicong@hisilicon.com/ Also-posted-by: Jay Zhou Signed-off-by: Yicong Yang Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/pci/pci.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci.c b/drivers/pci/pci.c index d539eb379743..c988aa425ac9 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/pci.c +++ b/drivers/pci/pci.c @@ -4915,18 +4915,18 @@ static int pci_dev_reset_slot_function(struct pci_dev *dev, int probe) static void pci_dev_lock(struct pci_dev *dev) { - pci_cfg_access_lock(dev); /* block PM suspend, driver probe, etc. */ device_lock(&dev->dev); + pci_cfg_access_lock(dev); } /* Return 1 on successful lock, 0 on contention */ static int pci_dev_trylock(struct pci_dev *dev) { - if (pci_cfg_access_trylock(dev)) { - if (device_trylock(&dev->dev)) + if (device_trylock(&dev->dev)) { + if (pci_cfg_access_trylock(dev)) return 1; - pci_cfg_access_unlock(dev); + device_unlock(&dev->dev); } return 0; @@ -4934,8 +4934,8 @@ static int pci_dev_trylock(struct pci_dev *dev) static void pci_dev_unlock(struct pci_dev *dev) { - device_unlock(&dev->dev); pci_cfg_access_unlock(dev); + device_unlock(&dev->dev); } static void pci_dev_save_and_disable(struct pci_dev *dev) From a910e9613130845f5f6fa912b5df0308b4183cbf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vasily Averin Date: Wed, 11 May 2022 12:46:53 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 0074/1091] tracing: incorrect isolate_mote_t cast in mm_vmscan_lru_isolate [ Upstream commit 2b132903de7124dd9a758be0c27562e91a510848 ] Fixes following sparse warnings: CHECK mm/vmscan.c mm/vmscan.c: note: in included file (through include/trace/trace_events.h, include/trace/define_trace.h, include/trace/events/vmscan.h): ./include/trace/events/vmscan.h:281:1: sparse: warning: cast to restricted isolate_mode_t ./include/trace/events/vmscan.h:281:1: sparse: warning: restricted isolate_mode_t degrades to integer Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/e85d7ff2-fd10-53f8-c24e-ba0458439c1b@openvz.org Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- include/trace/events/vmscan.h | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/trace/events/vmscan.h b/include/trace/events/vmscan.h index a5ab2973e8dc..57184c02e3b9 100644 --- a/include/trace/events/vmscan.h +++ b/include/trace/events/vmscan.h @@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(mm_vmscan_lru_isolate, __field(unsigned long, nr_scanned) __field(unsigned long, nr_skipped) __field(unsigned long, nr_taken) - __field(isolate_mode_t, isolate_mode) + __field(unsigned int, isolate_mode) __field(int, lru) ), @@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(mm_vmscan_lru_isolate, __entry->nr_scanned = nr_scanned; __entry->nr_skipped = nr_skipped; __entry->nr_taken = nr_taken; - __entry->isolate_mode = isolate_mode; + __entry->isolate_mode = (__force unsigned int)isolate_mode; __entry->lru = lru; ), From 537a317e5ff45d1f5a0ecaf6a0d7c8043c878cb1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lv Ruyi Date: Sat, 2 Apr 2022 01:34:19 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0075/1091] powerpc/xics: fix refcount leak in icp_opal_init() [ Upstream commit 5dd9e27ea4a39f7edd4bf81e9e70208e7ac0b7c9 ] The of_find_compatible_node() function returns a node pointer with refcount incremented, use of_node_put() on it when done. Reported-by: Zeal Robot Signed-off-by: Lv Ruyi Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220402013419.2410298-1-lv.ruyi@zte.com.cn Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/powerpc/sysdev/xics/icp-opal.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/sysdev/xics/icp-opal.c b/arch/powerpc/sysdev/xics/icp-opal.c index 68fd2540b093..7fa520efcefa 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/sysdev/xics/icp-opal.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/sysdev/xics/icp-opal.c @@ -195,6 +195,7 @@ int icp_opal_init(void) printk("XICS: Using OPAL ICP fallbacks\n"); + of_node_put(np); return 0; } From 793b82d1c42481ad51c14702e04265f3cce92a1f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lv Ruyi Date: Thu, 7 Apr 2022 09:00:43 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0076/1091] powerpc/powernv: fix missing of_node_put in uv_init() [ Upstream commit 3ffa9fd471f57f365bc54fc87824c530422f64a5 ] of_find_compatible_node() returns node pointer with refcount incremented, use of_node_put() on it when done. Reported-by: Zeal Robot Signed-off-by: Lv Ruyi Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220407090043.2491854-1-lv.ruyi@zte.com.cn Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/ultravisor.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/ultravisor.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/ultravisor.c index e4a00ad06f9d..67c8c4b2d8b1 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/ultravisor.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/ultravisor.c @@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ static int __init uv_init(void) return -ENODEV; uv_memcons = memcons_init(node, "memcons"); + of_node_put(node); if (!uv_memcons) return -ENOENT; From 6557555a86f3191ec3add21005dc42c59463d09e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Finn Thain Date: Thu, 7 Apr 2022 20:11:32 +1000 Subject: [PATCH 0077/1091] macintosh/via-pmu: Fix build failure when CONFIG_INPUT is disabled [ Upstream commit 86ce436e30d86327c9f5260f718104ae7b21f506 ] drivers/macintosh/via-pmu-event.o: In function `via_pmu_event': via-pmu-event.c:(.text+0x44): undefined reference to `input_event' via-pmu-event.c:(.text+0x68): undefined reference to `input_event' via-pmu-event.c:(.text+0x94): undefined reference to `input_event' via-pmu-event.c:(.text+0xb8): undefined reference to `input_event' drivers/macintosh/via-pmu-event.o: In function `via_pmu_event_init': via-pmu-event.c:(.init.text+0x20): undefined reference to `input_allocate_device' via-pmu-event.c:(.init.text+0xc4): undefined reference to `input_register_device' via-pmu-event.c:(.init.text+0xd4): undefined reference to `input_free_device' make[1]: *** [Makefile:1155: vmlinux] Error 1 make: *** [Makefile:350: __build_one_by_one] Error 2 Don't call into the input subsystem unless CONFIG_INPUT is built-in. Reported-by: kernel test robot Signed-off-by: Finn Thain Tested-by: Randy Dunlap Reviewed-by: Christophe Leroy Acked-by: Randy Dunlap Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/5edbe76ce68227f71e09af4614cc4c1bd61c7ec8.1649326292.git.fthain@linux-m68k.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/macintosh/Kconfig | 4 ++++ drivers/macintosh/Makefile | 3 ++- drivers/macintosh/via-pmu.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/macintosh/Kconfig b/drivers/macintosh/Kconfig index 574e122ae105..abaf1401cca6 100644 --- a/drivers/macintosh/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/macintosh/Kconfig @@ -67,6 +67,10 @@ config ADB_PMU this device; you should do so if your machine is one of those mentioned above. +config ADB_PMU_EVENT + def_bool y + depends on ADB_PMU && INPUT=y + config ADB_PMU_LED bool "Support for the Power/iBook front LED" depends on PPC_PMAC && ADB_PMU diff --git a/drivers/macintosh/Makefile b/drivers/macintosh/Makefile index 49819b1b6f20..712edcb3e0b0 100644 --- a/drivers/macintosh/Makefile +++ b/drivers/macintosh/Makefile @@ -12,7 +12,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_MAC_EMUMOUSEBTN) += mac_hid.o obj-$(CONFIG_INPUT_ADBHID) += adbhid.o obj-$(CONFIG_ANSLCD) += ans-lcd.o -obj-$(CONFIG_ADB_PMU) += via-pmu.o via-pmu-event.o +obj-$(CONFIG_ADB_PMU) += via-pmu.o +obj-$(CONFIG_ADB_PMU_EVENT) += via-pmu-event.o obj-$(CONFIG_ADB_PMU_LED) += via-pmu-led.o obj-$(CONFIG_PMAC_BACKLIGHT) += via-pmu-backlight.o obj-$(CONFIG_ADB_CUDA) += via-cuda.o diff --git a/drivers/macintosh/via-pmu.c b/drivers/macintosh/via-pmu.c index 21d532a78fa4..d8b6ac2ec313 100644 --- a/drivers/macintosh/via-pmu.c +++ b/drivers/macintosh/via-pmu.c @@ -1464,7 +1464,7 @@ next: pmu_pass_intr(data, len); /* len == 6 is probably a bad check. But how do I * know what PMU versions send what events here? */ - if (len == 6) { + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ADB_PMU_EVENT) && len == 6) { via_pmu_event(PMU_EVT_POWER, !!(data[1]&8)); via_pmu_event(PMU_EVT_LID, data[1]&1); } From cb4f2dc513e99c5d0485661f114e4dda73612d10 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peng Wu Date: Mon, 25 Apr 2022 08:12:45 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0078/1091] powerpc/iommu: Add missing of_node_put in iommu_init_early_dart [ Upstream commit 57b742a5b8945118022973e6416b71351df512fb ] The device_node pointer is returned by of_find_compatible_node with refcount incremented. We should use of_node_put() to avoid the refcount leak. Signed-off-by: Peng Wu Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220425081245.21705-1-wupeng58@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/powerpc/sysdev/dart_iommu.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/sysdev/dart_iommu.c b/arch/powerpc/sysdev/dart_iommu.c index 6b4a34b36d98..8ff9bcfe4b8d 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/sysdev/dart_iommu.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/sysdev/dart_iommu.c @@ -403,9 +403,10 @@ void __init iommu_init_early_dart(struct pci_controller_ops *controller_ops) } /* Initialize the DART HW */ - if (dart_init(dn) != 0) + if (dart_init(dn) != 0) { + of_node_put(dn); return; - + } /* * U4 supports a DART bypass, we use it for 64-bit capable devices to * improve performance. However, that only works for devices connected @@ -418,6 +419,7 @@ void __init iommu_init_early_dart(struct pci_controller_ops *controller_ops) /* Setup pci_dma ops */ set_pci_dma_ops(&dma_iommu_ops); + of_node_put(dn); } #ifdef CONFIG_PM From e60ad83f645ee6fadd5a8057ba267aeec54f08fe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Douglas Miller Date: Fri, 20 May 2022 14:37:06 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 0079/1091] RDMA/hfi1: Prevent panic when SDMA is disabled [ Upstream commit 629e052d0c98e46dde9f0824f0aa437f678d9b8f ] If the hfi1 module is loaded with HFI1_CAP_SDMA off, a call to hfi1_write_iter() will dereference a NULL pointer and panic. A typical stack frame is: sdma_select_user_engine [hfi1] hfi1_user_sdma_process_request [hfi1] hfi1_write_iter [hfi1] do_iter_readv_writev do_iter_write vfs_writev do_writev do_syscall_64 The fix is to test for SDMA in hfi1_write_iter() and fail the I/O with EINVAL. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220520183706.48973.79803.stgit@awfm-01.cornelisnetworks.com Signed-off-by: Douglas Miller Signed-off-by: Dennis Dalessandro Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/file_ops.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/file_ops.c b/drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/file_ops.c index 89e1dfd07a1b..8c7ba7bad42b 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/file_ops.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/file_ops.c @@ -308,6 +308,8 @@ static ssize_t hfi1_write_iter(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct iov_iter *from) unsigned long dim = from->nr_segs; int idx; + if (!HFI1_CAP_IS_KSET(SDMA)) + return -EINVAL; idx = srcu_read_lock(&fd->pq_srcu); pq = srcu_dereference(fd->pq, &fd->pq_srcu); if (!cq || !pq) { From ebede9aadfa3a387e5b014b6535bcb4af16d2e82 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Linus Torvalds Date: Sat, 28 May 2022 11:08:48 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0080/1091] drm: fix EDID struct for old ARM OABI format [ Upstream commit 47f15561b69e226bfc034e94ff6dbec51a4662af ] When building the kernel for arm with the "-mabi=apcs-gnu" option, gcc will force alignment of all structures and unions to a word boundary (see also STRUCTURE_SIZE_BOUNDARY and the "-mstructure-size-boundary=XX" option if you're a gcc person), even when the members of said structures do not want or need said alignment. This completely messes up the structure alignment of 'struct edid' on those targets, because even though all the embedded structures are marked with "__attribute__((packed))", the unions that contain them are not. This was exposed by commit f1e4c916f97f ("drm/edid: add EDID block count and size helpers"), but the bug is pre-existing. That commit just made the structure layout problem cause a build failure due to the addition of the BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*edid) != EDID_LENGTH); sanity check in drivers/gpu/drm/drm_edid.c:edid_block_data(). This legacy union alignment should probably not be used in the first place, but we can fix the layout by adding the packed attribute to the union entries even when each member is already packed and it shouldn't matter in a sane build environment. You can see this issue with a trivial test program: union { struct { char c[5]; }; struct { char d; unsigned e; } __attribute__((packed)); } a = { "1234" }; where building this with a normal "gcc -S" will result in the expected 5-byte size of said union: .type a, @object .size a, 5 but with an ARM compiler and the old ABI: arm-linux-gnu-gcc -mabi=apcs-gnu -mfloat-abi=soft -S t.c you get .type a, %object .size a, 8 instead, because even though each member of the union is packed, the union itself still gets aligned. This was reported by Sudip for the spear3xx_defconfig target. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YpCUzStDnSgQLNFN@debian/ Reported-by: Sudip Mukherjee Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann Cc: Maarten Lankhorst Cc: Maxime Ripard Cc: Thomas Zimmermann Cc: David Airlie Cc: Daniel Vetter Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- include/drm/drm_edid.h | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/drm/drm_edid.h b/include/drm/drm_edid.h index b9719418c3d2..f40a97417b68 100644 --- a/include/drm/drm_edid.h +++ b/include/drm/drm_edid.h @@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ struct detailed_data_monitor_range { u8 supported_scalings; u8 preferred_refresh; } __attribute__((packed)) cvt; - } formula; + } __attribute__((packed)) formula; } __attribute__((packed)); struct detailed_data_wpindex { @@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ struct detailed_non_pixel { struct detailed_data_wpindex color; struct std_timing timings[6]; struct cvt_timing cvt[4]; - } data; + } __attribute__((packed)) data; } __attribute__((packed)); #define EDID_DETAIL_EST_TIMINGS 0xf7 @@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ struct detailed_timing { union { struct detailed_pixel_timing pixel_data; struct detailed_non_pixel other_data; - } data; + } __attribute__((packed)) data; } __attribute__((packed)); #define DRM_EDID_INPUT_SERRATION_VSYNC (1 << 0) From 6577348668392029bd73ae45aaf7635b5f8f7263 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wenli Looi Date: Sun, 20 Mar 2022 17:30:08 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 0081/1091] ath9k: fix ar9003_get_eepmisc MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit 9aaff3864b603408c02c629957ae8d8ff5d5a4f2 ] The current implementation is reading the wrong eeprom type. Fixes: d8ec2e2a63e8 ("ath9k: Add an eeprom_ops callback for retrieving the eepmisc value") Signed-off-by: Wenli Looi Acked-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220320233010.123106-5-wlooi@ucalgary.ca Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/ar9003_eeprom.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/ar9003_eeprom.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/ar9003_eeprom.c index b0a4ca3559fd..abed1effd95c 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/ar9003_eeprom.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/ar9003_eeprom.c @@ -5615,7 +5615,7 @@ unsigned int ar9003_get_paprd_scale_factor(struct ath_hw *ah, static u8 ar9003_get_eepmisc(struct ath_hw *ah) { - return ah->eeprom.map4k.baseEepHeader.eepMisc; + return ah->eeprom.ar9300_eep.baseEepHeader.opCapFlags.eepMisc; } const struct eeprom_ops eep_ar9300_ops = { From 224e1eef0386a6448e51bc9f260978c3b4cfb533 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jani Nikula Date: Wed, 30 Mar 2022 20:04:26 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 0082/1091] drm/edid: fix invalid EDID extension block filtering MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit 3aefc722ff52076407203b6af9713de567993adf ] The invalid EDID block filtering uses the number of valid EDID extensions instead of all EDID extensions for looping the extensions in the copy. This is fine, by coincidence, if all the invalid blocks are at the end of the EDID. However, it's completely broken if there are invalid extensions in the middle; the invalid blocks are included and valid blocks are excluded. Fix it by modifying the base block after, not before, the copy. Fixes: 14544d0937bf ("drm/edid: Only print the bad edid when aborting") Reported-by: Ville Syrjälä Signed-off-by: Jani Nikula Reviewed-by: Ville Syrjälä Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20220330170426.349248-1-jani.nikula@intel.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/gpu/drm/drm_edid.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_edid.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_edid.c index aeeab1b57aad..2dc6dd6230d7 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_edid.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_edid.c @@ -1702,9 +1702,6 @@ struct edid *drm_do_get_edid(struct drm_connector *connector, connector_bad_edid(connector, edid, edid[0x7e] + 1); - edid[EDID_LENGTH-1] += edid[0x7e] - valid_extensions; - edid[0x7e] = valid_extensions; - new = kmalloc_array(valid_extensions + 1, EDID_LENGTH, GFP_KERNEL); if (!new) @@ -1721,6 +1718,9 @@ struct edid *drm_do_get_edid(struct drm_connector *connector, base += EDID_LENGTH; } + new[EDID_LENGTH - 1] += new[0x7e] - valid_extensions; + new[0x7e] = valid_extensions; + kfree(edid); edid = new; } From e92b927fffb646bf371f9a69f7e3a6efd8184369 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lucas Stach Date: Mon, 21 Mar 2022 11:47:05 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0083/1091] drm/bridge: adv7511: clean up CEC adapter when probe fails [ Upstream commit 7ed2b0dabf7a22874cb30f8878df239ef638eb53 ] When the probe routine fails we also need to clean up the CEC adapter registered in adv7511_cec_init(). Fixes: 3b1b975003e4 ("drm: adv7511/33: add HDMI CEC support") Signed-off-by: Lucas Stach Reviewed-by: Robert Foss Signed-off-by: Robert Foss Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20220321104705.2804423-1-l.stach@pengutronix.de Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/adv7511/adv7511_drv.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/adv7511/adv7511_drv.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/adv7511/adv7511_drv.c index 9e13e466e72c..e7bf32f234d7 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/adv7511/adv7511_drv.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/adv7511/adv7511_drv.c @@ -1225,6 +1225,7 @@ static int adv7511_probe(struct i2c_client *i2c, const struct i2c_device_id *id) return 0; err_unregister_cec: + cec_unregister_adapter(adv7511->cec_adap); i2c_unregister_device(adv7511->i2c_cec); if (adv7511->cec_clk) clk_disable_unprepare(adv7511->cec_clk); From 23f340ed906c758cec6527376768e3bc1474ac30 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miaoqian Lin Date: Mon, 4 Apr 2022 09:29:01 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0084/1091] ASoC: mediatek: Fix error handling in mt8173_max98090_dev_probe [ Upstream commit 4f4e0454e226de3bf4efd7e7924d1edc571c52d5 ] Call of_node_put(platform_node) to avoid refcount leak in the error path. Fixes: 94319ba10eca ("ASoC: mediatek: Use platform_of_node for machine drivers") Fixes: 493433785df0 ("ASoC: mediatek: mt8173: fix device_node leak") Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin Reviewed-by: AngeloGioacchino Del Regno Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220404092903.26725-1-linmq006@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- sound/soc/mediatek/mt8173/mt8173-max98090.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/mediatek/mt8173/mt8173-max98090.c b/sound/soc/mediatek/mt8173/mt8173-max98090.c index de1410c2c446..32df18180114 100644 --- a/sound/soc/mediatek/mt8173/mt8173-max98090.c +++ b/sound/soc/mediatek/mt8173/mt8173-max98090.c @@ -167,7 +167,8 @@ static int mt8173_max98090_dev_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) if (!codec_node) { dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Property 'audio-codec' missing or invalid\n"); - return -EINVAL; + ret = -EINVAL; + goto put_platform_node; } for_each_card_prelinks(card, i, dai_link) { if (dai_link->codecs->name) @@ -182,6 +183,8 @@ static int mt8173_max98090_dev_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) __func__, ret); of_node_put(codec_node); + +put_platform_node: of_node_put(platform_node); return ret; } From c71494f5f2b444adfd992a7359a0d2a791642b39 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miaoqian Lin Date: Mon, 4 Apr 2022 09:35:25 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0085/1091] ASoC: mediatek: Fix missing of_node_put in mt2701_wm8960_machine_probe [ Upstream commit 05654431a18fe24e5e46a375d98904134628a102 ] This node pointer is returned by of_parse_phandle() with refcount incremented in this function. Calling of_node_put() to avoid the refcount leak. Fixes: 8625c1dbd876 ("ASoC: mediatek: Add mt2701-wm8960 machine driver") Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220404093526.30004-1-linmq006@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- sound/soc/mediatek/mt2701/mt2701-wm8960.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/mediatek/mt2701/mt2701-wm8960.c b/sound/soc/mediatek/mt2701/mt2701-wm8960.c index 8c4c89e4c616..b9ad42112ea1 100644 --- a/sound/soc/mediatek/mt2701/mt2701-wm8960.c +++ b/sound/soc/mediatek/mt2701/mt2701-wm8960.c @@ -129,7 +129,8 @@ static int mt2701_wm8960_machine_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) if (!codec_node) { dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Property 'audio-codec' missing or invalid\n"); - return -EINVAL; + ret = -EINVAL; + goto put_platform_node; } for_each_card_prelinks(card, i, dai_link) { if (dai_link->codecs->name) @@ -140,7 +141,7 @@ static int mt2701_wm8960_machine_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) ret = snd_soc_of_parse_audio_routing(card, "audio-routing"); if (ret) { dev_err(&pdev->dev, "failed to parse audio-routing: %d\n", ret); - return ret; + goto put_codec_node; } ret = devm_snd_soc_register_card(&pdev->dev, card); @@ -148,6 +149,10 @@ static int mt2701_wm8960_machine_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) dev_err(&pdev->dev, "%s snd_soc_register_card fail %d\n", __func__, ret); +put_codec_node: + of_node_put(codec_node); +put_platform_node: + of_node_put(platform_node); return ret; } From ea8b2ecc920d3920fd17121b5c3683dd4ef1c7c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ammar Faizi Date: Tue, 29 Mar 2022 17:47:04 +0700 Subject: [PATCH 0086/1091] x86/delay: Fix the wrong asm constraint in delay_loop() [ Upstream commit b86eb74098a92afd789da02699b4b0dd3f73b889 ] The asm constraint does not reflect the fact that the asm statement can modify the value of the local variable loops. Which it does. Specifying the wrong constraint may lead to undefined behavior, it may clobber random stuff (e.g. local variable, important temporary value in regs, etc.). This is especially dangerous when the compiler decides to inline the function and since it doesn't know that the value gets modified, it might decide to use it from a register directly without reloading it. Change the constraint to "+a" to denote that the first argument is an input and an output argument. [ bp: Fix typo, massage commit message. ] Fixes: e01b70ef3eb3 ("x86: fix bug in arch/i386/lib/delay.c file, delay_loop function") Signed-off-by: Ammar Faizi Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220329104705.65256-2-ammarfaizi2@gnuweeb.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/x86/lib/delay.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/delay.c b/arch/x86/lib/delay.c index c126571e5e2e..3d1cfad36ba2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/delay.c +++ b/arch/x86/lib/delay.c @@ -43,8 +43,8 @@ static void delay_loop(unsigned long loops) " jnz 2b \n" "3: dec %0 \n" - : /* we don't need output */ - :"a" (loops) + : "+a" (loops) + : ); } From a0c890c0ae9fbb2e0387c0ebea18c0e551211661 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miles Chen Date: Wed, 16 Mar 2022 07:23:00 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0087/1091] drm/mediatek: Fix mtk_cec_mask() [ Upstream commit 2c5d69b0a141e1e98febe3111e6f4fd8420493a5 ] In current implementation, mtk_cec_mask() writes val into target register and ignores the mask. After talking to our hdmi experts, mtk_cec_mask() should read a register, clean only mask bits, and update (val | mask) bits to the register. Link: https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/linux-mediatek/patch/20220315232301.2434-1-miles.chen@mediatek.com/ Fixes: 8f83f26891e1 ("drm/mediatek: Add HDMI support") Signed-off-by: Miles Chen Reviewed-by: AngeloGioacchino Del Regno Reviewed-by: Matthias Brugger Cc: Zhiqiang Lin Cc: CK Hu Cc: Matthias Brugger Cc: AngeloGioacchino Del Regno Signed-off-by: Chun-Kuang Hu Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_cec.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_cec.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_cec.c index cb29b649fcdb..12bf93769497 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_cec.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_cec.c @@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ static void mtk_cec_mask(struct mtk_cec *cec, unsigned int offset, u32 tmp = readl(cec->regs + offset) & ~mask; tmp |= val & mask; - writel(val, cec->regs + offset); + writel(tmp, cec->regs + offset); } void mtk_cec_set_hpd_event(struct device *dev, From 8a60b54e41c9f745059c057ce3d726f742c0936c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Maxime Ripard Date: Mon, 28 Mar 2022 17:36:55 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0088/1091] drm/vc4: txp: Don't set TXP_VSTART_AT_EOF [ Upstream commit 234998df929f14d00cbf2f1e81a7facb69fd9266 ] The TXP_VSTART_AT_EOF will generate a second VSTART signal to the HVS. However, the HVS waits for VSTART to enable the FIFO and will thus start filling the FIFO before the start of the frame. This leads to corruption at the beginning of the first frame, and content from the previous frame at the beginning of the next frames. Since one VSTART is enough, let's get rid of it. Fixes: 008095e065a8 ("drm/vc4: Add support for the transposer block") Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard Acked-by: Thomas Zimmermann Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220328153659.2382206-3-maxime@cerno.tech Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_txp.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_txp.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_txp.c index bf720206727f..2342b49c16dd 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_txp.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_txp.c @@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ static void vc4_txp_connector_atomic_commit(struct drm_connector *conn, if (WARN_ON(i == ARRAY_SIZE(drm_fmts))) return; - ctrl = TXP_GO | TXP_VSTART_AT_EOF | TXP_EI | + ctrl = TXP_GO | TXP_EI | VC4_SET_FIELD(0xf, TXP_BYTE_ENABLE) | VC4_SET_FIELD(txp_fmts[i], TXP_FORMAT); From c398c2149b1773c56f9bc64b370df56db4fe09d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Maxime Ripard Date: Mon, 28 Mar 2022 17:36:56 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0089/1091] drm/vc4: txp: Force alpha to be 0xff if it's disabled [ Upstream commit 5453343a88ede8b12812fced81ecd24cb888ccc3 ] If we use a format that has padding instead of the alpha component (such as XRGB8888), it appears that the Transposer will fill the padding to 0, disregarding what was stored in the input buffer padding. This leads to issues with IGT, since it will set the padding to 0xff, but will then compare the CRC of the two frames which will thus fail. Another nice side effect is that it is now possible to just use the buffer as ARGB. Fixes: 008095e065a8 ("drm/vc4: Add support for the transposer block") Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard Acked-by: Thomas Zimmermann Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220328153659.2382206-4-maxime@cerno.tech Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_txp.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_txp.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_txp.c index 2342b49c16dd..0d9263f65d95 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_txp.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_txp.c @@ -291,6 +291,12 @@ static void vc4_txp_connector_atomic_commit(struct drm_connector *conn, if (fb->format->has_alpha) ctrl |= TXP_ALPHA_ENABLE; + else + /* + * If TXP_ALPHA_ENABLE isn't set and TXP_ALPHA_INVERT is, the + * hardware will force the output padding to be 0xff. + */ + ctrl |= TXP_ALPHA_INVERT; gem = drm_fb_cma_get_gem_obj(fb, 0); TXP_WRITE(TXP_DST_PTR, gem->paddr + fb->offsets[0]); From 93c0f9d78dddd3e60062b83715e5fabd2692d6a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yuntao Wang Date: Thu, 7 Apr 2022 21:04:23 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0090/1091] bpf: Fix excessive memory allocation in stack_map_alloc() [ Upstream commit b45043192b3e481304062938a6561da2ceea46a6 ] The 'n_buckets * (value_size + sizeof(struct stack_map_bucket))' part of the allocated memory for 'smap' is never used after the memlock accounting was removed, thus get rid of it. [ Note, Daniel: Commit b936ca643ade ("bpf: rework memlock-based memory accounting for maps") moved `cost += n_buckets * (value_size + sizeof(struct stack_map_bucket))` up and therefore before the bpf_map_area_alloc() allocation, sigh. In a later step commit c85d69135a91 ("bpf: move memory size checks to bpf_map_charge_init()"), and the overflow checks of `cost >= U32_MAX - PAGE_SIZE` moved into bpf_map_charge_init(). And then 370868107bf6 ("bpf: Eliminate rlimit-based memory accounting for stackmap maps") finally removed the bpf_map_charge_init(). Anyway, the original code did the allocation same way as /after/ this fix. ] Fixes: b936ca643ade ("bpf: rework memlock-based memory accounting for maps") Signed-off-by: Yuntao Wang Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220407130423.798386-1-ytcoode@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- kernel/bpf/stackmap.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c b/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c index 49c7a09d688d..768ffd603787 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c @@ -117,7 +117,6 @@ static struct bpf_map *stack_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr) return ERR_PTR(-E2BIG); cost = n_buckets * sizeof(struct stack_map_bucket *) + sizeof(*smap); - cost += n_buckets * (value_size + sizeof(struct stack_map_bucket)); err = bpf_map_charge_init(&mem, cost); if (err) return ERR_PTR(err); From 1a994f1f184150401a8cc44cf8a2bc107b121ddc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johannes Berg Date: Fri, 18 Mar 2022 13:46:57 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0091/1091] nl80211: show SSID for P2P_GO interfaces [ Upstream commit a75971bc2b8453630e9f85e0beaa4da8db8277a3 ] There's no real reason not to send the SSID to userspace when it requests information about P2P_GO, it is, in that respect, exactly the same as AP interfaces. Fix that. Fixes: 44905265bc15 ("nl80211: don't expose wdev->ssid for most interfaces") Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220318134656.14354ae223f0.Ia25e85a512281b92e1645d4160766a4b1a471597@changeid Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/wireless/nl80211.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/net/wireless/nl80211.c b/net/wireless/nl80211.c index d3e2b97d5d05..8459f5b6002e 100644 --- a/net/wireless/nl80211.c +++ b/net/wireless/nl80211.c @@ -3240,6 +3240,7 @@ static int nl80211_send_iface(struct sk_buff *msg, u32 portid, u32 seq, int flag wdev_lock(wdev); switch (wdev->iftype) { case NL80211_IFTYPE_AP: + case NL80211_IFTYPE_P2P_GO: if (wdev->ssid_len && nla_put(msg, NL80211_ATTR_SSID, wdev->ssid_len, wdev->ssid)) goto nla_put_failure_locked; From 797f8ee35f03a3534d00b3e6250d66a4430c4970 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zhou Qingyang Date: Wed, 1 Dec 2021 11:37:03 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0092/1091] drm/komeda: Fix an undefined behavior bug in komeda_plane_add() [ Upstream commit f5e284bb74ab296f98122673c7ecd22028b2c200 ] In komeda_plane_add(), komeda_get_layer_fourcc_list() is assigned to formats and used in drm_universal_plane_init(). drm_universal_plane_init() passes formats to __drm_universal_plane_init(). __drm_universal_plane_init() further passes formats to memcpy() as src parameter, which could lead to an undefined behavior bug on failure of komeda_get_layer_fourcc_list(). Fix this bug by adding a check of formats. This bug was found by a static analyzer. The analysis employs differential checking to identify inconsistent security operations (e.g., checks or kfrees) between two code paths and confirms that the inconsistent operations are not recovered in the current function or the callers, so they constitute bugs. Note that, as a bug found by static analysis, it can be a false positive or hard to trigger. Multiple researchers have cross-reviewed the bug. Builds with CONFIG_DRM_KOMEDA=m show no new warnings, and our static analyzer no longer warns about this code. Fixes: 61f1c4a8ab75 ("drm/komeda: Attach komeda_dev to DRM-KMS") Signed-off-by: Zhou Qingyang Signed-off-by: Liviu Dudau Link: https://lore.kernel.org/dri-devel/20211201033704.32054-1-zhou1615@umn.edu Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/gpu/drm/arm/display/komeda/komeda_plane.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/arm/display/komeda/komeda_plane.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/arm/display/komeda/komeda_plane.c index a5f57b38d193..bc3f42e915e9 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/arm/display/komeda/komeda_plane.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/arm/display/komeda/komeda_plane.c @@ -264,6 +264,10 @@ static int komeda_plane_add(struct komeda_kms_dev *kms, formats = komeda_get_layer_fourcc_list(&mdev->fmt_tbl, layer->layer_type, &n_formats); + if (!formats) { + kfree(kplane); + return -ENOMEM; + } err = drm_universal_plane_init(&kms->base, plane, get_possible_crtcs(kms, c->pipeline), From fa0d7ba25a53ac2e4bb24ef31aec49ff3578b44f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jiasheng Jiang Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2021 18:08:37 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0093/1091] drm: mali-dp: potential dereference of null pointer [ Upstream commit 73c3ed7495c67b8fbdc31cf58e6ca8757df31a33 ] The return value of kzalloc() needs to be checked. To avoid use of null pointer '&state->base' in case of the failure of alloc. Fixes: 99665d072183 ("drm: mali-dp: add malidp_crtc_state struct") Signed-off-by: Jiasheng Jiang Reviewed-by: Brian Starkey Signed-off-by: Liviu Dudau Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20211214100837.46912-1-jiasheng@iscas.ac.cn Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/gpu/drm/arm/malidp_crtc.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/arm/malidp_crtc.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/arm/malidp_crtc.c index 587d94798f5c..af729094260c 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/arm/malidp_crtc.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/arm/malidp_crtc.c @@ -483,7 +483,10 @@ static void malidp_crtc_reset(struct drm_crtc *crtc) if (crtc->state) malidp_crtc_destroy_state(crtc, crtc->state); - __drm_atomic_helper_crtc_reset(crtc, &state->base); + if (state) + __drm_atomic_helper_crtc_reset(crtc, &state->base); + else + __drm_atomic_helper_crtc_reset(crtc, NULL); } static int malidp_crtc_enable_vblank(struct drm_crtc *crtc) From 2c59535b6be05c7978ed13a2e52d220bfd455176 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miaoqian Lin Date: Mon, 11 Apr 2022 11:10:33 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0094/1091] spi: spi-ti-qspi: Fix return value handling of wait_for_completion_timeout [ Upstream commit 8b1ea69a63eb62f97cef63e6d816b64ed84e8760 ] wait_for_completion_timeout() returns unsigned long not int. It returns 0 if timed out, and positive if completed. The check for <= 0 is ambiguous and should be == 0 here indicating timeout which is the only error case. Fixes: 5720ec0a6d26 ("spi: spi-ti-qspi: Add DMA support for QSPI mmap read") Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220411111034.24447-1-linmq006@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/spi/spi-ti-qspi.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/spi/spi-ti-qspi.c b/drivers/spi/spi-ti-qspi.c index 6b6ef8944283..4bbad00244ab 100644 --- a/drivers/spi/spi-ti-qspi.c +++ b/drivers/spi/spi-ti-qspi.c @@ -401,6 +401,7 @@ static int ti_qspi_dma_xfer(struct ti_qspi *qspi, dma_addr_t dma_dst, enum dma_ctrl_flags flags = DMA_CTRL_ACK | DMA_PREP_INTERRUPT; struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *tx; int ret; + unsigned long time_left; tx = dmaengine_prep_dma_memcpy(chan, dma_dst, dma_src, len, flags); if (!tx) { @@ -420,9 +421,9 @@ static int ti_qspi_dma_xfer(struct ti_qspi *qspi, dma_addr_t dma_dst, } dma_async_issue_pending(chan); - ret = wait_for_completion_timeout(&qspi->transfer_complete, + time_left = wait_for_completion_timeout(&qspi->transfer_complete, msecs_to_jiffies(len)); - if (ret <= 0) { + if (time_left == 0) { dmaengine_terminate_sync(chan); dev_err(qspi->dev, "DMA wait_for_completion_timeout\n"); return -ETIMEDOUT; From fbf9c4c714d3cdeb98b6a18e4d057f931cad1d81 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lin Ma Date: Tue, 12 Apr 2022 13:32:08 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0095/1091] NFC: NULL out the dev->rfkill to prevent UAF [ Upstream commit 1b0e81416a24d6e9b8c2341e22e8bf48f8b8bfc9 ] Commit 3e3b5dfcd16a ("NFC: reorder the logic in nfc_{un,}register_device") assumes the device_is_registered() in function nfc_dev_up() will help to check when the rfkill is unregistered. However, this check only take effect when device_del(&dev->dev) is done in nfc_unregister_device(). Hence, the rfkill object is still possible be dereferenced. The crash trace in latest kernel (5.18-rc2): [ 68.760105] ================================================================== [ 68.760330] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __lock_acquire+0x3ec1/0x6750 [ 68.760756] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888009c93018 by task fuzz/313 [ 68.760756] [ 68.760756] CPU: 0 PID: 313 Comm: fuzz Not tainted 5.18.0-rc2 #4 [ 68.760756] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 68.760756] Call Trace: [ 68.760756] [ 68.760756] dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x7d [ 68.760756] print_report.cold+0x5e/0x5db [ 68.760756] ? __lock_acquire+0x3ec1/0x6750 [ 68.760756] kasan_report+0xbe/0x1c0 [ 68.760756] ? __lock_acquire+0x3ec1/0x6750 [ 68.760756] __lock_acquire+0x3ec1/0x6750 [ 68.760756] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x410/0x410 [ 68.760756] ? register_lock_class+0x18d0/0x18d0 [ 68.760756] lock_acquire+0x1ac/0x4f0 [ 68.760756] ? rfkill_blocked+0xe/0x60 [ 68.760756] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x410/0x410 [ 68.760756] ? mutex_lock_io_nested+0x12c0/0x12c0 [ 68.760756] ? nla_get_range_signed+0x540/0x540 [ 68.760756] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4e/0x50 [ 68.760756] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x39/0x50 [ 68.760756] ? rfkill_blocked+0xe/0x60 [ 68.760756] rfkill_blocked+0xe/0x60 [ 68.760756] nfc_dev_up+0x84/0x260 [ 68.760756] nfc_genl_dev_up+0x90/0xe0 [ 68.760756] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1f4/0x2f0 [ 68.760756] ? genl_family_rcv_msg_attrs_parse.constprop.0+0x230/0x230 [ 68.760756] ? security_capable+0x51/0x90 [ 68.760756] genl_rcv_msg+0x280/0x500 [ 68.760756] ? genl_get_cmd+0x3c0/0x3c0 [ 68.760756] ? lock_acquire+0x1ac/0x4f0 [ 68.760756] ? nfc_genl_dev_down+0xe0/0xe0 [ 68.760756] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x410/0x410 [ 68.760756] netlink_rcv_skb+0x11b/0x340 [ 68.760756] ? genl_get_cmd+0x3c0/0x3c0 [ 68.760756] ? netlink_ack+0x9c0/0x9c0 [ 68.760756] ? netlink_deliver_tap+0x136/0xb00 [ 68.760756] genl_rcv+0x1f/0x30 [ 68.760756] netlink_unicast+0x430/0x710 [ 68.760756] ? memset+0x20/0x40 [ 68.760756] ? netlink_attachskb+0x740/0x740 [ 68.760756] ? __build_skb_around+0x1f4/0x2a0 [ 68.760756] netlink_sendmsg+0x75d/0xc00 [ 68.760756] ? netlink_unicast+0x710/0x710 [ 68.760756] ? netlink_unicast+0x710/0x710 [ 68.760756] sock_sendmsg+0xdf/0x110 [ 68.760756] __sys_sendto+0x19e/0x270 [ 68.760756] ? __ia32_sys_getpeername+0xa0/0xa0 [ 68.760756] ? fd_install+0x178/0x4c0 [ 68.760756] ? fd_install+0x195/0x4c0 [ 68.760756] ? kernel_fpu_begin_mask+0x1c0/0x1c0 [ 68.760756] __x64_sys_sendto+0xd8/0x1b0 [ 68.760756] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0xbf/0x130 [ 68.760756] ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x1d/0x50 [ 68.760756] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [ 68.760756] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 68.760756] RIP: 0033:0x7f67fb50e6b3 ... [ 68.760756] RSP: 002b:00007f67fa91fe90 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c [ 68.760756] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f67fb50e6b3 [ 68.760756] RDX: 000000000000001c RSI: 0000559354603090 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 68.760756] RBP: 00007f67fa91ff00 R08: 00007f67fa91fedc R09: 000000000000000c [ 68.760756] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 00007ffe824d496e [ 68.760756] R13: 00007ffe824d496f R14: 00007f67fa120000 R15: 0000000000000003 [ 68.760756] [ 68.760756] [ 68.760756] Allocated by task 279: [ 68.760756] kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 [ 68.760756] __kasan_kmalloc+0x81/0xa0 [ 68.760756] rfkill_alloc+0x7f/0x280 [ 68.760756] nfc_register_device+0xa3/0x1a0 [ 68.760756] nci_register_device+0x77a/0xad0 [ 68.760756] nfcmrvl_nci_register_dev+0x20b/0x2c0 [ 68.760756] nfcmrvl_nci_uart_open+0xf2/0x1dd [ 68.760756] nci_uart_tty_ioctl+0x2c3/0x4a0 [ 68.760756] tty_ioctl+0x764/0x1310 [ 68.760756] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x122/0x190 [ 68.760756] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [ 68.760756] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 68.760756] [ 68.760756] Freed by task 314: [ 68.760756] kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 [ 68.760756] kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 [ 68.760756] kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30 [ 68.760756] __kasan_slab_free+0x108/0x170 [ 68.760756] kfree+0xb0/0x330 [ 68.760756] device_release+0x96/0x200 [ 68.760756] kobject_put+0xf9/0x1d0 [ 68.760756] nfc_unregister_device+0x77/0x190 [ 68.760756] nfcmrvl_nci_unregister_dev+0x88/0xd0 [ 68.760756] nci_uart_tty_close+0xdf/0x180 [ 68.760756] tty_ldisc_kill+0x73/0x110 [ 68.760756] tty_ldisc_hangup+0x281/0x5b0 [ 68.760756] __tty_hangup.part.0+0x431/0x890 [ 68.760756] tty_release+0x3a8/0xc80 [ 68.760756] __fput+0x1f0/0x8c0 [ 68.760756] task_work_run+0xc9/0x170 [ 68.760756] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x194/0x1a0 [ 68.760756] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x19/0x50 [ 68.760756] do_syscall_64+0x48/0x90 [ 68.760756] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae This patch just add the null out of dev->rfkill to make sure such dereference cannot happen. This is safe since the device_lock() already protect the check/write from data race. Fixes: 3e3b5dfcd16a ("NFC: reorder the logic in nfc_{un,}register_device") Signed-off-by: Lin Ma Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/nfc/core.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/net/nfc/core.c b/net/nfc/core.c index 63701a980ee1..2d4729d1f0eb 100644 --- a/net/nfc/core.c +++ b/net/nfc/core.c @@ -1159,6 +1159,7 @@ void nfc_unregister_device(struct nfc_dev *dev) if (dev->rfkill) { rfkill_unregister(dev->rfkill); rfkill_destroy(dev->rfkill); + dev->rfkill = NULL; } dev->shutting_down = true; device_unlock(&dev->dev); From 65065f96d53eb6677b67b2278d2df867c39774cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jan Kiszka Date: Fri, 4 Mar 2022 07:36:37 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0096/1091] efi: Add missing prototype for efi_capsule_setup_info [ Upstream commit aa480379d8bdb33920d68acfd90f823c8af32578 ] Fixes "no previous declaration for 'efi_capsule_setup_info'" warnings under W=1. Fixes: 2959c95d510c ("efi/capsule: Add support for Quark security header") Signed-off-by: Jan Kiszka Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/c28d3f86-dd72-27d1-e2c2-40971b8da6bd@siemens.com Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- include/linux/efi.h | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h index c82ef0eba4f8..f9b9f9a2fd4a 100644 --- a/include/linux/efi.h +++ b/include/linux/efi.h @@ -165,6 +165,8 @@ struct capsule_info { size_t page_bytes_remain; }; +int efi_capsule_setup_info(struct capsule_info *cap_info, void *kbuff, + size_t hdr_bytes); int __efi_capsule_setup_info(struct capsule_info *cap_info); /* From 3caa2d7943cab38c3bd6439b37a1825befe462e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Arnd Bergmann Date: Wed, 6 Apr 2022 21:07:09 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0097/1091] drbd: fix duplicate array initializer MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit 33cb0917bbe241dd17a2b87ead63514c1b7e5615 ] There are two initializers for P_RETRY_WRITE: drivers/block/drbd/drbd_main.c:3676:22: warning: initialized field overwritten [-Woverride-init] Remove the first one since it was already ignored by the compiler and reorder the list to match the enum definition. As P_ZEROES had no entry, add that one instead. Fixes: 036b17eaab93 ("drbd: Receiving part for the PROTOCOL_UPDATE packet") Fixes: f31e583aa2c2 ("drbd: introduce P_ZEROES (REQ_OP_WRITE_ZEROES on the "wire")") Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann Reviewed-by: Christoph Böhmwalder Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220406190715.1938174-2-christoph.boehmwalder@linbit.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/block/drbd/drbd_main.c | 11 ++++++----- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/block/drbd/drbd_main.c b/drivers/block/drbd/drbd_main.c index ba10fa24fa1f..5ece2fd70d9c 100644 --- a/drivers/block/drbd/drbd_main.c +++ b/drivers/block/drbd/drbd_main.c @@ -3709,9 +3709,8 @@ const char *cmdname(enum drbd_packet cmd) * when we want to support more than * one PRO_VERSION */ static const char *cmdnames[] = { + [P_DATA] = "Data", - [P_WSAME] = "WriteSame", - [P_TRIM] = "Trim", [P_DATA_REPLY] = "DataReply", [P_RS_DATA_REPLY] = "RSDataReply", [P_BARRIER] = "Barrier", @@ -3722,7 +3721,6 @@ const char *cmdname(enum drbd_packet cmd) [P_DATA_REQUEST] = "DataRequest", [P_RS_DATA_REQUEST] = "RSDataRequest", [P_SYNC_PARAM] = "SyncParam", - [P_SYNC_PARAM89] = "SyncParam89", [P_PROTOCOL] = "ReportProtocol", [P_UUIDS] = "ReportUUIDs", [P_SIZES] = "ReportSizes", @@ -3730,6 +3728,7 @@ const char *cmdname(enum drbd_packet cmd) [P_SYNC_UUID] = "ReportSyncUUID", [P_AUTH_CHALLENGE] = "AuthChallenge", [P_AUTH_RESPONSE] = "AuthResponse", + [P_STATE_CHG_REQ] = "StateChgRequest", [P_PING] = "Ping", [P_PING_ACK] = "PingAck", [P_RECV_ACK] = "RecvAck", @@ -3740,24 +3739,26 @@ const char *cmdname(enum drbd_packet cmd) [P_NEG_DREPLY] = "NegDReply", [P_NEG_RS_DREPLY] = "NegRSDReply", [P_BARRIER_ACK] = "BarrierAck", - [P_STATE_CHG_REQ] = "StateChgRequest", [P_STATE_CHG_REPLY] = "StateChgReply", [P_OV_REQUEST] = "OVRequest", [P_OV_REPLY] = "OVReply", [P_OV_RESULT] = "OVResult", [P_CSUM_RS_REQUEST] = "CsumRSRequest", [P_RS_IS_IN_SYNC] = "CsumRSIsInSync", + [P_SYNC_PARAM89] = "SyncParam89", [P_COMPRESSED_BITMAP] = "CBitmap", [P_DELAY_PROBE] = "DelayProbe", [P_OUT_OF_SYNC] = "OutOfSync", - [P_RETRY_WRITE] = "RetryWrite", [P_RS_CANCEL] = "RSCancel", [P_CONN_ST_CHG_REQ] = "conn_st_chg_req", [P_CONN_ST_CHG_REPLY] = "conn_st_chg_reply", [P_RETRY_WRITE] = "retry_write", [P_PROTOCOL_UPDATE] = "protocol_update", + [P_TRIM] = "Trim", [P_RS_THIN_REQ] = "rs_thin_req", [P_RS_DEALLOCATED] = "rs_deallocated", + [P_WSAME] = "WriteSame", + [P_ZEROES] = "Zeroes", /* enum drbd_packet, but not commands - obsoleted flags: * P_MAY_IGNORE From 75a89bc1baee6ee6c0d8c7aa7c709dbbaf972a4f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jonathan Teh Date: Sun, 13 Mar 2022 19:48:18 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0098/1091] HID: hid-led: fix maximum brightness for Dream Cheeky [ Upstream commit 116c3f4a78ebe478d5ad5a038baf931e93e7d748 ] Increase maximum brightness for Dream Cheeky to 63. Emperically determined based on testing in kernel 4.4 on this device: Bus 003 Device 002: ID 1d34:0004 Dream Cheeky Webmail Notifier Fixes: 6c7ad07e9e05 ("HID: migrate USB LED driver from usb misc to hid") Signed-off-by: Jonathan Teh Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/hid/hid-led.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-led.c b/drivers/hid/hid-led.c index c2c66ceca132..7d82f8d426bb 100644 --- a/drivers/hid/hid-led.c +++ b/drivers/hid/hid-led.c @@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ static const struct hidled_config hidled_configs[] = { .type = DREAM_CHEEKY, .name = "Dream Cheeky Webmail Notifier", .short_name = "dream_cheeky", - .max_brightness = 31, + .max_brightness = 63, .num_leds = 1, .report_size = 9, .report_type = RAW_REQUEST, From f1d4f19a796551edc6679a681ea1756b8c578c08 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miaoqian Lin Date: Sat, 16 Apr 2022 07:37:21 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0099/1091] HID: elan: Fix potential double free in elan_input_configured [ Upstream commit 1af20714fedad238362571620be0bd690ded05b6 ] 'input' is a managed resource allocated with devm_input_allocate_device(), so there is no need to call input_free_device() explicitly or there will be a double free. According to the doc of devm_input_allocate_device(): * Managed input devices do not need to be explicitly unregistered or * freed as it will be done automatically when owner device unbinds from * its driver (or binding fails). Fixes: b7429ea53d6c ("HID: elan: Fix memleak in elan_input_configured") Fixes: 9a6a4193d65b ("HID: Add driver for USB ELAN Touchpad") Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin Acked-by: Benjamin Tissoires Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/hid/hid-elan.c | 2 -- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-elan.c b/drivers/hid/hid-elan.c index 0e8f424025fe..838673303f77 100644 --- a/drivers/hid/hid-elan.c +++ b/drivers/hid/hid-elan.c @@ -188,7 +188,6 @@ static int elan_input_configured(struct hid_device *hdev, struct hid_input *hi) ret = input_mt_init_slots(input, ELAN_MAX_FINGERS, INPUT_MT_POINTER); if (ret) { hid_err(hdev, "Failed to init elan MT slots: %d\n", ret); - input_free_device(input); return ret; } @@ -200,7 +199,6 @@ static int elan_input_configured(struct hid_device *hdev, struct hid_input *hi) hid_err(hdev, "Failed to register elan input device: %d\n", ret); input_mt_destroy_slots(input); - input_free_device(input); return ret; } From 55fddbb1e2787ffbfc3009d0f24c59f6fa599dd4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miaoqian Lin Date: Wed, 20 Apr 2022 01:16:40 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0100/1091] drm/bridge: Fix error handling in analogix_dp_probe [ Upstream commit 9f15930bb2ef9f031d62ffc49629cbae89137733 ] In the error handling path, the clk_prepare_enable() function call should be balanced by a corresponding 'clk_disable_unprepare()' call, as already done in the remove function. Fixes: 3424e3a4f844 ("drm: bridge: analogix/dp: split exynos dp driver to bridge directory") Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin Reviewed-by: Robert Foss Signed-off-by: Robert Foss Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20220420011644.25730-1-linmq006@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- .../gpu/drm/bridge/analogix/analogix_dp_core.c | 18 +++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/analogix/analogix_dp_core.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/analogix/analogix_dp_core.c index 1f26890a8da6..3db0a631a6be 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/analogix/analogix_dp_core.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/analogix/analogix_dp_core.c @@ -1696,8 +1696,10 @@ analogix_dp_probe(struct device *dev, struct analogix_dp_plat_data *plat_data) res = platform_get_resource(pdev, IORESOURCE_MEM, 0); dp->reg_base = devm_ioremap_resource(&pdev->dev, res); - if (IS_ERR(dp->reg_base)) - return ERR_CAST(dp->reg_base); + if (IS_ERR(dp->reg_base)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(dp->reg_base); + goto err_disable_clk; + } dp->force_hpd = of_property_read_bool(dev->of_node, "force-hpd"); @@ -1709,7 +1711,8 @@ analogix_dp_probe(struct device *dev, struct analogix_dp_plat_data *plat_data) if (IS_ERR(dp->hpd_gpiod)) { dev_err(dev, "error getting HDP GPIO: %ld\n", PTR_ERR(dp->hpd_gpiod)); - return ERR_CAST(dp->hpd_gpiod); + ret = PTR_ERR(dp->hpd_gpiod); + goto err_disable_clk; } if (dp->hpd_gpiod) { @@ -1729,7 +1732,8 @@ analogix_dp_probe(struct device *dev, struct analogix_dp_plat_data *plat_data) if (dp->irq == -ENXIO) { dev_err(&pdev->dev, "failed to get irq\n"); - return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV); + ret = -ENODEV; + goto err_disable_clk; } ret = devm_request_threaded_irq(&pdev->dev, dp->irq, @@ -1738,11 +1742,15 @@ analogix_dp_probe(struct device *dev, struct analogix_dp_plat_data *plat_data) irq_flags, "analogix-dp", dp); if (ret) { dev_err(&pdev->dev, "failed to request irq\n"); - return ERR_PTR(ret); + goto err_disable_clk; } disable_irq(dp->irq); return dp; + +err_disable_clk: + clk_disable_unprepare(dp->clock); + return ERR_PTR(ret); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(analogix_dp_probe); From 735b57a960880dca055fcf739d7f434e380f1425 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chengming Zhou Date: Fri, 8 Apr 2022 19:53:08 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0101/1091] sched/fair: Fix cfs_rq_clock_pelt() for throttled cfs_rq [ Upstream commit 64eaf50731ac0a8c76ce2fedd50ef6652aabc5ff ] Since commit 23127296889f ("sched/fair: Update scale invariance of PELT") change to use rq_clock_pelt() instead of rq_clock_task(), we should also use rq_clock_pelt() for throttled_clock_task_time and throttled_clock_task accounting to get correct cfs_rq_clock_pelt() of throttled cfs_rq. And rename throttled_clock_task(_time) to be clock_pelt rather than clock_task. Fixes: 23127296889f ("sched/fair: Update scale invariance of PELT") Signed-off-by: Chengming Zhou Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Reviewed-by: Ben Segall Reviewed-by: Vincent Guittot Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220408115309.81603-1-zhouchengming@bytedance.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- kernel/sched/fair.c | 8 ++++---- kernel/sched/pelt.h | 4 ++-- kernel/sched/sched.h | 4 ++-- 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/sched/fair.c b/kernel/sched/fair.c index 87d9fad9d01d..d2a68ae7596e 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/fair.c +++ b/kernel/sched/fair.c @@ -4485,8 +4485,8 @@ static int tg_unthrottle_up(struct task_group *tg, void *data) cfs_rq->throttle_count--; if (!cfs_rq->throttle_count) { - cfs_rq->throttled_clock_task_time += rq_clock_task(rq) - - cfs_rq->throttled_clock_task; + cfs_rq->throttled_clock_pelt_time += rq_clock_pelt(rq) - + cfs_rq->throttled_clock_pelt; /* Add cfs_rq with already running entity in the list */ if (cfs_rq->nr_running >= 1) @@ -4503,7 +4503,7 @@ static int tg_throttle_down(struct task_group *tg, void *data) /* group is entering throttled state, stop time */ if (!cfs_rq->throttle_count) { - cfs_rq->throttled_clock_task = rq_clock_task(rq); + cfs_rq->throttled_clock_pelt = rq_clock_pelt(rq); list_del_leaf_cfs_rq(cfs_rq); } cfs_rq->throttle_count++; @@ -4932,7 +4932,7 @@ static void sync_throttle(struct task_group *tg, int cpu) pcfs_rq = tg->parent->cfs_rq[cpu]; cfs_rq->throttle_count = pcfs_rq->throttle_count; - cfs_rq->throttled_clock_task = rq_clock_task(cpu_rq(cpu)); + cfs_rq->throttled_clock_pelt = rq_clock_pelt(cpu_rq(cpu)); } /* conditionally throttle active cfs_rq's from put_prev_entity() */ diff --git a/kernel/sched/pelt.h b/kernel/sched/pelt.h index afff644da065..43e2a47489fa 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/pelt.h +++ b/kernel/sched/pelt.h @@ -127,9 +127,9 @@ static inline u64 rq_clock_pelt(struct rq *rq) static inline u64 cfs_rq_clock_pelt(struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq) { if (unlikely(cfs_rq->throttle_count)) - return cfs_rq->throttled_clock_task - cfs_rq->throttled_clock_task_time; + return cfs_rq->throttled_clock_pelt - cfs_rq->throttled_clock_pelt_time; - return rq_clock_pelt(rq_of(cfs_rq)) - cfs_rq->throttled_clock_task_time; + return rq_clock_pelt(rq_of(cfs_rq)) - cfs_rq->throttled_clock_pelt_time; } #else static inline u64 cfs_rq_clock_pelt(struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq) diff --git a/kernel/sched/sched.h b/kernel/sched/sched.h index fe755c1a0af9..b8a3db59e326 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/sched.h +++ b/kernel/sched/sched.h @@ -570,8 +570,8 @@ struct cfs_rq { s64 runtime_remaining; u64 throttled_clock; - u64 throttled_clock_task; - u64 throttled_clock_task_time; + u64 throttled_clock_pelt; + u64 throttled_clock_pelt_time; int throttled; int throttle_count; struct list_head throttled_list; From e7f0fd6f2566bd174a074f6a0b77f5d8167b78ba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zheng Yongjun Date: Fri, 22 Apr 2022 06:26:41 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0102/1091] spi: img-spfi: Fix pm_runtime_get_sync() error checking [ Upstream commit cc470d55343056d6b2a5c32e10e0aad06f324078 ] If the device is already in a runtime PM enabled state pm_runtime_get_sync() will return 1, so a test for negative value should be used to check for errors. Fixes: deba25800a12b ("spi: Add driver for IMG SPFI controller") Signed-off-by: Zheng Yongjun Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220422062641.10486-1-zhengyongjun3@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/spi/spi-img-spfi.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/spi/spi-img-spfi.c b/drivers/spi/spi-img-spfi.c index e9ef80983b79..5a6b02843f2b 100644 --- a/drivers/spi/spi-img-spfi.c +++ b/drivers/spi/spi-img-spfi.c @@ -771,7 +771,7 @@ static int img_spfi_resume(struct device *dev) int ret; ret = pm_runtime_get_sync(dev); - if (ret) { + if (ret < 0) { pm_runtime_put_noidle(dev); return ret; } From cd1f386120d0a43c4195e7f1a1c3e48c73208e34 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Schspa Shi Date: Thu, 21 Apr 2022 03:15:41 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0103/1091] cpufreq: Fix possible race in cpufreq online error path [ Upstream commit f346e96267cd76175d6c201b40f770c0116a8a04 ] When cpufreq online fails, the policy->cpus mask is not cleared and policy->rwsem is released too early, so the driver can be invoked via the cpuinfo_cur_freq sysfs attribute while its ->offline() or ->exit() callbacks are being run. Take policy->clk as an example: static int cpufreq_online(unsigned int cpu) { ... // policy->cpus != 0 at this time down_write(&policy->rwsem); ret = cpufreq_add_dev_interface(policy); up_write(&policy->rwsem); return 0; out_destroy_policy: for_each_cpu(j, policy->real_cpus) remove_cpu_dev_symlink(policy, get_cpu_device(j)); up_write(&policy->rwsem); ... out_exit_policy: if (cpufreq_driver->exit) cpufreq_driver->exit(policy); clk_put(policy->clk); // policy->clk is a wild pointer ... ^ | Another process access __cpufreq_get cpufreq_verify_current_freq cpufreq_generic_get // acces wild pointer of policy->clk; | | out_offline_policy: | cpufreq_policy_free(policy); | // deleted here, and will wait for no body reference cpufreq_policy_put_kobj(policy); } Address this by modifying cpufreq_online() to release policy->rwsem in the error path after the driver callbacks have run and to clear policy->cpus before releasing the semaphore. Fixes: 7106e02baed4 ("cpufreq: release policy->rwsem on error") Signed-off-by: Schspa Shi [ rjw: Subject and changelog edits ] Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/cpufreq/cpufreq.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/cpufreq/cpufreq.c b/drivers/cpufreq/cpufreq.c index af9f34804862..7ea07764988e 100644 --- a/drivers/cpufreq/cpufreq.c +++ b/drivers/cpufreq/cpufreq.c @@ -1509,8 +1509,6 @@ out_destroy_policy: for_each_cpu(j, policy->real_cpus) remove_cpu_dev_symlink(policy, get_cpu_device(j)); - up_write(&policy->rwsem); - out_offline_policy: if (cpufreq_driver->offline) cpufreq_driver->offline(policy); @@ -1519,6 +1517,9 @@ out_exit_policy: if (cpufreq_driver->exit) cpufreq_driver->exit(policy); + cpumask_clear(policy->cpus); + up_write(&policy->rwsem); + out_free_policy: cpufreq_policy_free(policy); return ret; From 2326d398ccd41ba6d93b8346532dfa432ab00fee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dan Carpenter Date: Sat, 9 Apr 2022 09:12:25 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 0104/1091] ath9k_htc: fix potential out of bounds access with invalid rxstatus->rs_keyix MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit 2dc509305cf956381532792cb8dceef2b1504765 ] The "rxstatus->rs_keyix" eventually gets passed to test_bit() so we need to ensure that it is within the bitmap. drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/common.c:46 ath9k_cmn_rx_accept() error: passing untrusted data 'rx_stats->rs_keyix' to 'test_bit()' Fixes: 4ed1a8d4a257 ("ath9k_htc: use ath9k_cmn_rx_accept") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter Acked-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220409061225.GA5447@kili Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_drv_txrx.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_drv_txrx.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_drv_txrx.c index 628f45c8c06f..eeaf63de71bf 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_drv_txrx.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_drv_txrx.c @@ -1005,6 +1005,14 @@ static bool ath9k_rx_prepare(struct ath9k_htc_priv *priv, goto rx_next; } + if (rxstatus->rs_keyix >= ATH_KEYMAX && + rxstatus->rs_keyix != ATH9K_RXKEYIX_INVALID) { + ath_dbg(common, ANY, + "Invalid keyix, dropping (keyix: %d)\n", + rxstatus->rs_keyix); + goto rx_next; + } + /* Get the RX status information */ memset(rx_status, 0, sizeof(struct ieee80211_rx_status)); From 60d159e0d0846671731d19dde489d48591dc9d2b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Amir Goldstein Date: Fri, 22 Apr 2022 15:03:12 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 0105/1091] inotify: show inotify mask flags in proc fdinfo [ Upstream commit a32e697cda27679a0327ae2cafdad8c7170f548f ] The inotify mask flags IN_ONESHOT and IN_EXCL_UNLINK are not "internal to kernel" and should be exposed in procfs fdinfo so CRIU can restore them. Fixes: 6933599697c9 ("inotify: hide internal kernel bits from fdinfo") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220422120327.3459282-2-amir73il@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein Signed-off-by: Jan Kara Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/notify/fdinfo.c | 11 ++--------- fs/notify/inotify/inotify.h | 12 ++++++++++++ fs/notify/inotify/inotify_user.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/notify/fdinfo.c b/fs/notify/fdinfo.c index 1e2bfd26b352..7df9ad4d8433 100644 --- a/fs/notify/fdinfo.c +++ b/fs/notify/fdinfo.c @@ -84,16 +84,9 @@ static void inotify_fdinfo(struct seq_file *m, struct fsnotify_mark *mark) inode_mark = container_of(mark, struct inotify_inode_mark, fsn_mark); inode = igrab(fsnotify_conn_inode(mark->connector)); if (inode) { - /* - * IN_ALL_EVENTS represents all of the mask bits - * that we expose to userspace. There is at - * least one bit (FS_EVENT_ON_CHILD) which is - * used only internally to the kernel. - */ - u32 mask = mark->mask & IN_ALL_EVENTS; - seq_printf(m, "inotify wd:%x ino:%lx sdev:%x mask:%x ignored_mask:%x ", + seq_printf(m, "inotify wd:%x ino:%lx sdev:%x mask:%x ignored_mask:0 ", inode_mark->wd, inode->i_ino, inode->i_sb->s_dev, - mask, mark->ignored_mask); + inotify_mark_user_mask(mark)); show_mark_fhandle(m, inode); seq_putc(m, '\n'); iput(inode); diff --git a/fs/notify/inotify/inotify.h b/fs/notify/inotify/inotify.h index 3f246f7b8a92..8b8bf52dd08b 100644 --- a/fs/notify/inotify/inotify.h +++ b/fs/notify/inotify/inotify.h @@ -22,6 +22,18 @@ static inline struct inotify_event_info *INOTIFY_E(struct fsnotify_event *fse) return container_of(fse, struct inotify_event_info, fse); } +/* + * INOTIFY_USER_FLAGS represents all of the mask bits that we expose to + * userspace. There is at least one bit (FS_EVENT_ON_CHILD) which is + * used only internally to the kernel. + */ +#define INOTIFY_USER_MASK (IN_ALL_EVENTS | IN_ONESHOT | IN_EXCL_UNLINK) + +static inline __u32 inotify_mark_user_mask(struct fsnotify_mark *fsn_mark) +{ + return fsn_mark->mask & INOTIFY_USER_MASK; +} + extern void inotify_ignored_and_remove_idr(struct fsnotify_mark *fsn_mark, struct fsnotify_group *group); extern int inotify_handle_event(struct fsnotify_group *group, diff --git a/fs/notify/inotify/inotify_user.c b/fs/notify/inotify/inotify_user.c index 81ffc8629fc4..b949b2c02f4b 100644 --- a/fs/notify/inotify/inotify_user.c +++ b/fs/notify/inotify/inotify_user.c @@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ static inline __u32 inotify_arg_to_mask(u32 arg) mask = (FS_IN_IGNORED | FS_EVENT_ON_CHILD | FS_UNMOUNT); /* mask off the flags used to open the fd */ - mask |= (arg & (IN_ALL_EVENTS | IN_ONESHOT | IN_EXCL_UNLINK)); + mask |= (arg & INOTIFY_USER_MASK); return mask; } From b0be017bc59dfbcd942a2152701a465e1fa8bb5e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Amir Goldstein Date: Fri, 22 Apr 2022 15:03:14 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 0106/1091] fsnotify: fix wrong lockdep annotations [ Upstream commit 623af4f538b5df9b416e1b82f720af7371b4c771 ] Commit 6960b0d909cd ("fsnotify: change locking order") changed some of the mark_mutex locks in direct reclaim path to use: mutex_lock_nested(&group->mark_mutex, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING); This change is explained: "...It uses nested locking to avoid deadlock in case we do the final iput() on an inode which still holds marks and thus would take the mutex again when calling fsnotify_inode_delete() in destroy_inode()." The problem is that the mutex_lock_nested() is not a nested lock at all. In fact, it has the opposite effect of preventing lockdep from warning about a very possible deadlock. Due to these wrong annotations, a deadlock that was introduced with nfsd filecache in kernel v5.4 went unnoticed in v5.4.y for over two years until it was reported recently by Khazhismel Kumykov, only to find out that the deadlock was already fixed in kernel v5.5. Fix the wrong lockdep annotations. Cc: Khazhismel Kumykov Fixes: 6960b0d909cd ("fsnotify: change locking order") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220321112310.vpr7oxro2xkz5llh@quack3.lan/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220422120327.3459282-4-amir73il@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein Signed-off-by: Jan Kara Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/notify/mark.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/notify/mark.c b/fs/notify/mark.c index 1d96216dffd1..fdf8e03bf3df 100644 --- a/fs/notify/mark.c +++ b/fs/notify/mark.c @@ -426,7 +426,7 @@ void fsnotify_free_mark(struct fsnotify_mark *mark) void fsnotify_destroy_mark(struct fsnotify_mark *mark, struct fsnotify_group *group) { - mutex_lock_nested(&group->mark_mutex, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING); + mutex_lock(&group->mark_mutex); fsnotify_detach_mark(mark); mutex_unlock(&group->mark_mutex); fsnotify_free_mark(mark); @@ -738,7 +738,7 @@ void fsnotify_clear_marks_by_group(struct fsnotify_group *group, * move marks to free to to_free list in one go and then free marks in * to_free list one by one. */ - mutex_lock_nested(&group->mark_mutex, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING); + mutex_lock(&group->mark_mutex); list_for_each_entry_safe(mark, lmark, &group->marks_list, g_list) { if ((1U << mark->connector->type) & type_mask) list_move(&mark->g_list, &to_free); @@ -747,7 +747,7 @@ void fsnotify_clear_marks_by_group(struct fsnotify_group *group, clear: while (1) { - mutex_lock_nested(&group->mark_mutex, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING); + mutex_lock(&group->mark_mutex); if (list_empty(head)) { mutex_unlock(&group->mark_mutex); break; From e120d31d04bf60a3b40de68c3dd86f54ffa73ecb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Nuno=20S=C3=A1?= Date: Wed, 20 Apr 2022 15:02:05 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0107/1091] of: overlay: do not break notify on NOTIFY_{OK|STOP} MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit 5f756a2eaa4436d7d3dc1e040147f5e992ae34b5 ] We should not break overlay notifications on NOTIFY_{OK|STOP} otherwise we might break on the first fragment. We should only stop notifications if a *real* errno is returned by one of the listeners. Fixes: a1d19bd4cf1fe ("of: overlay: pr_err from return NOTIFY_OK to overlay apply/remove") Signed-off-by: Nuno Sá Signed-off-by: Rob Herring Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220420130205.89435-1-nuno.sa@analog.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/of/overlay.c | 4 +--- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/of/overlay.c b/drivers/of/overlay.c index 1688f576ee8a..8420ef42d89e 100644 --- a/drivers/of/overlay.c +++ b/drivers/of/overlay.c @@ -170,9 +170,7 @@ static int overlay_notify(struct overlay_changeset *ovcs, ret = blocking_notifier_call_chain(&overlay_notify_chain, action, &nd); - if (ret == NOTIFY_OK || ret == NOTIFY_STOP) - return 0; - if (ret) { + if (notifier_to_errno(ret)) { ret = notifier_to_errno(ret); pr_err("overlay changeset %s notifier error %d, target: %pOF\n", of_overlay_action_name[action], ret, nd.target); From b889619eba6f9a5e57acb2e213e169a3752b614b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kiwoong Kim Date: Thu, 31 Mar 2022 10:24:05 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 0108/1091] scsi: ufs: core: Exclude UECxx from SFR dump list [ Upstream commit ef60031022eb6d972aac86ca26c98c33e1289436 ] Some devices may return invalid or zeroed data during an UIC error condition. In addition, reading these SFRs will clear them. This means the subsequent error handling will not be able to see them and therefore no error handling will be scheduled. Skip reading these SFRs in ufshcd_dump_regs(). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1648689845-33521-1-git-send-email-kwmad.kim@samsung.com Fixes: d67247566450 ("scsi: ufs: Use explicit access size in ufshcd_dump_regs") Signed-off-by: Kiwoong Kim Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c b/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c index ebf7ae1ef70d..670f4c7934f8 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c @@ -118,8 +118,13 @@ int ufshcd_dump_regs(struct ufs_hba *hba, size_t offset, size_t len, if (!regs) return -ENOMEM; - for (pos = 0; pos < len; pos += 4) + for (pos = 0; pos < len; pos += 4) { + if (offset == 0 && + pos >= REG_UIC_ERROR_CODE_PHY_ADAPTER_LAYER && + pos <= REG_UIC_ERROR_CODE_DME) + continue; regs[pos / 4] = ufshcd_readl(hba, offset + pos); + } ufshcd_hex_dump(prefix, regs, len); kfree(regs); From 1d0c4bc628ca2a2f2f41130dfc852efc065d555c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matthieu Baerts Date: Sat, 23 Apr 2022 20:24:10 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0109/1091] x86/pm: Fix false positive kmemleak report in msr_build_context() [ Upstream commit b0b592cf08367719e1d1ef07c9f136e8c17f7ec3 ] Since e2a1256b17b1 ("x86/speculation: Restore speculation related MSRs during S3 resume") kmemleak reports this issue: unreferenced object 0xffff888009cedc00 (size 256): comm "swapper/0", pid 1, jiffies 4294693823 (age 73.764s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 48 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ........H....... 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ backtrace: msr_build_context (include/linux/slab.h:621) pm_check_save_msr (arch/x86/power/cpu.c:520) do_one_initcall (init/main.c:1298) kernel_init_freeable (init/main.c:1370) kernel_init (init/main.c:1504) ret_from_fork (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:304) Reproducer: - boot the VM with a debug kernel config (see https://github.com/multipath-tcp/mptcp_net-next/issues/268) - wait ~1 minute - start a kmemleak scan The root cause here is alignment within the packed struct saved_context (from suspend_64.h). Kmemleak only searches for pointers that are aligned (see how pointers are scanned in kmemleak.c), but pahole shows that the saved_msrs struct member and all members after it in the structure are unaligned: struct saved_context { struct pt_regs regs; /* 0 168 */ /* --- cacheline 2 boundary (128 bytes) was 40 bytes ago --- */ u16 ds; /* 168 2 */ ... u64 misc_enable; /* 232 8 */ bool misc_enable_saved; /* 240 1 */ /* Note below odd offset values for the remainder of this struct */ struct saved_msrs saved_msrs; /* 241 16 */ /* --- cacheline 4 boundary (256 bytes) was 1 bytes ago --- */ long unsigned int efer; /* 257 8 */ u16 gdt_pad; /* 265 2 */ struct desc_ptr gdt_desc; /* 267 10 */ u16 idt_pad; /* 277 2 */ struct desc_ptr idt; /* 279 10 */ u16 ldt; /* 289 2 */ u16 tss; /* 291 2 */ long unsigned int tr; /* 293 8 */ long unsigned int safety; /* 301 8 */ long unsigned int return_address; /* 309 8 */ /* size: 317, cachelines: 5, members: 25 */ /* last cacheline: 61 bytes */ } __attribute__((__packed__)); Move misc_enable_saved to the end of the struct declaration so that saved_msrs fits in before the cacheline 4 boundary. The comment above the saved_context declaration says to fix wakeup_64.S file and __save/__restore_processor_state() if the struct is modified: it looks like all the accesses in wakeup_64.S are done through offsets which are computed at build-time. Update that comment accordingly. At the end, the false positive kmemleak report is due to a limitation from kmemleak but it is always good to avoid unaligned members for optimisation purposes. Please note that it looks like this issue is not new, e.g. https://lore.kernel.org/all/9f1bb619-c4ee-21c4-a251-870bd4db04fa@lwfinger.net/ https://lore.kernel.org/all/94e48fcd-1dbd-ebd2-4c91-f39941735909@molgen.mpg.de/ [ bp: Massage + cleanup commit message. ] Fixes: 7a9c2dd08ead ("x86/pm: Introduce quirk framework to save/restore extra MSR registers around suspend/resume") Suggested-by: Mat Martineau Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Rafael J. Wysocki Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220426202138.498310-1-matthieu.baerts@tessares.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/x86/include/asm/suspend_32.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/suspend_64.h | 12 ++++++++---- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/suspend_32.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/suspend_32.h index fdbd9d7b7bca..3b97aa921543 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/suspend_32.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/suspend_32.h @@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ struct saved_context { #endif unsigned long cr0, cr2, cr3, cr4; u64 misc_enable; - bool misc_enable_saved; struct saved_msrs saved_msrs; struct desc_ptr gdt_desc; struct desc_ptr idt; @@ -30,6 +29,7 @@ struct saved_context { unsigned long tr; unsigned long safety; unsigned long return_address; + bool misc_enable_saved; } __attribute__((packed)); /* routines for saving/restoring kernel state */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/suspend_64.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/suspend_64.h index 35bb35d28733..54df06687d83 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/suspend_64.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/suspend_64.h @@ -14,9 +14,13 @@ * Image of the saved processor state, used by the low level ACPI suspend to * RAM code and by the low level hibernation code. * - * If you modify it, fix arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S and make sure that - * __save/__restore_processor_state(), defined in arch/x86/kernel/suspend_64.c, - * still work as required. + * If you modify it, check how it is used in arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S + * and make sure that __save/__restore_processor_state(), defined in + * arch/x86/power/cpu.c, still work as required. + * + * Because the structure is packed, make sure to avoid unaligned members. For + * optimisation purposes but also because tools like kmemleak only search for + * pointers that are aligned. */ struct saved_context { struct pt_regs regs; @@ -36,7 +40,6 @@ struct saved_context { unsigned long cr0, cr2, cr3, cr4; u64 misc_enable; - bool misc_enable_saved; struct saved_msrs saved_msrs; unsigned long efer; u16 gdt_pad; /* Unused */ @@ -48,6 +51,7 @@ struct saved_context { unsigned long tr; unsigned long safety; unsigned long return_address; + bool misc_enable_saved; } __attribute__((packed)); #define loaddebug(thread,register) \ From ed8d5cf1dcad7a4ea4e71bfc943b351f8e17e83d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Poimboeuf Date: Mon, 25 Apr 2022 16:40:02 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0110/1091] x86/speculation: Add missing prototype for unpriv_ebpf_notify() MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit 2147c438fde135d6c145a96e373d9348e7076f7f ] Fix the following warnings seen with "make W=1": kernel/sysctl.c:183:13: warning: no previous prototype for ‘unpriv_ebpf_notify’ [-Wmissing-prototypes] 183 | void __weak unpriv_ebpf_notify(int new_state) | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c:659:6: warning: no previous prototype for ‘unpriv_ebpf_notify’ [-Wmissing-prototypes] 659 | void unpriv_ebpf_notify(int new_state) | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Fixes: 44a3918c8245 ("x86/speculation: Include unprivileged eBPF status in Spectre v2 mitigation reporting") Reported-by: kernel test robot Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/5689d065f739602ececaee1e05e68b8644009608.1650930000.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- include/linux/bpf.h | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h index a73ca7c9c7d0..5705cda3c4c4 100644 --- a/include/linux/bpf.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf.h @@ -929,6 +929,8 @@ void bpf_offload_dev_netdev_unregister(struct bpf_offload_dev *offdev, struct net_device *netdev); bool bpf_offload_dev_match(struct bpf_prog *prog, struct net_device *netdev); +void unpriv_ebpf_notify(int new_state); + #if defined(CONFIG_NET) && defined(CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL) int bpf_prog_offload_init(struct bpf_prog *prog, union bpf_attr *attr); From 31de06ef06a8f8f9fa3c1a4f46fa56d50d5c939b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nicolas Frattaroli Date: Wed, 27 Apr 2022 19:23:11 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0111/1091] ASoC: rk3328: fix disabling mclk on pclk probe failure [ Upstream commit dd508e324cdde1c06ace08a8143fa50333a90703 ] If preparing/enabling the pclk fails, the probe function should unprepare and disable the previously prepared and enabled mclk, which it doesn't do. This commit rectifies this. Fixes: c32759035ad2 ("ASoC: rockchip: support ACODEC for rk3328") Signed-off-by: Nicolas Frattaroli Reviewed-by: Katsuhiro Suzuki Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220427172310.138638-1-frattaroli.nicolas@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- sound/soc/codecs/rk3328_codec.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/rk3328_codec.c b/sound/soc/codecs/rk3328_codec.c index 514ebe16bbfa..4e71ecf54af7 100644 --- a/sound/soc/codecs/rk3328_codec.c +++ b/sound/soc/codecs/rk3328_codec.c @@ -479,7 +479,7 @@ static int rk3328_platform_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) ret = clk_prepare_enable(rk3328->pclk); if (ret < 0) { dev_err(&pdev->dev, "failed to enable acodec pclk\n"); - return ret; + goto err_unprepare_mclk; } base = devm_platform_ioremap_resource(pdev, 0); From db681127e96d988270d29af37c752927342445c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yang Jihong Date: Fri, 29 Apr 2022 17:05:39 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0112/1091] perf tools: Add missing headers needed by util/data.h MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit 4d27cf1d9de5becfa4d1efb2ea54dba1b9fc962a ] 'struct perf_data' in util/data.h uses the "u64" data type, which is defined in "linux/types.h". If we only include util/data.h, the following compilation error occurs: util/data.h:38:3: error: unknown type name ‘u64’ u64 version; ^~~ Solution: include "linux/types.h." to add the needed type definitions. Fixes: 258031c017c353e8 ("perf header: Add DIR_FORMAT feature to describe directory data") Signed-off-by: Yang Jihong Cc: Adrian Hunter Cc: Alexander Shishkin Cc: Andi Kleen Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Jiri Olsa Cc: Mark Rutland Cc: Namhyung Kim Cc: Peter Zijlstra Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220429090539.212448-1-yangjihong1@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- tools/perf/util/data.h | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/tools/perf/util/data.h b/tools/perf/util/data.h index 259868a39019..252d99071249 100644 --- a/tools/perf/util/data.h +++ b/tools/perf/util/data.h @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ #define __PERF_DATA_H #include +#include enum perf_data_mode { PERF_DATA_MODE_WRITE, From ef10d0c68e8608848cd58fca2589685718426607 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vinod Polimera Date: Mon, 25 Apr 2022 08:56:53 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 0113/1091] drm/msm/disp/dpu1: set vbif hw config to NULL to avoid use after memory free during pm runtime resume [ Upstream commit fa5186b279ecf44b14fb435540d2065be91cb1ed ] BUG: Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 006b6b6b6b6b6be3 Call trace: dpu_vbif_init_memtypes+0x40/0xb8 dpu_runtime_resume+0xcc/0x1c0 pm_generic_runtime_resume+0x30/0x44 __genpd_runtime_resume+0x68/0x7c genpd_runtime_resume+0x134/0x258 __rpm_callback+0x98/0x138 rpm_callback+0x30/0x88 rpm_resume+0x36c/0x49c __pm_runtime_resume+0x80/0xb0 dpu_core_irq_uninstall+0x30/0xb0 dpu_irq_uninstall+0x18/0x24 msm_drm_uninit+0xd8/0x16c Fixes: 25fdd5933e4c ("drm/msm: Add SDM845 DPU support") Signed-off-by: Vinod Polimera Reviewed-by: Dmitry Baryshkov Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/483255/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1650857213-30075-1-git-send-email-quic_vpolimer@quicinc.com [DB: fixed Fixes tag] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Baryshkov Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/dpu1/dpu_kms.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/dpu1/dpu_kms.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/dpu1/dpu_kms.c index 72f487692adb..c08c67338d73 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/dpu1/dpu_kms.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/dpu1/dpu_kms.c @@ -599,8 +599,10 @@ static void _dpu_kms_hw_destroy(struct dpu_kms *dpu_kms) for (i = 0; i < dpu_kms->catalog->vbif_count; i++) { u32 vbif_idx = dpu_kms->catalog->vbif[i].id; - if ((vbif_idx < VBIF_MAX) && dpu_kms->hw_vbif[vbif_idx]) + if ((vbif_idx < VBIF_MAX) && dpu_kms->hw_vbif[vbif_idx]) { dpu_hw_vbif_destroy(dpu_kms->hw_vbif[vbif_idx]); + dpu_kms->hw_vbif[vbif_idx] = NULL; + } } } From 11709592b350cbb94065b4a9f1f58cccce054f56 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dmitry Baryshkov Date: Sat, 2 Apr 2022 02:11:04 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 0114/1091] drm/msm/dsi: fix error checks and return values for DSI xmit functions [ Upstream commit f0e7e9ed379c012c4d6b09a09b868accc426223c ] As noticed by Dan ([1] an the followup thread) there are multiple issues with the return values for MSM DSI command transmission callback. In the error case it can easily return a positive value when it should have returned a proper error code. This commits attempts to fix these issues both in TX and in RX paths. [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-msm/20211001123617.GH2283@kili/ Fixes: a689554ba6ed ("drm/msm: Initial add DSI connector support") Reported-by: Dan Carpenter Signed-off-by: Dmitry Baryshkov Reviewed-by: Abhinav Kumar Tested-by: Marijn Suijten Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/480501/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220401231104.967193-1-dmitry.baryshkov@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Dmitry Baryshkov Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/gpu/drm/msm/dsi/dsi_host.c | 21 ++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/dsi/dsi_host.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/dsi/dsi_host.c index 423c4ae2be10..743142e15b4c 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/dsi/dsi_host.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/dsi/dsi_host.c @@ -1348,10 +1348,10 @@ static int dsi_cmds2buf_tx(struct msm_dsi_host *msm_host, dsi_get_bpp(msm_host->format) / 8; len = dsi_cmd_dma_add(msm_host, msg); - if (!len) { + if (len < 0) { pr_err("%s: failed to add cmd type = 0x%x\n", __func__, msg->type); - return -EINVAL; + return len; } /* for video mode, do not send cmds more than @@ -1370,10 +1370,14 @@ static int dsi_cmds2buf_tx(struct msm_dsi_host *msm_host, } ret = dsi_cmd_dma_tx(msm_host, len); - if (ret < len) { - pr_err("%s: cmd dma tx failed, type=0x%x, data0=0x%x, len=%d\n", - __func__, msg->type, (*(u8 *)(msg->tx_buf)), len); - return -ECOMM; + if (ret < 0) { + pr_err("%s: cmd dma tx failed, type=0x%x, data0=0x%x, len=%d, ret=%d\n", + __func__, msg->type, (*(u8 *)(msg->tx_buf)), len, ret); + return ret; + } else if (ret < len) { + pr_err("%s: cmd dma tx failed, type=0x%x, data0=0x%x, ret=%d len=%d\n", + __func__, msg->type, (*(u8 *)(msg->tx_buf)), ret, len); + return -EIO; } return len; @@ -2099,9 +2103,12 @@ int msm_dsi_host_cmd_rx(struct mipi_dsi_host *host, } ret = dsi_cmds2buf_tx(msm_host, msg); - if (ret < msg->tx_len) { + if (ret < 0) { pr_err("%s: Read cmd Tx failed, %d\n", __func__, ret); return ret; + } else if (ret < msg->tx_len) { + pr_err("%s: Read cmd Tx failed, too short: %d\n", __func__, ret); + return -ECOMM; } /* From 2b3ed7547b1a052209da6c4ab886ffe0eed88c42 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yang Yingliang Date: Fri, 22 Apr 2022 11:22:27 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0115/1091] drm/msm/hdmi: check return value after calling platform_get_resource_byname() [ Upstream commit a36e506711548df923ceb7ec9f6001375be799a5 ] It will cause null-ptr-deref if platform_get_resource_byname() returns NULL, we need check the return value. Fixes: c6a57a50ad56 ("drm/msm/hdmi: add hdmi hdcp support (V3)") Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang Reviewed-by: Dmitry Baryshkov Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/482992/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220422032227.2991553-1-yangyingliang@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry Baryshkov Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/gpu/drm/msm/hdmi/hdmi.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/hdmi/hdmi.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/hdmi/hdmi.c index 1a7e77373407..a0fd62b6ec99 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/hdmi/hdmi.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/hdmi/hdmi.c @@ -142,6 +142,10 @@ static struct hdmi *msm_hdmi_init(struct platform_device *pdev) /* HDCP needs physical address of hdmi register */ res = platform_get_resource_byname(pdev, IORESOURCE_MEM, config->mmio_name); + if (!res) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto fail; + } hdmi->mmio_phy_addr = res->start; hdmi->qfprom_mmio = msm_ioremap(pdev, From 35d9a84e3b3545ae1e808c5e6aec21c54956500e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lv Ruyi Date: Mon, 25 Apr 2022 09:18:31 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0116/1091] drm/msm/hdmi: fix error check return value of irq_of_parse_and_map() [ Upstream commit 03371e4fbdeb7f596cbceacb59e474248b6d95ac ] The irq_of_parse_and_map() function returns 0 on failure, and does not return a negative value anyhow, so never enter this conditional branch. Fixes: f6a8eaca0ea1 ("drm/msm/mdp5: use irqdomains") Reported-by: Zeal Robot Signed-off-by: Lv Ruyi Reviewed-by: Stephen Boyd Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/483294/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220425091831.3500487-1-lv.ruyi@zte.com.cn Signed-off-by: Dmitry Baryshkov Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/gpu/drm/msm/hdmi/hdmi.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/hdmi/hdmi.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/hdmi/hdmi.c index a0fd62b6ec99..e4c9ff934e5b 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/hdmi/hdmi.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/hdmi/hdmi.c @@ -315,9 +315,9 @@ int msm_hdmi_modeset_init(struct hdmi *hdmi, } hdmi->irq = irq_of_parse_and_map(pdev->dev.of_node, 0); - if (hdmi->irq < 0) { - ret = hdmi->irq; - DRM_DEV_ERROR(dev->dev, "failed to get irq: %d\n", ret); + if (!hdmi->irq) { + ret = -EINVAL; + DRM_DEV_ERROR(dev->dev, "failed to get irq\n"); goto fail; } From a9b4599665e437de8a1152799c34841b799a2e1c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yang Yingliang Date: Fri, 22 Apr 2022 11:28:54 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0117/1091] drm/rockchip: vop: fix possible null-ptr-deref in vop_bind() [ Upstream commit f8c242908ad15bbd604d3bcb54961b7d454c43f8 ] It will cause null-ptr-deref in resource_size(), if platform_get_resource() returns NULL, move calling resource_size() after devm_ioremap_resource() that will check 'res' to avoid null-ptr-deref. Fixes: 2048e3286f34 ("drm: rockchip: Add basic drm driver") Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang Signed-off-by: Heiko Stuebner Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20220422032854.2995175-1-yangyingliang@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/gpu/drm/rockchip/rockchip_drm_vop.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/rockchip/rockchip_drm_vop.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/rockchip/rockchip_drm_vop.c index 84e3decb17b1..2e4e1933a43c 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/rockchip/rockchip_drm_vop.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/rockchip/rockchip_drm_vop.c @@ -1848,10 +1848,10 @@ static int vop_bind(struct device *dev, struct device *master, void *data) vop_win_init(vop); res = platform_get_resource(pdev, IORESOURCE_MEM, 0); - vop->len = resource_size(res); vop->regs = devm_ioremap_resource(dev, res); if (IS_ERR(vop->regs)) return PTR_ERR(vop->regs); + vop->len = resource_size(res); vop->regsbak = devm_kzalloc(dev, vop->len, GFP_KERNEL); if (!vop->regsbak) From ee3901d7c7f4c0c40f57a66ac5b2c8fec551108f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christoph Hellwig Date: Mon, 18 Apr 2022 06:53:07 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0118/1091] virtio_blk: fix the discard_granularity and discard_alignment queue limits [ Upstream commit 62952cc5bccd89b76d710de1d0b43244af0f2903 ] The discard_alignment queue limit is named a bit misleading means the offset into the block device at which the discard granularity starts. On the other hand the discard_sector_alignment from the virtio 1.1 looks similar to what Linux uses as discard granularity (even if not very well described): "discard_sector_alignment can be used by OS when splitting a request based on alignment. " And at least qemu does set it to the discard granularity. So stop setting the discard_alignment and use the virtio discard_sector_alignment to set the discard granularity. Fixes: 1f23816b8eb8 ("virtio_blk: add discard and write zeroes support") Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220418045314.360785-5-hch@lst.de Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/block/virtio_blk.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/block/virtio_blk.c b/drivers/block/virtio_blk.c index 2a5cd502feae..9b3ea86c20e5 100644 --- a/drivers/block/virtio_blk.c +++ b/drivers/block/virtio_blk.c @@ -976,11 +976,12 @@ static int virtblk_probe(struct virtio_device *vdev) blk_queue_io_opt(q, blk_size * opt_io_size); if (virtio_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_BLK_F_DISCARD)) { - q->limits.discard_granularity = blk_size; - virtio_cread(vdev, struct virtio_blk_config, discard_sector_alignment, &v); - q->limits.discard_alignment = v ? v << SECTOR_SHIFT : 0; + if (v) + q->limits.discard_granularity = v << SECTOR_SHIFT; + else + q->limits.discard_granularity = blk_size; virtio_cread(vdev, struct virtio_blk_config, max_discard_sectors, &v); From 9777de28cfea449d5a7d18a90205aaa32c9a088c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Randy Dunlap Date: Sun, 13 Mar 2022 18:27:25 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0119/1091] x86: Fix return value of __setup handlers [ Upstream commit 12441ccdf5e2f5a01a46e344976cbbd3d46845c9 ] __setup() handlers should return 1 to obsolete_checksetup() in init/main.c to indicate that the boot option has been handled. A return of 0 causes the boot option/value to be listed as an Unknown kernel parameter and added to init's (limited) argument (no '=') or environment (with '=') strings. So return 1 from these x86 __setup handlers. Examples: Unknown kernel command line parameters "apicpmtimer BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/bzImage-517rc8 vdso=1 ring3mwait=disable", will be passed to user space. Run /sbin/init as init process with arguments: /sbin/init apicpmtimer with environment: HOME=/ TERM=linux BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/bzImage-517rc8 vdso=1 ring3mwait=disable Fixes: 2aae950b21e4 ("x86_64: Add vDSO for x86-64 with gettimeofday/clock_gettime/getcpu") Fixes: 77b52b4c5c66 ("x86: add "debugpat" boot option") Fixes: e16fd002afe2 ("x86/cpufeature: Enable RING3MWAIT for Knights Landing") Fixes: b8ce33590687 ("x86_64: convert to clock events") Reported-by: Igor Zhbanov Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/64644a2f-4a20-bab3-1e15-3b2cdd0defe3@omprussia.ru Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220314012725.26661-1-rdunlap@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c | 2 +- arch/x86/mm/pat.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c index f5937742b290..3613cfb83c6d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c @@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ int arch_setup_additional_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int uses_interp) static __init int vdso_setup(char *s) { vdso64_enabled = simple_strtoul(s, NULL, 0); - return 0; + return 1; } __setup("vdso=", vdso_setup); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c index 4e4476b832be..68c734032523 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c @@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ static __init int setup_apicpmtimer(char *s) { apic_calibrate_pmtmr = 1; notsc_setup(NULL); - return 0; + return 1; } __setup("apicpmtimer", setup_apicpmtimer); #endif diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c index 11d5c5950e2d..44688917d51f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c @@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ static bool ring3mwait_disabled __read_mostly; static int __init ring3mwait_disable(char *__unused) { ring3mwait_disabled = true; - return 0; + return 1; } __setup("ring3mwait=disable", ring3mwait_disable); diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pat.c b/arch/x86/mm/pat.c index 35b2e35c2203..c7c4e2f8c6a5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/pat.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pat.c @@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ int pat_debug_enable; static int __init pat_debug_setup(char *str) { pat_debug_enable = 1; - return 0; + return 1; } __setup("debugpat", pat_debug_setup); From b97eb924a234c6a640339a9707c5b3824bc84d3d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Thompson Date: Tue, 3 May 2022 14:45:41 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0120/1091] irqchip/exiu: Fix acknowledgment of edge triggered interrupts [ Upstream commit 4efc851c36e389f7ed432edac0149acc5f94b0c7 ] Currently the EXIU uses the fasteoi interrupt flow that is configured by it's parent (irq-gic-v3.c). With this flow the only chance to clear the interrupt request happens during .irq_eoi() and (obviously) this happens after the interrupt handler has run. EXIU requires edge triggered interrupts to be acked prior to interrupt handling. Without this we risk incorrect interrupt dismissal when a new interrupt is delivered after the handler reads and acknowledges the peripheral but before the irq_eoi() takes place. Fix this by clearing the interrupt request from .irq_ack() if we are configured for edge triggered interrupts. This requires adopting the fasteoi-ack flow instead of the fasteoi to ensure the ack gets called. These changes have been tested using the power button on a Developerbox/SC2A11 combined with some hackery in gpio-keys so I can play with the different trigger mode [and an mdelay(500) so I can can check what happens on a double click in both modes]. Fixes: 706cffc1b912 ("irqchip/exiu: Add support for Socionext Synquacer EXIU controller") Signed-off-by: Daniel Thompson Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220503134541.2566457-1-daniel.thompson@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/arm64/Kconfig.platforms | 1 + drivers/irqchip/irq-sni-exiu.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig.platforms b/arch/arm64/Kconfig.platforms index 9dccf4db319b..90202e5608d1 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig.platforms +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig.platforms @@ -225,6 +225,7 @@ config ARCH_STRATIX10 config ARCH_SYNQUACER bool "Socionext SynQuacer SoC Family" + select IRQ_FASTEOI_HIERARCHY_HANDLERS config ARCH_TEGRA bool "NVIDIA Tegra SoC Family" diff --git a/drivers/irqchip/irq-sni-exiu.c b/drivers/irqchip/irq-sni-exiu.c index abd011fcecf4..c7db617e1a2f 100644 --- a/drivers/irqchip/irq-sni-exiu.c +++ b/drivers/irqchip/irq-sni-exiu.c @@ -37,11 +37,26 @@ struct exiu_irq_data { u32 spi_base; }; -static void exiu_irq_eoi(struct irq_data *d) +static void exiu_irq_ack(struct irq_data *d) { struct exiu_irq_data *data = irq_data_get_irq_chip_data(d); writel(BIT(d->hwirq), data->base + EIREQCLR); +} + +static void exiu_irq_eoi(struct irq_data *d) +{ + struct exiu_irq_data *data = irq_data_get_irq_chip_data(d); + + /* + * Level triggered interrupts are latched and must be cleared during + * EOI or the interrupt will be jammed on. Of course if a level + * triggered interrupt is still asserted then the write will not clear + * the interrupt. + */ + if (irqd_is_level_type(d)) + writel(BIT(d->hwirq), data->base + EIREQCLR); + irq_chip_eoi_parent(d); } @@ -91,10 +106,13 @@ static int exiu_irq_set_type(struct irq_data *d, unsigned int type) writel_relaxed(val, data->base + EILVL); val = readl_relaxed(data->base + EIEDG); - if (type == IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_LOW || type == IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH) + if (type == IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_LOW || type == IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH) { val &= ~BIT(d->hwirq); - else + irq_set_handler_locked(d, handle_fasteoi_irq); + } else { val |= BIT(d->hwirq); + irq_set_handler_locked(d, handle_fasteoi_ack_irq); + } writel_relaxed(val, data->base + EIEDG); writel_relaxed(BIT(d->hwirq), data->base + EIREQCLR); @@ -104,6 +122,7 @@ static int exiu_irq_set_type(struct irq_data *d, unsigned int type) static struct irq_chip exiu_irq_chip = { .name = "EXIU", + .irq_ack = exiu_irq_ack, .irq_eoi = exiu_irq_eoi, .irq_enable = exiu_irq_enable, .irq_mask = exiu_irq_mask, From d2476a1fc50b79e1a92e28f650ad2668facf2a34 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Krzysztof Kozlowski Date: Sat, 23 Apr 2022 11:42:26 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0121/1091] irqchip/aspeed-i2c-ic: Fix irq_of_parse_and_map() return value [ Upstream commit 50f0f26e7c8665763d0d7d3372dbcf191f94d077 ] The irq_of_parse_and_map() returns 0 on failure, not a negative ERRNO. Fixes: f48e699ddf70 ("irqchip/aspeed-i2c-ic: Add I2C IRQ controller for Aspeed") Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220423094227.33148-1-krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/irqchip/irq-aspeed-i2c-ic.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/irqchip/irq-aspeed-i2c-ic.c b/drivers/irqchip/irq-aspeed-i2c-ic.c index 8d591c179f81..3d3210828e9b 100644 --- a/drivers/irqchip/irq-aspeed-i2c-ic.c +++ b/drivers/irqchip/irq-aspeed-i2c-ic.c @@ -79,8 +79,8 @@ static int __init aspeed_i2c_ic_of_init(struct device_node *node, } i2c_ic->parent_irq = irq_of_parse_and_map(node, 0); - if (i2c_ic->parent_irq < 0) { - ret = i2c_ic->parent_irq; + if (!i2c_ic->parent_irq) { + ret = -EINVAL; goto err_iounmap; } From db5a21f2dd62f83bd3dcea6f5a5286d3e64586fd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Randy Dunlap Date: Mon, 14 Mar 2022 17:10:45 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0122/1091] x86/mm: Cleanup the control_va_addr_alignment() __setup handler [ Upstream commit 1ef64b1e89e6d4018da46e08ffc32779a31160c7 ] Clean up control_va_addr_alignment(): a. Make '=' required instead of optional (as documented). b. Print a warning if an invalid option value is used. c. Return 1 from the __setup handler when an invalid option value is used. This prevents the kernel from polluting init's (limited) environment space with the entire string. Fixes: dfb09f9b7ab0 ("x86, amd: Avoid cache aliasing penalties on AMD family 15h") Reported-by: Igor Zhbanov Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/64644a2f-4a20-bab3-1e15-3b2cdd0defe3@omprussia.ru Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220315001045.7680-1-rdunlap@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c | 7 ++----- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c index f7476ce23b6e..42e31358a9d3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c @@ -70,9 +70,6 @@ static int __init control_va_addr_alignment(char *str) if (*str == 0) return 1; - if (*str == '=') - str++; - if (!strcmp(str, "32")) va_align.flags = ALIGN_VA_32; else if (!strcmp(str, "64")) @@ -82,11 +79,11 @@ static int __init control_va_addr_alignment(char *str) else if (!strcmp(str, "on")) va_align.flags = ALIGN_VA_32 | ALIGN_VA_64; else - return 0; + pr_warn("invalid option value: 'align_va_addr=%s'\n", str); return 1; } -__setup("align_va_addr", control_va_addr_alignment); +__setup("align_va_addr=", control_va_addr_alignment); SYSCALL_DEFINE6(mmap, unsigned long, addr, unsigned long, len, unsigned long, prot, unsigned long, flags, From cd4cfd99ec14f089ac202d7d6bd4277e401a54f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zev Weiss Date: Wed, 4 May 2022 21:31:52 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0123/1091] regulator: core: Fix enable_count imbalance with EXCLUSIVE_GET [ Upstream commit c3e3ca05dae37f8f74bb80358efd540911cbc2c8 ] Since the introduction of regulator->enable_count, a driver that did an exclusive get on an already-enabled regulator would end up with enable_count initialized to 0 but rdev->use_count initialized to 1. With that starting point the regulator is effectively stuck enabled, because if the driver attempted to disable it it would fail the enable_count underflow check in _regulator_handle_consumer_disable(). The EXCLUSIVE_GET path in _regulator_get() now initializes enable_count along with rdev->use_count so that the regulator can be disabled without underflowing the former. Signed-off-by: Zev Weiss Fixes: 5451781dadf85 ("regulator: core: Only count load for enabled consumers") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220505043152.12933-1-zev@bewilderbeest.net Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/regulator/core.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/regulator/core.c b/drivers/regulator/core.c index 7fd793d8536c..ae2addadb36f 100644 --- a/drivers/regulator/core.c +++ b/drivers/regulator/core.c @@ -1988,10 +1988,13 @@ struct regulator *_regulator_get(struct device *dev, const char *id, rdev->exclusive = 1; ret = _regulator_is_enabled(rdev); - if (ret > 0) + if (ret > 0) { rdev->use_count = 1; - else + regulator->enable_count = 1; + } else { rdev->use_count = 0; + regulator->enable_count = 0; + } } device_link_add(dev, &rdev->dev, DL_FLAG_STATELESS); From b2aa2c4efe93e2580d6a8774b04fe2b99756a322 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jessica Zhang Date: Thu, 5 May 2022 14:40:50 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0124/1091] drm/msm/mdp5: Return error code in mdp5_pipe_release when deadlock is detected [ Upstream commit d59be579fa932c46b908f37509f319cbd4ca9a68 ] mdp5_get_global_state runs the risk of hitting a -EDEADLK when acquiring the modeset lock, but currently mdp5_pipe_release doesn't check for if an error is returned. Because of this, there is a possibility of mdp5_pipe_release hitting a NULL dereference error. To avoid this, let's have mdp5_pipe_release check if mdp5_get_global_state returns an error and propogate that error. Changes since v1: - Separated declaration and initialization of *new_state to avoid compiler warning - Fixed some spelling mistakes in commit message Changes since v2: - Return 0 in case where hwpipe is NULL as this is considered normal behavior - Added 2nd patch in series to fix a similar NULL dereference issue in mdp5_mixer_release Reported-by: Tomeu Vizoso Signed-off-by: Jessica Zhang Fixes: 7907a0d77cb4 ("drm/msm/mdp5: Use the new private_obj state") Reviewed-by: Rob Clark Reviewed-by: Dmitry Baryshkov Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/485179/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220505214051.155-1-quic_jesszhan@quicinc.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry Baryshkov Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/mdp5/mdp5_pipe.c | 15 +++++++++++---- drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/mdp5/mdp5_pipe.h | 2 +- drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/mdp5/mdp5_plane.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++---- 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/mdp5/mdp5_pipe.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/mdp5/mdp5_pipe.c index ba6695963aa6..a4f5cb90f3e8 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/mdp5/mdp5_pipe.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/mdp5/mdp5_pipe.c @@ -119,18 +119,23 @@ int mdp5_pipe_assign(struct drm_atomic_state *s, struct drm_plane *plane, return 0; } -void mdp5_pipe_release(struct drm_atomic_state *s, struct mdp5_hw_pipe *hwpipe) +int mdp5_pipe_release(struct drm_atomic_state *s, struct mdp5_hw_pipe *hwpipe) { struct msm_drm_private *priv = s->dev->dev_private; struct mdp5_kms *mdp5_kms = to_mdp5_kms(to_mdp_kms(priv->kms)); struct mdp5_global_state *state = mdp5_get_global_state(s); - struct mdp5_hw_pipe_state *new_state = &state->hwpipe; + struct mdp5_hw_pipe_state *new_state; if (!hwpipe) - return; + return 0; + + if (IS_ERR(state)) + return PTR_ERR(state); + + new_state = &state->hwpipe; if (WARN_ON(!new_state->hwpipe_to_plane[hwpipe->idx])) - return; + return -EINVAL; DBG("%s: release from plane %s", hwpipe->name, new_state->hwpipe_to_plane[hwpipe->idx]->name); @@ -141,6 +146,8 @@ void mdp5_pipe_release(struct drm_atomic_state *s, struct mdp5_hw_pipe *hwpipe) } new_state->hwpipe_to_plane[hwpipe->idx] = NULL; + + return 0; } void mdp5_pipe_destroy(struct mdp5_hw_pipe *hwpipe) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/mdp5/mdp5_pipe.h b/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/mdp5/mdp5_pipe.h index 9b26d0761bd4..cca67938cab2 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/mdp5/mdp5_pipe.h +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/mdp5/mdp5_pipe.h @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ int mdp5_pipe_assign(struct drm_atomic_state *s, struct drm_plane *plane, uint32_t caps, uint32_t blkcfg, struct mdp5_hw_pipe **hwpipe, struct mdp5_hw_pipe **r_hwpipe); -void mdp5_pipe_release(struct drm_atomic_state *s, struct mdp5_hw_pipe *hwpipe); +int mdp5_pipe_release(struct drm_atomic_state *s, struct mdp5_hw_pipe *hwpipe); struct mdp5_hw_pipe *mdp5_pipe_init(enum mdp5_pipe pipe, uint32_t reg_offset, uint32_t caps); diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/mdp5/mdp5_plane.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/mdp5/mdp5_plane.c index da0799333970..0dc23c86747e 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/mdp5/mdp5_plane.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/mdp5/mdp5_plane.c @@ -393,12 +393,24 @@ static int mdp5_plane_atomic_check_with_state(struct drm_crtc_state *crtc_state, mdp5_state->r_hwpipe = NULL; - mdp5_pipe_release(state->state, old_hwpipe); - mdp5_pipe_release(state->state, old_right_hwpipe); + ret = mdp5_pipe_release(state->state, old_hwpipe); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = mdp5_pipe_release(state->state, old_right_hwpipe); + if (ret) + return ret; + } } else { - mdp5_pipe_release(state->state, mdp5_state->hwpipe); - mdp5_pipe_release(state->state, mdp5_state->r_hwpipe); + ret = mdp5_pipe_release(state->state, mdp5_state->hwpipe); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = mdp5_pipe_release(state->state, mdp5_state->r_hwpipe); + if (ret) + return ret; + mdp5_state->hwpipe = mdp5_state->r_hwpipe = NULL; } From 22d8424913b1348c6324916745fadaeea5273f0e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jessica Zhang Date: Thu, 5 May 2022 14:40:51 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0125/1091] drm/msm/mdp5: Return error code in mdp5_mixer_release when deadlock is detected [ Upstream commit ca75f6f7c6f89365e40f10f641b15981b1f07c31 ] There is a possibility for mdp5_get_global_state to return -EDEADLK when acquiring the modeset lock, but currently global_state in mdp5_mixer_release doesn't check for if an error is returned. To avoid a NULL dereference error, let's have mdp5_mixer_release check if an error is returned and propagate that error. Reported-by: Tomeu Vizoso Signed-off-by: Jessica Zhang Fixes: 7907a0d77cb4 ("drm/msm/mdp5: Use the new private_obj state") Reviewed-by: Rob Clark Reviewed-by: Dmitry Baryshkov Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/485181/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220505214051.155-2-quic_jesszhan@quicinc.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry Baryshkov Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/mdp5/mdp5_crtc.c | 10 ++++++++-- drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/mdp5/mdp5_mixer.c | 15 +++++++++++---- drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/mdp5/mdp5_mixer.h | 4 ++-- 3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/mdp5/mdp5_crtc.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/mdp5/mdp5_crtc.c index 395146884a22..9afbce3cb87b 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/mdp5/mdp5_crtc.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/mdp5/mdp5_crtc.c @@ -534,9 +534,15 @@ int mdp5_crtc_setup_pipeline(struct drm_crtc *crtc, if (ret) return ret; - mdp5_mixer_release(new_crtc_state->state, old_mixer); + ret = mdp5_mixer_release(new_crtc_state->state, old_mixer); + if (ret) + return ret; + if (old_r_mixer) { - mdp5_mixer_release(new_crtc_state->state, old_r_mixer); + ret = mdp5_mixer_release(new_crtc_state->state, old_r_mixer); + if (ret) + return ret; + if (!need_right_mixer) pipeline->r_mixer = NULL; } diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/mdp5/mdp5_mixer.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/mdp5/mdp5_mixer.c index 954db683ae44..2536def2a000 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/mdp5/mdp5_mixer.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/mdp5/mdp5_mixer.c @@ -116,21 +116,28 @@ int mdp5_mixer_assign(struct drm_atomic_state *s, struct drm_crtc *crtc, return 0; } -void mdp5_mixer_release(struct drm_atomic_state *s, struct mdp5_hw_mixer *mixer) +int mdp5_mixer_release(struct drm_atomic_state *s, struct mdp5_hw_mixer *mixer) { struct mdp5_global_state *global_state = mdp5_get_global_state(s); - struct mdp5_hw_mixer_state *new_state = &global_state->hwmixer; + struct mdp5_hw_mixer_state *new_state; if (!mixer) - return; + return 0; + + if (IS_ERR(global_state)) + return PTR_ERR(global_state); + + new_state = &global_state->hwmixer; if (WARN_ON(!new_state->hwmixer_to_crtc[mixer->idx])) - return; + return -EINVAL; DBG("%s: release from crtc %s", mixer->name, new_state->hwmixer_to_crtc[mixer->idx]->name); new_state->hwmixer_to_crtc[mixer->idx] = NULL; + + return 0; } void mdp5_mixer_destroy(struct mdp5_hw_mixer *mixer) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/mdp5/mdp5_mixer.h b/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/mdp5/mdp5_mixer.h index 43c9ba43ce18..545ee223b9d7 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/mdp5/mdp5_mixer.h +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/mdp5/mdp5_mixer.h @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ void mdp5_mixer_destroy(struct mdp5_hw_mixer *lm); int mdp5_mixer_assign(struct drm_atomic_state *s, struct drm_crtc *crtc, uint32_t caps, struct mdp5_hw_mixer **mixer, struct mdp5_hw_mixer **r_mixer); -void mdp5_mixer_release(struct drm_atomic_state *s, - struct mdp5_hw_mixer *mixer); +int mdp5_mixer_release(struct drm_atomic_state *s, + struct mdp5_hw_mixer *mixer); #endif /* __MDP5_LM_H__ */ From ab888b1a9a6df78ccc1c9773d13d7d5e809f9a16 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dan Carpenter Date: Thu, 5 May 2022 13:28:05 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 0126/1091] drm/msm: return an error pointer in msm_gem_prime_get_sg_table() [ Upstream commit cf575e31611eb6dccf08fad02e57e35b2187704d ] The msm_gem_prime_get_sg_table() needs to return error pointers on error. This is called from drm_gem_map_dma_buf() and returning a NULL will lead to a crash in that function. Fixes: ac45146733b0 ("drm/msm: fix msm_gem_prime_get_sg_table()") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter Reviewed-by: Dmitry Baryshkov Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/485023/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/YnOmtS5tfENywR9m@kili Signed-off-by: Dmitry Baryshkov Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/gpu/drm/msm/msm_gem_prime.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/msm_gem_prime.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/msm_gem_prime.c index d7c8948427fe..705a834ba1e6 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/msm_gem_prime.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/msm_gem_prime.c @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ struct sg_table *msm_gem_prime_get_sg_table(struct drm_gem_object *obj) int npages = obj->size >> PAGE_SHIFT; if (WARN_ON(!msm_obj->pages)) /* should have already pinned! */ - return NULL; + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); return drm_prime_pages_to_sg(msm_obj->pages, npages); } From 6b8291e574a8d722f95d0fd3d89dd5c916be9d65 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xiaomeng Tong Date: Sat, 19 Mar 2022 11:22:22 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0127/1091] media: uvcvideo: Fix missing check to determine if element is found in list [ Upstream commit 261f33388c29f6f3c12a724e6d89172b7f6d5996 ] The list iterator will point to a bogus position containing HEAD if the list is empty or the element is not found in list. This case should be checked before any use of the iterator, otherwise it will lead to a invalid memory access. The missing check here is before "pin = iterm->id;", just add check here to fix the security bug. In addition, the list iterator value will *always* be set and non-NULL by list_for_each_entry(), so it is incorrect to assume that the iterator value will be NULL if the element is not found in list, considering the (mis)use here: "if (iterm == NULL". Use a new value 'it' as the list iterator, while use the old value 'iterm' as a dedicated pointer to point to the found element, which 1. can fix this bug, due to 'iterm' is NULL only if it's not found. 2. do not need to change all the uses of 'iterm' after the loop. 3. can also limit the scope of the list iterator 'it' *only inside* the traversal loop by simply declaring 'it' inside the loop in the future, as usage of the iterator outside of the list_for_each_entry is considered harmful. https://lkml.org/lkml/2022/2/17/1032 Fixes: d5e90b7a6cd1c ("[media] uvcvideo: Move to video_ioctl2") Signed-off-by: Xiaomeng Tong Signed-off-by: Laurent Pinchart Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_v4l2.c | 20 +++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_v4l2.c b/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_v4l2.c index 3126ee9e965c..96ef64b6a232 100644 --- a/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_v4l2.c +++ b/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_v4l2.c @@ -859,29 +859,31 @@ static int uvc_ioctl_enum_input(struct file *file, void *fh, struct uvc_video_chain *chain = handle->chain; const struct uvc_entity *selector = chain->selector; struct uvc_entity *iterm = NULL; + struct uvc_entity *it; u32 index = input->index; - int pin = 0; if (selector == NULL || (chain->dev->quirks & UVC_QUIRK_IGNORE_SELECTOR_UNIT)) { if (index != 0) return -EINVAL; - list_for_each_entry(iterm, &chain->entities, chain) { - if (UVC_ENTITY_IS_ITERM(iterm)) + list_for_each_entry(it, &chain->entities, chain) { + if (UVC_ENTITY_IS_ITERM(it)) { + iterm = it; break; + } } - pin = iterm->id; } else if (index < selector->bNrInPins) { - pin = selector->baSourceID[index]; - list_for_each_entry(iterm, &chain->entities, chain) { - if (!UVC_ENTITY_IS_ITERM(iterm)) + list_for_each_entry(it, &chain->entities, chain) { + if (!UVC_ENTITY_IS_ITERM(it)) continue; - if (iterm->id == pin) + if (it->id == selector->baSourceID[index]) { + iterm = it; break; + } } } - if (iterm == NULL || iterm->id != pin) + if (iterm == NULL) return -EINVAL; memset(input, 0, sizeof(*input)); From 1253811c71e0070084416b39e8cc77bad799b3c5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andreas Gruenbacher Date: Thu, 5 May 2022 18:19:13 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0128/1091] iomap: iomap_write_failed fix [ Upstream commit b71450e2cc4b3c79f33c5bd276d152af9bd54f79 ] The @lend parameter of truncate_pagecache_range() should be the offset of the last byte of the hole, not the first byte beyond it. Fixes: ae259a9c8593 ("fs: introduce iomap infrastructure") Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/iomap/buffered-io.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/iomap/buffered-io.c b/fs/iomap/buffered-io.c index 5c73751adb2d..53cd7b2bb580 100644 --- a/fs/iomap/buffered-io.c +++ b/fs/iomap/buffered-io.c @@ -535,7 +535,8 @@ iomap_write_failed(struct inode *inode, loff_t pos, unsigned len) * write started inside the existing inode size. */ if (pos + len > i_size) - truncate_pagecache_range(inode, max(pos, i_size), pos + len); + truncate_pagecache_range(inode, max(pos, i_size), + pos + len - 1); } static int From f2e2e934d2b6fbd6847de8211e65485d52fc4ed1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Viresh Kumar Date: Mon, 9 May 2022 09:27:37 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 0129/1091] Revert "cpufreq: Fix possible race in cpufreq online error path" [ Upstream commit 85f0e42bd65d01b351d561efb38e584d4c596553 ] This reverts commit f346e96267cd76175d6c201b40f770c0116a8a04. The commit tried to fix a possible real bug but it made it even worse. The fix was simply buggy as now an error out to out_offline_policy or out_exit_policy will try to release a semaphore which was never taken in the first place. This works fine only if we failed late, i.e. via out_destroy_policy. Fixes: f346e96267cd ("cpufreq: Fix possible race in cpufreq online error path") Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/cpufreq/cpufreq.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/cpufreq/cpufreq.c b/drivers/cpufreq/cpufreq.c index 7ea07764988e..af9f34804862 100644 --- a/drivers/cpufreq/cpufreq.c +++ b/drivers/cpufreq/cpufreq.c @@ -1509,6 +1509,8 @@ out_destroy_policy: for_each_cpu(j, policy->real_cpus) remove_cpu_dev_symlink(policy, get_cpu_device(j)); + up_write(&policy->rwsem); + out_offline_policy: if (cpufreq_driver->offline) cpufreq_driver->offline(policy); @@ -1517,9 +1519,6 @@ out_exit_policy: if (cpufreq_driver->exit) cpufreq_driver->exit(policy); - cpumask_clear(policy->cpus); - up_write(&policy->rwsem); - out_free_policy: cpufreq_policy_free(policy); return ret; From ddb1a77f94d7b4a03a32a41358275969d393f5a8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ravi Bangoria Date: Fri, 29 Apr 2022 10:44:41 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 0130/1091] perf/amd/ibs: Use interrupt regs ip for stack unwinding [ Upstream commit 3d47083b9ff46863e8374ad3bb5edb5e464c75f8 ] IbsOpRip is recorded when IBS interrupt is triggered. But there is a skid from the time IBS interrupt gets triggered to the time the interrupt is presented to the core. Meanwhile processor would have moved ahead and thus IbsOpRip will be inconsistent with rsp and rbp recorded as part of the interrupt regs. This causes issues while unwinding stack using the ORC unwinder as it needs consistent rip, rsp and rbp. Fix this by using rip from interrupt regs instead of IbsOpRip for stack unwinding. Fixes: ee9f8fce99640 ("x86/unwind: Add the ORC unwinder") Reported-by: Dmitry Monakhov Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra Signed-off-by: Ravi Bangoria Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220429051441.14251-1-ravi.bangoria@amd.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/x86/events/amd/ibs.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/events/amd/ibs.c b/arch/x86/events/amd/ibs.c index b7baaa973317..2e930d8c04d9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/events/amd/ibs.c +++ b/arch/x86/events/amd/ibs.c @@ -312,6 +312,16 @@ static int perf_ibs_init(struct perf_event *event) hwc->config_base = perf_ibs->msr; hwc->config = config; + /* + * rip recorded by IbsOpRip will not be consistent with rsp and rbp + * recorded as part of interrupt regs. Thus we need to use rip from + * interrupt regs while unwinding call stack. Setting _EARLY flag + * makes sure we unwind call-stack before perf sample rip is set to + * IbsOpRip. + */ + if (event->attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_CALLCHAIN) + event->attr.sample_type |= __PERF_SAMPLE_CALLCHAIN_EARLY; + return 0; } @@ -683,6 +693,14 @@ fail: data.raw = &raw; } + /* + * rip recorded by IbsOpRip will not be consistent with rsp and rbp + * recorded as part of interrupt regs. Thus we need to use rip from + * interrupt regs while unwinding call stack. + */ + if (event->attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_CALLCHAIN) + data.callchain = perf_callchain(event, iregs); + throttle = perf_event_overflow(event, &data, ®s); out: if (throttle) { From 96fc3da6184af5687e153d420cd7dcdeefdd2f9a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miaoqian Lin Date: Wed, 11 May 2022 10:58:03 +0400 Subject: [PATCH 0131/1091] ASoC: fsl: Fix refcount leak in imx_sgtl5000_probe [ Upstream commit 41cd312dfe980af869c3503b4d38e62ed20dd3b7 ] of_find_i2c_device_by_node() takes a reference, In error paths, we should call put_device() to drop the reference to aviod refount leak. Fixes: 81e8e4926167 ("ASoC: fsl: add sgtl5000 clock support for imx-sgtl5000") Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220511065803.3957-1-linmq006@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- sound/soc/fsl/imx-sgtl5000.c | 14 ++++++++------ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/fsl/imx-sgtl5000.c b/sound/soc/fsl/imx-sgtl5000.c index 15e8b9343c35..7106d56a3346 100644 --- a/sound/soc/fsl/imx-sgtl5000.c +++ b/sound/soc/fsl/imx-sgtl5000.c @@ -120,19 +120,19 @@ static int imx_sgtl5000_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) data = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL); if (!data) { ret = -ENOMEM; - goto fail; + goto put_device; } comp = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, 3 * sizeof(*comp), GFP_KERNEL); if (!comp) { ret = -ENOMEM; - goto fail; + goto put_device; } data->codec_clk = clk_get(&codec_dev->dev, NULL); if (IS_ERR(data->codec_clk)) { ret = PTR_ERR(data->codec_clk); - goto fail; + goto put_device; } data->clk_frequency = clk_get_rate(data->codec_clk); @@ -158,10 +158,10 @@ static int imx_sgtl5000_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) data->card.dev = &pdev->dev; ret = snd_soc_of_parse_card_name(&data->card, "model"); if (ret) - goto fail; + goto put_device; ret = snd_soc_of_parse_audio_routing(&data->card, "audio-routing"); if (ret) - goto fail; + goto put_device; data->card.num_links = 1; data->card.owner = THIS_MODULE; data->card.dai_link = &data->dai; @@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ static int imx_sgtl5000_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) if (ret != -EPROBE_DEFER) dev_err(&pdev->dev, "snd_soc_register_card failed (%d)\n", ret); - goto fail; + goto put_device; } of_node_put(ssi_np); @@ -184,6 +184,8 @@ static int imx_sgtl5000_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) return 0; +put_device: + put_device(&codec_dev->dev); fail: if (data && !IS_ERR(data->codec_clk)) clk_put(data->codec_clk); From 18b907ff0ae4bf20120aae1538f7156b9d08e3a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miaoqian Lin Date: Wed, 11 May 2022 17:37:22 +0400 Subject: [PATCH 0132/1091] ASoC: mxs-saif: Fix refcount leak in mxs_saif_probe [ Upstream commit 2be84f73785fa9ed6443e3c5b158730266f1c2ee ] of_parse_phandle() returns a node pointer with refcount incremented, we should use of_node_put() on it when done. Fixes: 08641c7c74dd ("ASoC: mxs: add device tree support for mxs-saif") Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220511133725.39039-1-linmq006@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- sound/soc/mxs/mxs-saif.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/sound/soc/mxs/mxs-saif.c b/sound/soc/mxs/mxs-saif.c index cb1b525cbe9d..c899a05e896f 100644 --- a/sound/soc/mxs/mxs-saif.c +++ b/sound/soc/mxs/mxs-saif.c @@ -767,6 +767,7 @@ static int mxs_saif_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) saif->master_id = saif->id; } else { ret = of_alias_get_id(master, "saif"); + of_node_put(master); if (ret < 0) return ret; else From 0be5d9da5743b9825a95baec85a67500b2c1d362 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miaoqian Lin Date: Wed, 11 May 2022 15:35:05 +0400 Subject: [PATCH 0133/1091] regulator: pfuze100: Fix refcount leak in pfuze_parse_regulators_dt [ Upstream commit afaa7b933ef00a2d3262f4d1252087613fb5c06d ] of_node_get() returns a node with refcount incremented. Calling of_node_put() to drop the reference when not needed anymore. Fixes: 3784b6d64dc5 ("regulator: pfuze100: add pfuze100 regulator driver") Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220511113506.45185-1-linmq006@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/regulator/pfuze100-regulator.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/regulator/pfuze100-regulator.c b/drivers/regulator/pfuze100-regulator.c index 44b1da7cc374..f873d97100e2 100644 --- a/drivers/regulator/pfuze100-regulator.c +++ b/drivers/regulator/pfuze100-regulator.c @@ -528,6 +528,7 @@ static int pfuze_parse_regulators_dt(struct pfuze_chip *chip) parent = of_get_child_by_name(np, "regulators"); if (!parent) { dev_err(dev, "regulators node not found\n"); + of_node_put(np); return -EINVAL; } @@ -557,6 +558,7 @@ static int pfuze_parse_regulators_dt(struct pfuze_chip *chip) } of_node_put(parent); + of_node_put(np); if (ret < 0) { dev_err(dev, "Error parsing regulator init data: %d\n", ret); From d2b1dc3a0432fa1704685f792c9126612739994c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Poimboeuf Date: Thu, 12 May 2022 12:05:27 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0134/1091] scripts/faddr2line: Fix overlapping text section failures [ Upstream commit 1d1a0e7c5100d332583e20b40aa8c0a8ed3d7849 ] There have been some recent reports of faddr2line failures: $ scripts/faddr2line sound/soundcore.ko sound_devnode+0x5/0x35 bad symbol size: base: 0x0000000000000000 end: 0x0000000000000000 $ ./scripts/faddr2line vmlinux.o enter_from_user_mode+0x24 bad symbol size: base: 0x0000000000005fe0 end: 0x0000000000005fe0 The problem is that faddr2line is based on 'nm', which has a major limitation: it doesn't know how to distinguish between different text sections. So if an offset exists in multiple text sections in the object, it may fail. Rewrite faddr2line to be section-aware, by basing it on readelf. Fixes: 67326666e2d4 ("scripts: add script for translating stack dump function offsets") Reported-by: Kaiwan N Billimoria Reported-by: Peter Zijlstra Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/29ff99f86e3da965b6e46c1cc2d72ce6528c17c3.1652382321.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- scripts/faddr2line | 150 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 97 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-) diff --git a/scripts/faddr2line b/scripts/faddr2line index 6c6439f69a72..0e6268d59883 100755 --- a/scripts/faddr2line +++ b/scripts/faddr2line @@ -44,17 +44,6 @@ set -o errexit set -o nounset -READELF="${CROSS_COMPILE:-}readelf" -ADDR2LINE="${CROSS_COMPILE:-}addr2line" -SIZE="${CROSS_COMPILE:-}size" -NM="${CROSS_COMPILE:-}nm" - -command -v awk >/dev/null 2>&1 || die "awk isn't installed" -command -v ${READELF} >/dev/null 2>&1 || die "readelf isn't installed" -command -v ${ADDR2LINE} >/dev/null 2>&1 || die "addr2line isn't installed" -command -v ${SIZE} >/dev/null 2>&1 || die "size isn't installed" -command -v ${NM} >/dev/null 2>&1 || die "nm isn't installed" - usage() { echo "usage: faddr2line [--list] ..." >&2 exit 1 @@ -69,6 +58,14 @@ die() { exit 1 } +READELF="${CROSS_COMPILE:-}readelf" +ADDR2LINE="${CROSS_COMPILE:-}addr2line" +AWK="awk" + +command -v ${AWK} >/dev/null 2>&1 || die "${AWK} isn't installed" +command -v ${READELF} >/dev/null 2>&1 || die "${READELF} isn't installed" +command -v ${ADDR2LINE} >/dev/null 2>&1 || die "${ADDR2LINE} isn't installed" + # Try to figure out the source directory prefix so we can remove it from the # addr2line output. HACK ALERT: This assumes that start_kernel() is in # init/main.c! This only works for vmlinux. Otherwise it falls back to @@ -76,7 +73,7 @@ die() { find_dir_prefix() { local objfile=$1 - local start_kernel_addr=$(${READELF} -sW $objfile | awk '$8 == "start_kernel" {printf "0x%s", $2}') + local start_kernel_addr=$(${READELF} --symbols --wide $objfile | ${AWK} '$8 == "start_kernel" {printf "0x%s", $2}') [[ -z $start_kernel_addr ]] && return local file_line=$(${ADDR2LINE} -e $objfile $start_kernel_addr) @@ -97,86 +94,133 @@ __faddr2line() { local dir_prefix=$3 local print_warnings=$4 - local func=${func_addr%+*} + local sym_name=${func_addr%+*} local offset=${func_addr#*+} offset=${offset%/*} - local size= - [[ $func_addr =~ "/" ]] && size=${func_addr#*/} + local user_size= + [[ $func_addr =~ "/" ]] && user_size=${func_addr#*/} - if [[ -z $func ]] || [[ -z $offset ]] || [[ $func = $func_addr ]]; then + if [[ -z $sym_name ]] || [[ -z $offset ]] || [[ $sym_name = $func_addr ]]; then warn "bad func+offset $func_addr" DONE=1 return fi # Go through each of the object's symbols which match the func name. - # In rare cases there might be duplicates. - file_end=$(${SIZE} -Ax $objfile | awk '$1 == ".text" {print $2}') - while read symbol; do - local fields=($symbol) - local sym_base=0x${fields[0]} - local sym_type=${fields[1]} - local sym_end=${fields[3]} + # In rare cases there might be duplicates, in which case we print all + # matches. + while read line; do + local fields=($line) + local sym_addr=0x${fields[1]} + local sym_elf_size=${fields[2]} + local sym_sec=${fields[6]} - # calculate the size - local sym_size=$(($sym_end - $sym_base)) - if [[ -z $sym_size ]] || [[ $sym_size -le 0 ]]; then - warn "bad symbol size: base: $sym_base end: $sym_end" + # Get the section size: + local sec_size=$(${READELF} --section-headers --wide $objfile | + sed 's/\[ /\[/' | + ${AWK} -v sec=$sym_sec '$1 == "[" sec "]" { print "0x" $6; exit }') + + if [[ -z $sec_size ]]; then + warn "bad section size: section: $sym_sec" DONE=1 return fi + + # Calculate the symbol size. + # + # Unfortunately we can't use the ELF size, because kallsyms + # also includes the padding bytes in its size calculation. For + # kallsyms, the size calculation is the distance between the + # symbol and the next symbol in a sorted list. + local sym_size + local cur_sym_addr + local found=0 + while read line; do + local fields=($line) + cur_sym_addr=0x${fields[1]} + local cur_sym_elf_size=${fields[2]} + local cur_sym_name=${fields[7]:-} + + if [[ $cur_sym_addr = $sym_addr ]] && + [[ $cur_sym_elf_size = $sym_elf_size ]] && + [[ $cur_sym_name = $sym_name ]]; then + found=1 + continue + fi + + if [[ $found = 1 ]]; then + sym_size=$(($cur_sym_addr - $sym_addr)) + [[ $sym_size -lt $sym_elf_size ]] && continue; + found=2 + break + fi + done < <(${READELF} --symbols --wide $objfile | ${AWK} -v sec=$sym_sec '$7 == sec' | sort --key=2) + + if [[ $found = 0 ]]; then + warn "can't find symbol: sym_name: $sym_name sym_sec: $sym_sec sym_addr: $sym_addr sym_elf_size: $sym_elf_size" + DONE=1 + return + fi + + # If nothing was found after the symbol, assume it's the last + # symbol in the section. + [[ $found = 1 ]] && sym_size=$(($sec_size - $sym_addr)) + + if [[ -z $sym_size ]] || [[ $sym_size -le 0 ]]; then + warn "bad symbol size: sym_addr: $sym_addr cur_sym_addr: $cur_sym_addr" + DONE=1 + return + fi + sym_size=0x$(printf %x $sym_size) - # calculate the address - local addr=$(($sym_base + $offset)) + # Calculate the section address from user-supplied offset: + local addr=$(($sym_addr + $offset)) if [[ -z $addr ]] || [[ $addr = 0 ]]; then - warn "bad address: $sym_base + $offset" + warn "bad address: $sym_addr + $offset" DONE=1 return fi addr=0x$(printf %x $addr) - # weed out non-function symbols - if [[ $sym_type != t ]] && [[ $sym_type != T ]]; then + # If the user provided a size, make sure it matches the symbol's size: + if [[ -n $user_size ]] && [[ $user_size -ne $sym_size ]]; then [[ $print_warnings = 1 ]] && - echo "skipping $func address at $addr due to non-function symbol of type '$sym_type'" - continue - fi - - # if the user provided a size, make sure it matches the symbol's size - if [[ -n $size ]] && [[ $size -ne $sym_size ]]; then - [[ $print_warnings = 1 ]] && - echo "skipping $func address at $addr due to size mismatch ($size != $sym_size)" + echo "skipping $sym_name address at $addr due to size mismatch ($user_size != $sym_size)" continue; fi - # make sure the provided offset is within the symbol's range + # Make sure the provided offset is within the symbol's range: if [[ $offset -gt $sym_size ]]; then [[ $print_warnings = 1 ]] && - echo "skipping $func address at $addr due to size mismatch ($offset > $sym_size)" + echo "skipping $sym_name address at $addr due to size mismatch ($offset > $sym_size)" continue fi - # separate multiple entries with a blank line + # In case of duplicates or multiple addresses specified on the + # cmdline, separate multiple entries with a blank line: [[ $FIRST = 0 ]] && echo FIRST=0 - # pass real address to addr2line - echo "$func+$offset/$sym_size:" - local file_lines=$(${ADDR2LINE} -fpie $objfile $addr | sed "s; $dir_prefix\(\./\)*; ;") - [[ -z $file_lines ]] && return + echo "$sym_name+$offset/$sym_size:" + # Pass section address to addr2line and strip absolute paths + # from the output: + local output=$(${ADDR2LINE} -fpie $objfile $addr | sed "s; $dir_prefix\(\./\)*; ;") + [[ -z $output ]] && continue + + # Default output (non --list): if [[ $LIST = 0 ]]; then - echo "$file_lines" | while read -r line + echo "$output" | while read -r line do echo $line done DONE=1; - return + continue fi - # show each line with context - echo "$file_lines" | while read -r line + # For --list, show each line with its corresponding source code: + echo "$output" | while read -r line do echo echo $line @@ -184,12 +228,12 @@ __faddr2line() { n1=$[$n-5] n2=$[$n+5] f=$(echo $line | sed 's/.*at \(.\+\):.*/\1/g') - awk 'NR>=strtonum("'$n1'") && NR<=strtonum("'$n2'") { if (NR=='$n') printf(">%d<", NR); else printf(" %d ", NR); printf("\t%s\n", $0)}' $f + ${AWK} 'NR>=strtonum("'$n1'") && NR<=strtonum("'$n2'") { if (NR=='$n') printf(">%d<", NR); else printf(" %d ", NR); printf("\t%s\n", $0)}' $f done DONE=1 - done < <(${NM} -n $objfile | awk -v fn=$func -v end=$file_end '$3 == fn { found=1; line=$0; start=$1; next } found == 1 { found=0; print line, "0x"$1 } END {if (found == 1) print line, end; }') + done < <(${READELF} --symbols --wide $objfile | ${AWK} -v fn=$sym_name '$4 == "FUNC" && $8 == fn') } [[ $# -lt 2 ]] && usage From 12480f757810e938d4319ab3e6bba2e1904f35a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christophe JAILLET Date: Sun, 6 Mar 2022 19:08:07 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0135/1091] media: aspeed: Fix an error handling path in aspeed_video_probe() [ Upstream commit 310fda622bbd38be17fb444f7f049b137af3bc0d ] A dma_free_coherent() call is missing in the error handling path of the probe, as already done in the remove function. In fact, this call is included in aspeed_video_free_buf(). So use the latter both in the error handling path of the probe and in the remove function. It is easier to see the relation with aspeed_video_alloc_buf() this way. Fixes: d2b4387f3bdf ("media: platform: Add Aspeed Video Engine driver") Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/media/platform/aspeed-video.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/media/platform/aspeed-video.c b/drivers/media/platform/aspeed-video.c index c87eddb1c93f..c3f0b143330a 100644 --- a/drivers/media/platform/aspeed-video.c +++ b/drivers/media/platform/aspeed-video.c @@ -1688,6 +1688,7 @@ static int aspeed_video_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) rc = aspeed_video_setup_video(video); if (rc) { + aspeed_video_free_buf(video, &video->jpeg); clk_unprepare(video->vclk); clk_unprepare(video->eclk); return rc; @@ -1715,8 +1716,7 @@ static int aspeed_video_remove(struct platform_device *pdev) v4l2_device_unregister(v4l2_dev); - dma_free_coherent(video->dev, VE_JPEG_HEADER_SIZE, video->jpeg.virt, - video->jpeg.dma); + aspeed_video_free_buf(video, &video->jpeg); of_reserved_mem_device_release(dev); From b87d3a043b32b1dab5870beb19c0daa3da94e958 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miaoqian Lin Date: Mon, 7 Mar 2022 09:08:59 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0136/1091] media: st-delta: Fix PM disable depth imbalance in delta_probe [ Upstream commit 94e3dba710fe0afc772172305444250023fc2d30 ] The pm_runtime_enable will decrease power disable depth. If the probe fails, we should use pm_runtime_disable() to balance pm_runtime_enable(). Fixes: f386509e4959 ("[media] st-delta: STiH4xx multi-format video decoder v4l2 driver") Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin Acked-by: Hugues Fruchet Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/media/platform/sti/delta/delta-v4l2.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/media/platform/sti/delta/delta-v4l2.c b/drivers/media/platform/sti/delta/delta-v4l2.c index 2791107e641b..29732b49a2cd 100644 --- a/drivers/media/platform/sti/delta/delta-v4l2.c +++ b/drivers/media/platform/sti/delta/delta-v4l2.c @@ -1862,7 +1862,7 @@ static int delta_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) if (ret) { dev_err(delta->dev, "%s failed to initialize firmware ipc channel\n", DELTA_PREFIX); - goto err; + goto err_pm_disable; } /* register all available decoders */ @@ -1876,7 +1876,7 @@ static int delta_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) if (ret) { dev_err(delta->dev, "%s failed to register V4L2 device\n", DELTA_PREFIX); - goto err; + goto err_pm_disable; } delta->work_queue = create_workqueue(DELTA_NAME); @@ -1901,6 +1901,8 @@ err_work_queue: destroy_workqueue(delta->work_queue); err_v4l2: v4l2_device_unregister(&delta->v4l2_dev); +err_pm_disable: + pm_runtime_disable(dev); err: return ret; } From 83345b536599228c555ee7b8162804d68231277f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miaoqian Lin Date: Fri, 18 Mar 2022 12:01:01 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0137/1091] media: exynos4-is: Change clk_disable to clk_disable_unprepare [ Upstream commit 9fadab72a6916c7507d7fedcd644859eef995078 ] The corresponding API for clk_prepare_enable is clk_disable_unprepare, other than clk_disable. Fix this by changing clk_disable to clk_disable_unprepare. Fixes: b4155d7d5b2c ("[media] exynos4-is: Ensure fimc-is clocks are not enabled until properly configured") Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/media/platform/exynos4-is/fimc-is.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/media/platform/exynos4-is/fimc-is.c b/drivers/media/platform/exynos4-is/fimc-is.c index 64148b7e0d98..9bb14bb2e498 100644 --- a/drivers/media/platform/exynos4-is/fimc-is.c +++ b/drivers/media/platform/exynos4-is/fimc-is.c @@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ static int fimc_is_enable_clocks(struct fimc_is *is) dev_err(&is->pdev->dev, "clock %s enable failed\n", fimc_is_clocks[i]); for (--i; i >= 0; i--) - clk_disable(is->clocks[i]); + clk_disable_unprepare(is->clocks[i]); return ret; } pr_debug("enabled clock: %s\n", fimc_is_clocks[i]); From 1310fc3538dcc375a2f46ef0a438512c2ca32827 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pavel Skripkin Date: Fri, 15 Apr 2022 23:24:48 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0138/1091] media: pvrusb2: fix array-index-out-of-bounds in pvr2_i2c_core_init [ Upstream commit 471bec68457aaf981add77b4f590d65dd7da1059 ] Syzbot reported that -1 is used as array index. The problem was in missing validation check. hdw->unit_number is initialized with -1 and then if init table walk fails this value remains unchanged. Since code blindly uses this member for array indexing adding sanity check is the easiest fix for that. hdw->workpoll initialization moved upper to prevent warning in __flush_work. Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+1a247e36149ffd709a9b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: d855497edbfb ("V4L/DVB (4228a): pvrusb2 to kernel 2.6.18") Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/media/usb/pvrusb2/pvrusb2-hdw.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/media/usb/pvrusb2/pvrusb2-hdw.c b/drivers/media/usb/pvrusb2/pvrusb2-hdw.c index 2f00679f65a0..11e7fcfc3f19 100644 --- a/drivers/media/usb/pvrusb2/pvrusb2-hdw.c +++ b/drivers/media/usb/pvrusb2/pvrusb2-hdw.c @@ -2570,6 +2570,11 @@ struct pvr2_hdw *pvr2_hdw_create(struct usb_interface *intf, } while (0); mutex_unlock(&pvr2_unit_mtx); + INIT_WORK(&hdw->workpoll, pvr2_hdw_worker_poll); + + if (hdw->unit_number == -1) + goto fail; + cnt1 = 0; cnt2 = scnprintf(hdw->name+cnt1,sizeof(hdw->name)-cnt1,"pvrusb2"); cnt1 += cnt2; @@ -2581,8 +2586,6 @@ struct pvr2_hdw *pvr2_hdw_create(struct usb_interface *intf, if (cnt1 >= sizeof(hdw->name)) cnt1 = sizeof(hdw->name)-1; hdw->name[cnt1] = 0; - INIT_WORK(&hdw->workpoll,pvr2_hdw_worker_poll); - pvr2_trace(PVR2_TRACE_INIT,"Driver unit number is %d, name is %s", hdw->unit_number,hdw->name); From c3c8c7e409d031cf78252cef3139af9368103512 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michael Rodin Date: Tue, 23 Nov 2021 12:50:36 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0139/1091] media: vsp1: Fix offset calculation for plane cropping [ Upstream commit 5f25abec8f21b7527c1223a354d23c270befddb3 ] The vertical subsampling factor is currently not considered in the offset calculation for plane cropping done in rpf_configure_partition. This causes a distortion (shift of the color plane) when formats with the vsub factor larger than 1 are used (e.g. NV12, see vsp1_video_formats in vsp1_pipe.c). This commit considers vsub factor for all planes except plane 0 (luminance). Drop generalization of the offset calculation to reduce the binary size. Fixes: e5ad37b64de9 ("[media] v4l: vsp1: Add cropping support") Signed-off-by: Michael Rodin Signed-off-by: LUU HOAI Signed-off-by: Laurent Pinchart Reviewed-by: Kieran Bingham Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/media/platform/vsp1/vsp1_rpf.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/media/platform/vsp1/vsp1_rpf.c b/drivers/media/platform/vsp1/vsp1_rpf.c index 85587c1b6a37..75083cb234fe 100644 --- a/drivers/media/platform/vsp1/vsp1_rpf.c +++ b/drivers/media/platform/vsp1/vsp1_rpf.c @@ -291,11 +291,11 @@ static void rpf_configure_partition(struct vsp1_entity *entity, + crop.left * fmtinfo->bpp[0] / 8; if (format->num_planes > 1) { + unsigned int bpl = format->plane_fmt[1].bytesperline; unsigned int offset; - offset = crop.top * format->plane_fmt[1].bytesperline - + crop.left / fmtinfo->hsub - * fmtinfo->bpp[1] / 8; + offset = crop.top / fmtinfo->vsub * bpl + + crop.left / fmtinfo->hsub * fmtinfo->bpp[1] / 8; mem.addr[1] += offset; mem.addr[2] += offset; } From 6f55fac0af3531cf60d11369454c41f5fc81ab3f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ying Hsu Date: Sat, 26 Mar 2022 07:09:28 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0140/1091] Bluetooth: fix dangling sco_conn and use-after-free in sco_sock_timeout [ Upstream commit 7aa1e7d15f8a5b65f67bacb100d8fc033b21efa2 ] Connecting the same socket twice consecutively in sco_sock_connect() could lead to a race condition where two sco_conn objects are created but only one is associated with the socket. If the socket is closed before the SCO connection is established, the timer associated with the dangling sco_conn object won't be canceled. As the sock object is being freed, the use-after-free problem happens when the timer callback function sco_sock_timeout() accesses the socket. Here's the call trace: dump_stack+0x107/0x163 ? refcount_inc+0x1c/ print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1c/0x47e ? refcount_inc+0x1c/0x7b kasan_report+0x13a/0x173 ? refcount_inc+0x1c/0x7b check_memory_region+0x132/0x139 refcount_inc+0x1c/0x7b sco_sock_timeout+0xb2/0x1ba process_one_work+0x739/0xbd1 ? cancel_delayed_work+0x13f/0x13f ? __raw_spin_lock_init+0xf0/0xf0 ? to_kthread+0x59/0x85 worker_thread+0x593/0x70e kthread+0x346/0x35a ? drain_workqueue+0x31a/0x31a ? kthread_bind+0x4b/0x4b ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=2bef95d3ab4daa10155b Reported-by: syzbot+2bef95d3ab4daa10155b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: e1dee2c1de2b ("Bluetooth: fix repeated calls to sco_sock_kill") Signed-off-by: Ying Hsu Reviewed-by: Joseph Hwang Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/bluetooth/sco.c | 21 +++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/sco.c b/net/bluetooth/sco.c index 2c616c1c6295..fbfb12e43010 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/sco.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/sco.c @@ -563,19 +563,24 @@ static int sco_sock_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr, int alen addr->sa_family != AF_BLUETOOTH) return -EINVAL; - if (sk->sk_state != BT_OPEN && sk->sk_state != BT_BOUND) - return -EBADFD; + lock_sock(sk); + if (sk->sk_state != BT_OPEN && sk->sk_state != BT_BOUND) { + err = -EBADFD; + goto done; + } - if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_SEQPACKET) - return -EINVAL; + if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_SEQPACKET) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto done; + } hdev = hci_get_route(&sa->sco_bdaddr, &sco_pi(sk)->src, BDADDR_BREDR); - if (!hdev) - return -EHOSTUNREACH; + if (!hdev) { + err = -EHOSTUNREACH; + goto done; + } hci_dev_lock(hdev); - lock_sock(sk); - /* Set destination address and psm */ bacpy(&sco_pi(sk)->dst, &sa->sco_bdaddr); From d43a87d66039863b5a844361f096ec79f8fd2cb3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Geert Uytterhoeven Date: Fri, 13 May 2022 14:50:28 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0141/1091] m68k: math-emu: Fix dependencies of math emulation support [ Upstream commit ed6bc6bf0a7d75e80eb1df883c09975ebb74e590 ] If CONFIG_M54xx=y, CONFIG_MMU=y, and CONFIG_M68KFPU_EMU=y: {standard input}:272: Error: invalid instruction for this architecture; needs 68000 or higher (68000 [68ec000, 68hc000, 68hc001, 68008, 68302, 68306, 68307, 68322, 68356], 68010, 68020 [68k, 68ec020], 68030 [68ec030], 68040 [68ec040], 68060 [68ec060], cpu32 [68330, 68331, 68332, 68333, 68334, 68336, 68340, 68341, 68349, 68360], fidoa [fido]) -- statement `sub.b %d1,%d3' ignored {standard input}:609: Error: invalid instruction for this architecture; needs 68020 or higher (68020 [68k, 68ec020], 68030 [68ec030], 68040 [68ec040], 68060 [68ec060]) -- statement `bfextu 4(%a1){%d0,#8},%d0' ignored {standard input}:752: Error: operands mismatch -- statement `mulu.l 4(%a0),%d3:%d0' ignored {standard input}:1155: Error: operands mismatch -- statement `divu.l %d0,%d3:%d7' ignored The math emulation support code is intended for 68020 and higher, and uses several instructions or instruction modes not available on coldfire or 68000. Originally, the dependency of M68KFPU_EMU on MMU was fine, as MMU support was only available on 68020 or higher. But this assumption was broken by the introduction of MMU support for M547x and M548x. Drop the dependency on MMU, as the code should work fine on 68020 and up without MMU (which are not yet supported by Linux, though). Add dependencies on M68KCLASSIC (to rule out Coldfire) and FPU (kernel has some type of floating-point support --- be it hardware or software emulated, to rule out anything below 68020). Fixes: 1f7034b9616e6f14 ("m68k: allow ColdFire 547x and 548x CPUs to be built with MMU enabled") Reported-by: kernel test robot Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven Reviewed-by: Greg Ungerer Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/18c34695b7c95107f60ccca82a4ff252f3edf477.1652446117.git.geert@linux-m68k.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/m68k/Kconfig.cpu | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/m68k/Kconfig.cpu b/arch/m68k/Kconfig.cpu index 60ac1cd8b96f..6bc7fc14163f 100644 --- a/arch/m68k/Kconfig.cpu +++ b/arch/m68k/Kconfig.cpu @@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ comment "Processor Specific Options" config M68KFPU_EMU bool "Math emulation support" - depends on MMU + depends on M68KCLASSIC && FPU help At some point in the future, this will cause floating-point math instructions to be emulated by the kernel on machines that lack a From dc794fa2b3c42dc1d22bfb4f201eae98658de564 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Fri, 13 May 2022 11:55:42 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0142/1091] sctp: read sk->sk_bound_dev_if once in sctp_rcv() [ Upstream commit a20ea298071f46effa3aaf965bf9bb34c901db3f ] sctp_rcv() reads sk->sk_bound_dev_if twice while the socket is not locked. Another cpu could change this field under us. Fixes: 0fd9a65a76e8 ("[SCTP] Support SO_BINDTODEVICE socket option on incoming packets.") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Cc: Neil Horman Cc: Vlad Yasevich Cc: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/sctp/input.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/sctp/input.c b/net/sctp/input.c index 9616b600a876..c306cb25f524 100644 --- a/net/sctp/input.c +++ b/net/sctp/input.c @@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ int sctp_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb) struct sctp_chunk *chunk; union sctp_addr src; union sctp_addr dest; + int bound_dev_if; int family; struct sctp_af *af; struct net *net = dev_net(skb->dev); @@ -169,7 +170,8 @@ int sctp_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb) * If a frame arrives on an interface and the receiving socket is * bound to another interface, via SO_BINDTODEVICE, treat it as OOTB */ - if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if && (sk->sk_bound_dev_if != af->skb_iif(skb))) { + bound_dev_if = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_bound_dev_if); + if (bound_dev_if && (bound_dev_if != af->skb_iif(skb))) { if (transport) { sctp_transport_put(transport); asoc = NULL; From 3dc0323755958f422ac428ae4bcddcbdafab54c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dongliang Mu Date: Fri, 22 Apr 2022 10:54:05 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0143/1091] media: ov7670: remove ov7670_power_off from ov7670_remove [ Upstream commit 5bf19572e31375368f19edd2dbb2e0789518bb99 ] In ov7670_probe, it always invokes ov7670_power_off() no matter the execution is successful or failed. So we cannot invoke it agiain in ov7670_remove(). Fix this by removing ov7670_power_off from ov7670_remove. Fixes: 030f9f682e66 ("media: ov7670: control clock along with power") Signed-off-by: Dongliang Mu Signed-off-by: Sakari Ailus Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/media/i2c/ov7670.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/media/i2c/ov7670.c b/drivers/media/i2c/ov7670.c index b42b289faaef..154776d0069e 100644 --- a/drivers/media/i2c/ov7670.c +++ b/drivers/media/i2c/ov7670.c @@ -2000,7 +2000,6 @@ static int ov7670_remove(struct i2c_client *client) v4l2_async_unregister_subdev(sd); v4l2_ctrl_handler_free(&info->hdl); media_entity_cleanup(&info->sd.entity); - ov7670_power_off(sd); return 0; } From 48d331a03b0d16e92525e340649b38da9b83b225 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers Date: Tue, 10 May 2022 11:32:32 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0144/1091] ext4: reject the 'commit' option on ext2 filesystems [ Upstream commit cb8435dc8ba33bcafa41cf2aa253794320a3b8df ] The 'commit' option is only applicable for ext3 and ext4 filesystems, and has never been accepted by the ext2 filesystem driver, so the ext4 driver shouldn't allow it on ext2 filesystems. This fixes a failure in xfstest ext4/053. Fixes: 8dc0aa8cf0f7 ("ext4: check incompatible mount options while mounting ext2/3") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Reviewed-by: Ritesh Harjani Reviewed-by: Lukas Czerner Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220510183232.172615-1-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/ext4/super.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/fs/ext4/super.c b/fs/ext4/super.c index c13879bd2168..eba2506f4399 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/super.c +++ b/fs/ext4/super.c @@ -1703,6 +1703,7 @@ static const struct mount_opts { MOPT_EXT4_ONLY | MOPT_CLEAR}, {Opt_warn_on_error, EXT4_MOUNT_WARN_ON_ERROR, MOPT_SET}, {Opt_nowarn_on_error, EXT4_MOUNT_WARN_ON_ERROR, MOPT_CLEAR}, + {Opt_commit, 0, MOPT_NO_EXT2}, {Opt_nojournal_checksum, EXT4_MOUNT_JOURNAL_CHECKSUM, MOPT_EXT4_ONLY | MOPT_CLEAR}, {Opt_journal_checksum, EXT4_MOUNT_JOURNAL_CHECKSUM, From 6832e36f156ea35a6ed74bca72727806116effdd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miaoqian Lin Date: Thu, 12 May 2022 16:19:50 +0400 Subject: [PATCH 0145/1091] drm/msm/a6xx: Fix refcount leak in a6xx_gpu_init [ Upstream commit c56de483093d7ad0782327f95dda7da97bc4c315 ] of_parse_phandle() returns a node pointer with refcount incremented, we should use of_node_put() on it when not need anymore. a6xx_gmu_init() passes the node to of_find_device_by_node() and of_dma_configure(), of_find_device_by_node() will takes its reference, of_dma_configure() doesn't need the node after usage. Add missing of_node_put() to avoid refcount leak. Fixes: 4b565ca5a2cb ("drm/msm: Add A6XX device support") Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin Reviewed-by: Akhil P Oommen Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220512121955.56937-1-linmq006@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Rob Clark Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/gpu/drm/msm/adreno/a6xx_gpu.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/adreno/a6xx_gpu.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/adreno/a6xx_gpu.c index df2656e57991..a3ae6c1d341b 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/adreno/a6xx_gpu.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/adreno/a6xx_gpu.c @@ -891,6 +891,7 @@ struct msm_gpu *a6xx_gpu_init(struct drm_device *dev) BUG_ON(!node); ret = a6xx_gmu_init(a6xx_gpu, node); + of_node_put(node); if (ret) { a6xx_destroy(&(a6xx_gpu->base.base)); return ERR_PTR(ret); From 449374565f349d4233beec811d4286fdfe5de44b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hangyu Hua Date: Mon, 9 May 2022 14:11:25 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0146/1091] drm: msm: fix possible memory leak in mdp5_crtc_cursor_set() [ Upstream commit 947a844bb3ebff0f4736d244d792ce129f6700d7 ] drm_gem_object_lookup will call drm_gem_object_get inside. So cursor_bo needs to be put when msm_gem_get_and_pin_iova fails. Fixes: e172d10a9c4a ("drm/msm/mdp5: Add hardware cursor support") Signed-off-by: Hangyu Hua Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220509061125.18585-1-hbh25y@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Rob Clark Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/mdp5/mdp5_crtc.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/mdp5/mdp5_crtc.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/mdp5/mdp5_crtc.c index 9afbce3cb87b..03d60eb09257 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/mdp5/mdp5_crtc.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/mdp5/mdp5_crtc.c @@ -909,8 +909,10 @@ static int mdp5_crtc_cursor_set(struct drm_crtc *crtc, ret = msm_gem_get_and_pin_iova(cursor_bo, kms->aspace, &mdp5_crtc->cursor.iova); - if (ret) + if (ret) { + drm_gem_object_put(cursor_bo); return -EINVAL; + } pm_runtime_get_sync(&pdev->dev); From b3461ccaa5d2588568d865faee285512ad448049 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zheng Yongjun Date: Mon, 25 Apr 2022 09:29:29 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0147/1091] thermal/drivers/broadcom: Fix potential NULL dereference in sr_thermal_probe [ Upstream commit e20d136ec7d6f309989c447638365840d3424c8e ] platform_get_resource() may return NULL, add proper check to avoid potential NULL dereferencing. Fixes: 250e211057c72 ("thermal: broadcom: Add Stingray thermal driver") Signed-off-by: Zheng Yongjun Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220425092929.90412-1-zhengyongjun3@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Daniel Lezcano Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/thermal/broadcom/sr-thermal.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/thermal/broadcom/sr-thermal.c b/drivers/thermal/broadcom/sr-thermal.c index 475ce2900771..85ab9edd580c 100644 --- a/drivers/thermal/broadcom/sr-thermal.c +++ b/drivers/thermal/broadcom/sr-thermal.c @@ -60,6 +60,9 @@ static int sr_thermal_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) return -ENOMEM; res = platform_get_resource(pdev, IORESOURCE_MEM, 0); + if (!res) + return -ENOENT; + sr_thermal->regs = (void __iomem *)devm_memremap(&pdev->dev, res->start, resource_size(res), MEMREMAP_WB); From 9934025c4d6649c7e51e119db0f190793712fb85 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yang Yingliang Date: Sat, 14 May 2022 17:10:53 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0148/1091] ASoC: wm2000: fix missing clk_disable_unprepare() on error in wm2000_anc_transition() [ Upstream commit be2af740e2a9c7134f2d8ab4f104006e110b13de ] Fix the missing clk_disable_unprepare() before return from wm2000_anc_transition() in the error handling case. Fixes: 514cfd6dd725 ("ASoC: wm2000: Integrate with clock API") Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang Acked-by: Charles Keepax Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220514091053.686416-1-yangyingliang@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- sound/soc/codecs/wm2000.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/wm2000.c b/sound/soc/codecs/wm2000.c index 72e165cc6443..97ece3114b3d 100644 --- a/sound/soc/codecs/wm2000.c +++ b/sound/soc/codecs/wm2000.c @@ -536,7 +536,7 @@ static int wm2000_anc_transition(struct wm2000_priv *wm2000, { struct i2c_client *i2c = wm2000->i2c; int i, j; - int ret; + int ret = 0; if (wm2000->anc_mode == mode) return 0; @@ -566,13 +566,13 @@ static int wm2000_anc_transition(struct wm2000_priv *wm2000, ret = anc_transitions[i].step[j](i2c, anc_transitions[i].analogue); if (ret != 0) - return ret; + break; } if (anc_transitions[i].dest == ANC_OFF) clk_disable_unprepare(wm2000->mclk); - return 0; + return ret; } static int wm2000_anc_set_mode(struct wm2000_priv *wm2000) From 0bfaff00d1a7113dde90bc1f6301fd2b5e4ff9ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Duoming Zhou Date: Wed, 18 May 2022 19:57:33 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0149/1091] NFC: hci: fix sleep in atomic context bugs in nfc_hci_hcp_message_tx [ Upstream commit b413b0cb008646e9f24ce5253cb3cf7ee217aff6 ] There are sleep in atomic context bugs when the request to secure element of st21nfca is timeout. The root cause is that kzalloc and alloc_skb with GFP_KERNEL parameter and mutex_lock are called in st21nfca_se_wt_timeout which is a timer handler. The call tree shows the execution paths that could lead to bugs: (Interrupt context) st21nfca_se_wt_timeout nfc_hci_send_event nfc_hci_hcp_message_tx kzalloc(..., GFP_KERNEL) //may sleep alloc_skb(..., GFP_KERNEL) //may sleep mutex_lock() //may sleep This patch moves the operations that may sleep into a work item. The work item will run in another kernel thread which is in process context to execute the bottom half of the interrupt. So it could prevent atomic context from sleeping. Fixes: 2130fb97fecf ("NFC: st21nfca: Adding support for secure element") Signed-off-by: Duoming Zhou Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220518115733.62111-1-duoming@zju.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/nfc/st21nfca/se.c | 17 ++++++++++++++--- drivers/nfc/st21nfca/st21nfca.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/nfc/st21nfca/se.c b/drivers/nfc/st21nfca/se.c index a7ab6dab0f32..5256195f313b 100644 --- a/drivers/nfc/st21nfca/se.c +++ b/drivers/nfc/st21nfca/se.c @@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ int st21nfca_hci_se_io(struct nfc_hci_dev *hdev, u32 se_idx, } EXPORT_SYMBOL(st21nfca_hci_se_io); -static void st21nfca_se_wt_timeout(struct timer_list *t) +static void st21nfca_se_wt_work(struct work_struct *work) { /* * No answer from the secure element @@ -254,8 +254,9 @@ static void st21nfca_se_wt_timeout(struct timer_list *t) */ /* hardware reset managed through VCC_UICC_OUT power supply */ u8 param = 0x01; - struct st21nfca_hci_info *info = from_timer(info, t, - se_info.bwi_timer); + struct st21nfca_hci_info *info = container_of(work, + struct st21nfca_hci_info, + se_info.timeout_work); pr_debug("\n"); @@ -273,6 +274,13 @@ static void st21nfca_se_wt_timeout(struct timer_list *t) info->se_info.cb(info->se_info.cb_context, NULL, 0, -ETIME); } +static void st21nfca_se_wt_timeout(struct timer_list *t) +{ + struct st21nfca_hci_info *info = from_timer(info, t, se_info.bwi_timer); + + schedule_work(&info->se_info.timeout_work); +} + static void st21nfca_se_activation_timeout(struct timer_list *t) { struct st21nfca_hci_info *info = from_timer(info, t, @@ -365,6 +373,7 @@ int st21nfca_apdu_reader_event_received(struct nfc_hci_dev *hdev, switch (event) { case ST21NFCA_EVT_TRANSMIT_DATA: del_timer_sync(&info->se_info.bwi_timer); + cancel_work_sync(&info->se_info.timeout_work); info->se_info.bwi_active = false; r = nfc_hci_send_event(hdev, ST21NFCA_DEVICE_MGNT_GATE, ST21NFCA_EVT_SE_END_OF_APDU_TRANSFER, NULL, 0); @@ -394,6 +403,7 @@ void st21nfca_se_init(struct nfc_hci_dev *hdev) struct st21nfca_hci_info *info = nfc_hci_get_clientdata(hdev); init_completion(&info->se_info.req_completion); + INIT_WORK(&info->se_info.timeout_work, st21nfca_se_wt_work); /* initialize timers */ timer_setup(&info->se_info.bwi_timer, st21nfca_se_wt_timeout, 0); info->se_info.bwi_active = false; @@ -421,6 +431,7 @@ void st21nfca_se_deinit(struct nfc_hci_dev *hdev) if (info->se_info.se_active) del_timer_sync(&info->se_info.se_active_timer); + cancel_work_sync(&info->se_info.timeout_work); info->se_info.bwi_active = false; info->se_info.se_active = false; } diff --git a/drivers/nfc/st21nfca/st21nfca.h b/drivers/nfc/st21nfca/st21nfca.h index 5e0de0fef1d4..0e4a93d11efb 100644 --- a/drivers/nfc/st21nfca/st21nfca.h +++ b/drivers/nfc/st21nfca/st21nfca.h @@ -141,6 +141,7 @@ struct st21nfca_se_info { se_io_cb_t cb; void *cb_context; + struct work_struct timeout_work; }; struct st21nfca_hci_info { From 91b34bf0409f43bb60453bab23c5beadd726d022 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Howells Date: Sat, 21 May 2022 09:03:04 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0150/1091] rxrpc: Fix listen() setting the bar too high for the prealloc rings [ Upstream commit 88e22159750b0d55793302eeed8ee603f5c1a95c ] AF_RXRPC's listen() handler lets you set the backlog up to 32 (if you bump up the sysctl), but whilst the preallocation circular buffers have 32 slots in them, one of them has to be a dead slot because we're using CIRC_CNT(). This means that listen(rxrpc_sock, 32) will cause an oops when the socket is closed because rxrpc_service_prealloc_one() allocated one too many calls and rxrpc_discard_prealloc() won't then be able to get rid of them because it'll think the ring is empty. rxrpc_release_calls_on_socket() then tries to abort them, but oopses because call->peer isn't yet set. Fix this by setting the maximum backlog to RXRPC_BACKLOG_MAX - 1 to match the ring capacity. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000086 ... RIP: 0010:rxrpc_send_abort_packet+0x73/0x240 [rxrpc] Call Trace: ? __wake_up_common_lock+0x7a/0x90 ? rxrpc_notify_socket+0x8e/0x140 [rxrpc] ? rxrpc_abort_call+0x4c/0x60 [rxrpc] rxrpc_release_calls_on_socket+0x107/0x1a0 [rxrpc] rxrpc_release+0xc9/0x1c0 [rxrpc] __sock_release+0x37/0xa0 sock_close+0x11/0x20 __fput+0x89/0x240 task_work_run+0x59/0x90 do_exit+0x319/0xaa0 Fixes: 00e907127e6f ("rxrpc: Preallocate peers, conns and calls for incoming service requests") Reported-by: Marc Dionne Signed-off-by: David Howells cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org Link: https://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/linux-afs/2022-March/005079.html Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/rxrpc/sysctl.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/rxrpc/sysctl.c b/net/rxrpc/sysctl.c index 18dade4e6f9a..8fc419072505 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/sysctl.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/sysctl.c @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ static struct ctl_table_header *rxrpc_sysctl_reg_table; static const unsigned int four = 4; -static const unsigned int thirtytwo = 32; +static const unsigned int max_backlog = RXRPC_BACKLOG_MAX - 1; static const unsigned int n_65535 = 65535; static const unsigned int n_max_acks = RXRPC_RXTX_BUFF_SIZE - 1; static const unsigned long one_jiffy = 1; @@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ static struct ctl_table rxrpc_sysctl_table[] = { .mode = 0644, .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, .extra1 = (void *)&four, - .extra2 = (void *)&thirtytwo, + .extra2 = (void *)&max_backlog, }, { .procname = "rx_window_size", From 5aa14dafd2b091acc1ebbcbb125cd5d54ed76669 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Howells Date: Sat, 21 May 2022 09:03:11 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0151/1091] rxrpc: Don't try to resend the request if we're receiving the reply [ Upstream commit 114af61f88fbe34d641b13922d098ffec4c1be1b ] rxrpc has a timer to trigger resending of unacked data packets in a call. This is not cancelled when a client call switches to the receive phase on the basis that most calls don't last long enough for it to ever expire. However, if it *does* expire after we've started to receive the reply, we shouldn't then go into trying to retransmit or pinging the server to find out if an ack got lost. Fix this by skipping the resend code if we're into receiving the reply to a client call. Fixes: 17926a79320a ("[AF_RXRPC]: Provide secure RxRPC sockets for use by userspace and kernel both") Signed-off-by: David Howells cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/rxrpc/call_event.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/rxrpc/call_event.c b/net/rxrpc/call_event.c index 80e15310f1b2..8574e7066d94 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/call_event.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/call_event.c @@ -407,7 +407,8 @@ recheck_state: goto recheck_state; } - if (test_and_clear_bit(RXRPC_CALL_EV_RESEND, &call->events)) { + if (test_and_clear_bit(RXRPC_CALL_EV_RESEND, &call->events) && + call->state != RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_RECV_REPLY) { rxrpc_resend(call, now); goto recheck_state; } From 2fd958ae29fd9f6b8e6bbe6361f296f351b07ebc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Howells Date: Sat, 21 May 2022 09:03:18 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0152/1091] rxrpc: Fix overlapping ACK accounting [ Upstream commit 8940ba3cfe4841928777fd45eaa92051522c7f0c ] Fix accidental overlapping of Rx-phase ACK accounting with Tx-phase ACK accounting through variables shared between the two. call->acks_* members refer to ACKs received in the Tx phase and call->ackr_* members to ACKs sent/to be sent during the Rx phase. Fixes: 1a2391c30c0b ("rxrpc: Fix detection of out of order acks") Signed-off-by: David Howells cc: Jeffrey Altman cc: Marc Dionne cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h | 7 ++++--- net/rxrpc/input.c | 16 ++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h b/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h index 9fe264bec70c..8e72b77b33a9 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h +++ b/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h @@ -665,10 +665,9 @@ struct rxrpc_call { spinlock_t input_lock; /* Lock for packet input to this call */ - /* receive-phase ACK management */ + /* Receive-phase ACK management (ACKs we send). */ u8 ackr_reason; /* reason to ACK */ rxrpc_serial_t ackr_serial; /* serial of packet being ACK'd */ - rxrpc_serial_t ackr_first_seq; /* first sequence number received */ rxrpc_seq_t ackr_prev_seq; /* previous sequence number received */ rxrpc_seq_t ackr_consumed; /* Highest packet shown consumed */ rxrpc_seq_t ackr_seen; /* Highest packet shown seen */ @@ -677,8 +676,10 @@ struct rxrpc_call { rxrpc_serial_t ping_serial; /* Last ping sent */ ktime_t ping_time; /* Time last ping sent */ - /* transmission-phase ACK management */ + /* Transmission-phase ACK management (ACKs we've received). */ ktime_t acks_latest_ts; /* Timestamp of latest ACK received */ + rxrpc_seq_t acks_first_seq; /* first sequence number received */ + rxrpc_seq_t acks_prev_seq; /* previous sequence number received */ rxrpc_seq_t acks_lowest_nak; /* Lowest NACK in the buffer (or ==tx_hard_ack) */ rxrpc_seq_t acks_lost_top; /* tx_top at the time lost-ack ping sent */ rxrpc_serial_t acks_lost_ping; /* Serial number of probe ACK */ diff --git a/net/rxrpc/input.c b/net/rxrpc/input.c index 916d1f455b21..164dcd8d684a 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/input.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/input.c @@ -808,7 +808,7 @@ static void rxrpc_input_soft_acks(struct rxrpc_call *call, u8 *acks, static bool rxrpc_is_ack_valid(struct rxrpc_call *call, rxrpc_seq_t first_pkt, rxrpc_seq_t prev_pkt) { - rxrpc_seq_t base = READ_ONCE(call->ackr_first_seq); + rxrpc_seq_t base = READ_ONCE(call->acks_first_seq); if (after(first_pkt, base)) return true; /* The window advanced */ @@ -816,7 +816,7 @@ static bool rxrpc_is_ack_valid(struct rxrpc_call *call, if (before(first_pkt, base)) return false; /* firstPacket regressed */ - if (after_eq(prev_pkt, call->ackr_prev_seq)) + if (after_eq(prev_pkt, call->acks_prev_seq)) return true; /* previousPacket hasn't regressed. */ /* Some rx implementations put a serial number in previousPacket. */ @@ -891,8 +891,8 @@ static void rxrpc_input_ack(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb) /* Discard any out-of-order or duplicate ACKs (outside lock). */ if (!rxrpc_is_ack_valid(call, first_soft_ack, prev_pkt)) { trace_rxrpc_rx_discard_ack(call->debug_id, ack_serial, - first_soft_ack, call->ackr_first_seq, - prev_pkt, call->ackr_prev_seq); + first_soft_ack, call->acks_first_seq, + prev_pkt, call->acks_prev_seq); return; } @@ -907,14 +907,14 @@ static void rxrpc_input_ack(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb) /* Discard any out-of-order or duplicate ACKs (inside lock). */ if (!rxrpc_is_ack_valid(call, first_soft_ack, prev_pkt)) { trace_rxrpc_rx_discard_ack(call->debug_id, ack_serial, - first_soft_ack, call->ackr_first_seq, - prev_pkt, call->ackr_prev_seq); + first_soft_ack, call->acks_first_seq, + prev_pkt, call->acks_prev_seq); goto out; } call->acks_latest_ts = skb->tstamp; - call->ackr_first_seq = first_soft_ack; - call->ackr_prev_seq = prev_pkt; + call->acks_first_seq = first_soft_ack; + call->acks_prev_seq = prev_pkt; /* Parse rwind and mtu sizes if provided. */ if (buf.info.rxMTU) From d7b16ee15fc6d77e84989ad18fbebf027c986a88 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Howells Date: Sat, 21 May 2022 09:03:24 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0153/1091] rxrpc: Don't let ack.previousPacket regress [ Upstream commit 81524b6312535897707f2942695da1d359a5e56b ] The previousPacket field in the rx ACK packet should never go backwards - it's now the highest DATA sequence number received, not the last on received (it used to be used for out of sequence detection). Fixes: 248f219cb8bc ("rxrpc: Rewrite the data and ack handling code") Signed-off-by: David Howells cc: Marc Dionne cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h | 4 ++-- net/rxrpc/input.c | 4 +++- net/rxrpc/output.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h b/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h index 8e72b77b33a9..8ca7afe0ac26 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h +++ b/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h @@ -668,7 +668,7 @@ struct rxrpc_call { /* Receive-phase ACK management (ACKs we send). */ u8 ackr_reason; /* reason to ACK */ rxrpc_serial_t ackr_serial; /* serial of packet being ACK'd */ - rxrpc_seq_t ackr_prev_seq; /* previous sequence number received */ + rxrpc_seq_t ackr_highest_seq; /* Higest sequence number received */ rxrpc_seq_t ackr_consumed; /* Highest packet shown consumed */ rxrpc_seq_t ackr_seen; /* Highest packet shown seen */ @@ -679,7 +679,7 @@ struct rxrpc_call { /* Transmission-phase ACK management (ACKs we've received). */ ktime_t acks_latest_ts; /* Timestamp of latest ACK received */ rxrpc_seq_t acks_first_seq; /* first sequence number received */ - rxrpc_seq_t acks_prev_seq; /* previous sequence number received */ + rxrpc_seq_t acks_prev_seq; /* Highest previousPacket received */ rxrpc_seq_t acks_lowest_nak; /* Lowest NACK in the buffer (or ==tx_hard_ack) */ rxrpc_seq_t acks_lost_top; /* tx_top at the time lost-ack ping sent */ rxrpc_serial_t acks_lost_ping; /* Serial number of probe ACK */ diff --git a/net/rxrpc/input.c b/net/rxrpc/input.c index 164dcd8d684a..8eafa3463b88 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/input.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/input.c @@ -454,7 +454,6 @@ static void rxrpc_input_data(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb) !rxrpc_receiving_reply(call)) goto unlock; - call->ackr_prev_seq = seq0; hard_ack = READ_ONCE(call->rx_hard_ack); nr_subpackets = sp->nr_subpackets; @@ -535,6 +534,9 @@ static void rxrpc_input_data(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb) ack_serial = serial; } + if (after(seq0, call->ackr_highest_seq)) + call->ackr_highest_seq = seq0; + /* Queue the packet. We use a couple of memory barriers here as need * to make sure that rx_top is perceived to be set after the buffer * pointer and that the buffer pointer is set after the annotation and diff --git a/net/rxrpc/output.c b/net/rxrpc/output.c index a4a6f8ee0720..7f1c8116e030 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/output.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/output.c @@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ static size_t rxrpc_fill_out_ack(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, pkt->ack.bufferSpace = htons(8); pkt->ack.maxSkew = htons(0); pkt->ack.firstPacket = htonl(hard_ack + 1); - pkt->ack.previousPacket = htonl(call->ackr_prev_seq); + pkt->ack.previousPacket = htonl(call->ackr_highest_seq); pkt->ack.serial = htonl(serial); pkt->ack.reason = reason; pkt->ack.nAcks = top - hard_ack; From 91121ee57414ea0244b7fe4f99b5f396d0811952 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Howells Date: Sat, 21 May 2022 09:03:31 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0154/1091] rxrpc: Fix decision on when to generate an IDLE ACK [ Upstream commit 9a3dedcf18096e8f7f22b8777d78c4acfdea1651 ] Fix the decision on when to generate an IDLE ACK by keeping a count of the number of packets we've received, but not yet soft-ACK'd, and the number of packets we've processed, but not yet hard-ACK'd, rather than trying to keep track of which DATA sequence numbers correspond to those points. We then generate an ACK when either counter exceeds 2. The counters are both cleared when we transcribe the information into any sort of ACK packet for transmission. IDLE and DELAY ACKs are skipped if both counters are 0 (ie. no change). Fixes: 805b21b929e2 ("rxrpc: Send an ACK after every few DATA packets we receive") Signed-off-by: David Howells cc: Marc Dionne cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- include/trace/events/rxrpc.h | 2 +- net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h | 4 ++-- net/rxrpc/input.c | 11 +++++++++-- net/rxrpc/output.c | 18 +++++++++++------- net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c | 8 +++----- 5 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/trace/events/rxrpc.h b/include/trace/events/rxrpc.h index 059b6e45a028..839bb07b93a7 100644 --- a/include/trace/events/rxrpc.h +++ b/include/trace/events/rxrpc.h @@ -1511,7 +1511,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(rxrpc_call_reset, __entry->call_serial = call->rx_serial; __entry->conn_serial = call->conn->hi_serial; __entry->tx_seq = call->tx_hard_ack; - __entry->rx_seq = call->ackr_seen; + __entry->rx_seq = call->rx_hard_ack; ), TP_printk("c=%08x %08x:%08x r=%08x/%08x tx=%08x rx=%08x", diff --git a/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h b/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h index 8ca7afe0ac26..cb174f699665 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h +++ b/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h @@ -669,8 +669,8 @@ struct rxrpc_call { u8 ackr_reason; /* reason to ACK */ rxrpc_serial_t ackr_serial; /* serial of packet being ACK'd */ rxrpc_seq_t ackr_highest_seq; /* Higest sequence number received */ - rxrpc_seq_t ackr_consumed; /* Highest packet shown consumed */ - rxrpc_seq_t ackr_seen; /* Highest packet shown seen */ + atomic_t ackr_nr_unacked; /* Number of unacked packets */ + atomic_t ackr_nr_consumed; /* Number of packets needing hard ACK */ /* ping management */ rxrpc_serial_t ping_serial; /* Last ping sent */ diff --git a/net/rxrpc/input.c b/net/rxrpc/input.c index 8eafa3463b88..5cf64cf8debf 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/input.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/input.c @@ -413,8 +413,8 @@ static void rxrpc_input_data(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb) { struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(skb); enum rxrpc_call_state state; - unsigned int j, nr_subpackets; - rxrpc_serial_t serial = sp->hdr.serial, ack_serial = 0; + unsigned int j, nr_subpackets, nr_unacked = 0; + rxrpc_serial_t serial = sp->hdr.serial, ack_serial = serial; rxrpc_seq_t seq0 = sp->hdr.seq, hard_ack; bool immediate_ack = false, jumbo_bad = false; u8 ack = 0; @@ -570,6 +570,8 @@ static void rxrpc_input_data(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb) sp = NULL; } + nr_unacked++; + if (last) { set_bit(RXRPC_CALL_RX_LAST, &call->flags); if (!ack) { @@ -589,9 +591,14 @@ static void rxrpc_input_data(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb) } call->rx_expect_next = seq + 1; } + if (!ack) + ack_serial = serial; } ack: + if (atomic_add_return(nr_unacked, &call->ackr_nr_unacked) > 2 && !ack) + ack = RXRPC_ACK_IDLE; + if (ack) rxrpc_propose_ACK(call, ack, ack_serial, immediate_ack, true, diff --git a/net/rxrpc/output.c b/net/rxrpc/output.c index 7f1c8116e030..6202d2e32914 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/output.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/output.c @@ -74,11 +74,18 @@ static size_t rxrpc_fill_out_ack(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, u8 reason) { rxrpc_serial_t serial; + unsigned int tmp; rxrpc_seq_t hard_ack, top, seq; int ix; u32 mtu, jmax; u8 *ackp = pkt->acks; + tmp = atomic_xchg(&call->ackr_nr_unacked, 0); + tmp |= atomic_xchg(&call->ackr_nr_consumed, 0); + if (!tmp && (reason == RXRPC_ACK_DELAY || + reason == RXRPC_ACK_IDLE)) + return 0; + /* Barrier against rxrpc_input_data(). */ serial = call->ackr_serial; hard_ack = READ_ONCE(call->rx_hard_ack); @@ -180,6 +187,10 @@ int rxrpc_send_ack_packet(struct rxrpc_call *call, bool ping, n = rxrpc_fill_out_ack(conn, call, pkt, &hard_ack, &top, reason); spin_unlock_bh(&call->lock); + if (n == 0) { + kfree(pkt); + return 0; + } iov[0].iov_base = pkt; iov[0].iov_len = sizeof(pkt->whdr) + sizeof(pkt->ack) + n; @@ -227,13 +238,6 @@ int rxrpc_send_ack_packet(struct rxrpc_call *call, bool ping, ntohl(pkt->ack.serial), false, true, rxrpc_propose_ack_retry_tx); - } else { - spin_lock_bh(&call->lock); - if (after(hard_ack, call->ackr_consumed)) - call->ackr_consumed = hard_ack; - if (after(top, call->ackr_seen)) - call->ackr_seen = top; - spin_unlock_bh(&call->lock); } rxrpc_set_keepalive(call); diff --git a/net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c b/net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c index 4f48e3bdd4b4..c75789ebc514 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c @@ -212,11 +212,9 @@ static void rxrpc_rotate_rx_window(struct rxrpc_call *call) rxrpc_end_rx_phase(call, serial); } else { /* Check to see if there's an ACK that needs sending. */ - if (after_eq(hard_ack, call->ackr_consumed + 2) || - after_eq(top, call->ackr_seen + 2) || - (hard_ack == top && after(hard_ack, call->ackr_consumed))) - rxrpc_propose_ACK(call, RXRPC_ACK_DELAY, serial, - true, true, + if (atomic_inc_return(&call->ackr_nr_consumed) > 2) + rxrpc_propose_ACK(call, RXRPC_ACK_IDLE, serial, + true, false, rxrpc_propose_ack_rotate_rx); if (call->ackr_reason && call->ackr_reason != RXRPC_ACK_DELAY) rxrpc_send_ack_packet(call, false, NULL); From 60546c0b4b46724f480da371360adc5c685ece01 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: liuyacan Date: Mon, 23 May 2022 12:57:07 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0155/1091] net/smc: postpone sk_refcnt increment in connect() [ Upstream commit 75c1edf23b95a9c66923d9269d8e86e4dbde151f ] Same trigger condition as commit 86434744. When setsockopt runs in parallel to a connect(), and switch the socket into fallback mode. Then the sk_refcnt is incremented in smc_connect(), but its state stay in SMC_INIT (NOT SMC_ACTIVE). This cause the corresponding sk_refcnt decrement in __smc_release() will not be performed. Fixes: 86434744fedf ("net/smc: add fallback check to connect()") Signed-off-by: liuyacan Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/smc/af_smc.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/smc/af_smc.c b/net/smc/af_smc.c index a5a8cca46bd5..394491692a07 100644 --- a/net/smc/af_smc.c +++ b/net/smc/af_smc.c @@ -877,9 +877,9 @@ static int smc_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr, if (rc && rc != -EINPROGRESS) goto out; - sock_hold(&smc->sk); /* sock put in passive closing */ if (smc->use_fallback) goto out; + sock_hold(&smc->sk); /* sock put in passive closing */ if (flags & O_NONBLOCK) { if (schedule_work(&smc->connect_work)) smc->connect_nonblock = 1; From 754ef324b70bad8b72723f11debbf4c14039202f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shawn Lin Date: Tue, 15 Mar 2022 17:27:06 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0156/1091] arm64: dts: rockchip: Move drive-impedance-ohm to emmc phy on rk3399 [ Upstream commit 4246d0bab2a8685e3d4aec2cb0ef8c526689ce96 ] drive-impedance-ohm is introduced for emmc phy instead of pcie phy. Fixes: fb8b7460c995 ("arm64: dts: rockchip: Define drive-impedance-ohm for RK3399's emmc-phy.") Signed-off-by: Shawn Lin Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1647336426-154797-1-git-send-email-shawn.lin@rock-chips.com Signed-off-by: Heiko Stuebner Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3399.dtsi | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3399.dtsi b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3399.dtsi index 95942d917de5..4496f7e1c68f 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3399.dtsi +++ b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3399.dtsi @@ -1447,6 +1447,7 @@ reg = <0xf780 0x24>; clocks = <&sdhci>; clock-names = "emmcclk"; + drive-impedance-ohm = <50>; #phy-cells = <0>; status = "disabled"; }; @@ -1457,7 +1458,6 @@ clock-names = "refclk"; #phy-cells = <1>; resets = <&cru SRST_PCIEPHY>; - drive-impedance-ohm = <50>; reset-names = "phy"; status = "disabled"; }; From 56b8d748ec43a2e104af85c087c38bca634590f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andre Przywara Date: Thu, 17 Mar 2022 16:23:40 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0157/1091] ARM: dts: suniv: F1C100: fix watchdog compatible [ Upstream commit 01a850ee61cbf0ab77dcbf26bb133fec2dd640d6 ] The F1C100 series of SoCs actually have their watchdog IP being compatible with the newer Allwinner generation, not the older one. The currently described sun4i-a10-wdt actually does not work, neither the watchdog functionality (just never fires), nor the reset part (reboot hangs). Replace the compatible string with the one used by the newer generation. Verified to work with both the watchdog and reboot functionality on a LicheePi Nano. Also add the missing interrupt line and clock source, to make it binding compliant. Fixes: 4ba16d17efdd ("ARM: dts: suniv: add initial DTSI file for F1C100s") Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara Acked-by: Guenter Roeck Signed-off-by: Jernej Skrabec Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220317162349.739636-4-andre.przywara@arm.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/arm/boot/dts/suniv-f1c100s.dtsi | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/suniv-f1c100s.dtsi b/arch/arm/boot/dts/suniv-f1c100s.dtsi index 6100d3b75f61..def830101448 100644 --- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/suniv-f1c100s.dtsi +++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/suniv-f1c100s.dtsi @@ -104,8 +104,10 @@ wdt: watchdog@1c20ca0 { compatible = "allwinner,suniv-f1c100s-wdt", - "allwinner,sun4i-a10-wdt"; + "allwinner,sun6i-a31-wdt"; reg = <0x01c20ca0 0x20>; + interrupts = <16>; + clocks = <&osc32k>; }; uart0: serial@1c25000 { From 669575521633455b0658d109add0ca1eeba067d5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miaoqian Lin Date: Tue, 8 Mar 2022 07:19:42 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0158/1091] soc: qcom: smp2p: Fix missing of_node_put() in smp2p_parse_ipc [ Upstream commit 8fd3f18ea31a398ecce4a6d3804433658678b0a3 ] The device_node pointer is returned by of_parse_phandle() with refcount incremented. We should use of_node_put() on it when done. Fixes: 50e99641413e ("soc: qcom: smp2p: Qualcomm Shared Memory Point to Point") Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220308071942.22942-1-linmq006@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/soc/qcom/smp2p.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/soc/qcom/smp2p.c b/drivers/soc/qcom/smp2p.c index 42e0b8f647ae..d42bcca3b98e 100644 --- a/drivers/soc/qcom/smp2p.c +++ b/drivers/soc/qcom/smp2p.c @@ -420,6 +420,7 @@ static int smp2p_parse_ipc(struct qcom_smp2p *smp2p) } smp2p->ipc_regmap = syscon_node_to_regmap(syscon); + of_node_put(syscon); if (IS_ERR(smp2p->ipc_regmap)) return PTR_ERR(smp2p->ipc_regmap); From 5543752a48add983adc083d37bb0ec5db83a7fd9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miaoqian Lin Date: Tue, 8 Mar 2022 07:36:48 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0159/1091] soc: qcom: smsm: Fix missing of_node_put() in smsm_parse_ipc [ Upstream commit aad66a3c78da668f4506356c2fdb70b7a19ecc76 ] The device_node pointer is returned by of_parse_phandle() with refcount incremented. We should use of_node_put() on it when done. Fixes: c97c4090ff72 ("soc: qcom: smsm: Add driver for Qualcomm SMSM") Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220308073648.24634-1-linmq006@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/soc/qcom/smsm.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/soc/qcom/smsm.c b/drivers/soc/qcom/smsm.c index c428d0f78816..6564f15c5319 100644 --- a/drivers/soc/qcom/smsm.c +++ b/drivers/soc/qcom/smsm.c @@ -359,6 +359,7 @@ static int smsm_parse_ipc(struct qcom_smsm *smsm, unsigned host_id) return 0; host->ipc_regmap = syscon_node_to_regmap(syscon); + of_node_put(syscon); if (IS_ERR(host->ipc_regmap)) return PTR_ERR(host->ipc_regmap); From f063429ac33fd6c3938fc92efc0c07a9ea7740d7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dan Carpenter Date: Tue, 15 Mar 2022 09:58:29 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 0160/1091] PCI: cadence: Fix find_first_zero_bit() limit [ Upstream commit 0aa3a0937feeb91a0e4e438c3c063b749b194192 ] The ep->ob_region_map bitmap is a long and it has BITS_PER_LONG bits. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220315065829.GA13572@kili Fixes: 37dddf14f1ae ("PCI: cadence: Add EndPoint Controller driver for Cadence PCIe controller") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/pci/controller/pcie-cadence-ep.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/pci/controller/pcie-cadence-ep.c b/drivers/pci/controller/pcie-cadence-ep.c index def7820cb824..5e23d575e200 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/controller/pcie-cadence-ep.c +++ b/drivers/pci/controller/pcie-cadence-ep.c @@ -178,8 +178,7 @@ static int cdns_pcie_ep_map_addr(struct pci_epc *epc, u8 fn, phys_addr_t addr, struct cdns_pcie *pcie = &ep->pcie; u32 r; - r = find_first_zero_bit(&ep->ob_region_map, - sizeof(ep->ob_region_map) * BITS_PER_LONG); + r = find_first_zero_bit(&ep->ob_region_map, BITS_PER_LONG); if (r >= ep->max_regions - 1) { dev_err(&epc->dev, "no free outbound region\n"); return -EINVAL; From 9cccb3f6ed9a18ee0a5ebc96014fdda1cf284092 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dan Carpenter Date: Tue, 15 Mar 2022 09:59:44 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 0161/1091] PCI: rockchip: Fix find_first_zero_bit() limit [ Upstream commit 096950e230b8d83645c7cf408b9f399f58c08b96 ] The ep->ob_region_map bitmap is a long and it has BITS_PER_LONG bits. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220315065944.GB13572@kili Fixes: cf590b078391 ("PCI: rockchip: Add EP driver for Rockchip PCIe controller") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/pci/controller/pcie-rockchip-ep.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/pci/controller/pcie-rockchip-ep.c b/drivers/pci/controller/pcie-rockchip-ep.c index d743b0a48988..b82edefffd15 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/controller/pcie-rockchip-ep.c +++ b/drivers/pci/controller/pcie-rockchip-ep.c @@ -263,8 +263,7 @@ static int rockchip_pcie_ep_map_addr(struct pci_epc *epc, u8 fn, struct rockchip_pcie *pcie = &ep->rockchip; u32 r; - r = find_first_zero_bit(&ep->ob_region_map, - sizeof(ep->ob_region_map) * BITS_PER_LONG); + r = find_first_zero_bit(&ep->ob_region_map, BITS_PER_LONG); /* * Region 0 is reserved for configuration space and shouldn't * be used elsewhere per TRM, so leave it out. From 6077a1e637b30552c9b804195466f03314ee4db1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sean Christopherson Date: Thu, 7 Apr 2022 00:23:14 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0162/1091] KVM: nVMX: Leave most VM-Exit info fields unmodified on failed VM-Entry [ Upstream commit c3634d25fbee88e2368a8e0903ae0d0670eb9e71 ] Don't modify vmcs12 exit fields except EXIT_REASON and EXIT_QUALIFICATION when performing a nested VM-Exit due to failed VM-Entry. Per the SDM, only the two aformentioned fields are filled and "All other VM-exit information fields are unmodified". Fixes: 4704d0befb07 ("KVM: nVMX: Exiting from L2 to L1") Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Message-Id: <20220407002315.78092-3-seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 15 ++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c index 3041015b05f7..9f61ae64b727 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c @@ -3746,12 +3746,12 @@ static void prepare_vmcs12(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12, /* update exit information fields: */ vmcs12->vm_exit_reason = exit_reason; vmcs12->exit_qualification = exit_qualification; - vmcs12->vm_exit_intr_info = exit_intr_info; - - vmcs12->idt_vectoring_info_field = 0; - vmcs12->vm_exit_instruction_len = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN); - vmcs12->vmx_instruction_info = vmcs_read32(VMX_INSTRUCTION_INFO); + /* + * On VM-Exit due to a failed VM-Entry, the VMCS isn't marked launched + * and only EXIT_REASON and EXIT_QUALIFICATION are updated, all other + * exit info fields are unmodified. + */ if (!(vmcs12->vm_exit_reason & VMX_EXIT_REASONS_FAILED_VMENTRY)) { vmcs12->launch_state = 1; @@ -3763,8 +3763,13 @@ static void prepare_vmcs12(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12, * Transfer the event that L0 or L1 may wanted to inject into * L2 to IDT_VECTORING_INFO_FIELD. */ + vmcs12->idt_vectoring_info_field = 0; vmcs12_save_pending_event(vcpu, vmcs12); + vmcs12->vm_exit_intr_info = exit_intr_info; + vmcs12->vm_exit_instruction_len = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN); + vmcs12->vmx_instruction_info = vmcs_read32(VMX_INSTRUCTION_INFO); + /* * According to spec, there's no need to store the guest's * MSRs if the exit is due to a VM-entry failure that occurs From e4594ca90b4e008bd9a440f7a8d008cfd09689e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Marc Kleine-Budde Date: Thu, 17 Mar 2022 21:29:07 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0163/1091] can: xilinx_can: mark bit timing constants as const [ Upstream commit ae38fda02996d43d9fb09f16e81e0008704dd524 ] This patch marks the bit timing constants as const. Fixes: c223da689324 ("can: xilinx_can: Add support for CANFD FD frames") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220317203119.792552-1-mkl@pengutronix.de Cc: Appana Durga Kedareswara rao Cc: Naga Sureshkumar Relli Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/can/xilinx_can.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/can/xilinx_can.c b/drivers/net/can/xilinx_can.c index 008d3d492bd1..be3811311db2 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/xilinx_can.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/xilinx_can.c @@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ static const struct can_bittiming_const xcan_bittiming_const_canfd = { }; /* AXI CANFD Data Bittiming constants as per AXI CANFD 1.0 specs */ -static struct can_bittiming_const xcan_data_bittiming_const_canfd = { +static const struct can_bittiming_const xcan_data_bittiming_const_canfd = { .name = DRIVER_NAME, .tseg1_min = 1, .tseg1_max = 16, @@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ static const struct can_bittiming_const xcan_bittiming_const_canfd2 = { }; /* AXI CANFD 2.0 Data Bittiming constants as per AXI CANFD 2.0 spec */ -static struct can_bittiming_const xcan_data_bittiming_const_canfd2 = { +static const struct can_bittiming_const xcan_data_bittiming_const_canfd2 = { .name = DRIVER_NAME, .tseg1_min = 1, .tseg1_max = 32, From e0bf7f084412d39991aabcba9a10426238cddd5f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Phil Elwell Date: Mon, 11 Apr 2022 22:01:38 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0164/1091] ARM: dts: bcm2835-rpi-zero-w: Fix GPIO line name for Wifi/BT [ Upstream commit 2c663e5e5bbf2a5b85e0f76ccb69663f583c3e33 ] The GPIOs 30 to 39 are connected to the Cypress CYW43438 (Wifi/BT). So fix the GPIO line names accordingly. Fixes: 2c7c040c73e9 ("ARM: dts: bcm2835: Add Raspberry Pi Zero W") Signed-off-by: Phil Elwell Signed-off-by: Stefan Wahren Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm2835-rpi-zero-w.dts | 22 ++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm2835-rpi-zero-w.dts b/arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm2835-rpi-zero-w.dts index f65448c01e31..34a85ad9f03c 100644 --- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm2835-rpi-zero-w.dts +++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm2835-rpi-zero-w.dts @@ -74,16 +74,18 @@ "GPIO27", "SDA0", "SCL0", - "NC", /* GPIO30 */ - "NC", /* GPIO31 */ - "NC", /* GPIO32 */ - "NC", /* GPIO33 */ - "NC", /* GPIO34 */ - "NC", /* GPIO35 */ - "NC", /* GPIO36 */ - "NC", /* GPIO37 */ - "NC", /* GPIO38 */ - "NC", /* GPIO39 */ + /* Used by BT module */ + "CTS0", + "RTS0", + "TXD0", + "RXD0", + /* Used by Wifi */ + "SD1_CLK", + "SD1_CMD", + "SD1_DATA0", + "SD1_DATA1", + "SD1_DATA2", + "SD1_DATA3", "CAM_GPIO1", /* GPIO40 */ "WL_ON", /* GPIO41 */ "NC", /* GPIO42 */ From fd1c098b3bddf50b311e98ab1355baefa6995278 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Phil Elwell Date: Mon, 11 Apr 2022 22:01:39 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0165/1091] ARM: dts: bcm2837-rpi-cm3-io3: Fix GPIO line names for SMPS I2C [ Upstream commit 9fd26fd02749ec964eb0d588a3bab9e09bf77927 ] The GPIOs 46 & 47 are already used for a I2C interface to a SMPS. So fix the GPIO line names accordingly. Fixes: a54fe8a6cf66 ("ARM: dts: add Raspberry Pi Compute Module 3 and IO board") Signed-off-by: Phil Elwell Signed-off-by: Stefan Wahren Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm2837-rpi-cm3-io3.dts | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm2837-rpi-cm3-io3.dts b/arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm2837-rpi-cm3-io3.dts index 588d9411ceb6..3dfce4312dfc 100644 --- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm2837-rpi-cm3-io3.dts +++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm2837-rpi-cm3-io3.dts @@ -63,8 +63,8 @@ "GPIO43", "GPIO44", "GPIO45", - "GPIO46", - "GPIO47", + "SMPS_SCL", + "SMPS_SDA", /* Used by eMMC */ "SD_CLK_R", "SD_CMD_R", From 3a37022d48a5510af31a33c007c6c6556c8ed71e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Phil Elwell Date: Mon, 11 Apr 2022 22:01:40 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0166/1091] ARM: dts: bcm2837-rpi-3-b-plus: Fix GPIO line name of power LED [ Upstream commit 57f718aa4b93392fb1a8c0a874ab882b9e18136a ] The red LED on the Raspberry Pi 3 B Plus is the power LED. So fix the GPIO line name accordingly. Fixes: 71c0cd2283f2 ("ARM: dts: bcm2837: Add Raspberry Pi 3 B+") Signed-off-by: Phil Elwell Signed-off-by: Stefan Wahren Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm2837-rpi-3-b-plus.dts | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm2837-rpi-3-b-plus.dts b/arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm2837-rpi-3-b-plus.dts index 74ed6d047807..d9f63fc59f16 100644 --- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm2837-rpi-3-b-plus.dts +++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm2837-rpi-3-b-plus.dts @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ #gpio-cells = <2>; gpio-line-names = "BT_ON", "WL_ON", - "STATUS_LED_R", + "PWR_LED_R", "LAN_RUN", "", "CAM_GPIO0", From 7f287d0c7001f1174d408d891e5060bc6e51077b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefan Wahren Date: Mon, 11 Apr 2022 22:01:41 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0167/1091] ARM: dts: bcm2835-rpi-b: Fix GPIO line names [ Upstream commit 97bd8659c1c46c23e4daea7e040befca30939950 ] Recently this has been fixed in the vendor tree, so upstream this. Fixes: 731b26a6ac17 ("ARM: bcm2835: Add names for the Raspberry Pi GPIO lines") Signed-off-by: Phil Elwell Signed-off-by: Stefan Wahren Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm2835-rpi-b.dts | 13 ++++++------- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm2835-rpi-b.dts b/arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm2835-rpi-b.dts index 2b69957e0113..1838e0fa0ff5 100644 --- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm2835-rpi-b.dts +++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm2835-rpi-b.dts @@ -53,18 +53,17 @@ "GPIO18", "NC", /* GPIO19 */ "NC", /* GPIO20 */ - "GPIO21", + "CAM_GPIO0", "GPIO22", "GPIO23", "GPIO24", "GPIO25", "NC", /* GPIO26 */ - "CAM_GPIO0", - /* Binary number representing build/revision */ - "CONFIG0", - "CONFIG1", - "CONFIG2", - "CONFIG3", + "GPIO27", + "GPIO28", + "GPIO29", + "GPIO30", + "GPIO31", "NC", /* GPIO32 */ "NC", /* GPIO33 */ "NC", /* GPIO34 */ From de65c32ace9aa70d51facc61ba986607075e3a25 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hangyu Hua Date: Mon, 18 Apr 2022 16:57:58 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0168/1091] misc: ocxl: fix possible double free in ocxl_file_register_afu [ Upstream commit 950cf957fe34d40d63dfa3bf3968210430b6491e ] info_release() will be called in device_unregister() when info->dev's reference count is 0. So there is no need to call ocxl_afu_put() and kfree() again. Fix this by adding free_minor() and return to err_unregister error path. Fixes: 75ca758adbaf ("ocxl: Create a clear delineation between ocxl backend & frontend") Signed-off-by: Hangyu Hua Acked-by: Frederic Barrat Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220418085758.38145-1-hbh25y@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/misc/ocxl/file.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/misc/ocxl/file.c b/drivers/misc/ocxl/file.c index 4d1b44de1492..c742ab02ae18 100644 --- a/drivers/misc/ocxl/file.c +++ b/drivers/misc/ocxl/file.c @@ -558,7 +558,9 @@ int ocxl_file_register_afu(struct ocxl_afu *afu) err_unregister: ocxl_sysfs_unregister_afu(info); // safe to call even if register failed + free_minor(info); device_unregister(&info->dev); + return rc; err_put: ocxl_afu_put(afu); free_minor(info); From e7a0d0c2802f80c0b158d423470ff893dc968809 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Corentin Labbe Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2022 19:11:54 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0169/1091] crypto: marvell/cesa - ECB does not IV [ Upstream commit 4ffa1763622ae5752961499588f3f8874315f974 ] The DES3 ECB has an IV size set but ECB does not need one. Fixes: 4ada483978237 ("crypto: marvell/cesa - add Triple-DES support") Signed-off-by: Corentin Labbe Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/crypto/marvell/cipher.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/marvell/cipher.c b/drivers/crypto/marvell/cipher.c index 84ceddfee76b..708dc63b2f09 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/marvell/cipher.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/marvell/cipher.c @@ -610,7 +610,6 @@ struct skcipher_alg mv_cesa_ecb_des3_ede_alg = { .decrypt = mv_cesa_ecb_des3_ede_decrypt, .min_keysize = DES3_EDE_KEY_SIZE, .max_keysize = DES3_EDE_KEY_SIZE, - .ivsize = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE, .base = { .cra_name = "ecb(des3_ede)", .cra_driver_name = "mv-ecb-des3-ede", From bbf58e97426d175e820cceaf1d59afe442969782 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chuanhong Guo Date: Sat, 9 Apr 2022 17:13:47 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0170/1091] arm: mediatek: select arch timer for mt7629 [ Upstream commit d66aea197d534e23d4989eb72fca9c0c114b97c9 ] This chip has an armv7 arch timer according to the dts. Select it in Kconfig to enforce the support for it. Otherwise the system time is just completely wrong if user forget to enable ARM_ARCH_TIMER in kernel config. Fixes: a43379dddf1b ("arm: mediatek: add MT7629 smp bring up code") Signed-off-by: Chuanhong Guo Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220409091347.2473449-1-gch981213@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Matthias Brugger Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/arm/mach-mediatek/Kconfig | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-mediatek/Kconfig b/arch/arm/mach-mediatek/Kconfig index 9e0f592d87d8..35a3430c7942 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mach-mediatek/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm/mach-mediatek/Kconfig @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ config MACH_MT7623 config MACH_MT7629 bool "MediaTek MT7629 SoCs support" default ARCH_MEDIATEK + select HAVE_ARM_ARCH_TIMER config MACH_MT8127 bool "MediaTek MT8127 SoCs support" From 8c4eeab72608675ba72aaa8bc6aa69ca3004671d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hari Bathini Date: Wed, 6 Apr 2022 15:08:37 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 0171/1091] powerpc/fadump: fix PT_LOAD segment for boot memory area [ Upstream commit 15eb77f873255cf9f4d703b63cfbd23c46579654 ] Boot memory area is setup as separate PT_LOAD segment in the vmcore as it is moved by f/w, on crash, to a destination address provided by the kernel. Having separate PT_LOAD segment helps in handling the different physical address and offset for boot memory area in the vmcore. Commit ced1bf52f477 ("powerpc/fadump: merge adjacent memory ranges to reduce PT_LOAD segements") inadvertly broke this pre-condition for cases where some of the first kernel memory is available adjacent to boot memory area. This scenario is rare but possible when memory for fadump could not be reserved adjacent to boot memory area owing to memory hole or such. Reading memory from a vmcore exported in such scenario provides incorrect data. Fix it by ensuring no other region is folded into boot memory area. Fixes: ced1bf52f477 ("powerpc/fadump: merge adjacent memory ranges to reduce PT_LOAD segements") Signed-off-by: Hari Bathini Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220406093839.206608-2-hbathini@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/powerpc/kernel/fadump.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/fadump.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/fadump.c index 0455dc1b2797..69d64f406204 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/fadump.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/fadump.c @@ -835,7 +835,6 @@ static int fadump_alloc_mem_ranges(struct fadump_mrange_info *mrange_info) sizeof(struct fadump_memory_range)); return 0; } - static inline int fadump_add_mem_range(struct fadump_mrange_info *mrange_info, u64 base, u64 end) { @@ -854,7 +853,12 @@ static inline int fadump_add_mem_range(struct fadump_mrange_info *mrange_info, start = mem_ranges[mrange_info->mem_range_cnt - 1].base; size = mem_ranges[mrange_info->mem_range_cnt - 1].size; - if ((start + size) == base) + /* + * Boot memory area needs separate PT_LOAD segment(s) as it + * is moved to a different location at the time of crash. + * So, fold only if the region is not boot memory area. + */ + if ((start + size) == base && start >= fw_dump.boot_mem_top) is_adjacent = true; } if (!is_adjacent) { From 829ea474876fac1aaa296ead0341fb1afc9aad17 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lv Ruyi Date: Tue, 12 Apr 2022 08:53:05 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0172/1091] mfd: ipaq-micro: Fix error check return value of platform_get_irq() [ Upstream commit 3b49ae380ce1a3054e0c505dd9a356b82a5b48e8 ] platform_get_irq() return negative value on failure, so null check of irq is incorrect. Fix it by comparing whether it is less than zero. Fixes: dcc21cc09e3c ("mfd: Add driver for Atmel Microcontroller on iPaq h3xxx") Reported-by: Zeal Robot Signed-off-by: Lv Ruyi Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij Signed-off-by: Lee Jones Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220412085305.2533030-1-lv.ruyi@zte.com.cn Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/mfd/ipaq-micro.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/mfd/ipaq-micro.c b/drivers/mfd/ipaq-micro.c index a1d9be82734d..88387c7e7443 100644 --- a/drivers/mfd/ipaq-micro.c +++ b/drivers/mfd/ipaq-micro.c @@ -407,7 +407,7 @@ static int __init micro_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) micro_reset_comm(micro); irq = platform_get_irq(pdev, 0); - if (!irq) + if (irq < 0) return -EINVAL; ret = devm_request_irq(&pdev->dev, irq, micro_serial_isr, IRQF_SHARED, "ipaq-micro", From ffd3bed66b54d78c5140d8a19a83c7647208a882 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" Date: Thu, 3 Mar 2022 17:55:21 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 0173/1091] scsi: fcoe: Fix Wstringop-overflow warnings in fcoe_wwn_from_mac() MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit 54db804d5d7d36709d1ce70bde3b9a6c61b290b6 ] Fix the following Wstringop-overflow warnings when building with GCC-11: drivers/scsi/fcoe/fcoe.c: In function ‘fcoe_netdev_config’: drivers/scsi/fcoe/fcoe.c:744:32: warning: ‘fcoe_wwn_from_mac’ accessing 32 bytes in a region of size 6 [-Wstringop-overflow=] 744 | wwnn = fcoe_wwn_from_mac(ctlr->ctl_src_addr, 1, 0); | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ drivers/scsi/fcoe/fcoe.c:744:32: note: referencing argument 1 of type ‘unsigned char *’ In file included from drivers/scsi/fcoe/fcoe.c:36: ./include/scsi/libfcoe.h:252:5: note: in a call to function ‘fcoe_wwn_from_mac’ 252 | u64 fcoe_wwn_from_mac(unsigned char mac[MAX_ADDR_LEN], unsigned int, unsigned int); | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ drivers/scsi/fcoe/fcoe.c:747:32: warning: ‘fcoe_wwn_from_mac’ accessing 32 bytes in a region of size 6 [-Wstringop-overflow=] 747 | wwpn = fcoe_wwn_from_mac(ctlr->ctl_src_addr, | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 748 | 2, 0); | ~~~~~ drivers/scsi/fcoe/fcoe.c:747:32: note: referencing argument 1 of type ‘unsigned char *’ In file included from drivers/scsi/fcoe/fcoe.c:36: ./include/scsi/libfcoe.h:252:5: note: in a call to function ‘fcoe_wwn_from_mac’ 252 | u64 fcoe_wwn_from_mac(unsigned char mac[MAX_ADDR_LEN], unsigned int, unsigned int); | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ CC drivers/scsi/bnx2fc/bnx2fc_io.o In function ‘bnx2fc_net_config’, inlined from ‘bnx2fc_if_create’ at drivers/scsi/bnx2fc/bnx2fc_fcoe.c:1543:7: drivers/scsi/bnx2fc/bnx2fc_fcoe.c:833:32: warning: ‘fcoe_wwn_from_mac’ accessing 32 bytes in a region of size 6 [-Wstringop-overflow=] 833 | wwnn = fcoe_wwn_from_mac(ctlr->ctl_src_addr, | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 834 | 1, 0); | ~~~~~ drivers/scsi/bnx2fc/bnx2fc_fcoe.c: In function ‘bnx2fc_if_create’: drivers/scsi/bnx2fc/bnx2fc_fcoe.c:833:32: note: referencing argument 1 of type ‘unsigned char *’ In file included from drivers/scsi/bnx2fc/bnx2fc.h:53, from drivers/scsi/bnx2fc/bnx2fc_fcoe.c:17: ./include/scsi/libfcoe.h:252:5: note: in a call to function ‘fcoe_wwn_from_mac’ 252 | u64 fcoe_wwn_from_mac(unsigned char mac[MAX_ADDR_LEN], unsigned int, unsigned int); | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ In function ‘bnx2fc_net_config’, inlined from ‘bnx2fc_if_create’ at drivers/scsi/bnx2fc/bnx2fc_fcoe.c:1543:7: drivers/scsi/bnx2fc/bnx2fc_fcoe.c:839:32: warning: ‘fcoe_wwn_from_mac’ accessing 32 bytes in a region of size 6 [-Wstringop-overflow=] 839 | wwpn = fcoe_wwn_from_mac(ctlr->ctl_src_addr, | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 840 | 2, 0); | ~~~~~ drivers/scsi/bnx2fc/bnx2fc_fcoe.c: In function ‘bnx2fc_if_create’: drivers/scsi/bnx2fc/bnx2fc_fcoe.c:839:32: note: referencing argument 1 of type ‘unsigned char *’ In file included from drivers/scsi/bnx2fc/bnx2fc.h:53, from drivers/scsi/bnx2fc/bnx2fc_fcoe.c:17: ./include/scsi/libfcoe.h:252:5: note: in a call to function ‘fcoe_wwn_from_mac’ 252 | u64 fcoe_wwn_from_mac(unsigned char mac[MAX_ADDR_LEN], unsigned int, unsigned int); | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ drivers/scsi/qedf/qedf_main.c: In function ‘__qedf_probe’: drivers/scsi/qedf/qedf_main.c:3520:30: warning: ‘fcoe_wwn_from_mac’ accessing 32 bytes in a region of size 6 [-Wstringop-overflow=] 3520 | qedf->wwnn = fcoe_wwn_from_mac(qedf->mac, 1, 0); | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ drivers/scsi/qedf/qedf_main.c:3520:30: note: referencing argument 1 of type ‘unsigned char *’ In file included from drivers/scsi/qedf/qedf.h:9, from drivers/scsi/qedf/qedf_main.c:23: ./include/scsi/libfcoe.h:252:5: note: in a call to function ‘fcoe_wwn_from_mac’ 252 | u64 fcoe_wwn_from_mac(unsigned char mac[MAX_ADDR_LEN], unsigned int, unsigned int); | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ drivers/scsi/qedf/qedf_main.c:3521:30: warning: ‘fcoe_wwn_from_mac’ accessing 32 bytes in a region of size 6 [-Wstringop-overflow=] 3521 | qedf->wwpn = fcoe_wwn_from_mac(qedf->mac, 2, 0); | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ drivers/scsi/qedf/qedf_main.c:3521:30: note: referencing argument 1 of type ‘unsigned char *’ In file included from drivers/scsi/qedf/qedf.h:9, from drivers/scsi/qedf/qedf_main.c:23: ./include/scsi/libfcoe.h:252:5: note: in a call to function ‘fcoe_wwn_from_mac’ 252 | u64 fcoe_wwn_from_mac(unsigned char mac[MAX_ADDR_LEN], unsigned int, unsigned int); | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ by changing the array size to the correct value of ETH_ALEN in the argument declaration. Also, fix a couple of checkpatch warnings: WARNING: function definition argument 'unsigned int' should also have an identifier name This helps with the ongoing efforts to globally enable -Wstringop-overflow. Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/181 Fixes: 85b4aa4926a5 ("[SCSI] fcoe: Fibre Channel over Ethernet") Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/scsi/fcoe/fcoe_ctlr.c | 2 +- include/scsi/libfcoe.h | 3 ++- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/fcoe/fcoe_ctlr.c b/drivers/scsi/fcoe/fcoe_ctlr.c index 07a0dadc75bf..7ce2a0434e1e 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/fcoe/fcoe_ctlr.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/fcoe/fcoe_ctlr.c @@ -1966,7 +1966,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(fcoe_ctlr_recv_flogi); * * Returns: u64 fc world wide name */ -u64 fcoe_wwn_from_mac(unsigned char mac[MAX_ADDR_LEN], +u64 fcoe_wwn_from_mac(unsigned char mac[ETH_ALEN], unsigned int scheme, unsigned int port) { u64 wwn; diff --git a/include/scsi/libfcoe.h b/include/scsi/libfcoe.h index fac8e89aed81..310e0dbffda9 100644 --- a/include/scsi/libfcoe.h +++ b/include/scsi/libfcoe.h @@ -249,7 +249,8 @@ int fcoe_ctlr_recv_flogi(struct fcoe_ctlr *, struct fc_lport *, struct fc_frame *); /* libfcoe funcs */ -u64 fcoe_wwn_from_mac(unsigned char mac[MAX_ADDR_LEN], unsigned int, unsigned int); +u64 fcoe_wwn_from_mac(unsigned char mac[ETH_ALEN], unsigned int scheme, + unsigned int port); int fcoe_libfc_config(struct fc_lport *, struct fcoe_ctlr *, const struct libfc_function_template *, int init_fcp); u32 fcoe_fc_crc(struct fc_frame *fp); From b0e4bafac8963c2d85ee18d3d01f393735acceec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Cristian Marussi Date: Wed, 30 Mar 2022 16:05:32 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0174/1091] firmware: arm_scmi: Fix list protocols enumeration in the base protocol [ Upstream commit 8009120e0354a67068e920eb10dce532391361d0 ] While enumerating protocols implemented by the SCMI platform using BASE_DISCOVER_LIST_PROTOCOLS, the number of returned protocols is currently validated in an improper way since the check employs a sum between unsigned integers that could overflow and cause the check itself to be silently bypassed if the returned value 'loop_num_ret' is big enough. Fix the validation avoiding the addition. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220330150551.2573938-4-cristian.marussi@arm.com Fixes: b6f20ff8bd94 ("firmware: arm_scmi: add common infrastructure and support for base protocol") Signed-off-by: Cristian Marussi Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/base.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/base.c b/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/base.c index f986ee8919f0..2be32e86445f 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/base.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/base.c @@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ static int scmi_base_implementation_list_get(const struct scmi_handle *handle, break; loop_num_ret = le32_to_cpu(*num_ret); - if (tot_num_ret + loop_num_ret > MAX_PROTOCOLS_IMP) { + if (loop_num_ret > MAX_PROTOCOLS_IMP - tot_num_ret) { dev_err(dev, "No. of Protocol > MAX_PROTOCOLS_IMP"); break; } From 9282496aac8bf7f9fb08d63dc0c2cba5c56087f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dan Williams Date: Thu, 28 Apr 2022 15:47:46 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0175/1091] nvdimm: Allow overwrite in the presence of disabled dimms [ Upstream commit bb7bf697fed58eae9d3445944e457ab0de4da54f ] It is not clear why the original implementation of overwrite support required the dimm driver to be active before overwrite could proceed. In fact that can lead to cases where the kernel retains an invalid cached copy of the labels from before the overwrite. Unfortunately the kernel has not only allowed that case, but enforced it. Going forward, allow for overwrite to happen while the label area is offline, and follow-on with updates to 'ndctl sanitize-dimm --overwrite' to trigger the label area invalidation by default. Cc: Vishal Verma Cc: Dave Jiang Cc: Ira Weiny Cc: Jeff Moyer Reported-by: Krzysztof Kensicki Fixes: 7d988097c546 ("acpi/nfit, libnvdimm/security: Add security DSM overwrite support") Signed-off-by: Dan Williams Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/nvdimm/security.c | 5 ----- 1 file changed, 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/nvdimm/security.c b/drivers/nvdimm/security.c index 35d265014e1e..0e23d8c27792 100644 --- a/drivers/nvdimm/security.c +++ b/drivers/nvdimm/security.c @@ -379,11 +379,6 @@ static int security_overwrite(struct nvdimm *nvdimm, unsigned int keyid) || !nvdimm->sec.flags) return -EOPNOTSUPP; - if (dev->driver == NULL) { - dev_dbg(dev, "Unable to overwrite while DIMM active.\n"); - return -EINVAL; - } - rc = check_security_state(nvdimm); if (rc) return rc; From d1f908bd0100f939b4e4a5b4d87b77db90f6b806 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Krzysztof Kozlowski Date: Fri, 22 Apr 2022 12:53:38 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0176/1091] pinctrl: mvebu: Fix irq_of_parse_and_map() return value [ Upstream commit 71bc7cf3be65bab441e03667cf215c557712976c ] The irq_of_parse_and_map() returns 0 on failure, not a negative ERRNO. Fixes: 2f227605394b ("pinctrl: armada-37xx: Add irqchip support") Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220422105339.78810-1-krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/pinctrl/mvebu/pinctrl-armada-37xx.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/pinctrl/mvebu/pinctrl-armada-37xx.c b/drivers/pinctrl/mvebu/pinctrl-armada-37xx.c index f56add78d58c..359b2ecfcbdb 100644 --- a/drivers/pinctrl/mvebu/pinctrl-armada-37xx.c +++ b/drivers/pinctrl/mvebu/pinctrl-armada-37xx.c @@ -773,7 +773,7 @@ static int armada_37xx_irqchip_register(struct platform_device *pdev, for (i = 0; i < nr_irq_parent; i++) { int irq = irq_of_parse_and_map(np, i); - if (irq < 0) + if (!irq) continue; gpiochip_set_chained_irqchip(gc, irqchip, irq, From 386e69e068177ee91cac27f2f0e6ebda1515f5ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miaohe Lin Date: Thu, 28 Apr 2022 23:16:06 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0177/1091] drivers/base/node.c: fix compaction sysfs file leak [ Upstream commit da63dc84befaa9e6079a0bc363ff0eaa975f9073 ] Compaction sysfs file is created via compaction_register_node in register_node. But we forgot to remove it in unregister_node. Thus compaction sysfs file is leaked. Using compaction_unregister_node to fix this issue. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220401070905.43679-1-linmiaohe@huawei.com Fixes: ed4a6d7f0676 ("mm: compaction: add /sys trigger for per-node memory compaction") Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki Cc: Mel Gorman Cc: Minchan Kim Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/base/node.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/base/node.c b/drivers/base/node.c index 62a052990bb9..666eb55c0774 100644 --- a/drivers/base/node.c +++ b/drivers/base/node.c @@ -641,6 +641,7 @@ static int register_node(struct node *node, int num) */ void unregister_node(struct node *node) { + compaction_unregister_node(node); hugetlb_unregister_node(node); /* no-op, if memoryless node */ node_remove_accesses(node); node_remove_caches(node); From 662b70a45b32e4b499debcc1ec2f459a8a7fd27d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Muchun Song Date: Thu, 28 Apr 2022 23:16:09 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0178/1091] dax: fix cache flush on PMD-mapped pages [ Upstream commit e583b5c472bd23d450e06f148dc1f37be74f7666 ] The flush_cache_page() only remove a PAGE_SIZE sized range from the cache. However, it does not cover the full pages in a THP except a head page. Replace it with flush_cache_range() to fix this issue. This is just a documentation issue with the respect to properly documenting the expected usage of cache flushing before modifying the pmd. However, in practice this is not a problem due to the fact that DAX is not available on architectures with virtually indexed caches per: commit d92576f1167c ("dax: does not work correctly with virtual aliasing caches") Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220403053957.10770-3-songmuchun@bytedance.com Fixes: f729c8c9b24f ("dax: wrprotect pmd_t in dax_mapping_entry_mkclean") Signed-off-by: Muchun Song Reviewed-by: Dan Williams Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig Cc: Alistair Popple Cc: Al Viro Cc: Hugh Dickins Cc: Jan Kara Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" Cc: Matthew Wilcox Cc: Ralph Campbell Cc: Ross Zwisler Cc: Xiongchun Duan Cc: Xiyu Yang Cc: Yang Shi Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/dax.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/dax.c b/fs/dax.c index 12953e892bb2..bcb7c6b43fb2 100644 --- a/fs/dax.c +++ b/fs/dax.c @@ -819,7 +819,8 @@ static void dax_entry_mkclean(struct address_space *mapping, pgoff_t index, if (!pmd_dirty(*pmdp) && !pmd_write(*pmdp)) goto unlock_pmd; - flush_cache_page(vma, address, pfn); + flush_cache_range(vma, address, + address + HPAGE_PMD_SIZE); pmd = pmdp_invalidate(vma, address, pmdp); pmd = pmd_wrprotect(pmd); pmd = pmd_mkclean(pmd); From 1d83f304215b8096a134a98f04f1bcf70168e12f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Randy Dunlap Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2021 17:08:19 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 0179/1091] powerpc/8xx: export 'cpm_setbrg' for modules [ Upstream commit 22f8e625ebabd7ed3185b82b44b4f12fc0402113 ] Fix missing export for a loadable module build: ERROR: modpost: "cpm_setbrg" [drivers/tty/serial/cpm_uart/cpm_uart.ko] undefined! Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc") Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap Reported-by: kernel test robot [chleroy: Changed Fixes: tag] Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210122010819.30986-1-rdunlap@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/powerpc/platforms/8xx/cpm1.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/8xx/cpm1.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/8xx/cpm1.c index 0f65c51271db..ec6dc2d7a9db 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/8xx/cpm1.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/8xx/cpm1.c @@ -292,6 +292,7 @@ cpm_setbrg(uint brg, uint rate) out_be32(bp, (((BRG_UART_CLK_DIV16 / rate) - 1) << 1) | CPM_BRG_EN | CPM_BRG_DIV16); } +EXPORT_SYMBOL(cpm_setbrg); struct cpm_ioport16 { __be16 dir, par, odr_sor, dat, intr; From 337eef19aad8daed792a7e343ed26ba51dca0e6a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Randy Dunlap Date: Mon, 2 May 2022 12:29:25 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0180/1091] powerpc/idle: Fix return value of __setup() handler [ Upstream commit b793a01000122d2bd133ba451a76cc135b5e162c ] __setup() handlers should return 1 to obsolete_checksetup() in init/main.c to indicate that the boot option has been handled. A return of 0 causes the boot option/value to be listed as an Unknown kernel parameter and added to init's (limited) argument or environment strings. Also, error return codes don't mean anything to obsolete_checksetup() -- only non-zero (usually 1) or zero. So return 1 from powersave_off(). Fixes: 302eca184fb8 ("[POWERPC] cell: use ppc_md->power_save instead of cbe_idle_loop") Reported-by: Igor Zhbanov Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220502192925.19954-1-rdunlap@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/powerpc/kernel/idle.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/idle.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/idle.c index a36fd053c3db..0615ba86baef 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/idle.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/idle.c @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ static int __init powersave_off(char *arg) { ppc_md.power_save = NULL; cpuidle_disable = IDLE_POWERSAVE_OFF; - return 0; + return 1; } __setup("powersave=off", powersave_off); From 6cdb6582b56628187cbcff3c095dac6564cf5e0d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Randy Dunlap Date: Mon, 2 May 2022 12:29:41 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0181/1091] powerpc/4xx/cpm: Fix return value of __setup() handler [ Upstream commit 5bb99fd4090fe1acfdb90a97993fcda7f8f5a3d6 ] __setup() handlers should return 1 to obsolete_checksetup() in init/main.c to indicate that the boot option has been handled. A return of 0 causes the boot option/value to be listed as an Unknown kernel parameter and added to init's (limited) argument or environment strings. Also, error return codes don't mean anything to obsolete_checksetup() -- only non-zero (usually 1) or zero. So return 1 from cpm_powersave_off(). Fixes: d164f6d4f910 ("powerpc/4xx: Add suspend and idle support") Reported-by: Igor Zhbanov Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220502192941.20955-1-rdunlap@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/powerpc/platforms/4xx/cpm.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/4xx/cpm.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/4xx/cpm.c index ae8b812c9202..2481e78c0423 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/4xx/cpm.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/4xx/cpm.c @@ -327,6 +327,6 @@ late_initcall(cpm_init); static int __init cpm_powersave_off(char *arg) { cpm.powersave_off = 1; - return 0; + return 1; } __setup("powersave=off", cpm_powersave_off); From 203537caad3c72ff80c68925780643cd79280045 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexey Dobriyan Date: Mon, 9 May 2022 18:29:19 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0182/1091] proc: fix dentry/inode overinstantiating under /proc/${pid}/net [ Upstream commit 7055197705709c59b8ab77e6a5c7d46d61edd96e ] When a process exits, /proc/${pid}, and /proc/${pid}/net dentries are flushed. However some leaf dentries like /proc/${pid}/net/arp_cache aren't. That's because respective PDEs have proc_misc_d_revalidate() hook which returns 1 and leaves dentries/inodes in the LRU. Force revalidation/lookup on everything under /proc/${pid}/net by inheriting proc_net_dentry_ops. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style cleanups] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/YjdVHgildbWO7diJ@localhost.localdomain Fixes: c6c75deda813 ("proc: fix lookup in /proc/net subdirectories after setns(2)") Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan Reported-by: hui li Cc: Al Viro Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/proc/generic.c | 3 +++ fs/proc/proc_net.c | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/proc/generic.c b/fs/proc/generic.c index 8c3dbe13e647..372b4dad4863 100644 --- a/fs/proc/generic.c +++ b/fs/proc/generic.c @@ -446,6 +446,9 @@ static struct proc_dir_entry *__proc_create(struct proc_dir_entry **parent, proc_set_user(ent, (*parent)->uid, (*parent)->gid); ent->proc_dops = &proc_misc_dentry_ops; + /* Revalidate everything under /proc/${pid}/net */ + if ((*parent)->proc_dops == &proc_net_dentry_ops) + pde_force_lookup(ent); out: return ent; diff --git a/fs/proc/proc_net.c b/fs/proc/proc_net.c index 313b7c751867..9cd5b47199cb 100644 --- a/fs/proc/proc_net.c +++ b/fs/proc/proc_net.c @@ -343,6 +343,9 @@ static __net_init int proc_net_ns_init(struct net *net) proc_set_user(netd, uid, gid); + /* Seed dentry revalidation for /proc/${pid}/net */ + pde_force_lookup(netd); + err = -EEXIST; net_statd = proc_net_mkdir(net, "stat", netd); if (!net_statd) From 0b35a685d911b9df01769a60ee9ceceb541f3e73 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Waiman Long Date: Mon, 9 May 2022 18:29:21 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0183/1091] ipc/mqueue: use get_tree_nodev() in mqueue_get_tree() [ Upstream commit d60c4d01a98bc1942dba6e3adc02031f5519f94b ] When running the stress-ng clone benchmark with multiple testing threads, it was found that there were significant spinlock contention in sget_fc(). The contended spinlock was the sb_lock. It is under heavy contention because the following code in the critcal section of sget_fc(): hlist_for_each_entry(old, &fc->fs_type->fs_supers, s_instances) { if (test(old, fc)) goto share_extant_sb; } After testing with added instrumentation code, it was found that the benchmark could generate thousands of ipc namespaces with the corresponding number of entries in the mqueue's fs_supers list where the namespaces are the key for the search. This leads to excessive time in scanning the list for a match. Looking back at the mqueue calling sequence leading to sget_fc(): mq_init_ns() => mq_create_mount() => fc_mount() => vfs_get_tree() => mqueue_get_tree() => get_tree_keyed() => vfs_get_super() => sget_fc() Currently, mq_init_ns() is the only mqueue function that will indirectly call mqueue_get_tree() with a newly allocated ipc namespace as the key for searching. As a result, there will never be a match with the exising ipc namespaces stored in the mqueue's fs_supers list. So using get_tree_keyed() to do an existing ipc namespace search is just a waste of time. Instead, we could use get_tree_nodev() to eliminate the useless search. By doing so, we can greatly reduce the sb_lock hold time and avoid the spinlock contention problem in case a large number of ipc namespaces are present. Of course, if the code is modified in the future to allow mqueue_get_tree() to be called with an existing ipc namespace instead of a new one, we will have to use get_tree_keyed() in this case. The following stress-ng clone benchmark command was run on a 2-socket 48-core Intel system: ./stress-ng --clone 32 --verbose --oomable --metrics-brief -t 20 The "bogo ops/s" increased from 5948.45 before patch to 9137.06 after patch. This is an increase of 54% in performance. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220121172315.19652-1-longman@redhat.com Fixes: 935c6912b198 ("ipc: Convert mqueue fs to fs_context") Signed-off-by: Waiman Long Cc: Al Viro Cc: David Howells Cc: Manfred Spraul Cc: Davidlohr Bueso Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- ipc/mqueue.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+) diff --git a/ipc/mqueue.c b/ipc/mqueue.c index 2ea0c08188e6..12519bf5f330 100644 --- a/ipc/mqueue.c +++ b/ipc/mqueue.c @@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ struct mqueue_fs_context { struct ipc_namespace *ipc_ns; + bool newns; /* Set if newly created ipc namespace */ }; #define MQUEUE_MAGIC 0x19800202 @@ -365,6 +366,14 @@ static int mqueue_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc) { struct mqueue_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private; + /* + * With a newly created ipc namespace, we don't need to do a search + * for an ipc namespace match, but we still need to set s_fs_info. + */ + if (ctx->newns) { + fc->s_fs_info = ctx->ipc_ns; + return get_tree_nodev(fc, mqueue_fill_super); + } return get_tree_keyed(fc, mqueue_fill_super, ctx->ipc_ns); } @@ -392,6 +401,10 @@ static int mqueue_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc) return 0; } +/* + * mq_init_ns() is currently the only caller of mq_create_mount(). + * So the ns parameter is always a newly created ipc namespace. + */ static struct vfsmount *mq_create_mount(struct ipc_namespace *ns) { struct mqueue_fs_context *ctx; @@ -403,6 +416,7 @@ static struct vfsmount *mq_create_mount(struct ipc_namespace *ns) return ERR_CAST(fc); ctx = fc->fs_private; + ctx->newns = true; put_ipc_ns(ctx->ipc_ns); ctx->ipc_ns = get_ipc_ns(ns); put_user_ns(fc->user_ns); From ded067f24b90b45d9d0b38fad6d6cd150e2e5751 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Francesco Dolcini Date: Mon, 4 Apr 2022 10:15:09 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0184/1091] PCI: imx6: Fix PERST# start-up sequence [ Upstream commit a6809941c1f17f455db2cf4ca19c6d8c8746ec25 ] According to the PCIe standard the PERST# signal (reset-gpio in fsl,imx* compatible dts) should be kept asserted for at least 100 usec before the PCIe refclock is stable, should be kept asserted for at least 100 msec after the power rails are stable and the host should wait at least 100 msec after it is de-asserted before accessing the configuration space of any attached device. From PCIe CEM r2.0, sec 2.6.2 T-PVPERL: Power stable to PERST# inactive - 100 msec T-PERST-CLK: REFCLK stable before PERST# inactive - 100 usec. From PCIe r5.0, sec 6.6.1 With a Downstream Port that does not support Link speeds greater than 5.0 GT/s, software must wait a minimum of 100 ms before sending a Configuration Request to the device immediately below that Port. Failure to do so could prevent PCIe devices to be working correctly, and this was experienced with real devices. Move reset assert to imx6_pcie_assert_core_reset(), this way we ensure that PERST# is asserted before enabling any clock, move de-assert to the end of imx6_pcie_deassert_core_reset() after the clock is enabled and deemed stable and add a new delay of 100 msec just afterward. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220211152550.286821-1-francesco.dolcini@toradex.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220404081509.94356-1-francesco.dolcini@toradex.com Fixes: bb38919ec56e ("PCI: imx6: Add support for i.MX6 PCIe controller") Signed-off-by: Francesco Dolcini Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi Reviewed-by: Lucas Stach Acked-by: Richard Zhu Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pci-imx6.c | 23 ++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pci-imx6.c b/drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pci-imx6.c index acfbd34032a8..b34b52b364d5 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pci-imx6.c +++ b/drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pci-imx6.c @@ -413,6 +413,11 @@ static void imx6_pcie_assert_core_reset(struct imx6_pcie *imx6_pcie) dev_err(dev, "failed to disable vpcie regulator: %d\n", ret); } + + /* Some boards don't have PCIe reset GPIO. */ + if (gpio_is_valid(imx6_pcie->reset_gpio)) + gpio_set_value_cansleep(imx6_pcie->reset_gpio, + imx6_pcie->gpio_active_high); } static unsigned int imx6_pcie_grp_offset(const struct imx6_pcie *imx6_pcie) @@ -535,15 +540,6 @@ static void imx6_pcie_deassert_core_reset(struct imx6_pcie *imx6_pcie) /* allow the clocks to stabilize */ usleep_range(200, 500); - /* Some boards don't have PCIe reset GPIO. */ - if (gpio_is_valid(imx6_pcie->reset_gpio)) { - gpio_set_value_cansleep(imx6_pcie->reset_gpio, - imx6_pcie->gpio_active_high); - msleep(100); - gpio_set_value_cansleep(imx6_pcie->reset_gpio, - !imx6_pcie->gpio_active_high); - } - switch (imx6_pcie->drvdata->variant) { case IMX8MQ: reset_control_deassert(imx6_pcie->pciephy_reset); @@ -586,6 +582,15 @@ static void imx6_pcie_deassert_core_reset(struct imx6_pcie *imx6_pcie) break; } + /* Some boards don't have PCIe reset GPIO. */ + if (gpio_is_valid(imx6_pcie->reset_gpio)) { + msleep(100); + gpio_set_value_cansleep(imx6_pcie->reset_gpio, + !imx6_pcie->gpio_active_high); + /* Wait for 100ms after PERST# deassertion (PCIe r5.0, 6.6.1) */ + msleep(100); + } + return; err_ref_clk: From 3219ac364ac3d8d30771612a6010f1e0b7fa0a28 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Qi Zheng Date: Thu, 12 May 2022 20:38:37 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0185/1091] tty: fix deadlock caused by calling printk() under tty_port->lock [ Upstream commit 6b9dbedbe3499fef862c4dff5217cf91f34e43b3 ] pty_write() invokes kmalloc() which may invoke a normal printk() to print failure message. This can cause a deadlock in the scenario reported by syz-bot below: CPU0 CPU1 CPU2 ---- ---- ---- lock(console_owner); lock(&port_lock_key); lock(&port->lock); lock(&port_lock_key); lock(&port->lock); lock(console_owner); As commit dbdda842fe96 ("printk: Add console owner and waiter logic to load balance console writes") said, such deadlock can be prevented by using printk_deferred() in kmalloc() (which is invoked in the section guarded by the port->lock). But there are too many printk() on the kmalloc() path, and kmalloc() can be called from anywhere, so changing printk() to printk_deferred() is too complicated and inelegant. Therefore, this patch chooses to specify __GFP_NOWARN to kmalloc(), so that printk() will not be called, and this deadlock problem can be avoided. Syzbot reported the following lockdep error: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.4.143-00237-g08ccc19a-dirty #10 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ syz-executor.4/29420 is trying to acquire lock: ffffffff8aedb2a0 (console_owner){....}-{0:0}, at: console_trylock_spinning kernel/printk/printk.c:1752 [inline] ffffffff8aedb2a0 (console_owner){....}-{0:0}, at: vprintk_emit+0x2ca/0x470 kernel/printk/printk.c:2023 but task is already holding lock: ffff8880119c9158 (&port->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: pty_write+0xf4/0x1f0 drivers/tty/pty.c:120 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (&port->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x35/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:159 tty_port_tty_get drivers/tty/tty_port.c:288 [inline] <-- lock(&port->lock); tty_port_default_wakeup+0x1d/0xb0 drivers/tty/tty_port.c:47 serial8250_tx_chars+0x530/0xa80 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:1767 serial8250_handle_irq.part.0+0x31f/0x3d0 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:1854 serial8250_handle_irq drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:1827 [inline] <-- lock(&port_lock_key); serial8250_default_handle_irq+0xb2/0x220 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:1870 serial8250_interrupt+0xfd/0x200 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_core.c:126 __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x109/0xa50 kernel/irq/handle.c:156 [...] -> #1 (&port_lock_key){-.-.}-{2:2}: __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x35/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:159 serial8250_console_write+0x184/0xa40 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:3198 <-- lock(&port_lock_key); call_console_drivers kernel/printk/printk.c:1819 [inline] console_unlock+0x8cb/0xd00 kernel/printk/printk.c:2504 vprintk_emit+0x1b5/0x470 kernel/printk/printk.c:2024 <-- lock(console_owner); vprintk_func+0x8d/0x250 kernel/printk/printk_safe.c:394 printk+0xba/0xed kernel/printk/printk.c:2084 register_console+0x8b3/0xc10 kernel/printk/printk.c:2829 univ8250_console_init+0x3a/0x46 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_core.c:681 console_init+0x49d/0x6d3 kernel/printk/printk.c:2915 start_kernel+0x5e9/0x879 init/main.c:713 secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S:241 -> #0 (console_owner){....}-{0:0}: [...] lock_acquire+0x127/0x340 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4734 console_trylock_spinning kernel/printk/printk.c:1773 [inline] <-- lock(console_owner); vprintk_emit+0x307/0x470 kernel/printk/printk.c:2023 vprintk_func+0x8d/0x250 kernel/printk/printk_safe.c:394 printk+0xba/0xed kernel/printk/printk.c:2084 fail_dump lib/fault-inject.c:45 [inline] should_fail+0x67b/0x7c0 lib/fault-inject.c:144 __should_failslab+0x152/0x1c0 mm/failslab.c:33 should_failslab+0x5/0x10 mm/slab_common.c:1224 slab_pre_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:468 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2723 [inline] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2807 [inline] __kmalloc+0x72/0x300 mm/slub.c:3871 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:582 [inline] tty_buffer_alloc+0x23f/0x2a0 drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c:175 __tty_buffer_request_room+0x156/0x2a0 drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c:273 tty_insert_flip_string_fixed_flag+0x93/0x250 drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c:318 tty_insert_flip_string include/linux/tty_flip.h:37 [inline] pty_write+0x126/0x1f0 drivers/tty/pty.c:122 <-- lock(&port->lock); n_tty_write+0xa7a/0xfc0 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2356 do_tty_write drivers/tty/tty_io.c:961 [inline] tty_write+0x512/0x930 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1045 __vfs_write+0x76/0x100 fs/read_write.c:494 [...] other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: console_owner --> &port_lock_key --> &port->lock Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220511061951.1114-2-zhengqi.arch@bytedance.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220510113809.80626-2-zhengqi.arch@bytedance.com Fixes: b6da31b2c07c ("tty: Fix data race in tty_insert_flip_string_fixed_flag") Signed-off-by: Qi Zheng Acked-by: Jiri Slaby Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Cc: Akinobu Mita Cc: Vlastimil Babka Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c b/drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c index bb148dbfbb88..47f2370ad85c 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c +++ b/drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c @@ -172,7 +172,8 @@ static struct tty_buffer *tty_buffer_alloc(struct tty_port *port, size_t size) have queued and recycle that ? */ if (atomic_read(&port->buf.mem_used) > port->buf.mem_limit) return NULL; - p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct tty_buffer) + 2 * size, GFP_ATOMIC); + p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct tty_buffer) + 2 * size, + GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOWARN); if (p == NULL) return NULL; From 6d7b2cf5c7ed875f78c5a095bd1b5255ea53eec6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior Date: Wed, 4 May 2022 17:07:36 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0186/1091] crypto: cryptd - Protect per-CPU resource by disabling BH. [ Upstream commit 91e8bcd7b4da182e09ea19a2c73167345fe14c98 ] The access to cryptd_queue::cpu_queue is synchronized by disabling preemption in cryptd_enqueue_request() and disabling BH in cryptd_queue_worker(). This implies that access is allowed from BH. If cryptd_enqueue_request() is invoked from preemptible context _and_ soft interrupt then this can lead to list corruption since cryptd_enqueue_request() is not protected against access from soft interrupt. Replace get_cpu() in cryptd_enqueue_request() with local_bh_disable() to ensure BH is always disabled. Remove preempt_disable() from cryptd_queue_worker() since it is not needed because local_bh_disable() ensures synchronisation. Fixes: 254eff771441 ("crypto: cryptd - Per-CPU thread implementation...") Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- crypto/cryptd.c | 23 +++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/cryptd.c b/crypto/cryptd.c index 927760b316a4..43a1a855886b 100644 --- a/crypto/cryptd.c +++ b/crypto/cryptd.c @@ -39,6 +39,10 @@ struct cryptd_cpu_queue { }; struct cryptd_queue { + /* + * Protected by disabling BH to allow enqueueing from softinterrupt and + * dequeuing from kworker (cryptd_queue_worker()). + */ struct cryptd_cpu_queue __percpu *cpu_queue; }; @@ -125,28 +129,28 @@ static void cryptd_fini_queue(struct cryptd_queue *queue) static int cryptd_enqueue_request(struct cryptd_queue *queue, struct crypto_async_request *request) { - int cpu, err; + int err; struct cryptd_cpu_queue *cpu_queue; refcount_t *refcnt; - cpu = get_cpu(); + local_bh_disable(); cpu_queue = this_cpu_ptr(queue->cpu_queue); err = crypto_enqueue_request(&cpu_queue->queue, request); refcnt = crypto_tfm_ctx(request->tfm); if (err == -ENOSPC) - goto out_put_cpu; + goto out; - queue_work_on(cpu, cryptd_wq, &cpu_queue->work); + queue_work_on(smp_processor_id(), cryptd_wq, &cpu_queue->work); if (!refcount_read(refcnt)) - goto out_put_cpu; + goto out; refcount_inc(refcnt); -out_put_cpu: - put_cpu(); +out: + local_bh_enable(); return err; } @@ -162,15 +166,10 @@ static void cryptd_queue_worker(struct work_struct *work) cpu_queue = container_of(work, struct cryptd_cpu_queue, work); /* * Only handle one request at a time to avoid hogging crypto workqueue. - * preempt_disable/enable is used to prevent being preempted by - * cryptd_enqueue_request(). local_bh_disable/enable is used to prevent - * cryptd_enqueue_request() being accessed from software interrupts. */ local_bh_disable(); - preempt_disable(); backlog = crypto_get_backlog(&cpu_queue->queue); req = crypto_dequeue_request(&cpu_queue->queue); - preempt_enable(); local_bh_enable(); if (!req) From bbc2b0ce6042dd3117827f10ea8cb67e0ab786da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miaoqian Lin Date: Mon, 16 May 2022 14:55:55 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0187/1091] Input: sparcspkr - fix refcount leak in bbc_beep_probe [ Upstream commit c8994b30d71d64d5dcc9bc0edbfdf367171aa96f ] of_find_node_by_path() calls of_find_node_opts_by_path(), which returns a node pointer with refcount incremented, we should use of_node_put() on it when done. Add missing of_node_put() to avoid refcount leak. Fixes: 9c1a5077fdca ("input: Rewrite sparcspkr device probing.") Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220516081018.42728-1-linmq006@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/input/misc/sparcspkr.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/input/misc/sparcspkr.c b/drivers/input/misc/sparcspkr.c index fe43e5557ed7..cdcb7737c46a 100644 --- a/drivers/input/misc/sparcspkr.c +++ b/drivers/input/misc/sparcspkr.c @@ -205,6 +205,7 @@ static int bbc_beep_probe(struct platform_device *op) info = &state->u.bbc; info->clock_freq = of_getintprop_default(dp, "clock-frequency", 0); + of_node_put(dp); if (!info->clock_freq) goto out_free; From cf0b52858f7435f21f9dc9ad7e4e12906b3acbc9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michael Ellerman Date: Thu, 7 Apr 2022 00:58:01 +1000 Subject: [PATCH 0188/1091] powerpc/64: Only WARN if __pa()/__va() called with bad addresses [ Upstream commit c4bce84d0bd3f396f702d69be2e92bbd8af97583 ] We added checks to __pa() / __va() to ensure they're only called with appropriate addresses. But using BUG_ON() is too strong, it means virt_addr_valid() will BUG when DEBUG_VIRTUAL is enabled. Instead switch them to warnings, arm64 does the same. Fixes: 4dd7554a6456 ("powerpc/64: Add VIRTUAL_BUG_ON checks for __va and __pa addresses") Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220406145802.538416-5-mpe@ellerman.id.au Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/powerpc/include/asm/page.h | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/page.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/page.h index 0d8f9246ce15..d92353a96f81 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/page.h +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/page.h @@ -216,6 +216,9 @@ static inline bool pfn_valid(unsigned long pfn) #define __pa(x) ((unsigned long)(x) - VIRT_PHYS_OFFSET) #else #ifdef CONFIG_PPC64 + +#define VIRTUAL_WARN_ON(x) WARN_ON(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL) && (x)) + /* * gcc miscompiles (unsigned long)(&static_var) - PAGE_OFFSET * with -mcmodel=medium, so we use & and | instead of - and + on 64-bit. @@ -223,13 +226,13 @@ static inline bool pfn_valid(unsigned long pfn) */ #define __va(x) \ ({ \ - VIRTUAL_BUG_ON((unsigned long)(x) >= PAGE_OFFSET); \ + VIRTUAL_WARN_ON((unsigned long)(x) >= PAGE_OFFSET); \ (void *)(unsigned long)((phys_addr_t)(x) | PAGE_OFFSET); \ }) #define __pa(x) \ ({ \ - VIRTUAL_BUG_ON((unsigned long)(x) < PAGE_OFFSET); \ + VIRTUAL_WARN_ON((unsigned long)(x) < PAGE_OFFSET); \ (unsigned long)(x) & 0x0fffffffffffffffUL; \ }) From bc21634ce430944b483875dfe3d7edaedc9bff24 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kajol Jain Date: Fri, 6 May 2022 11:40:15 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 0189/1091] powerpc/perf: Fix the threshold compare group constraint for power9 [ Upstream commit ab0cc6bbf0c812731c703ec757fcc3fc3a457a34 ] Thresh compare bits for a event is used to program thresh compare field in Monitor Mode Control Register A (MMCRA: 9-18 bits for power9). When scheduling events as a group, all events in that group should match value in threshold bits (like thresh compare, thresh control, thresh select). Otherwise event open for the sibling events should fail. But in the current code, incase thresh compare bits are not valid, we are not failing in group_constraint function which can result in invalid group schduling. Fix the issue by returning -1 incase event is threshold and threshold compare value is not valid. Thresh control bits in the event code is used to program thresh_ctl field in Monitor Mode Control Register A (MMCRA: 48-55). In below example, the scheduling of group events PM_MRK_INST_CMPL (873534401e0) and PM_THRESH_MET (8734340101ec) is expected to fail as both event request different thresh control bits and invalid thresh compare value. Result before the patch changes: [command]# perf stat -e "{r8735340401e0,r8734340101ec}" sleep 1 Performance counter stats for 'sleep 1': 11,048 r8735340401e0 1,967 r8734340101ec 1.001354036 seconds time elapsed 0.001421000 seconds user 0.000000000 seconds sys Result after the patch changes: [command]# perf stat -e "{r8735340401e0,r8734340101ec}" sleep 1 Error: The sys_perf_event_open() syscall returned with 22 (Invalid argument) for event (r8735340401e0). /bin/dmesg | grep -i perf may provide additional information. Fixes: 78a16d9fc1206 ("powerpc/perf: Avoid FAB_*_MATCH checks for power9") Signed-off-by: Kajol Jain Reviewed-by: Athira Rajeev Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506061015.43916-2-kjain@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/powerpc/perf/isa207-common.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/perf/isa207-common.c b/arch/powerpc/perf/isa207-common.c index 944180f55a3c..25eda98f3b1b 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/perf/isa207-common.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/perf/isa207-common.c @@ -326,7 +326,8 @@ int isa207_get_constraint(u64 event, unsigned long *maskp, unsigned long *valp) if (event_is_threshold(event) && is_thresh_cmp_valid(event)) { mask |= CNST_THRESH_MASK; value |= CNST_THRESH_VAL(event >> EVENT_THRESH_SHIFT); - } + } else if (event_is_threshold(event)) + return -1; } else { /* * Special case for PM_MRK_FAB_RSP_MATCH and PM_MRK_FAB_RSP_MATCH_CYC, From 2631fe5b53b5295c632751692e4a0ea3ce63eb8a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Randy Dunlap Date: Sun, 10 Apr 2022 09:10:35 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0190/1091] macintosh: via-pmu and via-cuda need RTC_LIB [ Upstream commit 9a9c5ff5fff87eb1a43db0d899473554e408fd7b ] Fix build when RTC_LIB is not set/enabled. Eliminates these build errors: m68k-linux-ld: drivers/macintosh/via-pmu.o: in function `pmu_set_rtc_time': drivers/macintosh/via-pmu.c:1769: undefined reference to `rtc_tm_to_time64' m68k-linux-ld: drivers/macintosh/via-cuda.o: in function `cuda_set_rtc_time': drivers/macintosh/via-cuda.c:797: undefined reference to `rtc_tm_to_time64' Fixes: 0792a2c8e0bb ("macintosh: Use common code to access RTC") Reported-by: kernel test robot Suggested-by: Christophe Leroy Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220410161035.592-1-rdunlap@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/macintosh/Kconfig | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/macintosh/Kconfig b/drivers/macintosh/Kconfig index abaf1401cca6..b5a534206edd 100644 --- a/drivers/macintosh/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/macintosh/Kconfig @@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ config ADB_IOP config ADB_CUDA bool "Support for Cuda/Egret based Macs and PowerMacs" depends on (ADB || PPC_PMAC) && !PPC_PMAC64 + select RTC_LIB help This provides support for Cuda/Egret based Macintosh and Power Macintosh systems. This includes most m68k based Macs, @@ -57,6 +58,7 @@ config ADB_CUDA config ADB_PMU bool "Support for PMU based PowerMacs and PowerBooks" depends on PPC_PMAC || MAC + select RTC_LIB help On PowerBooks, iBooks, and recent iMacs and Power Macintoshes, the PMU is an embedded microprocessor whose primary function is to From bcb6c4c5eb4836a21411dfe8247bf9951eb6e7c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miaoqian Lin Date: Thu, 12 May 2022 16:37:18 +0400 Subject: [PATCH 0191/1091] powerpc/fsl_rio: Fix refcount leak in fsl_rio_setup [ Upstream commit fcee96924ba1596ca80a6770b2567ca546f9a482 ] of_parse_phandle() returns a node pointer with refcount incremented, we should use of_node_put() on it when not need anymore. Add missing of_node_put() to avoid refcount leak. Fixes: abc3aeae3aaa ("fsl-rio: Add two ports and rapidio message units support") Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220512123724.62931-1-linmq006@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/powerpc/sysdev/fsl_rio.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/sysdev/fsl_rio.c b/arch/powerpc/sysdev/fsl_rio.c index 07c164f7f8cf..3f9f78621cf3 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/sysdev/fsl_rio.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/sysdev/fsl_rio.c @@ -505,8 +505,10 @@ int fsl_rio_setup(struct platform_device *dev) if (rc) { dev_err(&dev->dev, "Can't get %pOF property 'reg'\n", rmu_node); + of_node_put(rmu_node); goto err_rmu; } + of_node_put(rmu_node); rmu_regs_win = ioremap(rmu_regs.start, resource_size(&rmu_regs)); if (!rmu_regs_win) { dev_err(&dev->dev, "Unable to map rmu register window\n"); From 49c1e32e7b3f301642a60448700ec531df981269 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yang Yingliang Date: Tue, 26 Apr 2022 11:08:57 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0192/1091] mfd: davinci_voicecodec: Fix possible null-ptr-deref davinci_vc_probe() [ Upstream commit 311242c7703df0da14c206260b7e855f69cb0264 ] It will cause null-ptr-deref when using 'res', if platform_get_resource() returns NULL, so move using 'res' after devm_ioremap_resource() that will check it to avoid null-ptr-deref. And use devm_platform_get_and_ioremap_resource() to simplify code. Fixes: b5e29aa880be ("mfd: davinci_voicecodec: Remove pointless #include") Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang Signed-off-by: Lee Jones Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220426030857.3539336-1-yangyingliang@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/mfd/davinci_voicecodec.c | 6 ++---- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/mfd/davinci_voicecodec.c b/drivers/mfd/davinci_voicecodec.c index e5c8bc998eb4..965820481f1e 100644 --- a/drivers/mfd/davinci_voicecodec.c +++ b/drivers/mfd/davinci_voicecodec.c @@ -46,14 +46,12 @@ static int __init davinci_vc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) } clk_enable(davinci_vc->clk); - res = platform_get_resource(pdev, IORESOURCE_MEM, 0); - - fifo_base = (dma_addr_t)res->start; - davinci_vc->base = devm_ioremap_resource(&pdev->dev, res); + davinci_vc->base = devm_platform_get_and_ioremap_resource(pdev, 0, &res); if (IS_ERR(davinci_vc->base)) { ret = PTR_ERR(davinci_vc->base); goto fail; } + fifo_base = (dma_addr_t)res->start; davinci_vc->regmap = devm_regmap_init_mmio(&pdev->dev, davinci_vc->base, From 6d8b9f574bcac0694fb0476e8e478be2f2362e7c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Bj=C3=B6rn=20Ard=C3=B6?= Date: Thu, 31 Mar 2022 09:01:15 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0193/1091] mailbox: forward the hrtimer if not queued and under a lock MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit bca1a1004615efe141fd78f360ecc48c60bc4ad5 ] This reverts commit c7dacf5b0f32957b24ef29df1207dc2cd8307743, "mailbox: avoid timer start from callback" The previous commit was reverted since it lead to a race that caused the hrtimer to not be started at all. The check for hrtimer_active() in msg_submit() will return true if the callback function txdone_hrtimer() is currently running. This function could return HRTIMER_NORESTART and then the timer will not be restarted, and also msg_submit() will not start the timer. This will lead to a message actually being submitted but no timer will start to check for its compleation. The original fix that added checking hrtimer_active() was added to avoid a warning with hrtimer_forward. Looking in the kernel another solution to avoid this warning is to check hrtimer_is_queued() before calling hrtimer_forward_now() instead. This however requires a lock so the timer is not started by msg_submit() inbetween this check and the hrtimer_forward() call. Fixes: c7dacf5b0f32 ("mailbox: avoid timer start from callback") Signed-off-by: Björn Ardö Signed-off-by: Jassi Brar Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/mailbox/mailbox.c | 19 +++++++++++++------ include/linux/mailbox_controller.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/mailbox/mailbox.c b/drivers/mailbox/mailbox.c index 3e7d4b20ab34..4229b9b5da98 100644 --- a/drivers/mailbox/mailbox.c +++ b/drivers/mailbox/mailbox.c @@ -82,11 +82,11 @@ static void msg_submit(struct mbox_chan *chan) exit: spin_unlock_irqrestore(&chan->lock, flags); - /* kick start the timer immediately to avoid delays */ if (!err && (chan->txdone_method & TXDONE_BY_POLL)) { - /* but only if not already active */ - if (!hrtimer_active(&chan->mbox->poll_hrt)) - hrtimer_start(&chan->mbox->poll_hrt, 0, HRTIMER_MODE_REL); + /* kick start the timer immediately to avoid delays */ + spin_lock_irqsave(&chan->mbox->poll_hrt_lock, flags); + hrtimer_start(&chan->mbox->poll_hrt, 0, HRTIMER_MODE_REL); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&chan->mbox->poll_hrt_lock, flags); } } @@ -120,20 +120,26 @@ static enum hrtimer_restart txdone_hrtimer(struct hrtimer *hrtimer) container_of(hrtimer, struct mbox_controller, poll_hrt); bool txdone, resched = false; int i; + unsigned long flags; for (i = 0; i < mbox->num_chans; i++) { struct mbox_chan *chan = &mbox->chans[i]; if (chan->active_req && chan->cl) { - resched = true; txdone = chan->mbox->ops->last_tx_done(chan); if (txdone) tx_tick(chan, 0); + else + resched = true; } } if (resched) { - hrtimer_forward_now(hrtimer, ms_to_ktime(mbox->txpoll_period)); + spin_lock_irqsave(&mbox->poll_hrt_lock, flags); + if (!hrtimer_is_queued(hrtimer)) + hrtimer_forward_now(hrtimer, ms_to_ktime(mbox->txpoll_period)); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&mbox->poll_hrt_lock, flags); + return HRTIMER_RESTART; } return HRTIMER_NORESTART; @@ -500,6 +506,7 @@ int mbox_controller_register(struct mbox_controller *mbox) hrtimer_init(&mbox->poll_hrt, CLOCK_MONOTONIC, HRTIMER_MODE_REL); mbox->poll_hrt.function = txdone_hrtimer; + spin_lock_init(&mbox->poll_hrt_lock); } for (i = 0; i < mbox->num_chans; i++) { diff --git a/include/linux/mailbox_controller.h b/include/linux/mailbox_controller.h index 36d6ce673503..6fee33cb52f5 100644 --- a/include/linux/mailbox_controller.h +++ b/include/linux/mailbox_controller.h @@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ struct mbox_controller { const struct of_phandle_args *sp); /* Internal to API */ struct hrtimer poll_hrt; + spinlock_t poll_hrt_lock; struct list_head node; }; From addb192000d8819c0b1553453994df9bb54c28db Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Douglas Miller Date: Fri, 20 May 2022 14:37:01 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 0194/1091] RDMA/hfi1: Prevent use of lock before it is initialized [ Upstream commit 05c03dfd09c069c4ffd783b47b2da5dcc9421f2c ] If there is a failure during probe of hfi1 before the sdma_map_lock is initialized, the call to hfi1_free_devdata() will attempt to use a lock that has not been initialized. If the locking correctness validator is on then an INFO message and stack trace resembling the following may be seen: INFO: trying to register non-static key. The code is fine but needs lockdep annotation, or maybe you didn't initialize this object before use? turning off the locking correctness validator. Call Trace: register_lock_class+0x11b/0x880 __lock_acquire+0xf3/0x7930 lock_acquire+0xff/0x2d0 _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x46/0x60 sdma_clean+0x42a/0x660 [hfi1] hfi1_free_devdata+0x3a7/0x420 [hfi1] init_one+0x867/0x11a0 [hfi1] pci_device_probe+0x40e/0x8d0 The use of sdma_map_lock in sdma_clean() is for freeing the sdma_map memory, and sdma_map is not allocated/initialized until after sdma_map_lock has been initialized. This code only needs to be run if sdma_map is not NULL, and so checking for that condition will avoid trying to use the lock before it is initialized. Fixes: 473291b3ea0e ("IB/hfi1: Fix for early release of sdma context") Fixes: 7724105686e7 ("IB/hfi1: add driver files") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220520183701.48973.72434.stgit@awfm-01.cornelisnetworks.com Reported-by: Zheyu Ma Signed-off-by: Douglas Miller Signed-off-by: Dennis Dalessandro Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/sdma.c | 12 +++++++----- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/sdma.c b/drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/sdma.c index 248be21acdbe..2a684fc6056e 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/sdma.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/sdma.c @@ -1329,11 +1329,13 @@ void sdma_clean(struct hfi1_devdata *dd, size_t num_engines) kvfree(sde->tx_ring); sde->tx_ring = NULL; } - spin_lock_irq(&dd->sde_map_lock); - sdma_map_free(rcu_access_pointer(dd->sdma_map)); - RCU_INIT_POINTER(dd->sdma_map, NULL); - spin_unlock_irq(&dd->sde_map_lock); - synchronize_rcu(); + if (rcu_access_pointer(dd->sdma_map)) { + spin_lock_irq(&dd->sde_map_lock); + sdma_map_free(rcu_access_pointer(dd->sdma_map)); + RCU_INIT_POINTER(dd->sdma_map, NULL); + spin_unlock_irq(&dd->sde_map_lock); + synchronize_rcu(); + } kfree(dd->per_sdma); dd->per_sdma = NULL; From c8735252f93fdb7a68b9cd5332dbc52ebd2fd25b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dmitry Torokhov Date: Wed, 25 May 2022 09:51:08 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0195/1091] Input: stmfts - do not leave device disabled in stmfts_input_open [ Upstream commit 5f76955ab1e43e5795a9631b22ca4f918a0ae986 ] The commit 26623eea0da3 attempted to deal with potential leak of runtime PM counter when opening the touchscreen device, however it ended up erroneously dropping the counter in the case of successfully enabling the device. Let's address this by using pm_runtime_resume_and_get() and then executing pm_runtime_put_sync() only when we fail to send "sense on" command to the device. Fixes: 26623eea0da3 ("Input: stmfts - fix reference leak in stmfts_input_open") Reported-by: Pavel Machek Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/input/touchscreen/stmfts.c | 16 ++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/input/touchscreen/stmfts.c b/drivers/input/touchscreen/stmfts.c index be1dd504d5b1..20bc2279a2f2 100644 --- a/drivers/input/touchscreen/stmfts.c +++ b/drivers/input/touchscreen/stmfts.c @@ -337,13 +337,15 @@ static int stmfts_input_open(struct input_dev *dev) struct stmfts_data *sdata = input_get_drvdata(dev); int err; - err = pm_runtime_get_sync(&sdata->client->dev); - if (err < 0) - goto out; + err = pm_runtime_resume_and_get(&sdata->client->dev); + if (err) + return err; err = i2c_smbus_write_byte(sdata->client, STMFTS_MS_MT_SENSE_ON); - if (err) - goto out; + if (err) { + pm_runtime_put_sync(&sdata->client->dev); + return err; + } mutex_lock(&sdata->mutex); sdata->running = true; @@ -366,9 +368,7 @@ static int stmfts_input_open(struct input_dev *dev) "failed to enable touchkey\n"); } -out: - pm_runtime_put_noidle(&sdata->client->dev); - return err; + return 0; } static void stmfts_input_close(struct input_dev *dev) From 5e47a7add3dda7f236548c5ec3017776dc2a729f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jakob Koschel Date: Fri, 1 Apr 2022 00:34:14 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0196/1091] f2fs: fix dereference of stale list iterator after loop body [ Upstream commit 2aaf51dd39afb6d01d13f1e6fe20b684733b37d5 ] The list iterator variable will be a bogus pointer if no break was hit. Dereferencing it (cur->page in this case) could load an out-of-bounds/undefined value making it unsafe to use that in the comparision to determine if the specific element was found. Since 'cur->page' *can* be out-ouf-bounds it cannot be guaranteed that by chance (or intention of an attacker) it matches the value of 'page' even though the correct element was not found. This is fixed by using a separate list iterator variable for the loop and only setting the original variable if a suitable element was found. Then determing if the element was found is simply checking if the variable is set. Fixes: 8c242db9b8c0 ("f2fs: fix stale ATOMIC_WRITTEN_PAGE private pointer") Signed-off-by: Jakob Koschel Reviewed-by: Chao Yu Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/f2fs/segment.c | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/f2fs/segment.c b/fs/f2fs/segment.c index 78c54bb7898d..7759323bd775 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/segment.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/segment.c @@ -352,16 +352,19 @@ void f2fs_drop_inmem_page(struct inode *inode, struct page *page) struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_I_SB(inode); struct list_head *head = &fi->inmem_pages; struct inmem_pages *cur = NULL; + struct inmem_pages *tmp; f2fs_bug_on(sbi, !IS_ATOMIC_WRITTEN_PAGE(page)); mutex_lock(&fi->inmem_lock); - list_for_each_entry(cur, head, list) { - if (cur->page == page) + list_for_each_entry(tmp, head, list) { + if (tmp->page == page) { + cur = tmp; break; + } } - f2fs_bug_on(sbi, list_empty(head) || cur->page != page); + f2fs_bug_on(sbi, !cur); list_del(&cur->list); mutex_unlock(&fi->inmem_lock); From e4db5f4b680a9ce1f60a4f4a915e804187f767f4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yong Wu Date: Tue, 3 May 2022 15:13:56 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0197/1091] iommu/mediatek: Add list_del in mtk_iommu_remove [ Upstream commit ee55f75e4bcade81d253163641b63bef3e76cac4 ] Lack the list_del in the mtk_iommu_remove, and remove bus_set_iommu(*, NULL) since there may be several iommu HWs. we can not bus_set_iommu null when one iommu driver unbind. This could be a fix for mt2712 which support 2 M4U HW and list them. Fixes: 7c3a2ec02806 ("iommu/mediatek: Merge 2 M4U HWs into one iommu domain") Signed-off-by: Yong Wu Reviewed-by: AngeloGioacchino Del Regno Reviewed-by: Matthias Brugger Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220503071427.2285-6-yong.wu@mediatek.com Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/iommu/mtk_iommu.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iommu/mtk_iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/mtk_iommu.c index c2f6c78fee44..18d7c818a174 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/mtk_iommu.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/mtk_iommu.c @@ -769,8 +769,7 @@ static int mtk_iommu_remove(struct platform_device *pdev) iommu_device_sysfs_remove(&data->iommu); iommu_device_unregister(&data->iommu); - if (iommu_present(&platform_bus_type)) - bus_set_iommu(&platform_bus_type, NULL); + list_del(&data->list); clk_disable_unprepare(data->bclk); devm_free_irq(&pdev->dev, data->irq, data); From d77a0f2842b3094d23add58687d06352d3e6f956 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michael Walle Date: Thu, 7 Apr 2022 17:08:28 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0198/1091] i2c: at91: use dma safe buffers [ Upstream commit 03fbb903c8bf7e53e101e8d9a7b261264317c411 ] The supplied buffer might be on the stack and we get the following error message: [ 3.312058] at91_i2c e0070600.i2c: rejecting DMA map of vmalloc memory Use i2c_{get,put}_dma_safe_msg_buf() to get a DMA-able memory region if necessary. Fixes: 60937b2cdbf9 ("i2c: at91: add dma support") Signed-off-by: Michael Walle Reviewed-by: Codrin Ciubotariu Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-at91-master.c | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-at91-master.c b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-at91-master.c index a3fcc35ffd3b..44502024cc10 100644 --- a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-at91-master.c +++ b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-at91-master.c @@ -609,6 +609,7 @@ static int at91_twi_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg *msg, int num) unsigned int_addr_flag = 0; struct i2c_msg *m_start = msg; bool is_read; + u8 *dma_buf; dev_dbg(&adap->dev, "at91_xfer: processing %d messages:\n", num); @@ -656,7 +657,17 @@ static int at91_twi_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg *msg, int num) dev->msg = m_start; dev->recv_len_abort = false; + if (dev->use_dma) { + dma_buf = i2c_get_dma_safe_msg_buf(m_start, 1); + if (!dma_buf) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + dev->buf = dma_buf; + } + ret = at91_do_twi_transfer(dev); + i2c_put_dma_safe_msg_buf(dma_buf, m_start, !ret); ret = (ret < 0) ? ret : num; out: From 4826af9a07cf243696ce4fc5280a0da4f25c8953 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nathan Chancellor Date: Thu, 5 May 2022 08:27:38 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0199/1091] i2c: at91: Initialize dma_buf in at91_twi_xfer() [ Upstream commit 6977262c2eee111645668fe9e235ef2f5694abf7 ] Clang warns: drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-at91-master.c:707:6: warning: variable 'dma_buf' is used uninitialized whenever 'if' condition is false [-Wsometimes-uninitialized] if (dev->use_dma) { ^~~~~~~~~~~~ drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-at91-master.c:717:27: note: uninitialized use occurs here i2c_put_dma_safe_msg_buf(dma_buf, m_start, !ret); ^~~~~~~ Initialize dma_buf to NULL, as i2c_put_dma_safe_msg_buf() is a no-op when the first argument is NULL, which will work for the !dev->use_dma case. Fixes: 03fbb903c8bf ("i2c: at91: use dma safe buffers") Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1629 Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor Reviewed-by: Michael Walle Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-at91-master.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-at91-master.c b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-at91-master.c index 44502024cc10..f74d5ad2f1fa 100644 --- a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-at91-master.c +++ b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-at91-master.c @@ -609,7 +609,7 @@ static int at91_twi_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg *msg, int num) unsigned int_addr_flag = 0; struct i2c_msg *m_start = msg; bool is_read; - u8 *dma_buf; + u8 *dma_buf = NULL; dev_dbg(&adap->dev, "at91_xfer: processing %d messages:\n", num); From 59137943af756cd721d16f46a3124901477a8ad2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Trond Myklebust Date: Sat, 14 May 2022 10:27:00 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 0200/1091] NFS: Do not report EINTR/ERESTARTSYS as mapping errors [ Upstream commit cea9ba7239dcc84175041174304c6cdeae3226e5 ] If the attempt to flush data was interrupted due to a local signal, then just requeue the writes back for I/O. Fixes: 6fbda89b257f ("NFS: Replace custom error reporting mechanism with generic one") Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/nfs/write.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/nfs/write.c b/fs/nfs/write.c index 30d8e7bc1cef..ecdd79a55840 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/write.c +++ b/fs/nfs/write.c @@ -1429,7 +1429,7 @@ static void nfs_async_write_error(struct list_head *head, int error) while (!list_empty(head)) { req = nfs_list_entry(head->next); nfs_list_remove_request(req); - if (nfs_error_is_fatal(error)) + if (nfs_error_is_fatal_on_server(error)) nfs_write_error(req, error); else nfs_redirty_request(req); From 55f0fc32b2f22b2b6b5f9ab076490792e8d8ce5d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Trond Myklebust Date: Sat, 14 May 2022 10:27:03 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 0201/1091] NFS: Do not report flush errors in nfs_write_end() [ Upstream commit d95b26650e86175e4a97698d89bc1626cd1df0c6 ] If we do flush cached writebacks in nfs_write_end() due to the imminent expiration of an RPCSEC_GSS session, then we should defer reporting any resulting errors until the calls to file_check_and_advance_wb_err() in nfs_file_write() and nfs_file_fsync(). Fixes: 6fbda89b257f ("NFS: Replace custom error reporting mechanism with generic one") Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/nfs/file.c | 7 ++----- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/nfs/file.c b/fs/nfs/file.c index 73415970af38..3233da79d49a 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/file.c +++ b/fs/nfs/file.c @@ -394,11 +394,8 @@ static int nfs_write_end(struct file *file, struct address_space *mapping, return status; NFS_I(mapping->host)->write_io += copied; - if (nfs_ctx_key_to_expire(ctx, mapping->host)) { - status = nfs_wb_all(mapping->host); - if (status < 0) - return status; - } + if (nfs_ctx_key_to_expire(ctx, mapping->host)) + nfs_wb_all(mapping->host); return copied; } From 3d216510f8afb8d108e0155fbac5baed1c2b1d8a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Trond Myklebust Date: Sat, 14 May 2022 10:27:04 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 0202/1091] NFS: Don't report errors from nfs_pageio_complete() more than once [ Upstream commit c5e483b77cc2edb318da152abe07e33006b975fd ] Since errors from nfs_pageio_complete() are already being reported through nfs_async_write_error(), we should not be returning them to the callers of do_writepages() as well. They will end up being reported through the generic mechanism instead. Fixes: 6fbda89b257f ("NFS: Replace custom error reporting mechanism with generic one") Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/nfs/write.c | 9 +-------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/nfs/write.c b/fs/nfs/write.c index ecdd79a55840..10ce264a6456 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/write.c +++ b/fs/nfs/write.c @@ -692,11 +692,7 @@ static int nfs_writepage_locked(struct page *page, err = nfs_do_writepage(page, wbc, &pgio); pgio.pg_error = 0; nfs_pageio_complete(&pgio); - if (err < 0) - return err; - if (nfs_error_is_fatal(pgio.pg_error)) - return pgio.pg_error; - return 0; + return err; } int nfs_writepage(struct page *page, struct writeback_control *wbc) @@ -747,9 +743,6 @@ int nfs_writepages(struct address_space *mapping, struct writeback_control *wbc) if (err < 0) goto out_err; - err = pgio.pg_error; - if (nfs_error_is_fatal(err)) - goto out_err; return 0; out_err: return err; From dcc00106c3259acb22d9cd309e56022dd860b844 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Trond Myklebust Date: Sat, 14 May 2022 10:08:11 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 0203/1091] NFSv4/pNFS: Do not fail I/O when we fail to allocate the pNFS layout [ Upstream commit 3764a17e31d579cf9b4bd0a69894b577e8d75702 ] Commit 587f03deb69b caused pnfs_update_layout() to stop returning ENOMEM when the memory allocation fails, and hence causes it to fall back to trying to do I/O through the MDS. There is no guarantee that this will fare any better. If we're failing the pNFS layout allocation, then we should just redirty the page and retry later. Reported-by: Olga Kornievskaia Fixes: 587f03deb69b ("pnfs: refactor send_layoutget") Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/nfs/pnfs.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/nfs/pnfs.c b/fs/nfs/pnfs.c index 0471b6e0da16..2fe48982fbb4 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/pnfs.c +++ b/fs/nfs/pnfs.c @@ -1961,6 +1961,7 @@ lookup_again: lo = pnfs_find_alloc_layout(ino, ctx, gfp_flags); if (lo == NULL) { spin_unlock(&ino->i_lock); + lseg = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); trace_pnfs_update_layout(ino, pos, count, iomode, lo, lseg, PNFS_UPDATE_LAYOUT_NOMEM); goto out; @@ -2090,6 +2091,7 @@ lookup_again: lgp = pnfs_alloc_init_layoutget_args(ino, ctx, &stateid, &arg, gfp_flags); if (!lgp) { + lseg = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); trace_pnfs_update_layout(ino, pos, count, iomode, lo, NULL, PNFS_UPDATE_LAYOUT_NOMEM); nfs_layoutget_end(lo); From 8db59df7f5826e104db82cfddbf22a33a151193e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miaoqian Lin Date: Thu, 12 May 2022 15:59:08 +0400 Subject: [PATCH 0204/1091] video: fbdev: clcdfb: Fix refcount leak in clcdfb_of_vram_setup [ Upstream commit b23789a59fa6f00e98a319291819f91fbba0deb8 ] of_parse_phandle() returns a node pointer with refcount incremented, we should use of_node_put() on it when not need anymore. Add missing of_node_put() to avoid refcount leak. Fixes: d10715be03bd ("video: ARM CLCD: Add DT support") Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin Signed-off-by: Helge Deller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/video/fbdev/amba-clcd.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/video/fbdev/amba-clcd.c b/drivers/video/fbdev/amba-clcd.c index 7de43be6ef2c..3b7a7c74bf0a 100644 --- a/drivers/video/fbdev/amba-clcd.c +++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/amba-clcd.c @@ -774,12 +774,15 @@ static int clcdfb_of_vram_setup(struct clcd_fb *fb) return -ENODEV; fb->fb.screen_base = of_iomap(memory, 0); - if (!fb->fb.screen_base) + if (!fb->fb.screen_base) { + of_node_put(memory); return -ENOMEM; + } fb->fb.fix.smem_start = of_translate_address(memory, of_get_address(memory, 0, &size, NULL)); fb->fb.fix.smem_len = size; + of_node_put(memory); return 0; } From db7ea8b261efc15c1348b5ba85991ece96929045 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Amelie Delaunay Date: Wed, 4 May 2022 17:53:20 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0205/1091] dmaengine: stm32-mdma: remove GISR1 register [ Upstream commit 9d6a2d92e450926c483e45eaf426080a19219f4e ] GISR1 was described in a not up-to-date documentation when the stm32-mdma driver has been developed. This register has not been added in reference manual of STM32 SoC with MDMA, which have only 32 MDMA channels. So remove it from stm32-mdma driver. Fixes: a4ffb13c8946 ("dmaengine: Add STM32 MDMA driver") Signed-off-by: Amelie Delaunay Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220504155322.121431-2-amelie.delaunay@foss.st.com Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/dma/stm32-mdma.c | 21 +++++---------------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/dma/stm32-mdma.c b/drivers/dma/stm32-mdma.c index a05355d1292e..c902c2480640 100644 --- a/drivers/dma/stm32-mdma.c +++ b/drivers/dma/stm32-mdma.c @@ -40,7 +40,6 @@ STM32_MDMA_SHIFT(mask)) #define STM32_MDMA_GISR0 0x0000 /* MDMA Int Status Reg 1 */ -#define STM32_MDMA_GISR1 0x0004 /* MDMA Int Status Reg 2 */ /* MDMA Channel x interrupt/status register */ #define STM32_MDMA_CISR(x) (0x40 + 0x40 * (x)) /* x = 0..62 */ @@ -196,7 +195,7 @@ #define STM32_MDMA_MAX_BUF_LEN 128 #define STM32_MDMA_MAX_BLOCK_LEN 65536 -#define STM32_MDMA_MAX_CHANNELS 63 +#define STM32_MDMA_MAX_CHANNELS 32 #define STM32_MDMA_MAX_REQUESTS 256 #define STM32_MDMA_MAX_BURST 128 #define STM32_MDMA_VERY_HIGH_PRIORITY 0x11 @@ -1351,21 +1350,11 @@ static irqreturn_t stm32_mdma_irq_handler(int irq, void *devid) /* Find out which channel generates the interrupt */ status = readl_relaxed(dmadev->base + STM32_MDMA_GISR0); - if (status) { - id = __ffs(status); - } else { - status = readl_relaxed(dmadev->base + STM32_MDMA_GISR1); - if (!status) { - dev_dbg(mdma2dev(dmadev), "spurious it\n"); - return IRQ_NONE; - } - id = __ffs(status); - /* - * As GISR0 provides status for channel id from 0 to 31, - * so GISR1 provides status for channel id from 32 to 62 - */ - id += 32; + if (!status) { + dev_dbg(mdma2dev(dmadev), "spurious it\n"); + return IRQ_NONE; } + id = __ffs(status); chan = &dmadev->chan[id]; if (!chan) { From e23eb2f43f4dea19a7ad81f423bb1e2529e51907 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joerg Roedel Date: Fri, 20 May 2022 12:22:14 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0206/1091] iommu/amd: Increase timeout waiting for GA log enablement MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit 42bb5aa043382f09bef2cc33b8431be867c70f8e ] On some systems it can take a long time for the hardware to enable the GA log of the AMD IOMMU. The current wait time is only 0.1ms, but testing showed that it can take up to 14ms for the GA log to enter running state after it has been enabled. Sometimes the long delay happens when booting the system, sometimes only on resume. Adjust the timeout accordingly to not print a warning when hardware takes a longer than usual. There has already been an attempt to fix this with commit 9b45a7738eec ("iommu/amd: Fix loop timeout issue in iommu_ga_log_enable()") But that commit was based on some wrong math and did not fix the issue in all cases. Cc: "D. Ziegfeld" Cc: Jörg-Volker Peetz Fixes: 8bda0cfbdc1a ("iommu/amd: Detect and initialize guest vAPIC log") Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220520102214.12563-1-joro@8bytes.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_init.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_init.c b/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_init.c index 7502fa84e253..82d008310418 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_init.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_init.c @@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ #define ACPI_DEVFLAG_LINT1 0x80 #define ACPI_DEVFLAG_ATSDIS 0x10000000 -#define LOOP_TIMEOUT 100000 +#define LOOP_TIMEOUT 2000000 /* * ACPI table definitions * From 9eb684dc41d8cd5807e8f82e3e228c3ed459a73e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Leo Yan Date: Thu, 26 May 2022 22:54:00 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0207/1091] perf c2c: Use stdio interface if slang is not supported [ Upstream commit c4040212bc97d16040712a410335f93bc94d2262 ] If the slang lib is not installed on the system, perf c2c tool disables TUI mode and roll back to use stdio mode; but the flag 'c2c.use_stdio' is missed to set true and thus it wrongly applies UI quirks in the function ui_quirks(). This commit forces to use stdio interface if slang is not supported, and it can avoid to apply the UI quirks and show the correct metric header. Before: ================================================= Shared Cache Line Distribution Pareto ================================================= ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 0 0 0 99 0 0 0 0xaaaac17d6000 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 0.00% 0.00% 6.06% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0x20 N/A 0 0xaaaac17c25ac 0 0 43 375 18469 2 [.] 0x00000000000025ac memstress memstress[25ac] 0 0.00% 0.00% 93.94% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0x29 N/A 0 0xaaaac17c3e88 0 0 173 180 135 2 [.] 0x0000000000003e88 memstress memstress[3e88] 0 After: ================================================= Shared Cache Line Distribution Pareto ================================================= ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 0 0 0 99 0 0 0 0xaaaac17d6000 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 0.00% 0.00% 6.06% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0x20 N/A 0 0xaaaac17c25ac 0 0 43 375 18469 2 [.] 0x00000000000025ac memstress memstress[25ac] 0 0.00% 0.00% 93.94% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0x29 N/A 0 0xaaaac17c3e88 0 0 173 180 135 2 [.] 0x0000000000003e88 memstress memstress[3e88] 0 Fixes: 5a1a99cd2e4e1557 ("perf c2c report: Add main TUI browser") Reported-by: Joe Mario Signed-off-by: Leo Yan Cc: Alexander Shishkin Cc: Jiri Olsa Cc: Mark Rutland Cc: Namhyung Kim Cc: Peter Zijlstra Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220526145400.611249-1-leo.yan@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- tools/perf/builtin-c2c.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/perf/builtin-c2c.c b/tools/perf/builtin-c2c.c index f2e9d2b1b913..d3e0ea06d78d 100644 --- a/tools/perf/builtin-c2c.c +++ b/tools/perf/builtin-c2c.c @@ -2733,9 +2733,7 @@ static int perf_c2c__report(int argc, const char **argv) "the input file to process"), OPT_INCR('N', "node-info", &c2c.node_info, "show extra node info in report (repeat for more info)"), -#ifdef HAVE_SLANG_SUPPORT OPT_BOOLEAN(0, "stdio", &c2c.use_stdio, "Use the stdio interface"), -#endif OPT_BOOLEAN(0, "stats", &c2c.stats_only, "Display only statistic tables (implies --stdio)"), OPT_BOOLEAN(0, "full-symbols", &c2c.symbol_full, @@ -2762,6 +2760,10 @@ static int perf_c2c__report(int argc, const char **argv) if (argc) usage_with_options(report_c2c_usage, options); +#ifndef HAVE_SLANG_SUPPORT + c2c.use_stdio = true; +#endif + if (c2c.stats_only) c2c.use_stdio = true; From 7f51f27345550762f8322091db1303b1dad69f7a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zhengjun Xing Date: Wed, 25 May 2022 22:04:10 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0208/1091] perf jevents: Fix event syntax error caused by ExtSel MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit f4df0dbbe62ee8e4405a57b27ccd54393971c773 ] In the origin code, when "ExtSel" is 1, the eventcode will change to "eventcode |= 1 << 21”. For event “UNC_Q_RxL_CREDITS_CONSUMED_VN0.DRS", its "ExtSel" is "1", its eventcode will change from 0x1E to 0x20001E, but in fact the eventcode should <=0x1FF, so this will cause the parse fail: # perf stat -e "UNC_Q_RxL_CREDITS_CONSUMED_VN0.DRS" -a sleep 0.1 event syntax error: '.._RxL_CREDITS_CONSUMED_VN0.DRS' \___ value too big for format, maximum is 511 On the perf kernel side, the kernel assumes the valid bits are continuous. It will adjust the 0x100 (bit 8 for perf tool) to bit 21 in HW. DEFINE_UNCORE_FORMAT_ATTR(event_ext, event, "config:0-7,21"); So the perf tool follows the kernel side and just set bit8 other than bit21. Fixes: fedb2b518239cbc0 ("perf jevents: Add support for parsing uncore json files") Reviewed-by: Kan Liang Signed-off-by: Xing Zhengjun Acked-by: Ian Rogers Cc: Adrian Hunter Cc: Alexander Shishkin Cc: Andi Kleen Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Jiri Olsa Cc: Peter Zijlstra Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220525140410.1706851-1-zhengjun.xing@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- tools/perf/pmu-events/jevents.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tools/perf/pmu-events/jevents.c b/tools/perf/pmu-events/jevents.c index 47f57f5829d3..a4244bf242e6 100644 --- a/tools/perf/pmu-events/jevents.c +++ b/tools/perf/pmu-events/jevents.c @@ -567,7 +567,7 @@ int json_events(const char *fn, } else if (json_streq(map, field, "ExtSel")) { char *code = NULL; addfield(map, &code, "", "", val); - eventcode |= strtoul(code, NULL, 0) << 21; + eventcode |= strtoul(code, NULL, 0) << 8; free(code); } else if (json_streq(map, field, "EventName")) { addfield(map, &name, "", "", val); From f8b3c3fcf33105bc1ee7788e3b51b0a1ae42ae53 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chao Yu Date: Wed, 27 Apr 2022 01:06:02 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0209/1091] f2fs: fix to avoid f2fs_bug_on() in dec_valid_node_count() commit 4d17e6fe9293d57081ffdc11e1cf313e25e8fd9e upstream. As Yanming reported in bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=215897 I have encountered a bug in F2FS file system in kernel v5.17. The kernel should enable CONFIG_KASAN=y and CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE=y. You can reproduce the bug by running the following commands: The kernel message is shown below: kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2511! Call Trace: f2fs_remove_inode_page+0x2a2/0x830 f2fs_evict_inode+0x9b7/0x1510 evict+0x282/0x4e0 do_unlinkat+0x33a/0x540 __x64_sys_unlinkat+0x8e/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae The root cause is: .total_valid_block_count or .total_valid_node_count could fuzzed to zero, then once dec_valid_node_count() was called, it will cause BUG_ON(), this patch fixes to print warning info and set SBI_NEED_FSCK into CP instead of panic. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Ming Yan Signed-off-by: Chao Yu Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 14 ++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h index 5645502c156d..c73a1638c18b 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h +++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h @@ -2100,11 +2100,17 @@ static inline void dec_valid_node_count(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, { spin_lock(&sbi->stat_lock); - f2fs_bug_on(sbi, !sbi->total_valid_block_count); - f2fs_bug_on(sbi, !sbi->total_valid_node_count); + if (unlikely(!sbi->total_valid_block_count || + !sbi->total_valid_node_count)) { + f2fs_warn(sbi, "dec_valid_node_count: inconsistent block counts, total_valid_block:%u, total_valid_node:%u", + sbi->total_valid_block_count, + sbi->total_valid_node_count); + set_sbi_flag(sbi, SBI_NEED_FSCK); + } else { + sbi->total_valid_block_count--; + sbi->total_valid_node_count--; + } - sbi->total_valid_node_count--; - sbi->total_valid_block_count--; if (sbi->reserved_blocks && sbi->current_reserved_blocks < sbi->reserved_blocks) sbi->current_reserved_blocks++; From 7361c9f2bd6a8f0cbb41cdea9aff04765ff23f67 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chao Yu Date: Wed, 27 Apr 2022 17:51:40 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0210/1091] f2fs: fix to do sanity check on block address in f2fs_do_zero_range() commit 25f8236213a91efdf708b9d77e9e51b6fc3e141c upstream. As Yanming reported in bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=215894 I have encountered a bug in F2FS file system in kernel v5.17. I have uploaded the system call sequence as case.c, and a fuzzed image can be found in google net disk The kernel should enable CONFIG_KASAN=y and CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE=y. You can reproduce the bug by running the following commands: kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/segment.c:2291! Call Trace: f2fs_invalidate_blocks+0x193/0x2d0 f2fs_fallocate+0x2593/0x4a70 vfs_fallocate+0x2a5/0xac0 ksys_fallocate+0x35/0x70 __x64_sys_fallocate+0x8e/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae The root cause is, after image was fuzzed, block mapping info in inode will be inconsistent with SIT table, so in f2fs_fallocate(), it will cause panic when updating SIT with invalid blkaddr. Let's fix the issue by adding sanity check on block address before updating SIT table with it. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Ming Yan Signed-off-by: Chao Yu Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/f2fs/file.c | 16 ++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/f2fs/file.c b/fs/f2fs/file.c index 516007bb1ced..99890dd00026 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/file.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/file.c @@ -1320,11 +1320,19 @@ static int f2fs_do_zero_range(struct dnode_of_data *dn, pgoff_t start, ret = -ENOSPC; break; } - if (dn->data_blkaddr != NEW_ADDR) { - f2fs_invalidate_blocks(sbi, dn->data_blkaddr); - dn->data_blkaddr = NEW_ADDR; - f2fs_set_data_blkaddr(dn); + + if (dn->data_blkaddr == NEW_ADDR) + continue; + + if (!f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(sbi, dn->data_blkaddr, + DATA_GENERIC_ENHANCE)) { + ret = -EFSCORRUPTED; + break; } + + f2fs_invalidate_blocks(sbi, dn->data_blkaddr); + dn->data_blkaddr = NEW_ADDR; + f2fs_set_data_blkaddr(dn); } f2fs_update_extent_cache_range(dn, start, 0, index - start); From 54c116615c99e22aa08aa950757ed726e2f60821 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chao Yu Date: Sat, 30 Apr 2022 21:19:24 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0211/1091] f2fs: fix to clear dirty inode in f2fs_evict_inode() commit f2db71053dc0409fae785096ad19cce4c8a95af7 upstream. As Yanming reported in bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=215904 The kernel message is shown below: kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/inode.c:825! Call Trace: evict+0x282/0x4e0 __dentry_kill+0x2b2/0x4d0 shrink_dentry_list+0x17c/0x4f0 shrink_dcache_parent+0x143/0x1e0 do_one_tree+0x9/0x30 shrink_dcache_for_umount+0x51/0x120 generic_shutdown_super+0x5c/0x3a0 kill_block_super+0x90/0xd0 kill_f2fs_super+0x225/0x310 deactivate_locked_super+0x78/0xc0 cleanup_mnt+0x2b7/0x480 task_work_run+0xc8/0x150 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x14a/0x150 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1d/0x40 do_syscall_64+0x48/0x90 The root cause is: inode node and dnode node share the same nid, so during f2fs_evict_inode(), dnode node truncation will invalidate its NAT entry, so when truncating inode node, it fails due to invalid NAT entry, result in inode is still marked as dirty, fix this issue by clearing dirty for inode and setting SBI_NEED_FSCK flag in filesystem. output from dump.f2fs: [print_node_info: 354] Node ID [0xf:15] is inode i_nid[0] [0x f : 15] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Ming Yan Signed-off-by: Chao Yu Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/f2fs/inode.c | 16 +++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/f2fs/inode.c b/fs/f2fs/inode.c index 264c19e17779..b5536570707c 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/inode.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/inode.c @@ -689,8 +689,22 @@ retry: f2fs_lock_op(sbi); err = f2fs_remove_inode_page(inode); f2fs_unlock_op(sbi); - if (err == -ENOENT) + if (err == -ENOENT) { err = 0; + + /* + * in fuzzed image, another node may has the same + * block address as inode's, if it was truncated + * previously, truncation of inode node will fail. + */ + if (is_inode_flag_set(inode, FI_DIRTY_INODE)) { + f2fs_warn(F2FS_I_SB(inode), + "f2fs_evict_inode: inconsistent node id, ino:%lu", + inode->i_ino); + f2fs_inode_synced(inode); + set_sbi_flag(sbi, SBI_NEED_FSCK); + } + } } /* give more chances, if ENOMEM case */ From 12ffc0044abaee594f9ba8674ca91408902dc768 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chao Yu Date: Wed, 4 May 2022 14:09:22 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0212/1091] f2fs: fix deadloop in foreground GC commit cfd66bb715fd11fde3338d0660cffa1396adc27d upstream. As Yanming reported in bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=215914 The root cause is: in a very small sized image, it's very easy to exceed threshold of foreground GC, if we calculate free space and dirty data based on section granularity, in corner case, has_not_enough_free_secs() will always return true, result in deadloop in f2fs_gc(). So this patch refactors has_not_enough_free_secs() as below to fix this issue: 1. calculate needed space based on block granularity, and separate all blocks to two parts, section part, and block part, comparing section part to free section, and comparing block part to free space in openned log. 2. account F2FS_DIRTY_NODES, F2FS_DIRTY_IMETA and F2FS_DIRTY_DENTS as node block consumer; 3. account F2FS_DIRTY_DENTS as data block consumer; Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Ming Yan Signed-off-by: Chao Yu Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/f2fs/segment.h | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/f2fs/segment.h b/fs/f2fs/segment.h index 15b343f65609..f39620f47542 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/segment.h +++ b/fs/f2fs/segment.h @@ -542,11 +542,10 @@ static inline int reserved_sections(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi) return GET_SEC_FROM_SEG(sbi, (unsigned int)reserved_segments(sbi)); } -static inline bool has_curseg_enough_space(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi) +static inline bool has_curseg_enough_space(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, + unsigned int node_blocks, unsigned int dent_blocks) { - unsigned int node_blocks = get_pages(sbi, F2FS_DIRTY_NODES) + - get_pages(sbi, F2FS_DIRTY_DENTS); - unsigned int dent_blocks = get_pages(sbi, F2FS_DIRTY_DENTS); + unsigned int segno, left_blocks; int i; @@ -572,19 +571,28 @@ static inline bool has_curseg_enough_space(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi) static inline bool has_not_enough_free_secs(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, int freed, int needed) { - int node_secs = get_blocktype_secs(sbi, F2FS_DIRTY_NODES); - int dent_secs = get_blocktype_secs(sbi, F2FS_DIRTY_DENTS); - int imeta_secs = get_blocktype_secs(sbi, F2FS_DIRTY_IMETA); + unsigned int total_node_blocks = get_pages(sbi, F2FS_DIRTY_NODES) + + get_pages(sbi, F2FS_DIRTY_DENTS) + + get_pages(sbi, F2FS_DIRTY_IMETA); + unsigned int total_dent_blocks = get_pages(sbi, F2FS_DIRTY_DENTS); + unsigned int node_secs = total_node_blocks / BLKS_PER_SEC(sbi); + unsigned int dent_secs = total_dent_blocks / BLKS_PER_SEC(sbi); + unsigned int node_blocks = total_node_blocks % BLKS_PER_SEC(sbi); + unsigned int dent_blocks = total_dent_blocks % BLKS_PER_SEC(sbi); + unsigned int free, need_lower, need_upper; if (unlikely(is_sbi_flag_set(sbi, SBI_POR_DOING))) return false; - if (free_sections(sbi) + freed == reserved_sections(sbi) + needed && - has_curseg_enough_space(sbi)) + free = free_sections(sbi) + freed; + need_lower = node_secs + dent_secs + reserved_sections(sbi) + needed; + need_upper = need_lower + (node_blocks ? 1 : 0) + (dent_blocks ? 1 : 0); + + if (free > need_upper) return false; - return (free_sections(sbi) + freed) <= - (node_secs + 2 * dent_secs + imeta_secs + - reserved_sections(sbi) + needed); + else if (free <= need_lower) + return true; + return !has_curseg_enough_space(sbi, node_blocks, dent_blocks); } static inline bool f2fs_is_checkpoint_ready(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi) From 1f926457c3e7395ab9068d3fc4c329e3387c771f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jaegeuk Kim Date: Thu, 5 May 2022 17:40:25 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0213/1091] f2fs: don't need inode lock for system hidden quota commit 6213f5d4d23c50d393a31dc8e351e63a1fd10dbe upstream. Let's avoid false-alarmed lockdep warning. [ 58.914674] [T1501146] -> #2 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#20){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 58.915975] [T1501146] system_server: down_write+0x7c/0xe0 [ 58.916738] [T1501146] system_server: f2fs_quota_sync+0x60/0x1a8 [ 58.917563] [T1501146] system_server: block_operations+0x16c/0x43c [ 58.918410] [T1501146] system_server: f2fs_write_checkpoint+0x114/0x318 [ 58.919312] [T1501146] system_server: f2fs_issue_checkpoint+0x178/0x21c [ 58.920214] [T1501146] system_server: f2fs_sync_fs+0x48/0x6c [ 58.920999] [T1501146] system_server: f2fs_do_sync_file+0x334/0x738 [ 58.921862] [T1501146] system_server: f2fs_sync_file+0x30/0x48 [ 58.922667] [T1501146] system_server: __arm64_sys_fsync+0x84/0xf8 [ 58.923506] [T1501146] system_server: el0_svc_common.llvm.12821150825140585682+0xd8/0x20c [ 58.924604] [T1501146] system_server: do_el0_svc+0x28/0xa0 [ 58.925366] [T1501146] system_server: el0_svc+0x24/0x38 [ 58.926094] [T1501146] system_server: el0_sync_handler+0x88/0xec [ 58.926920] [T1501146] system_server: el0_sync+0x1b4/0x1c0 [ 58.927681] [T1501146] -> #1 (&sbi->cp_global_sem){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 58.928889] [T1501146] system_server: down_write+0x7c/0xe0 [ 58.929650] [T1501146] system_server: f2fs_write_checkpoint+0xbc/0x318 [ 58.930541] [T1501146] system_server: f2fs_issue_checkpoint+0x178/0x21c [ 58.931443] [T1501146] system_server: f2fs_sync_fs+0x48/0x6c [ 58.932226] [T1501146] system_server: sync_filesystem+0xac/0x130 [ 58.933053] [T1501146] system_server: generic_shutdown_super+0x38/0x150 [ 58.933958] [T1501146] system_server: kill_block_super+0x24/0x58 [ 58.934791] [T1501146] system_server: kill_f2fs_super+0xcc/0x124 [ 58.935618] [T1501146] system_server: deactivate_locked_super+0x90/0x120 [ 58.936529] [T1501146] system_server: deactivate_super+0x74/0xac [ 58.937356] [T1501146] system_server: cleanup_mnt+0x128/0x168 [ 58.938150] [T1501146] system_server: __cleanup_mnt+0x18/0x28 [ 58.938944] [T1501146] system_server: task_work_run+0xb8/0x14c [ 58.939749] [T1501146] system_server: do_notify_resume+0x114/0x1e8 [ 58.940595] [T1501146] system_server: work_pending+0xc/0x5f0 [ 58.941375] [T1501146] -> #0 (&sbi->gc_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 58.942519] [T1501146] system_server: __lock_acquire+0x1270/0x2868 [ 58.943366] [T1501146] system_server: lock_acquire+0x114/0x294 [ 58.944169] [T1501146] system_server: down_write+0x7c/0xe0 [ 58.944930] [T1501146] system_server: f2fs_issue_checkpoint+0x13c/0x21c [ 58.945831] [T1501146] system_server: f2fs_sync_fs+0x48/0x6c [ 58.946614] [T1501146] system_server: f2fs_do_sync_file+0x334/0x738 [ 58.947472] [T1501146] system_server: f2fs_ioc_commit_atomic_write+0xc8/0x14c [ 58.948439] [T1501146] system_server: __f2fs_ioctl+0x674/0x154c [ 58.949253] [T1501146] system_server: f2fs_ioctl+0x54/0x88 [ 58.950018] [T1501146] system_server: __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xa8/0x110 [ 58.950865] [T1501146] system_server: el0_svc_common.llvm.12821150825140585682+0xd8/0x20c [ 58.951965] [T1501146] system_server: do_el0_svc+0x28/0xa0 [ 58.952727] [T1501146] system_server: el0_svc+0x24/0x38 [ 58.953454] [T1501146] system_server: el0_sync_handler+0x88/0xec [ 58.954279] [T1501146] system_server: el0_sync+0x1b4/0x1c0 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/f2fs/super.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/f2fs/super.c b/fs/f2fs/super.c index 6bd8a944902e..232c99e4a1ee 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/super.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/super.c @@ -2080,7 +2080,8 @@ int f2fs_quota_sync(struct super_block *sb, int type) if (!sb_has_quota_active(sb, cnt)) continue; - inode_lock(dqopt->files[cnt]); + if (!f2fs_sb_has_quota_ino(sbi)) + inode_lock(dqopt->files[cnt]); /* * do_quotactl @@ -2099,7 +2100,8 @@ int f2fs_quota_sync(struct super_block *sb, int type) up_read(&sbi->quota_sem); f2fs_unlock_op(sbi); - inode_unlock(dqopt->files[cnt]); + if (!f2fs_sb_has_quota_ino(sbi)) + inode_unlock(dqopt->files[cnt]); if (ret) break; From 9259227605df41996b088c17b70c1698e6ea558c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chao Yu Date: Tue, 17 May 2022 11:37:23 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0214/1091] f2fs: fix fallocate to use file_modified to update permissions consistently commit 958ed92922028ec67f504dcdc72bfdfd0f43936a upstream. This patch tries to fix permission consistency issue as all other mainline filesystems. Since the initial introduction of (posix) fallocate back at the turn of the century, it has been possible to use this syscall to change the user-visible contents of files. This can happen by extending the file size during a preallocation, or through any of the newer modes (punch, zero, collapse, insert range). Because the call can be used to change file contents, we should treat it like we do any other modification to a file -- update the mtime, and drop set[ug]id privileges/capabilities. The VFS function file_modified() does all this for us if pass it a locked inode, so let's make fallocate drop permissions correctly. Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Chao Yu Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/f2fs/file.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/f2fs/file.c b/fs/f2fs/file.c index 99890dd00026..ef08ef017030 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/file.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/file.c @@ -1608,6 +1608,10 @@ static long f2fs_fallocate(struct file *file, int mode, inode_lock(inode); + ret = file_modified(file); + if (ret) + goto out; + if (mode & FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE) { if (offset >= inode->i_size) goto out; From 265bec4779a38b65e86a25120370f200822dfa76 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johannes Berg Date: Wed, 1 Jun 2022 09:19:36 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0215/1091] wifi: mac80211: fix use-after-free in chanctx code commit 2965c4cdf7ad9ce0796fac5e57debb9519ea721e upstream. In ieee80211_vif_use_reserved_context(), when we have an old context and the new context's replace_state is set to IEEE80211_CHANCTX_REPLACE_NONE, we free the old context in ieee80211_vif_use_reserved_reassign(). Therefore, we cannot check the old_ctx anymore, so we should set it to NULL after this point. However, since the new_ctx replace state is clearly not IEEE80211_CHANCTX_REPLACES_OTHER, we're not going to do anything else in this function and can just return to avoid accessing the freed old_ctx. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 5bcae31d9cb1 ("mac80211: implement multi-vif in-place reservations") Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220601091926.df419d91b165.I17a9b3894ff0b8323ce2afdb153b101124c821e5@changeid Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/mac80211/chan.c | 7 ++----- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/mac80211/chan.c b/net/mac80211/chan.c index 9c94baaf693c..15f47918cbac 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/chan.c +++ b/net/mac80211/chan.c @@ -1639,12 +1639,9 @@ int ieee80211_vif_use_reserved_context(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata) if (new_ctx->replace_state == IEEE80211_CHANCTX_REPLACE_NONE) { if (old_ctx) - err = ieee80211_vif_use_reserved_reassign(sdata); - else - err = ieee80211_vif_use_reserved_assign(sdata); + return ieee80211_vif_use_reserved_reassign(sdata); - if (err) - return err; + return ieee80211_vif_use_reserved_assign(sdata); } /* From e0dddab01f94a9632416263352608e55491743ee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Emmanuel Grumbach Date: Tue, 17 May 2022 12:05:09 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 0216/1091] iwlwifi: mvm: fix assert 1F04 upon reconfig commit 9d096e3d3061dbf4ee10e2b59fc2c06e05bdb997 upstream. When we reconfig we must not send the MAC_POWER command that relates to a MAC that was not yet added to the firmware. Ignore those in the iterator. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach Signed-off-by: Gregory Greenman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220517120044.ed2ffc8ce732.If786e19512d0da4334a6382ea6148703422c7d7b@changeid Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/power.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/power.c b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/power.c index 22136e4832ea..b2a6e9b7d0a1 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/power.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/power.c @@ -626,6 +626,9 @@ static void iwl_mvm_power_get_vifs_iterator(void *_data, u8 *mac, struct iwl_power_vifs *power_iterator = _data; bool active = mvmvif->phy_ctxt && mvmvif->phy_ctxt->id < NUM_PHY_CTX; + if (!mvmvif->uploaded) + return; + switch (ieee80211_vif_type_p2p(vif)) { case NL80211_IFTYPE_P2P_DEVICE: break; From 440d345d027402c6b79f0ba24c8fa8c4e139b00b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zhihao Cheng Date: Tue, 10 May 2022 21:38:05 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0217/1091] =?UTF-8?q?fs-writeback:=20writeback=5Fsb=5Finod?= =?UTF-8?q?es=EF=BC=9ARecalculate=20'wrote'=20according=20skipped=20pages?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 68f4c6eba70df70a720188bce95c85570ddfcc87 upstream. Commit 505a666ee3fc ("writeback: plug writeback in wb_writeback() and writeback_inodes_wb()") has us holding a plug during wb_writeback, which may cause a potential ABBA dead lock: wb_writeback fat_file_fsync blk_start_plug(&plug) for (;;) { iter i-1: some reqs have been added into plug->mq_list // LOCK A iter i: progress = __writeback_inodes_wb(wb, work) . writeback_sb_inodes // fat's bdev . __writeback_single_inode . . generic_writepages . . __block_write_full_page . . . . __generic_file_fsync . . . . sync_inode_metadata . . . . writeback_single_inode . . . . __writeback_single_inode . . . . fat_write_inode . . . . __fat_write_inode . . . . sync_dirty_buffer // fat's bdev . . . . lock_buffer(bh) // LOCK B . . . . submit_bh . . . . blk_mq_get_tag // LOCK A . . . trylock_buffer(bh) // LOCK B . . . redirty_page_for_writepage . . . wbc->pages_skipped++ . . --wbc->nr_to_write . wrote += write_chunk - wbc.nr_to_write // wrote > 0 . requeue_inode . redirty_tail_locked if (progress) // progress > 0 continue; iter i+1: queue_io // similar process with iter i, infinite for-loop ! } blk_finish_plug(&plug) // flush plug won't be called Above process triggers a hungtask like: [ 399.044861] INFO: task bb:2607 blocked for more than 30 seconds. [ 399.046824] Not tainted 5.18.0-rc1-00005-gefae4d9eb6a2-dirty [ 399.051539] task:bb state:D stack: 0 pid: 2607 ppid: 2426 flags:0x00004000 [ 399.051556] Call Trace: [ 399.051570] __schedule+0x480/0x1050 [ 399.051592] schedule+0x92/0x1a0 [ 399.051602] io_schedule+0x22/0x50 [ 399.051613] blk_mq_get_tag+0x1d3/0x3c0 [ 399.051640] __blk_mq_alloc_requests+0x21d/0x3f0 [ 399.051657] blk_mq_submit_bio+0x68d/0xca0 [ 399.051674] __submit_bio+0x1b5/0x2d0 [ 399.051708] submit_bio_noacct+0x34e/0x720 [ 399.051718] submit_bio+0x3b/0x150 [ 399.051725] submit_bh_wbc+0x161/0x230 [ 399.051734] __sync_dirty_buffer+0xd1/0x420 [ 399.051744] sync_dirty_buffer+0x17/0x20 [ 399.051750] __fat_write_inode+0x289/0x310 [ 399.051766] fat_write_inode+0x2a/0xa0 [ 399.051783] __writeback_single_inode+0x53c/0x6f0 [ 399.051795] writeback_single_inode+0x145/0x200 [ 399.051803] sync_inode_metadata+0x45/0x70 [ 399.051856] __generic_file_fsync+0xa3/0x150 [ 399.051880] fat_file_fsync+0x1d/0x80 [ 399.051895] vfs_fsync_range+0x40/0xb0 [ 399.051929] __x64_sys_fsync+0x18/0x30 In my test, 'need_resched()' (which is imported by 590dca3a71 "fs-writeback: unplug before cond_resched in writeback_sb_inodes") in function 'writeback_sb_inodes()' seldom comes true, unless cond_resched() is deleted from write_cache_pages(). Fix it by correcting wrote number according number of skipped pages in writeback_sb_inodes(). Goto Link to find a reproducer. Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=215837 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.3 Signed-off-by: Zhihao Cheng Reviewed-by: Jan Kara Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220510133805.1988292-1-chengzhihao1@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/fs-writeback.c | 13 ++++++++----- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/fs-writeback.c b/fs/fs-writeback.c index 22e9c88f3960..5b3a288e0f14 100644 --- a/fs/fs-writeback.c +++ b/fs/fs-writeback.c @@ -1650,11 +1650,12 @@ static long writeback_sb_inodes(struct super_block *sb, }; unsigned long start_time = jiffies; long write_chunk; - long wrote = 0; /* count both pages and inodes */ + long total_wrote = 0; /* count both pages and inodes */ while (!list_empty(&wb->b_io)) { struct inode *inode = wb_inode(wb->b_io.prev); struct bdi_writeback *tmp_wb; + long wrote; if (inode->i_sb != sb) { if (work->sb) { @@ -1730,7 +1731,9 @@ static long writeback_sb_inodes(struct super_block *sb, wbc_detach_inode(&wbc); work->nr_pages -= write_chunk - wbc.nr_to_write; - wrote += write_chunk - wbc.nr_to_write; + wrote = write_chunk - wbc.nr_to_write - wbc.pages_skipped; + wrote = wrote < 0 ? 0 : wrote; + total_wrote += wrote; if (need_resched()) { /* @@ -1752,7 +1755,7 @@ static long writeback_sb_inodes(struct super_block *sb, tmp_wb = inode_to_wb_and_lock_list(inode); spin_lock(&inode->i_lock); if (!(inode->i_state & I_DIRTY_ALL)) - wrote++; + total_wrote++; requeue_inode(inode, tmp_wb, &wbc); inode_sync_complete(inode); spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); @@ -1766,14 +1769,14 @@ static long writeback_sb_inodes(struct super_block *sb, * bail out to wb_writeback() often enough to check * background threshold and other termination conditions. */ - if (wrote) { + if (total_wrote) { if (time_is_before_jiffies(start_time + HZ / 10UL)) break; if (work->nr_pages <= 0) break; } } - return wrote; + return total_wrote; } static long __writeback_inodes_wb(struct bdi_writeback *wb, From b1cda6dd2c44771f042d65f0d17bec322ef99a0a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Aditya Garg Date: Fri, 15 Apr 2022 17:02:46 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0218/1091] efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs commit 155ca952c7ca19aa32ecfb7373a32bbc2e1ec6eb upstream. On Apple T2 Macs, when Linux attempts to read the db and dbx efi variables at early boot to load UEFI Secure Boot certificates, a page fault occurs in Apple firmware code and EFI runtime services are disabled with the following logs: [Firmware Bug]: Page fault caused by firmware at PA: 0xffffb1edc0068000 WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 104 at arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c:735 efi_crash_gracefully_on_page_fault+0x50/0xf0 (Removed some logs from here) Call Trace: page_fault_oops+0x4f/0x2c0 ? search_bpf_extables+0x6b/0x80 ? search_module_extables+0x50/0x80 ? search_exception_tables+0x5b/0x60 kernelmode_fixup_or_oops+0x9e/0x110 __bad_area_nosemaphore+0x155/0x190 bad_area_nosemaphore+0x16/0x20 do_kern_addr_fault+0x8c/0xa0 exc_page_fault+0xd8/0x180 asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30 (Removed some logs from here) ? __efi_call+0x28/0x30 ? switch_mm+0x20/0x30 ? efi_call_rts+0x19a/0x8e0 ? process_one_work+0x222/0x3f0 ? worker_thread+0x4a/0x3d0 ? kthread+0x17a/0x1a0 ? process_one_work+0x3f0/0x3f0 ? set_kthread_struct+0x40/0x40 ? ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 ---[ end trace 1f82023595a5927f ]--- efi: Froze efi_rts_wq and disabled EFI Runtime Services integrity: Couldn't get size: 0x8000000000000015 integrity: MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list efi: EFI Runtime Services are disabled! integrity: Couldn't get size: 0x8000000000000015 integrity: Couldn't get UEFI dbx list integrity: Couldn't get size: 0x8000000000000015 integrity: Couldn't get mokx list integrity: Couldn't get size: 0x80000000 So we avoid reading these UEFI variables and thus prevent the crash. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Aditya Garg Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.h | 8 +++++ security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 41 insertions(+) diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h index 2462bfa08fe3..cd06bd6072be 100644 --- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h +++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h @@ -30,3 +30,11 @@ efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db(const efi_guid_t *sig_type); efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_dbx(const efi_guid_t *sig_type); #endif + +#ifndef UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT +#define UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT(vendor, product) \ + .matches = { \ + DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_VENDOR, vendor), \ + DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, product), \ + }, +#endif diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c index f0c908241966..452011428d11 100644 --- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c +++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -11,6 +12,31 @@ #include "../integrity.h" #include "keyring_handler.h" +/* + * On T2 Macs reading the db and dbx efi variables to load UEFI Secure Boot + * certificates causes occurrence of a page fault in Apple's firmware and + * a crash disabling EFI runtime services. The following quirk skips reading + * these variables. + */ +static const struct dmi_system_id uefi_skip_cert[] = { + { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookPro15,1") }, + { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookPro15,2") }, + { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookPro15,3") }, + { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookPro15,4") }, + { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookPro16,1") }, + { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookPro16,2") }, + { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookPro16,3") }, + { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookPro16,4") }, + { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookAir8,1") }, + { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookAir8,2") }, + { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookAir9,1") }, + { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacMini8,1") }, + { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacPro7,1") }, + { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "iMac20,1") }, + { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "iMac20,2") }, + { } +}; + /* * Look to see if a UEFI variable called MokIgnoreDB exists and return true if * it does. @@ -78,6 +104,13 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void) unsigned long dbsize = 0, dbxsize = 0, moksize = 0; efi_status_t status; int rc = 0; + const struct dmi_system_id *dmi_id; + + dmi_id = dmi_first_match(uefi_skip_cert); + if (dmi_id) { + pr_err("Reading UEFI Secure Boot Certs is not supported on T2 Macs.\n"); + return false; + } if (!efi.get_variable) return false; From 31326bf551269fb9bafa84ca99172b8340e5d8f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jan Kara Date: Fri, 1 Apr 2022 12:27:44 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0219/1091] bfq: Split shared queues on move between cgroups commit 3bc5e683c67d94bd839a1da2e796c15847b51b69 upstream. When bfqq is shared by multiple processes it can happen that one of the processes gets moved to a different cgroup (or just starts submitting IO for different cgroup). In case that happens we need to split the merged bfqq as otherwise we will have IO for multiple cgroups in one bfqq and we will just account IO time to wrong entities etc. Similarly if the bfqq is scheduled to merge with another bfqq but the merge didn't happen yet, cancel the merge as it need not be valid anymore. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: e21b7a0b9887 ("block, bfq: add full hierarchical scheduling and cgroups support") Tested-by: "yukuai (C)" Signed-off-by: Jan Kara Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220401102752.8599-3-jack@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- block/bfq-cgroup.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- block/bfq-iosched.c | 2 +- block/bfq-iosched.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/block/bfq-cgroup.c b/block/bfq-cgroup.c index c17eb794f0ae..6968ee90321c 100644 --- a/block/bfq-cgroup.c +++ b/block/bfq-cgroup.c @@ -708,9 +708,39 @@ static struct bfq_group *__bfq_bic_change_cgroup(struct bfq_data *bfqd, } if (sync_bfqq) { - entity = &sync_bfqq->entity; - if (entity->sched_data != &bfqg->sched_data) - bfq_bfqq_move(bfqd, sync_bfqq, bfqg); + if (!sync_bfqq->new_bfqq && !bfq_bfqq_coop(sync_bfqq)) { + /* We are the only user of this bfqq, just move it */ + if (sync_bfqq->entity.sched_data != &bfqg->sched_data) + bfq_bfqq_move(bfqd, sync_bfqq, bfqg); + } else { + struct bfq_queue *bfqq; + + /* + * The queue was merged to a different queue. Check + * that the merge chain still belongs to the same + * cgroup. + */ + for (bfqq = sync_bfqq; bfqq; bfqq = bfqq->new_bfqq) + if (bfqq->entity.sched_data != + &bfqg->sched_data) + break; + if (bfqq) { + /* + * Some queue changed cgroup so the merge is + * not valid anymore. We cannot easily just + * cancel the merge (by clearing new_bfqq) as + * there may be other processes using this + * queue and holding refs to all queues below + * sync_bfqq->new_bfqq. Similarly if the merge + * already happened, we need to detach from + * bfqq now so that we cannot merge bio to a + * request from the old cgroup. + */ + bfq_put_cooperator(sync_bfqq); + bfq_release_process_ref(bfqd, sync_bfqq); + bic_set_bfqq(bic, NULL, 1); + } + } } return bfqg; diff --git a/block/bfq-iosched.c b/block/bfq-iosched.c index d46806182b05..0e5f6b799fdc 100644 --- a/block/bfq-iosched.c +++ b/block/bfq-iosched.c @@ -4914,7 +4914,7 @@ void bfq_put_queue(struct bfq_queue *bfqq) bfqg_and_blkg_put(bfqg); } -static void bfq_put_cooperator(struct bfq_queue *bfqq) +void bfq_put_cooperator(struct bfq_queue *bfqq) { struct bfq_queue *__bfqq, *next; diff --git a/block/bfq-iosched.h b/block/bfq-iosched.h index de98fdfe9ea1..5402be82b5f1 100644 --- a/block/bfq-iosched.h +++ b/block/bfq-iosched.h @@ -949,6 +949,7 @@ void bfq_weights_tree_remove(struct bfq_data *bfqd, void bfq_bfqq_expire(struct bfq_data *bfqd, struct bfq_queue *bfqq, bool compensate, enum bfqq_expiration reason); void bfq_put_queue(struct bfq_queue *bfqq); +void bfq_put_cooperator(struct bfq_queue *bfqq); void bfq_end_wr_async_queues(struct bfq_data *bfqd, struct bfq_group *bfqg); void bfq_release_process_ref(struct bfq_data *bfqd, struct bfq_queue *bfqq); void bfq_schedule_dispatch(struct bfq_data *bfqd); From da9f3025d595956410ceaab2bea01980d7775948 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jan Kara Date: Fri, 1 Apr 2022 12:27:45 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0220/1091] bfq: Update cgroup information before merging bio commit ea591cd4eb270393810e7be01feb8fde6a34fbbe upstream. When the process is migrated to a different cgroup (or in case of writeback just starts submitting bios associated with a different cgroup) bfq_merge_bio() can operate with stale cgroup information in bic. Thus the bio can be merged to a request from a different cgroup or it can result in merging of bfqqs for different cgroups or bfqqs of already dead cgroups and causing possible use-after-free issues. Fix the problem by updating cgroup information in bfq_merge_bio(). CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: e21b7a0b9887 ("block, bfq: add full hierarchical scheduling and cgroups support") Tested-by: "yukuai (C)" Signed-off-by: Jan Kara Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220401102752.8599-4-jack@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- block/bfq-iosched.c | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/block/bfq-iosched.c b/block/bfq-iosched.c index 0e5f6b799fdc..bdfa707ce236 100644 --- a/block/bfq-iosched.c +++ b/block/bfq-iosched.c @@ -2227,10 +2227,17 @@ static bool bfq_bio_merge(struct request_queue *q, struct bio *bio, spin_lock_irq(&bfqd->lock); - if (bic) + if (bic) { + /* + * Make sure cgroup info is uptodate for current process before + * considering the merge. + */ + bfq_bic_update_cgroup(bic, bio); + bfqd->bio_bfqq = bic_to_bfqq(bic, op_is_sync(bio->bi_opf)); - else + } else { bfqd->bio_bfqq = NULL; + } bfqd->bio_bic = bic; ret = blk_mq_sched_try_merge(q, bio, nr_segs, &free); From 28a8060a0bd2c636788d248d722a67a306dd0189 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jan Kara Date: Fri, 1 Apr 2022 12:27:48 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0221/1091] bfq: Track whether bfq_group is still online commit 09f871868080c33992cd6a9b72a5ca49582578fa upstream. Track whether bfq_group is still online. We cannot rely on blkcg_gq->online because that gets cleared only after all policies are offlined and we need something that gets updated already under bfqd->lock when we are cleaning up our bfq_group to be able to guarantee that when we see online bfq_group, it will stay online while we are holding bfqd->lock lock. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Tested-by: "yukuai (C)" Signed-off-by: Jan Kara Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220401102752.8599-7-jack@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- block/bfq-cgroup.c | 3 ++- block/bfq-iosched.h | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/block/bfq-cgroup.c b/block/bfq-cgroup.c index 6968ee90321c..095f2f65bc16 100644 --- a/block/bfq-cgroup.c +++ b/block/bfq-cgroup.c @@ -536,6 +536,7 @@ static void bfq_pd_init(struct blkg_policy_data *pd) */ bfqg->bfqd = bfqd; bfqg->active_entities = 0; + bfqg->online = true; bfqg->rq_pos_tree = RB_ROOT; } @@ -582,7 +583,6 @@ struct bfq_group *bfq_find_set_group(struct bfq_data *bfqd, struct bfq_entity *entity; bfqg = bfq_lookup_bfqg(bfqd, blkcg); - if (unlikely(!bfqg)) return NULL; @@ -944,6 +944,7 @@ static void bfq_pd_offline(struct blkg_policy_data *pd) put_async_queues: bfq_put_async_queues(bfqd, bfqg); + bfqg->online = false; spin_unlock_irqrestore(&bfqd->lock, flags); /* diff --git a/block/bfq-iosched.h b/block/bfq-iosched.h index 5402be82b5f1..be1f4c1febf8 100644 --- a/block/bfq-iosched.h +++ b/block/bfq-iosched.h @@ -896,6 +896,8 @@ struct bfq_group { /* reference counter (see comments in bfq_bic_update_cgroup) */ int ref; + /* Is bfq_group still online? */ + bool online; struct bfq_entity entity; struct bfq_sched_data sched_data; From f36736fbd48491a8d85cd22f4740d542c5a1546e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pablo Neira Ayuso Date: Wed, 25 May 2022 10:36:38 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0222/1091] netfilter: nf_tables: disallow non-stateful expression in sets earlier commit 520778042ccca019f3ffa136dd0ca565c486cedd upstream. Since 3e135cd499bf ("netfilter: nft_dynset: dynamic stateful expression instantiation"), it is possible to attach stateful expressions to set elements. cd5125d8f518 ("netfilter: nf_tables: split set destruction in deactivate and destroy phase") introduces conditional destruction on the object to accomodate transaction semantics. nft_expr_init() calls expr->ops->init() first, then check for NFT_STATEFUL_EXPR, this stills allows to initialize a non-stateful lookup expressions which points to a set, which might lead to UAF since the set is not properly detached from the set->binding for this case. Anyway, this combination is non-sense from nf_tables perspective. This patch fixes this problem by checking for NFT_STATEFUL_EXPR before expr->ops->init() is called. The reporter provides a KASAN splat and a poc reproducer (similar to those autogenerated by syzbot to report use-after-free errors). It is unknown to me if they are using syzbot or if they use similar automated tool to locate the bug that they are reporting. For the record, this is the KASAN splat. [ 85.431824] ================================================================== [ 85.432901] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in nf_tables_bind_set+0x81b/0xa20 [ 85.433825] Write of size 8 at addr ffff8880286f0e98 by task poc/776 [ 85.434756] [ 85.434999] CPU: 1 PID: 776 Comm: poc Tainted: G W 5.18.0+ #2 [ 85.436023] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014 Fixes: 0b2d8a7b638b ("netfilter: nf_tables: add helper functions for expression handling") Reported-and-tested-by: Aaron Adams Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso [Ajay: Regenerated the patch for v5.4.y] Signed-off-by: Ajay Kaher Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 16 ++++++++++------ net/netfilter/nft_dynset.c | 3 --- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c index 545da270e802..b51c192105fc 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c @@ -2267,27 +2267,31 @@ struct nft_expr *nft_expr_init(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, err = nf_tables_expr_parse(ctx, nla, &info); if (err < 0) - goto err1; + goto err_expr_parse; + + err = -EOPNOTSUPP; + if (!(info.ops->type->flags & NFT_EXPR_STATEFUL)) + goto err_expr_stateful; err = -ENOMEM; expr = kzalloc(info.ops->size, GFP_KERNEL); if (expr == NULL) - goto err2; + goto err_expr_stateful; err = nf_tables_newexpr(ctx, &info, expr); if (err < 0) - goto err3; + goto err_expr_new; return expr; -err3: +err_expr_new: kfree(expr); -err2: +err_expr_stateful: owner = info.ops->type->owner; if (info.ops->type->release_ops) info.ops->type->release_ops(info.ops); module_put(owner); -err1: +err_expr_parse: return ERR_PTR(err); } diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_dynset.c b/net/netfilter/nft_dynset.c index 6fdea0e57db8..6bcc18124e5b 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_dynset.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_dynset.c @@ -204,9 +204,6 @@ static int nft_dynset_init(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, return PTR_ERR(priv->expr); err = -EOPNOTSUPP; - if (!(priv->expr->ops->type->flags & NFT_EXPR_STATEFUL)) - goto err1; - if (priv->expr->ops->type->flags & NFT_EXPR_GC) { if (set->flags & NFT_SET_TIMEOUT) goto err1; From eaecf7ebfd5dd09038a80b14be46b844f54cfc5c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ye Bin Date: Thu, 14 Apr 2022 10:52:23 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0223/1091] ext4: fix use-after-free in ext4_rename_dir_prepare commit 0be698ecbe4471fcad80e81ec6a05001421041b3 upstream. We got issue as follows: EXT4-fs (loop0): mounted filesystem without journal. Opts: ,errors=continue ext4_get_first_dir_block: bh->b_data=0xffff88810bee6000 len=34478 ext4_get_first_dir_block: *parent_de=0xffff88810beee6ae bh->b_data=0xffff88810bee6000 ext4_rename_dir_prepare: [1] parent_de=0xffff88810beee6ae ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ext4_rename_dir_prepare+0x152/0x220 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88810beee6ae by task rep/1895 CPU: 13 PID: 1895 Comm: rep Not tainted 5.10.0+ #241 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xbe/0xf9 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1e/0x220 kasan_report.cold+0x37/0x7f ext4_rename_dir_prepare+0x152/0x220 ext4_rename+0xf44/0x1ad0 ext4_rename2+0x11c/0x170 vfs_rename+0xa84/0x1440 do_renameat2+0x683/0x8f0 __x64_sys_renameat+0x53/0x60 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x7f45a6fc41c9 RSP: 002b:00007ffc5a470218 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000108 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f45a6fc41c9 RDX: 0000000000000005 RSI: 0000000020000180 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 00007ffc5a470240 R08: 00007ffc5a470160 R09: 0000000020000080 R10: 00000000200001c0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400bb0 R13: 00007ffc5a470320 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 The buggy address belongs to the page: page:00000000440015ce refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x1 pfn:0x10beee flags: 0x200000000000000() raw: 0200000000000000 ffffea00043ff4c8 ffffea0004325608 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88810beee580: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ffff88810beee600: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff >ffff88810beee680: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ^ ffff88810beee700: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ffff88810beee780: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ================================================================== Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint ext4_rename_dir_prepare: [2] parent_de->inode=3537895424 ext4_rename_dir_prepare: [3] dir=0xffff888124170140 ext4_rename_dir_prepare: [4] ino=2 ext4_rename_dir_prepare: ent->dir->i_ino=2 parent=-757071872 Reason is first directory entry which 'rec_len' is 34478, then will get illegal parent entry. Now, we do not check directory entry after read directory block in 'ext4_get_first_dir_block'. To solve this issue, check directory entry in 'ext4_get_first_dir_block'. [ Trigger an ext4_error() instead of just warning if the directory is missing a '.' or '..' entry. Also make sure we return an error code if the file system is corrupted. -TYT ] Signed-off-by: Ye Bin Reviewed-by: Jan Kara Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220414025223.4113128-1-yebin10@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/ext4/namei.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/namei.c b/fs/ext4/namei.c index f10307215d58..6af2457349fd 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/namei.c +++ b/fs/ext4/namei.c @@ -3442,6 +3442,9 @@ static struct buffer_head *ext4_get_first_dir_block(handle_t *handle, struct buffer_head *bh; if (!ext4_has_inline_data(inode)) { + struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de; + unsigned int offset; + /* The first directory block must not be a hole, so * treat it as DIRENT_HTREE */ @@ -3450,9 +3453,30 @@ static struct buffer_head *ext4_get_first_dir_block(handle_t *handle, *retval = PTR_ERR(bh); return NULL; } - *parent_de = ext4_next_entry( - (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *)bh->b_data, - inode->i_sb->s_blocksize); + + de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) bh->b_data; + if (ext4_check_dir_entry(inode, NULL, de, bh, bh->b_data, + bh->b_size, 0) || + le32_to_cpu(de->inode) != inode->i_ino || + strcmp(".", de->name)) { + EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "directory missing '.'"); + brelse(bh); + *retval = -EFSCORRUPTED; + return NULL; + } + offset = ext4_rec_len_from_disk(de->rec_len, + inode->i_sb->s_blocksize); + de = ext4_next_entry(de, inode->i_sb->s_blocksize); + if (ext4_check_dir_entry(inode, NULL, de, bh, bh->b_data, + bh->b_size, offset) || + le32_to_cpu(de->inode) == 0 || strcmp("..", de->name)) { + EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "directory missing '..'"); + brelse(bh); + *retval = -EFSCORRUPTED; + return NULL; + } + *parent_de = de; + return bh; } From 0ab308d72af7548f21e4499d025c25887da0c26a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ye Bin Date: Sat, 26 Mar 2022 14:53:51 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0224/1091] ext4: fix warning in ext4_handle_inode_extension commit f4534c9fc94d22383f187b9409abb3f9df2e3db3 upstream. We got issue as follows: EXT4-fs error (device loop0) in ext4_reserve_inode_write:5741: Out of memory EXT4-fs error (device loop0): ext4_setattr:5462: inode #13: comm syz-executor.0: mark_inode_dirty error EXT4-fs error (device loop0) in ext4_setattr:5519: Out of memory EXT4-fs error (device loop0): ext4_ind_map_blocks:595: inode #13: comm syz-executor.0: Can't allocate blocks for non-extent mapped inodes with bigalloc ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 4361 at fs/ext4/file.c:301 ext4_file_write_iter+0x11c9/0x1220 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 4361 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.10.0+ #1 RIP: 0010:ext4_file_write_iter+0x11c9/0x1220 RSP: 0018:ffff924d80b27c00 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: ffffffff815a3379 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000000003b000000 RDX: ffff924d81601000 RSI: 00000000000009cc RDI: 00000000000009cd RBP: 000000000000000d R08: ffffffffbc5a2c6b R09: 0000902e0e52a96f R10: ffff902e2b7c1b40 R11: ffff902e2b7c1b40 R12: 000000000000000a R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff902e0e52aa10 R15: ffffffffffffff8b FS: 00007f81a7f65700(0000) GS:ffff902e3bc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffffffff600400 CR3: 000000012db88001 CR4: 00000000003706e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: do_iter_readv_writev+0x2e5/0x360 do_iter_write+0x112/0x4c0 do_pwritev+0x1e5/0x390 __x64_sys_pwritev2+0x7e/0xa0 do_syscall_64+0x37/0x50 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Above issue may happen as follows: Assume inode.i_size=4096 EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize=4096 step 1: set inode->i_isize = 8192 ext4_setattr if (attr->ia_size != inode->i_size) EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize = attr->ia_size; rc = ext4_mark_inode_dirty ext4_reserve_inode_write ext4_get_inode_loc __ext4_get_inode_loc sb_getblk --> return -ENOMEM ... if (!error) ->will not update i_size i_size_write(inode, attr->ia_size); Now: inode.i_size=4096 EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize=8192 step 2: Direct write 4096 bytes ext4_file_write_iter ext4_dio_write_iter iomap_dio_rw ->return error if (extend) ext4_handle_inode_extension WARN_ON_ONCE(i_size_read(inode) < EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize); ->Then trigger warning. To solve above issue, if mark inode dirty failed in ext4_setattr just set 'EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize' with old value. Signed-off-by: Ye Bin Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220326065351.761952-1-yebin10@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/ext4/inode.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/ext4/inode.c b/fs/ext4/inode.c index 00686fbe3c27..1cac574911a7 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/inode.c +++ b/fs/ext4/inode.c @@ -5668,6 +5668,7 @@ int ext4_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) if (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) { handle_t *handle; loff_t oldsize = inode->i_size; + loff_t old_disksize; int shrink = (attr->ia_size < inode->i_size); if (!(ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS))) { @@ -5723,6 +5724,7 @@ int ext4_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) inode->i_ctime = inode->i_mtime; } down_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem); + old_disksize = EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize; EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize = attr->ia_size; rc = ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode); if (!error) @@ -5734,6 +5736,8 @@ int ext4_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) */ if (!error) i_size_write(inode, attr->ia_size); + else + EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize = old_disksize; up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem); ext4_journal_stop(handle); if (error) From 73fd5b19285197078ee8a2e651d75d5b094a4de9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ye Bin Date: Mon, 16 May 2022 20:26:34 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0225/1091] ext4: fix bug_on in ext4_writepages commit ef09ed5d37b84d18562b30cf7253e57062d0db05 upstream. we got issue as follows: EXT4-fs error (device loop0): ext4_mb_generate_buddy:1141: group 0, block bitmap and bg descriptor inconsistent: 25 vs 31513 free cls ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/ext4/inode.c:2708! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI CPU: 2 PID: 2147 Comm: rep Not tainted 5.18.0-rc2-next-20220413+ #155 RIP: 0010:ext4_writepages+0x1977/0x1c10 RSP: 0018:ffff88811d3e7880 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: ffff88811c098000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88811c098000 RDI: 0000000000000002 RBP: ffff888128140f50 R08: ffffffffb1ff6387 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000007 R11: ffffed10250281ea R12: 0000000000000001 R13: 00000000000000a4 R14: ffff88811d3e7bb8 R15: ffff888128141028 FS: 00007f443aed9740(0000) GS:ffff8883aef00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000020007200 CR3: 000000011c2a4000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: do_writepages+0x130/0x3a0 filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x83/0xa0 filemap_flush+0xab/0xe0 ext4_alloc_da_blocks+0x51/0x120 __ext4_ioctl+0x1534/0x3210 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x12c/0x170 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 It may happen as follows: 1. write inline_data inode vfs_write new_sync_write ext4_file_write_iter ext4_buffered_write_iter generic_perform_write ext4_da_write_begin ext4_da_write_inline_data_begin -> If inline data size too small will allocate block to write, then mapping will has dirty page ext4_da_convert_inline_data_to_extent ->clear EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA 2. fallocate do_vfs_ioctl ioctl_preallocate vfs_fallocate ext4_fallocate ext4_convert_inline_data ext4_convert_inline_data_nolock ext4_map_blocks -> fail will goto restore data ext4_restore_inline_data ext4_create_inline_data ext4_write_inline_data ext4_set_inode_state -> set inode EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA 3. writepages __ext4_ioctl ext4_alloc_da_blocks filemap_flush filemap_fdatawrite_wbc do_writepages ext4_writepages if (ext4_has_inline_data(inode)) BUG_ON(ext4_test_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA)) The root cause of this issue is we destory inline data until call ext4_writepages under delay allocation mode. But there maybe already convert from inline to extent. To solve this issue, we call filemap_flush first.. Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ye Bin Reviewed-by: Jan Kara Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220516122634.1690462-1-yebin10@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/ext4/inline.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/ext4/inline.c b/fs/ext4/inline.c index 8f665aa1d706..62384ae77a78 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/inline.c +++ b/fs/ext4/inline.c @@ -2013,6 +2013,18 @@ int ext4_convert_inline_data(struct inode *inode) if (!ext4_has_inline_data(inode)) { ext4_clear_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA); return 0; + } else if (!ext4_test_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA)) { + /* + * Inode has inline data but EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA is + * cleared. This means we are in the middle of moving of + * inline data to delay allocated block. Just force writeout + * here to finish conversion. + */ + error = filemap_flush(inode->i_mapping); + if (error) + return error; + if (!ext4_has_inline_data(inode)) + return 0; } needed_blocks = ext4_writepage_trans_blocks(inode); From 17034d45ec443fb0e3c0e7297f9cd10f70446064 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jan Kara Date: Wed, 18 May 2022 11:33:28 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0226/1091] ext4: verify dir block before splitting it commit 46c116b920ebec58031f0a78c5ea9599b0d2a371 upstream. Before splitting a directory block verify its directory entries are sane so that the splitting code does not access memory it should not. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jan Kara Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220518093332.13986-1-jack@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/ext4/namei.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/namei.c b/fs/ext4/namei.c index 6af2457349fd..73963977f2de 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/namei.c +++ b/fs/ext4/namei.c @@ -273,9 +273,9 @@ static struct dx_frame *dx_probe(struct ext4_filename *fname, struct dx_hash_info *hinfo, struct dx_frame *frame); static void dx_release(struct dx_frame *frames); -static int dx_make_map(struct inode *dir, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de, - unsigned blocksize, struct dx_hash_info *hinfo, - struct dx_map_entry map[]); +static int dx_make_map(struct inode *dir, struct buffer_head *bh, + struct dx_hash_info *hinfo, + struct dx_map_entry *map_tail); static void dx_sort_map(struct dx_map_entry *map, unsigned count); static struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *dx_move_dirents(char *from, char *to, struct dx_map_entry *offsets, int count, unsigned blocksize); @@ -1205,15 +1205,23 @@ static inline int search_dirblock(struct buffer_head *bh, * Create map of hash values, offsets, and sizes, stored at end of block. * Returns number of entries mapped. */ -static int dx_make_map(struct inode *dir, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de, - unsigned blocksize, struct dx_hash_info *hinfo, +static int dx_make_map(struct inode *dir, struct buffer_head *bh, + struct dx_hash_info *hinfo, struct dx_map_entry *map_tail) { int count = 0; - char *base = (char *) de; + struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *)bh->b_data; + unsigned int buflen = bh->b_size; + char *base = bh->b_data; struct dx_hash_info h = *hinfo; - while ((char *) de < base + blocksize) { + if (ext4_has_metadata_csum(dir->i_sb)) + buflen -= sizeof(struct ext4_dir_entry_tail); + + while ((char *) de < base + buflen) { + if (ext4_check_dir_entry(dir, NULL, de, bh, base, buflen, + ((char *)de) - base)) + return -EFSCORRUPTED; if (de->name_len && de->inode) { ext4fs_dirhash(dir, de->name, de->name_len, &h); map_tail--; @@ -1223,8 +1231,7 @@ static int dx_make_map(struct inode *dir, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de, count++; cond_resched(); } - /* XXX: do we need to check rec_len == 0 case? -Chris */ - de = ext4_next_entry(de, blocksize); + de = ext4_next_entry(de, dir->i_sb->s_blocksize); } return count; } @@ -1848,8 +1855,11 @@ static struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *do_split(handle_t *handle, struct inode *dir, /* create map in the end of data2 block */ map = (struct dx_map_entry *) (data2 + blocksize); - count = dx_make_map(dir, (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) data1, - blocksize, hinfo, map); + count = dx_make_map(dir, *bh, hinfo, map); + if (count < 0) { + err = count; + goto journal_error; + } map -= count; dx_sort_map(map, count); /* Ensure that neither split block is over half full */ From e157c8f87e8fac112d6c955e69a60cdb9bc80a60 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jan Kara Date: Wed, 18 May 2022 11:33:29 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0227/1091] ext4: avoid cycles in directory h-tree commit 3ba733f879c2a88910744647e41edeefbc0d92b2 upstream. A maliciously corrupted filesystem can contain cycles in the h-tree stored inside a directory. That can easily lead to the kernel corrupting tree nodes that were already verified under its hands while doing a node split and consequently accessing unallocated memory. Fix the problem by verifying traversed block numbers are unique. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jan Kara Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220518093332.13986-2-jack@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/ext4/namei.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/namei.c b/fs/ext4/namei.c index 73963977f2de..b01059bb562c 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/namei.c +++ b/fs/ext4/namei.c @@ -750,12 +750,14 @@ static struct dx_frame * dx_probe(struct ext4_filename *fname, struct inode *dir, struct dx_hash_info *hinfo, struct dx_frame *frame_in) { - unsigned count, indirect; + unsigned count, indirect, level, i; struct dx_entry *at, *entries, *p, *q, *m; struct dx_root *root; struct dx_frame *frame = frame_in; struct dx_frame *ret_err = ERR_PTR(ERR_BAD_DX_DIR); u32 hash; + ext4_lblk_t block; + ext4_lblk_t blocks[EXT4_HTREE_LEVEL]; memset(frame_in, 0, EXT4_HTREE_LEVEL * sizeof(frame_in[0])); frame->bh = ext4_read_dirblock(dir, 0, INDEX); @@ -811,6 +813,8 @@ dx_probe(struct ext4_filename *fname, struct inode *dir, } dxtrace(printk("Look up %x", hash)); + level = 0; + blocks[0] = 0; while (1) { count = dx_get_count(entries); if (!count || count > dx_get_limit(entries)) { @@ -852,15 +856,27 @@ dx_probe(struct ext4_filename *fname, struct inode *dir, dx_get_block(at))); frame->entries = entries; frame->at = at; - if (!indirect--) + + block = dx_get_block(at); + for (i = 0; i <= level; i++) { + if (blocks[i] == block) { + ext4_warning_inode(dir, + "dx entry: tree cycle block %u points back to block %u", + blocks[level], block); + goto fail; + } + } + if (++level > indirect) return frame; + blocks[level] = block; frame++; - frame->bh = ext4_read_dirblock(dir, dx_get_block(at), INDEX); + frame->bh = ext4_read_dirblock(dir, block, INDEX); if (IS_ERR(frame->bh)) { ret_err = (struct dx_frame *) frame->bh; frame->bh = NULL; goto fail; } + entries = ((struct dx_node *) frame->bh->b_data)->entries; if (dx_get_limit(entries) != dx_node_limit(dir)) { From 742736dc9c014c4daad52941db74878573acbd52 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sakari Ailus Date: Wed, 6 Apr 2022 16:12:08 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 0228/1091] ACPI: property: Release subnode properties with data nodes commit 3bd561e1572ee02a50cd1a5be339abf1a5b78d56 upstream. struct acpi_device_properties describes one source of properties present on either struct acpi_device or struct acpi_data_node. When properties are parsed, both are populated but when released, only those properties that are associated with the device node are freed. Fix this by also releasing memory of the data node properties. Fixes: 5f5e4890d57a ("ACPI / property: Allow multiple property compatible _DSD entries") Cc: 4.20+ # 4.20+ Signed-off-by: Sakari Ailus Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/acpi/property.c | 18 ++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/acpi/property.c b/drivers/acpi/property.c index a4b7cdd0c844..1b0aeb832044 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/property.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/property.c @@ -430,6 +430,16 @@ void acpi_init_properties(struct acpi_device *adev) acpi_extract_apple_properties(adev); } +static void acpi_free_device_properties(struct list_head *list) +{ + struct acpi_device_properties *props, *tmp; + + list_for_each_entry_safe(props, tmp, list, list) { + list_del(&props->list); + kfree(props); + } +} + static void acpi_destroy_nondev_subnodes(struct list_head *list) { struct acpi_data_node *dn, *next; @@ -442,22 +452,18 @@ static void acpi_destroy_nondev_subnodes(struct list_head *list) wait_for_completion(&dn->kobj_done); list_del(&dn->sibling); ACPI_FREE((void *)dn->data.pointer); + acpi_free_device_properties(&dn->data.properties); kfree(dn); } } void acpi_free_properties(struct acpi_device *adev) { - struct acpi_device_properties *props, *tmp; - acpi_destroy_nondev_subnodes(&adev->data.subnodes); ACPI_FREE((void *)adev->data.pointer); adev->data.of_compatible = NULL; adev->data.pointer = NULL; - list_for_each_entry_safe(props, tmp, &adev->data.properties, list) { - list_del(&props->list); - kfree(props); - } + acpi_free_device_properties(&adev->data.properties); } /** From c27f744ceefadc7bbeb14233b6abc150ced617d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Keita Suzuki Date: Mon, 25 Apr 2022 06:37:38 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0229/1091] tracing: Fix potential double free in create_var_ref() commit 99696a2592bca641eb88cc9a80c90e591afebd0f upstream. In create_var_ref(), init_var_ref() is called to initialize the fields of variable ref_field, which is allocated in the previous function call to create_hist_field(). Function init_var_ref() allocates the corresponding fields such as ref_field->system, but frees these fields when the function encounters an error. The caller later calls destroy_hist_field() to conduct error handling, which frees the fields and the variable itself. This results in double free of the fields which are already freed in the previous function. Fix this by storing NULL to the corresponding fields when they are freed in init_var_ref(). Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220425063739.3859998-1-keitasuzuki.park@sslab.ics.keio.ac.jp Fixes: 067fe038e70f ("tracing: Add variable reference handling to hist triggers") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu Reviewed-by: Tom Zanussi Signed-off-by: Keita Suzuki Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c b/kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c index 413da11260f8..83e181055685 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c +++ b/kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c @@ -2695,8 +2695,11 @@ static int init_var_ref(struct hist_field *ref_field, return err; free: kfree(ref_field->system); + ref_field->system = NULL; kfree(ref_field->event_name); + ref_field->event_name = NULL; kfree(ref_field->name); + ref_field->name = NULL; goto out; } From c99306cf5983147669636c0bac3ba8b41e9b6943 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Bjorn Helgaas Date: Thu, 26 May 2022 16:52:23 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 0230/1091] PCI/PM: Fix bridge_d3_blacklist[] Elo i2 overwrite of Gigabyte X299 commit 12068bb346db5776d0ec9bb4cd073f8427a1ac92 upstream. 92597f97a40b ("PCI/PM: Avoid putting Elo i2 PCIe Ports in D3cold") omitted braces around the new Elo i2 entry, so it overwrote the existing Gigabyte X299 entry. Add the appropriate braces. Found by: $ make W=1 drivers/pci/pci.o CC drivers/pci/pci.o drivers/pci/pci.c:2974:12: error: initialized field overwritten [-Werror=override-init] 2974 | .ident = "Elo i2", | ^~~~~~~~ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220526221258.GA409855@bhelgaas Fixes: 92597f97a40b ("PCI/PM: Avoid putting Elo i2 PCIe Ports in D3cold") Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.15+ Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/pci/pci.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci.c b/drivers/pci/pci.c index c988aa425ac9..ec741f92246d 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/pci.c +++ b/drivers/pci/pci.c @@ -2613,6 +2613,8 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id bridge_d3_blacklist[] = { DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_VENDOR, "Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd."), DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "X299 DESIGNARE EX-CF"), }, + }, + { /* * Downstream device is not accessible after putting a root port * into D3cold and back into D0 on Elo i2. From c3919b10c45fe851fbed77350108df3b301a6698 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johan Hovold Date: Fri, 1 Apr 2022 15:38:53 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0231/1091] PCI: qcom: Fix runtime PM imbalance on probe errors commit 87d83b96c8d6c6c2d2096bd0bdba73bcf42b8ef0 upstream. Drop the leftover pm_runtime_disable() calls from the late probe error paths that would, for example, prevent runtime PM from being reenabled after a probe deferral. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220401133854.10421-2-johan+linaro@kernel.org Fixes: 6e5da6f7d824 ("PCI: qcom: Fix error handling in runtime PM support") Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas Reviewed-by: Manivannan Sadhasivam Acked-by: Stanimir Varbanov Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.20 Cc: Bjorn Andersson Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pcie-qcom.c | 5 +---- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pcie-qcom.c b/drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pcie-qcom.c index a8eab4e67af1..1229e1da93af 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pcie-qcom.c +++ b/drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pcie-qcom.c @@ -1343,17 +1343,14 @@ static int qcom_pcie_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) } ret = phy_init(pcie->phy); - if (ret) { - pm_runtime_disable(&pdev->dev); + if (ret) goto err_pm_runtime_put; - } platform_set_drvdata(pdev, pcie); ret = dw_pcie_host_init(pp); if (ret) { dev_err(dev, "cannot initialize host\n"); - pm_runtime_disable(&pdev->dev); goto err_pm_runtime_put; } From 665602c837762c20ddc3364e3d96bac68f9f3c43 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johan Hovold Date: Fri, 1 Apr 2022 15:38:54 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0232/1091] PCI: qcom: Fix unbalanced PHY init on probe errors commit 83013631f0f9961416abd812e228c8efbc2f6069 upstream. Undo the PHY initialisation (e.g. balance runtime PM) if host initialisation fails during probe. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220401133854.10421-3-johan+linaro@kernel.org Fixes: 82a823833f4e ("PCI: qcom: Add Qualcomm PCIe controller driver") Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas Reviewed-by: Manivannan Sadhasivam Acked-by: Stanimir Varbanov Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.5 Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pcie-qcom.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pcie-qcom.c b/drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pcie-qcom.c index 1229e1da93af..17f411772f0c 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pcie-qcom.c +++ b/drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pcie-qcom.c @@ -1351,11 +1351,13 @@ static int qcom_pcie_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) ret = dw_pcie_host_init(pp); if (ret) { dev_err(dev, "cannot initialize host\n"); - goto err_pm_runtime_put; + goto err_phy_exit; } return 0; +err_phy_exit: + phy_exit(pcie->phy); err_pm_runtime_put: pm_runtime_put(dev); pm_runtime_disable(dev); From f160e7b4b02a7369ac306c07a18102739d3415b8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Rei Yamamoto Date: Fri, 13 May 2022 16:48:57 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0233/1091] mm, compaction: fast_find_migrateblock() should return pfn in the target zone commit bbe832b9db2e1ad21522f8f0bf02775fff8a0e0e upstream. At present, pages not in the target zone are added to cc->migratepages list in isolate_migratepages_block(). As a result, pages may migrate between nodes unintentionally. This would be a serious problem for older kernels without commit a984226f457f849e ("mm: memcontrol: remove the pgdata parameter of mem_cgroup_page_lruvec"), because it can corrupt the lru list by handling pages in list without holding proper lru_lock. Avoid returning a pfn outside the target zone in the case that it is not aligned with a pageblock boundary. Otherwise isolate_migratepages_block() will handle pages not in the target zone. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220511044300.4069-1-yamamoto.rei@jp.fujitsu.com Fixes: 70b44595eafe ("mm, compaction: use free lists to quickly locate a migration source") Signed-off-by: Rei Yamamoto Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin Acked-by: Mel Gorman Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador Cc: Don Dutile Cc: Wonhyuk Yang Cc: Rei Yamamoto Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- mm/compaction.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/mm/compaction.c b/mm/compaction.c index d686887856fe..0758afd6325d 100644 --- a/mm/compaction.c +++ b/mm/compaction.c @@ -1709,6 +1709,8 @@ static unsigned long fast_find_migrateblock(struct compact_control *cc) update_fast_start_pfn(cc, free_pfn); pfn = pageblock_start_pfn(free_pfn); + if (pfn < cc->zone->zone_start_pfn) + pfn = cc->zone->zone_start_pfn; cc->fast_search_fail = 0; found_block = true; set_pageblock_skip(freepage); From 49cd9eb7b9a7b88124b31e31f8e539acaf1b3a6d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexander Aring Date: Mon, 4 Apr 2022 16:06:30 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 0234/1091] dlm: fix plock invalid read commit 42252d0d2aa9b94d168241710a761588b3959019 upstream. This patch fixes an invalid read showed by KASAN. A unlock will allocate a "struct plock_op" and a followed send_op() will append it to a global send_list data structure. In some cases a followed dev_read() moves it to recv_list and dev_write() will cast it to "struct plock_xop" and access fields which are only available in those structures. At this point an invalid read happens by accessing those fields. To fix this issue the "callback" field is moved to "struct plock_op" to indicate that a cast to "plock_xop" is allowed and does the additional "plock_xop" handling if set. Example of the KASAN output which showed the invalid read: [ 2064.296453] ================================================================== [ 2064.304852] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in dev_write+0x52b/0x5a0 [dlm] [ 2064.306491] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800ef227d8 by task dlm_controld/7484 [ 2064.308168] [ 2064.308575] CPU: 0 PID: 7484 Comm: dlm_controld Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.14.0+ #9 [ 2064.310292] Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011 [ 2064.311618] Call Trace: [ 2064.312218] dump_stack_lvl+0x56/0x7b [ 2064.313150] print_address_description.constprop.8+0x21/0x150 [ 2064.314578] ? dev_write+0x52b/0x5a0 [dlm] [ 2064.315610] ? dev_write+0x52b/0x5a0 [dlm] [ 2064.316595] kasan_report.cold.14+0x7f/0x11b [ 2064.317674] ? dev_write+0x52b/0x5a0 [dlm] [ 2064.318687] dev_write+0x52b/0x5a0 [dlm] [ 2064.319629] ? dev_read+0x4a0/0x4a0 [dlm] [ 2064.320713] ? bpf_lsm_kernfs_init_security+0x10/0x10 [ 2064.321926] vfs_write+0x17e/0x930 [ 2064.322769] ? __fget_light+0x1aa/0x220 [ 2064.323753] ksys_write+0xf1/0x1c0 [ 2064.324548] ? __ia32_sys_read+0xb0/0xb0 [ 2064.325464] do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x80 [ 2064.326387] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 2064.327606] RIP: 0033:0x7f807e4ba96f [ 2064.328470] Code: 89 54 24 18 48 89 74 24 10 89 7c 24 08 e8 39 87 f8 ff 48 8b 54 24 18 48 8b 74 24 10 41 89 c0 8b 7c 24 08 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 31 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 7c 87 f8 ff 48 [ 2064.332902] RSP: 002b:00007ffd50cfe6e0 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 [ 2064.334658] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055cc3886eb30 RCX: 00007f807e4ba96f [ 2064.336275] RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 00007ffd50cfe7e0 RDI: 0000000000000010 [ 2064.337980] RBP: 00007ffd50cfe7e0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 [ 2064.339560] R10: 000055cc3886eb30 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 000055cc3886eb80 [ 2064.341237] R13: 000055cc3886eb00 R14: 000055cc3886f590 R15: 0000000000000001 [ 2064.342857] [ 2064.343226] Allocated by task 12438: [ 2064.344057] kasan_save_stack+0x1c/0x40 [ 2064.345079] __kasan_kmalloc+0x84/0xa0 [ 2064.345933] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x13b/0x220 [ 2064.346953] dlm_posix_unlock+0xec/0x720 [dlm] [ 2064.348811] do_lock_file_wait.part.32+0xca/0x1d0 [ 2064.351070] fcntl_setlk+0x281/0xbc0 [ 2064.352879] do_fcntl+0x5e4/0xfe0 [ 2064.354657] __x64_sys_fcntl+0x11f/0x170 [ 2064.356550] do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x80 [ 2064.358259] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 2064.360745] [ 2064.361511] Last potentially related work creation: [ 2064.363957] kasan_save_stack+0x1c/0x40 [ 2064.365811] __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xaf/0xc0 [ 2064.368100] call_rcu+0x11b/0xf70 [ 2064.369785] dlm_process_incoming_buffer+0x47d/0xfd0 [dlm] [ 2064.372404] receive_from_sock+0x290/0x770 [dlm] [ 2064.374607] process_recv_sockets+0x32/0x40 [dlm] [ 2064.377290] process_one_work+0x9a8/0x16e0 [ 2064.379357] worker_thread+0x87/0xbf0 [ 2064.381188] kthread+0x3ac/0x490 [ 2064.383460] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [ 2064.385588] [ 2064.386518] Second to last potentially related work creation: [ 2064.389219] kasan_save_stack+0x1c/0x40 [ 2064.391043] __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xaf/0xc0 [ 2064.393303] call_rcu+0x11b/0xf70 [ 2064.394885] dlm_process_incoming_buffer+0x47d/0xfd0 [dlm] [ 2064.397694] receive_from_sock+0x290/0x770 [dlm] [ 2064.399932] process_recv_sockets+0x32/0x40 [dlm] [ 2064.402180] process_one_work+0x9a8/0x16e0 [ 2064.404388] worker_thread+0x87/0xbf0 [ 2064.406124] kthread+0x3ac/0x490 [ 2064.408021] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [ 2064.409834] [ 2064.410599] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800ef22780 [ 2064.410599] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-96 of size 96 [ 2064.416495] The buggy address is located 88 bytes inside of [ 2064.416495] 96-byte region [ffff88800ef22780, ffff88800ef227e0) [ 2064.422045] The buggy address belongs to the page: [ 2064.424635] page:00000000b6bef8bc refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0xef22 [ 2064.428970] flags: 0xfffffc0000200(slab|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) [ 2064.432515] raw: 000fffffc0000200 ffffea0000d68b80 0000001400000014 ffff888001041780 [ 2064.436110] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080200020 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 2064.439813] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 2064.442548] [ 2064.443310] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 2064.445988] ffff88800ef22680: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc [ 2064.449444] ffff88800ef22700: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc [ 2064.452941] >ffff88800ef22780: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc [ 2064.456383] ^ [ 2064.459386] ffff88800ef22800: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 2064.462788] ffff88800ef22880: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc [ 2064.466239] ================================================================== reproducer in python: import argparse import struct import fcntl import os parser = argparse.ArgumentParser() parser.add_argument('-f', '--file', help='file to use fcntl, must be on dlm lock filesystem e.g. gfs2') args = parser.parse_args() f = open(args.file, 'wb+') lockdata = struct.pack('hhllhh', fcntl.F_WRLCK,0,0,0,0,0) fcntl.fcntl(f, fcntl.F_SETLK, lockdata) lockdata = struct.pack('hhllhh', fcntl.F_UNLCK,0,0,0,0,0) fcntl.fcntl(f, fcntl.F_SETLK, lockdata) Fixes: 586759f03e2e ("gfs2: nfs lock support for gfs2") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher Signed-off-by: Alexander Aring Signed-off-by: David Teigland Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/dlm/plock.c | 12 +++++------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/dlm/plock.c b/fs/dlm/plock.c index c38b2b8ffd1d..a10d2bcfe75a 100644 --- a/fs/dlm/plock.c +++ b/fs/dlm/plock.c @@ -23,11 +23,11 @@ struct plock_op { struct list_head list; int done; struct dlm_plock_info info; + int (*callback)(struct file_lock *fl, int result); }; struct plock_xop { struct plock_op xop; - int (*callback)(struct file_lock *fl, int result); void *fl; void *file; struct file_lock flc; @@ -129,19 +129,18 @@ int dlm_posix_lock(dlm_lockspace_t *lockspace, u64 number, struct file *file, /* fl_owner is lockd which doesn't distinguish processes on the nfs client */ op->info.owner = (__u64) fl->fl_pid; - xop->callback = fl->fl_lmops->lm_grant; + op->callback = fl->fl_lmops->lm_grant; locks_init_lock(&xop->flc); locks_copy_lock(&xop->flc, fl); xop->fl = fl; xop->file = file; } else { op->info.owner = (__u64)(long) fl->fl_owner; - xop->callback = NULL; } send_op(op); - if (xop->callback == NULL) { + if (!op->callback) { rv = wait_event_interruptible(recv_wq, (op->done != 0)); if (rv == -ERESTARTSYS) { log_debug(ls, "dlm_posix_lock: wait killed %llx", @@ -203,7 +202,7 @@ static int dlm_plock_callback(struct plock_op *op) file = xop->file; flc = &xop->flc; fl = xop->fl; - notify = xop->callback; + notify = op->callback; if (op->info.rv) { notify(fl, op->info.rv); @@ -436,10 +435,9 @@ static ssize_t dev_write(struct file *file, const char __user *u, size_t count, if (op->info.fsid == info.fsid && op->info.number == info.number && op->info.owner == info.owner) { - struct plock_xop *xop = (struct plock_xop *)op; list_del_init(&op->list); memcpy(&op->info, &info, sizeof(info)); - if (xop->callback) + if (op->callback) do_callback = 1; else op->done = 1; From 17ea634849758265f5c2ff74155e9d1c32860f01 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexander Aring Date: Fri, 29 Apr 2022 11:06:51 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 0235/1091] dlm: fix missing lkb refcount handling commit 1689c169134f4b5a39156122d799b7dca76d8ddb upstream. We always call hold_lkb(lkb) if we increment lkb->lkb_wait_count. So, we always need to call unhold_lkb(lkb) if we decrement lkb->lkb_wait_count. This patch will add missing unhold_lkb(lkb) if we decrement lkb->lkb_wait_count. In case of setting lkb->lkb_wait_count to zero we need to countdown until reaching zero and call unhold_lkb(lkb). The waiters list unhold_lkb(lkb) can be removed because it's done for the last lkb_wait_count decrement iteration as it's done in _remove_from_waiters(). This issue was discovered by a dlm gfs2 test case which use excessively dlm_unlock(LKF_CANCEL) feature. Probably the lkb->lkb_wait_count value never reached above 1 if this feature isn't used and so it was not discovered before. The testcase ended in a rsb on the rsb keep data structure with a refcount of 1 but no lkb was associated with it, which is itself an invalid behaviour. A side effect of that was a condition in which the dlm was sending remove messages in a looping behaviour. With this patch that has not been reproduced. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexander Aring Signed-off-by: David Teigland Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/dlm/lock.c | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/dlm/lock.c b/fs/dlm/lock.c index 53500b555bfa..4ae8becdb51d 100644 --- a/fs/dlm/lock.c +++ b/fs/dlm/lock.c @@ -1551,6 +1551,7 @@ static int _remove_from_waiters(struct dlm_lkb *lkb, int mstype, lkb->lkb_wait_type = 0; lkb->lkb_flags &= ~DLM_IFL_OVERLAP_CANCEL; lkb->lkb_wait_count--; + unhold_lkb(lkb); goto out_del; } @@ -1577,6 +1578,7 @@ static int _remove_from_waiters(struct dlm_lkb *lkb, int mstype, log_error(ls, "remwait error %x reply %d wait_type %d overlap", lkb->lkb_id, mstype, lkb->lkb_wait_type); lkb->lkb_wait_count--; + unhold_lkb(lkb); lkb->lkb_wait_type = 0; } @@ -5312,11 +5314,16 @@ int dlm_recover_waiters_post(struct dlm_ls *ls) lkb->lkb_flags &= ~DLM_IFL_OVERLAP_UNLOCK; lkb->lkb_flags &= ~DLM_IFL_OVERLAP_CANCEL; lkb->lkb_wait_type = 0; - lkb->lkb_wait_count = 0; + /* drop all wait_count references we still + * hold a reference for this iteration. + */ + while (lkb->lkb_wait_count) { + lkb->lkb_wait_count--; + unhold_lkb(lkb); + } mutex_lock(&ls->ls_waiters_mutex); list_del_init(&lkb->lkb_wait_reply); mutex_unlock(&ls->ls_waiters_mutex); - unhold_lkb(lkb); /* for waiters list */ if (oc || ou) { /* do an unlock or cancel instead of resending */ From 82bf8e7271fade40184177cb406203addc34c4a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Junxiao Bi via Ocfs2-devel Date: Wed, 18 May 2022 16:52:24 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0236/1091] ocfs2: dlmfs: fix error handling of user_dlm_destroy_lock commit 863e0d81b6683c4cbc588ad831f560c90e494bef upstream. When user_dlm_destroy_lock failed, it didn't clean up the flags it set before exit. For USER_LOCK_IN_TEARDOWN, if this function fails because of lock is still in used, next time when unlink invokes this function, it will return succeed, and then unlink will remove inode and dentry if lock is not in used(file closed), but the dlm lock is still linked in dlm lock resource, then when bast come in, it will trigger a panic due to user-after-free. See the following panic call trace. To fix this, USER_LOCK_IN_TEARDOWN should be reverted if fail. And also error should be returned if USER_LOCK_IN_TEARDOWN is set to let user know that unlink fail. For the case of ocfs2_dlm_unlock failure, besides USER_LOCK_IN_TEARDOWN, USER_LOCK_BUSY is also required to be cleared. Even though spin lock is released in between, but USER_LOCK_IN_TEARDOWN is still set, for USER_LOCK_BUSY, if before every place that waits on this flag, USER_LOCK_IN_TEARDOWN is checked to bail out, that will make sure no flow waits on the busy flag set by user_dlm_destroy_lock(), then we can simplely revert USER_LOCK_BUSY when ocfs2_dlm_unlock fails. Fix user_dlm_cluster_lock() which is the only function not following this. [ 941.336392] (python,26174,16):dlmfs_unlink:562 ERROR: unlink 004fb0000060000b5a90b8c847b72e1, error -16 from destroy [ 989.757536] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 989.757709] kernel BUG at fs/ocfs2/dlmfs/userdlm.c:173! [ 989.757876] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 989.758027] Modules linked in: ksplice_2zhuk2jr_ib_ipoib_new(O) ksplice_2zhuk2jr(O) mptctl mptbase xen_netback xen_blkback xen_gntalloc xen_gntdev xen_evtchn cdc_ether usbnet mii ocfs2 jbd2 rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss nfsv4 nfsv3 nfs_acl nfs fscache lockd grace ocfs2_dlmfs ocfs2_stack_o2cb ocfs2_dlm ocfs2_nodemanager ocfs2_stackglue configfs bnx2fc fcoe libfcoe libfc scsi_transport_fc sunrpc ipmi_devintf bridge stp llc rds_rdma rds bonding ib_sdp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_ucm ib_uverbs ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm falcon_lsm_serviceable(PE) falcon_nf_netcontain(PE) mlx4_vnic falcon_kal(E) falcon_lsm_pinned_13402(E) mlx4_ib ib_sa ib_mad ib_core ib_addr xenfs xen_privcmd dm_multipath iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support pcspkr sb_edac edac_core i2c_i801 lpc_ich mfd_core ipmi_ssif i2c_core ipmi_si ipmi_msghandler [ 989.760686] ioatdma sg ext3 jbd mbcache sd_mod ahci libahci ixgbe dca ptp pps_core vxlan udp_tunnel ip6_udp_tunnel megaraid_sas mlx4_core crc32c_intel be2iscsi bnx2i cnic uio cxgb4i cxgb4 cxgb3i libcxgbi ipv6 cxgb3 mdio libiscsi_tcp qla4xxx iscsi_boot_sysfs libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi wmi dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod [last unloaded: ksplice_2zhuk2jr_ib_ipoib_old] [ 989.761987] CPU: 10 PID: 19102 Comm: dlm_thread Tainted: P OE 4.1.12-124.57.1.el6uek.x86_64 #2 [ 989.762290] Hardware name: Oracle Corporation ORACLE SERVER X5-2/ASM,MOTHERBOARD,1U, BIOS 30350100 06/17/2021 [ 989.762599] task: ffff880178af6200 ti: ffff88017f7c8000 task.ti: ffff88017f7c8000 [ 989.762848] RIP: e030:[] [] __user_dlm_queue_lockres.part.4+0x76/0x80 [ocfs2_dlmfs] [ 989.763185] RSP: e02b:ffff88017f7cbcb8 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 989.763353] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff880174d48008 RCX: 0000000000000003 [ 989.763565] RDX: 0000000000120012 RSI: 0000000000000003 RDI: ffff880174d48170 [ 989.763778] RBP: ffff88017f7cbcc8 R08: ffff88021f4293b0 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 989.763991] R10: ffff880179c8c000 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff880174d48008 [ 989.764204] R13: 0000000000000003 R14: ffff880179c8c000 R15: ffff88021db7a000 [ 989.764422] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880247480000(0000) knlGS:ffff880247480000 [ 989.764685] CS: e033 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 989.764865] CR2: ffff8000007f6800 CR3: 0000000001ae0000 CR4: 0000000000042660 [ 989.765081] Stack: [ 989.765167] 0000000000000003 ffff880174d48040 ffff88017f7cbd18 ffffffffc07d455f [ 989.765442] ffff88017f7cbd88 ffffffff816fb639 ffff88017f7cbd38 ffff8800361b5600 [ 989.765717] ffff88021db7a000 ffff88021f429380 0000000000000003 ffffffffc0453020 [ 989.765991] Call Trace: [ 989.766093] [] user_bast+0x5f/0xf0 [ocfs2_dlmfs] [ 989.766287] [] ? schedule_timeout+0x169/0x2d0 [ 989.766475] [] ? o2dlm_lock_ast_wrapper+0x20/0x20 [ocfs2_stack_o2cb] [ 989.766738] [] o2dlm_blocking_ast_wrapper+0x1a/0x20 [ocfs2_stack_o2cb] [ 989.767010] [] dlm_do_local_bast+0x46/0xe0 [ocfs2_dlm] [ 989.767217] [] ? dlm_lockres_calc_usage+0x4c/0x60 [ocfs2_dlm] [ 989.767466] [] dlm_thread+0xa31/0x1140 [ocfs2_dlm] [ 989.767662] [] ? __schedule+0x24a/0x810 [ 989.767834] [] ? __schedule+0x23e/0x810 [ 989.768006] [] ? __schedule+0x24a/0x810 [ 989.768178] [] ? __schedule+0x23e/0x810 [ 989.768349] [] ? __schedule+0x24a/0x810 [ 989.768521] [] ? __schedule+0x23e/0x810 [ 989.768693] [] ? __schedule+0x24a/0x810 [ 989.768893] [] ? __schedule+0x23e/0x810 [ 989.769067] [] ? __schedule+0x24a/0x810 [ 989.769241] [] ? wait_woken+0x90/0x90 [ 989.769411] [] ? dlm_kick_thread+0x80/0x80 [ocfs2_dlm] [ 989.769617] [] kthread+0xcb/0xf0 [ 989.769774] [] ? __schedule+0x24a/0x810 [ 989.769945] [] ? __schedule+0x24a/0x810 [ 989.770117] [] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x180/0x180 [ 989.770321] [] ret_from_fork+0x61/0x90 [ 989.770492] [] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x180/0x180 [ 989.770689] Code: d0 00 00 00 f0 45 7d c0 bf 00 20 00 00 48 89 83 c0 00 00 00 48 89 83 c8 00 00 00 e8 55 c1 8c c0 83 4b 04 10 48 83 c4 08 5b 5d c3 <0f> 0b 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 55 41 54 53 48 83 [ 989.771892] RIP [] __user_dlm_queue_lockres.part.4+0x76/0x80 [ocfs2_dlmfs] [ 989.772174] RSP [ 989.772704] ---[ end trace ebd1e38cebcc93a8 ]--- [ 989.772907] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception [ 989.773173] Kernel Offset: disabled Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220518235224.87100-2-junxiao.bi@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi Cc: Mark Fasheh Cc: Joel Becker Cc: Joseph Qi Cc: Changwei Ge Cc: Gang He Cc: Jun Piao Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/ocfs2/dlmfs/userdlm.c | 16 +++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/dlmfs/userdlm.c b/fs/ocfs2/dlmfs/userdlm.c index 3df5be25bfb1..d23bc720753e 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/dlmfs/userdlm.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/dlmfs/userdlm.c @@ -435,6 +435,11 @@ again: } spin_lock(&lockres->l_lock); + if (lockres->l_flags & USER_LOCK_IN_TEARDOWN) { + spin_unlock(&lockres->l_lock); + status = -EAGAIN; + goto bail; + } /* We only compare against the currently granted level * here. If the lock is blocked waiting on a downconvert, @@ -601,7 +606,7 @@ int user_dlm_destroy_lock(struct user_lock_res *lockres) spin_lock(&lockres->l_lock); if (lockres->l_flags & USER_LOCK_IN_TEARDOWN) { spin_unlock(&lockres->l_lock); - return 0; + goto bail; } lockres->l_flags |= USER_LOCK_IN_TEARDOWN; @@ -615,12 +620,17 @@ int user_dlm_destroy_lock(struct user_lock_res *lockres) } if (lockres->l_ro_holders || lockres->l_ex_holders) { + lockres->l_flags &= ~USER_LOCK_IN_TEARDOWN; spin_unlock(&lockres->l_lock); goto bail; } status = 0; if (!(lockres->l_flags & USER_LOCK_ATTACHED)) { + /* + * lock is never requested, leave USER_LOCK_IN_TEARDOWN set + * to avoid new lock request coming in. + */ spin_unlock(&lockres->l_lock); goto bail; } @@ -631,6 +641,10 @@ int user_dlm_destroy_lock(struct user_lock_res *lockres) status = ocfs2_dlm_unlock(conn, &lockres->l_lksb, DLM_LKF_VALBLK); if (status) { + spin_lock(&lockres->l_lock); + lockres->l_flags &= ~USER_LOCK_IN_TEARDOWN; + lockres->l_flags &= ~USER_LOCK_BUSY; + spin_unlock(&lockres->l_lock); user_log_dlm_error("ocfs2_dlm_unlock", status, lockres); goto bail; } From 494685db0023a1877d2dc139a788349e12da79a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xiaomeng Tong Date: Thu, 14 Apr 2022 12:02:31 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0237/1091] scsi: dc395x: Fix a missing check on list iterator commit 036a45aa587a10fa2abbd50fbd0f6c4cfc44f69f upstream. The bug is here: p->target_id, p->target_lun); The list iterator 'p' will point to a bogus position containing HEAD if the list is empty or no element is found. This case must be checked before any use of the iterator, otherwise it will lead to an invalid memory access. To fix this bug, add a check. Use a new variable 'iter' as the list iterator, and use the original variable 'p' as a dedicated pointer to point to the found element. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220414040231.2662-1-xiam0nd.tong@gmail.com Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Xiaomeng Tong Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/scsi/dc395x.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/dc395x.c b/drivers/scsi/dc395x.c index 5fb06930912a..c4a6609d8fae 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/dc395x.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/dc395x.c @@ -3664,10 +3664,19 @@ static struct DeviceCtlBlk *device_alloc(struct AdapterCtlBlk *acb, #endif if (dcb->target_lun != 0) { /* Copy settings */ - struct DeviceCtlBlk *p; - list_for_each_entry(p, &acb->dcb_list, list) - if (p->target_id == dcb->target_id) + struct DeviceCtlBlk *p = NULL, *iter; + + list_for_each_entry(iter, &acb->dcb_list, list) + if (iter->target_id == dcb->target_id) { + p = iter; break; + } + + if (!p) { + kfree(dcb); + return NULL; + } + dprintkdbg(DBG_1, "device_alloc: <%02i-%i> copy from <%02i-%i>\n", dcb->target_id, dcb->target_lun, From 8e105178c26ab0ba8aebfe1fb8a61423774a0dd9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Manivannan Sadhasivam Date: Wed, 4 May 2022 14:12:10 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 0238/1091] scsi: ufs: qcom: Add a readl() to make sure ref_clk gets enabled commit 8eecddfca30e1651dc1c74531ed5eef21dcce7e3 upstream. In ufs_qcom_dev_ref_clk_ctrl(), it was noted that the ref_clk needs to be stable for at least 1us. Even though there is wmb() to make sure the write gets "completed", there is no guarantee that the write actually reached the UFS device. There is a good chance that the write could be stored in a Write Buffer (WB). In that case, even though the CPU waits for 1us, the ref_clk might not be stable for that period. So lets do a readl() to make sure that the previous write has reached the UFS device before udelay(). Also, the wmb() after writel_relaxed() is not really needed. Both writel() and readl() are ordered on all architectures and the CPU won't speculate instructions after readl() due to the in-built control dependency with read value on weakly ordered architectures. So it can be safely removed. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220504084212.11605-4-manivannan.sadhasivam@linaro.org Fixes: f06fcc7155dc ("scsi: ufs-qcom: add QUniPro hardware support and power optimizations") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Bjorn Andersson Signed-off-by: Manivannan Sadhasivam Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/scsi/ufs/ufs-qcom.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufs-qcom.c b/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufs-qcom.c index 4f066e3b19af..7c9664c0c4c4 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufs-qcom.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufs-qcom.c @@ -781,8 +781,11 @@ static void ufs_qcom_dev_ref_clk_ctrl(struct ufs_qcom_host *host, bool enable) writel_relaxed(temp, host->dev_ref_clk_ctrl_mmio); - /* ensure that ref_clk is enabled/disabled before we return */ - wmb(); + /* + * Make sure the write to ref_clk reaches the destination and + * not stored in a Write Buffer (WB). + */ + readl(host->dev_ref_clk_ctrl_mmio); /* * If we call hibern8 exit after this, we need to make sure that From c12984cdb077b9042d2dc20ca18cb16a87bcc774 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dave Airlie Date: Mon, 23 May 2022 10:24:18 +1000 Subject: [PATCH 0239/1091] drm/amdgpu/cs: make commands with 0 chunks illegal behaviour. commit 31ab27b14daaa75541a415c6794d6f3567fea44a upstream. Submitting a cs with 0 chunks, causes an oops later, found trying to execute the wrong userspace driver. MESA_LOADER_DRIVER_OVERRIDE=v3d glxinfo [172536.665184] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000001d8 [172536.665188] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [172536.665189] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [172536.665191] PGD 6712a0067 P4D 6712a0067 PUD 5af9ff067 PMD 0 [172536.665195] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [172536.665197] CPU: 7 PID: 2769838 Comm: glxinfo Tainted: P O 5.10.81 #1-NixOS [172536.665199] Hardware name: To be filled by O.E.M. To be filled by O.E.M./CROSSHAIR V FORMULA-Z, BIOS 2201 03/23/2015 [172536.665272] RIP: 0010:amdgpu_cs_ioctl+0x96/0x1ce0 [amdgpu] [172536.665274] Code: 75 18 00 00 4c 8b b2 88 00 00 00 8b 46 08 48 89 54 24 68 49 89 f7 4c 89 5c 24 60 31 d2 4c 89 74 24 30 85 c0 0f 85 c0 01 00 00 <48> 83 ba d8 01 00 00 00 48 8b b4 24 90 00 00 00 74 16 48 8b 46 10 [172536.665276] RSP: 0018:ffffb47c0e81bbe0 EFLAGS: 00010246 [172536.665277] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [172536.665278] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffb47c0e81be28 RDI: ffffb47c0e81bd68 [172536.665279] RBP: ffff936524080010 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffb47c0e81be38 [172536.665281] R10: ffff936524080010 R11: ffff936524080000 R12: ffffb47c0e81bc40 [172536.665282] R13: ffffb47c0e81be28 R14: ffff9367bc410000 R15: ffffb47c0e81be28 [172536.665283] FS: 00007fe35e05d740(0000) GS:ffff936c1edc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [172536.665284] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [172536.665286] CR2: 00000000000001d8 CR3: 0000000532e46000 CR4: 00000000000406e0 [172536.665287] Call Trace: [172536.665322] ? amdgpu_cs_find_mapping+0x110/0x110 [amdgpu] [172536.665332] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xaa/0xf0 [drm] [172536.665338] drm_ioctl+0x201/0x3b0 [drm] [172536.665369] ? amdgpu_cs_find_mapping+0x110/0x110 [amdgpu] [172536.665372] ? selinux_file_ioctl+0x135/0x230 [172536.665399] amdgpu_drm_ioctl+0x49/0x80 [amdgpu] [172536.665403] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0 [172536.665406] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 [172536.665409] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Bug: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/amd/-/issues/2018 Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_cs.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_cs.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_cs.c index fddeea2b17e5..7eeb98fe50ed 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_cs.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_cs.c @@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ static int amdgpu_cs_parser_init(struct amdgpu_cs_parser *p, union drm_amdgpu_cs int ret; if (cs->in.num_chunks == 0) - return 0; + return -EINVAL; chunk_array = kmalloc_array(cs->in.num_chunks, sizeof(uint64_t), GFP_KERNEL); if (!chunk_array) From 19323b3671a85788569d15685c8f83a05ec48cbb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lucas Stach Date: Wed, 23 Mar 2022 17:08:22 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0240/1091] drm/etnaviv: check for reaped mapping in etnaviv_iommu_unmap_gem MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit e168c25526cd0368af098095c2ded4a008007e1b upstream. When the mapping is already reaped the unmap must be a no-op, as we would otherwise try to remove the mapping twice, corrupting the involved data structures. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4 Signed-off-by: Lucas Stach Reviewed-by: Philipp Zabel Tested-by: Guido Günther Acked-by: Guido Günther Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/gpu/drm/etnaviv/etnaviv_mmu.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/etnaviv/etnaviv_mmu.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/etnaviv/etnaviv_mmu.c index 707f5c1a5874..790cbb20aaeb 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/etnaviv/etnaviv_mmu.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/etnaviv/etnaviv_mmu.c @@ -289,6 +289,12 @@ void etnaviv_iommu_unmap_gem(struct etnaviv_iommu_context *context, mutex_lock(&context->lock); + /* Bail if the mapping has been reaped by another thread */ + if (!mapping->context) { + mutex_unlock(&context->lock); + return; + } + /* If the vram node is on the mm, unmap and remove the node */ if (mapping->vram_node.mm == &context->mm) etnaviv_iommu_remove_mapping(context, mapping); From 8fa6eb03e3f544e8d4fbccfbb9c71330ee64661a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xiaomeng Tong Date: Sun, 27 Mar 2022 15:58:24 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0241/1091] drm/nouveau/clk: Fix an incorrect NULL check on list iterator commit 1c3b2a27def609473ed13b1cd668cb10deab49b4 upstream. The bug is here: if (nvkm_cstate_valid(clk, cstate, max_volt, clk->temp)) return cstate; The list iterator value 'cstate' will *always* be set and non-NULL by list_for_each_entry_from_reverse(), so it is incorrect to assume that the iterator value will be unchanged if the list is empty or no element is found (In fact, it will be a bogus pointer to an invalid structure object containing the HEAD). Also it missed a NULL check at callsite and may lead to invalid memory access after that. To fix this bug, just return 'encoder' when found, otherwise return NULL. And add the NULL check. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 1f7f3d91ad38a ("drm/nouveau/clk: Respect voltage limits in nvkm_cstate_prog") Signed-off-by: Xiaomeng Tong Reviewed-by: Lyude Paul Signed-off-by: Lyude Paul Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20220327075824.11806-1-xiam0nd.tong@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/clk/base.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/clk/base.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/clk/base.c index 40e564524b7a..93a49cbfb81d 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/clk/base.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/clk/base.c @@ -135,10 +135,10 @@ nvkm_cstate_find_best(struct nvkm_clk *clk, struct nvkm_pstate *pstate, list_for_each_entry_from_reverse(cstate, &pstate->list, head) { if (nvkm_cstate_valid(clk, cstate, max_volt, clk->temp)) - break; + return cstate; } - return cstate; + return NULL; } static struct nvkm_cstate * @@ -169,6 +169,8 @@ nvkm_cstate_prog(struct nvkm_clk *clk, struct nvkm_pstate *pstate, int cstatei) if (!list_empty(&pstate->list)) { cstate = nvkm_cstate_get(clk, pstate, cstatei); cstate = nvkm_cstate_find_best(clk, pstate, cstate); + if (!cstate) + return -EINVAL; } else { cstate = &pstate->base; } From 3623f833e19bb3d819f0b74301ba0681053e31f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Brian Norris Date: Tue, 1 Mar 2022 18:11:38 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 0242/1091] drm/bridge: analogix_dp: Grab runtime PM reference for DP-AUX commit 8fb6c44fe8468f92ac7b8bbfcca4404a4e88645f upstream. If the display is not enable()d, then we aren't holding a runtime PM reference here. Thus, it's easy to accidentally cause a hang, if user space is poking around at /dev/drm_dp_aux0 at the "wrong" time. Let's get a runtime PM reference, and check that we "see" the panel. Don't force any panel power-up, etc., because that can be intrusive, and that's not what other drivers do (see drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/ti-sn65dsi86.c and drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/parade-ps8640.c.) Fixes: 0d97ad03f422 ("drm/bridge: analogix_dp: Remove duplicated code") Cc: Cc: Tomeu Vizoso Signed-off-by: Brian Norris Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20220301181107.v4.1.I773a08785666ebb236917b0c8e6c05e3de471e75@changeid Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/analogix/analogix_dp_core.c | 13 ++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/analogix/analogix_dp_core.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/analogix/analogix_dp_core.c index 3db0a631a6be..c6a51d1c7ec9 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/analogix/analogix_dp_core.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/analogix/analogix_dp_core.c @@ -1630,8 +1630,19 @@ static ssize_t analogix_dpaux_transfer(struct drm_dp_aux *aux, struct drm_dp_aux_msg *msg) { struct analogix_dp_device *dp = to_dp(aux); + int ret; - return analogix_dp_transfer(dp, msg); + pm_runtime_get_sync(dp->dev); + + ret = analogix_dp_detect_hpd(dp); + if (ret) + goto out; + + ret = analogix_dp_transfer(dp, msg); +out: + pm_runtime_put(dp->dev); + + return ret; } struct analogix_dp_device * From d0bdc809f788a5d0a71de5f189a3064f226e9491 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xiaomeng Tong Date: Fri, 8 Apr 2022 16:37:28 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0243/1091] md: fix an incorrect NULL check in does_sb_need_changing commit fc8738343eefc4ea8afb6122826dea48eacde514 upstream. The bug is here: if (!rdev) The list iterator value 'rdev' will *always* be set and non-NULL by rdev_for_each(), so it is incorrect to assume that the iterator value will be NULL if the list is empty or no element found. Otherwise it will bypass the NULL check and lead to invalid memory access passing the check. To fix the bug, use a new variable 'iter' as the list iterator, while using the original variable 'rdev' as a dedicated pointer to point to the found element. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 2aa82191ac36 ("md-cluster: Perform a lazy update") Acked-by: Guoqing Jiang Signed-off-by: Xiaomeng Tong Acked-by: Goldwyn Rodrigues Signed-off-by: Song Liu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/md/md.c | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/md/md.c b/drivers/md/md.c index c178b2f406de..2bd491decd31 100644 --- a/drivers/md/md.c +++ b/drivers/md/md.c @@ -2532,14 +2532,16 @@ static void sync_sbs(struct mddev *mddev, int nospares) static bool does_sb_need_changing(struct mddev *mddev) { - struct md_rdev *rdev; + struct md_rdev *rdev = NULL, *iter; struct mdp_superblock_1 *sb; int role; /* Find a good rdev */ - rdev_for_each(rdev, mddev) - if ((rdev->raid_disk >= 0) && !test_bit(Faulty, &rdev->flags)) + rdev_for_each(iter, mddev) + if ((iter->raid_disk >= 0) && !test_bit(Faulty, &iter->flags)) { + rdev = iter; break; + } /* No good device found. */ if (!rdev) From 16e993ac7c81696b894caae0c5c29b356faa8d56 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xiaomeng Tong Date: Fri, 8 Apr 2022 16:47:15 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0244/1091] md: fix an incorrect NULL check in md_reload_sb commit 64c54d9244a4efe9bc6e9c98e13c4bbb8bb39083 upstream. The bug is here: if (!rdev || rdev->desc_nr != nr) { The list iterator value 'rdev' will *always* be set and non-NULL by rdev_for_each_rcu(), so it is incorrect to assume that the iterator value will be NULL if the list is empty or no element found (In fact, it will be a bogus pointer to an invalid struct object containing the HEAD). Otherwise it will bypass the check and lead to invalid memory access passing the check. To fix the bug, use a new variable 'iter' as the list iterator, while using the original variable 'pdev' as a dedicated pointer to point to the found element. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 70bcecdb1534 ("md-cluster: Improve md_reload_sb to be less error prone") Signed-off-by: Xiaomeng Tong Signed-off-by: Song Liu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/md/md.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/md/md.c b/drivers/md/md.c index 2bd491decd31..4d1ef470f2fa 100644 --- a/drivers/md/md.c +++ b/drivers/md/md.c @@ -9531,16 +9531,18 @@ static int read_rdev(struct mddev *mddev, struct md_rdev *rdev) void md_reload_sb(struct mddev *mddev, int nr) { - struct md_rdev *rdev; + struct md_rdev *rdev = NULL, *iter; int err; /* Find the rdev */ - rdev_for_each_rcu(rdev, mddev) { - if (rdev->desc_nr == nr) + rdev_for_each_rcu(iter, mddev) { + if (iter->desc_nr == nr) { + rdev = iter; break; + } } - if (!rdev || rdev->desc_nr != nr) { + if (!rdev) { pr_warn("%s: %d Could not find rdev with nr %d\n", __func__, __LINE__, nr); return; } From f2c2ad538e497cd486cf036f9af92babf5c4240d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tokunori Ikegami Date: Thu, 24 Mar 2022 02:04:55 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 0245/1091] mtd: cfi_cmdset_0002: Move and rename chip_check/chip_ready/chip_good_for_write commit 083084df578a8bdb18334f69e7b32d690aaa3247 upstream. This is a preparation patch for the S29GL064N buffer writes fix. There is no functional change. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/b687c259-6413-26c9-d4c9-b3afa69ea124@pengutronix.de/ Fixes: dfeae1073583("mtd: cfi_cmdset_0002: Change write buffer to check correct value") Signed-off-by: Tokunori Ikegami Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Vignesh Raghavendra Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mtd/20220323170458.5608-2-ikegami.t@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0002.c | 101 ++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 66 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0002.c b/drivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0002.c index 9c98ddef0097..fa5324693200 100644 --- a/drivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0002.c +++ b/drivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0002.c @@ -797,47 +797,11 @@ static struct mtd_info *cfi_amdstd_setup(struct mtd_info *mtd) return NULL; } -/* - * Return true if the chip is ready. - * - * Ready is one of: read mode, query mode, erase-suspend-read mode (in any - * non-suspended sector) and is indicated by no toggle bits toggling. - * - * Note that anything more complicated than checking if no bits are toggling - * (including checking DQ5 for an error status) is tricky to get working - * correctly and is therefore not done (particularly with interleaved chips - * as each chip must be checked independently of the others). - */ -static int __xipram chip_ready(struct map_info *map, struct flchip *chip, - unsigned long addr) -{ - struct cfi_private *cfi = map->fldrv_priv; - map_word d, t; - - if (cfi_use_status_reg(cfi)) { - map_word ready = CMD(CFI_SR_DRB); - /* - * For chips that support status register, check device - * ready bit - */ - cfi_send_gen_cmd(0x70, cfi->addr_unlock1, chip->start, map, cfi, - cfi->device_type, NULL); - d = map_read(map, addr); - - return map_word_andequal(map, d, ready, ready); - } - - d = map_read(map, addr); - t = map_read(map, addr); - - return map_word_equal(map, d, t); -} - /* * Return true if the chip is ready and has the correct value. * * Ready is one of: read mode, query mode, erase-suspend-read mode (in any - * non-suspended sector) and it is indicated by no bits toggling. + * non-suspended sector) and is indicated by no toggle bits toggling. * * Error are indicated by toggling bits or bits held with the wrong value, * or with bits toggling. @@ -846,33 +810,36 @@ static int __xipram chip_ready(struct map_info *map, struct flchip *chip, * (including checking DQ5 for an error status) is tricky to get working * correctly and is therefore not done (particularly with interleaved chips * as each chip must be checked independently of the others). - * */ -static int __xipram chip_good(struct map_info *map, struct flchip *chip, - unsigned long addr, map_word expected) +static int __xipram chip_ready(struct map_info *map, struct flchip *chip, + unsigned long addr, map_word *expected) { struct cfi_private *cfi = map->fldrv_priv; - map_word oldd, curd; + map_word d, t; + int ret; if (cfi_use_status_reg(cfi)) { map_word ready = CMD(CFI_SR_DRB); - /* * For chips that support status register, check device * ready bit */ cfi_send_gen_cmd(0x70, cfi->addr_unlock1, chip->start, map, cfi, cfi->device_type, NULL); - curd = map_read(map, addr); + t = map_read(map, addr); - return map_word_andequal(map, curd, ready, ready); + return map_word_andequal(map, t, ready, ready); } - oldd = map_read(map, addr); - curd = map_read(map, addr); + d = map_read(map, addr); + t = map_read(map, addr); - return map_word_equal(map, oldd, curd) && - map_word_equal(map, curd, expected); + ret = map_word_equal(map, d, t); + + if (!ret || !expected) + return ret; + + return map_word_equal(map, t, *expected); } static int get_chip(struct map_info *map, struct flchip *chip, unsigned long adr, int mode) @@ -889,7 +856,7 @@ static int get_chip(struct map_info *map, struct flchip *chip, unsigned long adr case FL_STATUS: for (;;) { - if (chip_ready(map, chip, adr)) + if (chip_ready(map, chip, adr, NULL)) break; if (time_after(jiffies, timeo)) { @@ -927,7 +894,7 @@ static int get_chip(struct map_info *map, struct flchip *chip, unsigned long adr chip->state = FL_ERASE_SUSPENDING; chip->erase_suspended = 1; for (;;) { - if (chip_ready(map, chip, adr)) + if (chip_ready(map, chip, adr, NULL)) break; if (time_after(jiffies, timeo)) { @@ -1459,7 +1426,7 @@ static int do_otp_lock(struct map_info *map, struct flchip *chip, loff_t adr, /* wait for chip to become ready */ timeo = jiffies + msecs_to_jiffies(2); for (;;) { - if (chip_ready(map, chip, adr)) + if (chip_ready(map, chip, adr, NULL)) break; if (time_after(jiffies, timeo)) { @@ -1691,11 +1658,11 @@ static int __xipram do_write_oneword_once(struct map_info *map, } /* - * We check "time_after" and "!chip_good" before checking - * "chip_good" to avoid the failure due to scheduling. + * We check "time_after" and "!chip_ready" before checking + * "chip_ready" to avoid the failure due to scheduling. */ if (time_after(jiffies, timeo) && - !chip_good(map, chip, adr, datum)) { + !chip_ready(map, chip, adr, &datum)) { xip_enable(map, chip, adr); printk(KERN_WARNING "MTD %s(): software timeout\n", __func__); xip_disable(map, chip, adr); @@ -1703,7 +1670,7 @@ static int __xipram do_write_oneword_once(struct map_info *map, break; } - if (chip_good(map, chip, adr, datum)) { + if (chip_ready(map, chip, adr, &datum)) { if (cfi_check_err_status(map, chip, adr)) ret = -EIO; break; @@ -1971,18 +1938,18 @@ static int __xipram do_write_buffer_wait(struct map_info *map, } /* - * We check "time_after" and "!chip_good" before checking - * "chip_good" to avoid the failure due to scheduling. + * We check "time_after" and "!chip_ready" before checking + * "chip_ready" to avoid the failure due to scheduling. */ if (time_after(jiffies, timeo) && - !chip_good(map, chip, adr, datum)) { + !chip_ready(map, chip, adr, &datum)) { pr_err("MTD %s(): software timeout, address:0x%.8lx.\n", __func__, adr); ret = -EIO; break; } - if (chip_good(map, chip, adr, datum)) { + if (chip_ready(map, chip, adr, &datum)) { if (cfi_check_err_status(map, chip, adr)) ret = -EIO; break; @@ -2191,7 +2158,7 @@ static int cfi_amdstd_panic_wait(struct map_info *map, struct flchip *chip, * If the driver thinks the chip is idle, and no toggle bits * are changing, then the chip is actually idle for sure. */ - if (chip->state == FL_READY && chip_ready(map, chip, adr)) + if (chip->state == FL_READY && chip_ready(map, chip, adr, NULL)) return 0; /* @@ -2208,7 +2175,7 @@ static int cfi_amdstd_panic_wait(struct map_info *map, struct flchip *chip, /* wait for the chip to become ready */ for (i = 0; i < jiffies_to_usecs(timeo); i++) { - if (chip_ready(map, chip, adr)) + if (chip_ready(map, chip, adr, NULL)) return 0; udelay(1); @@ -2272,13 +2239,13 @@ retry: map_write(map, datum, adr); for (i = 0; i < jiffies_to_usecs(uWriteTimeout); i++) { - if (chip_ready(map, chip, adr)) + if (chip_ready(map, chip, adr, NULL)) break; udelay(1); } - if (!chip_good(map, chip, adr, datum) || + if (!chip_ready(map, chip, adr, &datum) || cfi_check_err_status(map, chip, adr)) { /* reset on all failures. */ map_write(map, CMD(0xF0), chip->start); @@ -2420,6 +2387,7 @@ static int __xipram do_erase_chip(struct map_info *map, struct flchip *chip) DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait, current); int ret = 0; int retry_cnt = 0; + map_word datum = map_word_ff(map); adr = cfi->addr_unlock1; @@ -2474,7 +2442,7 @@ static int __xipram do_erase_chip(struct map_info *map, struct flchip *chip) chip->erase_suspended = 0; } - if (chip_good(map, chip, adr, map_word_ff(map))) { + if (chip_ready(map, chip, adr, &datum)) { if (cfi_check_err_status(map, chip, adr)) ret = -EIO; break; @@ -2519,6 +2487,7 @@ static int __xipram do_erase_oneblock(struct map_info *map, struct flchip *chip, DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait, current); int ret = 0; int retry_cnt = 0; + map_word datum = map_word_ff(map); adr += chip->start; @@ -2573,7 +2542,7 @@ static int __xipram do_erase_oneblock(struct map_info *map, struct flchip *chip, chip->erase_suspended = 0; } - if (chip_good(map, chip, adr, map_word_ff(map))) { + if (chip_ready(map, chip, adr, &datum)) { if (cfi_check_err_status(map, chip, adr)) ret = -EIO; break; @@ -2767,7 +2736,7 @@ static int __maybe_unused do_ppb_xxlock(struct map_info *map, */ timeo = jiffies + msecs_to_jiffies(2000); /* 2s max (un)locking */ for (;;) { - if (chip_ready(map, chip, adr)) + if (chip_ready(map, chip, adr, NULL)) break; if (time_after(jiffies, timeo)) { From adcea1c8eea8bb16ae4984280b3e1bbf55d1e8c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nicolas Dufresne Date: Wed, 6 Apr 2022 21:23:42 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0246/1091] media: coda: Fix reported H264 profile commit 7110c08ea71953a7fc342f0b76046f72442cf26c upstream. The CODA960 manual states that ASO/FMO features of baseline are not supported, so for this reason this driver should only report constrained baseline support. This fixes negotiation issue with constrained baseline content on GStreamer 1.17.1. ASO/FMO features are unsupported for the encoder and untested for the decoder because there is currently no userspace support. Neither GStreamer parsers nor FFMPEG parsers support ASO/FMO. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 42a68012e67c2 ("media: coda: add read-only h.264 decoder profile/level controls") Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dufresne Signed-off-by: Ezequiel Garcia Tested-by: Pascal Speck Signed-off-by: Fabio Estevam Reviewed-by: Philipp Zabel Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/media/platform/coda/coda-common.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/media/platform/coda/coda-common.c b/drivers/media/platform/coda/coda-common.c index fb469340634b..888217c56109 100644 --- a/drivers/media/platform/coda/coda-common.c +++ b/drivers/media/platform/coda/coda-common.c @@ -2172,8 +2172,8 @@ static void coda_encode_ctrls(struct coda_ctx *ctx) V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDEO_H264_CHROMA_QP_INDEX_OFFSET, -12, 12, 1, 0); v4l2_ctrl_new_std_menu(&ctx->ctrls, &coda_ctrl_ops, V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDEO_H264_PROFILE, - V4L2_MPEG_VIDEO_H264_PROFILE_BASELINE, 0x0, - V4L2_MPEG_VIDEO_H264_PROFILE_BASELINE); + V4L2_MPEG_VIDEO_H264_PROFILE_CONSTRAINED_BASELINE, 0x0, + V4L2_MPEG_VIDEO_H264_PROFILE_CONSTRAINED_BASELINE); if (ctx->dev->devtype->product == CODA_HX4 || ctx->dev->devtype->product == CODA_7541) { v4l2_ctrl_new_std_menu(&ctx->ctrls, &coda_ctrl_ops, @@ -2254,7 +2254,7 @@ static void coda_decode_ctrls(struct coda_ctx *ctx) ctx->h264_profile_ctrl = v4l2_ctrl_new_std_menu(&ctx->ctrls, &coda_ctrl_ops, V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDEO_H264_PROFILE, V4L2_MPEG_VIDEO_H264_PROFILE_HIGH, - ~((1 << V4L2_MPEG_VIDEO_H264_PROFILE_BASELINE) | + ~((1 << V4L2_MPEG_VIDEO_H264_PROFILE_CONSTRAINED_BASELINE) | (1 << V4L2_MPEG_VIDEO_H264_PROFILE_MAIN) | (1 << V4L2_MPEG_VIDEO_H264_PROFILE_HIGH)), V4L2_MPEG_VIDEO_H264_PROFILE_HIGH); From 532aa3f7a50cf9c882a25e0117477e396cda8bd6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nicolas Dufresne Date: Wed, 6 Apr 2022 21:23:43 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0247/1091] media: coda: Add more H264 levels for CODA960 commit eb2fd187abc878a2dfad46902becb74963473c7d upstream. Add H264 level 1.0, 4.1, 4.2 to the list of supported formats. While the hardware does not fully support these levels, it does support most of them. The constraints on frame size and pixel formats already cover the limitation. This fixes negotiation of level on GStreamer 1.17.1. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 42a68012e67c2 ("media: coda: add read-only h.264 decoder profile/level controls") Suggested-by: Philipp Zabel Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dufresne Signed-off-by: Ezequiel Garcia Signed-off-by: Fabio Estevam Reviewed-by: Philipp Zabel Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/media/platform/coda/coda-common.c | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/media/platform/coda/coda-common.c b/drivers/media/platform/coda/coda-common.c index 888217c56109..ebe5e44b6fd3 100644 --- a/drivers/media/platform/coda/coda-common.c +++ b/drivers/media/platform/coda/coda-common.c @@ -2187,12 +2187,15 @@ static void coda_encode_ctrls(struct coda_ctx *ctx) if (ctx->dev->devtype->product == CODA_960) { v4l2_ctrl_new_std_menu(&ctx->ctrls, &coda_ctrl_ops, V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDEO_H264_LEVEL, - V4L2_MPEG_VIDEO_H264_LEVEL_4_0, - ~((1 << V4L2_MPEG_VIDEO_H264_LEVEL_2_0) | + V4L2_MPEG_VIDEO_H264_LEVEL_4_2, + ~((1 << V4L2_MPEG_VIDEO_H264_LEVEL_1_0) | + (1 << V4L2_MPEG_VIDEO_H264_LEVEL_2_0) | (1 << V4L2_MPEG_VIDEO_H264_LEVEL_3_0) | (1 << V4L2_MPEG_VIDEO_H264_LEVEL_3_1) | (1 << V4L2_MPEG_VIDEO_H264_LEVEL_3_2) | - (1 << V4L2_MPEG_VIDEO_H264_LEVEL_4_0)), + (1 << V4L2_MPEG_VIDEO_H264_LEVEL_4_0) | + (1 << V4L2_MPEG_VIDEO_H264_LEVEL_4_1) | + (1 << V4L2_MPEG_VIDEO_H264_LEVEL_4_2)), V4L2_MPEG_VIDEO_H264_LEVEL_4_0); } v4l2_ctrl_new_std(&ctx->ctrls, &coda_ctrl_ops, From 64623236263fb0c320ebad62250bd3ddd141e8a8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sean Christopherson Date: Wed, 2 Feb 2022 00:49:41 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0248/1091] Kconfig: Add option for asm goto w/ tied outputs to workaround clang-13 bug commit 1aa0e8b144b6474c4914439d232d15bfe883636b upstream. Add a config option to guard (future) usage of asm_volatile_goto() that includes "tied outputs", i.e. "+" constraints that specify both an input and output parameter. clang-13 has a bug[1] that causes compilation of such inline asm to fail, and KVM wants to use a "+m" constraint to implement a uaccess form of CMPXCHG[2]. E.g. the test code fails with :1:29: error: invalid operand in inline asm: '.long (${1:l}) - .' int foo(int *x) { asm goto (".long (%l[bar]) - .\n": "+m"(*x) ::: bar); return *x; bar: return 0; } ^ :1:29: error: unknown token in expression :1:9: note: instantiated into assembly here .long () - . ^ 2 errors generated. on clang-13, but passes on gcc (with appropriate asm goto support). The bug is fixed in clang-14, but won't be backported to clang-13 as the changes are too invasive/risky. gcc also had a similar bug[3], fixed in gcc-11, where gcc failed to account for its behavior of assigning two numbers to tied outputs (one for input, one for output) when evaluating symbolic references. [1] https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1512 [2] https://lore.kernel.org/all/YfMruK8%2F1izZ2VHS@google.com [3] https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=98096 Suggested-by: Nick Desaulniers Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Message-Id: <20220202004945.2540433-2-seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- init/Kconfig | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig index e6216dc2a1d1..1cdb6a66b85c 100644 --- a/init/Kconfig +++ b/init/Kconfig @@ -33,6 +33,11 @@ config CC_CAN_LINK config CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO def_bool $(success,$(srctree)/scripts/gcc-goto.sh $(CC)) +config CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO_TIED_OUTPUT + depends on CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO_OUTPUT + # Detect buggy gcc and clang, fixed in gcc-11 clang-14. + def_bool $(success,echo 'int foo(int *x) { asm goto (".long (%l[bar]) - .\n": "+m"(*x) ::: bar); return *x; bar: return 0; }' | $CC -x c - -c -o /dev/null) + config TOOLS_SUPPORT_RELR def_bool $(success,env "CC=$(CC)" "LD=$(LD)" "NM=$(NM)" "OBJCOPY=$(OBJCOPY)" $(srctree)/scripts/tools-support-relr.sh) From 8858284dd74906fa00f04f0252c75df4893a7959 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dennis Dalessandro Date: Fri, 20 May 2022 14:37:12 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 0249/1091] RDMA/hfi1: Fix potential integer multiplication overflow errors commit f93e91a0372c922c20d5bee260b0f43b4b8a1bee upstream. When multiplying of different types, an overflow is possible even when storing the result in a larger type. This is because the conversion is done after the multiplication. So arithmetic overflow and thus in incorrect value is possible. Correct an instance of this in the inter packet delay calculation. Fix by ensuring one of the operands is u64 which will promote the other to u64 as well ensuring no overflow. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 7724105686e7 ("IB/hfi1: add driver files") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220520183712.48973.29855.stgit@awfm-01.cornelisnetworks.com Reviewed-by: Mike Marciniszyn Signed-off-by: Dennis Dalessandro Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/init.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/init.c b/drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/init.c index 85583f51124e..d698c26282ea 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/init.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/init.c @@ -543,7 +543,7 @@ void set_link_ipg(struct hfi1_pportdata *ppd) u16 shift, mult; u64 src; u32 current_egress_rate; /* Mbits /sec */ - u32 max_pkt_time; + u64 max_pkt_time; /* * max_pkt_time is the maximum packet egress time in units * of the fabric clock period 1/(805 MHz). From 36bab24bb81b44eb6d5f2666181ecb11afaf7c01 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Pali=20Roh=C3=A1r?= Date: Mon, 25 Apr 2022 13:37:05 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0250/1091] irqchip/armada-370-xp: Do not touch Performance Counter Overflow on A375, A38x, A39x MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit a3d66a76348daf559873f19afc912a2a7c2ccdaf upstream. Register ARMADA_370_XP_INT_FABRIC_MASK_OFFS is Armada 370 and XP specific and on new Armada platforms it has different meaning. It does not configure Performance Counter Overflow interrupt masking. So do not touch this register on non-A370/XP platforms (A375, A38x and A39x). Signed-off-by: Pali Rohár Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 28da06dfd9e4 ("irqchip: armada-370-xp: Enable the PMU interrupts") Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220425113706.29310-1-pali@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/irqchip/irq-armada-370-xp.c | 11 ++++++++++- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/irqchip/irq-armada-370-xp.c b/drivers/irqchip/irq-armada-370-xp.c index 5849ac5a2ad3..0fd428db3aa4 100644 --- a/drivers/irqchip/irq-armada-370-xp.c +++ b/drivers/irqchip/irq-armada-370-xp.c @@ -392,7 +392,16 @@ static void armada_xp_mpic_smp_cpu_init(void) static void armada_xp_mpic_perf_init(void) { - unsigned long cpuid = cpu_logical_map(smp_processor_id()); + unsigned long cpuid; + + /* + * This Performance Counter Overflow interrupt is specific for + * Armada 370 and XP. It is not available on Armada 375, 38x and 39x. + */ + if (!of_machine_is_compatible("marvell,armada-370-xp")) + return; + + cpuid = cpu_logical_map(smp_processor_id()); /* Enable Performance Counter Overflow interrupts */ writel(ARMADA_370_XP_INT_CAUSE_PERF(cpuid), From cf465ecfe3a863f71ab5d1196f0a55f22b8f71de Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Max Filippov Date: Tue, 26 Apr 2022 09:01:18 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0251/1091] irqchip: irq-xtensa-mx: fix initial IRQ affinity commit a255ee29252066d621df5d6b420bf534c6ba5bc0 upstream. When irq-xtensa-mx chip is used in non-SMP configuration its irq_set_affinity callback is not called leaving IRQ affinity set empty. As a result IRQ delivery does not work in that configuration. Initialize IRQ affinity of the xtensa MX interrupt distributor to CPU 0 for all external IRQ lines. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Max Filippov Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/irqchip/irq-xtensa-mx.c | 18 ++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/irqchip/irq-xtensa-mx.c b/drivers/irqchip/irq-xtensa-mx.c index 27933338f7b3..8c581c985aa7 100644 --- a/drivers/irqchip/irq-xtensa-mx.c +++ b/drivers/irqchip/irq-xtensa-mx.c @@ -151,14 +151,25 @@ static struct irq_chip xtensa_mx_irq_chip = { .irq_set_affinity = xtensa_mx_irq_set_affinity, }; +static void __init xtensa_mx_init_common(struct irq_domain *root_domain) +{ + unsigned int i; + + irq_set_default_host(root_domain); + secondary_init_irq(); + + /* Initialize default IRQ routing to CPU 0 */ + for (i = 0; i < XCHAL_NUM_EXTINTERRUPTS; ++i) + set_er(1, MIROUT(i)); +} + int __init xtensa_mx_init_legacy(struct device_node *interrupt_parent) { struct irq_domain *root_domain = irq_domain_add_legacy(NULL, NR_IRQS - 1, 1, 0, &xtensa_mx_irq_domain_ops, &xtensa_mx_irq_chip); - irq_set_default_host(root_domain); - secondary_init_irq(); + xtensa_mx_init_common(root_domain); return 0; } @@ -168,8 +179,7 @@ static int __init xtensa_mx_init(struct device_node *np, struct irq_domain *root_domain = irq_domain_add_linear(np, NR_IRQS, &xtensa_mx_irq_domain_ops, &xtensa_mx_irq_chip); - irq_set_default_host(root_domain); - secondary_init_irq(); + xtensa_mx_init_common(root_domain); return 0; } IRQCHIP_DECLARE(xtensa_mx_irq_chip, "cdns,xtensa-mx", xtensa_mx_init); From 3466e4265244bae136c8871c487a69b12494da48 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Felix Fietkau Date: Wed, 20 Apr 2022 12:49:07 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0252/1091] mac80211: upgrade passive scan to active scan on DFS channels after beacon rx commit b041b7b9de6e1d4362de855ab90f9d03ef323edd upstream. In client mode, we can't connect to hidden SSID APs or SSIDs not advertised in beacons on DFS channels, since we're forced to passive scan. Fix this by sending out a probe request immediately after the first beacon, if active scan was requested by the user. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Catrinel Catrinescu Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220420104907.36275-1-nbd@nbd.name Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h | 5 +++++ net/mac80211/scan.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h index e574fbf6745a..7747a6f46d29 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h +++ b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h @@ -1082,6 +1082,9 @@ struct tpt_led_trigger { * a scan complete for an aborted scan. * @SCAN_HW_CANCELLED: Set for our scan work function when the scan is being * cancelled. + * @SCAN_BEACON_WAIT: Set whenever we're passive scanning because of radar/no-IR + * and could send a probe request after receiving a beacon. + * @SCAN_BEACON_DONE: Beacon received, we can now send a probe request */ enum { SCAN_SW_SCANNING, @@ -1090,6 +1093,8 @@ enum { SCAN_COMPLETED, SCAN_ABORTED, SCAN_HW_CANCELLED, + SCAN_BEACON_WAIT, + SCAN_BEACON_DONE, }; /** diff --git a/net/mac80211/scan.c b/net/mac80211/scan.c index 4d31d9688dc2..344b2c22e75b 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/scan.c +++ b/net/mac80211/scan.c @@ -252,6 +252,16 @@ void ieee80211_scan_rx(struct ieee80211_local *local, struct sk_buff *skb) if (likely(!sdata1 && !sdata2)) return; + if (test_and_clear_bit(SCAN_BEACON_WAIT, &local->scanning)) { + /* + * we were passive scanning because of radar/no-IR, but + * the beacon/proberesp rx gives us an opportunity to upgrade + * to active scan + */ + set_bit(SCAN_BEACON_DONE, &local->scanning); + ieee80211_queue_delayed_work(&local->hw, &local->scan_work, 0); + } + if (ieee80211_is_probe_resp(mgmt->frame_control)) { struct cfg80211_scan_request *scan_req; struct cfg80211_sched_scan_request *sched_scan_req; @@ -753,6 +763,8 @@ static int __ieee80211_start_scan(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, IEEE80211_CHAN_RADAR)) || !req->n_ssids) { next_delay = IEEE80211_PASSIVE_CHANNEL_TIME; + if (req->n_ssids) + set_bit(SCAN_BEACON_WAIT, &local->scanning); } else { ieee80211_scan_state_send_probe(local, &next_delay); next_delay = IEEE80211_CHANNEL_TIME; @@ -945,6 +957,8 @@ static void ieee80211_scan_state_set_channel(struct ieee80211_local *local, !scan_req->n_ssids) { *next_delay = IEEE80211_PASSIVE_CHANNEL_TIME; local->next_scan_state = SCAN_DECISION; + if (scan_req->n_ssids) + set_bit(SCAN_BEACON_WAIT, &local->scanning); return; } @@ -1037,6 +1051,8 @@ void ieee80211_scan_work(struct work_struct *work) goto out; } + clear_bit(SCAN_BEACON_WAIT, &local->scanning); + /* * as long as no delay is required advance immediately * without scheduling a new work @@ -1047,6 +1063,10 @@ void ieee80211_scan_work(struct work_struct *work) goto out_complete; } + if (test_and_clear_bit(SCAN_BEACON_DONE, &local->scanning) && + local->next_scan_state == SCAN_DECISION) + local->next_scan_state = SCAN_SEND_PROBE; + switch (local->next_scan_state) { case SCAN_DECISION: /* if no more bands/channels left, complete scan */ From 6cbe83680f015e920c0ec332616f9073f19bc606 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johannes Berg Date: Fri, 20 May 2022 19:45:36 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0253/1091] um: chan_user: Fix winch_tramp() return value commit 57ae0b67b747031bc41fb44643aa5344ab58607e upstream. The previous fix here was only partially correct, it did result in returning a proper error value in case of error, but it also clobbered the pid that we need to return from this function (not just zero for success). As a result, it returned 0 here, but later this is treated as a pid and used to kill the process, but since it's now 0 we kill(0, SIGKILL), which makes UML kill itself rather than just the helper thread. Fix that and make it more obvious by using a separate variable for the pid. Fixes: ccf1236ecac4 ("um: fix error return code in winch_tramp()") Reported-and-tested-by: Nathan Chancellor Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/um/drivers/chan_user.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/um/drivers/chan_user.c b/arch/um/drivers/chan_user.c index 6040817c036f..25727ed648b7 100644 --- a/arch/um/drivers/chan_user.c +++ b/arch/um/drivers/chan_user.c @@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ static int winch_tramp(int fd, struct tty_port *port, int *fd_out, unsigned long *stack_out) { struct winch_data data; - int fds[2], n, err; + int fds[2], n, err, pid; char c; err = os_pipe(fds, 1, 1); @@ -238,8 +238,9 @@ static int winch_tramp(int fd, struct tty_port *port, int *fd_out, * problem with /dev/net/tun, which if held open by this * thread, prevents the TUN/TAP device from being reused. */ - err = run_helper_thread(winch_thread, &data, CLONE_FILES, stack_out); - if (err < 0) { + pid = run_helper_thread(winch_thread, &data, CLONE_FILES, stack_out); + if (pid < 0) { + err = pid; printk(UM_KERN_ERR "fork of winch_thread failed - errno = %d\n", -err); goto out_close; @@ -263,7 +264,7 @@ static int winch_tramp(int fd, struct tty_port *port, int *fd_out, goto out_close; } - return err; + return pid; out_close: close(fds[1]); From 9caad70819aef3431abaf73ba5163b55b161aba0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vincent Whitchurch Date: Mon, 23 May 2022 16:04:03 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0254/1091] um: Fix out-of-bounds read in LDT setup commit 2a4a62a14be1947fa945c5c11ebf67326381a568 upstream. syscall_stub_data() expects the data_count parameter to be the number of longs, not bytes. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in syscall_stub_data+0x70/0xe0 Read of size 128 at addr 000000006411f6f0 by task swapper/1 CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.18.0+ #18 Call Trace: show_stack.cold+0x166/0x2a7 __dump_stack+0x3a/0x43 dump_stack_lvl+0x1f/0x27 print_report.cold+0xdb/0xf81 kasan_report+0x119/0x1f0 kasan_check_range+0x3a3/0x440 memcpy+0x52/0x140 syscall_stub_data+0x70/0xe0 write_ldt_entry+0xac/0x190 init_new_ldt+0x515/0x960 init_new_context+0x2c4/0x4d0 mm_init.constprop.0+0x5ed/0x760 mm_alloc+0x118/0x170 0x60033f48 do_one_initcall+0x1d7/0x860 0x60003e7b kernel_init+0x6e/0x3d4 new_thread_handler+0x1e7/0x2c0 The buggy address belongs to stack of task swapper/1 and is located at offset 64 in frame: init_new_ldt+0x0/0x960 This frame has 2 objects: [32, 40) 'addr' [64, 80) 'desc' ================================================================== Fixes: 858259cf7d1c443c83 ("uml: maintain own LDT entries") Signed-off-by: Vincent Whitchurch Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/um/ldt.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/um/ldt.c b/arch/x86/um/ldt.c index 3ee234b6234d..255a44dd415a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/um/ldt.c +++ b/arch/x86/um/ldt.c @@ -23,9 +23,11 @@ static long write_ldt_entry(struct mm_id *mm_idp, int func, { long res; void *stub_addr; + + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*desc) % sizeof(long)); + res = syscall_stub_data(mm_idp, (unsigned long *)desc, - (sizeof(*desc) + sizeof(long) - 1) & - ~(sizeof(long) - 1), + sizeof(*desc) / sizeof(long), addr, &stub_addr); if (!res) { unsigned long args[] = { func, From 6e071eaf5002731ab5008688e9d657a414abcb6c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xiaomeng Tong Date: Sun, 1 May 2022 21:28:23 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0255/1091] iommu/msm: Fix an incorrect NULL check on list iterator commit 8b9ad480bd1dd25f4ff4854af5685fa334a2f57a upstream. The bug is here: if (!iommu || iommu->dev->of_node != spec->np) { The list iterator value 'iommu' will *always* be set and non-NULL by list_for_each_entry(), so it is incorrect to assume that the iterator value will be NULL if the list is empty or no element is found (in fact, it will point to a invalid structure object containing HEAD). To fix the bug, use a new value 'iter' as the list iterator, while use the old value 'iommu' as a dedicated variable to point to the found one, and remove the unneeded check for 'iommu->dev->of_node != spec->np' outside the loop. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: f78ebca8ff3d6 ("iommu/msm: Add support for generic master bindings") Signed-off-by: Xiaomeng Tong Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220501132823.12714-1-xiam0nd.tong@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iommu/msm_iommu.c | 11 +++++++---- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iommu/msm_iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/msm_iommu.c index be99d408cf35..cba0097eba39 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/msm_iommu.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/msm_iommu.c @@ -636,16 +636,19 @@ static void insert_iommu_master(struct device *dev, static int qcom_iommu_of_xlate(struct device *dev, struct of_phandle_args *spec) { - struct msm_iommu_dev *iommu; + struct msm_iommu_dev *iommu = NULL, *iter; unsigned long flags; int ret = 0; spin_lock_irqsave(&msm_iommu_lock, flags); - list_for_each_entry(iommu, &qcom_iommu_devices, dev_node) - if (iommu->dev->of_node == spec->np) + list_for_each_entry(iter, &qcom_iommu_devices, dev_node) { + if (iter->dev->of_node == spec->np) { + iommu = iter; break; + } + } - if (!iommu || iommu->dev->of_node != spec->np) { + if (!iommu) { ret = -ENODEV; goto fail; } From 73bdb2359dbc260364141c83dd1e1a5497f29d3d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christophe de Dinechin Date: Thu, 14 Apr 2022 17:08:54 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0256/1091] nodemask.h: fix compilation error with GCC12 commit 37462a920392cb86541650a6f4121155f11f1199 upstream. With gcc version 12.0.1 20220401 (Red Hat 12.0.1-0), building with defconfig results in the following compilation error: | CC mm/swapfile.o | mm/swapfile.c: In function `setup_swap_info': | mm/swapfile.c:2291:47: error: array subscript -1 is below array bounds | of `struct plist_node[]' [-Werror=array-bounds] | 2291 | p->avail_lists[i].prio = 1; | | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~ | In file included from mm/swapfile.c:16: | ./include/linux/swap.h:292:27: note: while referencing `avail_lists' | 292 | struct plist_node avail_lists[]; /* | | ^~~~~~~~~~~ This is due to the compiler detecting that the mask in node_states[__state] could theoretically be zero, which would lead to first_node() returning -1 through find_first_bit. I believe that the warning/error is legitimate. I first tried adding a test to check that the node mask is not emtpy, since a similar test exists in the case where MAX_NUMNODES == 1. However, adding the if statement causes other warnings to appear in for_each_cpu_node_but, because it introduces a dangling else ambiguity. And unfortunately, GCC is not smart enough to detect that the added test makes the case where (node) == -1 impossible, so it still complains with the same message. This is why I settled on replacing that with a harmless, but relatively useless (node) >= 0 test. Based on the warning for the dangling else, I also decided to fix the case where MAX_NUMNODES == 1 by moving the condition inside the for loop. It will still only be tested once. This ensures that the meaning of an else following for_each_node_mask or derivatives would not silently have a different meaning depending on the configuration. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220414150855.2407137-3-dinechin@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Christophe de Dinechin Signed-off-by: Christophe de Dinechin Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton Cc: Ben Segall Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" Cc: Steven Rostedt Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Mel Gorman Cc: Dietmar Eggemann Cc: Vincent Guittot Cc: Paolo Bonzini Cc: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira Cc: Jason Wang Cc: Zhen Lei Cc: Juri Lelli Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/linux/nodemask.h | 13 ++++++------- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/nodemask.h b/include/linux/nodemask.h index 27e7fa36f707..8a404dfeec42 100644 --- a/include/linux/nodemask.h +++ b/include/linux/nodemask.h @@ -375,14 +375,13 @@ static inline void __nodes_fold(nodemask_t *dstp, const nodemask_t *origp, } #if MAX_NUMNODES > 1 -#define for_each_node_mask(node, mask) \ - for ((node) = first_node(mask); \ - (node) < MAX_NUMNODES; \ - (node) = next_node((node), (mask))) +#define for_each_node_mask(node, mask) \ + for ((node) = first_node(mask); \ + (node >= 0) && (node) < MAX_NUMNODES; \ + (node) = next_node((node), (mask))) #else /* MAX_NUMNODES == 1 */ -#define for_each_node_mask(node, mask) \ - if (!nodes_empty(mask)) \ - for ((node) = 0; (node) < 1; (node)++) +#define for_each_node_mask(node, mask) \ + for ((node) = 0; (node) < 1 && !nodes_empty(mask); (node)++) #endif /* MAX_NUMNODES */ /* From 6f4a489d8458a93b5efdbb7ca439dfeef8d9d7a1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mike Kravetz Date: Tue, 24 May 2022 13:50:03 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0257/1091] hugetlb: fix huge_pmd_unshare address update commit 48381273f8734d28ef56a5bdf1966dd8530111bc upstream. The routine huge_pmd_unshare() is passed a pointer to an address associated with an area which may be unshared. If unshare is successful this address is updated to 'optimize' callers iterating over huge page addresses. For the optimization to work correctly, address should be updated to the last huge page in the unmapped/unshared area. However, in the common case where the passed address is PUD_SIZE aligned, the address is incorrectly updated to the address of the preceding huge page. That wastes CPU cycles as the unmapped/unshared range is scanned twice. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220524205003.126184-1-mike.kravetz@oracle.com Fixes: 39dde65c9940 ("shared page table for hugetlb page") Signed-off-by: Mike Kravetz Acked-by: Muchun Song Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- mm/hugetlb.c | 9 ++++++++- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/mm/hugetlb.c b/mm/hugetlb.c index 20da6ede7704..b6f029a1059f 100644 --- a/mm/hugetlb.c +++ b/mm/hugetlb.c @@ -5033,7 +5033,14 @@ int huge_pmd_unshare(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long *addr, pte_t *ptep) pud_clear(pud); put_page(virt_to_page(ptep)); mm_dec_nr_pmds(mm); - *addr = ALIGN(*addr, HPAGE_SIZE * PTRS_PER_PTE) - HPAGE_SIZE; + /* + * This update of passed address optimizes loops sequentially + * processing addresses in increments of huge page size (PMD_SIZE + * in this case). By clearing the pud, a PUD_SIZE area is unmapped. + * Update address to the 'last page' in the cleared area so that + * calling loop can move to first page past this area. + */ + *addr |= PUD_SIZE - PMD_SIZE; return 1; } #define want_pmd_share() (1) From b8ce58ab80faaea015c206382041ff3bcf5495ff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexander Wetzel Date: Fri, 22 Apr 2022 16:52:28 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0258/1091] rtl818x: Prevent using not initialized queues commit 746285cf81dc19502ab238249d75f5990bd2d231 upstream. Using not existing queues can panic the kernel with rtl8180/rtl8185 cards. Ignore the skb priority for those cards, they only have one tx queue. Pierre Asselin (pa@panix.com) reported the kernel crash in the Gentoo forum: https://forums.gentoo.org/viewtopic-t-1147832-postdays-0-postorder-asc-start-25.html He also confirmed that this patch fixes the issue. In summary this happened: After updating wpa_supplicant from 2.9 to 2.10 the kernel crashed with a "divide error: 0000" when connecting to an AP. Control port tx now tries to use IEEE80211_AC_VO for the priority, which wpa_supplicants starts to use in 2.10. Since only the rtl8187se part of the driver supports QoS, the priority of the skb is set to IEEE80211_AC_BE (2) by mac80211 for rtl8180/rtl8185 cards. rtl8180 is then unconditionally reading out the priority and finally crashes on drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtl818x/rtl8180/dev.c line 544 without this patch: idx = (ring->idx + skb_queue_len(&ring->queue)) % ring->entries "ring->entries" is zero for rtl8180/rtl8185 cards, tx_ring[2] never got initialized. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: pa@panix.com Tested-by: pa@panix.com Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220422145228.7567-1-alexander@wetzel-home.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtl818x/rtl8180/dev.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtl818x/rtl8180/dev.c b/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtl818x/rtl8180/dev.c index d5f65372356b..0b305badae98 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtl818x/rtl8180/dev.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtl818x/rtl8180/dev.c @@ -460,8 +460,10 @@ static void rtl8180_tx(struct ieee80211_hw *dev, struct rtl8180_priv *priv = dev->priv; struct rtl8180_tx_ring *ring; struct rtl8180_tx_desc *entry; + unsigned int prio = 0; unsigned long flags; - unsigned int idx, prio, hw_prio; + unsigned int idx, hw_prio; + dma_addr_t mapping; u32 tx_flags; u8 rc_flags; @@ -470,7 +472,9 @@ static void rtl8180_tx(struct ieee80211_hw *dev, /* do arithmetic and then convert to le16 */ u16 frame_duration = 0; - prio = skb_get_queue_mapping(skb); + /* rtl8180/rtl8185 only has one useable tx queue */ + if (dev->queues > IEEE80211_AC_BK) + prio = skb_get_queue_mapping(skb); ring = &priv->tx_ring[prio]; mapping = pci_map_single(priv->pdev, skb->data, From 2ea49d6310c9894c45e11c28dfc7b3d4420657f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mark Brown Date: Thu, 28 Apr 2022 17:24:44 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0259/1091] ASoC: rt5514: Fix event generation for "DSP Voice Wake Up" control commit 4213ff556740bb45e2d9ff0f50d056c4e7dd0921 upstream. The driver has a custom put function for "DSP Voice Wake Up" which does not generate event notifications on change, instead returning 0. Since we already exit early in the case that there is no change this can be fixed by unconditionally returning 1 at the end of the function. Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220428162444.3883147-1-broonie@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/soc/codecs/rt5514.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/rt5514.c b/sound/soc/codecs/rt5514.c index 7081142a355e..c444a56df95b 100644 --- a/sound/soc/codecs/rt5514.c +++ b/sound/soc/codecs/rt5514.c @@ -419,7 +419,7 @@ static int rt5514_dsp_voice_wake_up_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, } } - return 0; + return 1; } static const struct snd_kcontrol_new rt5514_snd_controls[] = { From f6cb1470ba22982a1bc656d87aad1bd5d3ad9053 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xiaomeng Tong Date: Mon, 28 Mar 2022 20:28:20 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0260/1091] carl9170: tx: fix an incorrect use of list iterator commit 54a6f29522da3c914da30e50721dedf51046449a upstream. If the previous list_for_each_entry_continue_rcu() don't exit early (no goto hit inside the loop), the iterator 'cvif' after the loop will be a bogus pointer to an invalid structure object containing the HEAD (&ar->vif_list). As a result, the use of 'cvif' after that will lead to a invalid memory access (i.e., 'cvif->id': the invalid pointer dereference when return back to/after the callsite in the carl9170_update_beacon()). The original intention should have been to return the valid 'cvif' when found in list, NULL otherwise. So just return NULL when no entry found, to fix this bug. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 1f1d9654e183c ("carl9170: refactor carl9170_update_beacon") Signed-off-by: Xiaomeng Tong Acked-by: Christian Lamparter Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220328122820.1004-1-xiam0nd.tong@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/tx.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/tx.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/tx.c index 2407931440ed..dfab6be1080c 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/tx.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/tx.c @@ -1557,6 +1557,9 @@ static struct carl9170_vif_info *carl9170_pick_beaconing_vif(struct ar9170 *ar) goto out; } } while (ar->beacon_enabled && i--); + + /* no entry found in list */ + return NULL; } out: From 77ec584d3de04592176c2a0139cf103d92d263ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jiri Slaby Date: Tue, 3 May 2022 10:08:03 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0261/1091] serial: pch: don't overwrite xmit->buf[0] by x_char commit d9f3af4fbb1d955bbaf872d9e76502f6e3e803cb upstream. When x_char is to be sent, the TX path overwrites whatever is in the circular buffer at offset 0 with x_char and sends it using pch_uart_hal_write(). I don't understand how this was supposed to work if xmit->buf[0] already contained some character. It must have been lost. Remove this whole pop_tx_x() concept and do the work directly in the callers. (Without printing anything using dev_dbg().) Cc: Fixes: 3c6a483275f4 (Serial: EG20T: add PCH_UART driver) Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220503080808.28332-1-jslaby@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/tty/serial/pch_uart.c | 27 +++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/pch_uart.c b/drivers/tty/serial/pch_uart.c index c16234bca78f..77f18445bb98 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/serial/pch_uart.c +++ b/drivers/tty/serial/pch_uart.c @@ -635,22 +635,6 @@ static int push_rx(struct eg20t_port *priv, const unsigned char *buf, return 0; } -static int pop_tx_x(struct eg20t_port *priv, unsigned char *buf) -{ - int ret = 0; - struct uart_port *port = &priv->port; - - if (port->x_char) { - dev_dbg(priv->port.dev, "%s:X character send %02x (%lu)\n", - __func__, port->x_char, jiffies); - buf[0] = port->x_char; - port->x_char = 0; - ret = 1; - } - - return ret; -} - static int dma_push_rx(struct eg20t_port *priv, int size) { int room; @@ -900,9 +884,10 @@ static unsigned int handle_tx(struct eg20t_port *priv) fifo_size = max(priv->fifo_size, 1); tx_empty = 1; - if (pop_tx_x(priv, xmit->buf)) { - pch_uart_hal_write(priv, xmit->buf, 1); + if (port->x_char) { + pch_uart_hal_write(priv, &port->x_char, 1); port->icount.tx++; + port->x_char = 0; tx_empty = 0; fifo_size--; } @@ -957,9 +942,11 @@ static unsigned int dma_handle_tx(struct eg20t_port *priv) } fifo_size = max(priv->fifo_size, 1); - if (pop_tx_x(priv, xmit->buf)) { - pch_uart_hal_write(priv, xmit->buf, 1); + + if (port->x_char) { + pch_uart_hal_write(priv, &port->x_char, 1); port->icount.tx++; + port->x_char = 0; fifo_size--; } From a62591e36100fab47dac22c38a10663c4ae0453d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xiaomeng Tong Date: Sun, 27 Mar 2022 14:15:16 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0262/1091] tilcdc: tilcdc_external: fix an incorrect NULL check on list iterator commit 8b917cbe38e9b0d002492477a9fc2bfee2412ce4 upstream. The bug is here: if (!encoder) { The list iterator value 'encoder' will *always* be set and non-NULL by list_for_each_entry(), so it is incorrect to assume that the iterator value will be NULL if the list is empty or no element is found. To fix the bug, use a new variable 'iter' as the list iterator, while use the original variable 'encoder' as a dedicated pointer to point to the found element. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: ec9eab097a500 ("drm/tilcdc: Add drm bridge support for attaching drm bridge drivers") Signed-off-by: Xiaomeng Tong Reviewed-by: Jyri Sarha Tested-by: Jyri Sarha Signed-off-by: Jyri Sarha Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20220327061516.5076-1-xiam0nd.tong@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/gpu/drm/tilcdc/tilcdc_external.c | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/tilcdc/tilcdc_external.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/tilcdc/tilcdc_external.c index 43d756b7810e..67e23317c7de 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/tilcdc/tilcdc_external.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/tilcdc/tilcdc_external.c @@ -58,11 +58,13 @@ struct drm_connector *tilcdc_encoder_find_connector(struct drm_device *ddev, int tilcdc_add_component_encoder(struct drm_device *ddev) { struct tilcdc_drm_private *priv = ddev->dev_private; - struct drm_encoder *encoder; + struct drm_encoder *encoder = NULL, *iter; - list_for_each_entry(encoder, &ddev->mode_config.encoder_list, head) - if (encoder->possible_crtcs & (1 << priv->crtc->index)) + list_for_each_entry(iter, &ddev->mode_config.encoder_list, head) + if (iter->possible_crtcs & (1 << priv->crtc->index)) { + encoder = iter; break; + } if (!encoder) { dev_err(ddev->dev, "%s: No suitable encoder found\n", __func__); From 8dd2e5f9c1f13509091b9d1594307a62500b41fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xiaomeng Tong Date: Sun, 27 Mar 2022 13:20:28 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0263/1091] gma500: fix an incorrect NULL check on list iterator commit bdef417d84536715145f6dc9cc3275c46f26295a upstream. The bug is here: return crtc; The list iterator value 'crtc' will *always* be set and non-NULL by list_for_each_entry(), so it is incorrect to assume that the iterator value will be NULL if the list is empty or no element is found. To fix the bug, return 'crtc' when found, otherwise return NULL. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org fixes: 89c78134cc54d ("gma500: Add Poulsbo support") Signed-off-by: Xiaomeng Tong Signed-off-by: Patrik Jakobsson Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20220327052028.2013-1-xiam0nd.tong@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/gpu/drm/gma500/psb_intel_display.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/gma500/psb_intel_display.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/gma500/psb_intel_display.c index 4256410535f0..65e67e12a0a1 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/gma500/psb_intel_display.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/gma500/psb_intel_display.c @@ -532,14 +532,15 @@ void psb_intel_crtc_init(struct drm_device *dev, int pipe, struct drm_crtc *psb_intel_get_crtc_from_pipe(struct drm_device *dev, int pipe) { - struct drm_crtc *crtc = NULL; + struct drm_crtc *crtc; list_for_each_entry(crtc, &dev->mode_config.crtc_list, head) { struct gma_crtc *gma_crtc = to_gma_crtc(crtc); + if (gma_crtc->pipe == pipe) - break; + return crtc; } - return crtc; + return NULL; } int gma_connector_clones(struct drm_device *dev, int type_mask) From 2040b6076544d450468750da43ccacfe7b553103 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kathiravan T Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2022 17:44:15 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 0264/1091] arm64: dts: qcom: ipq8074: fix the sleep clock frequency commit f607dd767f5d6800ffbdce5b99ba81763b023781 upstream. Sleep clock frequency should be 32768Hz. Lets fix it. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 41dac73e243d ("arm64: dts: Add ipq8074 SoC and HK01 board support") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/e2a447f8-6024-0369-f698-2027b6edcf9e@codeaurora.org/ Signed-off-by: Kathiravan T Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1644581655-11568-1-git-send-email-quic_kathirav@quicinc.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/ipq8074.dtsi | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/ipq8074.dtsi b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/ipq8074.dtsi index 67ee5f560104..7822592664ff 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/ipq8074.dtsi +++ b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/ipq8074.dtsi @@ -482,7 +482,7 @@ clocks { sleep_clk: sleep_clk { compatible = "fixed-clock"; - clock-frequency = <32000>; + clock-frequency = <32768>; #clock-cells = <0>; }; From 1668ad103679306ba2ef37f758d704e58a3ef1a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johan Hovold Date: Wed, 27 Apr 2022 08:32:41 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0265/1091] phy: qcom-qmp: fix struct clk leak on probe errors commit f0a4bc38a12f5a0cc5ad68670d9480e91e6a94df upstream. Make sure to release the pipe clock reference in case of a late probe error (e.g. probe deferral). Fixes: e78f3d15e115 ("phy: qcom-qmp: new qmp phy driver for qcom-chipsets") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.12 Cc: Vivek Gautam Reviewed-by: Bjorn Andersson Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220427063243.32576-2-johan+linaro@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/phy/qualcomm/phy-qcom-qmp.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/phy/qualcomm/phy-qcom-qmp.c b/drivers/phy/qualcomm/phy-qcom-qmp.c index 5ddbf9a1f328..508305a27887 100644 --- a/drivers/phy/qualcomm/phy-qcom-qmp.c +++ b/drivers/phy/qualcomm/phy-qcom-qmp.c @@ -1929,7 +1929,7 @@ int qcom_qmp_phy_create(struct device *dev, struct device_node *np, int id) * all phys that don't need this. */ snprintf(prop_name, sizeof(prop_name), "pipe%d", id); - qphy->pipe_clk = of_clk_get_by_name(np, prop_name); + qphy->pipe_clk = devm_get_clk_from_child(dev, np, prop_name); if (IS_ERR(qphy->pipe_clk)) { if (qmp->cfg->type == PHY_TYPE_PCIE || qmp->cfg->type == PHY_TYPE_USB3) { From da9634374d41bd17bc15670124523966f9bbc763 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Arnd Bergmann Date: Wed, 11 Sep 2019 22:31:51 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0266/1091] ARM: pxa: maybe fix gpio lookup tables commit 2672a4bff6c03a20d5ae460a091f67ee782c3eff upstream. From inspection I found a couple of GPIO lookups that are listed with device "gpio-pxa", but actually have a number from a different gpio controller. Try to rectify that here, with a guess of what the actual device name is. Acked-by: Robert Jarzmik Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm/mach-pxa/cm-x300.c | 8 ++++---- arch/arm/mach-pxa/magician.c | 2 +- arch/arm/mach-pxa/tosa.c | 4 ++-- 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-pxa/cm-x300.c b/arch/arm/mach-pxa/cm-x300.c index 425855f456f2..719e6395797c 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mach-pxa/cm-x300.c +++ b/arch/arm/mach-pxa/cm-x300.c @@ -355,13 +355,13 @@ static struct platform_device cm_x300_spi_gpio = { static struct gpiod_lookup_table cm_x300_spi_gpiod_table = { .dev_id = "spi_gpio", .table = { - GPIO_LOOKUP("gpio-pxa", GPIO_LCD_SCL, + GPIO_LOOKUP("pca9555.1", GPIO_LCD_SCL - GPIO_LCD_BASE, "sck", GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH), - GPIO_LOOKUP("gpio-pxa", GPIO_LCD_DIN, + GPIO_LOOKUP("pca9555.1", GPIO_LCD_DIN - GPIO_LCD_BASE, "mosi", GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH), - GPIO_LOOKUP("gpio-pxa", GPIO_LCD_DOUT, + GPIO_LOOKUP("pca9555.1", GPIO_LCD_DOUT - GPIO_LCD_BASE, "miso", GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH), - GPIO_LOOKUP("gpio-pxa", GPIO_LCD_CS, + GPIO_LOOKUP("pca9555.1", GPIO_LCD_CS - GPIO_LCD_BASE, "cs", GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH), { }, }, diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-pxa/magician.c b/arch/arm/mach-pxa/magician.c index e1a394ac3eea..8f2d4faa2612 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mach-pxa/magician.c +++ b/arch/arm/mach-pxa/magician.c @@ -675,7 +675,7 @@ static struct platform_device bq24022 = { static struct gpiod_lookup_table bq24022_gpiod_table = { .dev_id = "gpio-regulator", .table = { - GPIO_LOOKUP("gpio-pxa", EGPIO_MAGICIAN_BQ24022_ISET2, + GPIO_LOOKUP("htc-egpio-0", EGPIO_MAGICIAN_BQ24022_ISET2 - MAGICIAN_EGPIO_BASE, NULL, GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH), GPIO_LOOKUP("gpio-pxa", GPIO30_MAGICIAN_BQ24022_nCHARGE_EN, "enable", GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW), diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-pxa/tosa.c b/arch/arm/mach-pxa/tosa.c index f537ff1c3ba7..3fbcaa3b4e18 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mach-pxa/tosa.c +++ b/arch/arm/mach-pxa/tosa.c @@ -295,9 +295,9 @@ static struct gpiod_lookup_table tosa_mci_gpio_table = { .table = { GPIO_LOOKUP("gpio-pxa", TOSA_GPIO_nSD_DETECT, "cd", GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW), - GPIO_LOOKUP("gpio-pxa", TOSA_GPIO_SD_WP, + GPIO_LOOKUP("sharp-scoop.0", TOSA_GPIO_SD_WP - TOSA_SCOOP_GPIO_BASE, "wp", GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW), - GPIO_LOOKUP("gpio-pxa", TOSA_GPIO_PWR_ON, + GPIO_LOOKUP("sharp-scoop.0", TOSA_GPIO_PWR_ON - TOSA_SCOOP_GPIO_BASE, "power", GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH), { }, }, From 3b8c37780d119f4f5028f8f3a025c671f88d3d4a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Akira Yokosawa Date: Wed, 1 Jun 2022 23:34:06 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 0267/1091] docs/conf.py: Cope with removal of language=None in Sphinx 5.0.0 commit 627f01eab93d8671d4e4afee9b148f9998d20e7c upstream. One of the changes in Sphinx 5.0.0 [1] says [sic]: 5.0.0 final - #10474: language does not accept None as it value. The default value of language becomes to 'en' now. [1]: https://www.sphinx-doc.org/en/master/changes.html#release-5-0-0-released-may-30-2022 It results in a new warning from Sphinx 5.0.0 [sic]: WARNING: Invalid configuration value found: 'language = None'. Update your configuration to a valid langauge code. Falling back to 'en' (English). Silence the warning by using 'en'. It works with all the Sphinx versions required for building kernel documentation (1.7.9 or later). Signed-off-by: Akira Yokosawa Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/bd0c2ddc-2401-03cb-4526-79ca664e1cbe@gmail.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Documentation/conf.py | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Documentation/conf.py b/Documentation/conf.py index a8fe845832bc..38c1f7618b5e 100644 --- a/Documentation/conf.py +++ b/Documentation/conf.py @@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ finally: # # This is also used if you do content translation via gettext catalogs. # Usually you set "language" from the command line for these cases. -language = None +language = 'en' # There are two options for replacing |today|: either, you set today to some # non-false value, then it is used: From 8a068913d19deed38d9ce1a872efd8fd5bf13328 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dinh Nguyen Date: Wed, 11 May 2022 12:54:46 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 0268/1091] dt-bindings: gpio: altera: correct interrupt-cells commit 3a21c3ac93aff7b4522b152399df8f6a041df56d upstream. update documentation to correctly state the interrupt-cells to be 2. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 4fd9bbc6e071 ("drivers/gpio: Altera soft IP GPIO driver devicetree binding") Signed-off-by: Dinh Nguyen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Documentation/devicetree/bindings/gpio/gpio-altera.txt | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/gpio/gpio-altera.txt b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/gpio/gpio-altera.txt index 146e554b3c67..2a80e272cd66 100644 --- a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/gpio/gpio-altera.txt +++ b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/gpio/gpio-altera.txt @@ -9,8 +9,9 @@ Required properties: - The second cell is reserved and is currently unused. - gpio-controller : Marks the device node as a GPIO controller. - interrupt-controller: Mark the device node as an interrupt controller -- #interrupt-cells : Should be 1. The interrupt type is fixed in the hardware. +- #interrupt-cells : Should be 2. The interrupt type is fixed in the hardware. - The first cell is the GPIO offset number within the GPIO controller. + - The second cell is the interrupt trigger type and level flags. - interrupts: Specify the interrupt. - altr,interrupt-type: Specifies the interrupt trigger type the GPIO hardware is synthesized. This field is required if the Altera GPIO controller @@ -38,6 +39,6 @@ gpio_altr: gpio@ff200000 { altr,interrupt-type = ; #gpio-cells = <2>; gpio-controller; - #interrupt-cells = <1>; + #interrupt-cells = <2>; interrupt-controller; }; From d19fa8f252000d141f9199ca32959c50314e1f05 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tejun Heo Date: Fri, 13 May 2022 20:55:45 -1000 Subject: [PATCH 0269/1091] blk-iolatency: Fix inflight count imbalances and IO hangs on offline commit 8a177a36da6c54c98b8685d4f914cb3637d53c0d upstream. iolatency needs to track the number of inflight IOs per cgroup. As this tracking can be expensive, it is disabled when no cgroup has iolatency configured for the device. To ensure that the inflight counters stay balanced, iolatency_set_limit() freezes the request_queue while manipulating the enabled counter, which ensures that no IO is in flight and thus all counters are zero. Unfortunately, iolatency_set_limit() isn't the only place where the enabled counter is manipulated. iolatency_pd_offline() can also dec the counter and trigger disabling. As this disabling happens without freezing the q, this can easily happen while some IOs are in flight and thus leak the counts. This can be easily demonstrated by turning on iolatency on an one empty cgroup while IOs are in flight in other cgroups and then removing the cgroup. Note that iolatency shouldn't have been enabled elsewhere in the system to ensure that removing the cgroup disables iolatency for the whole device. The following keeps flipping on and off iolatency on sda: echo +io > /sys/fs/cgroup/cgroup.subtree_control while true; do mkdir -p /sys/fs/cgroup/test echo '8:0 target=100000' > /sys/fs/cgroup/test/io.latency sleep 1 rmdir /sys/fs/cgroup/test sleep 1 done and there's concurrent fio generating direct rand reads: fio --name test --filename=/dev/sda --direct=1 --rw=randread \ --runtime=600 --time_based --iodepth=256 --numjobs=4 --bs=4k while monitoring with the following drgn script: while True: for css in css_for_each_descendant_pre(prog['blkcg_root'].css.address_of_()): for pos in hlist_for_each(container_of(css, 'struct blkcg', 'css').blkg_list): blkg = container_of(pos, 'struct blkcg_gq', 'blkcg_node') pd = blkg.pd[prog['blkcg_policy_iolatency'].plid] if pd.value_() == 0: continue iolat = container_of(pd, 'struct iolatency_grp', 'pd') inflight = iolat.rq_wait.inflight.counter.value_() if inflight: print(f'inflight={inflight} {disk_name(blkg.q.disk).decode("utf-8")} ' f'{cgroup_path(css.cgroup).decode("utf-8")}') time.sleep(1) The monitoring output looks like the following: inflight=1 sda /user.slice inflight=1 sda /user.slice ... inflight=14 sda /user.slice inflight=13 sda /user.slice inflight=17 sda /user.slice inflight=15 sda /user.slice inflight=18 sda /user.slice inflight=17 sda /user.slice inflight=20 sda /user.slice inflight=19 sda /user.slice <- fio stopped, inflight stuck at 19 inflight=19 sda /user.slice inflight=19 sda /user.slice If a cgroup with stuck inflight ends up getting throttled, the throttled IOs will never get issued as there's no completion event to wake it up leading to an indefinite hang. This patch fixes the bug by unifying enable handling into a work item which is automatically kicked off from iolatency_set_min_lat_nsec() which is called from both iolatency_set_limit() and iolatency_pd_offline() paths. Punting to a work item is necessary as iolatency_pd_offline() is called under spinlocks while freezing a request_queue requires a sleepable context. This also simplifies the code reducing LOC sans the comments and avoids the unnecessary freezes which were happening whenever a cgroup's latency target is newly set or cleared. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo Cc: Josef Bacik Cc: Liu Bo Fixes: 8c772a9bfc7c ("blk-iolatency: fix IO hang due to negative inflight counter") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.0+ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/Yn9ScX6Nx2qIiQQi@slm.duckdns.org Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- block/blk-iolatency.c | 122 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 64 insertions(+), 58 deletions(-) diff --git a/block/blk-iolatency.c b/block/blk-iolatency.c index 71a82528d4bf..a4156b3b33c3 100644 --- a/block/blk-iolatency.c +++ b/block/blk-iolatency.c @@ -86,7 +86,17 @@ struct iolatency_grp; struct blk_iolatency { struct rq_qos rqos; struct timer_list timer; - atomic_t enabled; + + /* + * ->enabled is the master enable switch gating the throttling logic and + * inflight tracking. The number of cgroups which have iolat enabled is + * tracked in ->enable_cnt, and ->enable is flipped on/off accordingly + * from ->enable_work with the request_queue frozen. For details, See + * blkiolatency_enable_work_fn(). + */ + bool enabled; + atomic_t enable_cnt; + struct work_struct enable_work; }; static inline struct blk_iolatency *BLKIOLATENCY(struct rq_qos *rqos) @@ -94,11 +104,6 @@ static inline struct blk_iolatency *BLKIOLATENCY(struct rq_qos *rqos) return container_of(rqos, struct blk_iolatency, rqos); } -static inline bool blk_iolatency_enabled(struct blk_iolatency *blkiolat) -{ - return atomic_read(&blkiolat->enabled) > 0; -} - struct child_latency_info { spinlock_t lock; @@ -463,7 +468,7 @@ static void blkcg_iolatency_throttle(struct rq_qos *rqos, struct bio *bio) struct blkcg_gq *blkg = bio->bi_blkg; bool issue_as_root = bio_issue_as_root_blkg(bio); - if (!blk_iolatency_enabled(blkiolat)) + if (!blkiolat->enabled) return; while (blkg && blkg->parent) { @@ -593,7 +598,6 @@ static void blkcg_iolatency_done_bio(struct rq_qos *rqos, struct bio *bio) u64 window_start; u64 now = ktime_to_ns(ktime_get()); bool issue_as_root = bio_issue_as_root_blkg(bio); - bool enabled = false; int inflight = 0; blkg = bio->bi_blkg; @@ -604,8 +608,7 @@ static void blkcg_iolatency_done_bio(struct rq_qos *rqos, struct bio *bio) if (!iolat) return; - enabled = blk_iolatency_enabled(iolat->blkiolat); - if (!enabled) + if (!iolat->blkiolat->enabled) return; while (blkg && blkg->parent) { @@ -643,6 +646,7 @@ static void blkcg_iolatency_exit(struct rq_qos *rqos) struct blk_iolatency *blkiolat = BLKIOLATENCY(rqos); del_timer_sync(&blkiolat->timer); + flush_work(&blkiolat->enable_work); blkcg_deactivate_policy(rqos->q, &blkcg_policy_iolatency); kfree(blkiolat); } @@ -714,6 +718,44 @@ next: rcu_read_unlock(); } +/** + * blkiolatency_enable_work_fn - Enable or disable iolatency on the device + * @work: enable_work of the blk_iolatency of interest + * + * iolatency needs to keep track of the number of in-flight IOs per cgroup. This + * is relatively expensive as it involves walking up the hierarchy twice for + * every IO. Thus, if iolatency is not enabled in any cgroup for the device, we + * want to disable the in-flight tracking. + * + * We have to make sure that the counting is balanced - we don't want to leak + * the in-flight counts by disabling accounting in the completion path while IOs + * are in flight. This is achieved by ensuring that no IO is in flight by + * freezing the queue while flipping ->enabled. As this requires a sleepable + * context, ->enabled flipping is punted to this work function. + */ +static void blkiolatency_enable_work_fn(struct work_struct *work) +{ + struct blk_iolatency *blkiolat = container_of(work, struct blk_iolatency, + enable_work); + bool enabled; + + /* + * There can only be one instance of this function running for @blkiolat + * and it's guaranteed to be executed at least once after the latest + * ->enabled_cnt modification. Acting on the latest ->enable_cnt is + * sufficient. + * + * Also, we know @blkiolat is safe to access as ->enable_work is flushed + * in blkcg_iolatency_exit(). + */ + enabled = atomic_read(&blkiolat->enable_cnt); + if (enabled != blkiolat->enabled) { + blk_mq_freeze_queue(blkiolat->rqos.q); + blkiolat->enabled = enabled; + blk_mq_unfreeze_queue(blkiolat->rqos.q); + } +} + int blk_iolatency_init(struct request_queue *q) { struct blk_iolatency *blkiolat; @@ -739,17 +781,15 @@ int blk_iolatency_init(struct request_queue *q) } timer_setup(&blkiolat->timer, blkiolatency_timer_fn, 0); + INIT_WORK(&blkiolat->enable_work, blkiolatency_enable_work_fn); return 0; } -/* - * return 1 for enabling iolatency, return -1 for disabling iolatency, otherwise - * return 0. - */ -static int iolatency_set_min_lat_nsec(struct blkcg_gq *blkg, u64 val) +static void iolatency_set_min_lat_nsec(struct blkcg_gq *blkg, u64 val) { struct iolatency_grp *iolat = blkg_to_lat(blkg); + struct blk_iolatency *blkiolat = iolat->blkiolat; u64 oldval = iolat->min_lat_nsec; iolat->min_lat_nsec = val; @@ -757,13 +797,15 @@ static int iolatency_set_min_lat_nsec(struct blkcg_gq *blkg, u64 val) iolat->cur_win_nsec = min_t(u64, iolat->cur_win_nsec, BLKIOLATENCY_MAX_WIN_SIZE); - if (!oldval && val) - return 1; + if (!oldval && val) { + if (atomic_inc_return(&blkiolat->enable_cnt) == 1) + schedule_work(&blkiolat->enable_work); + } if (oldval && !val) { blkcg_clear_delay(blkg); - return -1; + if (atomic_dec_return(&blkiolat->enable_cnt) == 0) + schedule_work(&blkiolat->enable_work); } - return 0; } static void iolatency_clear_scaling(struct blkcg_gq *blkg) @@ -795,7 +837,6 @@ static ssize_t iolatency_set_limit(struct kernfs_open_file *of, char *buf, u64 lat_val = 0; u64 oldval; int ret; - int enable = 0; ret = blkg_conf_prep(blkcg, &blkcg_policy_iolatency, buf, &ctx); if (ret) @@ -830,41 +871,12 @@ static ssize_t iolatency_set_limit(struct kernfs_open_file *of, char *buf, blkg = ctx.blkg; oldval = iolat->min_lat_nsec; - enable = iolatency_set_min_lat_nsec(blkg, lat_val); - if (enable) { - if (!blk_get_queue(blkg->q)) { - ret = -ENODEV; - goto out; - } - - blkg_get(blkg); - } - - if (oldval != iolat->min_lat_nsec) { + iolatency_set_min_lat_nsec(blkg, lat_val); + if (oldval != iolat->min_lat_nsec) iolatency_clear_scaling(blkg); - } - ret = 0; out: blkg_conf_finish(&ctx); - if (ret == 0 && enable) { - struct iolatency_grp *tmp = blkg_to_lat(blkg); - struct blk_iolatency *blkiolat = tmp->blkiolat; - - blk_mq_freeze_queue(blkg->q); - - if (enable == 1) - atomic_inc(&blkiolat->enabled); - else if (enable == -1) - atomic_dec(&blkiolat->enabled); - else - WARN_ON_ONCE(1); - - blk_mq_unfreeze_queue(blkg->q); - - blkg_put(blkg); - blk_put_queue(blkg->q); - } return ret ?: nbytes; } @@ -1005,14 +1017,8 @@ static void iolatency_pd_offline(struct blkg_policy_data *pd) { struct iolatency_grp *iolat = pd_to_lat(pd); struct blkcg_gq *blkg = lat_to_blkg(iolat); - struct blk_iolatency *blkiolat = iolat->blkiolat; - int ret; - ret = iolatency_set_min_lat_nsec(blkg, 0); - if (ret == 1) - atomic_inc(&blkiolat->enabled); - if (ret == -1) - atomic_dec(&blkiolat->enabled); + iolatency_set_min_lat_nsec(blkg, 0); iolatency_clear_scaling(blkg); } From 7ac21b24af859c097eb4034e93430056068f8f31 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johan Hovold Date: Wed, 27 Apr 2022 08:32:42 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0270/1091] phy: qcom-qmp: fix reset-controller leak on probe errors commit 4d2900f20edfe541f75756a00deeb2ffe7c66bc1 upstream. Make sure to release the lane reset controller in case of a late probe error (e.g. probe deferral). Note that due to the reset controller being defined in devicetree in "lane" child nodes, devm_reset_control_get_exclusive() cannot be used directly. Fixes: e78f3d15e115 ("phy: qcom-qmp: new qmp phy driver for qcom-chipsets") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.12 Cc: Vivek Gautam Reviewed-by: Philipp Zabel Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Reviewed-by: Bjorn Andersson Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220427063243.32576-3-johan+linaro@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/phy/qualcomm/phy-qcom-qmp.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/phy/qualcomm/phy-qcom-qmp.c b/drivers/phy/qualcomm/phy-qcom-qmp.c index 508305a27887..ff5955fb4d8b 100644 --- a/drivers/phy/qualcomm/phy-qcom-qmp.c +++ b/drivers/phy/qualcomm/phy-qcom-qmp.c @@ -1860,6 +1860,11 @@ static const struct phy_ops qcom_qmp_ufs_ops = { .owner = THIS_MODULE, }; +static void qcom_qmp_reset_control_put(void *data) +{ + reset_control_put(data); +} + static int qcom_qmp_phy_create(struct device *dev, struct device_node *np, int id) { @@ -1951,6 +1956,10 @@ int qcom_qmp_phy_create(struct device *dev, struct device_node *np, int id) dev_err(dev, "failed to get lane%d reset\n", id); return PTR_ERR(qphy->lane_rst); } + ret = devm_add_action_or_reset(dev, qcom_qmp_reset_control_put, + qphy->lane_rst); + if (ret) + return ret; } if (qmp->cfg->type == PHY_TYPE_UFS) From 4946cfd1c8f018a084182ce71886d8e27d01911e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nick Desaulniers Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2020 14:18:11 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 0271/1091] Kconfig: add config option for asm goto w/ outputs commit 587f17018a2c6c414e41a312b002faaef60cf423 upstream. This allows C code to make use of compilers with support for output variables along the fallthrough path via preprocessor define: CONFIG_CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO_OUTPUT [ This is not used anywhere yet, and currently released compilers don't support this yet, but it's coming, and I have some local experimental patches to take advantage of it when it does - Linus ] Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- init/Kconfig | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig index 1cdb6a66b85c..74f44b753d61 100644 --- a/init/Kconfig +++ b/init/Kconfig @@ -38,6 +38,10 @@ config CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO_TIED_OUTPUT # Detect buggy gcc and clang, fixed in gcc-11 clang-14. def_bool $(success,echo 'int foo(int *x) { asm goto (".long (%l[bar]) - .\n": "+m"(*x) ::: bar); return *x; bar: return 0; }' | $CC -x c - -c -o /dev/null) +config CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO_OUTPUT + depends on CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO + def_bool $(success,echo 'int foo(int x) { asm goto ("": "=r"(x) ::: bar); return x; bar: return 0; }' | $(CC) -x c - -c -o /dev/null) + config TOOLS_SUPPORT_RELR def_bool $(success,env "CC=$(CC)" "LD=$(LD)" "NM=$(NM)" "OBJCOPY=$(OBJCOPY)" $(srctree)/scripts/tools-support-relr.sh) From 427c3c7ebd5f3ba5d1276a2834c44b32ce24de77 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xiao Yang Date: Sun, 10 Apr 2022 19:35:13 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0272/1091] RDMA/rxe: Generate a completion for unsupported/invalid opcode commit 2f917af777011c88e977b9b9a5d00b280d3a59ce upstream. Current rxe_requester() doesn't generate a completion when processing an unsupported/invalid opcode. If rxe driver doesn't support a new opcode (e.g. RDMA Atomic Write) and RDMA library supports it, an application using the new opcode can reproduce this issue. Fix the issue by calling "goto err;". Fixes: 8700e3e7c485 ("Soft RoCE driver") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220410113513.27537-1-yangx.jy@fujitsu.com Signed-off-by: Xiao Yang Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_req.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_req.c b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_req.c index a4d6e0b7901e..87702478eb99 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_req.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_req.c @@ -680,7 +680,7 @@ next_wqe: opcode = next_opcode(qp, wqe, wqe->wr.opcode); if (unlikely(opcode < 0)) { wqe->status = IB_WC_LOC_QP_OP_ERR; - goto exit; + goto err; } mask = rxe_opcode[opcode].mask; From 54073410537f0a753275d3c3eb21b263aa93ee42 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Maciej W. Rozycki" Date: Sun, 1 May 2022 23:14:16 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0273/1091] MIPS: IP27: Remove incorrect `cpu_has_fpu' override commit 424c3781dd1cb401857585331eaaa425a13f2429 upstream. Remove unsupported forcing of `cpu_has_fpu' to 1, which makes the `nofpu' kernel parameter non-functional, and also causes a link error: ld: arch/mips/kernel/traps.o: in function `trap_init': ./arch/mips/include/asm/msa.h:(.init.text+0x348): undefined reference to `handle_fpe' ld: ./arch/mips/include/asm/msa.h:(.init.text+0x354): undefined reference to `handle_fpe' ld: ./arch/mips/include/asm/msa.h:(.init.text+0x360): undefined reference to `handle_fpe' where the CONFIG_MIPS_FP_SUPPORT configuration option has been disabled. Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki Reported-by: Stephen Zhang Fixes: 0ebb2f4159af ("MIPS: IP27: Update/restructure CPU overrides") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.2+ Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/mips/include/asm/mach-ip27/cpu-feature-overrides.h | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/mips/include/asm/mach-ip27/cpu-feature-overrides.h b/arch/mips/include/asm/mach-ip27/cpu-feature-overrides.h index 136d6d464e32..93c69fc7bbd8 100644 --- a/arch/mips/include/asm/mach-ip27/cpu-feature-overrides.h +++ b/arch/mips/include/asm/mach-ip27/cpu-feature-overrides.h @@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ #define cpu_has_6k_cache 0 #define cpu_has_8k_cache 0 #define cpu_has_tx39_cache 0 -#define cpu_has_fpu 1 #define cpu_has_nofpuex 0 #define cpu_has_32fpr 1 #define cpu_has_counter 1 From 97be7d13fbd4001eeab49b1be6399f23a8c66160 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jan Kara Date: Tue, 7 Jun 2022 11:15:09 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0274/1091] bfq: Avoid merging queues with different parents commit c1cee4ab36acef271be9101590756ed0c0c374d9 upstream. It can happen that the parent of a bfqq changes between the moment we decide two queues are worth to merge (and set bic->stable_merge_bfqq) and the moment bfq_setup_merge() is called. This can happen e.g. because the process submitted IO for a different cgroup and thus bfqq got reparented. It can even happen that the bfqq we are merging with has parent cgroup that is already offline and going to be destroyed in which case the merge can lead to use-after-free issues such as: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __bfq_deactivate_entity+0x9cb/0xa50 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800693c0c0 by task runc:[2:INIT]/10544 CPU: 0 PID: 10544 Comm: runc:[2:INIT] Tainted: G E 5.15.2-0.g5fb85fd-default #1 openSUSE Tumbleweed (unreleased) f1f3b891c72369aebecd2e43e4641a6358867c70 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x46/0x5a print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x140 ? __bfq_deactivate_entity+0x9cb/0xa50 kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x11b ? __bfq_deactivate_entity+0x9cb/0xa50 __bfq_deactivate_entity+0x9cb/0xa50 ? update_curr+0x32f/0x5d0 bfq_deactivate_entity+0xa0/0x1d0 bfq_del_bfqq_busy+0x28a/0x420 ? resched_curr+0x116/0x1d0 ? bfq_requeue_bfqq+0x70/0x70 ? check_preempt_wakeup+0x52b/0xbc0 __bfq_bfqq_expire+0x1a2/0x270 bfq_bfqq_expire+0xd16/0x2160 ? try_to_wake_up+0x4ee/0x1260 ? bfq_end_wr_async_queues+0xe0/0xe0 ? _raw_write_unlock_bh+0x60/0x60 ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x81/0xe0 bfq_idle_slice_timer+0x109/0x280 ? bfq_dispatch_request+0x4870/0x4870 __hrtimer_run_queues+0x37d/0x700 ? enqueue_hrtimer+0x1b0/0x1b0 ? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0xd/0x10 ? ktime_get_update_offsets_now+0x6f/0x280 hrtimer_interrupt+0x2c8/0x740 Fix the problem by checking that the parent of the two bfqqs we are merging in bfq_setup_merge() is the same. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-block/20211125172809.GC19572@quack2.suse.cz/ CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 430a67f9d616 ("block, bfq: merge bursts of newly-created queues") Tested-by: "yukuai (C)" Signed-off-by: Jan Kara Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220401102752.8599-2-jack@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- block/bfq-iosched.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/block/bfq-iosched.c b/block/bfq-iosched.c index bdfa707ce236..29c15079c4d5 100644 --- a/block/bfq-iosched.c +++ b/block/bfq-iosched.c @@ -2509,6 +2509,14 @@ bfq_setup_merge(struct bfq_queue *bfqq, struct bfq_queue *new_bfqq) if (process_refs == 0 || new_process_refs == 0) return NULL; + /* + * Make sure merged queues belong to the same parent. Parents could + * have changed since the time we decided the two queues are suitable + * for merging. + */ + if (new_bfqq->entity.parent != bfqq->entity.parent) + return NULL; + bfq_log_bfqq(bfqq->bfqd, bfqq, "scheduling merge with queue %d", new_bfqq->pid); From f885f55033a189a29ede6761a32aa7a2e6030cdb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jan Kara Date: Tue, 7 Jun 2022 11:15:10 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0275/1091] bfq: Drop pointless unlock-lock pair commit fc84e1f941b91221092da5b3102ec82da24c5673 upstream. In bfq_insert_request() we unlock bfqd->lock only to call trace_block_rq_insert() and then lock bfqd->lock again. This is really pointless since tracing is disabled if we really care about performance and even if the tracepoint is enabled, it is a quick call. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Tested-by: "yukuai (C)" Signed-off-by: Jan Kara Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220401102752.8599-5-jack@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- block/bfq-iosched.c | 3 --- 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/block/bfq-iosched.c b/block/bfq-iosched.c index 29c15079c4d5..ed25bcd1e820 100644 --- a/block/bfq-iosched.c +++ b/block/bfq-iosched.c @@ -5529,11 +5529,8 @@ static void bfq_insert_request(struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx, struct request *rq, return; } - spin_unlock_irq(&bfqd->lock); - blk_mq_sched_request_inserted(rq); - spin_lock_irq(&bfqd->lock); bfqq = bfq_init_rq(rq); if (!bfqq || at_head || blk_rq_is_passthrough(rq)) { if (at_head) From be1b78f949922550ff05b51b57d5b30672ee086a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jan Kara Date: Tue, 7 Jun 2022 11:15:11 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0276/1091] bfq: Remove pointless bfq_init_rq() calls commit 5f550ede5edf846ecc0067be1ba80514e6fe7f8e upstream. We call bfq_init_rq() from request merging functions where requests we get should have already gone through bfq_init_rq() during insert and anyway we want to do anything only if the request is already tracked by BFQ. So replace calls to bfq_init_rq() with RQ_BFQQ() instead to simply skip requests untracked by BFQ. We move bfq_init_rq() call in bfq_insert_request() a bit earlier to cover request merging and thus can transfer FIFO position in case of a merge. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Tested-by: "yukuai (C)" Signed-off-by: Jan Kara Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220401102752.8599-6-jack@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- block/bfq-iosched.c | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/block/bfq-iosched.c b/block/bfq-iosched.c index ed25bcd1e820..f91c9bb687a8 100644 --- a/block/bfq-iosched.c +++ b/block/bfq-iosched.c @@ -2267,8 +2267,6 @@ static int bfq_request_merge(struct request_queue *q, struct request **req, return ELEVATOR_NO_MERGE; } -static struct bfq_queue *bfq_init_rq(struct request *rq); - static void bfq_request_merged(struct request_queue *q, struct request *req, enum elv_merge type) { @@ -2277,7 +2275,7 @@ static void bfq_request_merged(struct request_queue *q, struct request *req, blk_rq_pos(req) < blk_rq_pos(container_of(rb_prev(&req->rb_node), struct request, rb_node))) { - struct bfq_queue *bfqq = bfq_init_rq(req); + struct bfq_queue *bfqq = RQ_BFQQ(req); struct bfq_data *bfqd; struct request *prev, *next_rq; @@ -2329,8 +2327,8 @@ static void bfq_request_merged(struct request_queue *q, struct request *req, static void bfq_requests_merged(struct request_queue *q, struct request *rq, struct request *next) { - struct bfq_queue *bfqq = bfq_init_rq(rq), - *next_bfqq = bfq_init_rq(next); + struct bfq_queue *bfqq = RQ_BFQQ(rq), + *next_bfqq = RQ_BFQQ(next); if (!bfqq) return; @@ -5514,6 +5512,8 @@ static inline void bfq_update_insert_stats(struct request_queue *q, unsigned int cmd_flags) {} #endif /* CONFIG_BFQ_CGROUP_DEBUG */ +static struct bfq_queue *bfq_init_rq(struct request *rq); + static void bfq_insert_request(struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx, struct request *rq, bool at_head) { @@ -5524,6 +5524,7 @@ static void bfq_insert_request(struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx, struct request *rq, unsigned int cmd_flags; spin_lock_irq(&bfqd->lock); + bfqq = bfq_init_rq(rq); if (blk_mq_sched_try_insert_merge(q, rq)) { spin_unlock_irq(&bfqd->lock); return; @@ -5531,7 +5532,6 @@ static void bfq_insert_request(struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx, struct request *rq, blk_mq_sched_request_inserted(rq); - bfqq = bfq_init_rq(rq); if (!bfqq || at_head || blk_rq_is_passthrough(rq)) { if (at_head) list_add(&rq->queuelist, &bfqd->dispatch); From 8afc13b958bd194553cb8bee22bf7522e2f9e6ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jan Kara Date: Tue, 7 Jun 2022 11:15:12 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0277/1091] bfq: Get rid of __bio_blkcg() usage commit 4e54a2493e582361adc3bfbf06c7d50d19d18837 upstream. BFQ usage of __bio_blkcg() is a relict from the past. Furthermore if bio would not be associated with any blkcg, the usage of __bio_blkcg() in BFQ is prone to races with the task being migrated between cgroups as __bio_blkcg() calls at different places could return different blkcgs. Convert BFQ to the new situation where bio->bi_blkg is initialized in bio_set_dev() and thus practically always valid. This allows us to save blkcg_gq lookup and noticeably simplify the code. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 0fe061b9f03c ("blkcg: fix ref count issue with bio_blkcg() using task_css") Tested-by: "yukuai (C)" Signed-off-by: Jan Kara Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220401102752.8599-8-jack@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- block/bfq-cgroup.c | 63 +++++++++++++++++---------------------------- block/bfq-iosched.c | 10 +------ block/bfq-iosched.h | 3 +-- 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-) diff --git a/block/bfq-cgroup.c b/block/bfq-cgroup.c index 095f2f65bc16..3835cd920587 100644 --- a/block/bfq-cgroup.c +++ b/block/bfq-cgroup.c @@ -565,27 +565,11 @@ static void bfq_group_set_parent(struct bfq_group *bfqg, entity->sched_data = &parent->sched_data; } -static struct bfq_group *bfq_lookup_bfqg(struct bfq_data *bfqd, - struct blkcg *blkcg) +static void bfq_link_bfqg(struct bfq_data *bfqd, struct bfq_group *bfqg) { - struct blkcg_gq *blkg; - - blkg = blkg_lookup(blkcg, bfqd->queue); - if (likely(blkg)) - return blkg_to_bfqg(blkg); - return NULL; -} - -struct bfq_group *bfq_find_set_group(struct bfq_data *bfqd, - struct blkcg *blkcg) -{ - struct bfq_group *bfqg, *parent; + struct bfq_group *parent; struct bfq_entity *entity; - bfqg = bfq_lookup_bfqg(bfqd, blkcg); - if (unlikely(!bfqg)) - return NULL; - /* * Update chain of bfq_groups as we might be handling a leaf group * which, along with some of its relatives, has not been hooked yet @@ -602,8 +586,15 @@ struct bfq_group *bfq_find_set_group(struct bfq_data *bfqd, bfq_group_set_parent(curr_bfqg, parent); } } +} - return bfqg; +struct bfq_group *bfq_bio_bfqg(struct bfq_data *bfqd, struct bio *bio) +{ + struct blkcg_gq *blkg = bio->bi_blkg; + + if (!blkg) + return bfqd->root_group; + return blkg_to_bfqg(blkg); } /** @@ -679,25 +670,15 @@ void bfq_bfqq_move(struct bfq_data *bfqd, struct bfq_queue *bfqq, * Move bic to blkcg, assuming that bfqd->lock is held; which makes * sure that the reference to cgroup is valid across the call (see * comments in bfq_bic_update_cgroup on this issue) - * - * NOTE: an alternative approach might have been to store the current - * cgroup in bfqq and getting a reference to it, reducing the lookup - * time here, at the price of slightly more complex code. */ -static struct bfq_group *__bfq_bic_change_cgroup(struct bfq_data *bfqd, - struct bfq_io_cq *bic, - struct blkcg *blkcg) +static void *__bfq_bic_change_cgroup(struct bfq_data *bfqd, + struct bfq_io_cq *bic, + struct bfq_group *bfqg) { struct bfq_queue *async_bfqq = bic_to_bfqq(bic, 0); struct bfq_queue *sync_bfqq = bic_to_bfqq(bic, 1); - struct bfq_group *bfqg; struct bfq_entity *entity; - bfqg = bfq_find_set_group(bfqd, blkcg); - - if (unlikely(!bfqg)) - bfqg = bfqd->root_group; - if (async_bfqq) { entity = &async_bfqq->entity; @@ -749,20 +730,24 @@ static struct bfq_group *__bfq_bic_change_cgroup(struct bfq_data *bfqd, void bfq_bic_update_cgroup(struct bfq_io_cq *bic, struct bio *bio) { struct bfq_data *bfqd = bic_to_bfqd(bic); - struct bfq_group *bfqg = NULL; + struct bfq_group *bfqg = bfq_bio_bfqg(bfqd, bio); uint64_t serial_nr; - rcu_read_lock(); - serial_nr = __bio_blkcg(bio)->css.serial_nr; + serial_nr = bfqg_to_blkg(bfqg)->blkcg->css.serial_nr; /* * Check whether blkcg has changed. The condition may trigger * spuriously on a newly created cic but there's no harm. */ if (unlikely(!bfqd) || likely(bic->blkcg_serial_nr == serial_nr)) - goto out; + return; - bfqg = __bfq_bic_change_cgroup(bfqd, bic, __bio_blkcg(bio)); + /* + * New cgroup for this process. Make sure it is linked to bfq internal + * cgroup hierarchy. + */ + bfq_link_bfqg(bfqd, bfqg); + __bfq_bic_change_cgroup(bfqd, bic, bfqg); /* * Update blkg_path for bfq_log_* functions. We cache this * path, and update it here, for the following @@ -815,8 +800,6 @@ void bfq_bic_update_cgroup(struct bfq_io_cq *bic, struct bio *bio) */ blkg_path(bfqg_to_blkg(bfqg), bfqg->blkg_path, sizeof(bfqg->blkg_path)); bic->blkcg_serial_nr = serial_nr; -out: - rcu_read_unlock(); } /** @@ -1433,7 +1416,7 @@ void bfq_end_wr_async(struct bfq_data *bfqd) bfq_end_wr_async_queues(bfqd, bfqd->root_group); } -struct bfq_group *bfq_find_set_group(struct bfq_data *bfqd, struct blkcg *blkcg) +struct bfq_group *bfq_bio_bfqg(struct bfq_data *bfqd, struct bio *bio) { return bfqd->root_group; } diff --git a/block/bfq-iosched.c b/block/bfq-iosched.c index f91c9bb687a8..962701d3f46b 100644 --- a/block/bfq-iosched.c +++ b/block/bfq-iosched.c @@ -5158,14 +5158,7 @@ static struct bfq_queue *bfq_get_queue(struct bfq_data *bfqd, struct bfq_queue *bfqq; struct bfq_group *bfqg; - rcu_read_lock(); - - bfqg = bfq_find_set_group(bfqd, __bio_blkcg(bio)); - if (!bfqg) { - bfqq = &bfqd->oom_bfqq; - goto out; - } - + bfqg = bfq_bio_bfqg(bfqd, bio); if (!is_sync) { async_bfqq = bfq_async_queue_prio(bfqd, bfqg, ioprio_class, ioprio); @@ -5209,7 +5202,6 @@ static struct bfq_queue *bfq_get_queue(struct bfq_data *bfqd, out: bfqq->ref++; /* get a process reference to this queue */ bfq_log_bfqq(bfqd, bfqq, "get_queue, at end: %p, %d", bfqq, bfqq->ref); - rcu_read_unlock(); return bfqq; } diff --git a/block/bfq-iosched.h b/block/bfq-iosched.h index be1f4c1febf8..f6cc2b418008 100644 --- a/block/bfq-iosched.h +++ b/block/bfq-iosched.h @@ -978,8 +978,7 @@ void bfq_bfqq_move(struct bfq_data *bfqd, struct bfq_queue *bfqq, void bfq_init_entity(struct bfq_entity *entity, struct bfq_group *bfqg); void bfq_bic_update_cgroup(struct bfq_io_cq *bic, struct bio *bio); void bfq_end_wr_async(struct bfq_data *bfqd); -struct bfq_group *bfq_find_set_group(struct bfq_data *bfqd, - struct blkcg *blkcg); +struct bfq_group *bfq_bio_bfqg(struct bfq_data *bfqd, struct bio *bio); struct blkcg_gq *bfqg_to_blkg(struct bfq_group *bfqg); struct bfq_group *bfqq_group(struct bfq_queue *bfqq); struct bfq_group *bfq_create_group_hierarchy(struct bfq_data *bfqd, int node); From ccddf8cd411c1800863ed357064e56ceffd356bb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jan Kara Date: Tue, 7 Jun 2022 11:15:13 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0278/1091] bfq: Make sure bfqg for which we are queueing requests is online commit 075a53b78b815301f8d3dd1ee2cd99554e34f0dd upstream. Bios queued into BFQ IO scheduler can be associated with a cgroup that was already offlined. This may then cause insertion of this bfq_group into a service tree. But this bfq_group will get freed as soon as last bio associated with it is completed leading to use after free issues for service tree users. Fix the problem by making sure we always operate on online bfq_group. If the bfq_group associated with the bio is not online, we pick the first online parent. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: e21b7a0b9887 ("block, bfq: add full hierarchical scheduling and cgroups support") Tested-by: "yukuai (C)" Signed-off-by: Jan Kara Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220401102752.8599-9-jack@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- block/bfq-cgroup.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/block/bfq-cgroup.c b/block/bfq-cgroup.c index 3835cd920587..09d721b1f6ac 100644 --- a/block/bfq-cgroup.c +++ b/block/bfq-cgroup.c @@ -591,10 +591,19 @@ static void bfq_link_bfqg(struct bfq_data *bfqd, struct bfq_group *bfqg) struct bfq_group *bfq_bio_bfqg(struct bfq_data *bfqd, struct bio *bio) { struct blkcg_gq *blkg = bio->bi_blkg; + struct bfq_group *bfqg; - if (!blkg) - return bfqd->root_group; - return blkg_to_bfqg(blkg); + while (blkg) { + bfqg = blkg_to_bfqg(blkg); + if (bfqg->online) { + bio_associate_blkg_from_css(bio, &blkg->blkcg->css); + return bfqg; + } + blkg = blkg->parent; + } + bio_associate_blkg_from_css(bio, + &bfqg_to_blkg(bfqd->root_group)->blkcg->css); + return bfqd->root_group; } /** From 5f62b21b7c93ad0c0b77585685ed906c919c437f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jan Kara Date: Tue, 7 Jun 2022 11:15:14 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0279/1091] block: fix bio_clone_blkg_association() to associate with proper blkcg_gq commit 22b106e5355d6e7a9c3b5cb5ed4ef22ae585ea94 upstream. Commit d92c370a16cb ("block: really clone the block cgroup in bio_clone_blkg_association") changed bio_clone_blkg_association() to just clone bio->bi_blkg reference from source to destination bio. This is however wrong if the source and destination bios are against different block devices because struct blkcg_gq is different for each bdev-blkcg pair. This will result in IOs being accounted (and throttled as a result) multiple times against the same device (src bdev) while throttling of the other device (dst bdev) is ignored. In case of BFQ the inconsistency can even result in crashes in bfq_bic_update_cgroup(). Fix the problem by looking up correct blkcg_gq for the cloned bio. Reported-by: Logan Gunthorpe Reported-and-tested-by: Donald Buczek Fixes: d92c370a16cb ("block: really clone the block cgroup in bio_clone_blkg_association") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig Signed-off-by: Jan Kara Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220602081242.7731-1-jack@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- block/bio.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/block/bio.c b/block/bio.c index 40004a3631a8..08dbdc32ceaa 100644 --- a/block/bio.c +++ b/block/bio.c @@ -2179,7 +2179,7 @@ void bio_clone_blkg_association(struct bio *dst, struct bio *src) rcu_read_lock(); if (src->bi_blkg) - __bio_associate_blkg(dst, src->bi_blkg); + bio_associate_blkg_from_css(dst, &bio_blkcg(src)->css); rcu_read_unlock(); } From 4faa6308e1b89688e0e92fa44a4c05955827c40e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jia-Ju Bai Date: Fri, 27 May 2022 23:28:18 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0280/1091] md: bcache: check the return value of kzalloc() in detached_dev_do_request() commit 40f567bbb3b0639d2ec7d1c6ad4b1b018f80cf19 upstream. The function kzalloc() in detached_dev_do_request() can fail, so its return value should be checked. Fixes: bc082a55d25c ("bcache: fix inaccurate io state for detached bcache devices") Reported-by: TOTE Robot Signed-off-by: Jia-Ju Bai Signed-off-by: Coly Li Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220527152818.27545-4-colyli@suse.de Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/md/bcache/request.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/md/bcache/request.c b/drivers/md/bcache/request.c index 4045ae748f17..f5d24620d818 100644 --- a/drivers/md/bcache/request.c +++ b/drivers/md/bcache/request.c @@ -1119,6 +1119,12 @@ static void detached_dev_do_request(struct bcache_device *d, struct bio *bio) * which would call closure_get(&dc->disk.cl) */ ddip = kzalloc(sizeof(struct detached_dev_io_private), GFP_NOIO); + if (!ddip) { + bio->bi_status = BLK_STS_RESOURCE; + bio->bi_end_io(bio); + return; + } + ddip->d = d; ddip->start_time = jiffies; ddip->bi_end_io = bio->bi_end_io; From 6c8c536e00203983ebbcc5c590515c6f9a9d6b3b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Randy Dunlap Date: Sun, 23 Jan 2022 09:40:31 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 0281/1091] pcmcia: db1xxx_ss: restrict to MIPS_DB1XXX boards [ Upstream commit 3928cf08334ed895a31458cbebd8d4ec6d84c080 ] When the MIPS_ALCHEMY board selection is MIPS_XXS1500 instead of MIPS_DB1XXX, the PCMCIA driver 'db1xxx_ss' has build errors due to missing DB1XXX symbols. The PCMCIA driver should be restricted to MIPS_DB1XXX instead of MIPS_ALCHEMY to fix this build error. ERROR: modpost: "bcsr_read" [drivers/pcmcia/db1xxx_ss.ko] undefined! ERROR: modpost: "bcsr_mod" [drivers/pcmcia/db1xxx_ss.ko] undefined! Fixes: 42a4f17dc356 ("MIPS: Alchemy: remove SOC_AU1X00 in favor of MIPS_ALCHEMY") Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap Reported-by: kernel test robot Cc: Arnd Bergmann Cc: Daniel Vetter Cc: Kees Cook Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer Cc: linux-mips@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Manuel Lauss Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/pcmcia/Kconfig | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/pcmcia/Kconfig b/drivers/pcmcia/Kconfig index e004d8da03dc..73df71a14253 100644 --- a/drivers/pcmcia/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/pcmcia/Kconfig @@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ config TCIC config PCMCIA_ALCHEMY_DEVBOARD tristate "Alchemy Db/Pb1xxx PCMCIA socket services" - depends on MIPS_ALCHEMY && PCMCIA + depends on MIPS_DB1XXX && PCMCIA help Enable this driver of you want PCMCIA support on your Alchemy Db1000, Db/Pb1100, Db/Pb1500, Db/Pb1550, Db/Pb1200, DB1300 From 1aa30dc88372fec237e6884aa83378e360b77d1f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jakob Koschel Date: Mon, 21 Mar 2022 13:36:26 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0282/1091] staging: greybus: codecs: fix type confusion of list iterator variable [ Upstream commit 84ef256550196bc06e6849a34224c998b45bd557 ] If the list does not exit early then data == NULL and 'module' does not point to a valid list element. Using 'module' in such a case is not valid and was therefore removed. Fixes: 6dd67645f22c ("greybus: audio: Use single codec driver registration") Reviewed-by: Dan Carpenter Reviewed-by: Vaibhav Agarwal Reviewed-by: Mark Greer Signed-off-by: Jakob Koschel Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220321123626.3068639-1-jakobkoschel@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/staging/greybus/audio_codec.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/staging/greybus/audio_codec.c b/drivers/staging/greybus/audio_codec.c index 3259bf02ba25..2418fbf1d2ab 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/greybus/audio_codec.c +++ b/drivers/staging/greybus/audio_codec.c @@ -620,8 +620,8 @@ static int gbcodec_mute_stream(struct snd_soc_dai *dai, int mute, int stream) break; } if (!data) { - dev_err(dai->dev, "%s:%s DATA connection missing\n", - dai->name, module->name); + dev_err(dai->dev, "%s DATA connection missing\n", + dai->name); mutex_unlock(&codec->lock); return -ENODEV; } From d88fdea1477c8e763a04ccd1cea9cf7b02eff92b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexandru Tachici Date: Tue, 22 Mar 2022 12:50:24 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0283/1091] iio: adc: ad7124: Remove shift from scan_type [ Upstream commit fe78ccf79b0e29fd6d8dc2e2c3b0dbeda4ce3ad8 ] The 24 bits data is stored in 32 bits in BE. There is no need to shift it. This confuses user-space apps. Fixes: b3af341bbd966 ("iio: adc: Add ad7124 support") Signed-off-by: Alexandru Tachici Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220322105029.86389-2-alexandru.tachici@analog.com Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/iio/adc/ad7124.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/iio/adc/ad7124.c b/drivers/iio/adc/ad7124.c index 635cc1e7b123..793a803919c5 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/adc/ad7124.c +++ b/drivers/iio/adc/ad7124.c @@ -142,7 +142,6 @@ static const struct iio_chan_spec ad7124_channel_template = { .sign = 'u', .realbits = 24, .storagebits = 32, - .shift = 8, .endianness = IIO_BE, }, }; From 9ae3d073f7db5578ae1907544f0c15947e9678e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wang Weiyang Date: Mon, 28 Mar 2022 19:58:44 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0284/1091] tty: goldfish: Use tty_port_destroy() to destroy port [ Upstream commit 507b05063d1b7a1fcb9f7d7c47586fc4f3508f98 ] In goldfish_tty_probe(), the port initialized through tty_port_init() should be destroyed in error paths.In goldfish_tty_remove(), qtty->port also should be destroyed or else might leak resources. Fix the above by calling tty_port_destroy(). Fixes: 666b7793d4bf ("goldfish: tty driver") Reviewed-by: Jiri Slaby Signed-off-by: Wang Weiyang Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220328115844.86032-1-wangweiyang2@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/tty/goldfish.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/tty/goldfish.c b/drivers/tty/goldfish.c index c8c5cdfc5e19..abc84d84f638 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/goldfish.c +++ b/drivers/tty/goldfish.c @@ -407,6 +407,7 @@ static int goldfish_tty_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) err_tty_register_device_failed: free_irq(irq, qtty); err_dec_line_count: + tty_port_destroy(&qtty->port); goldfish_tty_current_line_count--; if (goldfish_tty_current_line_count == 0) goldfish_tty_delete_driver(); @@ -428,6 +429,7 @@ static int goldfish_tty_remove(struct platform_device *pdev) iounmap(qtty->base); qtty->base = NULL; free_irq(qtty->irq, pdev); + tty_port_destroy(&qtty->port); goldfish_tty_current_line_count--; if (goldfish_tty_current_line_count == 0) goldfish_tty_delete_driver(); From 7320308b189cb052f86cfb80c2bcbd479223627e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miaoqian Lin Date: Mon, 7 Mar 2022 10:51:35 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0285/1091] tty: serial: owl: Fix missing clk_disable_unprepare() in owl_uart_probe [ Upstream commit bcea0f547ec1a2ee44d429aaf0334633e386e67c ] Fix the missing clk_disable_unprepare() before return from owl_uart_probe() in the error handling case. Fixes: abf42d2f333b ("tty: serial: owl: add "much needed" clk_prepare_enable()") Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220307105135.11698-1-linmq006@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/tty/serial/owl-uart.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/owl-uart.c b/drivers/tty/serial/owl-uart.c index c55c8507713c..e87953f8a768 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/serial/owl-uart.c +++ b/drivers/tty/serial/owl-uart.c @@ -695,6 +695,7 @@ static int owl_uart_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) owl_port->port.uartclk = clk_get_rate(owl_port->clk); if (owl_port->port.uartclk == 0) { dev_err(&pdev->dev, "clock rate is zero\n"); + clk_disable_unprepare(owl_port->clk); return -EINVAL; } owl_port->port.flags = UPF_BOOT_AUTOCONF | UPF_IOREMAP | UPF_LOW_LATENCY; From 077f58e469a6adf01c12daecd94d29bfc59ac85e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sherry Sun Date: Mon, 21 Mar 2022 19:22:11 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0286/1091] tty: serial: fsl_lpuart: fix potential bug when using both of_alias_get_id and ida_simple_get [ Upstream commit f398e0aa325c61fa20903833a5b534ecb8e6e418 ] Now fsl_lpuart driver use both of_alias_get_id() and ida_simple_get() in .probe(), which has the potential bug. For example, when remove the lpuart7 alias in dts, of_alias_get_id() will return error, then call ida_simple_get() to allocate the id 0 for lpuart7, this may confilct with the lpuart4 which has alias 0. aliases { ... serial0 = &lpuart4; serial1 = &lpuart5; serial2 = &lpuart6; serial3 = &lpuart7; } So remove the ida_simple_get() in .probe(), return an error directly when calling of_alias_get_id() fails, which is consistent with other uart drivers behavior. Fixes: 3bc3206e1c0f ("serial: fsl_lpuart: Remove the alias node dependence") Signed-off-by: Sherry Sun Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220321112211.8895-1-sherry.sun@nxp.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/tty/serial/fsl_lpuart.c | 24 ++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/fsl_lpuart.c b/drivers/tty/serial/fsl_lpuart.c index 13e705b53217..4bdc12908146 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/serial/fsl_lpuart.c +++ b/drivers/tty/serial/fsl_lpuart.c @@ -233,8 +233,6 @@ /* IMX lpuart has four extra unused regs located at the beginning */ #define IMX_REG_OFF 0x10 -static DEFINE_IDA(fsl_lpuart_ida); - enum lpuart_type { VF610_LPUART, LS1021A_LPUART, @@ -269,7 +267,6 @@ struct lpuart_port { int rx_dma_rng_buf_len; unsigned int dma_tx_nents; wait_queue_head_t dma_wait; - bool id_allocated; }; struct lpuart_soc_data { @@ -2450,23 +2447,18 @@ static int lpuart_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) ret = of_alias_get_id(np, "serial"); if (ret < 0) { - ret = ida_simple_get(&fsl_lpuart_ida, 0, UART_NR, GFP_KERNEL); - if (ret < 0) { - dev_err(&pdev->dev, "port line is full, add device failed\n"); - return ret; - } - sport->id_allocated = true; + dev_err(&pdev->dev, "failed to get alias id, errno %d\n", ret); + return ret; } if (ret >= ARRAY_SIZE(lpuart_ports)) { dev_err(&pdev->dev, "serial%d out of range\n", ret); - ret = -EINVAL; - goto failed_out_of_range; + return -EINVAL; } sport->port.line = ret; ret = lpuart_enable_clks(sport); if (ret) - goto failed_clock_enable; + return ret; sport->port.uartclk = lpuart_get_baud_clk_rate(sport); lpuart_ports[sport->port.line] = sport; @@ -2516,10 +2508,6 @@ static int lpuart_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) failed_attach_port: failed_irq_request: lpuart_disable_clks(sport); -failed_clock_enable: -failed_out_of_range: - if (sport->id_allocated) - ida_simple_remove(&fsl_lpuart_ida, sport->port.line); return ret; } @@ -2529,9 +2517,6 @@ static int lpuart_remove(struct platform_device *pdev) uart_remove_one_port(&lpuart_reg, &sport->port); - if (sport->id_allocated) - ida_simple_remove(&fsl_lpuart_ida, sport->port.line); - lpuart_disable_clks(sport); if (sport->dma_tx_chan) @@ -2663,7 +2648,6 @@ static int __init lpuart_serial_init(void) static void __exit lpuart_serial_exit(void) { - ida_destroy(&fsl_lpuart_ida); platform_driver_unregister(&lpuart_driver); uart_unregister_driver(&lpuart_reg); } From 2f0ae93ec33c8456cdfbf7876b80403a6318ebce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hangyu Hua Date: Tue, 12 Apr 2022 10:02:57 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0287/1091] usb: usbip: fix a refcount leak in stub_probe() [ Upstream commit 9ec4cbf1cc55d126759051acfe328d489c5d6e60 ] usb_get_dev() is called in stub_device_alloc(). When stub_probe() fails after that, usb_put_dev() needs to be called to release the reference. Fix this by moving usb_put_dev() to sdev_free error path handling. Find this by code review. Fixes: 3ff67445750a ("usbip: fix error handling in stub_probe()") Reviewed-by: Shuah Khan Signed-off-by: Hangyu Hua Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220412020257.9767-1-hbh25y@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/usb/usbip/stub_dev.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/usbip/stub_dev.c b/drivers/usb/usbip/stub_dev.c index d8d3892e5a69..3c6d452e3bf4 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/usbip/stub_dev.c +++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/stub_dev.c @@ -393,7 +393,6 @@ static int stub_probe(struct usb_device *udev) err_port: dev_set_drvdata(&udev->dev, NULL); - usb_put_dev(udev); /* we already have busid_priv, just lock busid_lock */ spin_lock(&busid_priv->busid_lock); @@ -408,6 +407,7 @@ call_put_busid_priv: put_busid_priv(busid_priv); sdev_free: + usb_put_dev(udev); stub_device_free(sdev); return rc; From 72ab0f6f2ba823a9b6e8ff96bef2094c423a8165 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Niels Dossche Date: Tue, 12 Apr 2022 18:50:55 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0288/1091] usb: usbip: add missing device lock on tweak configuration cmd [ Upstream commit d088fabace2ca337b275d1d4b36db4fe7771e44f ] The function documentation of usb_set_configuration says that its callers should hold the device lock. This lock is held for all callsites except tweak_set_configuration_cmd. The code path can be executed for example when attaching a remote USB device. The solution is to surround the call by the device lock. This bug was found using my experimental own-developed static analysis tool, which reported the missing lock on v5.17.2. I manually verified this bug report by doing code review as well. I runtime checked that the required lock is not held. I compiled and runtime tested this on x86_64 with a USB mouse. After applying this patch, my analyser no longer reports this potential bug. Fixes: 2c8c98158946 ("staging: usbip: let client choose device configuration") Reviewed-by: Shuah Khan Signed-off-by: Niels Dossche Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220412165055.257113-1-dossche.niels@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/usb/usbip/stub_rx.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/usbip/stub_rx.c b/drivers/usb/usbip/stub_rx.c index e2b019532234..d3d360ff0d24 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/usbip/stub_rx.c +++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/stub_rx.c @@ -138,7 +138,9 @@ static int tweak_set_configuration_cmd(struct urb *urb) req = (struct usb_ctrlrequest *) urb->setup_packet; config = le16_to_cpu(req->wValue); + usb_lock_device(sdev->udev); err = usb_set_configuration(sdev->udev, config); + usb_unlock_device(sdev->udev); if (err && err != -ENODEV) dev_err(&sdev->udev->dev, "can't set config #%d, error %d\n", config, err); From b78499772fa7bfeceffc776425d9671d199672ce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lin Ma Date: Tue, 12 Apr 2022 22:43:59 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0289/1091] USB: storage: karma: fix rio_karma_init return [ Upstream commit b92ffb1eddd9a66a90defc556dcbf65a43c196c7 ] The function rio_karam_init() should return -ENOMEM instead of value 0 (USB_STOR_TRANSPORT_GOOD) when allocation fails. Similarly, it should return -EIO when rio_karma_send_command() fails. Fixes: dfe0d3ba20e8 ("USB Storage: add rio karma eject support") Acked-by: Alan Stern Signed-off-by: Lin Ma Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220412144359.28447-1-linma@zju.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/usb/storage/karma.c | 15 ++++++++------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/storage/karma.c b/drivers/usb/storage/karma.c index 05cec81dcd3f..38ddfedef629 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/storage/karma.c +++ b/drivers/usb/storage/karma.c @@ -174,24 +174,25 @@ static void rio_karma_destructor(void *extra) static int rio_karma_init(struct us_data *us) { - int ret = 0; struct karma_data *data = kzalloc(sizeof(struct karma_data), GFP_NOIO); if (!data) - goto out; + return -ENOMEM; data->recv = kmalloc(RIO_RECV_LEN, GFP_NOIO); if (!data->recv) { kfree(data); - goto out; + return -ENOMEM; } us->extra = data; us->extra_destructor = rio_karma_destructor; - ret = rio_karma_send_command(RIO_ENTER_STORAGE, us); - data->in_storage = (ret == 0); -out: - return ret; + if (rio_karma_send_command(RIO_ENTER_STORAGE, us)) + return -EIO; + + data->in_storage = 1; + + return 0; } static struct scsi_host_template karma_host_template; From 67c2aa77b40e7d166c3885e133c527eb93e825ab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miaoqian Lin Date: Wed, 9 Mar 2022 11:10:33 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0290/1091] usb: musb: Fix missing of_node_put() in omap2430_probe [ Upstream commit 424bef51fa530389b0b9008c9e144e40c10e8458 ] The device_node pointer is returned by of_parse_phandle() with refcount incremented. We should use of_node_put() on it when done. Fixes: 8934d3e4d0e7 ("usb: musb: omap2430: Don't use omap_get_control_dev()") Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220309111033.24487-1-linmq006@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/usb/musb/omap2430.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/musb/omap2430.c b/drivers/usb/musb/omap2430.c index 5c93226e0e20..8def19fc5025 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/musb/omap2430.c +++ b/drivers/usb/musb/omap2430.c @@ -433,6 +433,7 @@ static int omap2430_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) control_node = of_parse_phandle(np, "ctrl-module", 0); if (control_node) { control_pdev = of_find_device_by_node(control_node); + of_node_put(control_node); if (!control_pdev) { dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Failed to get control device\n"); ret = -EINVAL; From 8e9f3f508a9c1bcfa21c8846a4fd1e9b60be22f1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christophe JAILLET Date: Fri, 22 Apr 2022 08:48:18 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0291/1091] staging: fieldbus: Fix the error handling path in anybuss_host_common_probe() [ Upstream commit 7079b3483a17be2cfba64cbd4feb1b7ae07f1ea7 ] If device_register() fails, device_unregister() should not be called because it will free some resources that are not allocated. put_device() should be used instead. Fixes: 308ee87a2f1e ("staging: fieldbus: anybus-s: support HMS Anybus-S bus") Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/5401a519608d6e1a4e7435c20f4f20b0c5c36c23.1650610082.git.christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/staging/fieldbus/anybuss/host.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/staging/fieldbus/anybuss/host.c b/drivers/staging/fieldbus/anybuss/host.c index f69dc4930457..b7a91bdef6f4 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/fieldbus/anybuss/host.c +++ b/drivers/staging/fieldbus/anybuss/host.c @@ -1384,7 +1384,7 @@ anybuss_host_common_probe(struct device *dev, goto err_device; return cd; err_device: - device_unregister(&cd->client->dev); + put_device(&cd->client->dev); err_kthread: kthread_stop(cd->qthread); err_reset: From 89d1b9dfcccee6e77b35e326186bfeb0838814bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Uwe=20Kleine-K=C3=B6nig?= Date: Fri, 8 Apr 2022 17:22:38 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0292/1091] pwm: lp3943: Fix duty calculation in case period was clamped MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit 5e3b07ca5cc78cd4a987e78446849e41288d87cb ] The hardware only supports periods <= 1.6 ms and if a bigger period is requested it is clamped to 1.6 ms. In this case duty_cycle might be bigger than 1.6 ms and then the duty cycle register is written with a value bigger than LP3943_MAX_DUTY. So clamp duty_cycle accordingly. Fixes: af66b3c0934e ("pwm: Add LP3943 PWM driver") Signed-off-by: Uwe Kleine-König Signed-off-by: Thierry Reding Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/pwm/pwm-lp3943.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/pwm/pwm-lp3943.c b/drivers/pwm/pwm-lp3943.c index bf3f14fb5f24..05e4120fd702 100644 --- a/drivers/pwm/pwm-lp3943.c +++ b/drivers/pwm/pwm-lp3943.c @@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ static int lp3943_pwm_config(struct pwm_chip *chip, struct pwm_device *pwm, if (err) return err; + duty_ns = min(duty_ns, period_ns); val = (u8)(duty_ns * LP3943_MAX_DUTY / period_ns); return lp3943_write_byte(lp3943, reg_duty, val); From 1026ee392ba389e5b9e13114bfbf59036d61924e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Krzysztof Kozlowski Date: Fri, 22 Apr 2022 12:53:26 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0293/1091] rpmsg: qcom_smd: Fix irq_of_parse_and_map() return value [ Upstream commit 1a358d35066487d228a68303d808bc4721c6b1b9 ] The irq_of_parse_and_map() returns 0 on failure, not a negative ERRNO. Fixes: 53e2822e56c7 ("rpmsg: Introduce Qualcomm SMD backend") Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220422105326.78713-1-krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/rpmsg/qcom_smd.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/rpmsg/qcom_smd.c b/drivers/rpmsg/qcom_smd.c index 19903de6268d..db5f6009fb49 100644 --- a/drivers/rpmsg/qcom_smd.c +++ b/drivers/rpmsg/qcom_smd.c @@ -1388,7 +1388,7 @@ static int qcom_smd_parse_edge(struct device *dev, edge->name = node->name; irq = irq_of_parse_and_map(node, 0); - if (irq < 0) { + if (!irq) { dev_err(dev, "required smd interrupt missing\n"); ret = irq; goto put_node; From 8ad7b3d9f83818ccb8308876f8b6565257a505ee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zheng Yongjun Date: Fri, 22 Apr 2022 06:26:52 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0294/1091] usb: dwc3: pci: Fix pm_runtime_get_sync() error checking [ Upstream commit a03e2ddab8e735e2cc315609b297b300e9cc60d2 ] If the device is already in a runtime PM enabled state pm_runtime_get_sync() will return 1, so a test for negative value should be used to check for errors. Fixes: 8eed00b237a28 ("usb: dwc3: pci: Runtime resume child device from wq") Signed-off-by: Zheng Yongjun Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220422062652.10575-1-zhengyongjun3@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-pci.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-pci.c b/drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-pci.c index 99964f96ff74..955bf820f410 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-pci.c +++ b/drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-pci.c @@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ static void dwc3_pci_resume_work(struct work_struct *work) int ret; ret = pm_runtime_get_sync(&dwc3->dev); - if (ret) { + if (ret < 0) { pm_runtime_put_sync_autosuspend(&dwc3->dev); return; } From bec18bb00f11fe75ac1156c3bc3cccd7c6e825b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xiaomeng Tong Date: Thu, 14 Apr 2022 11:56:09 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0295/1091] firmware: stratix10-svc: fix a missing check on list iterator [ Upstream commit 5a0793ac66ac0e254d292f129a4d6c526f9f2aff ] The bug is here: pmem->vaddr = NULL; The list iterator 'pmem' will point to a bogus position containing HEAD if the list is empty or no element is found. This case must be checked before any use of the iterator, otherwise it will lead to a invalid memory access. To fix this bug, just gen_pool_free/set NULL/list_del() and return when found, otherwise list_del HEAD and return; Fixes: 7ca5ce896524f ("firmware: add Intel Stratix10 service layer driver") Signed-off-by: Xiaomeng Tong Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220414035609.2239-1-xiam0nd.tong@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/firmware/stratix10-svc.c | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/firmware/stratix10-svc.c b/drivers/firmware/stratix10-svc.c index b2b4ba240fb1..08c422380a00 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/stratix10-svc.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/stratix10-svc.c @@ -934,17 +934,17 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(stratix10_svc_allocate_memory); void stratix10_svc_free_memory(struct stratix10_svc_chan *chan, void *kaddr) { struct stratix10_svc_data_mem *pmem; - size_t size = 0; list_for_each_entry(pmem, &svc_data_mem, node) if (pmem->vaddr == kaddr) { - size = pmem->size; - break; + gen_pool_free(chan->ctrl->genpool, + (unsigned long)kaddr, pmem->size); + pmem->vaddr = NULL; + list_del(&pmem->node); + return; } - gen_pool_free(chan->ctrl->genpool, (unsigned long)kaddr, size); - pmem->vaddr = NULL; - list_del(&pmem->node); + list_del(&svc_data_mem); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(stratix10_svc_free_memory); From 0f57d139300f617b7ddf7804f5b8fa9dd3a352f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miaoqian Lin Date: Tue, 12 Apr 2022 06:51:45 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0296/1091] iio: adc: stmpe-adc: Fix wait_for_completion_timeout return value check [ Upstream commit d345b23200bcdbd2bd3582213d738c258b77718f ] wait_for_completion_timeout() returns unsigned long not long. it returns 0 if timed out, and positive if completed. The check for <= 0 is ambiguous and should be == 0 here indicating timeout which is the only error case Fixes: e813dde6f833 ("iio: stmpe-adc: Use wait_for_completion_timeout") Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin Reviewed-by: Philippe Schenker Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220412065150.14486-1-linmq006@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/iio/adc/stmpe-adc.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iio/adc/stmpe-adc.c b/drivers/iio/adc/stmpe-adc.c index bd72727fc417..35ae801c4d35 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/adc/stmpe-adc.c +++ b/drivers/iio/adc/stmpe-adc.c @@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ struct stmpe_adc { static int stmpe_read_voltage(struct stmpe_adc *info, struct iio_chan_spec const *chan, int *val) { - long ret; + unsigned long ret; mutex_lock(&info->lock); @@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ static int stmpe_read_voltage(struct stmpe_adc *info, ret = wait_for_completion_timeout(&info->completion, STMPE_ADC_TIMEOUT); - if (ret <= 0) { + if (ret == 0) { stmpe_reg_write(info->stmpe, STMPE_REG_ADC_INT_STA, STMPE_ADC_CH(info->channel)); mutex_unlock(&info->lock); @@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ static int stmpe_read_voltage(struct stmpe_adc *info, static int stmpe_read_temp(struct stmpe_adc *info, struct iio_chan_spec const *chan, int *val) { - long ret; + unsigned long ret; mutex_lock(&info->lock); @@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ static int stmpe_read_temp(struct stmpe_adc *info, ret = wait_for_completion_timeout(&info->completion, STMPE_ADC_TIMEOUT); - if (ret <= 0) { + if (ret == 0) { mutex_unlock(&info->lock); return -ETIMEDOUT; } From e5d48301d1fcb6cf4158e0e76f176d898f8779d0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Cixi Geng Date: Tue, 19 Apr 2022 22:24:53 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0297/1091] iio: adc: sc27xx: fix read big scale voltage not right [ Upstream commit ad930a75613282400179361e220e58b87386b8c7 ] Fix wrong configuration value of SC27XX_ADC_SCALE_MASK and SC27XX_ADC_SCALE_SHIFT by spec documetation. Fixes: 5df362a6cf49c (iio: adc: Add Spreadtrum SC27XX PMICs ADC support) Signed-off-by: Cixi Geng Reviewed-by: Baolin Wang Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220419142458.884933-3-gengcixi@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/iio/adc/sc27xx_adc.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iio/adc/sc27xx_adc.c b/drivers/iio/adc/sc27xx_adc.c index a6c046575ec3..dcc01cdcff3f 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/adc/sc27xx_adc.c +++ b/drivers/iio/adc/sc27xx_adc.c @@ -36,8 +36,8 @@ /* Bits and mask definition for SC27XX_ADC_CH_CFG register */ #define SC27XX_ADC_CHN_ID_MASK GENMASK(4, 0) -#define SC27XX_ADC_SCALE_MASK GENMASK(10, 8) -#define SC27XX_ADC_SCALE_SHIFT 8 +#define SC27XX_ADC_SCALE_MASK GENMASK(10, 9) +#define SC27XX_ADC_SCALE_SHIFT 9 /* Bits definitions for SC27XX_ADC_INT_EN registers */ #define SC27XX_ADC_IRQ_EN BIT(0) From 088f449d9d3c9fdc939270a32e7f4ac51c45ecd6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Cixi Geng Date: Tue, 19 Apr 2022 22:24:54 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0298/1091] iio: adc: sc27xx: Fine tune the scale calibration values [ Upstream commit 5a7a184b11c6910f47600ff5cbbee34168f701a8 ] Small adjustment the scale calibration value for the sc2731, use new name sc2731_[big|small]_scale_graph_calib, and remove the origin [big|small]_scale_graph_calib struct for unused. Fixes: 8ba0dbfd07a35 (iio: adc: sc27xx: Add ADC scale calibration) Signed-off-by: Cixi Geng Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220419142458.884933-4-gengcixi@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/iio/adc/sc27xx_adc.c | 16 ++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iio/adc/sc27xx_adc.c b/drivers/iio/adc/sc27xx_adc.c index dcc01cdcff3f..5b79c8b9ccde 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/adc/sc27xx_adc.c +++ b/drivers/iio/adc/sc27xx_adc.c @@ -103,14 +103,14 @@ static struct sc27xx_adc_linear_graph small_scale_graph = { 100, 341, }; -static const struct sc27xx_adc_linear_graph big_scale_graph_calib = { - 4200, 856, - 3600, 733, +static const struct sc27xx_adc_linear_graph sc2731_big_scale_graph_calib = { + 4200, 850, + 3600, 728, }; -static const struct sc27xx_adc_linear_graph small_scale_graph_calib = { - 1000, 833, - 100, 80, +static const struct sc27xx_adc_linear_graph sc2731_small_scale_graph_calib = { + 1000, 838, + 100, 84, }; static int sc27xx_adc_get_calib_data(u32 calib_data, int calib_adc) @@ -130,11 +130,11 @@ static int sc27xx_adc_scale_calibration(struct sc27xx_adc_data *data, size_t len; if (big_scale) { - calib_graph = &big_scale_graph_calib; + calib_graph = &sc2731_big_scale_graph_calib; graph = &big_scale_graph; cell_name = "big_scale_calib"; } else { - calib_graph = &small_scale_graph_calib; + calib_graph = &sc2731_small_scale_graph_calib; graph = &small_scale_graph; cell_name = "small_scale_calib"; } From b6b0f8904bd699882ea3801473614ec0fa8d297f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Krzysztof Kozlowski Date: Sat, 23 Apr 2022 11:39:32 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0299/1091] rpmsg: qcom_smd: Fix returning 0 if irq_of_parse_and_map() fails [ Upstream commit 59d6f72f6f9c92fec8757d9e29527da828e9281f ] irq_of_parse_and_map() returns 0 on failure, so this should not be passed further as error return code. Fixes: 1a358d350664 ("rpmsg: qcom_smd: Fix irq_of_parse_and_map() return value") Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220423093932.32136-1-krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/rpmsg/qcom_smd.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/rpmsg/qcom_smd.c b/drivers/rpmsg/qcom_smd.c index db5f6009fb49..a4db9f6100d2 100644 --- a/drivers/rpmsg/qcom_smd.c +++ b/drivers/rpmsg/qcom_smd.c @@ -1390,7 +1390,7 @@ static int qcom_smd_parse_edge(struct device *dev, irq = irq_of_parse_and_map(node, 0); if (!irq) { dev_err(dev, "required smd interrupt missing\n"); - ret = irq; + ret = -EINVAL; goto put_node; } From f2a16af2ee0a10f4605d16cad77b95cba31a4997 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johan Hovold Date: Mon, 2 May 2022 15:31:29 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0300/1091] phy: qcom-qmp: fix pipe-clock imbalance on power-on failure [ Upstream commit 5e73b2d9867998278479ccc065a8a8227a5513ef ] Make sure to disable the pipe clock also if ufs-reset deassertion fails during power on. Note that the ufs-reset is asserted in qcom_qmp_phy_com_exit(). Fixes: c9b589791fc1 ("phy: qcom: Utilize UFS reset controller") Cc: Evan Green Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220502133130.4125-2-johan+linaro@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/phy/qualcomm/phy-qcom-qmp.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/phy/qualcomm/phy-qcom-qmp.c b/drivers/phy/qualcomm/phy-qcom-qmp.c index ff5955fb4d8b..21d40c665854 100644 --- a/drivers/phy/qualcomm/phy-qcom-qmp.c +++ b/drivers/phy/qualcomm/phy-qcom-qmp.c @@ -1517,7 +1517,7 @@ static int qcom_qmp_phy_enable(struct phy *phy) qcom_qmp_phy_configure(pcs, cfg->regs, cfg->pcs_tbl, cfg->pcs_tbl_num); ret = reset_control_deassert(qmp->ufs_reset); if (ret) - goto err_lane_rst; + goto err_pcs_ready; /* * Pull out PHY from POWER DOWN state. From 47e4c42faab9a515c44b28f69d2e5e62ccc8b714 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Maciej W. Rozycki" Date: Fri, 29 Apr 2022 21:40:18 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0301/1091] serial: sifive: Report actual baud base rather than fixed 115200 [ Upstream commit 0a7ff843d507ce2cca2c3b7e169ee56e28133530 ] The base baud value reported is supposed to be the highest baud rate that can be set for a serial port. The SiFive FU740-C000 SOC's on-chip UART supports baud rates of up to 1/16 of the input clock rate, which is the bus clock `tlclk'[1], often at 130MHz in the case of the HiFive Unmatched board. However the sifive UART driver reports a fixed value of 115200 instead: 10010000.serial: ttySIF0 at MMIO 0x10010000 (irq = 1, base_baud = 115200) is a SiFive UART v0 10011000.serial: ttySIF1 at MMIO 0x10011000 (irq = 2, base_baud = 115200) is a SiFive UART v0 even though we already support setting higher baud rates, e.g.: $ tty /dev/ttySIF1 $ stty speed 230400 The baud base value is computed by the serial core by dividing the UART clock recorded in `struct uart_port' by 16, which is also the minimum value of the clock divider supported, so correct the baud base value reported by setting the UART clock recorded to the input clock rate rather than 115200: 10010000.serial: ttySIF0 at MMIO 0x10010000 (irq = 1, base_baud = 8125000) is a SiFive UART v0 10011000.serial: ttySIF1 at MMIO 0x10011000 (irq = 2, base_baud = 8125000) is a SiFive UART v0 References: [1] "SiFive FU740-C000 Manual", v1p3, SiFive, Inc., August 13, 2021, Section 16.9 "Baud Rate Divisor Register (div)", pp.143-144 Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki Fixes: 1f1496a923b6 ("riscv: Fix sifive serial driver") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.2204291656280.9383@angie.orcam.me.uk Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/tty/serial/sifive.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/sifive.c b/drivers/tty/serial/sifive.c index 6a2dc823ea82..ec9bd2207271 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/serial/sifive.c +++ b/drivers/tty/serial/sifive.c @@ -973,7 +973,7 @@ static int sifive_serial_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) /* Set up clock divider */ ssp->clkin_rate = clk_get_rate(ssp->clk); ssp->baud_rate = SIFIVE_DEFAULT_BAUD_RATE; - ssp->port.uartclk = ssp->baud_rate * 16; + ssp->port.uartclk = ssp->clkin_rate; __ssp_update_div(ssp); platform_set_drvdata(pdev, ssp); From 0f91755514b8466b5efa201b7ff7acbe26234d09 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Guilherme G. Piccoli" Date: Wed, 27 Apr 2022 19:49:03 -0300 Subject: [PATCH 0302/1091] coresight: cpu-debug: Replace mutex with mutex_trylock on panic notifier [ Upstream commit 1adff542d67a2ed1120955cb219bfff8a9c53f59 ] The panic notifier infrastructure executes registered callbacks when a panic event happens - such callbacks are executed in atomic context, with interrupts and preemption disabled in the running CPU and all other CPUs disabled. That said, mutexes in such context are not a good idea. This patch replaces a regular mutex with a mutex_trylock safer approach; given the nature of the mutex used in the driver, it should be pretty uncommon being unable to acquire such mutex in the panic path, hence no functional change should be observed (and if it is, that would be likely a deadlock with the regular mutex). Fixes: 2227b7c74634 ("coresight: add support for CPU debug module") Cc: Leo Yan Cc: Mathieu Poirier Cc: Mike Leach Cc: Suzuki K Poulose Signed-off-by: Guilherme G. Piccoli Reviewed-by: Suzuki K Poulose Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220427224924.592546-10-gpiccoli@igalia.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-cpu-debug.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-cpu-debug.c b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-cpu-debug.c index 96544b348c27..ebe34fd6adb0 100644 --- a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-cpu-debug.c +++ b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-cpu-debug.c @@ -379,9 +379,10 @@ static int debug_notifier_call(struct notifier_block *self, int cpu; struct debug_drvdata *drvdata; - mutex_lock(&debug_lock); + /* Bail out if we can't acquire the mutex or the functionality is off */ + if (!mutex_trylock(&debug_lock)) + return NOTIFY_DONE; - /* Bail out if the functionality is disabled */ if (!debug_enable) goto skip_dump; @@ -400,7 +401,7 @@ static int debug_notifier_call(struct notifier_block *self, skip_dump: mutex_unlock(&debug_lock); - return 0; + return NOTIFY_DONE; } static struct notifier_block debug_notifier = { From 69a30b2ed620c2206cbbd1e9c112e4fc584e02bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miaoqian Lin Date: Mon, 16 May 2022 11:20:10 +0400 Subject: [PATCH 0303/1091] soc: rockchip: Fix refcount leak in rockchip_grf_init [ Upstream commit 9b59588d8be91c96bfb0371e912ceb4f16315dbf ] of_find_matching_node_and_match returns a node pointer with refcount incremented, we should use of_node_put() on it when done. Add missing of_node_put() to avoid refcount leak. Fixes: 4c58063d4258 ("soc: rockchip: add driver handling grf setup") Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220516072013.19731-1-linmq006@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Heiko Stuebner Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/soc/rockchip/grf.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/soc/rockchip/grf.c b/drivers/soc/rockchip/grf.c index 494cf2b5bf7b..343ff61ccccb 100644 --- a/drivers/soc/rockchip/grf.c +++ b/drivers/soc/rockchip/grf.c @@ -148,12 +148,14 @@ static int __init rockchip_grf_init(void) return -ENODEV; if (!match || !match->data) { pr_err("%s: missing grf data\n", __func__); + of_node_put(np); return -EINVAL; } grf_info = match->data; grf = syscon_node_to_regmap(np); + of_node_put(np); if (IS_ERR(grf)) { pr_err("%s: could not get grf syscon\n", __func__); return PTR_ERR(grf); From d041e885749f1506d41bc0dd945f27fc0cfc73f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Samuel Holland Date: Sun, 8 May 2022 20:21:21 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 0304/1091] clocksource/drivers/riscv: Events are stopped during CPU suspend [ Upstream commit 232ccac1bd9b5bfe73895f527c08623e7fa0752d ] Some implementations of the SBI time extension depend on hart-local state (for example, CSRs) that are lost or hardware that is powered down when a CPU is suspended. To be safe, the clockevents driver cannot assume that timer IRQs will be received during CPU suspend. Fixes: 62b019436814 ("clocksource: new RISC-V SBI timer driver") Signed-off-by: Samuel Holland Reviewed-by: Anup Patel Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220509012121.40031-1-samuel@sholland.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Lezcano Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/clocksource/timer-riscv.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/clocksource/timer-riscv.c b/drivers/clocksource/timer-riscv.c index 4b04ffbe5e7e..e3be5c2f57b8 100644 --- a/drivers/clocksource/timer-riscv.c +++ b/drivers/clocksource/timer-riscv.c @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ static int riscv_clock_next_event(unsigned long delta, static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct clock_event_device, riscv_clock_event) = { .name = "riscv_timer_clockevent", - .features = CLOCK_EVT_FEAT_ONESHOT, + .features = CLOCK_EVT_FEAT_ONESHOT | CLOCK_EVT_FEAT_C3STOP, .rating = 100, .set_next_event = riscv_clock_next_event, }; From d77f28c1bc9d3043a52069fe42e4a26fbf961ebd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yang Yingliang Date: Thu, 5 May 2022 20:50:43 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0305/1091] rtc: mt6397: check return value after calling platform_get_resource() [ Upstream commit d3b43eb505bffb8e4cdf6800c15660c001553fe6 ] It will cause null-ptr-deref if platform_get_resource() returns NULL, we need check the return value. Fixes: fc2979118f3f ("rtc: mediatek: Add MT6397 RTC driver") Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang Reviewed-by: AngeloGioacchino Del Regno Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220505125043.1594771-1-yangyingliang@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/rtc/rtc-mt6397.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/rtc/rtc-mt6397.c b/drivers/rtc/rtc-mt6397.c index b216bdcba0da..dd3901b0a4ed 100644 --- a/drivers/rtc/rtc-mt6397.c +++ b/drivers/rtc/rtc-mt6397.c @@ -331,6 +331,8 @@ static int mtk_rtc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) return -ENOMEM; res = platform_get_resource(pdev, IORESOURCE_MEM, 0); + if (!res) + return -EINVAL; rtc->addr_base = res->start; rtc->irq = platform_get_irq(pdev, 0); From 1b3ae6d8506953e2f88b817e1d0c9fa693f5413a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: John Ogness Date: Sun, 8 May 2022 12:41:47 +0206 Subject: [PATCH 0306/1091] serial: meson: acquire port->lock in startup() [ Upstream commit 589f892ac8ef244e47c5a00ffd8605daa1eaef8e ] The uart_ops startup() callback is called without interrupts disabled and without port->lock locked, relatively late during the boot process (from the call path of console_on_rootfs()). If the device is a console, it was already previously registered and could be actively printing messages. Since the startup() callback is reading/writing registers used by the console write() callback (AML_UART_CONTROL), its access must be synchronized using the port->lock. Currently it is not. The startup() callback is the only function that explicitly enables interrupts. Without the synchronization, it is possible that interrupts become accidentally permanently disabled. CPU0 CPU1 meson_serial_console_write meson_uart_startup -------------------------- ------------------ spin_lock(port->lock) val = readl(AML_UART_CONTROL) uart_console_write() writel(INT_EN, AML_UART_CONTROL) writel(val, AML_UART_CONTROL) spin_unlock(port->lock) Add port->lock synchronization to meson_uart_startup() to avoid racing with meson_serial_console_write(). Also add detailed comments to meson_uart_reset() explaining why it is *not* using port->lock synchronization. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/2a82eae7-a256-f70c-fd82-4e510750906e@samsung.com Fixes: ff7693d079e5 ("ARM: meson: serial: add MesonX SoC on-chip uart driver") Reported-by: Marek Szyprowski Tested-by: Marek Szyprowski Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek Reviewed-by: Jiri Slaby Acked-by: Neil Armstrong Signed-off-by: John Ogness Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220508103547.626355-1-john.ogness@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/tty/serial/meson_uart.c | 13 +++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/meson_uart.c b/drivers/tty/serial/meson_uart.c index fbc5bc022a39..849ce8c1ef39 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/serial/meson_uart.c +++ b/drivers/tty/serial/meson_uart.c @@ -256,6 +256,14 @@ static const char *meson_uart_type(struct uart_port *port) return (port->type == PORT_MESON) ? "meson_uart" : NULL; } +/* + * This function is called only from probe() using a temporary io mapping + * in order to perform a reset before setting up the device. Since the + * temporarily mapped region was successfully requested, there can be no + * console on this port at this time. Hence it is not necessary for this + * function to acquire the port->lock. (Since there is no console on this + * port at this time, the port->lock is not initialized yet.) + */ static void meson_uart_reset(struct uart_port *port) { u32 val; @@ -270,9 +278,12 @@ static void meson_uart_reset(struct uart_port *port) static int meson_uart_startup(struct uart_port *port) { + unsigned long flags; u32 val; int ret = 0; + spin_lock_irqsave(&port->lock, flags); + val = readl(port->membase + AML_UART_CONTROL); val |= AML_UART_CLEAR_ERR; writel(val, port->membase + AML_UART_CONTROL); @@ -288,6 +299,8 @@ static int meson_uart_startup(struct uart_port *port) val = (AML_UART_RECV_IRQ(1) | AML_UART_XMIT_IRQ(port->fifosize / 2)); writel(val, port->membase + AML_UART_MISC); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&port->lock, flags); + ret = request_irq(port->irq, meson_uart_interrupt, 0, port->name, port); From 035bc3b734aa5ea2c6b8d1643add4eaeaa9f96e3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Ilpo=20J=C3=A4rvinen?= Date: Fri, 13 May 2022 16:46:43 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 0307/1091] serial: 8250_fintek: Check SER_RS485_RTS_* only with RS485 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit af0179270977508df6986b51242825d7edd59caf ] SER_RS485_RTS_ON_SEND and SER_RS485_RTS_AFTER_SEND relate to behavior within RS485 operation. The driver checks if they have the same value which is not possible to realize with the hardware. The check is taken regardless of SER_RS485_ENABLED flag and -EINVAL is returned when the check fails, which creates problems. This check makes it unnecessarily complicated to turn RS485 mode off as simple zeroed serial_rs485 struct will trigger that equal values check. In addition, the driver itself memsets its rs485 structure to zero when RS485 is disabled but if userspace would try to make an TIOCSRS485 ioctl() call with the very same struct, it would end up failing with -EINVAL which doesn't make much sense. Resolve the problem by moving the check inside SER_RS485_ENABLED block. Fixes: 7ecc77011c6f ("serial: 8250_fintek: Return -EINVAL on invalid configuration") Cc: Ricardo Ribalda Delgado Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/035c738-8ea5-8b17-b1d7-84a7b3aeaa51@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_fintek.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_fintek.c b/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_fintek.c index e24161004ddc..9b1cddbfc75c 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_fintek.c +++ b/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_fintek.c @@ -197,12 +197,12 @@ static int fintek_8250_rs485_config(struct uart_port *port, if (!pdata) return -EINVAL; - /* Hardware do not support same RTS level on send and receive */ - if (!(rs485->flags & SER_RS485_RTS_ON_SEND) == - !(rs485->flags & SER_RS485_RTS_AFTER_SEND)) - return -EINVAL; if (rs485->flags & SER_RS485_ENABLED) { + /* Hardware do not support same RTS level on send and receive */ + if (!(rs485->flags & SER_RS485_RTS_ON_SEND) == + !(rs485->flags & SER_RS485_RTS_AFTER_SEND)) + return -EINVAL; memset(rs485->padding, 0, sizeof(rs485->padding)); config |= RS485_URA; } else { From 0de3d2344ee0c5ed2d072dae1efde08f59b02e60 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Ilpo=20J=C3=A4rvinen?= Date: Thu, 19 May 2022 11:18:01 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 0308/1091] serial: digicolor-usart: Don't allow CS5-6 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit fd63031b8c0763addcecdefe0e0c59d49646204e ] Only CS7 and CS8 seem supported but CSIZE is not sanitized to CS8 in the default: block. Set CSIZE correctly so that userspace knows the effective value. Incorrect CSIZE also results in miscalculation of the frame bits in tty_get_char_size() or in its predecessor where the roughly the same code is directly within uart_update_timeout(). Fixes: 5930cb3511df (serial: driver for Conexant Digicolor USART) Acked-by: Baruch Siach Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220519081808.3776-3-ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/tty/serial/digicolor-usart.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/digicolor-usart.c b/drivers/tty/serial/digicolor-usart.c index 4446c13629b1..e06967ca62fa 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/serial/digicolor-usart.c +++ b/drivers/tty/serial/digicolor-usart.c @@ -309,6 +309,8 @@ static void digicolor_uart_set_termios(struct uart_port *port, case CS8: default: config |= UA_CONFIG_CHAR_LEN; + termios->c_cflag &= ~CSIZE; + termios->c_cflag |= CS8; break; } From eb8de4bac35a16fe1745e8388e2f152cd3cb94e4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Ilpo=20J=C3=A4rvinen?= Date: Thu, 19 May 2022 11:18:02 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 0309/1091] serial: rda-uart: Don't allow CS5-6 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit 098333a9c7d12bb3ce44c82f08b4d810c44d31b0 ] Only CS7 and CS8 are supported but CSIZE is not sanitized after fallthrough from CS5 or CS6 to CS7. Set CSIZE correctly so that userspace knows the effective value. Incorrect CSIZE also results in miscalculation of the frame bits in tty_get_char_size() or in its predecessor where the roughly the same code is directly within uart_update_timeout(). Fixes: c10b13325ced (tty: serial: Add RDA8810PL UART driver) Cc: Manivannan Sadhasivam Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220519081808.3776-4-ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/tty/serial/rda-uart.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/rda-uart.c b/drivers/tty/serial/rda-uart.c index ff9a27d48bca..877d86ff6819 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/serial/rda-uart.c +++ b/drivers/tty/serial/rda-uart.c @@ -262,6 +262,8 @@ static void rda_uart_set_termios(struct uart_port *port, /* Fall through */ case CS7: ctrl &= ~RDA_UART_DBITS_8; + termios->c_cflag &= ~CSIZE; + termios->c_cflag |= CS7; break; default: ctrl |= RDA_UART_DBITS_8; From 942aa88467b95ce9f73f5183fff6c04e32aca8f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Ilpo=20J=C3=A4rvinen?= Date: Thu, 19 May 2022 11:18:03 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 0310/1091] serial: txx9: Don't allow CS5-6 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit 79ac88655dc0551e3571ad16bdabdbe65d61553e ] Only CS7 and CS8 are supported but CSIZE is not sanitized with CS5 or CS6 to CS8. Set CSIZE correctly so that userspace knows the effective value. Incorrect CSIZE also results in miscalculation of the frame bits in tty_get_char_size() or in its predecessor where the roughly the same code is directly within uart_update_timeout(). Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 (Linux-2.6.12-rc2) Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220519081808.3776-5-ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/tty/serial/serial_txx9.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/serial_txx9.c b/drivers/tty/serial/serial_txx9.c index 8507f18900d0..2783baa5dfe5 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/serial/serial_txx9.c +++ b/drivers/tty/serial/serial_txx9.c @@ -648,6 +648,8 @@ serial_txx9_set_termios(struct uart_port *port, struct ktermios *termios, case CS6: /* not supported */ case CS8: cval |= TXX9_SILCR_UMODE_8BIT; + termios->c_cflag &= ~CSIZE; + termios->c_cflag |= CS8; break; } From 841cab744cc0dbef471905b8229bda460e89cffe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Ilpo=20J=C3=A4rvinen?= Date: Thu, 19 May 2022 11:18:04 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 0311/1091] serial: sh-sci: Don't allow CS5-6 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit 9b87162de8be26bf3156460b37deee6399fd0fcb ] Only CS7 and CS8 seem supported but CSIZE is not sanitized from CS5 or CS6 to CS8. Set CSIZE correctly so that userspace knows the effective value. Incorrect CSIZE also results in miscalculation of the frame bits in tty_get_char_size() or in its predecessor where the roughly the same code is directly within uart_update_timeout(). Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 (Linux-2.6.12-rc2) Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220519081808.3776-6-ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/tty/serial/sh-sci.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/sh-sci.c b/drivers/tty/serial/sh-sci.c index ecff9b208808..c066bb7f07b0 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/serial/sh-sci.c +++ b/drivers/tty/serial/sh-sci.c @@ -2395,8 +2395,12 @@ static void sci_set_termios(struct uart_port *port, struct ktermios *termios, int best_clk = -1; unsigned long flags; - if ((termios->c_cflag & CSIZE) == CS7) + if ((termios->c_cflag & CSIZE) == CS7) { smr_val |= SCSMR_CHR; + } else { + termios->c_cflag &= ~CSIZE; + termios->c_cflag |= CS8; + } if (termios->c_cflag & PARENB) smr_val |= SCSMR_PE; if (termios->c_cflag & PARODD) From 5c01c19f64c7731391307cb31e19b7b50e68527f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Ilpo=20J=C3=A4rvinen?= Date: Thu, 19 May 2022 11:18:05 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 0312/1091] serial: sifive: Sanitize CSIZE and c_iflag MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit c069d2756c01ed36121fae6a42c14fdf1325c71d ] Only CS8 is supported but CSIZE was not sanitized to CS8. Set CSIZE correctly so that userspace knows the effective value. Incorrect CSIZE also results in miscalculation of the frame bits in tty_get_char_size() or in its predecessor where the roughly the same code is directly within uart_update_timeout(). Similarly, INPCK, PARMRK, and BRKINT are reported textually unsupported but were not cleared in termios c_iflag which is the machine-readable format. Fixes: 45c054d0815b (tty: serial: add driver for the SiFive UART) Cc: Paul Walmsley Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220519081808.3776-7-ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/tty/serial/sifive.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/sifive.c b/drivers/tty/serial/sifive.c index ec9bd2207271..7015632c4990 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/serial/sifive.c +++ b/drivers/tty/serial/sifive.c @@ -667,12 +667,16 @@ static void sifive_serial_set_termios(struct uart_port *port, int rate; char nstop; - if ((termios->c_cflag & CSIZE) != CS8) + if ((termios->c_cflag & CSIZE) != CS8) { dev_err_once(ssp->port.dev, "only 8-bit words supported\n"); + termios->c_cflag &= ~CSIZE; + termios->c_cflag |= CS8; + } if (termios->c_iflag & (INPCK | PARMRK)) dev_err_once(ssp->port.dev, "parity checking not supported\n"); if (termios->c_iflag & BRKINT) dev_err_once(ssp->port.dev, "BREAK detection not supported\n"); + termios->c_iflag &= ~(INPCK|PARMRK|BRKINT); /* Set number of stop bits */ nstop = (termios->c_cflag & CSTOPB) ? 2 : 1; From 29d963635ee6ed14f186d7b65e8ee2fc708b518e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Ilpo=20J=C3=A4rvinen?= Date: Thu, 19 May 2022 11:18:06 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 0313/1091] serial: st-asc: Sanitize CSIZE and correct PARENB for CS7 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit 52bb1cb7118564166b04d52387bd8403632f5190 ] Only CS7 and CS8 seem supported but CSIZE is not sanitized from CS5 or CS6 to CS8. In addition, ASC_CTL_MODE_7BIT_PAR suggests that CS7 has to have parity, thus add PARENB. Incorrect CSIZE results in miscalculation of the frame bits in tty_get_char_size() or in its predecessor where the roughly the same code is directly within uart_update_timeout(). Fixes: c4b058560762 (serial:st-asc: Add ST ASC driver.) Cc: Srinivas Kandagatla Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220519081808.3776-8-ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/tty/serial/st-asc.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/st-asc.c b/drivers/tty/serial/st-asc.c index 7971997cdead..ce35e3a131b1 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/serial/st-asc.c +++ b/drivers/tty/serial/st-asc.c @@ -540,10 +540,14 @@ static void asc_set_termios(struct uart_port *port, struct ktermios *termios, /* set character length */ if ((cflag & CSIZE) == CS7) { ctrl_val |= ASC_CTL_MODE_7BIT_PAR; + cflag |= PARENB; } else { ctrl_val |= (cflag & PARENB) ? ASC_CTL_MODE_8BIT_PAR : ASC_CTL_MODE_8BIT; + cflag &= ~CSIZE; + cflag |= CS8; } + termios->c_cflag = cflag; /* set stop bit */ ctrl_val |= (cflag & CSTOPB) ? ASC_CTL_STOP_2BIT : ASC_CTL_STOP_1BIT; From c3a16e7c862420e7aa1cc3c545693d13c426ee72 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Ilpo=20J=C3=A4rvinen?= Date: Thu, 19 May 2022 11:18:07 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 0314/1091] serial: stm32-usart: Correct CSIZE, bits, and parity MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit 1deeda8d2877c18bc2b9eeee10dd6d2628852848 ] Add CSIZE sanitization for unsupported CSIZE configurations. In addition, if parity is asked for but CSx was unsupported, the sensible result is CS8+parity which requires setting USART_CR1_M0 like with 9 bits. Incorrect CSIZE results in miscalculation of the frame bits in tty_get_char_size() or in its predecessor where the roughly the same code is directly within uart_update_timeout(). Fixes: c8a9d043947b (serial: stm32: fix word length configuration) Cc: Erwan Le Ray Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220519081808.3776-9-ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/tty/serial/stm32-usart.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/stm32-usart.c b/drivers/tty/serial/stm32-usart.c index d517b911cd04..d5a084ffde89 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/serial/stm32-usart.c +++ b/drivers/tty/serial/stm32-usart.c @@ -745,13 +745,22 @@ static void stm32_set_termios(struct uart_port *port, struct ktermios *termios, * CS8 or (CS7 + parity), 8 bits word aka [M1:M0] = 0b00 * M0 and M1 already cleared by cr1 initialization. */ - if (bits == 9) + if (bits == 9) { cr1 |= USART_CR1_M0; - else if ((bits == 7) && cfg->has_7bits_data) + } else if ((bits == 7) && cfg->has_7bits_data) { cr1 |= USART_CR1_M1; - else if (bits != 8) + } else if (bits != 8) { dev_dbg(port->dev, "Unsupported data bits config: %u bits\n" , bits); + cflag &= ~CSIZE; + cflag |= CS8; + termios->c_cflag = cflag; + bits = 8; + if (cflag & PARENB) { + bits++; + cr1 |= USART_CR1_M0; + } + } if (ofs->rtor != UNDEF_REG && (stm32_port->rx_ch || stm32_port->fifoen)) { From a724634b2a49f6ff0177a9e19a5a92fc1545e1b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miaoqian Lin Date: Wed, 11 May 2022 11:14:19 +0400 Subject: [PATCH 0315/1091] firmware: dmi-sysfs: Fix memory leak in dmi_sysfs_register_handle [ Upstream commit 660ba678f9998aca6db74f2dd912fa5124f0fa31 ] kobject_init_and_add() takes reference even when it fails. According to the doc of kobject_init_and_add() If this function returns an error, kobject_put() must be called to properly clean up the memory associated with the object. Fix this issue by calling kobject_put(). Fixes: 948af1f0bbc8 ("firmware: Basic dmi-sysfs support") Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220511071421.9769-1-linmq006@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/firmware/dmi-sysfs.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/firmware/dmi-sysfs.c b/drivers/firmware/dmi-sysfs.c index b6180023eba7..2858e05636e9 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/dmi-sysfs.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/dmi-sysfs.c @@ -603,7 +603,7 @@ static void __init dmi_sysfs_register_handle(const struct dmi_header *dh, "%d-%d", dh->type, entry->instance); if (*ret) { - kfree(entry); + kobject_put(&entry->kobj); return; } From 3157118c1795338ce27d484c5df5018f2624229e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tony Lindgren Date: Thu, 12 May 2022 08:30:21 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 0316/1091] bus: ti-sysc: Fix warnings for unbind for serial [ Upstream commit c337125b8834f9719dfda0e40b25eaa266f1b8cf ] We can get "failed to disable" clock_unprepare warnings on unbind at least for the serial console device if the unbind is done before the device has been idled. As some devices are using deferred idle, we must check the status for pending idle work to idle the device. Fixes: 76f0f772e469 ("bus: ti-sysc: Improve handling for no-reset-on-init and no-idle-on-init") Cc: Romain Naour Reviewed-by: Romain Naour Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220512053021.61650-1-tony@atomide.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/bus/ti-sysc.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/bus/ti-sysc.c b/drivers/bus/ti-sysc.c index 469ca73de4ce..44aeceaccfa4 100644 --- a/drivers/bus/ti-sysc.c +++ b/drivers/bus/ti-sysc.c @@ -2724,7 +2724,9 @@ static int sysc_remove(struct platform_device *pdev) struct sysc *ddata = platform_get_drvdata(pdev); int error; - cancel_delayed_work_sync(&ddata->idle_work); + /* Device can still be enabled, see deferred idle quirk in probe */ + if (cancel_delayed_work_sync(&ddata->idle_work)) + ti_sysc_idle(&ddata->idle_work.work); error = pm_runtime_get_sync(ddata->dev); if (error < 0) { From 5d709f58c743166fe1c6914b9de0ae8868600d9b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Schspa Shi Date: Fri, 13 May 2022 19:24:44 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0317/1091] driver: base: fix UAF when driver_attach failed [ Upstream commit 310862e574001a97ad02272bac0fd13f75f42a27 ] When driver_attach(drv); failed, the driver_private will be freed. But it has been added to the bus, which caused a UAF. To fix it, we need to delete it from the bus when failed. Fixes: 190888ac01d0 ("driver core: fix possible missing of device probe") Signed-off-by: Schspa Shi Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220513112444.45112-1-schspa@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/base/bus.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/base/bus.c b/drivers/base/bus.c index a1d1e8256324..7d7d28f498ed 100644 --- a/drivers/base/bus.c +++ b/drivers/base/bus.c @@ -620,7 +620,7 @@ int bus_add_driver(struct device_driver *drv) if (drv->bus->p->drivers_autoprobe) { error = driver_attach(drv); if (error) - goto out_unregister; + goto out_del_list; } module_add_driver(drv->owner, drv); @@ -647,6 +647,8 @@ int bus_add_driver(struct device_driver *drv) return 0; +out_del_list: + klist_del(&priv->knode_bus); out_unregister: kobject_put(&priv->kobj); /* drv->p is freed in driver_release() */ From 593b595332bd2d65e1a5c1ae7897996c157f5468 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zhang Wensheng Date: Wed, 18 May 2022 15:45:16 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0318/1091] driver core: fix deadlock in __device_attach [ Upstream commit b232b02bf3c205b13a26dcec08e53baddd8e59ed ] In __device_attach function, The lock holding logic is as follows: ... __device_attach device_lock(dev) // get lock dev async_schedule_dev(__device_attach_async_helper, dev); // func async_schedule_node async_schedule_node_domain(func) entry = kzalloc(sizeof(struct async_entry), GFP_ATOMIC); /* when fail or work limit, sync to execute func, but __device_attach_async_helper will get lock dev as well, which will lead to A-A deadlock. */ if (!entry || atomic_read(&entry_count) > MAX_WORK) { func; else queue_work_node(node, system_unbound_wq, &entry->work) device_unlock(dev) As shown above, when it is allowed to do async probes, because of out of memory or work limit, async work is not allowed, to do sync execute instead. it will lead to A-A deadlock because of __device_attach_async_helper getting lock dev. To fix the deadlock, move the async_schedule_dev outside device_lock, as we can see, in async_schedule_node_domain, the parameter of queue_work_node is system_unbound_wq, so it can accept concurrent operations. which will also not change the code logic, and will not lead to deadlock. Fixes: 765230b5f084 ("driver-core: add asynchronous probing support for drivers") Signed-off-by: Zhang Wensheng Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220518074516.1225580-1-zhangwensheng5@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/base/dd.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/base/dd.c b/drivers/base/dd.c index 26cd4ce3ac75..6f85280fef8d 100644 --- a/drivers/base/dd.c +++ b/drivers/base/dd.c @@ -873,6 +873,7 @@ out_unlock: static int __device_attach(struct device *dev, bool allow_async) { int ret = 0; + bool async = false; device_lock(dev); if (dev->p->dead) { @@ -911,7 +912,7 @@ static int __device_attach(struct device *dev, bool allow_async) */ dev_dbg(dev, "scheduling asynchronous probe\n"); get_device(dev); - async_schedule_dev(__device_attach_async_helper, dev); + async = true; } else { pm_request_idle(dev); } @@ -921,6 +922,8 @@ static int __device_attach(struct device *dev, bool allow_async) } out_unlock: device_unlock(dev); + if (async) + async_schedule_dev(__device_attach_async_helper, dev); return ret; } From 5b110d940417942bc87d9e4bea6d4f24e05ed483 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miaoqian Lin Date: Wed, 11 May 2022 15:42:03 +0400 Subject: [PATCH 0319/1091] watchdog: ts4800_wdt: Fix refcount leak in ts4800_wdt_probe [ Upstream commit 5d24df3d690809952528e7a19a43d84bc5b99d44 ] of_parse_phandle() returns a node pointer with refcount incremented, we should use of_node_put() on it when done. Add missing of_node_put() in some error paths. Fixes: bf9006399939 ("watchdog: ts4800: add driver for TS-4800 watchdog") Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin Reviewed-by: Guenter Roeck Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220511114203.47420-1-linmq006@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck Signed-off-by: Wim Van Sebroeck Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/watchdog/ts4800_wdt.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/watchdog/ts4800_wdt.c b/drivers/watchdog/ts4800_wdt.c index c137ad2bd5c3..0ea554c7cda5 100644 --- a/drivers/watchdog/ts4800_wdt.c +++ b/drivers/watchdog/ts4800_wdt.c @@ -125,13 +125,16 @@ static int ts4800_wdt_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) ret = of_property_read_u32_index(np, "syscon", 1, ®); if (ret < 0) { dev_err(dev, "no offset in syscon\n"); + of_node_put(syscon_np); return ret; } /* allocate memory for watchdog struct */ wdt = devm_kzalloc(dev, sizeof(*wdt), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!wdt) + if (!wdt) { + of_node_put(syscon_np); return -ENOMEM; + } /* set regmap and offset to know where to write */ wdt->feed_offset = reg; From e5d479d73f2127a58df84d3410565eb525270bf2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shengjiu Wang Date: Mon, 23 May 2022 13:44:21 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0320/1091] ASoC: fsl_sai: Fix FSL_SAI_xDR/xFR definition [ Upstream commit e4dd748dc87cf431af7b3954963be0d9f6150217 ] There are multiple xDR and xFR registers, the index is from 0 to 7. FSL_SAI_xDR and FSL_SAI_xFR is abandoned, replace them with FSL_SAI_xDR0 and FSL_SAI_xFR0. Fixes: 4f7a0728b530 ("ASoC: fsl_sai: Add support for SAI new version") Signed-off-by: Shengjiu Wang Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1653284661-18964-1-git-send-email-shengjiu.wang@nxp.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- sound/soc/fsl/fsl_sai.h | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/fsl/fsl_sai.h b/sound/soc/fsl/fsl_sai.h index 677ecfc1ec68..afaef2027234 100644 --- a/sound/soc/fsl/fsl_sai.h +++ b/sound/soc/fsl/fsl_sai.h @@ -67,8 +67,8 @@ #define FSL_SAI_xCR3(tx, ofs) (tx ? FSL_SAI_TCR3(ofs) : FSL_SAI_RCR3(ofs)) #define FSL_SAI_xCR4(tx, ofs) (tx ? FSL_SAI_TCR4(ofs) : FSL_SAI_RCR4(ofs)) #define FSL_SAI_xCR5(tx, ofs) (tx ? FSL_SAI_TCR5(ofs) : FSL_SAI_RCR5(ofs)) -#define FSL_SAI_xDR(tx, ofs) (tx ? FSL_SAI_TDR(ofs) : FSL_SAI_RDR(ofs)) -#define FSL_SAI_xFR(tx, ofs) (tx ? FSL_SAI_TFR(ofs) : FSL_SAI_RFR(ofs)) +#define FSL_SAI_xDR0(tx) (tx ? FSL_SAI_TDR0 : FSL_SAI_RDR0) +#define FSL_SAI_xFR0(tx) (tx ? FSL_SAI_TFR0 : FSL_SAI_RFR0) #define FSL_SAI_xMR(tx) (tx ? FSL_SAI_TMR : FSL_SAI_RMR) /* SAI Transmit/Receive Control Register */ From 80f6712f241c4c4937fc93a4d163120bb457007a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Krzysztof Kozlowski Date: Fri, 22 Apr 2022 12:41:01 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0321/1091] clocksource/drivers/oxnas-rps: Fix irq_of_parse_and_map() return value [ Upstream commit 9c04a8ff03def4df3f81219ffbe1ec9b44ff5348 ] The irq_of_parse_and_map() returns 0 on failure, not a negative ERRNO. Fixes: 89355274e1f7 ("clocksource/drivers/oxnas-rps: Add Oxford Semiconductor RPS Dual Timer") Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski Reviewed-by: Neil Armstrong Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220422104101.55754-1-krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Lezcano Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/clocksource/timer-oxnas-rps.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/clocksource/timer-oxnas-rps.c b/drivers/clocksource/timer-oxnas-rps.c index 56c0cc32d0ac..d514b44e67dd 100644 --- a/drivers/clocksource/timer-oxnas-rps.c +++ b/drivers/clocksource/timer-oxnas-rps.c @@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ static int __init oxnas_rps_timer_init(struct device_node *np) } rps->irq = irq_of_parse_and_map(np, 0); - if (rps->irq < 0) { + if (!rps->irq) { ret = -EINVAL; goto err_iomap; } From 51ed32c1cfcf58a9b6da7885c009846add6c5abf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jann Horn Date: Tue, 17 May 2022 16:30:47 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0322/1091] s390/crypto: fix scatterwalk_unmap() callers in AES-GCM [ Upstream commit bd52cd5e23f134019b23f0c389db0f9a436e4576 ] The argument of scatterwalk_unmap() is supposed to be the void* that was returned by the previous scatterwalk_map() call. The s390 AES-GCM implementation was instead passing the pointer to the struct scatter_walk. This doesn't actually break anything because scatterwalk_unmap() only uses its argument under CONFIG_HIGHMEM and ARCH_HAS_FLUSH_ON_KUNMAP. Fixes: bf7fa038707c ("s390/crypto: add s390 platform specific aes gcm support.") Signed-off-by: Jann Horn Acked-by: Harald Freudenberger Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220517143047.3054498-1-jannh@google.com Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/s390/crypto/aes_s390.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/aes_s390.c b/arch/s390/crypto/aes_s390.c index 9803e96d2924..558cfe570ccf 100644 --- a/arch/s390/crypto/aes_s390.c +++ b/arch/s390/crypto/aes_s390.c @@ -861,7 +861,7 @@ static inline void _gcm_sg_unmap_and_advance(struct gcm_sg_walk *gw, unsigned int nbytes) { gw->walk_bytes_remain -= nbytes; - scatterwalk_unmap(&gw->walk); + scatterwalk_unmap(gw->walk_ptr); scatterwalk_advance(&gw->walk, nbytes); scatterwalk_done(&gw->walk, 0, gw->walk_bytes_remain); gw->walk_ptr = NULL; @@ -936,7 +936,7 @@ static int gcm_out_walk_go(struct gcm_sg_walk *gw, unsigned int minbytesneeded) goto out; } - scatterwalk_unmap(&gw->walk); + scatterwalk_unmap(gw->walk_ptr); gw->walk_ptr = NULL; gw->ptr = gw->buf; From be73e3bf68620db7dba698c92e33b45bf8bff79f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vincent Ray Date: Wed, 25 May 2022 17:17:46 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0323/1091] net: sched: fixed barrier to prevent skbuff sticking in qdisc backlog [ Upstream commit a54ce3703613e41fe1d98060b62ec09a3984dc28 ] In qdisc_run_begin(), smp_mb__before_atomic() used before test_bit() does not provide any ordering guarantee as test_bit() is not an atomic operation. This, added to the fact that the spin_trylock() call at the beginning of qdisc_run_begin() does not guarantee acquire semantics if it does not grab the lock, makes it possible for the following statement : if (test_bit(__QDISC_STATE_MISSED, &qdisc->state)) to be executed before an enqueue operation called before qdisc_run_begin(). As a result the following race can happen : CPU 1 CPU 2 qdisc_run_begin() qdisc_run_begin() /* true */ set(MISSED) . /* returns false */ . . /* sees MISSED = 1 */ . /* so qdisc not empty */ . __qdisc_run() . . . pfifo_fast_dequeue() ----> /* may be done here */ . | . clear(MISSED) | . . | . smp_mb __after_atomic(); | . . | . /* recheck the queue */ | . /* nothing => exit */ | enqueue(skb1) | . | qdisc_run_begin() | . | spin_trylock() /* fail */ | . | smp_mb__before_atomic() /* not enough */ | . ---- if (test_bit(MISSED)) return false; /* exit */ In the above scenario, CPU 1 and CPU 2 both try to grab the qdisc->seqlock at the same time. Only CPU 2 succeeds and enters the bypass code path, where it emits its skb then calls __qdisc_run(). CPU1 fails, sets MISSED and goes down the traditionnal enqueue() + dequeue() code path. But when executing qdisc_run_begin() for the second time, after enqueuing its skbuff, it sees the MISSED bit still set (by itself) and consequently chooses to exit early without setting it again nor trying to grab the spinlock again. Meanwhile CPU2 has seen MISSED = 1, cleared it, checked the queue and found it empty, so it returned. At the end of the sequence, we end up with skb1 enqueued in the backlog, both CPUs out of __dev_xmit_skb(), the MISSED bit not set, and no __netif_schedule() called made. skb1 will now linger in the qdisc until somebody later performs a full __qdisc_run(). Associated to the bypass capacity of the qdisc, and the ability of the TCP layer to avoid resending packets which it knows are still in the qdisc, this can lead to serious traffic "holes" in a TCP connection. We fix this by replacing the smp_mb__before_atomic() / test_bit() / set_bit() / smp_mb__after_atomic() sequence inside qdisc_run_begin() by a single test_and_set_bit() call, which is more concise and enforces the needed memory barriers. Fixes: 89837eb4b246 ("net: sched: add barrier to ensure correct ordering for lockless qdisc") Signed-off-by: Vincent Ray Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220526001746.2437669-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- include/net/sch_generic.h | 36 ++++++++---------------------------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/sch_generic.h b/include/net/sch_generic.h index ae69059ba76d..90fb413d9fd7 100644 --- a/include/net/sch_generic.h +++ b/include/net/sch_generic.h @@ -160,37 +160,17 @@ static inline bool qdisc_run_begin(struct Qdisc *qdisc) if (spin_trylock(&qdisc->seqlock)) goto nolock_empty; - /* Paired with smp_mb__after_atomic() to make sure - * STATE_MISSED checking is synchronized with clearing - * in pfifo_fast_dequeue(). + /* No need to insist if the MISSED flag was already set. + * Note that test_and_set_bit() also gives us memory ordering + * guarantees wrt potential earlier enqueue() and below + * spin_trylock(), both of which are necessary to prevent races */ - smp_mb__before_atomic(); - - /* If the MISSED flag is set, it means other thread has - * set the MISSED flag before second spin_trylock(), so - * we can return false here to avoid multi cpus doing - * the set_bit() and second spin_trylock() concurrently. - */ - if (test_bit(__QDISC_STATE_MISSED, &qdisc->state)) + if (test_and_set_bit(__QDISC_STATE_MISSED, &qdisc->state)) return false; - /* Set the MISSED flag before the second spin_trylock(), - * if the second spin_trylock() return false, it means - * other cpu holding the lock will do dequeuing for us - * or it will see the MISSED flag set after releasing - * lock and reschedule the net_tx_action() to do the - * dequeuing. - */ - set_bit(__QDISC_STATE_MISSED, &qdisc->state); - - /* spin_trylock() only has load-acquire semantic, so use - * smp_mb__after_atomic() to ensure STATE_MISSED is set - * before doing the second spin_trylock(). - */ - smp_mb__after_atomic(); - - /* Retry again in case other CPU may not see the new flag - * after it releases the lock at the end of qdisc_run_end(). + /* Try to take the lock again to make sure that we will either + * grab it or the CPU that still has it will see MISSED set + * when testing it in qdisc_run_end() */ if (!spin_trylock(&qdisc->seqlock)) return false; From 2bd1faedb74dc2a2be3972abcd4239b75a3e7b00 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dan Carpenter Date: Thu, 26 May 2022 11:02:42 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 0324/1091] net: ethernet: mtk_eth_soc: out of bounds read in mtk_hwlro_get_fdir_entry() [ Upstream commit e7e7104e2d5ddf3806a28695670f21bef471f1e1 ] The "fsp->location" variable comes from user via ethtool_get_rxnfc(). Check that it is valid to prevent an out of bounds read. Fixes: 7aab747e5563 ("net: ethernet: mediatek: add ethtool functions to configure RX flows of HW LRO") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/mediatek/mtk_eth_soc.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mediatek/mtk_eth_soc.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mediatek/mtk_eth_soc.c index 3351d4f9363a..5dce4cd60f58 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mediatek/mtk_eth_soc.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mediatek/mtk_eth_soc.c @@ -1962,6 +1962,9 @@ static int mtk_hwlro_get_fdir_entry(struct net_device *dev, struct ethtool_rx_flow_spec *fsp = (struct ethtool_rx_flow_spec *)&cmd->fs; + if (fsp->location >= ARRAY_SIZE(mac->hwlro_ip)) + return -EINVAL; + /* only tcp dst ipv4 is meaningful, others are meaningless */ fsp->flow_type = TCP_V4_FLOW; fsp->h_u.tcp_ip4_spec.ip4dst = ntohl(mac->hwlro_ip[fsp->location]); From a101793994c0a14c70bb4e44c7fda597eeebba0a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miaoqian Lin Date: Thu, 26 May 2022 18:52:08 +0400 Subject: [PATCH 0325/1091] net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: Fix refcount leak in mv88e6xxx_mdios_register MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit 02ded5a173619b11728b8bf75a3fd995a2c1ff28 ] of_get_child_by_name() returns a node pointer with refcount incremented, we should use of_node_put() on it when done. mv88e6xxx_mdio_register() pass the device node to of_mdiobus_register(). We don't need the device node after it. Add missing of_node_put() to avoid refcount leak. Fixes: a3c53be55c95 ("net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: Support multiple MDIO busses") Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin Reviewed-by: Marek Behún Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.c b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.c index 87d28ef82559..b336ed071fa8 100644 --- a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.c +++ b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.c @@ -2910,6 +2910,7 @@ static int mv88e6xxx_mdios_register(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, */ child = of_get_child_by_name(np, "mdio"); err = mv88e6xxx_mdio_register(chip, child, false); + of_node_put(child); if (err) return err; From acf92b525723849de23bd02863b8d3295b9be61f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexander Lobakin Date: Tue, 24 May 2022 17:27:18 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0326/1091] modpost: fix removing numeric suffixes [ Upstream commit b5beffa20d83c4e15306c991ffd00de0d8628338 ] With the `-z unique-symbol` linker flag or any similar mechanism, it is possible to trigger the following: ERROR: modpost: "param_set_uint.0" [vmlinux] is a static EXPORT_SYMBOL The reason is that for now the condition from remove_dot(): if (m && (s[n + m] == '.' || s[n + m] == 0)) which was designed to test if it's a dot or a '\0' after the suffix is never satisfied. This is due to that `s[n + m]` always points to the last digit of a numeric suffix, not on the symbol next to it (from a custom debug print added to modpost): param_set_uint.0, s[n + m] is '0', s[n + m + 1] is '\0' So it's off-by-one and was like that since 2014. Fix this for the sake of any potential upcoming features, but don't bother stable-backporting, as it's well hidden -- apart from that LD flag, it can be triggered only with GCC LTO which never landed upstream. Fixes: fcd38ed0ff26 ("scripts: modpost: fix compilation warning") Signed-off-by: Alexander Lobakin Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- scripts/mod/modpost.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/scripts/mod/modpost.c b/scripts/mod/modpost.c index 13cda6aa2688..74e2052f429d 100644 --- a/scripts/mod/modpost.c +++ b/scripts/mod/modpost.c @@ -1998,7 +1998,7 @@ static char *remove_dot(char *s) if (n && s[n]) { size_t m = strspn(s + n + 1, "0123456789"); - if (m && (s[n + m] == '.' || s[n + m] == 0)) + if (m && (s[n + m + 1] == '.' || s[n + m + 1] == 0)) s[n] = 0; } return s; From d3a4fff1e7e408c32649030daa7c2c42a7e19a95 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Baokun Li Date: Tue, 12 Apr 2022 17:38:16 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0327/1091] jffs2: fix memory leak in jffs2_do_fill_super [ Upstream commit c14adb1cf70a984ed081c67e9d27bc3caad9537c ] If jffs2_iget() or d_make_root() in jffs2_do_fill_super() returns an error, we can observe the following kmemleak report: -------------------------------------------- unreferenced object 0xffff888105a65340 (size 64): comm "mount", pid 710, jiffies 4302851558 (age 58.239s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ backtrace: [] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x475/0x8a0 [] jffs2_sum_init+0x96/0x1a0 [] jffs2_do_mount_fs+0x745/0x2120 [] jffs2_do_fill_super+0x35c/0x810 [] jffs2_fill_super+0x2b9/0x3b0 [...] unreferenced object 0xffff8881bd7f0000 (size 65536): comm "mount", pid 710, jiffies 4302851558 (age 58.239s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb ................ bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb ................ backtrace: [] kmalloc_order+0xda/0x110 [] kmalloc_order_trace+0x21/0x130 [] __kmalloc+0x711/0x8a0 [] jffs2_sum_init+0xd9/0x1a0 [] jffs2_do_mount_fs+0x745/0x2120 [] jffs2_do_fill_super+0x35c/0x810 [] jffs2_fill_super+0x2b9/0x3b0 [...] -------------------------------------------- This is because the resources allocated in jffs2_sum_init() are not released. Call jffs2_sum_exit() to release these resources to solve the problem. Fixes: e631ddba5887 ("[JFFS2] Add erase block summary support (mount time improvement)") Signed-off-by: Baokun Li Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/jffs2/fs.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/fs/jffs2/fs.c b/fs/jffs2/fs.c index ad1eba809e7e..ee2282b8c7a7 100644 --- a/fs/jffs2/fs.c +++ b/fs/jffs2/fs.c @@ -603,6 +603,7 @@ out_root: jffs2_free_raw_node_refs(c); kvfree(c->blocks); jffs2_clear_xattr_subsystem(c); + jffs2_sum_exit(c); out_inohash: kfree(c->inocache_list); out_wbuf: From 8302620aeb940f386817321d272b12411ae7d39f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zhihao Cheng Date: Tue, 10 May 2022 20:31:26 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0328/1091] ubi: ubi_create_volume: Fix use-after-free when volume creation failed [ Upstream commit 8c03a1c21d72210f81cb369cc528e3fde4b45411 ] There is an use-after-free problem for 'eba_tbl' in ubi_create_volume()'s error handling path: ubi_eba_replace_table(vol, eba_tbl) vol->eba_tbl = tbl out_mapping: ubi_eba_destroy_table(eba_tbl) // Free 'eba_tbl' out_unlock: put_device(&vol->dev) vol_release kfree(tbl->entries) // UAF Fix it by removing redundant 'eba_tbl' releasing. Fetch a reproducer in [Link]. Fixes: 493cfaeaa0c9b ("mtd: utilize new cdev_device_add helper function") Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=215965 Signed-off-by: Zhihao Cheng Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/mtd/ubi/vmt.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/mtd/ubi/vmt.c b/drivers/mtd/ubi/vmt.c index 1bc7b3a05604..6ea95ade4ca6 100644 --- a/drivers/mtd/ubi/vmt.c +++ b/drivers/mtd/ubi/vmt.c @@ -309,7 +309,6 @@ out_mapping: ubi->volumes[vol_id] = NULL; ubi->vol_count -= 1; spin_unlock(&ubi->volumes_lock); - ubi_eba_destroy_table(eba_tbl); out_acc: spin_lock(&ubi->volumes_lock); ubi->rsvd_pebs -= vol->reserved_pebs; From 00803d30518f9daf101ba6ac7ff5fcab5c20a7a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yu Xiao Date: Fri, 27 May 2022 20:24:24 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0329/1091] nfp: only report pause frame configuration for physical device [ Upstream commit 0649e4d63420ebc8cbebef3e9d39e12ffc5eb9fa ] Only report pause frame configuration for physical device. Logical port of both PCI PF and PCI VF do not support it. Fixes: 9fdc5d85a8fe ("nfp: update ethtool reporting of pauseframe control") Signed-off-by: Yu Xiao Signed-off-by: Simon Horman Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/netronome/nfp/nfp_net_ethtool.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/netronome/nfp/nfp_net_ethtool.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/netronome/nfp/nfp_net_ethtool.c index 89e578e25ff8..10857914c552 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/netronome/nfp/nfp_net_ethtool.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/netronome/nfp/nfp_net_ethtool.c @@ -266,8 +266,6 @@ nfp_net_get_link_ksettings(struct net_device *netdev, /* Init to unknowns */ ethtool_link_ksettings_add_link_mode(cmd, supported, FIBRE); - ethtool_link_ksettings_add_link_mode(cmd, supported, Pause); - ethtool_link_ksettings_add_link_mode(cmd, advertising, Pause); cmd->base.port = PORT_OTHER; cmd->base.speed = SPEED_UNKNOWN; cmd->base.duplex = DUPLEX_UNKNOWN; @@ -275,6 +273,8 @@ nfp_net_get_link_ksettings(struct net_device *netdev, port = nfp_port_from_netdev(netdev); eth_port = nfp_port_get_eth_port(port); if (eth_port) { + ethtool_link_ksettings_add_link_mode(cmd, supported, Pause); + ethtool_link_ksettings_add_link_mode(cmd, advertising, Pause); cmd->base.autoneg = eth_port->aneg != NFP_ANEG_DISABLED ? AUTONEG_ENABLE : AUTONEG_DISABLE; nfp_net_set_fec_link_mode(eth_port, cmd); From a4c52440acf4fdb5f08cf6b66474d16ed75608e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Leon Romanovsky Date: Tue, 24 May 2022 15:59:27 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 0330/1091] net/mlx5: Don't use already freed action pointer [ Upstream commit 80b2bd737d0e833e6a2b77e482e5a714a79c86a4 ] The call to mlx5dr_action_destroy() releases "action" memory. That pointer is set to miss_action later and generates the following smatch error: drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/steering/fs_dr.c:53 set_miss_action() warn: 'action' was already freed. Make sure that the pointer is always valid by setting NULL after destroy. Fixes: 6a48faeeca10 ("net/mlx5: Add direct rule fs_cmd implementation") Reported-by: Dan Carpenter Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/steering/fs_dr.c | 9 ++++----- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/steering/fs_dr.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/steering/fs_dr.c index 348f02e336f6..d64368506754 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/steering/fs_dr.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/steering/fs_dr.c @@ -43,11 +43,10 @@ static int set_miss_action(struct mlx5_flow_root_namespace *ns, err = mlx5dr_table_set_miss_action(ft->fs_dr_table.dr_table, action); if (err && action) { err = mlx5dr_action_destroy(action); - if (err) { - action = NULL; - mlx5_core_err(ns->dev, "Failed to destroy action (%d)\n", - err); - } + if (err) + mlx5_core_err(ns->dev, + "Failed to destroy action (%d)\n", err); + action = NULL; } ft->fs_dr_table.miss_action = action; if (old_miss_action) { From 77b954ce2d64b111b540876a32e60f43ce286c3a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Maxim Mikityanskiy Date: Mon, 23 May 2022 15:39:13 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 0331/1091] net/mlx5e: Update netdev features after changing XDP state [ Upstream commit f6279f113ad593971999c877eb69dc3d36a75894 ] Some features (LRO, HW GRO) conflict with XDP. If there is an attempt to enable such features while XDP is active, they will be set to `off [requested on]`. In order to activate these features after XDP is turned off, the driver needs to call netdev_update_features(). This commit adds this missing call after XDP state changes. Fixes: cf6e34c8c22f ("net/mlx5e: Properly block LRO when XDP is enabled") Fixes: b0617e7b3500 ("net/mlx5e: Properly block HW GRO when XDP is enabled") Signed-off-by: Maxim Mikityanskiy Reviewed-by: Tariq Toukan Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c index 73291051808f..35630b538c82 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c @@ -4638,6 +4638,11 @@ static int mlx5e_xdp_set(struct net_device *netdev, struct bpf_prog *prog) unlock: mutex_unlock(&priv->state_lock); + + /* Need to fix some features. */ + if (!err) + netdev_update_features(netdev); + return err; } From 1bd2f7f38bace42895d2989b4baa202361ac06c5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Guoju Fang Date: Sat, 28 May 2022 18:16:28 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0332/1091] net: sched: add barrier to fix packet stuck problem for lockless qdisc [ Upstream commit 2e8728c955ce0624b958eee6e030a37aca3a5d86 ] In qdisc_run_end(), the spin_unlock() only has store-release semantic, which guarantees all earlier memory access are visible before it. But the subsequent test_bit() has no barrier semantics so may be reordered ahead of the spin_unlock(). The store-load reordering may cause a packet stuck problem. The concurrent operations can be described as below, CPU 0 | CPU 1 qdisc_run_end() | qdisc_run_begin() . | . ----> /* may be reorderd here */ | . | . | . | spin_unlock() | set_bit() | . | smp_mb__after_atomic() ---- test_bit() | spin_trylock() . | . Consider the following sequence of events: CPU 0 reorder test_bit() ahead and see MISSED = 0 CPU 1 calls set_bit() CPU 1 calls spin_trylock() and return fail CPU 0 executes spin_unlock() At the end of the sequence, CPU 0 calls spin_unlock() and does nothing because it see MISSED = 0. The skb on CPU 1 has beed enqueued but no one take it, until the next cpu pushing to the qdisc (if ever ...) will notice and dequeue it. This patch fix this by adding one explicit barrier. As spin_unlock() and test_bit() ordering is a store-load ordering, a full memory barrier smp_mb() is needed here. Fixes: a90c57f2cedd ("net: sched: fix packet stuck problem for lockless qdisc") Signed-off-by: Guoju Fang Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220528101628.120193-1-gjfang@linux.alibaba.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- include/net/sch_generic.h | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/net/sch_generic.h b/include/net/sch_generic.h index 90fb413d9fd7..1ee396ce0eda 100644 --- a/include/net/sch_generic.h +++ b/include/net/sch_generic.h @@ -194,6 +194,12 @@ static inline void qdisc_run_end(struct Qdisc *qdisc) if (qdisc->flags & TCQ_F_NOLOCK) { spin_unlock(&qdisc->seqlock); + /* spin_unlock() only has store-release semantic. The unlock + * and test_bit() ordering is a store-load ordering, so a full + * memory barrier is needed here. + */ + smp_mb(); + if (unlikely(test_bit(__QDISC_STATE_MISSED, &qdisc->state))) { clear_bit(__QDISC_STATE_MISSED, &qdisc->state); From d05c2fdf8e10528bb6751bd95243e862d5402a9b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Mon, 30 May 2022 14:37:13 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0333/1091] tcp: tcp_rtx_synack() can be called from process context [ Upstream commit 0a375c822497ed6ad6b5da0792a12a6f1af10c0b ] Laurent reported the enclosed report [1] This bug triggers with following coditions: 0) Kernel built with CONFIG_DEBUG_PREEMPT=y 1) A new passive FastOpen TCP socket is created. This FO socket waits for an ACK coming from client to be a complete ESTABLISHED one. 2) A socket operation on this socket goes through lock_sock() release_sock() dance. 3) While the socket is owned by the user in step 2), a retransmit of the SYN is received and stored in socket backlog. 4) At release_sock() time, the socket backlog is processed while in process context. 5) A SYNACK packet is cooked in response of the SYN retransmit. 6) -> tcp_rtx_synack() is called in process context. Before blamed commit, tcp_rtx_synack() was always called from BH handler, from a timer handler. Fix this by using TCP_INC_STATS() & NET_INC_STATS() which do not assume caller is in non preemptible context. [1] BUG: using __this_cpu_add() in preemptible [00000000] code: epollpep/2180 caller is tcp_rtx_synack.part.0+0x36/0xc0 CPU: 10 PID: 2180 Comm: epollpep Tainted: G OE 5.16.0-0.bpo.4-amd64 #1 Debian 5.16.12-1~bpo11+1 Hardware name: Supermicro SYS-5039MC-H8TRF/X11SCD-F, BIOS 1.7 11/23/2021 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x48/0x5e check_preemption_disabled+0xde/0xe0 tcp_rtx_synack.part.0+0x36/0xc0 tcp_rtx_synack+0x8d/0xa0 ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x2e0/0x3e0 ? apparmor_file_alloc_security+0x3b/0x1f0 inet_rtx_syn_ack+0x16/0x30 tcp_check_req+0x367/0x610 tcp_rcv_state_process+0x91/0xf60 ? get_nohz_timer_target+0x18/0x1a0 ? lock_timer_base+0x61/0x80 ? preempt_count_add+0x68/0xa0 tcp_v4_do_rcv+0xbd/0x270 __release_sock+0x6d/0xb0 release_sock+0x2b/0x90 sock_setsockopt+0x138/0x1140 ? __sys_getsockname+0x7e/0xc0 ? aa_sk_perm+0x3e/0x1a0 __sys_setsockopt+0x198/0x1e0 __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x21/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x38/0xc0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Fixes: 168a8f58059a ("tcp: TCP Fast Open Server - main code path") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reported-by: Laurent Fasnacht Acked-by: Neal Cardwell Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220530213713.601888-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c index 67493ec6318a..739fc69cdcc6 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c @@ -3869,8 +3869,8 @@ int tcp_rtx_synack(const struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req) tcp_rsk(req)->txhash = net_tx_rndhash(); res = af_ops->send_synack(sk, NULL, &fl, req, NULL, TCP_SYNACK_NORMAL); if (!res) { - __TCP_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), TCP_MIB_RETRANSSEGS); - __NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPSYNRETRANS); + TCP_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), TCP_MIB_RETRANSSEGS); + NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPSYNRETRANS); if (unlikely(tcp_passive_fastopen(sk))) tcp_sk(sk)->total_retrans++; trace_tcp_retransmit_synack(sk, req); From c2eba68d185b3bcc261859db42672f13c51f32a8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Howells Date: Tue, 31 May 2022 09:30:40 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0334/1091] afs: Fix infinite loop found by xfstest generic/676 [ Upstream commit 17eabd42560f4636648ad65ba5b20228071e2363 ] In AFS, a directory is handled as a file that the client downloads and parses locally for the purposes of performing lookup and getdents operations. The in-kernel afs filesystem has a number of functions that do this. A directory file is arranged as a series of 2K blocks divided into 32-byte slots, where a directory entry occupies one or more slots, plus each block starts with one or more metadata blocks. When parsing a block, if the last slots are occupied by a dirent that occupies more than a single slot and the file position points at a slot that's not the initial one, the logic in afs_dir_iterate_block() that skips over it won't advance the file pointer to the end of it. This will cause an infinite loop in getdents() as it will keep retrying that block and failing to advance beyond the final entry. Fix this by advancing the file pointer if the next entry will be beyond it when we skip a block. This was found by the generic/676 xfstest but can also be triggered with something like: ~/xfstests-dev/src/t_readdir_3 /xfstest.test/z 4000 1 Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: David Howells Reviewed-by: Marc Dionne Tested-by: Marc Dionne cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org Link: http://lore.kernel.org/r/165391973497.110268.2939296942213894166.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/afs/dir.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/afs/dir.c b/fs/afs/dir.c index 8c39533d122a..3a355a209919 100644 --- a/fs/afs/dir.c +++ b/fs/afs/dir.c @@ -415,8 +415,11 @@ static int afs_dir_iterate_block(struct afs_vnode *dvnode, } /* skip if starts before the current position */ - if (offset < curr) + if (offset < curr) { + if (next > curr) + ctx->pos = blkoff + next * sizeof(union afs_xdr_dirent); continue; + } /* found the next entry */ if (!dir_emit(ctx, dire->u.name, nlen, From 8b91d0dfc839e67708c905648cd0e7507a2263e5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hoang Le Date: Thu, 2 Jun 2022 13:30:53 +0700 Subject: [PATCH 0335/1091] tipc: check attribute length for bearer name [ Upstream commit 7f36f798f89bf32c0164049cb0e3fd1af613d0bb ] syzbot reported uninit-value: ===================================================== BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in string_nocheck lib/vsprintf.c:644 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in string+0x4f9/0x6f0 lib/vsprintf.c:725 string_nocheck lib/vsprintf.c:644 [inline] string+0x4f9/0x6f0 lib/vsprintf.c:725 vsnprintf+0x2222/0x3650 lib/vsprintf.c:2806 vprintk_store+0x537/0x2150 kernel/printk/printk.c:2158 vprintk_emit+0x28b/0xab0 kernel/printk/printk.c:2256 vprintk_default+0x86/0xa0 kernel/printk/printk.c:2283 vprintk+0x15f/0x180 kernel/printk/printk_safe.c:50 _printk+0x18d/0x1cf kernel/printk/printk.c:2293 tipc_enable_bearer net/tipc/bearer.c:371 [inline] __tipc_nl_bearer_enable+0x2022/0x22a0 net/tipc/bearer.c:1033 tipc_nl_bearer_enable+0x6c/0xb0 net/tipc/bearer.c:1042 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit net/netlink/genetlink.c:731 [inline] - Do sanity check the attribute length for TIPC_NLA_BEARER_NAME. - Do not use 'illegal name' in printing message. Reported-by: syzbot+e820fdc8ce362f2dea51@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: cb30a63384bc ("tipc: refactor function tipc_enable_bearer()") Acked-by: Jon Maloy Signed-off-by: Hoang Le Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220602063053.5892-1-hoang.h.le@dektech.com.au Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/tipc/bearer.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/tipc/bearer.c b/net/tipc/bearer.c index 8bd2454cc89d..577f71dd63fb 100644 --- a/net/tipc/bearer.c +++ b/net/tipc/bearer.c @@ -248,9 +248,8 @@ static int tipc_enable_bearer(struct net *net, const char *name, u32 i; if (!bearer_name_validate(name, &b_names)) { - errstr = "illegal name"; NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Illegal name"); - goto rejected; + return res; } if (prio > TIPC_MAX_LINK_PRI && prio != TIPC_MEDIA_LINK_PRI) { From ff66ae4359ff16f0d334470469d8c99478680743 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Leo Yan Date: Mon, 30 May 2022 16:42:53 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0336/1091] perf c2c: Fix sorting in percent_rmt_hitm_cmp() [ Upstream commit b24192a17337abbf3f44aaa75e15df14a2d0016e ] The function percent_rmt_hitm_cmp() wrongly uses local HITMs for sorting remote HITMs. Since this function is to sort cache lines for remote HITMs, this patch changes to use 'rmt_hitm' field for correct sorting. Fixes: 9cb3500afc0980c5 ("perf c2c report: Add hitm/store percent related sort keys") Signed-off-by: Leo Yan Acked-by: Namhyung Kim Cc: Alexander Shishkin Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Jiri Olsa Cc: Joe Mario Cc: Mark Rutland Cc: Peter Zijlstra Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220530084253.750190-1-leo.yan@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- tools/perf/builtin-c2c.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/perf/builtin-c2c.c b/tools/perf/builtin-c2c.c index d3e0ea06d78d..29d460c30176 100644 --- a/tools/perf/builtin-c2c.c +++ b/tools/perf/builtin-c2c.c @@ -953,8 +953,8 @@ percent_rmt_hitm_cmp(struct perf_hpp_fmt *fmt __maybe_unused, double per_left; double per_right; - per_left = PERCENT(left, lcl_hitm); - per_right = PERCENT(right, lcl_hitm); + per_left = PERCENT(left, rmt_hitm); + per_right = PERCENT(right, rmt_hitm); return per_left - per_right; } From cc0aed22d33ced9e266c50bdf1cbe668c5acfdf8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gong Yuanjun Date: Thu, 7 Apr 2022 12:26:57 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0337/1091] mips: cpc: Fix refcount leak in mips_cpc_default_phys_base [ Upstream commit 4107fa700f314592850e2c64608f6ede4c077476 ] Add the missing of_node_put() to release the refcount incremented by of_find_compatible_node(). Signed-off-by: Gong Yuanjun Reviewed-by: Serge Semin Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/mips/kernel/mips-cpc.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/mips-cpc.c b/arch/mips/kernel/mips-cpc.c index 69e3e0b556bf..1b0d4bb617a9 100644 --- a/arch/mips/kernel/mips-cpc.c +++ b/arch/mips/kernel/mips-cpc.c @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ phys_addr_t __weak mips_cpc_default_phys_base(void) cpc_node = of_find_compatible_node(of_root, NULL, "mti,mips-cpc"); if (cpc_node) { err = of_address_to_resource(cpc_node, 0, &res); + of_node_put(cpc_node); if (!err) return res.start; } From 48c6ee7d6c614f09b2c8553a95eefef6ecf196e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jun Miao Date: Tue, 19 Apr 2022 09:39:10 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0338/1091] tracing: Fix sleeping function called from invalid context on RT kernel [ Upstream commit 12025abdc8539ed9d5014e2d647a3fd1bd3de5cd ] When setting bootparams="trace_event=initcall:initcall_start tp_printk=1" in the cmdline, the output_printk() was called, and the spin_lock_irqsave() was called in the atomic and irq disable interrupt context suitation. On the PREEMPT_RT kernel, these locks are replaced with sleepable rt-spinlock, so the stack calltrace will be triggered. Fix it by raw_spin_lock_irqsave when PREEMPT_RT and "trace_event=initcall:initcall_start tp_printk=1" enabled. BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:46 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 1, name: swapper/0 preempt_count: 2, expected: 0 RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0 Preemption disabled at: [] try_to_wake_up+0x7e/0xba0 CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.17.1-rt17+ #19 34c5812404187a875f32bee7977f7367f9679ea7 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0x8c dump_stack+0x10/0x12 __might_resched.cold+0x11d/0x155 rt_spin_lock+0x40/0x70 trace_event_buffer_commit+0x2fa/0x4c0 ? map_vsyscall+0x93/0x93 trace_event_raw_event_initcall_start+0xbe/0x110 ? perf_trace_initcall_finish+0x210/0x210 ? probe_sched_wakeup+0x34/0x40 ? ttwu_do_wakeup+0xda/0x310 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x35/0x170 ? map_vsyscall+0x93/0x93 do_one_initcall+0x217/0x3c0 ? trace_event_raw_event_initcall_level+0x170/0x170 ? push_cpu_stop+0x400/0x400 ? cblist_init_generic+0x241/0x290 kernel_init_freeable+0x1ac/0x347 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x65/0x80 ? rest_init+0xf0/0xf0 kernel_init+0x1e/0x150 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220419013910.894370-1-jun.miao@intel.com Signed-off-by: Jun Miao Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- kernel/trace/trace.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace.c b/kernel/trace/trace.c index 56619766e910..ce9165de019c 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/trace.c +++ b/kernel/trace/trace.c @@ -2537,7 +2537,7 @@ trace_event_buffer_lock_reserve(struct ring_buffer **current_rb, } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(trace_event_buffer_lock_reserve); -static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(tracepoint_iter_lock); +static DEFINE_RAW_SPINLOCK(tracepoint_iter_lock); static DEFINE_MUTEX(tracepoint_printk_mutex); static void output_printk(struct trace_event_buffer *fbuffer) @@ -2558,14 +2558,14 @@ static void output_printk(struct trace_event_buffer *fbuffer) event = &fbuffer->trace_file->event_call->event; - spin_lock_irqsave(&tracepoint_iter_lock, flags); + raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&tracepoint_iter_lock, flags); trace_seq_init(&iter->seq); iter->ent = fbuffer->entry; event_call->event.funcs->trace(iter, 0, event); trace_seq_putc(&iter->seq, 0); printk("%s", iter->seq.buffer); - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tracepoint_iter_lock, flags); + raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tracepoint_iter_lock, flags); } int tracepoint_printk_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int write, From 23b2163b887f1a997ea7378c8cb01d81ea8e94fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mark-PK Tsai Date: Tue, 26 Apr 2022 20:24:06 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0339/1091] tracing: Avoid adding tracer option before update_tracer_options [ Upstream commit ef9188bcc6ca1d8a2ad83e826b548e6820721061 ] To prepare for support asynchronous tracer_init_tracefs initcall, avoid calling create_trace_option_files before __update_tracer_options. Otherwise, create_trace_option_files will show warning because some tracers in trace_types list are already in tr->topts. For example, hwlat_tracer call register_tracer in late_initcall, and global_trace.dir is already created in tracing_init_dentry, hwlat_tracer will be put into tr->topts. Then if the __update_tracer_options is executed after hwlat_tracer registered, create_trace_option_files find that hwlat_tracer is already in tr->topts. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220426122407.17042-2-mark-pk.tsai@mediatek.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220322133339.GA32582@xsang-OptiPlex-9020/ Reported-by: kernel test robot Signed-off-by: Mark-PK Tsai Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- kernel/trace/trace.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace.c b/kernel/trace/trace.c index ce9165de019c..55da88f18342 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/trace.c +++ b/kernel/trace/trace.c @@ -5638,12 +5638,18 @@ static void tracing_set_nop(struct trace_array *tr) tr->current_trace = &nop_trace; } +static bool tracer_options_updated; + static void add_tracer_options(struct trace_array *tr, struct tracer *t) { /* Only enable if the directory has been created already. */ if (!tr->dir) return; + /* Only create trace option files after update_tracer_options finish */ + if (!tracer_options_updated) + return; + create_trace_option_files(tr, t); } @@ -8391,6 +8397,7 @@ static void __update_tracer_options(struct trace_array *tr) static void update_tracer_options(struct trace_array *tr) { mutex_lock(&trace_types_lock); + tracer_options_updated = true; __update_tracer_options(tr); mutex_unlock(&trace_types_lock); } From 0a7a1fc7e71eecf2e5053a6c312c9f0dcbb9b8fd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dongliang Mu Date: Fri, 15 Apr 2022 21:19:02 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0340/1091] f2fs: remove WARN_ON in f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr [ Upstream commit dc2f78e2d4cc844a1458653d57ce1b54d4a29f21 ] Syzbot triggers two WARNs in f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr and __is_bitmap_valid. For example, in f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr, if type is DATA_GENERIC_ENHANCE or DATA_GENERIC_ENHANCE_READ, it invokes WARN_ON if blkaddr is not in the right range. The call trace is as follows: f2fs_get_node_info+0x45f/0x1070 read_node_page+0x577/0x1190 __get_node_page.part.0+0x9e/0x10e0 __get_node_page f2fs_get_node_page+0x109/0x180 do_read_inode f2fs_iget+0x2a5/0x58b0 f2fs_fill_super+0x3b39/0x7ca0 Fix these two WARNs by replacing WARN_ON with dump_stack. Reported-by: syzbot+763ae12a2ede1d99d4dc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Dongliang Mu Reviewed-by: Chao Yu Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c b/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c index 54f0d2c4c7d8..44c5110e18f0 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c @@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ static bool __is_bitmap_valid(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, block_t blkaddr, f2fs_err(sbi, "Inconsistent error blkaddr:%u, sit bitmap:%d", blkaddr, exist); set_sbi_flag(sbi, SBI_NEED_FSCK); - WARN_ON(1); + dump_stack(); } return exist; } @@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ bool f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, f2fs_warn(sbi, "access invalid blkaddr:%u", blkaddr); set_sbi_flag(sbi, SBI_NEED_FSCK); - WARN_ON(1); + dump_stack(); return false; } else { return __is_bitmap_valid(sbi, blkaddr, type); From 27fdb4572344abcfa3af409cb526c1f8e099b63f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lucas Tanure Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2022 10:14:10 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0341/1091] i2c: cadence: Increase timeout per message if necessary [ Upstream commit 96789dce043f5bff8b7d62aa28d52a7c59403a84 ] Timeout as 1 second sets an upper limit on the length of the transfer executed, but there is no maximum length of a write or read message set in i2c_adapter_quirks for this controller. This upper limit affects devices that require sending large firmware blobs over I2C. To remove that limitation, calculate the minimal time necessary, plus some wiggle room, for every message and use it instead of the default one second, if more than one second. Signed-off-by: Lucas Tanure Acked-by: Michal Simek Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-cadence.c | 12 ++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-cadence.c b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-cadence.c index 17f0dd1f891e..8a3a0991bc1c 100644 --- a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-cadence.c +++ b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-cadence.c @@ -506,7 +506,7 @@ static void cdns_i2c_master_reset(struct i2c_adapter *adap) static int cdns_i2c_process_msg(struct cdns_i2c *id, struct i2c_msg *msg, struct i2c_adapter *adap) { - unsigned long time_left; + unsigned long time_left, msg_timeout; u32 reg; id->p_msg = msg; @@ -531,8 +531,16 @@ static int cdns_i2c_process_msg(struct cdns_i2c *id, struct i2c_msg *msg, else cdns_i2c_msend(id); + /* Minimal time to execute this message */ + msg_timeout = msecs_to_jiffies((1000 * msg->len * BITS_PER_BYTE) / id->i2c_clk); + /* Plus some wiggle room */ + msg_timeout += msecs_to_jiffies(500); + + if (msg_timeout < adap->timeout) + msg_timeout = adap->timeout; + /* Wait for the signal of completion */ - time_left = wait_for_completion_timeout(&id->xfer_done, adap->timeout); + time_left = wait_for_completion_timeout(&id->xfer_done, msg_timeout); if (time_left == 0) { cdns_i2c_master_reset(adap); dev_err(id->adap.dev.parent, From f6bdafbb9b04f620cd6090f6dd112fcb0545dcd9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Ungerer Date: Wed, 20 Apr 2022 23:27:47 +1000 Subject: [PATCH 0342/1091] m68knommu: set ZERO_PAGE() to the allocated zeroed page [ Upstream commit dc068f46217970d9516f16cd37972a01d50dc055 ] The non-MMU m68k pagetable ZERO_PAGE() macro is being set to the somewhat non-sensical value of "virt_to_page(0)". The zeroth page is not in any way guaranteed to be a page full of "0". So the result is that ZERO_PAGE() will almost certainly contain random values. We already allocate a real "empty_zero_page" in the mm setup code shared between MMU m68k and non-MMU m68k. It is just not hooked up to the ZERO_PAGE() macro for the non-MMU m68k case. Fix ZERO_PAGE() to use the allocated "empty_zero_page" pointer. I am not aware of any specific issues caused by the old code. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-m68k/2a462b23-5b8e-bbf4-ec7d-778434a3b9d7@google.com/T/#t Reported-by: Hugh Dickens Signed-off-by: Greg Ungerer Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/m68k/include/asm/pgtable_no.h | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/m68k/include/asm/pgtable_no.h b/arch/m68k/include/asm/pgtable_no.h index c18165b0d904..6b0248466569 100644 --- a/arch/m68k/include/asm/pgtable_no.h +++ b/arch/m68k/include/asm/pgtable_no.h @@ -42,7 +42,8 @@ extern void paging_init(void); * ZERO_PAGE is a global shared page that is always zero: used * for zero-mapped memory areas etc.. */ -#define ZERO_PAGE(vaddr) (virt_to_page(0)) +extern void *empty_zero_page; +#define ZERO_PAGE(vaddr) (virt_to_page(empty_zero_page)) /* * All 32bit addresses are effectively valid for vmalloc... From 4917e43bca50d0a0162b57ab0715db998c3eeb86 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Ungerer Date: Fri, 13 May 2022 17:27:39 +1000 Subject: [PATCH 0343/1091] m68knommu: fix undefined reference to `_init_sp' [ Upstream commit a71b9e66fee47c59b3ec34e652b5c23bc6550794 ] When configuring a nommu classic m68k system enabling the uboot parameter passing support (CONFIG_UBOOT) will produce the following compile error: m68k-linux-ld: arch/m68k/kernel/uboot.o: in function `process_uboot_commandline': uboot.c:(.init.text+0x32): undefined reference to `_init_sp' The logic to support this option is only used on ColdFire based platforms (in its head.S startup code). So make the selection of this option depend on building for a ColdFire based platform. Reported-by: kernel test robot Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven Signed-off-by: Greg Ungerer Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/m68k/Kconfig.machine | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/m68k/Kconfig.machine b/arch/m68k/Kconfig.machine index b88a980f56f8..f0527b155c05 100644 --- a/arch/m68k/Kconfig.machine +++ b/arch/m68k/Kconfig.machine @@ -320,6 +320,7 @@ comment "Machine Options" config UBOOT bool "Support for U-Boot command line parameters" + depends on COLDFIRE help If you say Y here kernel will try to collect command line parameters from the initial u-boot stack. From 83960276ffc9bf5570d4106490346b61e61be5f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Radhey Shyam Pandey Date: Tue, 10 May 2022 12:42:40 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 0344/1091] dmaengine: zynqmp_dma: In struct zynqmp_dma_chan fix desc_size data type [ Upstream commit f9a9f43a62a04ec3183fb0da9226c7706eed0115 ] In zynqmp_dma_alloc/free_chan_resources functions there is a potential overflow in the below expressions. dma_alloc_coherent(chan->dev, (2 * chan->desc_size * ZYNQMP_DMA_NUM_DESCS), &chan->desc_pool_p, GFP_KERNEL); dma_free_coherent(chan->dev,(2 * ZYNQMP_DMA_DESC_SIZE(chan) * ZYNQMP_DMA_NUM_DESCS), chan->desc_pool_v, chan->desc_pool_p); The arguments desc_size and ZYNQMP_DMA_NUM_DESCS were 32 bit. Though this overflow condition is not observed but it is a potential problem in the case of 32-bit multiplication. Hence fix it by changing the desc_size data type to size_t. In addition to coverity fix it also reuse ZYNQMP_DMA_DESC_SIZE macro in dma_alloc_coherent API argument. Addresses-Coverity: Event overflow_before_widen. Signed-off-by: Radhey Shyam Pandey Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1652166762-18317-2-git-send-email-radhey.shyam.pandey@xilinx.com Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/dma/xilinx/zynqmp_dma.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/dma/xilinx/zynqmp_dma.c b/drivers/dma/xilinx/zynqmp_dma.c index 84009c5e0f33..b61d0c79dffb 100644 --- a/drivers/dma/xilinx/zynqmp_dma.c +++ b/drivers/dma/xilinx/zynqmp_dma.c @@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ struct zynqmp_dma_chan { bool is_dmacoherent; struct tasklet_struct tasklet; bool idle; - u32 desc_size; + size_t desc_size; bool err; u32 bus_width; u32 src_burst_len; @@ -489,7 +489,8 @@ static int zynqmp_dma_alloc_chan_resources(struct dma_chan *dchan) } chan->desc_pool_v = dma_alloc_coherent(chan->dev, - (2 * chan->desc_size * ZYNQMP_DMA_NUM_DESCS), + (2 * ZYNQMP_DMA_DESC_SIZE(chan) * + ZYNQMP_DMA_NUM_DESCS), &chan->desc_pool_p, GFP_KERNEL); if (!chan->desc_pool_v) return -ENOMEM; From a2b3be930e79cc5d9d829f158e31172b2043f0cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Trond Myklebust Date: Sat, 14 May 2022 10:08:14 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 0345/1091] NFSv4: Don't hold the layoutget locks across multiple RPC calls [ Upstream commit 6949493884fe88500de4af182588e071cf1544ee ] When doing layoutget as part of the open() compound, we have to be careful to release the layout locks before we can call any further RPC calls, such as setattr(). The reason is that those calls could trigger a recall, which could deadlock. Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c index cf3b00751ff6..ba4a03a69fbf 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c +++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c @@ -3041,6 +3041,10 @@ static int _nfs4_open_and_get_state(struct nfs4_opendata *opendata, } out: + if (opendata->lgp) { + nfs4_lgopen_release(opendata->lgp); + opendata->lgp = NULL; + } if (!opendata->cancelled) nfs4_sequence_free_slot(&opendata->o_res.seq_res); return ret; From 48dea4d3a11ff0eba86c137e3e97c9581be9cf40 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yang Yingliang Date: Fri, 13 May 2022 18:05:41 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0346/1091] video: fbdev: pxa3xx-gcu: release the resources correctly in pxa3xx_gcu_probe/remove() [ Upstream commit d87ad457f7e1b8d2492ca5b1531eb35030a1cc8f ] In pxa3xx_gcu_probe(), the sequence of error lable is wrong, it will leads some resource leaked, so adjust the sequence to handle the error correctly, and if pxa3xx_gcu_add_buffer() fails, pxa3xx_gcu_free_buffers() need be called. In pxa3xx_gcu_remove(), add missing clk_disable_unpreprare(). Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang Signed-off-by: Helge Deller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/video/fbdev/pxa3xx-gcu.c | 12 +++++++----- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/video/fbdev/pxa3xx-gcu.c b/drivers/video/fbdev/pxa3xx-gcu.c index 74ffb446e00c..7c4694d70dac 100644 --- a/drivers/video/fbdev/pxa3xx-gcu.c +++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/pxa3xx-gcu.c @@ -651,6 +651,7 @@ static int pxa3xx_gcu_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { ret = pxa3xx_gcu_add_buffer(dev, priv); if (ret) { + pxa3xx_gcu_free_buffers(dev, priv); dev_err(dev, "failed to allocate DMA memory\n"); goto err_disable_clk; } @@ -667,15 +668,15 @@ static int pxa3xx_gcu_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) SHARED_SIZE, irq); return 0; -err_free_dma: - dma_free_coherent(dev, SHARED_SIZE, - priv->shared, priv->shared_phys); +err_disable_clk: + clk_disable_unprepare(priv->clk); err_misc_deregister: misc_deregister(&priv->misc_dev); -err_disable_clk: - clk_disable_unprepare(priv->clk); +err_free_dma: + dma_free_coherent(dev, SHARED_SIZE, + priv->shared, priv->shared_phys); return ret; } @@ -688,6 +689,7 @@ static int pxa3xx_gcu_remove(struct platform_device *pdev) pxa3xx_gcu_wait_idle(priv); misc_deregister(&priv->misc_dev); dma_free_coherent(dev, SHARED_SIZE, priv->shared, priv->shared_phys); + clk_disable_unprepare(priv->clk); pxa3xx_gcu_free_buffers(dev, priv); return 0; From da99331fa62131a38a0947a8204c5208de7b0454 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kinglong Mee Date: Sun, 22 May 2022 20:36:48 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0347/1091] xprtrdma: treat all calls not a bcall when bc_serv is NULL [ Upstream commit 11270e7ca268e8d61b5d9e5c3a54bd1550642c9c ] When a rdma server returns a fault format reply, nfs v3 client may treats it as a bcall when bc service is not exist. The debug message at rpcrdma_bc_receive_call are, [56579.837169] RPC: rpcrdma_bc_receive_call: callback XID 00000001, length=20 [56579.837174] RPC: rpcrdma_bc_receive_call: 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 After that, rpcrdma_bc_receive_call will meets NULL pointer as, [ 226.057890] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000000c8 ... [ 226.058704] RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_lock+0xc/0x20 ... [ 226.059732] Call Trace: [ 226.059878] rpcrdma_bc_receive_call+0x138/0x327 [rpcrdma] [ 226.060011] __ib_process_cq+0x89/0x170 [ib_core] [ 226.060092] ib_cq_poll_work+0x26/0x80 [ib_core] [ 226.060257] process_one_work+0x1a7/0x360 [ 226.060367] ? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0 [ 226.060440] worker_thread+0x30/0x390 [ 226.060500] ? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0 [ 226.060574] kthread+0x116/0x130 [ 226.060661] ? kthread_flush_work_fn+0x10/0x10 [ 226.060724] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 ... Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee Reviewed-by: Chuck Lever Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/rpc_rdma.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/rpc_rdma.c b/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/rpc_rdma.c index c091417bd799..60aaed9457e4 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/rpc_rdma.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/rpc_rdma.c @@ -1042,6 +1042,7 @@ static bool rpcrdma_is_bcall(struct rpcrdma_xprt *r_xprt, struct rpcrdma_rep *rep) #if defined(CONFIG_SUNRPC_BACKCHANNEL) { + struct rpc_xprt *xprt = &r_xprt->rx_xprt; struct xdr_stream *xdr = &rep->rr_stream; __be32 *p; @@ -1065,6 +1066,10 @@ rpcrdma_is_bcall(struct rpcrdma_xprt *r_xprt, struct rpcrdma_rep *rep) if (*p != cpu_to_be32(RPC_CALL)) return false; + /* No bc service. */ + if (xprt->bc_serv == NULL) + return false; + /* Now that we are sure this is a backchannel call, * advance to the RPC header. */ From e0212033ff68adf8272c980560b65ae0461806cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Westphal Date: Wed, 1 Jun 2022 10:47:35 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0348/1091] netfilter: nat: really support inet nat without l3 address [ Upstream commit 282e5f8fe907dc3f2fbf9f2103b0e62ffc3a68a5 ] When no l3 address is given, priv->family is set to NFPROTO_INET and the evaluation function isn't called. Call it too so l4-only rewrite can work. Also add a test case for this. Fixes: a33f387ecd5aa ("netfilter: nft_nat: allow to specify layer 4 protocol NAT only") Reported-by: Yi Chen Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/netfilter/nft_nat.c | 3 +- tools/testing/selftests/netfilter/nft_nat.sh | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_nat.c b/net/netfilter/nft_nat.c index 17c0f75dfcdb..0c5bc3c37ecf 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_nat.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_nat.c @@ -283,7 +283,8 @@ static void nft_nat_inet_eval(const struct nft_expr *expr, { const struct nft_nat *priv = nft_expr_priv(expr); - if (priv->family == nft_pf(pkt)) + if (priv->family == nft_pf(pkt) || + priv->family == NFPROTO_INET) nft_nat_eval(expr, regs, pkt); } diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/netfilter/nft_nat.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/netfilter/nft_nat.sh index d7e07f4c3d7f..4e15e8167310 100755 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/netfilter/nft_nat.sh +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/netfilter/nft_nat.sh @@ -374,6 +374,45 @@ EOF return $lret } +test_local_dnat_portonly() +{ + local family=$1 + local daddr=$2 + local lret=0 + local sr_s + local sr_r + +ip netns exec "$ns0" nft -f /dev/stdin < Date: Wed, 1 Jun 2022 12:59:26 +0400 Subject: [PATCH 0349/1091] ata: pata_octeon_cf: Fix refcount leak in octeon_cf_probe [ Upstream commit 10d6bdf532902be1d8aa5900b3c03c5671612aa2 ] of_find_device_by_node() takes reference, we should use put_device() to release it when not need anymore. Add missing put_device() to avoid refcount leak. Fixes: 43f01da0f279 ("MIPS/OCTEON/ata: Convert pata_octeon_cf.c to use device tree.") Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin Reviewed-by: Sergey Shtylyov Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/ata/pata_octeon_cf.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/ata/pata_octeon_cf.c b/drivers/ata/pata_octeon_cf.c index ac3b1fda820f..c240d8cbfd41 100644 --- a/drivers/ata/pata_octeon_cf.c +++ b/drivers/ata/pata_octeon_cf.c @@ -888,12 +888,14 @@ static int octeon_cf_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) int i; res_dma = platform_get_resource(dma_dev, IORESOURCE_MEM, 0); if (!res_dma) { + put_device(&dma_dev->dev); of_node_put(dma_node); return -EINVAL; } cf_port->dma_base = (u64)devm_ioremap_nocache(&pdev->dev, res_dma->start, resource_size(res_dma)); if (!cf_port->dma_base) { + put_device(&dma_dev->dev); of_node_put(dma_node); return -EINVAL; } @@ -903,6 +905,7 @@ static int octeon_cf_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) irq = i; irq_handler = octeon_cf_interrupt; } + put_device(&dma_dev->dev); } of_node_put(dma_node); } From 5b8d63489c3b701eb2a76f848ec94d8cbc9373b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pablo Neira Ayuso Date: Mon, 6 Jun 2022 17:15:57 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0350/1091] netfilter: nf_tables: memleak flow rule from commit path [ Upstream commit 9dd732e0bdf538b1b76dc7c157e2b5e560ff30d3 ] Abort path release flow rule object, however, commit path does not. Update code to destroy these objects before releasing the transaction. Fixes: c9626a2cbdb2 ("netfilter: nf_tables: add hardware offload support") Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c index b51c192105fc..58a7d89719b1 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c @@ -6570,6 +6570,9 @@ static void nft_commit_release(struct nft_trans *trans) nf_tables_chain_destroy(&trans->ctx); break; case NFT_MSG_DELRULE: + if (trans->ctx.chain->flags & NFT_CHAIN_HW_OFFLOAD) + nft_flow_rule_destroy(nft_trans_flow_rule(trans)); + nf_tables_rule_destroy(&trans->ctx, nft_trans_rule(trans)); break; case NFT_MSG_DELSET: @@ -6891,6 +6894,9 @@ static int nf_tables_commit(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb) nf_tables_rule_notify(&trans->ctx, nft_trans_rule(trans), NFT_MSG_NEWRULE); + if (trans->ctx.chain->flags & NFT_CHAIN_HW_OFFLOAD) + nft_flow_rule_destroy(nft_trans_flow_rule(trans)); + nft_trans_destroy(trans); break; case NFT_MSG_DELRULE: From b49c884146e20314808c9420640b26876ff55c80 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Masahiro Yamada Date: Mon, 6 Jun 2022 13:59:20 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 0351/1091] xen: unexport __init-annotated xen_xlate_map_ballooned_pages() [ Upstream commit dbac14a5a05ff8e1ce7c0da0e1f520ce39ec62ea ] EXPORT_SYMBOL and __init is a bad combination because the .init.text section is freed up after the initialization. Hence, modules cannot use symbols annotated __init. The access to a freed symbol may end up with kernel panic. modpost used to detect it, but it has been broken for a decade. Recently, I fixed modpost so it started to warn it again, then this showed up in linux-next builds. There are two ways to fix it: - Remove __init - Remove EXPORT_SYMBOL I chose the latter for this case because none of the in-tree call-sites (arch/arm/xen/enlighten.c, arch/x86/xen/grant-table.c) is compiled as modular. Fixes: 243848fc018c ("xen/grant-table: Move xlated_setup_gnttab_pages to common place") Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada Reviewed-by: Oleksandr Tyshchenko Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220606045920.4161881-1-masahiroy@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/xen/xlate_mmu.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/xen/xlate_mmu.c b/drivers/xen/xlate_mmu.c index 7b1077f0abcb..c8aa4f5f85db 100644 --- a/drivers/xen/xlate_mmu.c +++ b/drivers/xen/xlate_mmu.c @@ -261,7 +261,6 @@ int __init xen_xlate_map_ballooned_pages(xen_pfn_t **gfns, void **virt, return 0; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xen_xlate_map_ballooned_pages); struct remap_pfn { struct mm_struct *mm; From 556720013c36c193d9cbfb06e7b33e51f0c39fbf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Sun, 5 Jun 2022 16:23:25 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0352/1091] af_unix: Fix a data-race in unix_dgram_peer_wake_me(). [ Upstream commit 662a80946ce13633ae90a55379f1346c10f0c432 ] unix_dgram_poll() calls unix_dgram_peer_wake_me() without `other`'s lock held and check if its receive queue is full. Here we need to use unix_recvq_full_lockless() instead of unix_recvq_full(), otherwise KCSAN will report a data-race. Fixes: 7d267278a9ec ("unix: avoid use-after-free in ep_remove_wait_queue") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220605232325.11804-1-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/unix/af_unix.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c index 05470ca91bd9..f33e90bd0683 100644 --- a/net/unix/af_unix.c +++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c @@ -440,7 +440,7 @@ static int unix_dgram_peer_wake_me(struct sock *sk, struct sock *other) * -ECONNREFUSED. Otherwise, if we haven't queued any skbs * to other and its full, we will hang waiting for POLLOUT. */ - if (unix_recvq_full(other) && !sock_flag(other, SOCK_DEAD)) + if (unix_recvq_full_lockless(other) && !sock_flag(other, SOCK_DEAD)) return 1; if (connected) From e412b3d178ea4bf746f6b8ee086761613704c6be Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Tue, 31 May 2022 14:51:13 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0353/1091] bpf, arm64: Clear prog->jited_len along prog->jited [ Upstream commit 10f3b29c65bb2fe0d47c2945cd0b4087be1c5218 ] syzbot reported an illegal copy_to_user() attempt from bpf_prog_get_info_by_fd() [1] There was no repro yet on this bug, but I think that commit 0aef499f3172 ("mm/usercopy: Detect vmalloc overruns") is exposing a prior bug in bpf arm64. bpf_prog_get_info_by_fd() looks at prog->jited_len to determine if the JIT image can be copied out to user space. My theory is that syzbot managed to get a prog where prog->jited_len has been set to 43, while prog->bpf_func has ben cleared. It is not clear why copy_to_user(uinsns, NULL, ulen) is triggering this particular warning. I thought find_vma_area(NULL) would not find a vm_struct. As we do not hold vmap_area_lock spinlock, it might be possible that the found vm_struct was garbage. [1] usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from vmalloc (offset 792633534417210172, size 43)! kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:101! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 25002 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 5.18.0-syzkaller-10139-g8291eaafed36 #0 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : usercopy_abort+0x90/0x94 mm/usercopy.c:101 lr : usercopy_abort+0x90/0x94 mm/usercopy.c:89 sp : ffff80000b773a20 x29: ffff80000b773a30 x28: faff80000b745000 x27: ffff80000b773b48 x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 000000000000002b x24: 0000000000000000 x23: 00000000000000e0 x22: ffff80000b75db67 x21: 0000000000000001 x20: 000000000000002b x19: ffff80000b75db3c x18: 00000000fffffffd x17: 2820636f6c6c616d x16: 76206d6f72662064 x15: 6574636574656420 x14: 74706d6574746120 x13: 2129333420657a69 x12: 73202c3237313031 x11: 3237313434333533 x10: 3336323937207465 x9 : 657275736f707865 x8 : ffff80000a30c550 x7 : ffff80000b773830 x6 : ffff80000b773830 x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : ffff00007fbbaa10 x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : f7ff000028fc0000 x0 : 0000000000000064 Call trace: usercopy_abort+0x90/0x94 mm/usercopy.c:89 check_heap_object mm/usercopy.c:186 [inline] __check_object_size mm/usercopy.c:252 [inline] __check_object_size+0x198/0x36c mm/usercopy.c:214 check_object_size include/linux/thread_info.h:199 [inline] check_copy_size include/linux/thread_info.h:235 [inline] copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:159 [inline] bpf_prog_get_info_by_fd.isra.0+0xf14/0xfdc kernel/bpf/syscall.c:3993 bpf_obj_get_info_by_fd+0x12c/0x510 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4253 __sys_bpf+0x900/0x2150 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4956 __do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5021 [inline] __se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5019 [inline] __arm64_sys_bpf+0x28/0x40 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5019 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:38 [inline] invoke_syscall+0x48/0x114 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:52 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x44/0xec arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:142 do_el0_svc+0xa0/0xc0 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:206 el0_svc+0x44/0xb0 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:624 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x1ac/0x1b0 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:642 el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:581 Code: aa0003e3 d00038c0 91248000 97fff65f (d4210000) Fixes: db496944fdaa ("bpf: arm64: add JIT support for multi-function programs") Reported-by: syzbot Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Acked-by: Song Liu Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220531215113.1100754-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c index 17a8d1484f9b..9f71ca441482 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +++ b/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c @@ -973,6 +973,7 @@ skip_init_ctx: bpf_jit_binary_free(header); prog->bpf_func = NULL; prog->jited = 0; + prog->jited_len = 0; goto out_off; } bpf_jit_binary_lock_ro(header); From 7c8df6fad43d9d5d77f281f794b2a93cd02fd1a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miaoqian Lin Date: Sun, 5 Jun 2022 11:23:34 +0400 Subject: [PATCH 0354/1091] net: dsa: lantiq_gswip: Fix refcount leak in gswip_gphy_fw_list [ Upstream commit 0737e018a05e2aa352828c52bdeed3b02cff2930 ] Every iteration of for_each_available_child_of_node() decrements the reference count of the previous node. when breaking early from a for_each_available_child_of_node() loop, we need to explicitly call of_node_put() on the gphy_fw_np. Add missing of_node_put() to avoid refcount leak. Fixes: 14fceff4771e ("net: dsa: Add Lantiq / Intel DSA driver for vrx200") Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220605072335.11257-1-linmq006@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/dsa/lantiq_gswip.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/lantiq_gswip.c b/drivers/net/dsa/lantiq_gswip.c index 0c191d395f8f..b546002e5fd4 100644 --- a/drivers/net/dsa/lantiq_gswip.c +++ b/drivers/net/dsa/lantiq_gswip.c @@ -1958,8 +1958,10 @@ static int gswip_gphy_fw_list(struct gswip_priv *priv, for_each_available_child_of_node(gphy_fw_list_np, gphy_fw_np) { err = gswip_gphy_fw_probe(priv, &priv->gphy_fw[i], gphy_fw_np, i); - if (err) + if (err) { + of_node_put(gphy_fw_np); goto remove_gphy; + } i++; } From 180473e8e42a1b121ff7f3ffa481698f0a1a1db8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gal Pressman Date: Mon, 6 Jun 2022 14:57:18 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 0355/1091] net/mlx4_en: Fix wrong return value on ioctl EEPROM query failure [ Upstream commit f5826c8c9d57210a17031af5527056eefdc2b7eb ] The ioctl EEPROM query wrongly returns success on read failures, fix that by returning the appropriate error code. Fixes: 7202da8b7f71 ("ethtool, net/mlx4_en: Cable info, get_module_info/eeprom ethtool support") Signed-off-by: Gal Pressman Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220606115718.14233-1-tariqt@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_ethtool.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_ethtool.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_ethtool.c index dd029d91bbc2..b711148a9d50 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_ethtool.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_ethtool.c @@ -2083,7 +2083,7 @@ static int mlx4_en_get_module_eeprom(struct net_device *dev, en_err(priv, "mlx4_get_module_info i(%d) offset(%d) bytes_to_read(%d) - FAILED (0x%x)\n", i, offset, ee->len - i, ret); - return 0; + return ret; } i += ret; From 978dcc55cf3603ce8f6ad240ac856973844fcc70 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chuck Lever Date: Tue, 7 Jun 2022 16:47:52 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 0356/1091] SUNRPC: Fix the calculation of xdr->end in xdr_get_next_encode_buffer() [ Upstream commit 6c254bf3b637dd4ef4f78eb78c7447419c0161d7 ] I found that NFSD's new NFSv3 READDIRPLUS XDR encoder was screwing up right at the end of the page array. xdr_get_next_encode_buffer() does not compute the value of xdr->end correctly: * The check to see if we're on the final available page in xdr->buf needs to account for the space consumed by @nbytes. * The new xdr->end value needs to account for the portion of @nbytes that is to be encoded into the previous buffer. Fixes: 2825a7f90753 ("nfsd4: allow encoding across page boundaries") Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever Reviewed-by: NeilBrown Reviewed-by: J. Bruce Fields Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/sunrpc/xdr.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/sunrpc/xdr.c b/net/sunrpc/xdr.c index 7ef37054071f..cb8740d15633 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/xdr.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/xdr.c @@ -608,7 +608,11 @@ static __be32 *xdr_get_next_encode_buffer(struct xdr_stream *xdr, */ xdr->p = (void *)p + frag2bytes; space_left = xdr->buf->buflen - xdr->buf->len; - xdr->end = (void *)p + min_t(int, space_left, PAGE_SIZE); + if (space_left - nbytes >= PAGE_SIZE) + xdr->end = (void *)p + PAGE_SIZE; + else + xdr->end = (void *)p + space_left - frag1bytes; + xdr->buf->page_len += frag2bytes; xdr->buf->len += nbytes; return p; From 6a90a44d53428a3bf01bd80df9ba78b19959270c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Masahiro Yamada Date: Mon, 6 Jun 2022 13:53:53 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 0357/1091] net: mdio: unexport __init-annotated mdio_bus_init() [ Upstream commit 35b42dce619701f1300fb8498dae82c9bb1f0263 ] EXPORT_SYMBOL and __init is a bad combination because the .init.text section is freed up after the initialization. Hence, modules cannot use symbols annotated __init. The access to a freed symbol may end up with kernel panic. modpost used to detect it, but it has been broken for a decade. Recently, I fixed modpost so it started to warn it again, then this showed up in linux-next builds. There are two ways to fix it: - Remove __init - Remove EXPORT_SYMBOL I chose the latter for this case because the only in-tree call-site, drivers/net/phy/phy_device.c is never compiled as modular. (CONFIG_PHYLIB is boolean) Fixes: 90eff9096c01 ("net: phy: Allow splitting MDIO bus/device support from PHYs") Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c b/drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c index b0a439248ff6..05c24db507a2 100644 --- a/drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c +++ b/drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c @@ -753,7 +753,6 @@ int __init mdio_bus_init(void) return ret; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mdio_bus_init); #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PHYLIB) void mdio_bus_exit(void) From ef6d2354de238b065d8799c80da4be9a6af18e39 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Masahiro Yamada Date: Mon, 6 Jun 2022 13:53:54 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 0358/1091] net: xfrm: unexport __init-annotated xfrm4_protocol_init() [ Upstream commit 4a388f08d8784af48f352193d2b72aaf167a57a1 ] EXPORT_SYMBOL and __init is a bad combination because the .init.text section is freed up after the initialization. Hence, modules cannot use symbols annotated __init. The access to a freed symbol may end up with kernel panic. modpost used to detect it, but it has been broken for a decade. Recently, I fixed modpost so it started to warn it again, then this showed up in linux-next builds. There are two ways to fix it: - Remove __init - Remove EXPORT_SYMBOL I chose the latter for this case because the only in-tree call-site, net/ipv4/xfrm4_policy.c is never compiled as modular. (CONFIG_XFRM is boolean) Fixes: 2f32b51b609f ("xfrm: Introduce xfrm_input_afinfo to access the the callbacks properly") Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada Acked-by: Steffen Klassert Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/ipv4/xfrm4_protocol.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/xfrm4_protocol.c b/net/ipv4/xfrm4_protocol.c index 8a4285712808..9031b7732fec 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/xfrm4_protocol.c +++ b/net/ipv4/xfrm4_protocol.c @@ -298,4 +298,3 @@ void __init xfrm4_protocol_init(void) { xfrm_input_register_afinfo(&xfrm4_input_afinfo); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm4_protocol_init); From 317260b3eb6384a05a8af212308fa50f3b2e8290 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Masahiro Yamada Date: Mon, 6 Jun 2022 13:53:55 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 0359/1091] net: ipv6: unexport __init-annotated seg6_hmac_init() [ Upstream commit 5801f064e35181c71857a80ff18af4dbec3c5f5c ] EXPORT_SYMBOL and __init is a bad combination because the .init.text section is freed up after the initialization. Hence, modules cannot use symbols annotated __init. The access to a freed symbol may end up with kernel panic. modpost used to detect it, but it has been broken for a decade. Recently, I fixed modpost so it started to warn it again, then this showed up in linux-next builds. There are two ways to fix it: - Remove __init - Remove EXPORT_SYMBOL I chose the latter for this case because the caller (net/ipv6/seg6.c) and the callee (net/ipv6/seg6_hmac.c) belong to the same module. It seems an internal function call in ipv6.ko. Fixes: bf355b8d2c30 ("ipv6: sr: add core files for SR HMAC support") Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/ipv6/seg6_hmac.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv6/seg6_hmac.c b/net/ipv6/seg6_hmac.c index ffcfcd2b128f..a4cad71c4204 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/seg6_hmac.c +++ b/net/ipv6/seg6_hmac.c @@ -401,7 +401,6 @@ int __init seg6_hmac_init(void) { return seg6_hmac_init_algo(); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(seg6_hmac_init); int __net_init seg6_hmac_net_init(struct net *net) { From 8a6740fdc56239d16120c58cdd5a16ac0b265f6d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Feras Daoud Date: Sat, 19 Mar 2022 21:47:48 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0360/1091] net/mlx5: Rearm the FW tracer after each tracer event [ Upstream commit 8bf94e6414c9481bfa28269022688ab445d0081d ] The current design does not arm the tracer if traces are available before the tracer string database is fully loaded, leading to an unfunctional tracer. This fix will rearm the tracer every time the FW triggers tracer event regardless of the tracer strings database status. Fixes: c71ad41ccb0c ("net/mlx5: FW tracer, events handling") Signed-off-by: Feras Daoud Signed-off-by: Roy Novich Reviewed-by: Moshe Shemesh Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/diag/fw_tracer.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/diag/fw_tracer.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/diag/fw_tracer.c index 97359417c6e7..f8144ce7e476 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/diag/fw_tracer.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/diag/fw_tracer.c @@ -673,6 +673,9 @@ static void mlx5_fw_tracer_handle_traces(struct work_struct *work) if (!tracer->owner) return; + if (unlikely(!tracer->str_db.loaded)) + goto arm; + block_count = tracer->buff.size / TRACER_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTE; start_offset = tracer->buff.consumer_index * TRACER_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTE; @@ -730,6 +733,7 @@ static void mlx5_fw_tracer_handle_traces(struct work_struct *work) &tmp_trace_block[TRACES_PER_BLOCK - 1]); } +arm: mlx5_fw_tracer_arm(dev); } @@ -1084,8 +1088,7 @@ static int fw_tracer_event(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long action, void queue_work(tracer->work_queue, &tracer->ownership_change_work); break; case MLX5_TRACER_SUBTYPE_TRACES_AVAILABLE: - if (likely(tracer->str_db.loaded)) - queue_work(tracer->work_queue, &tracer->handle_traces_work); + queue_work(tracer->work_queue, &tracer->handle_traces_work); break; default: mlx5_core_dbg(dev, "FWTracer: Event with unrecognized subtype: sub_type %d\n", From 957d298526b5ce9f871b9148ae8d2bbf2a24ce39 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mark Bloch Date: Mon, 30 May 2022 10:46:59 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 0361/1091] net/mlx5: fs, fail conflicting actions [ Upstream commit 8fa5e7b20e01042b14f8cd684d2da9b638460c74 ] When combining two steering rules into one check not only do they share the same actions but those actions are also the same. This resolves an issue where when creating two different rules with the same match the actions are overwritten and one of the rules is deleted a FW syndrome can be seen in dmesg. mlx5_core 0000:03:00.0: mlx5_cmd_check:819:(pid 2105): DEALLOC_MODIFY_HEADER_CONTEXT(0x941) op_mod(0x0) failed, status bad resource state(0x9), syndrome (0x1ab444) Fixes: 0d235c3fabb7 ("net/mlx5: Add hash table to search FTEs in a flow-group") Signed-off-by: Mark Bloch Reviewed-by: Maor Gottlieb Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- .../net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/fs_core.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/fs_core.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/fs_core.c index 8c8b68e7abb4..41087c0618c1 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/fs_core.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/fs_core.c @@ -1450,9 +1450,22 @@ static struct mlx5_flow_rule *find_flow_rule(struct fs_fte *fte, return NULL; } -static bool check_conflicting_actions(u32 action1, u32 action2) +static bool check_conflicting_actions_vlan(const struct mlx5_fs_vlan *vlan0, + const struct mlx5_fs_vlan *vlan1) { - u32 xored_actions = action1 ^ action2; + return vlan0->ethtype != vlan1->ethtype || + vlan0->vid != vlan1->vid || + vlan0->prio != vlan1->prio; +} + +static bool check_conflicting_actions(const struct mlx5_flow_act *act1, + const struct mlx5_flow_act *act2) +{ + u32 action1 = act1->action; + u32 action2 = act2->action; + u32 xored_actions; + + xored_actions = action1 ^ action2; /* if one rule only wants to count, it's ok */ if (action1 == MLX5_FLOW_CONTEXT_ACTION_COUNT || @@ -1469,6 +1482,22 @@ static bool check_conflicting_actions(u32 action1, u32 action2) MLX5_FLOW_CONTEXT_ACTION_VLAN_PUSH_2)) return true; + if (action1 & MLX5_FLOW_CONTEXT_ACTION_PACKET_REFORMAT && + act1->pkt_reformat != act2->pkt_reformat) + return true; + + if (action1 & MLX5_FLOW_CONTEXT_ACTION_MOD_HDR && + act1->modify_hdr != act2->modify_hdr) + return true; + + if (action1 & MLX5_FLOW_CONTEXT_ACTION_VLAN_PUSH && + check_conflicting_actions_vlan(&act1->vlan[0], &act2->vlan[0])) + return true; + + if (action1 & MLX5_FLOW_CONTEXT_ACTION_VLAN_PUSH_2 && + check_conflicting_actions_vlan(&act1->vlan[1], &act2->vlan[1])) + return true; + return false; } @@ -1476,7 +1505,7 @@ static int check_conflicting_ftes(struct fs_fte *fte, const struct mlx5_flow_context *flow_context, const struct mlx5_flow_act *flow_act) { - if (check_conflicting_actions(flow_act->action, fte->action.action)) { + if (check_conflicting_actions(flow_act, &fte->action)) { mlx5_core_warn(get_dev(&fte->node), "Found two FTEs with conflicting actions\n"); return -EEXIST; From 3d08bc3a5d9b2106f5c8bcf1adb73147824aa006 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Willem de Bruijn Date: Mon, 6 Jun 2022 09:21:07 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 0362/1091] ip_gre: test csum_start instead of transport header [ Upstream commit 8d21e9963bec1aad2280cdd034c8993033ef2948 ] GRE with TUNNEL_CSUM will apply local checksum offload on CHECKSUM_PARTIAL packets. ipgre_xmit must validate csum_start after an optional skb_pull, else lco_csum may trigger an overflow. The original check was if (csum && skb_checksum_start(skb) < skb->data) return -EINVAL; This had false positives when skb_checksum_start is undefined: when ip_summed is not CHECKSUM_PARTIAL. A discussed refinement was straightforward if (csum && skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL && skb_checksum_start(skb) < skb->data) return -EINVAL; But was eventually revised more thoroughly: - restrict the check to the only branch where needed, in an uncommon GRE path that uses header_ops and calls skb_pull. - test skb_transport_header, which is set along with csum_start in skb_partial_csum_set in the normal header_ops datapath. Turns out skbs can arrive in this branch without the transport header set, e.g., through BPF redirection. Revise the check back to check csum_start directly, and only if CHECKSUM_PARTIAL. Do leave the check in the updated location. Check field regardless of whether TUNNEL_CSUM is configured. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/YS+h%2FtqCJJiQei+W@shredder/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20210902193447.94039-2-willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com/T/#u Fixes: 8a0ed250f911 ("ip_gre: validate csum_start only on pull") Reported-by: syzbot Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet Reviewed-by: Alexander Duyck Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220606132107.3582565-1-willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/ipv4/ip_gre.c | 11 +++++------ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_gre.c b/net/ipv4/ip_gre.c index 5b38d03f6d79..614410a6db44 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/ip_gre.c +++ b/net/ipv4/ip_gre.c @@ -602,21 +602,20 @@ static netdev_tx_t ipgre_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, } if (dev->header_ops) { - const int pull_len = tunnel->hlen + sizeof(struct iphdr); - if (skb_cow_head(skb, 0)) goto free_skb; tnl_params = (const struct iphdr *)skb->data; - if (pull_len > skb_transport_offset(skb)) - goto free_skb; - /* Pull skb since ip_tunnel_xmit() needs skb->data pointing * to gre header. */ - skb_pull(skb, pull_len); + skb_pull(skb, tunnel->hlen + sizeof(struct iphdr)); skb_reset_mac_header(skb); + + if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL && + skb_checksum_start(skb) < skb->data) + goto free_skb; } else { if (skb_cow_head(skb, dev->needed_headroom)) goto free_skb; From 8174acbef87b8dd8bf3731eba2a5af1ac857e239 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miaoqian Lin Date: Tue, 7 Jun 2022 08:11:43 +0400 Subject: [PATCH 0363/1091] net: altera: Fix refcount leak in altera_tse_mdio_create [ Upstream commit 11ec18b1d8d92b9df307d31950dcba0b3dd7283c ] Every iteration of for_each_child_of_node() decrements the reference count of the previous node. When break from a for_each_child_of_node() loop, we need to explicitly call of_node_put() on the child node when not need anymore. Add missing of_node_put() to avoid refcount leak. Fixes: bbd2190ce96d ("Altera TSE: Add main and header file for Altera Ethernet Driver") Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220607041144.7553-1-linmq006@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/altera/altera_tse_main.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/altera/altera_tse_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/altera/altera_tse_main.c index 1f8c3b669dc1..f36536114790 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/altera/altera_tse_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/altera/altera_tse_main.c @@ -163,7 +163,8 @@ static int altera_tse_mdio_create(struct net_device *dev, unsigned int id) mdio = mdiobus_alloc(); if (mdio == NULL) { netdev_err(dev, "Error allocating MDIO bus\n"); - return -ENOMEM; + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto put_node; } mdio->name = ALTERA_TSE_RESOURCE_NAME; @@ -180,6 +181,7 @@ static int altera_tse_mdio_create(struct net_device *dev, unsigned int id) mdio->id); goto out_free_mdio; } + of_node_put(mdio_node); if (netif_msg_drv(priv)) netdev_info(dev, "MDIO bus %s: created\n", mdio->id); @@ -189,6 +191,8 @@ static int altera_tse_mdio_create(struct net_device *dev, unsigned int id) out_free_mdio: mdiobus_free(mdio); mdio = NULL; +put_node: + of_node_put(mdio_node); return ret; } From 36acb4d9ce55a891cd91d460bcc1c53ff67f78cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Linus Torvalds Date: Wed, 8 Jun 2022 16:59:29 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0364/1091] drm: imx: fix compiler warning with gcc-12 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit 7aefd8b53815274f3ef398d370a3c9b27dd9f00c ] Gcc-12 correctly warned about this code using a non-NULL pointer as a truth value: drivers/gpu/drm/imx/ipuv3-crtc.c: In function ‘ipu_crtc_disable_planes’: drivers/gpu/drm/imx/ipuv3-crtc.c:72:21: error: the comparison will always evaluate as ‘true’ for the address of ‘plane’ will never be NULL [-Werror=address] 72 | if (&ipu_crtc->plane[1] && plane == &ipu_crtc->plane[1]->base) | ^ due to the extraneous '&' address-of operator. Philipp Zabel points out that The mistake had no adverse effect since the following condition doesn't actually dereference the NULL pointer, but the intent of the code was obviously to check for it, not to take the address of the member. Fixes: eb8c88808c83 ("drm/imx: add deferred plane disabling") Acked-by: Philipp Zabel Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/gpu/drm/imx/ipuv3-crtc.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/imx/ipuv3-crtc.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/imx/ipuv3-crtc.c index 2256c9789fc2..f19264e91d4d 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/imx/ipuv3-crtc.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/imx/ipuv3-crtc.c @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ static void ipu_crtc_disable_planes(struct ipu_crtc *ipu_crtc, drm_atomic_crtc_state_for_each_plane(plane, old_crtc_state) { if (plane == &ipu_crtc->plane[0]->base) disable_full = true; - if (&ipu_crtc->plane[1] && plane == &ipu_crtc->plane[1]->base) + if (ipu_crtc->plane[1] && plane == &ipu_crtc->plane[1]->base) disable_partial = true; } From ab75e02366e14dedeac20fd149cd8be4e2e56266 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xiaoke Wang Date: Sat, 5 Mar 2022 11:14:05 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0365/1091] iio: dummy: iio_simple_dummy: check the return value of kstrdup() [ Upstream commit ba93642188a6fed754bf7447f638bc410e05a929 ] kstrdup() is also a memory allocation-related function, it returns NULL when some memory errors happen. So it is better to check the return value of it so to catch the memory error in time. Besides, there should have a kfree() to clear up the allocation if we get a failure later in this function to prevent memory leak. Signed-off-by: Xiaoke Wang Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/tencent_C920CFCC33B9CC1C63141FE1334A39FF8508@qq.com Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/iio/dummy/iio_simple_dummy.c | 20 ++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iio/dummy/iio_simple_dummy.c b/drivers/iio/dummy/iio_simple_dummy.c index 6cb02299a215..18cfe1cb7a40 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/dummy/iio_simple_dummy.c +++ b/drivers/iio/dummy/iio_simple_dummy.c @@ -568,10 +568,9 @@ static struct iio_sw_device *iio_dummy_probe(const char *name) struct iio_sw_device *swd; swd = kzalloc(sizeof(*swd), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!swd) { - ret = -ENOMEM; - goto error_kzalloc; - } + if (!swd) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + /* * Allocate an IIO device. * @@ -583,7 +582,7 @@ static struct iio_sw_device *iio_dummy_probe(const char *name) indio_dev = iio_device_alloc(sizeof(*st)); if (!indio_dev) { ret = -ENOMEM; - goto error_ret; + goto error_free_swd; } st = iio_priv(indio_dev); @@ -614,6 +613,10 @@ static struct iio_sw_device *iio_dummy_probe(const char *name) * indio_dev->name = spi_get_device_id(spi)->name; */ indio_dev->name = kstrdup(name, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!indio_dev->name) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto error_free_device; + } /* Provide description of available channels */ indio_dev->channels = iio_dummy_channels; @@ -630,7 +633,7 @@ static struct iio_sw_device *iio_dummy_probe(const char *name) ret = iio_simple_dummy_events_register(indio_dev); if (ret < 0) - goto error_free_device; + goto error_free_name; ret = iio_simple_dummy_configure_buffer(indio_dev); if (ret < 0) @@ -647,11 +650,12 @@ error_unconfigure_buffer: iio_simple_dummy_unconfigure_buffer(indio_dev); error_unregister_events: iio_simple_dummy_events_unregister(indio_dev); +error_free_name: + kfree(indio_dev->name); error_free_device: iio_device_free(indio_dev); -error_ret: +error_free_swd: kfree(swd); -error_kzalloc: return ERR_PTR(ret); } From ca2498cce8757884f05476a328a90bc6ffd387bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miquel Raynal Date: Mon, 7 Feb 2022 15:38:33 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0366/1091] iio: st_sensors: Add a local lock for protecting odr [ Upstream commit 474010127e2505fc463236470908e1ff5ddb3578 ] Right now the (framework) mlock lock is (ab)used for multiple purposes: 1- protecting concurrent accesses over the odr local cache 2- avoid changing samplig frequency whilst buffer is running Let's start by handling situation #1 with a local lock. Suggested-by: Jonathan Cameron Cc: Denis Ciocca Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220207143840.707510-7-miquel.raynal@bootlin.com Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- .../iio/common/st_sensors/st_sensors_core.c | 24 ++++++++++++++----- include/linux/iio/common/st_sensors.h | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iio/common/st_sensors/st_sensors_core.c b/drivers/iio/common/st_sensors/st_sensors_core.c index 364683783ae5..c25b0bc89b0c 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/common/st_sensors/st_sensors_core.c +++ b/drivers/iio/common/st_sensors/st_sensors_core.c @@ -76,16 +76,18 @@ st_sensors_match_odr_error: int st_sensors_set_odr(struct iio_dev *indio_dev, unsigned int odr) { - int err; + int err = 0; struct st_sensor_odr_avl odr_out = {0, 0}; struct st_sensor_data *sdata = iio_priv(indio_dev); + mutex_lock(&sdata->odr_lock); + if (!sdata->sensor_settings->odr.mask) - return 0; + goto unlock_mutex; err = st_sensors_match_odr(sdata->sensor_settings, odr, &odr_out); if (err < 0) - goto st_sensors_match_odr_error; + goto unlock_mutex; if ((sdata->sensor_settings->odr.addr == sdata->sensor_settings->pw.addr) && @@ -108,7 +110,9 @@ int st_sensors_set_odr(struct iio_dev *indio_dev, unsigned int odr) if (err >= 0) sdata->odr = odr_out.hz; -st_sensors_match_odr_error: +unlock_mutex: + mutex_unlock(&sdata->odr_lock); + return err; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(st_sensors_set_odr); @@ -384,6 +388,8 @@ int st_sensors_init_sensor(struct iio_dev *indio_dev, struct st_sensors_platform_data *of_pdata; int err = 0; + mutex_init(&sdata->odr_lock); + /* If OF/DT pdata exists, it will take precedence of anything else */ of_pdata = st_sensors_of_probe(indio_dev->dev.parent, pdata); if (of_pdata) @@ -575,18 +581,24 @@ int st_sensors_read_info_raw(struct iio_dev *indio_dev, err = -EBUSY; goto out; } else { + mutex_lock(&sdata->odr_lock); err = st_sensors_set_enable(indio_dev, true); - if (err < 0) + if (err < 0) { + mutex_unlock(&sdata->odr_lock); goto out; + } msleep((sdata->sensor_settings->bootime * 1000) / sdata->odr); err = st_sensors_read_axis_data(indio_dev, ch, val); - if (err < 0) + if (err < 0) { + mutex_unlock(&sdata->odr_lock); goto out; + } *val = *val >> ch->scan_type.shift; err = st_sensors_set_enable(indio_dev, false); + mutex_unlock(&sdata->odr_lock); } out: mutex_unlock(&indio_dev->mlock); diff --git a/include/linux/iio/common/st_sensors.h b/include/linux/iio/common/st_sensors.h index 686be532f4cb..7816bf070f83 100644 --- a/include/linux/iio/common/st_sensors.h +++ b/include/linux/iio/common/st_sensors.h @@ -228,6 +228,7 @@ struct st_sensor_settings { * @hw_irq_trigger: if we're using the hardware interrupt on the sensor. * @hw_timestamp: Latest timestamp from the interrupt handler, when in use. * @buffer_data: Data used by buffer part. + * @odr_lock: Local lock for preventing concurrent ODR accesses/changes */ struct st_sensor_data { struct device *dev; @@ -253,6 +254,8 @@ struct st_sensor_data { s64 hw_timestamp; char buffer_data[ST_SENSORS_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE] ____cacheline_aligned; + + struct mutex odr_lock; }; #ifdef CONFIG_IIO_BUFFER From 1b04c934e1e65e06a95d18044958815d9fdd9ecb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kees Cook Date: Wed, 16 Feb 2022 12:15:03 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 0367/1091] lkdtm/usercopy: Expand size of "out of frame" object [ Upstream commit f387e86d3a74407bdd9c5815820ac9d060962840 ] To be sufficiently out of range for the usercopy test to see the lifetime mismatch, expand the size of the "bad" buffer, which will let it be beyond current_stack_pointer regardless of stack growth direction. Paired with the recent addition of stack depth checking under CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y, this will correctly start tripping again. Reported-by: Muhammad Usama Anjum Cc: Arnd Bergmann Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman Reviewed-by: Muhammad Usama Anjum Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/762faf1b-0443-5ddf-4430-44a20cf2ec4d@collabora.com/ Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/misc/lkdtm/usercopy.c | 17 ++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/usercopy.c b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/usercopy.c index e172719dd86d..4617c63b1026 100644 --- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/usercopy.c +++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/usercopy.c @@ -30,12 +30,12 @@ static const unsigned char test_text[] = "This is a test.\n"; */ static noinline unsigned char *trick_compiler(unsigned char *stack) { - return stack + 0; + return stack + unconst; } static noinline unsigned char *do_usercopy_stack_callee(int value) { - unsigned char buf[32]; + unsigned char buf[128]; int i; /* Exercise stack to avoid everything living in registers. */ @@ -43,7 +43,12 @@ static noinline unsigned char *do_usercopy_stack_callee(int value) buf[i] = value & 0xff; } - return trick_compiler(buf); + /* + * Put the target buffer in the middle of stack allocation + * so that we don't step on future stack users regardless + * of stack growth direction. + */ + return trick_compiler(&buf[(128/2)-32]); } static noinline void do_usercopy_stack(bool to_user, bool bad_frame) @@ -66,6 +71,12 @@ static noinline void do_usercopy_stack(bool to_user, bool bad_frame) bad_stack -= sizeof(unsigned long); } +#ifdef ARCH_HAS_CURRENT_STACK_POINTER + pr_info("stack : %px\n", (void *)current_stack_pointer); +#endif + pr_info("good_stack: %px-%px\n", good_stack, good_stack + sizeof(good_stack)); + pr_info("bad_stack : %px-%px\n", bad_stack, bad_stack + sizeof(good_stack)); + user_addr = vm_mmap(NULL, 0, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC, MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, 0); From f6e07eb7ebec53ffe81fc2489589320fbe4a6b75 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zheyu Ma Date: Sun, 10 Apr 2022 19:48:14 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0368/1091] tty: synclink_gt: Fix null-pointer-dereference in slgt_clean() [ Upstream commit 689ca31c542687709ba21ec2195c1fbce34fd029 ] When the driver fails at alloc_hdlcdev(), and then we remove the driver module, we will get the following splat: [ 25.065966] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000182: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI [ 25.066914] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000c10-0x0000000000000c17] [ 25.069262] RIP: 0010:detach_hdlc_protocol+0x2a/0x3e0 [ 25.077709] Call Trace: [ 25.077924] [ 25.078108] unregister_hdlc_device+0x16/0x30 [ 25.078481] slgt_cleanup+0x157/0x9f0 [synclink_gt] Fix this by checking whether the 'info->netdev' is a null pointer first. Reviewed-by: Jiri Slaby Signed-off-by: Zheyu Ma Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220410114814.3920474-1-zheyuma97@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/tty/synclink_gt.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/tty/synclink_gt.c b/drivers/tty/synclink_gt.c index ff345a8e0fcc..b72471373c71 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/synclink_gt.c +++ b/drivers/tty/synclink_gt.c @@ -1752,6 +1752,8 @@ static int hdlcdev_init(struct slgt_info *info) */ static void hdlcdev_exit(struct slgt_info *info) { + if (!info->netdev) + return; unregister_hdlc_device(info->netdev); free_netdev(info->netdev); info->netdev = NULL; From 8c014373f178a4f13a08e045ef63bdb23f62e892 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Huang Guobin Date: Thu, 31 Mar 2022 17:10:05 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0369/1091] tty: Fix a possible resource leak in icom_probe [ Upstream commit ee157a79e7c82b01ae4c25de0ac75899801f322c ] When pci_read_config_dword failed, call pci_release_regions() and pci_disable_device() to recycle the resource previously allocated. Reviewed-by: Jiri Slaby Signed-off-by: Huang Guobin Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220331091005.3290753-1-huangguobin4@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/tty/serial/icom.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/icom.c b/drivers/tty/serial/icom.c index 624f3d541c68..d047380259b5 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/serial/icom.c +++ b/drivers/tty/serial/icom.c @@ -1499,7 +1499,7 @@ static int icom_probe(struct pci_dev *dev, retval = pci_read_config_dword(dev, PCI_COMMAND, &command_reg); if (retval) { dev_err(&dev->dev, "PCI Config read FAILED\n"); - return retval; + goto probe_exit0; } pci_write_config_dword(dev, PCI_COMMAND, From 1fbe033c52480f7954c057510040fa6286c4ea25 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Duoming Zhou Date: Sun, 17 Apr 2022 21:54:07 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0370/1091] drivers: staging: rtl8192u: Fix deadlock in ieee80211_beacons_stop() [ Upstream commit 806c7b53414934ba2a39449b31fd1a038e500273 ] There is a deadlock in ieee80211_beacons_stop(), which is shown below: (Thread 1) | (Thread 2) | ieee80211_send_beacon() ieee80211_beacons_stop() | mod_timer() spin_lock_irqsave() //(1) | (wait a time) ... | ieee80211_send_beacon_cb() del_timer_sync() | spin_lock_irqsave() //(2) (wait timer to stop) | ... We hold ieee->beacon_lock in position (1) of thread 1 and use del_timer_sync() to wait timer to stop, but timer handler also need ieee->beacon_lock in position (2) of thread 2. As a result, ieee80211_beacons_stop() will block forever. This patch extracts del_timer_sync() from the protection of spin_lock_irqsave(), which could let timer handler to obtain the needed lock. Signed-off-by: Duoming Zhou Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220417135407.109536-1-duoming@zju.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/staging/rtl8192u/ieee80211/ieee80211_softmac.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8192u/ieee80211/ieee80211_softmac.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8192u/ieee80211/ieee80211_softmac.c index 33a6af7aad22..a869694337f7 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/rtl8192u/ieee80211/ieee80211_softmac.c +++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8192u/ieee80211/ieee80211_softmac.c @@ -528,9 +528,9 @@ static void ieee80211_beacons_stop(struct ieee80211_device *ieee) spin_lock_irqsave(&ieee->beacon_lock, flags); ieee->beacon_txing = 0; - del_timer_sync(&ieee->beacon_timer); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ieee->beacon_lock, flags); + del_timer_sync(&ieee->beacon_timer); } void ieee80211_stop_send_beacons(struct ieee80211_device *ieee) From 64b05fa212c7e4d057676e8b7e7120c6eb2f615b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Duoming Zhou Date: Sun, 17 Apr 2022 22:16:41 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0371/1091] drivers: staging: rtl8192e: Fix deadlock in rtllib_beacons_stop() [ Upstream commit 9b6bdbd9337de3917945847bde262a34a87a6303 ] There is a deadlock in rtllib_beacons_stop(), which is shown below: (Thread 1) | (Thread 2) | rtllib_send_beacon() rtllib_beacons_stop() | mod_timer() spin_lock_irqsave() //(1) | (wait a time) ... | rtllib_send_beacon_cb() del_timer_sync() | spin_lock_irqsave() //(2) (wait timer to stop) | ... We hold ieee->beacon_lock in position (1) of thread 1 and use del_timer_sync() to wait timer to stop, but timer handler also need ieee->beacon_lock in position (2) of thread 2. As a result, rtllib_beacons_stop() will block forever. This patch extracts del_timer_sync() from the protection of spin_lock_irqsave(), which could let timer handler to obtain the needed lock. Signed-off-by: Duoming Zhou Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220417141641.124388-1-duoming@zju.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/staging/rtl8192e/rtllib_softmac.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8192e/rtllib_softmac.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8192e/rtllib_softmac.c index 4ff8fd694c60..0154f5791b12 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/rtl8192e/rtllib_softmac.c +++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8192e/rtllib_softmac.c @@ -651,9 +651,9 @@ static void rtllib_beacons_stop(struct rtllib_device *ieee) spin_lock_irqsave(&ieee->beacon_lock, flags); ieee->beacon_txing = 0; - del_timer_sync(&ieee->beacon_timer); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ieee->beacon_lock, flags); + del_timer_sync(&ieee->beacon_timer); } From c91a74b1f0f2d2d7e728742ae55e3ffe9ba7853d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zhen Ni Date: Wed, 2 Mar 2022 11:37:16 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0372/1091] USB: host: isp116x: check return value after calling platform_get_resource() [ Upstream commit 134a3408c2d3f7e23eb0e4556e0a2d9f36c2614e ] It will cause null-ptr-deref if platform_get_resource() returns NULL, we need check the return value. Signed-off-by: Zhen Ni Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220302033716.31272-1-nizhen@uniontech.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/usb/host/isp116x-hcd.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/host/isp116x-hcd.c b/drivers/usb/host/isp116x-hcd.c index a87c0b26279e..00a4e12a1f15 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/host/isp116x-hcd.c +++ b/drivers/usb/host/isp116x-hcd.c @@ -1541,10 +1541,12 @@ static int isp116x_remove(struct platform_device *pdev) iounmap(isp116x->data_reg); res = platform_get_resource(pdev, IORESOURCE_MEM, 1); - release_mem_region(res->start, 2); + if (res) + release_mem_region(res->start, 2); iounmap(isp116x->addr_reg); res = platform_get_resource(pdev, IORESOURCE_MEM, 0); - release_mem_region(res->start, 2); + if (res) + release_mem_region(res->start, 2); usb_put_hcd(hcd); return 0; From 09a5958a2452ad22d0cb638711ef34ea1863a829 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Duoming Zhou Date: Sun, 17 Apr 2022 19:16:26 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0373/1091] drivers: tty: serial: Fix deadlock in sa1100_set_termios() [ Upstream commit 62b2caef400c1738b6d22f636c628d9f85cd4c4c ] There is a deadlock in sa1100_set_termios(), which is shown below: (Thread 1) | (Thread 2) | sa1100_enable_ms() sa1100_set_termios() | mod_timer() spin_lock_irqsave() //(1) | (wait a time) ... | sa1100_timeout() del_timer_sync() | spin_lock_irqsave() //(2) (wait timer to stop) | ... We hold sport->port.lock in position (1) of thread 1 and use del_timer_sync() to wait timer to stop, but timer handler also need sport->port.lock in position (2) of thread 2. As a result, sa1100_set_termios() will block forever. This patch moves del_timer_sync() before spin_lock_irqsave() in order to prevent the deadlock. Signed-off-by: Duoming Zhou Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220417111626.7802-1-duoming@zju.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/tty/serial/sa1100.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/sa1100.c b/drivers/tty/serial/sa1100.c index 8e618129e65c..ff4b44bdf6b6 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/serial/sa1100.c +++ b/drivers/tty/serial/sa1100.c @@ -454,6 +454,8 @@ sa1100_set_termios(struct uart_port *port, struct ktermios *termios, baud = uart_get_baud_rate(port, termios, old, 0, port->uartclk/16); quot = uart_get_divisor(port, baud); + del_timer_sync(&sport->timer); + spin_lock_irqsave(&sport->port.lock, flags); sport->port.read_status_mask &= UTSR0_TO_SM(UTSR0_TFS); @@ -484,8 +486,6 @@ sa1100_set_termios(struct uart_port *port, struct ktermios *termios, UTSR1_TO_SM(UTSR1_ROR); } - del_timer_sync(&sport->timer); - /* * Update the per-port timeout. */ From 2dcec0bc142be2096af71a5703d63237127db204 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Duoming Zhou Date: Sun, 17 Apr 2022 20:03:05 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0374/1091] drivers: usb: host: Fix deadlock in oxu_bus_suspend() [ Upstream commit 4d378f2ae58138d4c55684e1d274e7dd94aa6524 ] There is a deadlock in oxu_bus_suspend(), which is shown below: (Thread 1) | (Thread 2) | timer_action() oxu_bus_suspend() | mod_timer() spin_lock_irq() //(1) | (wait a time) ... | oxu_watchdog() del_timer_sync() | spin_lock_irq() //(2) (wait timer to stop) | ... We hold oxu->lock in position (1) of thread 1, and use del_timer_sync() to wait timer to stop, but timer handler also need oxu->lock in position (2) of thread 2. As a result, oxu_bus_suspend() will block forever. This patch extracts del_timer_sync() from the protection of spin_lock_irq(), which could let timer handler to obtain the needed lock. Signed-off-by: Duoming Zhou Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220417120305.64577-1-duoming@zju.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/usb/host/oxu210hp-hcd.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/host/oxu210hp-hcd.c b/drivers/usb/host/oxu210hp-hcd.c index 65985247fc00..f05b6f2b0865 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/host/oxu210hp-hcd.c +++ b/drivers/usb/host/oxu210hp-hcd.c @@ -3906,8 +3906,10 @@ static int oxu_bus_suspend(struct usb_hcd *hcd) } } + spin_unlock_irq(&oxu->lock); /* turn off now-idle HC */ del_timer_sync(&oxu->watchdog); + spin_lock_irq(&oxu->lock); ehci_halt(oxu); hcd->state = HC_STATE_SUSPENDED; From 3a7170a3de628befe501e389b121f0cae4a731af Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Evan Green Date: Thu, 21 Apr 2022 10:39:27 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0375/1091] USB: hcd-pci: Fully suspend across freeze/thaw cycle [ Upstream commit 63acaa8e9c65dc34dc249440216f8e977f5d2748 ] The documentation for the freeze() method says that it "should quiesce the device so that it doesn't generate IRQs or DMA". The unspoken consequence of not doing this is that MSIs aimed at non-boot CPUs may get fully lost if they're sent during the period where the target CPU is offline. The current callbacks for USB HCD do not fully quiesce interrupts, specifically on XHCI. Change to use the full suspend/resume flow for freeze/thaw to ensure interrupts are fully quiesced. This fixes issues where USB devices fail to thaw during hibernation because XHCI misses its interrupt and cannot recover. Acked-by: Alan Stern Signed-off-by: Evan Green Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220421103751.v3.2.I8226c7fdae88329ef70957b96a39b346c69a914e@changeid Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/usb/core/hcd-pci.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/core/hcd-pci.c b/drivers/usb/core/hcd-pci.c index 9e26b0143a59..db16efe293e0 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/core/hcd-pci.c +++ b/drivers/usb/core/hcd-pci.c @@ -604,10 +604,10 @@ const struct dev_pm_ops usb_hcd_pci_pm_ops = { .suspend_noirq = hcd_pci_suspend_noirq, .resume_noirq = hcd_pci_resume_noirq, .resume = hcd_pci_resume, - .freeze = check_root_hub_suspended, + .freeze = hcd_pci_suspend, .freeze_noirq = check_root_hub_suspended, .thaw_noirq = NULL, - .thaw = NULL, + .thaw = hcd_pci_resume, .poweroff = hcd_pci_suspend, .poweroff_noirq = hcd_pci_suspend_noirq, .restore_noirq = hcd_pci_resume_noirq, From d232ca0bbc7d03144bad0ffd1792c3352bfd03fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Marek Szyprowski Date: Thu, 5 May 2022 12:46:18 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0376/1091] usb: dwc2: gadget: don't reset gadget's driver->bus [ Upstream commit 3120aac6d0ecd9accf56894aeac0e265f74d3d5a ] UDC driver should not touch gadget's driver internals, especially it should not reset driver->bus. This wasn't harmful so far, but since commit fc274c1e9973 ("USB: gadget: Add a new bus for gadgets") gadget subsystem got it's own bus and messing with ->bus triggers the following NULL pointer dereference: dwc2 12480000.hsotg: bound driver g_ether 8<--- cut here --- Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000 [00000000] *pgd=00000000 Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] SMP ARM Modules linked in: ... CPU: 0 PID: 620 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 5.18.0-rc5-next-20220504 #11862 Hardware name: Samsung Exynos (Flattened Device Tree) PC is at module_add_driver+0x44/0xe8 LR is at sysfs_do_create_link_sd+0x84/0xe0 ... Process modprobe (pid: 620, stack limit = 0x(ptrval)) ... module_add_driver from bus_add_driver+0xf4/0x1e4 bus_add_driver from driver_register+0x78/0x10c driver_register from usb_gadget_register_driver_owner+0x40/0xb4 usb_gadget_register_driver_owner from do_one_initcall+0x44/0x1e0 do_one_initcall from do_init_module+0x44/0x1c8 do_init_module from load_module+0x19b8/0x1b9c load_module from sys_finit_module+0xdc/0xfc sys_finit_module from ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x54 Exception stack(0xf1771fa8 to 0xf1771ff0) ... dwc2 12480000.hsotg: new device is high-speed ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Fix this by removing driver->bus entry reset. Signed-off-by: Marek Szyprowski Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220505104618.22729-1-m.szyprowski@samsung.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/usb/dwc2/gadget.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/dwc2/gadget.c b/drivers/usb/dwc2/gadget.c index 379bbf27c7ce..8fd6eefc671c 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/dwc2/gadget.c +++ b/drivers/usb/dwc2/gadget.c @@ -4486,7 +4486,6 @@ static int dwc2_hsotg_udc_start(struct usb_gadget *gadget, WARN_ON(hsotg->driver); - driver->driver.bus = NULL; hsotg->driver = driver; hsotg->gadget.dev.of_node = hsotg->dev->of_node; hsotg->gadget.speed = USB_SPEED_UNKNOWN; From fa0b2dd6829dcd27f4eeacaeef4275b12967a52e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shuah Khan Date: Fri, 29 Apr 2022 15:09:13 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 0377/1091] misc: rtsx: set NULL intfdata when probe fails [ Upstream commit f861d36e021e1ac4a0a2a1f6411d623809975d63 ] rtsx_usb_probe() doesn't call usb_set_intfdata() to null out the interface pointer when probe fails. This leaves a stale pointer. Noticed the missing usb_set_intfdata() while debugging an unrelated invalid DMA mapping problem. Fix it with a call to usb_set_intfdata(..., NULL). Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220429210913.46804-1-skhan@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/misc/cardreader/rtsx_usb.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/misc/cardreader/rtsx_usb.c b/drivers/misc/cardreader/rtsx_usb.c index a328cab11014..4aef33d07cc3 100644 --- a/drivers/misc/cardreader/rtsx_usb.c +++ b/drivers/misc/cardreader/rtsx_usb.c @@ -667,6 +667,7 @@ static int rtsx_usb_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, return 0; out_init_fail: + usb_set_intfdata(ucr->pusb_intf, NULL); usb_free_coherent(ucr->pusb_dev, IOBUF_SIZE, ucr->iobuf, ucr->iobuf_dma); return ret; From d472c78cc82999d07bd09193a6718016ce9cd386 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: bumwoo lee Date: Wed, 27 Apr 2022 12:00:05 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 0378/1091] extcon: Modify extcon device to be created after driver data is set [ Upstream commit 5dcc2afe716d69f5112ce035cb14f007461ff189 ] Currently, someone can invoke the sysfs such as state_show() intermittently before dev_set_drvdata() is done. And it can be a cause of kernel Oops because of edev is Null at that time. So modified the driver registration to after setting drviver data. - Oops's backtrace. Backtrace: [] (state_show) from [] (dev_attr_show) [] (dev_attr_show) from [] (sysfs_kf_seq_show) [] (sysfs_kf_seq_show) from [] (kernfs_seq_show) [] (kernfs_seq_show) from [] (seq_read) [] (seq_read) from [] (kernfs_fop_read) [] (kernfs_fop_read) from [] (__vfs_read) [] (__vfs_read) from [] (vfs_read) [] (vfs_read) from [] (ksys_read) [] (ksys_read) from [] (sys_read) [] (sys_read) from [] (__sys_trace_return) Signed-off-by: bumwoo lee Signed-off-by: Chanwoo Choi Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/extcon/extcon.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/extcon/extcon.c b/drivers/extcon/extcon.c index 5c9e156cd086..6b905c3d30f4 100644 --- a/drivers/extcon/extcon.c +++ b/drivers/extcon/extcon.c @@ -1230,19 +1230,14 @@ int extcon_dev_register(struct extcon_dev *edev) edev->dev.type = &edev->extcon_dev_type; } - ret = device_register(&edev->dev); - if (ret) { - put_device(&edev->dev); - goto err_dev; - } - spin_lock_init(&edev->lock); - edev->nh = devm_kcalloc(&edev->dev, edev->max_supported, - sizeof(*edev->nh), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!edev->nh) { - ret = -ENOMEM; - device_unregister(&edev->dev); - goto err_dev; + if (edev->max_supported) { + edev->nh = kcalloc(edev->max_supported, sizeof(*edev->nh), + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!edev->nh) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto err_alloc_nh; + } } for (index = 0; index < edev->max_supported; index++) @@ -1253,6 +1248,12 @@ int extcon_dev_register(struct extcon_dev *edev) dev_set_drvdata(&edev->dev, edev); edev->state = 0; + ret = device_register(&edev->dev); + if (ret) { + put_device(&edev->dev); + goto err_dev; + } + mutex_lock(&extcon_dev_list_lock); list_add(&edev->entry, &extcon_dev_list); mutex_unlock(&extcon_dev_list_lock); @@ -1260,6 +1261,9 @@ int extcon_dev_register(struct extcon_dev *edev) return 0; err_dev: + if (edev->max_supported) + kfree(edev->nh); +err_alloc_nh: if (edev->max_supported) kfree(edev->extcon_dev_type.groups); err_alloc_groups: @@ -1320,6 +1324,7 @@ void extcon_dev_unregister(struct extcon_dev *edev) if (edev->max_supported) { kfree(edev->extcon_dev_type.groups); kfree(edev->cables); + kfree(edev->nh); } put_device(&edev->dev); From 1bcfb95de192728fe48737fde6c09abd578945c4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andre Przywara Date: Fri, 6 May 2022 17:25:22 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0379/1091] clocksource/drivers/sp804: Avoid error on multiple instances [ Upstream commit a98399cbc1e05f7b977419f03905501d566cf54e ] When a machine sports more than one SP804 timer instance, we only bring up the first one, since multiple timers of the same kind are not useful to Linux. As this is intentional behaviour, we should not return an error message, as we do today: =============== [ 0.000800] Failed to initialize '/bus@8000000/motherboard-bus@8000000/iofpga-bus@300000000/timer@120000': -22 =============== Replace the -EINVAL return with a debug message and return 0 instead. Also we do not reach the init function anymore if the DT node is disabled (as this is now handled by OF_DECLARE), so remove the explicit check for that case. This fixes a long standing bogus error when booting ARM's fastmodels. Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara Reviewed-by: Robin Murphy Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506162522.3675399-1-andre.przywara@arm.com Signed-off-by: Daniel Lezcano Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/clocksource/timer-sp804.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/clocksource/timer-sp804.c b/drivers/clocksource/timer-sp804.c index 9c841980eed1..c9aa0498fb84 100644 --- a/drivers/clocksource/timer-sp804.c +++ b/drivers/clocksource/timer-sp804.c @@ -215,6 +215,11 @@ static int __init sp804_of_init(struct device_node *np) struct clk *clk1, *clk2; const char *name = of_get_property(np, "compatible", NULL); + if (initialized) { + pr_debug("%pOF: skipping further SP804 timer device\n", np); + return 0; + } + base = of_iomap(np, 0); if (!base) return -ENXIO; @@ -223,11 +228,6 @@ static int __init sp804_of_init(struct device_node *np) writel(0, base + TIMER_CTRL); writel(0, base + TIMER_2_BASE + TIMER_CTRL); - if (initialized || !of_device_is_available(np)) { - ret = -EINVAL; - goto err; - } - clk1 = of_clk_get(np, 0); if (IS_ERR(clk1)) clk1 = NULL; From 58762f1c63c75cbe1dc393eed3c9cf8e38310ca1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wang Cheng Date: Mon, 16 May 2022 17:22:23 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0380/1091] staging: rtl8712: fix uninit-value in usb_read8() and friends [ Upstream commit d1b57669732d09da7e13ef86d058dab0cd57f6e0 ] When r8712_usbctrl_vendorreq() returns negative, 'data' in usb_read{8,16,32} will not be initialized. BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in string_nocheck lib/vsprintf.c:643 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in string+0x4ec/0x6f0 lib/vsprintf.c:725 string_nocheck lib/vsprintf.c:643 [inline] string+0x4ec/0x6f0 lib/vsprintf.c:725 vsnprintf+0x2222/0x3650 lib/vsprintf.c:2806 va_format lib/vsprintf.c:1704 [inline] pointer+0x18e6/0x1f70 lib/vsprintf.c:2443 vsnprintf+0x1a9b/0x3650 lib/vsprintf.c:2810 vprintk_store+0x537/0x2150 kernel/printk/printk.c:2158 vprintk_emit+0x28b/0xab0 kernel/printk/printk.c:2256 dev_vprintk_emit+0x5ef/0x6d0 drivers/base/core.c:4604 dev_printk_emit+0x1dd/0x21f drivers/base/core.c:4615 __dev_printk+0x3be/0x440 drivers/base/core.c:4627 _dev_info+0x1ea/0x22f drivers/base/core.c:4673 r871xu_drv_init+0x1929/0x3070 drivers/staging/rtl8712/usb_intf.c:401 usb_probe_interface+0xf19/0x1600 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:396 really_probe+0x6c7/0x1350 drivers/base/dd.c:621 __driver_probe_device+0x3e9/0x530 drivers/base/dd.c:752 driver_probe_device drivers/base/dd.c:782 [inline] __device_attach_driver+0x79f/0x1120 drivers/base/dd.c:899 bus_for_each_drv+0x2d6/0x3f0 drivers/base/bus.c:427 __device_attach+0x593/0x8e0 drivers/base/dd.c:970 device_initial_probe+0x4a/0x60 drivers/base/dd.c:1017 bus_probe_device+0x17b/0x3e0 drivers/base/bus.c:487 device_add+0x1fff/0x26e0 drivers/base/core.c:3405 usb_set_configuration+0x37e9/0x3ed0 drivers/usb/core/message.c:2170 usb_generic_driver_probe+0x13c/0x300 drivers/usb/core/generic.c:238 usb_probe_device+0x309/0x570 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:293 really_probe+0x6c7/0x1350 drivers/base/dd.c:621 __driver_probe_device+0x3e9/0x530 drivers/base/dd.c:752 driver_probe_device drivers/base/dd.c:782 [inline] __device_attach_driver+0x79f/0x1120 drivers/base/dd.c:899 bus_for_each_drv+0x2d6/0x3f0 drivers/base/bus.c:427 __device_attach+0x593/0x8e0 drivers/base/dd.c:970 device_initial_probe+0x4a/0x60 drivers/base/dd.c:1017 bus_probe_device+0x17b/0x3e0 drivers/base/bus.c:487 device_add+0x1fff/0x26e0 drivers/base/core.c:3405 usb_new_device+0x1b91/0x2950 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:2566 hub_port_connect drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5363 [inline] hub_port_connect_change drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5507 [inline] port_event drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5665 [inline] hub_event+0x58e3/0x89e0 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5747 process_one_work+0xdb6/0x1820 kernel/workqueue.c:2289 worker_thread+0x10d0/0x2240 kernel/workqueue.c:2436 kthread+0x3c7/0x500 kernel/kthread.c:376 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 Local variable data created at: usb_read8+0x5d/0x130 drivers/staging/rtl8712/usb_ops.c:33 r8712_read8+0xa5/0xd0 drivers/staging/rtl8712/rtl8712_io.c:29 KMSAN: uninit-value in r871xu_drv_init https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=3cd92b1d85428b128503bfa7a250294c9ae00bd8 Reported-by: Tested-by: Reviewed-by: Dan Carpenter Signed-off-by: Wang Cheng Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/b9b7a6ee02c02aa28054f5cf16129977775f3cd9.1652618244.git.wanngchenng@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/staging/rtl8712/usb_ops.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8712/usb_ops.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8712/usb_ops.c index e64845e6adf3..af9966d03979 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/rtl8712/usb_ops.c +++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8712/usb_ops.c @@ -29,7 +29,8 @@ static u8 usb_read8(struct intf_hdl *intfhdl, u32 addr) u16 wvalue; u16 index; u16 len; - __le32 data; + int status; + __le32 data = 0; struct intf_priv *intfpriv = intfhdl->pintfpriv; request = 0x05; @@ -37,8 +38,10 @@ static u8 usb_read8(struct intf_hdl *intfhdl, u32 addr) index = 0; wvalue = (u16)(addr & 0x0000ffff); len = 1; - r8712_usbctrl_vendorreq(intfpriv, request, wvalue, index, &data, len, - requesttype); + status = r8712_usbctrl_vendorreq(intfpriv, request, wvalue, index, + &data, len, requesttype); + if (status < 0) + return 0; return (u8)(le32_to_cpu(data) & 0x0ff); } @@ -49,7 +52,8 @@ static u16 usb_read16(struct intf_hdl *intfhdl, u32 addr) u16 wvalue; u16 index; u16 len; - __le32 data; + int status; + __le32 data = 0; struct intf_priv *intfpriv = intfhdl->pintfpriv; request = 0x05; @@ -57,8 +61,10 @@ static u16 usb_read16(struct intf_hdl *intfhdl, u32 addr) index = 0; wvalue = (u16)(addr & 0x0000ffff); len = 2; - r8712_usbctrl_vendorreq(intfpriv, request, wvalue, index, &data, len, - requesttype); + status = r8712_usbctrl_vendorreq(intfpriv, request, wvalue, index, + &data, len, requesttype); + if (status < 0) + return 0; return (u16)(le32_to_cpu(data) & 0xffff); } @@ -69,7 +75,8 @@ static u32 usb_read32(struct intf_hdl *intfhdl, u32 addr) u16 wvalue; u16 index; u16 len; - __le32 data; + int status; + __le32 data = 0; struct intf_priv *intfpriv = intfhdl->pintfpriv; request = 0x05; @@ -77,8 +84,10 @@ static u32 usb_read32(struct intf_hdl *intfhdl, u32 addr) index = 0; wvalue = (u16)(addr & 0x0000ffff); len = 4; - r8712_usbctrl_vendorreq(intfpriv, request, wvalue, index, &data, len, - requesttype); + status = r8712_usbctrl_vendorreq(intfpriv, request, wvalue, index, + &data, len, requesttype); + if (status < 0) + return 0; return le32_to_cpu(data); } From 52a0d88c328098b4e9fb8f2f3877fec0eff4104b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wang Cheng Date: Mon, 16 May 2022 17:22:41 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0381/1091] staging: rtl8712: fix uninit-value in r871xu_drv_init() [ Upstream commit 0458e5428e5e959d201a40ffe71d762a79ecedc4 ] When 'tmpU1b' returns from r8712_read8(padapter, EE_9346CR) is 0, 'mac[6]' will not be initialized. BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in r871xu_drv_init+0x2d54/0x3070 drivers/staging/rtl8712/usb_intf.c:541 r871xu_drv_init+0x2d54/0x3070 drivers/staging/rtl8712/usb_intf.c:541 usb_probe_interface+0xf19/0x1600 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:396 really_probe+0x653/0x14b0 drivers/base/dd.c:596 __driver_probe_device+0x3e9/0x530 drivers/base/dd.c:752 driver_probe_device drivers/base/dd.c:782 [inline] __device_attach_driver+0x79f/0x1120 drivers/base/dd.c:899 bus_for_each_drv+0x2d6/0x3f0 drivers/base/bus.c:427 __device_attach+0x593/0x8e0 drivers/base/dd.c:970 device_initial_probe+0x4a/0x60 drivers/base/dd.c:1017 bus_probe_device+0x17b/0x3e0 drivers/base/bus.c:487 device_add+0x1fff/0x26e0 drivers/base/core.c:3405 usb_set_configuration+0x37e9/0x3ed0 drivers/usb/core/message.c:2170 usb_generic_driver_probe+0x13c/0x300 drivers/usb/core/generic.c:238 usb_probe_device+0x309/0x570 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:293 really_probe+0x653/0x14b0 drivers/base/dd.c:596 __driver_probe_device+0x3e9/0x530 drivers/base/dd.c:752 driver_probe_device drivers/base/dd.c:782 [inline] __device_attach_driver+0x79f/0x1120 drivers/base/dd.c:899 bus_for_each_drv+0x2d6/0x3f0 drivers/base/bus.c:427 __device_attach+0x593/0x8e0 drivers/base/dd.c:970 device_initial_probe+0x4a/0x60 drivers/base/dd.c:1017 bus_probe_device+0x17b/0x3e0 drivers/base/bus.c:487 device_add+0x1fff/0x26e0 drivers/base/core.c:3405 usb_new_device+0x1b8e/0x2950 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:2566 hub_port_connect drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5358 [inline] hub_port_connect_change drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5502 [inline] port_event drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5660 [inline] hub_event+0x58e3/0x89e0 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5742 process_one_work+0xdb6/0x1820 kernel/workqueue.c:2307 worker_thread+0x10b3/0x21e0 kernel/workqueue.c:2454 kthread+0x3c7/0x500 kernel/kthread.c:377 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 Local variable mac created at: r871xu_drv_init+0x1771/0x3070 drivers/staging/rtl8712/usb_intf.c:394 usb_probe_interface+0xf19/0x1600 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:396 KMSAN: uninit-value in r871xu_drv_init https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=3cd92b1d85428b128503bfa7a250294c9ae00bd8 Reported-by: Tested-by: Reviewed-by: Dan Carpenter Signed-off-by: Wang Cheng Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/14c3886173dfa4597f0704547c414cfdbcd11d16.1652618244.git.wanngchenng@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/staging/rtl8712/usb_intf.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8712/usb_intf.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8712/usb_intf.c index 49188ab04612..f7c1258eaa39 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/rtl8712/usb_intf.c +++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8712/usb_intf.c @@ -539,13 +539,13 @@ static int r871xu_drv_init(struct usb_interface *pusb_intf, } else { AutoloadFail = false; } - if (((mac[0] == 0xff) && (mac[1] == 0xff) && + if ((!AutoloadFail) || + ((mac[0] == 0xff) && (mac[1] == 0xff) && (mac[2] == 0xff) && (mac[3] == 0xff) && (mac[4] == 0xff) && (mac[5] == 0xff)) || ((mac[0] == 0x00) && (mac[1] == 0x00) && (mac[2] == 0x00) && (mac[3] == 0x00) && - (mac[4] == 0x00) && (mac[5] == 0x00)) || - (!AutoloadFail)) { + (mac[4] == 0x00) && (mac[5] == 0x00))) { mac[0] = 0x00; mac[1] = 0xe0; mac[2] = 0x4c; From 19f4b51b836d44bbeeab605a6c65fb479a79f0f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: John Ogness Date: Fri, 6 May 2022 23:39:24 +0206 Subject: [PATCH 0382/1091] serial: msm_serial: disable interrupts in __msm_console_write() [ Upstream commit aabdbb1b7a5819e18c403334a31fb0cc2c06ad41 ] __msm_console_write() assumes that interrupts are disabled, but with threaded console printers it is possible that the write() callback of the console is called with interrupts enabled. Explicitly disable interrupts using local_irq_save() to preserve the assumed context. Reported-by: Marek Szyprowski Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek Signed-off-by: John Ogness Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506213324.470461-1-john.ogness@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/tty/serial/msm_serial.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/msm_serial.c b/drivers/tty/serial/msm_serial.c index 5129c2dfbe07..aac96659694d 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/serial/msm_serial.c +++ b/drivers/tty/serial/msm_serial.c @@ -1579,6 +1579,7 @@ static inline struct uart_port *msm_get_port_from_line(unsigned int line) static void __msm_console_write(struct uart_port *port, const char *s, unsigned int count, bool is_uartdm) { + unsigned long flags; int i; int num_newlines = 0; bool replaced = false; @@ -1596,6 +1597,8 @@ static void __msm_console_write(struct uart_port *port, const char *s, num_newlines++; count += num_newlines; + local_irq_save(flags); + if (port->sysrq) locked = 0; else if (oops_in_progress) @@ -1641,6 +1644,8 @@ static void __msm_console_write(struct uart_port *port, const char *s, if (locked) spin_unlock(&port->lock); + + local_irq_restore(flags); } static void msm_console_write(struct console *co, const char *s, From 6fd031799e7b287bc708e0ea19b66a6b40e935a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hao Luo Date: Mon, 16 May 2022 12:09:51 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0383/1091] kernfs: Separate kernfs_pr_cont_buf and rename_lock. [ Upstream commit 1a702dc88e150487c9c173a249b3d236498b9183 ] Previously the protection of kernfs_pr_cont_buf was piggy backed by rename_lock, which means that pr_cont() needs to be protected under rename_lock. This can cause potential circular lock dependencies. If there is an OOM, we have the following call hierarchy: -> cpuset_print_current_mems_allowed() -> pr_cont_cgroup_name() -> pr_cont_kernfs_name() pr_cont_kernfs_name() will grab rename_lock and call printk. So we have the following lock dependencies: kernfs_rename_lock -> console_sem Sometimes, printk does a wakeup before releasing console_sem, which has the dependence chain: console_sem -> p->pi_lock -> rq->lock Now, imagine one wants to read cgroup_name under rq->lock, for example, printing cgroup_name in a tracepoint in the scheduler code. They will be holding rq->lock and take rename_lock: rq->lock -> kernfs_rename_lock Now they will deadlock. A prevention to this circular lock dependency is to separate the protection of pr_cont_buf from rename_lock. In principle, rename_lock is to protect the integrity of cgroup name when copying to buf. Once pr_cont_buf has got its content, rename_lock can be dropped. So it's safe to drop rename_lock after kernfs_name_locked (and kernfs_path_from_node_locked) and rely on a dedicated pr_cont_lock to protect pr_cont_buf. Acked-by: Tejun Heo Signed-off-by: Hao Luo Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220516190951.3144144-1-haoluo@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/kernfs/dir.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/kernfs/dir.c b/fs/kernfs/dir.c index 7d4af6cea2a6..99ee657596b5 100644 --- a/fs/kernfs/dir.c +++ b/fs/kernfs/dir.c @@ -19,7 +19,15 @@ DEFINE_MUTEX(kernfs_mutex); static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(kernfs_rename_lock); /* kn->parent and ->name */ -static char kernfs_pr_cont_buf[PATH_MAX]; /* protected by rename_lock */ +/* + * Don't use rename_lock to piggy back on pr_cont_buf. We don't want to + * call pr_cont() while holding rename_lock. Because sometimes pr_cont() + * will perform wakeups when releasing console_sem. Holding rename_lock + * will introduce deadlock if the scheduler reads the kernfs_name in the + * wakeup path. + */ +static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(kernfs_pr_cont_lock); +static char kernfs_pr_cont_buf[PATH_MAX]; /* protected by pr_cont_lock */ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(kernfs_idr_lock); /* root->ino_idr */ #define rb_to_kn(X) rb_entry((X), struct kernfs_node, rb) @@ -230,12 +238,12 @@ void pr_cont_kernfs_name(struct kernfs_node *kn) { unsigned long flags; - spin_lock_irqsave(&kernfs_rename_lock, flags); + spin_lock_irqsave(&kernfs_pr_cont_lock, flags); - kernfs_name_locked(kn, kernfs_pr_cont_buf, sizeof(kernfs_pr_cont_buf)); + kernfs_name(kn, kernfs_pr_cont_buf, sizeof(kernfs_pr_cont_buf)); pr_cont("%s", kernfs_pr_cont_buf); - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kernfs_rename_lock, flags); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kernfs_pr_cont_lock, flags); } /** @@ -249,10 +257,10 @@ void pr_cont_kernfs_path(struct kernfs_node *kn) unsigned long flags; int sz; - spin_lock_irqsave(&kernfs_rename_lock, flags); + spin_lock_irqsave(&kernfs_pr_cont_lock, flags); - sz = kernfs_path_from_node_locked(kn, NULL, kernfs_pr_cont_buf, - sizeof(kernfs_pr_cont_buf)); + sz = kernfs_path_from_node(kn, NULL, kernfs_pr_cont_buf, + sizeof(kernfs_pr_cont_buf)); if (sz < 0) { pr_cont("(error)"); goto out; @@ -266,7 +274,7 @@ void pr_cont_kernfs_path(struct kernfs_node *kn) pr_cont("%s", kernfs_pr_cont_buf); out: - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kernfs_rename_lock, flags); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kernfs_pr_cont_lock, flags); } /** @@ -870,13 +878,12 @@ static struct kernfs_node *kernfs_walk_ns(struct kernfs_node *parent, lockdep_assert_held(&kernfs_mutex); - /* grab kernfs_rename_lock to piggy back on kernfs_pr_cont_buf */ - spin_lock_irq(&kernfs_rename_lock); + spin_lock_irq(&kernfs_pr_cont_lock); len = strlcpy(kernfs_pr_cont_buf, path, sizeof(kernfs_pr_cont_buf)); if (len >= sizeof(kernfs_pr_cont_buf)) { - spin_unlock_irq(&kernfs_rename_lock); + spin_unlock_irq(&kernfs_pr_cont_lock); return NULL; } @@ -888,7 +895,7 @@ static struct kernfs_node *kernfs_walk_ns(struct kernfs_node *parent, parent = kernfs_find_ns(parent, name, ns); } - spin_unlock_irq(&kernfs_rename_lock); + spin_unlock_irq(&kernfs_pr_cont_lock); return parent; } From 99e4c67a5581af17b8741dbad0363eb0f3649fb2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Liu Xinpeng Date: Tue, 26 Apr 2022 22:53:29 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0384/1091] watchdog: wdat_wdt: Stop watchdog when rebooting the system [ Upstream commit 27fdf84510a1374748904db43f6755f912736d92 ] Executing reboot command several times on the machine "Dell PowerEdge R740", UEFI security detection stopped machine with the following prompt: UEFI0082: The system was reset due to a timeout from the watchdog timer. Check the System Event Log (SEL) or crash dumps from Operating Sysstem to identify the source that triggered the watchdog timer reset. Update the firmware or driver for the identified device. iDRAC has warning event: "The watchdog timer reset the system". This patch fixes this issue by adding the reboot notifier. Signed-off-by: Liu Xinpeng Reviewed-by: Guenter Roeck Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1650984810-6247-3-git-send-email-liuxp11@chinatelecom.cn Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck Signed-off-by: Wim Van Sebroeck Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/watchdog/wdat_wdt.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/watchdog/wdat_wdt.c b/drivers/watchdog/wdat_wdt.c index 88c5e6361aa0..fddbb39433be 100644 --- a/drivers/watchdog/wdat_wdt.c +++ b/drivers/watchdog/wdat_wdt.c @@ -462,6 +462,7 @@ static int wdat_wdt_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) return ret; watchdog_set_nowayout(&wdat->wdd, nowayout); + watchdog_stop_on_reboot(&wdat->wdd); return devm_watchdog_register_device(dev, &wdat->wdd); } From cf6b9316879f19c99b4a4db50b138d27e83b8dca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Guoqing Jiang Date: Fri, 29 Apr 2022 16:49:09 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0385/1091] md: protect md_unregister_thread from reentrancy [ Upstream commit 1e267742283a4b5a8ca65755c44166be27e9aa0f ] Generally, the md_unregister_thread is called with reconfig_mutex, but raid_message in dm-raid doesn't hold reconfig_mutex to unregister thread, so md_unregister_thread can be called simulitaneously from two call sites in theory. Then after previous commit which remove the protection of reconfig_mutex for md_unregister_thread completely, the potential issue could be worse than before. Let's take pers_lock at the beginning of function to ensure reentrancy. Reported-by: Donald Buczek Signed-off-by: Guoqing Jiang Signed-off-by: Song Liu Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/md/md.c | 15 ++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/md/md.c b/drivers/md/md.c index 4d1ef470f2fa..11fd3b32b562 100644 --- a/drivers/md/md.c +++ b/drivers/md/md.c @@ -7777,17 +7777,22 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(md_register_thread); void md_unregister_thread(struct md_thread **threadp) { - struct md_thread *thread = *threadp; - if (!thread) - return; - pr_debug("interrupting MD-thread pid %d\n", task_pid_nr(thread->tsk)); - /* Locking ensures that mddev_unlock does not wake_up a + struct md_thread *thread; + + /* + * Locking ensures that mddev_unlock does not wake_up a * non-existent thread */ spin_lock(&pers_lock); + thread = *threadp; + if (!thread) { + spin_unlock(&pers_lock); + return; + } *threadp = NULL; spin_unlock(&pers_lock); + pr_debug("interrupting MD-thread pid %d\n", task_pid_nr(thread->tsk)); kthread_stop(thread->tsk); kfree(thread); } From 0331d261c3983c7e987223115679242080802756 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hannes Reinecke Date: Mon, 23 May 2022 14:02:44 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0386/1091] scsi: myrb: Fix up null pointer access on myrb_cleanup() [ Upstream commit f9f0a46141e2e39bedb4779c88380d1b5f018c14 ] When myrb_probe() fails the callback might not be set, so we need to validate the 'disable_intr' callback in myrb_cleanup() to not cause a null pointer exception. And while at it do not call myrb_cleanup() if we cannot enable the PCI device at all. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220523120244.99515-1-hare@suse.de Reported-by: Zheyu Ma Tested-by: Zheyu Ma Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/scsi/myrb.c | 11 ++++++++--- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/myrb.c b/drivers/scsi/myrb.c index 539ac8ce4fcd..35b32920a94a 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/myrb.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/myrb.c @@ -1241,7 +1241,8 @@ static void myrb_cleanup(struct myrb_hba *cb) myrb_unmap(cb); if (cb->mmio_base) { - cb->disable_intr(cb->io_base); + if (cb->disable_intr) + cb->disable_intr(cb->io_base); iounmap(cb->mmio_base); } if (cb->irq) @@ -3516,9 +3517,13 @@ static struct myrb_hba *myrb_detect(struct pci_dev *pdev, mutex_init(&cb->dcmd_mutex); mutex_init(&cb->dma_mutex); cb->pdev = pdev; + cb->host = shost; - if (pci_enable_device(pdev)) - goto failure; + if (pci_enable_device(pdev)) { + dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Failed to enable PCI device\n"); + scsi_host_put(shost); + return NULL; + } if (privdata->hw_init == DAC960_PD_hw_init || privdata->hw_init == DAC960_P_hw_init) { From 7df12bee5415adc87c9ca787c5c0bf420905762b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michal Kubecek Date: Mon, 23 May 2022 22:05:24 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0387/1091] Revert "net: af_key: add check for pfkey_broadcast in function pfkey_process" [ Upstream commit 9c90c9b3e50e16d03c7f87d63e9db373974781e0 ] This reverts commit 4dc2a5a8f6754492180741facf2a8787f2c415d7. A non-zero return value from pfkey_broadcast() does not necessarily mean an error occurred as this function returns -ESRCH when no registered listener received the message. In particular, a call with BROADCAST_PROMISC_ONLY flag and null one_sk argument can never return zero so that this commit in fact prevents processing any PF_KEY message. One visible effect is that racoon daemon fails to find encryption algorithms like aes and refuses to start. Excluding -ESRCH return value would fix this but it's not obvious that we really want to bail out here and most other callers of pfkey_broadcast() also ignore the return value. Also, as pointed out by Steffen Klassert, PF_KEY is kind of deprecated and newer userspace code should use netlink instead so that we should only disturb the code for really important fixes. v2: add a comment explaining why is the return value ignored Signed-off-by: Michal Kubecek Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/key/af_key.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/key/af_key.c b/net/key/af_key.c index dd064d5eff6e..32fe99cd01fc 100644 --- a/net/key/af_key.c +++ b/net/key/af_key.c @@ -2830,10 +2830,12 @@ static int pfkey_process(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct sadb void *ext_hdrs[SADB_EXT_MAX]; int err; - err = pfkey_broadcast(skb_clone(skb, GFP_KERNEL), GFP_KERNEL, - BROADCAST_PROMISC_ONLY, NULL, sock_net(sk)); - if (err) - return err; + /* Non-zero return value of pfkey_broadcast() does not always signal + * an error and even on an actual error we may still want to process + * the message so rather ignore the return value. + */ + pfkey_broadcast(skb_clone(skb, GFP_KERNEL), GFP_KERNEL, + BROADCAST_PROMISC_ONLY, NULL, sock_net(sk)); memset(ext_hdrs, 0, sizeof(ext_hdrs)); err = parse_exthdrs(skb, hdr, ext_hdrs); From 9223144fdd64582d61edab35fee7174135ef2fad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Venky Shankar Date: Thu, 10 Mar 2022 09:34:19 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 0388/1091] ceph: allow ceph.dir.rctime xattr to be updatable [ Upstream commit d7a2dc523085f8b8c60548ceedc696934aefeb0e ] `rctime' has been a pain point in cephfs due to its buggy nature - inconsistent values reported and those sorts. Fixing rctime is non-trivial needing an overall redesign of the entire nested statistics infrastructure. As a workaround, PR http://github.com/ceph/ceph/pull/37938 allows this extended attribute to be manually set. This allows users to "fixup" inconsistent rctime values. While this sounds messy, its probably the wisest approach allowing users/scripts to workaround buggy rctime values. The above PR enables Ceph MDS to allow manually setting rctime extended attribute with the corresponding user-land changes. We may as well allow the same to be done via kclient for parity. Signed-off-by: Venky Shankar Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/ceph/xattr.c | 10 +++++++++- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/ceph/xattr.c b/fs/ceph/xattr.c index cb18ee637cb7..4bcf0226818d 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/xattr.c +++ b/fs/ceph/xattr.c @@ -316,6 +316,14 @@ static ssize_t ceph_vxattrcb_snap_btime(struct ceph_inode_info *ci, char *val, } #define XATTR_RSTAT_FIELD(_type, _name) \ XATTR_NAME_CEPH(_type, _name, VXATTR_FLAG_RSTAT) +#define XATTR_RSTAT_FIELD_UPDATABLE(_type, _name) \ + { \ + .name = CEPH_XATTR_NAME(_type, _name), \ + .name_size = sizeof (CEPH_XATTR_NAME(_type, _name)), \ + .getxattr_cb = ceph_vxattrcb_ ## _type ## _ ## _name, \ + .exists_cb = NULL, \ + .flags = VXATTR_FLAG_RSTAT, \ + } #define XATTR_LAYOUT_FIELD(_type, _name, _field) \ { \ .name = CEPH_XATTR_NAME2(_type, _name, _field), \ @@ -353,7 +361,7 @@ static struct ceph_vxattr ceph_dir_vxattrs[] = { XATTR_RSTAT_FIELD(dir, rfiles), XATTR_RSTAT_FIELD(dir, rsubdirs), XATTR_RSTAT_FIELD(dir, rbytes), - XATTR_RSTAT_FIELD(dir, rctime), + XATTR_RSTAT_FIELD_UPDATABLE(dir, rctime), { .name = "ceph.dir.pin", .name_size = sizeof("ceph.dir.pin"), From 28fd384c78d7d8ed8af0d086d778c3e438ba7f60 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gong Yuanjun Date: Tue, 17 May 2022 17:57:00 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0389/1091] drm/radeon: fix a possible null pointer dereference [ Upstream commit a2b28708b645c5632dc93669ab06e97874c8244f ] In radeon_fp_native_mode(), the return value of drm_mode_duplicate() is assigned to mode, which will lead to a NULL pointer dereference on failure of drm_mode_duplicate(). Add a check to avoid npd. The failure status of drm_cvt_mode() on the other path is checked too. Signed-off-by: Gong Yuanjun Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_connectors.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_connectors.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_connectors.c index bc63f4cecf5d..ca6ccd69424e 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_connectors.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_connectors.c @@ -477,6 +477,8 @@ static struct drm_display_mode *radeon_fp_native_mode(struct drm_encoder *encode native_mode->vdisplay != 0 && native_mode->clock != 0) { mode = drm_mode_duplicate(dev, native_mode); + if (!mode) + return NULL; mode->type = DRM_MODE_TYPE_PREFERRED | DRM_MODE_TYPE_DRIVER; drm_mode_set_name(mode); @@ -491,6 +493,8 @@ static struct drm_display_mode *radeon_fp_native_mode(struct drm_encoder *encode * simpler. */ mode = drm_cvt_mode(dev, native_mode->hdisplay, native_mode->vdisplay, 60, true, false, false); + if (!mode) + return NULL; mode->type = DRM_MODE_TYPE_PREFERRED | DRM_MODE_TYPE_DRIVER; DRM_DEBUG_KMS("Adding cvt approximation of native panel mode %s\n", mode->name); } From 460083de66c4eaf69e60011c4cb9da5474164868 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Masahiro Yamada Date: Tue, 24 May 2022 01:46:22 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 0390/1091] modpost: fix undefined behavior of is_arm_mapping_symbol() [ Upstream commit d6b732666a1bae0df3c3ae06925043bba34502b1 ] The return value of is_arm_mapping_symbol() is unpredictable when "$" is passed in. strchr(3) says: The strchr() and strrchr() functions return a pointer to the matched character or NULL if the character is not found. The terminating null byte is considered part of the string, so that if c is specified as '\0', these functions return a pointer to the terminator. When str[1] is '\0', strchr("axtd", str[1]) is not NULL, and str[2] is referenced (i.e. buffer overrun). Test code --------- char str1[] = "abc"; char str2[] = "ab"; strcpy(str1, "$"); strcpy(str2, "$"); printf("test1: %d\n", is_arm_mapping_symbol(str1)); printf("test2: %d\n", is_arm_mapping_symbol(str2)); Result ------ test1: 0 test2: 1 Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- scripts/mod/modpost.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/scripts/mod/modpost.c b/scripts/mod/modpost.c index 74e2052f429d..59011ddf8bb8 100644 --- a/scripts/mod/modpost.c +++ b/scripts/mod/modpost.c @@ -1283,7 +1283,8 @@ static int secref_whitelist(const struct sectioncheck *mismatch, static inline int is_arm_mapping_symbol(const char *str) { - return str[0] == '$' && strchr("axtd", str[1]) + return str[0] == '$' && + (str[1] == 'a' || str[1] == 'd' || str[1] == 't' || str[1] == 'x') && (str[2] == '\0' || str[2] == '.'); } From 045045b522c619c40449058148ee499a6622643c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Mon, 2 May 2022 12:15:23 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0391/1091] x86/cpu: Elide KCSAN for cpu_has() and friends [ Upstream commit a6a5eb269f6f3a2fe392f725a8d9052190c731e2 ] As x86 uses the headers, the regular forms of all bitops are instrumented with explicit calls to KASAN and KCSAN checks. As these are explicit calls, these are not suppressed by the noinstr function attribute. This can result in calls to those check functions in noinstr code, which objtool warns about: vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: enter_from_user_mode+0x24: call to __kcsan_check_access() leaves .noinstr.text section vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x28: call to __kcsan_check_access() leaves .noinstr.text section vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: syscall_enter_from_user_mode_prepare+0x24: call to __kcsan_check_access() leaves .noinstr.text section vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: irqentry_enter_from_user_mode+0x24: call to __kcsan_check_access() leaves .noinstr.text section Prevent this by using the arch_*() bitops, which are the underlying bitops without explciit instrumentation. [null: Changelog] Reported-by: kernel test robot Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220502111216.290518605@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h index 59bf91c57aa8..619c1f80a2ab 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ extern const char * const x86_power_flags[32]; extern const char * const x86_bug_flags[NBUGINTS*32]; #define test_cpu_cap(c, bit) \ - test_bit(bit, (unsigned long *)((c)->x86_capability)) + arch_test_bit(bit, (unsigned long *)((c)->x86_capability)) /* * There are 32 bits/features in each mask word. The high bits From 1be608e1ee1f222464b2856bda9b85ab5184a33e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yu Kuai Date: Sat, 21 May 2022 15:37:44 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0392/1091] nbd: call genl_unregister_family() first in nbd_cleanup() [ Upstream commit 06c4da89c24e7023ea448cadf8e9daf06a0aae6e ] Otherwise there may be race between module removal and the handling of netlink command, which can lead to the oops as shown below: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000098 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 1 PID: 31299 Comm: nbd-client Tainted: G E 5.14.0-rc4 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996) RIP: 0010:down_write+0x1a/0x50 Call Trace: start_creating+0x89/0x130 debugfs_create_dir+0x1b/0x130 nbd_start_device+0x13d/0x390 [nbd] nbd_genl_connect+0x42f/0x748 [nbd] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.0+0xec/0x150 genl_rcv_msg+0xe5/0x1e0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x55/0x100 genl_rcv+0x29/0x40 netlink_unicast+0x1a8/0x250 netlink_sendmsg+0x21b/0x430 ____sys_sendmsg+0x2a4/0x2d0 ___sys_sendmsg+0x81/0xc0 __sys_sendmsg+0x62/0xb0 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x1f/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Modules linked in: nbd(E-) Signed-off-by: Hou Tao Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220521073749.3146892-2-yukuai3@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/block/nbd.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/block/nbd.c b/drivers/block/nbd.c index 510e75435c43..f3425e51a54b 100644 --- a/drivers/block/nbd.c +++ b/drivers/block/nbd.c @@ -2446,6 +2446,12 @@ static void __exit nbd_cleanup(void) struct nbd_device *nbd; LIST_HEAD(del_list); + /* + * Unregister netlink interface prior to waiting + * for the completion of netlink commands. + */ + genl_unregister_family(&nbd_genl_family); + nbd_dbg_close(); mutex_lock(&nbd_index_mutex); @@ -2461,7 +2467,6 @@ static void __exit nbd_cleanup(void) } idr_destroy(&nbd_index_idr); - genl_unregister_family(&nbd_genl_family); unregister_blkdev(NBD_MAJOR, "nbd"); } From 8a7da4ced236ce6637fe70f14ca18e718d4bf9e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yu Kuai Date: Sat, 21 May 2022 15:37:45 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0393/1091] nbd: fix race between nbd_alloc_config() and module removal [ Upstream commit c55b2b983b0fa012942c3eb16384b2b722caa810 ] When nbd module is being removing, nbd_alloc_config() may be called concurrently by nbd_genl_connect(), although try_module_get() will return false, but nbd_alloc_config() doesn't handle it. The race may lead to the leak of nbd_config and its related resources (e.g, recv_workq) and oops in nbd_read_stat() due to the unload of nbd module as shown below: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000040 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 5 PID: 13840 Comm: kworker/u17:33 Not tainted 5.14.0+ #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996) Workqueue: knbd16-recv recv_work [nbd] RIP: 0010:nbd_read_stat.cold+0x130/0x1a4 [nbd] Call Trace: recv_work+0x3b/0xb0 [nbd] process_one_work+0x1ed/0x390 worker_thread+0x4a/0x3d0 kthread+0x12a/0x150 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 Fixing it by checking the return value of try_module_get() in nbd_alloc_config(). As nbd_alloc_config() may return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV), assign nbd->config only when nbd_alloc_config() succeeds to ensure the value of nbd->config is binary (valid or NULL). Also adding a debug message to check the reference counter of nbd_config during module removal. Signed-off-by: Hou Tao Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220521073749.3146892-3-yukuai3@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/block/nbd.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/block/nbd.c b/drivers/block/nbd.c index f3425e51a54b..ef355f14ed2c 100644 --- a/drivers/block/nbd.c +++ b/drivers/block/nbd.c @@ -1457,15 +1457,20 @@ static struct nbd_config *nbd_alloc_config(void) { struct nbd_config *config; + if (!try_module_get(THIS_MODULE)) + return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV); + config = kzalloc(sizeof(struct nbd_config), GFP_NOFS); - if (!config) - return NULL; + if (!config) { + module_put(THIS_MODULE); + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + } + atomic_set(&config->recv_threads, 0); init_waitqueue_head(&config->recv_wq); init_waitqueue_head(&config->conn_wait); config->blksize = NBD_DEF_BLKSIZE; atomic_set(&config->live_connections, 0); - try_module_get(THIS_MODULE); return config; } @@ -1492,12 +1497,13 @@ static int nbd_open(struct block_device *bdev, fmode_t mode) mutex_unlock(&nbd->config_lock); goto out; } - config = nbd->config = nbd_alloc_config(); - if (!config) { - ret = -ENOMEM; + config = nbd_alloc_config(); + if (IS_ERR(config)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(config); mutex_unlock(&nbd->config_lock); goto out; } + nbd->config = config; refcount_set(&nbd->config_refs, 1); refcount_inc(&nbd->refs); mutex_unlock(&nbd->config_lock); @@ -1919,13 +1925,14 @@ again: nbd_put(nbd); return -EINVAL; } - config = nbd->config = nbd_alloc_config(); - if (!nbd->config) { + config = nbd_alloc_config(); + if (IS_ERR(config)) { mutex_unlock(&nbd->config_lock); nbd_put(nbd); printk(KERN_ERR "nbd: couldn't allocate config\n"); - return -ENOMEM; + return PTR_ERR(config); } + nbd->config = config; refcount_set(&nbd->config_refs, 1); set_bit(NBD_RT_BOUND, &config->runtime_flags); @@ -2461,6 +2468,9 @@ static void __exit nbd_cleanup(void) while (!list_empty(&del_list)) { nbd = list_first_entry(&del_list, struct nbd_device, list); list_del_init(&nbd->list); + if (refcount_read(&nbd->config_refs)) + printk(KERN_ERR "nbd: possibly leaking nbd_config (ref %d)\n", + refcount_read(&nbd->config_refs)); if (refcount_read(&nbd->refs) != 1) printk(KERN_ERR "nbd: possibly leaking a device\n"); nbd_put(nbd); From 69893d6d7f5c10d8306c1b5fc64b71efc91aa6cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yu Kuai Date: Sat, 21 May 2022 15:37:47 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0394/1091] nbd: fix io hung while disconnecting device [ Upstream commit 09dadb5985023e27d4740ebd17e6fea4640110e5 ] In our tests, "qemu-nbd" triggers a io hung: INFO: task qemu-nbd:11445 blocked for more than 368 seconds. Not tainted 5.18.0-rc3-next-20220422-00003-g2176915513ca #884 "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. task:qemu-nbd state:D stack: 0 pid:11445 ppid: 1 flags:0x00000000 Call Trace: __schedule+0x480/0x1050 ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x3e/0xb0 schedule+0x9c/0x1b0 blk_mq_freeze_queue_wait+0x9d/0xf0 ? ipi_rseq+0x70/0x70 blk_mq_freeze_queue+0x2b/0x40 nbd_add_socket+0x6b/0x270 [nbd] nbd_ioctl+0x383/0x510 [nbd] blkdev_ioctl+0x18e/0x3e0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0xac/0x120 do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7fd8ff706577 RSP: 002b:00007fd8fcdfebf8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000040000000 RCX: 00007fd8ff706577 RDX: 000000000000000d RSI: 000000000000ab00 RDI: 000000000000000f RBP: 000000000000000f R08: 000000000000fbe8 R09: 000055fe497c62b0 R10: 00000002aff20000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000000006d R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffe82dc5e70 R15: 00007fd8fcdff9c0 "qemu-ndb -d" will call ioctl 'NBD_DISCONNECT' first, however, following message was found: block nbd0: Send disconnect failed -32 Which indicate that something is wrong with the server. Then, "qemu-nbd -d" will call ioctl 'NBD_CLEAR_SOCK', however ioctl can't clear requests after commit 2516ab1543fd("nbd: only clear the queue on device teardown"). And in the meantime, request can't complete through timeout because nbd_xmit_timeout() will always return 'BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER', which means such request will never be completed in this situation. Now that the flag 'NBD_CMD_INFLIGHT' can make sure requests won't complete multiple times, switch back to call nbd_clear_sock() in nbd_clear_sock_ioctl(), so that inflight requests can be cleared. Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220521073749.3146892-5-yukuai3@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/block/nbd.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/block/nbd.c b/drivers/block/nbd.c index ef355f14ed2c..09323b0510f0 100644 --- a/drivers/block/nbd.c +++ b/drivers/block/nbd.c @@ -1344,7 +1344,7 @@ static int nbd_start_device_ioctl(struct nbd_device *nbd, struct block_device *b static void nbd_clear_sock_ioctl(struct nbd_device *nbd, struct block_device *bdev) { - sock_shutdown(nbd); + nbd_clear_sock(nbd); __invalidate_device(bdev, true); nbd_bdev_reset(bdev); if (test_and_clear_bit(NBD_RT_HAS_CONFIG_REF, From 5cb13cdc180adac2ecd3c8c3d146c82549163fc3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christian Borntraeger Date: Mon, 30 May 2022 11:27:05 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0395/1091] s390/gmap: voluntarily schedule during key setting [ Upstream commit 6d5946274df1fff539a7eece458a43be733d1db8 ] With large and many guest with storage keys it is possible to create large latencies or stalls during initial key setting: rcu: INFO: rcu_sched self-detected stall on CPU rcu: 18-....: (2099 ticks this GP) idle=54e/1/0x4000000000000002 softirq=35598716/35598716 fqs=998 (t=2100 jiffies g=155867385 q=20879) Task dump for CPU 18: CPU 1/KVM R running task 0 1030947 256019 0x06000004 Call Trace: sched_show_task rcu_dump_cpu_stacks rcu_sched_clock_irq update_process_times tick_sched_handle tick_sched_timer __hrtimer_run_queues hrtimer_interrupt do_IRQ ext_int_handler ptep_zap_key The mmap lock is held during the page walking but since this is a semaphore scheduling is still possible. Same for the kvm srcu. To minimize overhead do this on every segment table entry or large page. Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger Reviewed-by: Alexander Gordeev Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220530092706.11637-2-borntraeger@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/s390/mm/gmap.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/s390/mm/gmap.c b/arch/s390/mm/gmap.c index 5e5a4e1f0e6c..19ee8355b2a7 100644 --- a/arch/s390/mm/gmap.c +++ b/arch/s390/mm/gmap.c @@ -2579,6 +2579,18 @@ static int __s390_enable_skey_pte(pte_t *pte, unsigned long addr, return 0; } +/* + * Give a chance to schedule after setting a key to 256 pages. + * We only hold the mm lock, which is a rwsem and the kvm srcu. + * Both can sleep. + */ +static int __s390_enable_skey_pmd(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long addr, + unsigned long next, struct mm_walk *walk) +{ + cond_resched(); + return 0; +} + static int __s390_enable_skey_hugetlb(pte_t *pte, unsigned long addr, unsigned long hmask, unsigned long next, struct mm_walk *walk) @@ -2601,12 +2613,14 @@ static int __s390_enable_skey_hugetlb(pte_t *pte, unsigned long addr, end = start + HPAGE_SIZE - 1; __storage_key_init_range(start, end); set_bit(PG_arch_1, &page->flags); + cond_resched(); return 0; } static const struct mm_walk_ops enable_skey_walk_ops = { .hugetlb_entry = __s390_enable_skey_hugetlb, .pte_entry = __s390_enable_skey_pte, + .pmd_entry = __s390_enable_skey_pmd, }; int s390_enable_skey(void) From 9b306339a51164008bf3af2fd607138f72223630 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steve French Date: Wed, 1 Jun 2022 22:08:46 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 0396/1091] cifs: version operations for smb20 unneeded when legacy support disabled [ Upstream commit 7ef93ffccd55fb0ba000ed16ef6a81cd7dee07b5 ] We should not be including unused smb20 specific code when legacy support is disabled (CONFIG_CIFS_ALLOW_INSECURE_LEGACY turned off). For example smb2_operations and smb2_values aren't used in that case. Over time we can move more and more SMB1/CIFS and SMB2.0 code into the insecure legacy ifdefs Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg Signed-off-by: Steve French Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/cifs/cifsglob.h | 4 +++- fs/cifs/smb2ops.c | 7 ++++++- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifsglob.h b/fs/cifs/cifsglob.h index 9c0e348cb00f..414936989255 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/cifsglob.h +++ b/fs/cifs/cifsglob.h @@ -1930,11 +1930,13 @@ extern mempool_t *cifs_mid_poolp; /* Operations for different SMB versions */ #define SMB1_VERSION_STRING "1.0" +#define SMB20_VERSION_STRING "2.0" +#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_ALLOW_INSECURE_LEGACY extern struct smb_version_operations smb1_operations; extern struct smb_version_values smb1_values; -#define SMB20_VERSION_STRING "2.0" extern struct smb_version_operations smb20_operations; extern struct smb_version_values smb20_values; +#endif /* CIFS_ALLOW_INSECURE_LEGACY */ #define SMB21_VERSION_STRING "2.1" extern struct smb_version_operations smb21_operations; extern struct smb_version_values smb21_values; diff --git a/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c b/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c index 7985fe25850b..57164563eec6 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c +++ b/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c @@ -3487,11 +3487,13 @@ smb3_set_oplock_level(struct cifsInodeInfo *cinode, __u32 oplock, } } +#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_ALLOW_INSECURE_LEGACY static bool smb2_is_read_op(__u32 oplock) { return oplock == SMB2_OPLOCK_LEVEL_II; } +#endif /* CIFS_ALLOW_INSECURE_LEGACY */ static bool smb21_is_read_op(__u32 oplock) @@ -4573,7 +4575,7 @@ out: return rc; } - +#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_ALLOW_INSECURE_LEGACY struct smb_version_operations smb20_operations = { .compare_fids = smb2_compare_fids, .setup_request = smb2_setup_request, @@ -4670,6 +4672,7 @@ struct smb_version_operations smb20_operations = { .fiemap = smb3_fiemap, .llseek = smb3_llseek, }; +#endif /* CIFS_ALLOW_INSECURE_LEGACY */ struct smb_version_operations smb21_operations = { .compare_fids = smb2_compare_fids, @@ -4987,6 +4990,7 @@ struct smb_version_operations smb311_operations = { .llseek = smb3_llseek, }; +#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_ALLOW_INSECURE_LEGACY struct smb_version_values smb20_values = { .version_string = SMB20_VERSION_STRING, .protocol_id = SMB20_PROT_ID, @@ -5007,6 +5011,7 @@ struct smb_version_values smb20_values = { .signing_required = SMB2_NEGOTIATE_SIGNING_REQUIRED, .create_lease_size = sizeof(struct create_lease), }; +#endif /* ALLOW_INSECURE_LEGACY */ struct smb_version_values smb21_values = { .version_string = SMB21_VERSION_STRING, From a3f9b0afd8b4fcec563e97cedae84636e1a468d8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kees Cook Date: Wed, 18 May 2022 13:52:23 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0397/1091] nodemask: Fix return values to be unsigned MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit 0dfe54071d7c828a02917b595456bfde1afdddc9 ] The nodemask routines had mixed return values that provided potentially signed return values that could never happen. This was leading to the compiler getting confusing about the range of possible return values (it was thinking things could be negative where they could not be). Fix all the nodemask routines that should be returning unsigned (or bool) values. Silences: mm/swapfile.c: In function ‘setup_swap_info’: mm/swapfile.c:2291:47: error: array subscript -1 is below array bounds of ‘struct plist_node[]’ [-Werror=array-bounds] 2291 | p->avail_lists[i].prio = 1; | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~ In file included from mm/swapfile.c:16: ./include/linux/swap.h:292:27: note: while referencing ‘avail_lists’ 292 | struct plist_node avail_lists[]; /* | ^~~~~~~~~~~ Reported-by: Christophe de Dinechin Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220414150855.2407137-3-dinechin@redhat.com/ Cc: Alexey Dobriyan Cc: Yury Norov Cc: Andy Shevchenko Cc: Rasmus Villemoes Cc: Andrew Morton Cc: Zhen Lei Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Signed-off-by: Yury Norov Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- include/linux/nodemask.h | 38 +++++++++++++++++++------------------- lib/nodemask.c | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/nodemask.h b/include/linux/nodemask.h index 8a404dfeec42..a8d79f5b9a52 100644 --- a/include/linux/nodemask.h +++ b/include/linux/nodemask.h @@ -42,11 +42,11 @@ * void nodes_shift_right(dst, src, n) Shift right * void nodes_shift_left(dst, src, n) Shift left * - * int first_node(mask) Number lowest set bit, or MAX_NUMNODES - * int next_node(node, mask) Next node past 'node', or MAX_NUMNODES - * int next_node_in(node, mask) Next node past 'node', or wrap to first, + * unsigned int first_node(mask) Number lowest set bit, or MAX_NUMNODES + * unsigend int next_node(node, mask) Next node past 'node', or MAX_NUMNODES + * unsigned int next_node_in(node, mask) Next node past 'node', or wrap to first, * or MAX_NUMNODES - * int first_unset_node(mask) First node not set in mask, or + * unsigned int first_unset_node(mask) First node not set in mask, or * MAX_NUMNODES * * nodemask_t nodemask_of_node(node) Return nodemask with bit 'node' set @@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ static inline void __nodes_clear(nodemask_t *dstp, unsigned int nbits) #define node_test_and_set(node, nodemask) \ __node_test_and_set((node), &(nodemask)) -static inline int __node_test_and_set(int node, nodemask_t *addr) +static inline bool __node_test_and_set(int node, nodemask_t *addr) { return test_and_set_bit(node, addr->bits); } @@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ static inline void __nodes_complement(nodemask_t *dstp, #define nodes_equal(src1, src2) \ __nodes_equal(&(src1), &(src2), MAX_NUMNODES) -static inline int __nodes_equal(const nodemask_t *src1p, +static inline bool __nodes_equal(const nodemask_t *src1p, const nodemask_t *src2p, unsigned int nbits) { return bitmap_equal(src1p->bits, src2p->bits, nbits); @@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ static inline int __nodes_equal(const nodemask_t *src1p, #define nodes_intersects(src1, src2) \ __nodes_intersects(&(src1), &(src2), MAX_NUMNODES) -static inline int __nodes_intersects(const nodemask_t *src1p, +static inline bool __nodes_intersects(const nodemask_t *src1p, const nodemask_t *src2p, unsigned int nbits) { return bitmap_intersects(src1p->bits, src2p->bits, nbits); @@ -216,20 +216,20 @@ static inline int __nodes_intersects(const nodemask_t *src1p, #define nodes_subset(src1, src2) \ __nodes_subset(&(src1), &(src2), MAX_NUMNODES) -static inline int __nodes_subset(const nodemask_t *src1p, +static inline bool __nodes_subset(const nodemask_t *src1p, const nodemask_t *src2p, unsigned int nbits) { return bitmap_subset(src1p->bits, src2p->bits, nbits); } #define nodes_empty(src) __nodes_empty(&(src), MAX_NUMNODES) -static inline int __nodes_empty(const nodemask_t *srcp, unsigned int nbits) +static inline bool __nodes_empty(const nodemask_t *srcp, unsigned int nbits) { return bitmap_empty(srcp->bits, nbits); } #define nodes_full(nodemask) __nodes_full(&(nodemask), MAX_NUMNODES) -static inline int __nodes_full(const nodemask_t *srcp, unsigned int nbits) +static inline bool __nodes_full(const nodemask_t *srcp, unsigned int nbits) { return bitmap_full(srcp->bits, nbits); } @@ -260,15 +260,15 @@ static inline void __nodes_shift_left(nodemask_t *dstp, > MAX_NUMNODES, then the silly min_ts could be dropped. */ #define first_node(src) __first_node(&(src)) -static inline int __first_node(const nodemask_t *srcp) +static inline unsigned int __first_node(const nodemask_t *srcp) { - return min_t(int, MAX_NUMNODES, find_first_bit(srcp->bits, MAX_NUMNODES)); + return min_t(unsigned int, MAX_NUMNODES, find_first_bit(srcp->bits, MAX_NUMNODES)); } #define next_node(n, src) __next_node((n), &(src)) -static inline int __next_node(int n, const nodemask_t *srcp) +static inline unsigned int __next_node(int n, const nodemask_t *srcp) { - return min_t(int,MAX_NUMNODES,find_next_bit(srcp->bits, MAX_NUMNODES, n+1)); + return min_t(unsigned int, MAX_NUMNODES, find_next_bit(srcp->bits, MAX_NUMNODES, n+1)); } /* @@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ static inline int __next_node(int n, const nodemask_t *srcp) * the first node in src if needed. Returns MAX_NUMNODES if src is empty. */ #define next_node_in(n, src) __next_node_in((n), &(src)) -int __next_node_in(int node, const nodemask_t *srcp); +unsigned int __next_node_in(int node, const nodemask_t *srcp); static inline void init_nodemask_of_node(nodemask_t *mask, int node) { @@ -296,9 +296,9 @@ static inline void init_nodemask_of_node(nodemask_t *mask, int node) }) #define first_unset_node(mask) __first_unset_node(&(mask)) -static inline int __first_unset_node(const nodemask_t *maskp) +static inline unsigned int __first_unset_node(const nodemask_t *maskp) { - return min_t(int,MAX_NUMNODES, + return min_t(unsigned int, MAX_NUMNODES, find_first_zero_bit(maskp->bits, MAX_NUMNODES)); } @@ -434,11 +434,11 @@ static inline int num_node_state(enum node_states state) #define first_online_node first_node(node_states[N_ONLINE]) #define first_memory_node first_node(node_states[N_MEMORY]) -static inline int next_online_node(int nid) +static inline unsigned int next_online_node(int nid) { return next_node(nid, node_states[N_ONLINE]); } -static inline int next_memory_node(int nid) +static inline unsigned int next_memory_node(int nid) { return next_node(nid, node_states[N_MEMORY]); } diff --git a/lib/nodemask.c b/lib/nodemask.c index 3aa454c54c0d..e22647f5181b 100644 --- a/lib/nodemask.c +++ b/lib/nodemask.c @@ -3,9 +3,9 @@ #include #include -int __next_node_in(int node, const nodemask_t *srcp) +unsigned int __next_node_in(int node, const nodemask_t *srcp) { - int ret = __next_node(node, srcp); + unsigned int ret = __next_node(node, srcp); if (ret == MAX_NUMNODES) ret = __first_node(srcp); From 1a36f77dc23c3768e06cdc32777b2d85be7f4150 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xie Yongji Date: Thu, 5 May 2022 18:09:10 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0398/1091] vringh: Fix loop descriptors check in the indirect cases [ Upstream commit dbd29e0752286af74243cf891accf472b2f3edd8 ] We should use size of descriptor chain to test loop condition in the indirect case. And another statistical count is also introduced for indirect descriptors to avoid conflict with the statistical count of direct descriptors. Fixes: f87d0fbb5798 ("vringh: host-side implementation of virtio rings.") Signed-off-by: Xie Yongji Signed-off-by: Fam Zheng Message-Id: <20220505100910.137-1-xieyongji@bytedance.com> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin Acked-by: Jason Wang Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/vhost/vringh.c | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/vhost/vringh.c b/drivers/vhost/vringh.c index 4653de001e26..264cbe385a63 100644 --- a/drivers/vhost/vringh.c +++ b/drivers/vhost/vringh.c @@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ __vringh_iov(struct vringh *vrh, u16 i, gfp_t gfp, int (*copy)(void *dst, const void *src, size_t len)) { - int err, count = 0, up_next, desc_max; + int err, count = 0, indirect_count = 0, up_next, desc_max; struct vring_desc desc, *descs; struct vringh_range range = { -1ULL, 0 }, slowrange; bool slow = false; @@ -321,7 +321,12 @@ __vringh_iov(struct vringh *vrh, u16 i, continue; } - if (count++ == vrh->vring.num) { + if (up_next == -1) + count++; + else + indirect_count++; + + if (count > vrh->vring.num || indirect_count > desc_max) { vringh_bad("Descriptor loop in %p", descs); err = -ELOOP; goto fail; @@ -383,6 +388,7 @@ __vringh_iov(struct vringh *vrh, u16 i, i = return_from_indirect(vrh, &up_next, &descs, &desc_max); slow = false; + indirect_count = 0; } else break; } From 6c04a2ae039b906cf93cf7a92153d260bbb3c3b2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuan-Ying Lee Date: Fri, 10 Jun 2022 15:14:57 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0399/1091] scripts/gdb: change kernel config dumping method [ Upstream commit 1f7a6cf6b07c74a17343c2559cd5f5018a245961 ] MAGIC_START("IKCFG_ST") and MAGIC_END("IKCFG_ED") are moved out from the kernel_config_data variable. Thus, we parse kernel_config_data directly instead of considering offset of MAGIC_START and MAGIC_END. Fixes: 13610aa908dc ("kernel/configs: use .incbin directive to embed config_data.gz") Signed-off-by: Kuan-Ying Lee Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- scripts/gdb/linux/config.py | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/scripts/gdb/linux/config.py b/scripts/gdb/linux/config.py index 90e1565b1967..8843ab3cbadd 100644 --- a/scripts/gdb/linux/config.py +++ b/scripts/gdb/linux/config.py @@ -24,9 +24,9 @@ class LxConfigDump(gdb.Command): filename = arg try: - py_config_ptr = gdb.parse_and_eval("kernel_config_data + 8") - py_config_size = gdb.parse_and_eval( - "sizeof(kernel_config_data) - 1 - 8 * 2") + py_config_ptr = gdb.parse_and_eval("&kernel_config_data") + py_config_ptr_end = gdb.parse_and_eval("&kernel_config_data_end") + py_config_size = py_config_ptr_end - py_config_ptr except gdb.error as e: raise gdb.GdbError("Can't find config, enable CONFIG_IKCONFIG?") From 850965edc861bcd0fe45d767e8da45e6190c73a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: huangwenhui Date: Tue, 7 Jun 2022 14:56:31 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0400/1091] ALSA: hda/conexant - Fix loopback issue with CX20632 commit d5ea7544c32ba27c2c5826248e4ff58bd50a2518 upstream. On a machine with CX20632, Alsamixer doesn't have 'Loopback Mixing' and 'Line'. Signed-off-by: huangwenhui Cc: Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220607065631.10708-1-huangwenhuia@uniontech.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/pci/hda/patch_conexant.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/patch_conexant.c b/sound/pci/hda/patch_conexant.c index 5e2fadb264e4..c0b6881b0672 100644 --- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_conexant.c +++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_conexant.c @@ -1012,6 +1012,13 @@ static int patch_conexant_auto(struct hda_codec *codec) snd_hda_pick_fixup(codec, cxt5051_fixup_models, cxt5051_fixups, cxt_fixups); break; + case 0x14f15098: + codec->pin_amp_workaround = 1; + spec->gen.mixer_nid = 0x22; + spec->gen.add_stereo_mix_input = HDA_HINT_STEREO_MIX_AUTO; + snd_hda_pick_fixup(codec, cxt5066_fixup_models, + cxt5066_fixups, cxt_fixups); + break; case 0x14f150f2: codec->power_save_node = 1; /* Fall through */ From b651f70ed3a8a7dcfe043ea2ffbe9653af29c5a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shyam Prasad N Date: Tue, 31 May 2022 12:31:05 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0401/1091] cifs: return errors during session setup during reconnects commit 8ea21823aa584b55ba4b861307093b78054b0c1b upstream. During reconnects, we check the return value from cifs_negotiate_protocol, and have handlers for both success and failures. But if that passes, and cifs_setup_session returns any errors other than -EACCES, we do not handle that. This fix adds a handler for that, so that we don't go ahead and try a tree_connect on a failed session. Signed-off-by: Shyam Prasad N Reviewed-by: Enzo Matsumiya Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Steve French Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c b/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c index e068f82ffedd..0857eb7a95e2 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c +++ b/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c @@ -356,6 +356,9 @@ smb2_reconnect(__le16 smb2_command, struct cifs_tcon *tcon) rc = -EHOSTDOWN; mutex_unlock(&tcon->ses->session_mutex); goto failed; + } else if (rc) { + mutex_unlock(&ses->session_mutex); + goto out; } } if (rc || !tcon->need_reconnect) { From 0245434e381efdd448f7acd49eb45c6c0a2f248b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sergey Shtylyov Date: Wed, 8 Jun 2022 22:51:07 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 0402/1091] ata: libata-transport: fix {dma|pio|xfer}_mode sysfs files commit 72aad489f992871e908ff6d9055b26c6366fb864 upstream. The {dma|pio}_mode sysfs files are incorrectly documented as having a list of the supported DMA/PIO transfer modes, while the corresponding fields of the *struct* ata_device hold the transfer mode IDs, not masks. To match these docs, the {dma|pio}_mode (and even xfer_mode!) sysfs files are handled by the ata_bitfield_name_match() macro which leads to reading such kind of nonsense from them: $ cat /sys/class/ata_device/dev3.0/pio_mode XFER_UDMA_7, XFER_UDMA_6, XFER_UDMA_5, XFER_UDMA_4, XFER_MW_DMA_4, XFER_PIO_6, XFER_PIO_5, XFER_PIO_4, XFER_PIO_3, XFER_PIO_2, XFER_PIO_1, XFER_PIO_0 Using the correct ata_bitfield_name_search() macro fixes that: $ cat /sys/class/ata_device/dev3.0/pio_mode XFER_PIO_4 While fixing the file documentation, somewhat reword the {dma|pio}_mode file doc and add a note about being mostly useful for PATA devices to the xfer_mode file doc... Fixes: d9027470b886 ("[libata] Add ATA transport class") Signed-off-by: Sergey Shtylyov Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-ata | 11 ++++++----- drivers/ata/libata-transport.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-ata b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-ata index 9ab0ef1dd1c7..299e0d1dc161 100644 --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-ata +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-ata @@ -107,13 +107,14 @@ Description: described in ATA8 7.16 and 7.17. Only valid if the device is not a PM. - pio_mode: (RO) Transfer modes supported by the device when - in PIO mode. Mostly used by PATA device. + pio_mode: (RO) PIO transfer mode used by the device. + Mostly used by PATA devices. - xfer_mode: (RO) Current transfer mode + xfer_mode: (RO) Current transfer mode. Mostly used by + PATA devices. - dma_mode: (RO) Transfer modes supported by the device when - in DMA mode. Mostly used by PATA device. + dma_mode: (RO) DMA transfer mode used by the device. + Mostly used by PATA devices. class: (RO) Device class. Can be "ata" for disk, "atapi" for packet device, "pmp" for PM, or diff --git a/drivers/ata/libata-transport.c b/drivers/ata/libata-transport.c index 12a505bb9c5b..c4f36312b8a4 100644 --- a/drivers/ata/libata-transport.c +++ b/drivers/ata/libata-transport.c @@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ static struct { { XFER_PIO_0, "XFER_PIO_0" }, { XFER_PIO_SLOW, "XFER_PIO_SLOW" } }; -ata_bitfield_name_match(xfer,ata_xfer_names) +ata_bitfield_name_search(xfer, ata_xfer_names) /* * ATA Port attributes From 4f4ab5004633c2206fa306a15f6d68d469a5fbd6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Adrian Hunter Date: Tue, 31 May 2022 20:19:22 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 0403/1091] mmc: block: Fix CQE recovery reset success commit a051246b786af7e4a9d9219cc7038a6e8a411531 upstream. The intention of the use of mmc_blk_reset_success() in mmc_blk_cqe_recovery() was to prevent repeated resets when retrying and getting the same error. However, that may not be the case - any amount of time and I/O may pass before another recovery is needed, in which case there would be no reason to deny it the opportunity to recover via a reset if necessary. CQE recovery is expected seldom and failure to recover (if the clear tasks command fails), even more seldom, so it is better to allow the reset always, which can be done by calling mmc_blk_reset_success() always. Fixes: 1e8e55b67030c6 ("mmc: block: Add CQE support") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220531171922.76080-1-adrian.hunter@intel.com Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/mmc/core/block.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/mmc/core/block.c b/drivers/mmc/core/block.c index 709f117fd577..482e01ece0b7 100644 --- a/drivers/mmc/core/block.c +++ b/drivers/mmc/core/block.c @@ -1492,8 +1492,7 @@ void mmc_blk_cqe_recovery(struct mmc_queue *mq) err = mmc_cqe_recovery(host); if (err) mmc_blk_reset(mq->blkdata, host, MMC_BLK_CQE_RECOVERY); - else - mmc_blk_reset_success(mq->blkdata, MMC_BLK_CQE_RECOVERY); + mmc_blk_reset_success(mq->blkdata, MMC_BLK_CQE_RECOVERY); pr_debug("%s: CQE recovery done\n", mmc_hostname(host)); } From 31f9c39b4a378fb971063179ff4cc98a1a806916 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Martin Faltesek Date: Mon, 6 Jun 2022 21:57:27 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 0404/1091] nfc: st21nfca: fix incorrect validating logic in EVT_TRANSACTION commit 77e5fe8f176a525523ae091d6fd0fbb8834c156d upstream. The first validation check for EVT_TRANSACTION has two different checks tied together with logical AND. One is a check for minimum packet length, and the other is for a valid aid_tag. If either condition is true (fails), then an error should be triggered. The fix is to change && to ||. Fixes: 26fc6c7f02cb ("NFC: st21nfca: Add HCI transaction event support") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Martin Faltesek Reviewed-by: Guenter Roeck Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/nfc/st21nfca/se.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/nfc/st21nfca/se.c b/drivers/nfc/st21nfca/se.c index 5256195f313b..97ec83c6b3e9 100644 --- a/drivers/nfc/st21nfca/se.c +++ b/drivers/nfc/st21nfca/se.c @@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ int st21nfca_connectivity_event_received(struct nfc_hci_dev *hdev, u8 host, * AID 81 5 to 16 * PARAMETERS 82 0 to 255 */ - if (skb->len < NFC_MIN_AID_LENGTH + 2 && + if (skb->len < NFC_MIN_AID_LENGTH + 2 || skb->data[0] != NFC_EVT_TRANSACTION_AID_TAG) return -EPROTO; From 3eca2c42daa4659965db6817479027cbc6df7899 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Martin Faltesek Date: Mon, 6 Jun 2022 21:57:28 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 0405/1091] nfc: st21nfca: fix memory leaks in EVT_TRANSACTION handling commit 996419e0594abb311fb958553809f24f38e7abbe upstream. Error paths do not free previously allocated memory. Add devm_kfree() to those failure paths. Fixes: 26fc6c7f02cb ("NFC: st21nfca: Add HCI transaction event support") Fixes: 4fbcc1a4cb20 ("nfc: st21nfca: Fix potential buffer overflows in EVT_TRANSACTION") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Martin Faltesek Reviewed-by: Guenter Roeck Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/nfc/st21nfca/se.c | 13 ++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/nfc/st21nfca/se.c b/drivers/nfc/st21nfca/se.c index 97ec83c6b3e9..ccaace2a5b0e 100644 --- a/drivers/nfc/st21nfca/se.c +++ b/drivers/nfc/st21nfca/se.c @@ -331,22 +331,29 @@ int st21nfca_connectivity_event_received(struct nfc_hci_dev *hdev, u8 host, transaction->aid_len = skb->data[1]; /* Checking if the length of the AID is valid */ - if (transaction->aid_len > sizeof(transaction->aid)) + if (transaction->aid_len > sizeof(transaction->aid)) { + devm_kfree(dev, transaction); return -EINVAL; + } memcpy(transaction->aid, &skb->data[2], transaction->aid_len); /* Check next byte is PARAMETERS tag (82) */ if (skb->data[transaction->aid_len + 2] != - NFC_EVT_TRANSACTION_PARAMS_TAG) + NFC_EVT_TRANSACTION_PARAMS_TAG) { + devm_kfree(dev, transaction); return -EPROTO; + } transaction->params_len = skb->data[transaction->aid_len + 3]; /* Total size is allocated (skb->len - 2) minus fixed array members */ - if (transaction->params_len > ((skb->len - 2) - sizeof(struct nfc_evt_transaction))) + if (transaction->params_len > ((skb->len - 2) - + sizeof(struct nfc_evt_transaction))) { + devm_kfree(dev, transaction); return -EINVAL; + } memcpy(transaction->params, skb->data + transaction->aid_len + 4, transaction->params_len); From 24030768a7b4ae1b0a7a87b3176258d139f73a74 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Olivier Matz Date: Wed, 6 Apr 2022 11:52:51 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0406/1091] ixgbe: fix bcast packets Rx on VF after promisc removal commit 803e9895ea2b0fe80bc85980ae2d7a7e44037914 upstream. After a VF requested to remove the promiscuous flag on an interface, the broadcast packets are not received anymore. This breaks some protocols like ARP. In ixgbe_update_vf_xcast_mode(), we should keep the IXGBE_VMOLR_BAM bit (Broadcast Accept) on promiscuous removal. This flag is already set by default in ixgbe_set_vmolr() on VF reset. Fixes: 8443c1a4b192 ("ixgbe, ixgbevf: Add new mbox API xcast mode") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Nicolas Dichtel Signed-off-by: Olivier Matz Tested-by: Konrad Jankowski Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_sriov.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_sriov.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_sriov.c index 47a920128760..a1e1002a7c6d 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_sriov.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_sriov.c @@ -1157,9 +1157,9 @@ static int ixgbe_update_vf_xcast_mode(struct ixgbe_adapter *adapter, switch (xcast_mode) { case IXGBEVF_XCAST_MODE_NONE: - disable = IXGBE_VMOLR_BAM | IXGBE_VMOLR_ROMPE | + disable = IXGBE_VMOLR_ROMPE | IXGBE_VMOLR_MPE | IXGBE_VMOLR_UPE | IXGBE_VMOLR_VPE; - enable = 0; + enable = IXGBE_VMOLR_BAM; break; case IXGBEVF_XCAST_MODE_MULTI: disable = IXGBE_VMOLR_MPE | IXGBE_VMOLR_UPE | IXGBE_VMOLR_VPE; From 6ec537c50033468db72de4d508eef8fa131a290b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Olivier Matz Date: Wed, 6 Apr 2022 11:52:52 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0407/1091] ixgbe: fix unexpected VLAN Rx in promisc mode on VF MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 7bb0fb7c63df95d6027dc50d6af3bc3bbbc25483 upstream. When the promiscuous mode is enabled on a VF, the IXGBE_VMOLR_VPE bit (VLAN Promiscuous Enable) is set. This means that the VF will receive packets whose VLAN is not the same than the VLAN of the VF. For instance, in this situation: ┌────────┐ ┌────────┐ ┌────────┐ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ VF0├────┤VF1 VF2├────┤VF3 │ │ │ │ │ │ │ └────────┘ └────────┘ └────────┘ VM1 VM2 VM3 vf 0: vlan 1000 vf 1: vlan 1000 vf 2: vlan 1001 vf 3: vlan 1001 If we tcpdump on VF3, we see all the packets, even those transmitted on vlan 1000. This behavior prevents to bridge VF1 and VF2 in VM2, because it will create a loop: packets transmitted on VF1 will be received by VF2 and vice-versa, and bridged again through the software bridge. This patch remove the activation of VLAN Promiscuous when a VF enables the promiscuous mode. However, the IXGBE_VMOLR_UPE bit (Unicast Promiscuous) is kept, so that a VF receives all packets that has the same VLAN, whatever the destination MAC address. Fixes: 8443c1a4b192 ("ixgbe, ixgbevf: Add new mbox API xcast mode") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Nicolas Dichtel Signed-off-by: Olivier Matz Tested-by: Konrad Jankowski Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_sriov.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_sriov.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_sriov.c index a1e1002a7c6d..cf5c2b9465eb 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_sriov.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_sriov.c @@ -1181,9 +1181,9 @@ static int ixgbe_update_vf_xcast_mode(struct ixgbe_adapter *adapter, return -EPERM; } - disable = 0; + disable = IXGBE_VMOLR_VPE; enable = IXGBE_VMOLR_BAM | IXGBE_VMOLR_ROMPE | - IXGBE_VMOLR_MPE | IXGBE_VMOLR_UPE | IXGBE_VMOLR_VPE; + IXGBE_VMOLR_MPE | IXGBE_VMOLR_UPE; break; default: return -EOPNOTSUPP; From 3c953d47eb1e6ecfa69fbffc1e5f6321a1e2075a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mathias Nyman Date: Tue, 7 Jun 2022 12:11:33 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0408/1091] Input: bcm5974 - set missing URB_NO_TRANSFER_DMA_MAP urb flag commit c42e65664390be7c1ef3838cd84956d3a2739d60 upstream. The bcm5974 driver does the allocation and dma mapping of the usb urb data buffer, but driver does not set the URB_NO_TRANSFER_DMA_MAP flag to let usb core know the buffer is already mapped. usb core tries to map the already mapped buffer, causing a warning: "xhci_hcd 0000:00:14.0: rejecting DMA map of vmalloc memory" Fix this by setting the URB_NO_TRANSFER_DMA_MAP, letting usb core know buffer is already mapped by bcm5974 driver Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=215890 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220606113636.588955-1-mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/input/mouse/bcm5974.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/input/mouse/bcm5974.c b/drivers/input/mouse/bcm5974.c index 59a14505b9cd..ca150618d32f 100644 --- a/drivers/input/mouse/bcm5974.c +++ b/drivers/input/mouse/bcm5974.c @@ -942,17 +942,22 @@ static int bcm5974_probe(struct usb_interface *iface, if (!dev->tp_data) goto err_free_bt_buffer; - if (dev->bt_urb) + if (dev->bt_urb) { usb_fill_int_urb(dev->bt_urb, udev, usb_rcvintpipe(udev, cfg->bt_ep), dev->bt_data, dev->cfg.bt_datalen, bcm5974_irq_button, dev, 1); + dev->bt_urb->transfer_flags |= URB_NO_TRANSFER_DMA_MAP; + } + usb_fill_int_urb(dev->tp_urb, udev, usb_rcvintpipe(udev, cfg->tp_ep), dev->tp_data, dev->cfg.tp_datalen, bcm5974_irq_trackpad, dev, 1); + dev->tp_urb->transfer_flags |= URB_NO_TRANSFER_DMA_MAP; + /* create bcm5974 device */ usb_make_path(udev, dev->phys, sizeof(dev->phys)); strlcat(dev->phys, "/input0", sizeof(dev->phys)); From 0c4bc0a2f8257f79a70fe02b9a698eb14695a64b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michael Ellerman Date: Tue, 7 Jun 2022 00:34:56 +1000 Subject: [PATCH 0409/1091] powerpc/32: Fix overread/overwrite of thread_struct via ptrace commit 8e1278444446fc97778a5e5c99bca1ce0bbc5ec9 upstream. The ptrace PEEKUSR/POKEUSR (aka PEEKUSER/POKEUSER) API allows a process to read/write registers of another process. To get/set a register, the API takes an index into an imaginary address space called the "USER area", where the registers of the process are laid out in some fashion. The kernel then maps that index to a particular register in its own data structures and gets/sets the value. The API only allows a single machine-word to be read/written at a time. So 4 bytes on 32-bit kernels and 8 bytes on 64-bit kernels. The way floating point registers (FPRs) are addressed is somewhat complicated, because double precision float values are 64-bit even on 32-bit CPUs. That means on 32-bit kernels each FPR occupies two word-sized locations in the USER area. On 64-bit kernels each FPR occupies one word-sized location in the USER area. Internally the kernel stores the FPRs in an array of u64s, or if VSX is enabled, an array of pairs of u64s where one half of each pair stores the FPR. Which half of the pair stores the FPR depends on the kernel's endianness. To handle the different layouts of the FPRs depending on VSX/no-VSX and big/little endian, the TS_FPR() macro was introduced. Unfortunately the TS_FPR() macro does not take into account the fact that the addressing of each FPR differs between 32-bit and 64-bit kernels. It just takes the index into the "USER area" passed from userspace and indexes into the fp_state.fpr array. On 32-bit there are 64 indexes that address FPRs, but only 32 entries in the fp_state.fpr array, meaning the user can read/write 256 bytes past the end of the array. Because the fp_state sits in the middle of the thread_struct there are various fields than can be overwritten, including some pointers. As such it may be exploitable. It has also been observed to cause systems to hang or otherwise misbehave when using gdbserver, and is probably the root cause of this report which could not be easily reproduced: https://lore.kernel.org/linuxppc-dev/dc38afe9-6b78-f3f5-666b-986939e40fc6@keymile.com/ Rather than trying to make the TS_FPR() macro even more complicated to fix the bug, or add more macros, instead add a special-case for 32-bit kernels. This is more obvious and hopefully avoids a similar bug happening again in future. Note that because 32-bit kernels never have VSX enabled the code doesn't need to consider TS_FPRWIDTH/OFFSET at all. Add a BUILD_BUG_ON() to ensure that 32-bit && VSX is never enabled. Fixes: 87fec0514f61 ("powerpc: PTRACE_PEEKUSR/PTRACE_POKEUSER of FPR registers in little endian builds") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+ Reported-by: Ariel Miculas Tested-by: Christophe Leroy Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220609133245.573565-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace.c index 8c92febf5f44..63bfc5250b67 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -3014,8 +3014,13 @@ long arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, long request, flush_fp_to_thread(child); if (fpidx < (PT_FPSCR - PT_FPR0)) - memcpy(&tmp, &child->thread.TS_FPR(fpidx), - sizeof(long)); + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PPC32)) { + // On 32-bit the index we are passed refers to 32-bit words + tmp = ((u32 *)child->thread.fp_state.fpr)[fpidx]; + } else { + memcpy(&tmp, &child->thread.TS_FPR(fpidx), + sizeof(long)); + } else tmp = child->thread.fp_state.fpscr; } @@ -3047,8 +3052,13 @@ long arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, long request, flush_fp_to_thread(child); if (fpidx < (PT_FPSCR - PT_FPR0)) - memcpy(&child->thread.TS_FPR(fpidx), &data, - sizeof(long)); + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PPC32)) { + // On 32-bit the index we are passed refers to 32-bit words + ((u32 *)child->thread.fp_state.fpr)[fpidx] = data; + } else { + memcpy(&child->thread.TS_FPR(fpidx), &data, + sizeof(long)); + } else child->thread.fp_state.fpscr = data; ret = 0; @@ -3398,4 +3408,7 @@ void __init pt_regs_check(void) offsetof(struct user_pt_regs, result)); BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct user_pt_regs) > sizeof(struct pt_regs)); + + // ptrace_get/put_fpr() rely on PPC32 and VSX being incompatible + BUILD_BUG_ON(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PPC32) && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VSX)); } From 0c12d7625502545b8133334f551e5dec8ef610c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pascal Hambourg Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2022 08:53:56 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0410/1091] md/raid0: Ignore RAID0 layout if the second zone has only one device commit ea23994edc4169bd90d7a9b5908c6ccefd82fa40 upstream. The RAID0 layout is irrelevant if all members have the same size so the array has only one zone. It is *also* irrelevant if the array has two zones and the second zone has only one device, for example if the array has two members of different sizes. So in that case it makes sense to allow assembly even when the layout is undefined, like what is done when the array has only one zone. Reviewed-by: NeilBrown Signed-off-by: Pascal Hambourg Signed-off-by: Song Liu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/md/raid0.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/md/raid0.c b/drivers/md/raid0.c index 322386ff5d22..0ead5a7887f1 100644 --- a/drivers/md/raid0.c +++ b/drivers/md/raid0.c @@ -143,21 +143,6 @@ static int create_strip_zones(struct mddev *mddev, struct r0conf **private_conf) pr_debug("md/raid0:%s: FINAL %d zones\n", mdname(mddev), conf->nr_strip_zones); - if (conf->nr_strip_zones == 1) { - conf->layout = RAID0_ORIG_LAYOUT; - } else if (mddev->layout == RAID0_ORIG_LAYOUT || - mddev->layout == RAID0_ALT_MULTIZONE_LAYOUT) { - conf->layout = mddev->layout; - } else if (default_layout == RAID0_ORIG_LAYOUT || - default_layout == RAID0_ALT_MULTIZONE_LAYOUT) { - conf->layout = default_layout; - } else { - pr_err("md/raid0:%s: cannot assemble multi-zone RAID0 with default_layout setting\n", - mdname(mddev)); - pr_err("md/raid0: please set raid0.default_layout to 1 or 2\n"); - err = -ENOTSUPP; - goto abort; - } /* * now since we have the hard sector sizes, we can make sure * chunk size is a multiple of that sector size @@ -288,6 +273,22 @@ static int create_strip_zones(struct mddev *mddev, struct r0conf **private_conf) (unsigned long long)smallest->sectors); } + if (conf->nr_strip_zones == 1 || conf->strip_zone[1].nb_dev == 1) { + conf->layout = RAID0_ORIG_LAYOUT; + } else if (mddev->layout == RAID0_ORIG_LAYOUT || + mddev->layout == RAID0_ALT_MULTIZONE_LAYOUT) { + conf->layout = mddev->layout; + } else if (default_layout == RAID0_ORIG_LAYOUT || + default_layout == RAID0_ALT_MULTIZONE_LAYOUT) { + conf->layout = default_layout; + } else { + pr_err("md/raid0:%s: cannot assemble multi-zone RAID0 with default_layout setting\n", + mdname(mddev)); + pr_err("md/raid0: please set raid0.default_layout to 1 or 2\n"); + err = -EOPNOTSUPP; + goto abort; + } + pr_debug("md/raid0:%s: done.\n", mdname(mddev)); *private_conf = conf; From b35e08edb2c268647dab89c8e5be84e21e7e1f58 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tokunori Ikegami Date: Thu, 24 Mar 2022 02:04:56 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 0411/1091] mtd: cfi_cmdset_0002: Use chip_ready() for write on S29GL064N commit 0a8e98305f63deaf0a799d5cf5532cc83af035d1 upstream. Since commit dfeae1073583("mtd: cfi_cmdset_0002: Change write buffer to check correct value") buffered writes fail on S29GL064N. This is because, on S29GL064N, reads return 0xFF at the end of DQ polling for write completion, where as, chip_good() check expects actual data written to the last location to be returned post DQ polling completion. Fix is to revert to using chip_good() for S29GL064N which only checks for DQ lines to settle down to determine write completion. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/b687c259-6413-26c9-d4c9-b3afa69ea124@pengutronix.de/ Fixes: dfeae1073583("mtd: cfi_cmdset_0002: Change write buffer to check correct value") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Tokunori Ikegami Acked-by: Vignesh Raghavendra Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mtd/20220323170458.5608-3-ikegami.t@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0002.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++------ include/linux/mtd/cfi.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0002.c b/drivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0002.c index fa5324693200..006221284d0a 100644 --- a/drivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0002.c +++ b/drivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0002.c @@ -59,6 +59,10 @@ #define CFI_SR_WBASB BIT(3) #define CFI_SR_SLSB BIT(1) +enum cfi_quirks { + CFI_QUIRK_DQ_TRUE_DATA = BIT(0), +}; + static int cfi_amdstd_read (struct mtd_info *, loff_t, size_t, size_t *, u_char *); static int cfi_amdstd_write_words(struct mtd_info *, loff_t, size_t, size_t *, const u_char *); #if !FORCE_WORD_WRITE @@ -432,6 +436,15 @@ static void fixup_s29ns512p_sectors(struct mtd_info *mtd) mtd->name); } +static void fixup_quirks(struct mtd_info *mtd) +{ + struct map_info *map = mtd->priv; + struct cfi_private *cfi = map->fldrv_priv; + + if (cfi->mfr == CFI_MFR_AMD && cfi->id == 0x0c01) + cfi->quirks |= CFI_QUIRK_DQ_TRUE_DATA; +} + /* Used to fix CFI-Tables of chips without Extended Query Tables */ static struct cfi_fixup cfi_nopri_fixup_table[] = { { CFI_MFR_SST, 0x234a, fixup_sst39vf }, /* SST39VF1602 */ @@ -470,6 +483,7 @@ static struct cfi_fixup cfi_fixup_table[] = { #if !FORCE_WORD_WRITE { CFI_MFR_ANY, CFI_ID_ANY, fixup_use_write_buffers }, #endif + { CFI_MFR_ANY, CFI_ID_ANY, fixup_quirks }, { 0, 0, NULL } }; static struct cfi_fixup jedec_fixup_table[] = { @@ -842,6 +856,18 @@ static int __xipram chip_ready(struct map_info *map, struct flchip *chip, return map_word_equal(map, t, *expected); } +static int __xipram chip_good(struct map_info *map, struct flchip *chip, + unsigned long addr, map_word *expected) +{ + struct cfi_private *cfi = map->fldrv_priv; + map_word *datum = expected; + + if (cfi->quirks & CFI_QUIRK_DQ_TRUE_DATA) + datum = NULL; + + return chip_ready(map, chip, addr, datum); +} + static int get_chip(struct map_info *map, struct flchip *chip, unsigned long adr, int mode) { DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait, current); @@ -1658,11 +1684,11 @@ static int __xipram do_write_oneword_once(struct map_info *map, } /* - * We check "time_after" and "!chip_ready" before checking - * "chip_ready" to avoid the failure due to scheduling. + * We check "time_after" and "!chip_good" before checking + * "chip_good" to avoid the failure due to scheduling. */ if (time_after(jiffies, timeo) && - !chip_ready(map, chip, adr, &datum)) { + !chip_good(map, chip, adr, &datum)) { xip_enable(map, chip, adr); printk(KERN_WARNING "MTD %s(): software timeout\n", __func__); xip_disable(map, chip, adr); @@ -1670,7 +1696,7 @@ static int __xipram do_write_oneword_once(struct map_info *map, break; } - if (chip_ready(map, chip, adr, &datum)) { + if (chip_good(map, chip, adr, &datum)) { if (cfi_check_err_status(map, chip, adr)) ret = -EIO; break; @@ -1938,18 +1964,18 @@ static int __xipram do_write_buffer_wait(struct map_info *map, } /* - * We check "time_after" and "!chip_ready" before checking - * "chip_ready" to avoid the failure due to scheduling. + * We check "time_after" and "!chip_good" before checking + * "chip_good" to avoid the failure due to scheduling. */ if (time_after(jiffies, timeo) && - !chip_ready(map, chip, adr, &datum)) { + !chip_good(map, chip, adr, &datum)) { pr_err("MTD %s(): software timeout, address:0x%.8lx.\n", __func__, adr); ret = -EIO; break; } - if (chip_ready(map, chip, adr, &datum)) { + if (chip_good(map, chip, adr, &datum)) { if (cfi_check_err_status(map, chip, adr)) ret = -EIO; break; diff --git a/include/linux/mtd/cfi.h b/include/linux/mtd/cfi.h index c98a21108688..f3c149073c21 100644 --- a/include/linux/mtd/cfi.h +++ b/include/linux/mtd/cfi.h @@ -286,6 +286,7 @@ struct cfi_private { map_word sector_erase_cmd; unsigned long chipshift; /* Because they're of the same type */ const char *im_name; /* inter_module name for cmdset_setup */ + unsigned long quirks; struct flchip chips[0]; /* per-chip data structure for each chip */ }; From 602b338e3c3cd7f935f3f5011882961d074e5ac1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Fri, 27 May 2022 14:28:29 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0412/1091] tcp: fix tcp_mtup_probe_success vs wrong snd_cwnd commit 11825765291a93d8e7f44230da67b9f607c777bf upstream. syzbot got a new report [1] finally pointing to a very old bug, added in initial support for MTU probing. tcp_mtu_probe() has checks about starting an MTU probe if tcp_snd_cwnd(tp) >= 11. But nothing prevents tcp_snd_cwnd(tp) to be reduced later and before the MTU probe succeeds. This bug would lead to potential zero-divides. Debugging added in commit 40570375356c ("tcp: add accessors to read/set tp->snd_cwnd") has paid off :) While we are at it, address potential overflows in this code. [1] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 14132 at include/net/tcp.h:1219 tcp_mtup_probe_success+0x366/0x570 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:2712 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 14132 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 5.18.0-syzkaller-07857-gbabf0bb978e3 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:tcp_snd_cwnd_set include/net/tcp.h:1219 [inline] RIP: 0010:tcp_mtup_probe_success+0x366/0x570 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:2712 Code: 74 08 48 89 ef e8 da 80 17 f9 48 8b 45 00 65 48 ff 80 80 03 00 00 48 83 c4 30 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 e8 aa b0 c5 f8 <0f> 0b e9 16 fe ff ff 48 8b 4c 24 08 80 e1 07 38 c1 0f 8c c7 fc ff RSP: 0018:ffffc900079e70f8 EFLAGS: 00010287 RAX: ffffffff88c0f7f6 RBX: ffff8880756e7a80 RCX: 0000000000040000 RDX: ffffc9000c6c4000 RSI: 0000000000031f9e RDI: 0000000000031f9f RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffffff88c0f606 R09: ffffc900079e7520 R10: ffffed101011226d R11: 1ffff1101011226c R12: 1ffff1100eadcf50 R13: ffff8880756e72c0 R14: 1ffff1100eadcf89 R15: dffffc0000000000 FS: 00007f643236e700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f1ab3f1e2a0 CR3: 0000000064fe7000 CR4: 00000000003506e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: tcp_clean_rtx_queue+0x223a/0x2da0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:3356 tcp_ack+0x1962/0x3c90 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:3861 tcp_rcv_established+0x7c8/0x1ac0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5973 tcp_v6_do_rcv+0x57b/0x1210 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:1476 sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:1061 [inline] __release_sock+0x1d8/0x4c0 net/core/sock.c:2849 release_sock+0x5d/0x1c0 net/core/sock.c:3404 sk_stream_wait_memory+0x700/0xdc0 net/core/stream.c:145 tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x111d/0x3fc0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1410 tcp_sendmsg+0x2c/0x40 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1448 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:734 [inline] __sys_sendto+0x439/0x5c0 net/socket.c:2119 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2131 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2127 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0xda/0xf0 net/socket.c:2127 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x2b/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 RIP: 0033:0x7f6431289109 Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f643236e168 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f643139c100 RCX: 00007f6431289109 RDX: 00000000d0d0c2ac RSI: 0000000020000080 RDI: 000000000000000a RBP: 00007f64312e308d R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007fff372533af R14: 00007f643236e300 R15: 0000000000022000 Fixes: 5d424d5a674f ("[TCP]: MTU probing") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reported-by: syzbot Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng Acked-by: Neal Cardwell Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 11 +++++++---- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index b0e6fc2c5e10..0808110451a0 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -2578,12 +2578,15 @@ static void tcp_mtup_probe_success(struct sock *sk) { struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk); + u64 val; - /* FIXME: breaks with very large cwnd */ tp->prior_ssthresh = tcp_current_ssthresh(sk); - tp->snd_cwnd = tp->snd_cwnd * - tcp_mss_to_mtu(sk, tp->mss_cache) / - icsk->icsk_mtup.probe_size; + + val = (u64)tp->snd_cwnd * tcp_mss_to_mtu(sk, tp->mss_cache); + do_div(val, icsk->icsk_mtup.probe_size); + WARN_ON_ONCE((u32)val != val); + tp->snd_cwnd = max_t(u32, 1U, val); + tp->snd_cwnd_cnt = 0; tp->snd_cwnd_stamp = tcp_jiffies32; tp->snd_ssthresh = tcp_current_ssthresh(sk); From 9d6e67bf50908cc661972969e8f073ec1d1bc97d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 18:12:03 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0413/1091] Linux 5.4.198 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220613094928.482772422@linuxfoundation.org Tested-by: Florian Fainelli Tested-by: Guenter Roeck Tested-by: Shuah Khan Tested-by: Sudip Mukherjee Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Makefile | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index 57e27af9fc0c..1c99e688da21 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 VERSION = 5 PATCHLEVEL = 4 -SUBLEVEL = 197 +SUBLEVEL = 198 EXTRAVERSION = NAME = Kleptomaniac Octopus From 9e2efaa5dd104bc3e2ecdfbbaf68a4edfb09198d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Guenter Roeck Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2020 07:14:10 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0414/1091] cpu/speculation: Add prototype for cpu_show_srbds() commit 2accfa69050c2a0d6fc6106f609208b3e9622b26 upstream. 0-day is not happy that there is no prototype for cpu_show_srbds(): drivers/base/cpu.c:565:16: error: no previous prototype for 'cpu_show_srbds' Fixes: 7e5b3c267d25 ("x86/speculation: Add Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS) mitigation") Reported-by: kernel test robot Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200617141410.93338-1-linux@roeck-us.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/linux/cpu.h | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/include/linux/cpu.h b/include/linux/cpu.h index 4e9822cb11f3..1b045a98cd6a 100644 --- a/include/linux/cpu.h +++ b/include/linux/cpu.h @@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ extern ssize_t cpu_show_tsx_async_abort(struct device *dev, char *buf); extern ssize_t cpu_show_itlb_multihit(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf); +extern ssize_t cpu_show_srbds(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf); extern __printf(4, 5) struct device *cpu_device_create(struct device *parent, void *drvdata, From 79568d5515709e2281746010bd214ed05502006f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zhang Rui Date: Mon, 16 Dec 2019 16:33:44 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0415/1091] x86/cpu: Add Jasper Lake to Intel family commit b2d32af0bff402b4c1fce28311759dd1f6af058a upstream. Japser Lake is an Atom family processor. It uses Tremont cores and is targeted at mobile platforms. Reviewed-by: Tony Luck Signed-off-by: Zhang Rui Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h index c606c0b70738..4981c293f926 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h @@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ #define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_TREMONT_D 0x86 /* Jacobsville */ #define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_TREMONT 0x96 /* Elkhart Lake */ +#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_TREMONT_L 0x9C /* Jasper Lake */ /* Xeon Phi */ From 45e744de251c490851329ce00a68a81e914dd53e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tony Luck Date: Mon, 20 Jul 2020 21:37:49 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0416/1091] x86/cpu: Add Lakefield, Alder Lake and Rocket Lake models to the to Intel CPU family commit e00b62f0b06d0ae2b844049f216807617aff0cdb upstream. Add three new Intel CPU models. Signed-off-by: Tony Luck Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200721043749.31567-1-tony.luck@intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h index 4981c293f926..0285b10ed453 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h @@ -86,6 +86,13 @@ #define INTEL_FAM6_COMETLAKE 0xA5 #define INTEL_FAM6_COMETLAKE_L 0xA6 +#define INTEL_FAM6_ROCKETLAKE 0xA7 + +/* Hybrid Core/Atom Processors */ + +#define INTEL_FAM6_LAKEFIELD 0x8A +#define INTEL_FAM6_ALDERLAKE 0x97 + /* "Small Core" Processors (Atom) */ #define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_BONNELL 0x1C /* Diamondville, Pineview */ From 1e9f4e8a7aa996b6fcd6ef87047f9cf427bcc29d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gayatri Kammela Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2021 13:50:04 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 0417/1091] x86/cpu: Add another Alder Lake CPU to the Intel family commit 6e1239c13953f3c2a76e70031f74ddca9ae57cd3 upstream. Add Alder Lake mobile CPU model number to Intel family. Signed-off-by: Gayatri Kammela Signed-off-by: Tony Luck Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210121215004.11618-1-tony.luck@intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h index 0285b10ed453..5b07573c3bc8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h @@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ #define INTEL_FAM6_LAKEFIELD 0x8A #define INTEL_FAM6_ALDERLAKE 0x97 +#define INTEL_FAM6_ALDERLAKE_L 0x9A /* "Small Core" Processors (Atom) */ From 91f8147c8371cb228bef738641abcd183d7adaf1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pawan Gupta Date: Thu, 19 May 2022 20:26:07 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0418/1091] Documentation: Add documentation for Processor MMIO Stale Data commit 4419470191386456e0b8ed4eb06a70b0021798a6 upstream Add the admin guide for Processor MMIO stale data vulnerabilities. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst | 1 + .../hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst | 246 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 247 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst index ca4dbdd9016d..2adec1e6520a 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst @@ -15,3 +15,4 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time. tsx_async_abort multihit.rst special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst + processor_mmio_stale_data.rst diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..9393c50b5afc --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst @@ -0,0 +1,246 @@ +========================================= +Processor MMIO Stale Data Vulnerabilities +========================================= + +Processor MMIO Stale Data Vulnerabilities are a class of memory-mapped I/O +(MMIO) vulnerabilities that can expose data. The sequences of operations for +exposing data range from simple to very complex. Because most of the +vulnerabilities require the attacker to have access to MMIO, many environments +are not affected. System environments using virtualization where MMIO access is +provided to untrusted guests may need mitigation. These vulnerabilities are +not transient execution attacks. However, these vulnerabilities may propagate +stale data into core fill buffers where the data can subsequently be inferred +by an unmitigated transient execution attack. Mitigation for these +vulnerabilities includes a combination of microcode update and software +changes, depending on the platform and usage model. Some of these mitigations +are similar to those used to mitigate Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) or +those used to mitigate Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS). + +Data Propagators +================ +Propagators are operations that result in stale data being copied or moved from +one microarchitectural buffer or register to another. Processor MMIO Stale Data +Vulnerabilities are operations that may result in stale data being directly +read into an architectural, software-visible state or sampled from a buffer or +register. + +Fill Buffer Stale Data Propagator (FBSDP) +----------------------------------------- +Stale data may propagate from fill buffers (FB) into the non-coherent portion +of the uncore on some non-coherent writes. Fill buffer propagation by itself +does not make stale data architecturally visible. Stale data must be propagated +to a location where it is subject to reading or sampling. + +Sideband Stale Data Propagator (SSDP) +------------------------------------- +The sideband stale data propagator (SSDP) is limited to the client (including +Intel Xeon server E3) uncore implementation. The sideband response buffer is +shared by all client cores. For non-coherent reads that go to sideband +destinations, the uncore logic returns 64 bytes of data to the core, including +both requested data and unrequested stale data, from a transaction buffer and +the sideband response buffer. As a result, stale data from the sideband +response and transaction buffers may now reside in a core fill buffer. + +Primary Stale Data Propagator (PSDP) +------------------------------------ +The primary stale data propagator (PSDP) is limited to the client (including +Intel Xeon server E3) uncore implementation. Similar to the sideband response +buffer, the primary response buffer is shared by all client cores. For some +processors, MMIO primary reads will return 64 bytes of data to the core fill +buffer including both requested data and unrequested stale data. This is +similar to the sideband stale data propagator. + +Vulnerabilities +=============== +Device Register Partial Write (DRPW) (CVE-2022-21166) +----------------------------------------------------- +Some endpoint MMIO registers incorrectly handle writes that are smaller than +the register size. Instead of aborting the write or only copying the correct +subset of bytes (for example, 2 bytes for a 2-byte write), more bytes than +specified by the write transaction may be written to the register. On +processors affected by FBSDP, this may expose stale data from the fill buffers +of the core that created the write transaction. + +Shared Buffers Data Sampling (SBDS) (CVE-2022-21125) +---------------------------------------------------- +After propagators may have moved data around the uncore and copied stale data +into client core fill buffers, processors affected by MFBDS can leak data from +the fill buffer. It is limited to the client (including Intel Xeon server E3) +uncore implementation. + +Shared Buffers Data Read (SBDR) (CVE-2022-21123) +------------------------------------------------ +It is similar to Shared Buffer Data Sampling (SBDS) except that the data is +directly read into the architectural software-visible state. It is limited to +the client (including Intel Xeon server E3) uncore implementation. + +Affected Processors +=================== +Not all the CPUs are affected by all the variants. For instance, most +processors for the server market (excluding Intel Xeon E3 processors) are +impacted by only Device Register Partial Write (DRPW). + +Below is the list of affected Intel processors [#f1]_: + + =================== ============ ========= + Common name Family_Model Steppings + =================== ============ ========= + HASWELL_X 06_3FH 2,4 + SKYLAKE_L 06_4EH 3 + BROADWELL_X 06_4FH All + SKYLAKE_X 06_55H 3,4,6,7,11 + BROADWELL_D 06_56H 3,4,5 + SKYLAKE 06_5EH 3 + ICELAKE_X 06_6AH 4,5,6 + ICELAKE_D 06_6CH 1 + ICELAKE_L 06_7EH 5 + ATOM_TREMONT_D 06_86H All + LAKEFIELD 06_8AH 1 + KABYLAKE_L 06_8EH 9 to 12 + ATOM_TREMONT 06_96H 1 + ATOM_TREMONT_L 06_9CH 0 + KABYLAKE 06_9EH 9 to 13 + COMETLAKE 06_A5H 2,3,5 + COMETLAKE_L 06_A6H 0,1 + ROCKETLAKE 06_A7H 1 + =================== ============ ========= + +If a CPU is in the affected processor list, but not affected by a variant, it +is indicated by new bits in MSR IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES. As described in a later +section, mitigation largely remains the same for all the variants, i.e. to +clear the CPU fill buffers via VERW instruction. + +New bits in MSRs +================ +Newer processors and microcode update on existing affected processors added new +bits to IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR. These bits can be used to enumerate +specific variants of Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities and mitigation +capability. + +MSR IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES +-------------------------- +Bit 13 - SBDR_SSDP_NO - When set, processor is not affected by either the + Shared Buffers Data Read (SBDR) vulnerability or the sideband stale + data propagator (SSDP). +Bit 14 - FBSDP_NO - When set, processor is not affected by the Fill Buffer + Stale Data Propagator (FBSDP). +Bit 15 - PSDP_NO - When set, processor is not affected by Primary Stale Data + Propagator (PSDP). +Bit 17 - FB_CLEAR - When set, VERW instruction will overwrite CPU fill buffer + values as part of MD_CLEAR operations. Processors that do not + enumerate MDS_NO (meaning they are affected by MDS) but that do + enumerate support for both L1D_FLUSH and MD_CLEAR implicitly enumerate + FB_CLEAR as part of their MD_CLEAR support. +Bit 18 - FB_CLEAR_CTRL - Processor supports read and write to MSR + IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL[FB_CLEAR_DIS]. On such processors, the FB_CLEAR_DIS + bit can be set to cause the VERW instruction to not perform the + FB_CLEAR action. Not all processors that support FB_CLEAR will support + FB_CLEAR_CTRL. + +MSR IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL +--------------------- +Bit 3 - FB_CLEAR_DIS - When set, VERW instruction does not perform the FB_CLEAR +action. This may be useful to reduce the performance impact of FB_CLEAR in +cases where system software deems it warranted (for example, when performance +is more critical, or the untrusted software has no MMIO access). Note that +FB_CLEAR_DIS has no impact on enumeration (for example, it does not change +FB_CLEAR or MD_CLEAR enumeration) and it may not be supported on all processors +that enumerate FB_CLEAR. + +Mitigation +========== +Like MDS, all variants of Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities have the +same mitigation strategy to force the CPU to clear the affected buffers before +an attacker can extract the secrets. + +This is achieved by using the otherwise unused and obsolete VERW instruction in +combination with a microcode update. The microcode clears the affected CPU +buffers when the VERW instruction is executed. + +Kernel reuses the MDS function to invoke the buffer clearing: + + mds_clear_cpu_buffers() + +On MDS affected CPUs, the kernel already invokes CPU buffer clear on +kernel/userspace, hypervisor/guest and C-state (idle) transitions. No +additional mitigation is needed on such CPUs. + +For CPUs not affected by MDS or TAA, mitigation is needed only for the attacker +with MMIO capability. Therefore, VERW is not required for kernel/userspace. For +virtualization case, VERW is only needed at VMENTER for a guest with MMIO +capability. + +Mitigation points +----------------- +Return to user space +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ +Same mitigation as MDS when affected by MDS/TAA, otherwise no mitigation +needed. + +C-State transition +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ +Control register writes by CPU during C-state transition can propagate data +from fill buffer to uncore buffers. Execute VERW before C-state transition to +clear CPU fill buffers. + +Guest entry point +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ +Same mitigation as MDS when processor is also affected by MDS/TAA, otherwise +execute VERW at VMENTER only for MMIO capable guests. On CPUs not affected by +MDS/TAA, guest without MMIO access cannot extract secrets using Processor MMIO +Stale Data vulnerabilities, so there is no need to execute VERW for such guests. + +Mitigation control on the kernel command line +--------------------------------------------- +The kernel command line allows to control the Processor MMIO Stale Data +mitigations at boot time with the option "mmio_stale_data=". The valid +arguments for this option are: + + ========== ================================================================= + full If the CPU is vulnerable, enable mitigation; CPU buffer clearing + on exit to userspace and when entering a VM. Idle transitions are + protected as well. It does not automatically disable SMT. + full,nosmt Same as full, with SMT disabled on vulnerable CPUs. This is the + complete mitigation. + off Disables mitigation completely. + ========== ================================================================= + +If the CPU is affected and mmio_stale_data=off is not supplied on the kernel +command line, then the kernel selects the appropriate mitigation. + +Mitigation status information +----------------------------- +The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current +vulnerability status of the system: whether the system is vulnerable, and +which mitigations are active. The relevant sysfs file is: + + /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mmio_stale_data + +The possible values in this file are: + + .. list-table:: + + * - 'Not affected' + - The processor is not vulnerable + * - 'Vulnerable' + - The processor is vulnerable, but no mitigation enabled + * - 'Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode' + - The processor is vulnerable, but microcode is not updated. The + mitigation is enabled on a best effort basis. + * - 'Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers' + - The processor is vulnerable and the CPU buffer clearing mitigation is + enabled. + +If the processor is vulnerable then the following information is appended to +the above information: + + ======================== =========================================== + 'SMT vulnerable' SMT is enabled + 'SMT disabled' SMT is disabled + 'SMT Host state unknown' Kernel runs in a VM, Host SMT state unknown + ======================== =========================================== + +References +---------- +.. [#f1] Affected Processors + https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/topic-technology/software-security-guidance/processors-affected-consolidated-product-cpu-model.html From 814ccb6730358c2e30e00cb81fb84f4d480ff34f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pawan Gupta Date: Thu, 19 May 2022 20:27:08 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0419/1091] x86/speculation/mmio: Enumerate Processor MMIO Stale Data bug commit 51802186158c74a0304f51ab963e7c2b3a2b046f upstream Processor MMIO Stale Data is a class of vulnerabilities that may expose data after an MMIO operation. For more details please refer to Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst Add the Processor MMIO Stale Data bug enumeration. A microcode update adds new bits to the MSR IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, define them. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 19 +++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 3 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index 56eb9a6524e9..8c28a2365a92 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -405,5 +405,6 @@ #define X86_BUG_TAA X86_BUG(22) /* CPU is affected by TSX Async Abort(TAA) */ #define X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT X86_BUG(23) /* CPU may incur MCE during certain page attribute changes */ #define X86_BUG_SRBDS X86_BUG(24) /* CPU may leak RNG bits if not mitigated */ +#define X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA X86_BUG(25) /* CPU is affected by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities */ #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h index f312b6f6ac48..75844ee07acc 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h @@ -105,6 +105,25 @@ * Not susceptible to * TSX Async Abort (TAA) vulnerabilities. */ +#define ARCH_CAP_SBDR_SSDP_NO BIT(13) /* + * Not susceptible to SBDR and SSDP + * variants of Processor MMIO stale data + * vulnerabilities. + */ +#define ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO BIT(14) /* + * Not susceptible to FBSDP variant of + * Processor MMIO stale data + * vulnerabilities. + */ +#define ARCH_CAP_PSDP_NO BIT(15) /* + * Not susceptible to PSDP variant of + * Processor MMIO stale data + * vulnerabilities. + */ +#define ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR BIT(17) /* + * VERW clears CPU fill buffer + * even on MDS_NO CPUs. + */ #define MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD 0x0000010b #define L1D_FLUSH BIT(0) /* diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index 4c85ca112a2a..856cb10f51ff 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -1099,18 +1099,39 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = { X86_FEATURE_ANY, issues) #define SRBDS BIT(0) +/* CPU is affected by X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA */ +#define MMIO BIT(1) static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = { VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(IVYBRIDGE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_G, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_X, BIT(2) | BIT(4), MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_D, X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x5), MMIO), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_G, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3), SRBDS | MMIO), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_X, BIT(3) | BIT(4) | BIT(6) | + BIT(7) | BIT(0xB), MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3), SRBDS | MMIO), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0xC), SRBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0xD), SRBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xC), SRBDS | MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x8), SRBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xD), SRBDS | MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x8), SRBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x5, 0x5), MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_D, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X, X86_STEPPINGS(0x4, 0x6), MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE, BIT(2) | BIT(3) | BIT(5), MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x1), MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO), {} }; @@ -1131,6 +1152,13 @@ u64 x86_read_arch_cap_msr(void) return ia32_cap; } +static bool arch_cap_mmio_immune(u64 ia32_cap) +{ + return (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO && + ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSDP_NO && + ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SBDR_SSDP_NO); +} + static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr(); @@ -1190,6 +1218,17 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, SRBDS)) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS); + /* + * Processor MMIO Stale Data bug enumeration + * + * Affected CPU list is generally enough to enumerate the vulnerability, + * but for virtualization case check for ARCH_CAP MSR bits also, VMM may + * not want the guest to enumerate the bug. + */ + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, MMIO) && + !arch_cap_mmio_immune(ia32_cap)) + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA); + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN)) return; From ae649e0cbf76c665cf3a92dc16ddef27789b0447 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pawan Gupta Date: Thu, 19 May 2022 20:28:10 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0420/1091] x86/speculation: Add a common function for MD_CLEAR mitigation update commit f52ea6c26953fed339aa4eae717ee5c2133c7ff2 upstream Processor MMIO Stale Data mitigation uses similar mitigation as MDS and TAA. In preparation for adding its mitigation, add a common function to update all mitigations that depend on MD_CLEAR. [ bp: Add a newline in md_clear_update_mitigation() to separate statements better. ] Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index e817aaeef254..a65e38222cad 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void); static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void); static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void); static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void); -static void __init mds_print_mitigation(void); +static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void); static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void); static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void); @@ -113,10 +113,10 @@ void __init check_bugs(void) srbds_select_mitigation(); /* - * As MDS and TAA mitigations are inter-related, print MDS - * mitigation until after TAA mitigation selection is done. + * As MDS and TAA mitigations are inter-related, update and print their + * mitigation after TAA mitigation selection is done. */ - mds_print_mitigation(); + md_clear_update_mitigation(); arch_smt_update(); @@ -257,14 +257,6 @@ static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void) } } -static void __init mds_print_mitigation(void) -{ - if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) || cpu_mitigations_off()) - return; - - pr_info("%s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation]); -} - static int __init mds_cmdline(char *str) { if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS)) @@ -312,7 +304,7 @@ static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void) /* TSX previously disabled by tsx=off */ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)) { taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED; - goto out; + return; } if (cpu_mitigations_off()) { @@ -326,7 +318,7 @@ static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void) */ if (taa_mitigation == TAA_MITIGATION_OFF && mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_OFF) - goto out; + return; if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR)) taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW; @@ -358,18 +350,6 @@ static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void) if (taa_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt()) cpu_smt_disable(false); - - /* - * Update MDS mitigation, if necessary, as the mds_user_clear is - * now enabled for TAA mitigation. - */ - if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_OFF && - boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS)) { - mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL; - mds_select_mitigation(); - } -out: - pr_info("%s\n", taa_strings[taa_mitigation]); } static int __init tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline(char *str) @@ -393,6 +373,33 @@ static int __init tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline(char *str) } early_param("tsx_async_abort", tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline); +#undef pr_fmt +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "" fmt + +static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void) +{ + if (cpu_mitigations_off()) + return; + + if (!static_key_enabled(&mds_user_clear)) + goto out; + + /* + * mds_user_clear is now enabled. Update MDS mitigation, if + * necessary. + */ + if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_OFF && + boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS)) { + mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL; + mds_select_mitigation(); + } +out: + if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS)) + pr_info("MDS: %s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation]); + if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA)) + pr_info("TAA: %s\n", taa_strings[taa_mitigation]); +} + #undef pr_fmt #define pr_fmt(fmt) "SRBDS: " fmt From 0800f1b45bf6d85e5a168db9ae91fb816f0a8c34 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pawan Gupta Date: Thu, 19 May 2022 20:29:11 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0421/1091] x86/speculation/mmio: Add mitigation for Processor MMIO Stale Data commit 8cb861e9e3c9a55099ad3d08e1a3b653d29c33ca upstream Processor MMIO Stale Data is a class of vulnerabilities that may expose data after an MMIO operation. For details please refer to Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst. These vulnerabilities are broadly categorized as: Device Register Partial Write (DRPW): Some endpoint MMIO registers incorrectly handle writes that are smaller than the register size. Instead of aborting the write or only copying the correct subset of bytes (for example, 2 bytes for a 2-byte write), more bytes than specified by the write transaction may be written to the register. On some processors, this may expose stale data from the fill buffers of the core that created the write transaction. Shared Buffers Data Sampling (SBDS): After propagators may have moved data around the uncore and copied stale data into client core fill buffers, processors affected by MFBDS can leak data from the fill buffer. Shared Buffers Data Read (SBDR): It is similar to Shared Buffer Data Sampling (SBDS) except that the data is directly read into the architectural software-visible state. An attacker can use these vulnerabilities to extract data from CPU fill buffers using MDS and TAA methods. Mitigate it by clearing the CPU fill buffers using the VERW instruction before returning to a user or a guest. On CPUs not affected by MDS and TAA, user application cannot sample data from CPU fill buffers using MDS or TAA. A guest with MMIO access can still use DRPW or SBDR to extract data architecturally. Mitigate it with VERW instruction to clear fill buffers before VMENTER for MMIO capable guests. Add a kernel parameter mmio_stale_data={off|full|full,nosmt} to control the mitigation. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 36 ++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 111 +++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 3 + 4 files changed, 148 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index 979423e1b639..cad17c7a311e 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -2681,6 +2681,7 @@ kvm.nx_huge_pages=off [X86] no_entry_flush [PPC] no_uaccess_flush [PPC] + mmio_stale_data=off [X86] Exceptions: This does not have any effect on @@ -2702,6 +2703,7 @@ Equivalent to: l1tf=flush,nosmt [X86] mds=full,nosmt [X86] tsx_async_abort=full,nosmt [X86] + mmio_stale_data=full,nosmt [X86] mminit_loglevel= [KNL] When CONFIG_DEBUG_MEMORY_INIT is set, this @@ -2711,6 +2713,40 @@ log everything. Information is printed at KERN_DEBUG so loglevel=8 may also need to be specified. + mmio_stale_data= + [X86,INTEL] Control mitigation for the Processor + MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities. + + Processor MMIO Stale Data is a class of + vulnerabilities that may expose data after an MMIO + operation. Exposed data could originate or end in + the same CPU buffers as affected by MDS and TAA. + Therefore, similar to MDS and TAA, the mitigation + is to clear the affected CPU buffers. + + This parameter controls the mitigation. The + options are: + + full - Enable mitigation on vulnerable CPUs + + full,nosmt - Enable mitigation and disable SMT on + vulnerable CPUs. + + off - Unconditionally disable mitigation + + On MDS or TAA affected machines, + mmio_stale_data=off can be prevented by an active + MDS or TAA mitigation as these vulnerabilities are + mitigated with the same mechanism so in order to + disable this mitigation, you need to specify + mds=off and tsx_async_abort=off too. + + Not specifying this option is equivalent to + mmio_stale_data=full. + + For details see: + Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst + module.sig_enforce [KNL] When CONFIG_MODULE_SIG is set, this means that modules without (valid) signatures will fail to load. diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index 956df82bbc2b..ece2b2c6d020 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -313,6 +313,8 @@ DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always_ibpb); DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_user_clear); DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_idle_clear); +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mmio_stale_data_clear); + #include /** diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index a65e38222cad..f7b0a226cd9f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void); static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void); static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void); static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void); +static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void); static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void); /* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR that always has to be preserved. */ @@ -76,6 +77,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mds_user_clear); DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_idle_clear); EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mds_idle_clear); +/* Controls CPU Fill buffer clear before KVM guest MMIO accesses */ +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mmio_stale_data_clear); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mmio_stale_data_clear); + void __init check_bugs(void) { identify_boot_cpu(); @@ -110,11 +115,13 @@ void __init check_bugs(void) l1tf_select_mitigation(); mds_select_mitigation(); taa_select_mitigation(); + mmio_select_mitigation(); srbds_select_mitigation(); /* - * As MDS and TAA mitigations are inter-related, update and print their - * mitigation after TAA mitigation selection is done. + * As MDS, TAA and MMIO Stale Data mitigations are inter-related, update + * and print their mitigation after MDS, TAA and MMIO Stale Data + * mitigation selection is done. */ md_clear_update_mitigation(); @@ -373,6 +380,90 @@ static int __init tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline(char *str) } early_param("tsx_async_abort", tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline); +#undef pr_fmt +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "MMIO Stale Data: " fmt + +enum mmio_mitigations { + MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF, + MMIO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED, + MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW, +}; + +/* Default mitigation for Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities */ +static enum mmio_mitigations mmio_mitigation __ro_after_init = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW; +static bool mmio_nosmt __ro_after_init = false; + +static const char * const mmio_strings[] = { + [MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF] = "Vulnerable", + [MMIO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED] = "Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode", + [MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW] = "Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers", +}; + +static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void) +{ + u64 ia32_cap; + + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA) || + cpu_mitigations_off()) { + mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF; + return; + } + + if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF) + return; + + ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr(); + + /* + * Enable CPU buffer clear mitigation for host and VMM, if also affected + * by MDS or TAA. Otherwise, enable mitigation for VMM only. + */ + if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) || (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA) && + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM))) + static_branch_enable(&mds_user_clear); + else + static_branch_enable(&mmio_stale_data_clear); + + /* + * Check if the system has the right microcode. + * + * CPU Fill buffer clear mitigation is enumerated by either an explicit + * FB_CLEAR or by the presence of both MD_CLEAR and L1D_FLUSH on MDS + * affected systems. + */ + if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR) || + (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR) && + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D) && + !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO))) + mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW; + else + mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED; + + if (mmio_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt()) + cpu_smt_disable(false); +} + +static int __init mmio_stale_data_parse_cmdline(char *str) +{ + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA)) + return 0; + + if (!str) + return -EINVAL; + + if (!strcmp(str, "off")) { + mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF; + } else if (!strcmp(str, "full")) { + mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW; + } else if (!strcmp(str, "full,nosmt")) { + mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW; + mmio_nosmt = true; + } + + return 0; +} +early_param("mmio_stale_data", mmio_stale_data_parse_cmdline); + #undef pr_fmt #define pr_fmt(fmt) "" fmt @@ -385,19 +476,31 @@ static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void) goto out; /* - * mds_user_clear is now enabled. Update MDS mitigation, if - * necessary. + * mds_user_clear is now enabled. Update MDS, TAA and MMIO Stale Data + * mitigation, if necessary. */ if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_OFF && boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS)) { mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL; mds_select_mitigation(); } + if (taa_mitigation == TAA_MITIGATION_OFF && + boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA)) { + taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW; + taa_select_mitigation(); + } + if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF && + boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA)) { + mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW; + mmio_select_mitigation(); + } out: if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS)) pr_info("MDS: %s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation]); if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA)) pr_info("TAA: %s\n", taa_strings[taa_mitigation]); + if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA)) + pr_info("MMIO Stale Data: %s\n", mmio_strings[mmio_mitigation]); } #undef pr_fmt diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index 0f7c05198406..a07d91ab44dd 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -6555,6 +6555,9 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) vmx_l1d_flush(vcpu); else if (static_branch_unlikely(&mds_user_clear)) mds_clear_cpu_buffers(); + else if (static_branch_unlikely(&mmio_stale_data_clear) && + kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(vcpu->kvm)) + mds_clear_cpu_buffers(); if (vcpu->arch.cr2 != read_cr2()) write_cr2(vcpu->arch.cr2); From 7f898baa2044094accfbe49c846f50fecc58e043 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pawan Gupta Date: Thu, 19 May 2022 20:30:12 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0422/1091] x86/bugs: Group MDS, TAA & Processor MMIO Stale Data mitigations commit e5925fb867290ee924fcf2fe3ca887b792714366 upstream MDS, TAA and Processor MMIO Stale Data mitigations rely on clearing CPU buffers. Moreover, status of these mitigations affects each other. During boot, it is important to maintain the order in which these mitigations are selected. This is especially true for md_clear_update_mitigation() that needs to be called after MDS, TAA and Processor MMIO Stale Data mitigation selection is done. Introduce md_clear_select_mitigation(), and select all these mitigations from there. This reflects relationships between these mitigations and ensures proper ordering. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index f7b0a226cd9f..ac5aed2eec58 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void); static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void); static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void); static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void); +static void __init md_clear_select_mitigation(void); static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void); static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void); static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void); @@ -113,18 +114,9 @@ void __init check_bugs(void) spectre_v2_select_mitigation(); ssb_select_mitigation(); l1tf_select_mitigation(); - mds_select_mitigation(); - taa_select_mitigation(); - mmio_select_mitigation(); + md_clear_select_mitigation(); srbds_select_mitigation(); - /* - * As MDS, TAA and MMIO Stale Data mitigations are inter-related, update - * and print their mitigation after MDS, TAA and MMIO Stale Data - * mitigation selection is done. - */ - md_clear_update_mitigation(); - arch_smt_update(); #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 @@ -503,6 +495,20 @@ out: pr_info("MMIO Stale Data: %s\n", mmio_strings[mmio_mitigation]); } +static void __init md_clear_select_mitigation(void) +{ + mds_select_mitigation(); + taa_select_mitigation(); + mmio_select_mitigation(); + + /* + * As MDS, TAA and MMIO Stale Data mitigations are inter-related, update + * and print their mitigation after MDS, TAA and MMIO Stale Data + * mitigation selection is done. + */ + md_clear_update_mitigation(); +} + #undef pr_fmt #define pr_fmt(fmt) "SRBDS: " fmt From 8d25482fc96aa2cb24a221295fdd498f40565415 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pawan Gupta Date: Thu, 19 May 2022 20:31:12 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0423/1091] x86/speculation/mmio: Enable CPU Fill buffer clearing on idle commit 99a83db5a605137424e1efe29dc0573d6a5b6316 upstream When the CPU is affected by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities, Fill Buffer Stale Data Propagator (FBSDP) can propagate stale data out of Fill buffer to uncore buffer when CPU goes idle. Stale data can then be exploited with other variants using MMIO operations. Mitigate it by clearing the Fill buffer before entering idle state. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Co-developed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 16 ++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index ac5aed2eec58..b02ef5341aef 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -416,6 +416,14 @@ static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void) else static_branch_enable(&mmio_stale_data_clear); + /* + * If Processor-MMIO-Stale-Data bug is present and Fill Buffer data can + * be propagated to uncore buffers, clearing the Fill buffers on idle + * is required irrespective of SMT state. + */ + if (!(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO)) + static_branch_enable(&mds_idle_clear); + /* * Check if the system has the right microcode. * @@ -1182,6 +1190,8 @@ static void update_indir_branch_cond(void) /* Update the static key controlling the MDS CPU buffer clear in idle */ static void update_mds_branch_idle(void) { + u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr(); + /* * Enable the idle clearing if SMT is active on CPUs which are * affected only by MSBDS and not any other MDS variant. @@ -1193,10 +1203,12 @@ static void update_mds_branch_idle(void) if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY)) return; - if (sched_smt_active()) + if (sched_smt_active()) { static_branch_enable(&mds_idle_clear); - else + } else if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF || + (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO)) { static_branch_disable(&mds_idle_clear); + } } #define MDS_MSG_SMT "MDS CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.html for more details.\n" From 020ce7495cfccec17693bf58b42282707dece24d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pawan Gupta Date: Thu, 19 May 2022 20:32:13 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0424/1091] x86/speculation/mmio: Add sysfs reporting for Processor MMIO Stale Data commit 8d50cdf8b8341770bc6367bce40c0c1bb0e1d5b3 upstream Add the sysfs reporting file for Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerability. It exposes the vulnerability and mitigation state similar to the existing files for the other hardware vulnerabilities. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- .../ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++ drivers/base/cpu.c | 8 +++++++ include/linux/cpu.h | 3 +++ 4 files changed, 34 insertions(+) diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu index c24afa60a30e..726ac2e01b77 100644 --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu @@ -489,6 +489,7 @@ What: /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/itlb_multihit + /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mmio_stale_data Date: January 2018 Contact: Linux kernel mailing list Description: Information about CPU vulnerabilities diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index b02ef5341aef..bd18ae0ddff0 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -1820,6 +1820,20 @@ static ssize_t tsx_async_abort_show_state(char *buf) sched_smt_active() ? "vulnerable" : "disabled"); } +static ssize_t mmio_stale_data_show_state(char *buf) +{ + if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF) + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", mmio_strings[mmio_mitigation]); + + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) { + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s; SMT Host state unknown\n", + mmio_strings[mmio_mitigation]); + } + + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s; SMT %s\n", mmio_strings[mmio_mitigation], + sched_smt_active() ? "vulnerable" : "disabled"); +} + static char *stibp_state(void) { if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled)) @@ -1920,6 +1934,9 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr case X86_BUG_SRBDS: return srbds_show_state(buf); + case X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA: + return mmio_stale_data_show_state(buf); + default: break; } @@ -1971,4 +1988,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_srbds(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char * { return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SRBDS); } + +ssize_t cpu_show_mmio_stale_data(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) +{ + return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA); +} #endif diff --git a/drivers/base/cpu.c b/drivers/base/cpu.c index 81ec0a1020d6..9b5edf1dfe9e 100644 --- a/drivers/base/cpu.c +++ b/drivers/base/cpu.c @@ -568,6 +568,12 @@ ssize_t __weak cpu_show_srbds(struct device *dev, return sysfs_emit(buf, "Not affected\n"); } +ssize_t __weak cpu_show_mmio_stale_data(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) +{ + return sysfs_emit(buf, "Not affected\n"); +} + static DEVICE_ATTR(meltdown, 0444, cpu_show_meltdown, NULL); static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v1, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v1, NULL); static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v2, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v2, NULL); @@ -577,6 +583,7 @@ static DEVICE_ATTR(mds, 0444, cpu_show_mds, NULL); static DEVICE_ATTR(tsx_async_abort, 0444, cpu_show_tsx_async_abort, NULL); static DEVICE_ATTR(itlb_multihit, 0444, cpu_show_itlb_multihit, NULL); static DEVICE_ATTR(srbds, 0444, cpu_show_srbds, NULL); +static DEVICE_ATTR(mmio_stale_data, 0444, cpu_show_mmio_stale_data, NULL); static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = { &dev_attr_meltdown.attr, @@ -588,6 +595,7 @@ static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = { &dev_attr_tsx_async_abort.attr, &dev_attr_itlb_multihit.attr, &dev_attr_srbds.attr, + &dev_attr_mmio_stale_data.attr, NULL }; diff --git a/include/linux/cpu.h b/include/linux/cpu.h index 1b045a98cd6a..29a6fa2f518d 100644 --- a/include/linux/cpu.h +++ b/include/linux/cpu.h @@ -65,6 +65,9 @@ extern ssize_t cpu_show_tsx_async_abort(struct device *dev, extern ssize_t cpu_show_itlb_multihit(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf); extern ssize_t cpu_show_srbds(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf); +extern ssize_t cpu_show_mmio_stale_data(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, + char *buf); extern __printf(4, 5) struct device *cpu_device_create(struct device *parent, void *drvdata, From bc64f38b5a3839f14896cb9e2de7614d47151fc3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pawan Gupta Date: Thu, 19 May 2022 20:33:13 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0425/1091] x86/speculation/srbds: Update SRBDS mitigation selection commit 22cac9c677c95f3ac5c9244f8ca0afdc7c8afb19 upstream Currently, Linux disables SRBDS mitigation on CPUs not affected by MDS and have the TSX feature disabled. On such CPUs, secrets cannot be extracted from CPU fill buffers using MDS or TAA. Without SRBDS mitigation, Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities can be used to extract RDRAND, RDSEED, and EGETKEY data. Do not disable SRBDS mitigation by default when CPU is also affected by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index bd18ae0ddff0..67fed9168b5f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -578,11 +578,13 @@ static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void) return; /* - * Check to see if this is one of the MDS_NO systems supporting - * TSX that are only exposed to SRBDS when TSX is enabled. + * Check to see if this is one of the MDS_NO systems supporting TSX that + * are only exposed to SRBDS when TSX is enabled or when CPU is affected + * by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerability. */ ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr(); - if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)) + if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM) && + !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA)) srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF; else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR; From d961592635932bd1ea32a534412a41fb794e2212 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pawan Gupta Date: Thu, 19 May 2022 20:34:14 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0426/1091] x86/speculation/mmio: Reuse SRBDS mitigation for SBDS commit a992b8a4682f119ae035a01b40d4d0665c4a2875 upstream The Shared Buffers Data Sampling (SBDS) variant of Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities may expose RDRAND, RDSEED and SGX EGETKEY data. Mitigation for this is added by a microcode update. As some of the implications of SBDS are similar to SRBDS, SRBDS mitigation infrastructure can be leveraged by SBDS. Set X86_BUG_SRBDS and use SRBDS mitigation. Mitigation is enabled by default; use srbds=off to opt-out. Mitigation status can be checked from below file: /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 21 ++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index 856cb10f51ff..305f30e45f3d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -1101,6 +1101,8 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = { #define SRBDS BIT(0) /* CPU is affected by X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA */ #define MMIO BIT(1) +/* CPU is affected by Shared Buffers Data Sampling (SBDS), a variant of X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA */ +#define MMIO_SBDS BIT(2) static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = { VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(IVYBRIDGE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), @@ -1122,16 +1124,17 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = { VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x8), SRBDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xD), SRBDS | MMIO), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x8), SRBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x5, 0x5), MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x5, 0x5), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_D, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X, X86_STEPPINGS(0x4, 0x6), MMIO), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE, BIT(2) | BIT(3) | BIT(5), MMIO), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x1), MMIO), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE, BIT(2) | BIT(3) | BIT(5), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), {} }; @@ -1212,10 +1215,14 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) /* * SRBDS affects CPUs which support RDRAND or RDSEED and are listed * in the vulnerability blacklist. + * + * Some of the implications and mitigation of Shared Buffers Data + * Sampling (SBDS) are similar to SRBDS. Give SBDS same treatment as + * SRBDS. */ if ((cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RDRAND) || cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RDSEED)) && - cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, SRBDS)) + cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, SRBDS | MMIO_SBDS)) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS); /* From d49c22094e6f698a86dfdfd8f22b2a220e797bd4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pawan Gupta Date: Thu, 19 May 2022 20:35:15 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0427/1091] KVM: x86/speculation: Disable Fill buffer clear within guests commit 027bbb884be006b05d9c577d6401686053aa789e upstream The enumeration of MD_CLEAR in CPUID(EAX=7,ECX=0).EDX{bit 10} is not an accurate indicator on all CPUs of whether the VERW instruction will overwrite fill buffers. FB_CLEAR enumeration in IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES{bit 17} covers the case of CPUs that are not vulnerable to MDS/TAA, indicating that microcode does overwrite fill buffers. Guests running in VMM environments may not be aware of all the capabilities/vulnerabilities of the host CPU. Specifically, a guest may apply MDS/TAA mitigations when a virtual CPU is enumerated as vulnerable to MDS/TAA even when the physical CPU is not. On CPUs that enumerate FB_CLEAR_CTRL the VMM may set FB_CLEAR_DIS to skip overwriting of fill buffers by the VERW instruction. This is done by setting FB_CLEAR_DIS during VMENTER and resetting on VMEXIT. For guests that enumerate FB_CLEAR (explicitly asking for fill buffer clear capability) the VMM will not use FB_CLEAR_DIS. Irrespective of guest state, host overwrites CPU buffers before VMENTER to protect itself from an MMIO capable guest, as part of mitigation for MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 6 +++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 72 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 3 ++ arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 4 ++ 4 files changed, 84 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h index 75844ee07acc..c56042916a7c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h @@ -124,6 +124,11 @@ * VERW clears CPU fill buffer * even on MDS_NO CPUs. */ +#define ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR_CTRL BIT(18) /* + * MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL[FB_CLEAR_DIS] + * bit available to control VERW + * behavior. + */ #define MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD 0x0000010b #define L1D_FLUSH BIT(0) /* @@ -141,6 +146,7 @@ /* SRBDS support */ #define MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL 0x00000123 #define RNGDS_MITG_DIS BIT(0) +#define FB_CLEAR_DIS BIT(3) /* CPU Fill buffer clear disable */ #define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS 0x00000174 #define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP 0x00000175 diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index a07d91ab44dd..4bd1bf6214ee 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -204,6 +204,9 @@ static const struct { #define L1D_CACHE_ORDER 4 static void *vmx_l1d_flush_pages; +/* Control for disabling CPU Fill buffer clear */ +static bool __read_mostly vmx_fb_clear_ctrl_available; + static int vmx_setup_l1d_flush(enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf) { struct page *page; @@ -335,6 +338,60 @@ static int vmentry_l1d_flush_get(char *s, const struct kernel_param *kp) return sprintf(s, "%s\n", vmentry_l1d_param[l1tf_vmx_mitigation].option); } +static void vmx_setup_fb_clear_ctrl(void) +{ + u64 msr; + + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES) && + !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) && + !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA)) { + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, msr); + if (msr & ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR_CTRL) + vmx_fb_clear_ctrl_available = true; + } +} + +static __always_inline void vmx_disable_fb_clear(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) +{ + u64 msr; + + if (!vmx->disable_fb_clear) + return; + + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, msr); + msr |= FB_CLEAR_DIS; + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, msr); + /* Cache the MSR value to avoid reading it later */ + vmx->msr_ia32_mcu_opt_ctrl = msr; +} + +static __always_inline void vmx_enable_fb_clear(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) +{ + if (!vmx->disable_fb_clear) + return; + + vmx->msr_ia32_mcu_opt_ctrl &= ~FB_CLEAR_DIS; + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, vmx->msr_ia32_mcu_opt_ctrl); +} + +static void vmx_update_fb_clear_dis(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) +{ + vmx->disable_fb_clear = vmx_fb_clear_ctrl_available; + + /* + * If guest will not execute VERW, there is no need to set FB_CLEAR_DIS + * at VMEntry. Skip the MSR read/write when a guest has no use case to + * execute VERW. + */ + if ((vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR) || + ((vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) && + (vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO) && + (vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_PSDP_NO) && + (vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO) && + (vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_SBDR_SSDP_NO))) + vmx->disable_fb_clear = false; +} + static const struct kernel_param_ops vmentry_l1d_flush_ops = { .set = vmentry_l1d_flush_set, .get = vmentry_l1d_flush_get, @@ -2167,9 +2224,13 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info) } break; } - ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info); + ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info); } + /* FB_CLEAR may have changed, also update the FB_CLEAR_DIS behavior */ + if (msr_index == MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES) + vmx_update_fb_clear_dis(vcpu, vmx); + return ret; } @@ -4362,6 +4423,8 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event) vpid_sync_context(vmx->vpid); if (init_event) vmx_clear_hlt(vcpu); + + vmx_update_fb_clear_dis(vcpu, vmx); } static void enable_irq_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) @@ -6559,6 +6622,8 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(vcpu->kvm)) mds_clear_cpu_buffers(); + vmx_disable_fb_clear(vmx); + if (vcpu->arch.cr2 != read_cr2()) write_cr2(vcpu->arch.cr2); @@ -6567,6 +6632,8 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) vcpu->arch.cr2 = read_cr2(); + vmx_enable_fb_clear(vmx); + /* * We do not use IBRS in the kernel. If this vCPU has used the * SPEC_CTRL MSR it may have left it on; save the value and @@ -8041,8 +8108,11 @@ static int __init vmx_init(void) return r; } + vmx_setup_fb_clear_ctrl(); + for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { INIT_LIST_HEAD(&per_cpu(loaded_vmcss_on_cpu, cpu)); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&per_cpu(blocked_vcpu_on_cpu, cpu)); spin_lock_init(&per_cpu(blocked_vcpu_on_cpu_lock, cpu)); } diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h index 55731dd0096f..7a3362ab5986 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h @@ -280,8 +280,11 @@ struct vcpu_vmx { u64 msr_ia32_feature_control; u64 msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits; u64 ept_pointer; + u64 msr_ia32_mcu_opt_ctrl; + bool disable_fb_clear; struct pt_desc pt_desc; + }; enum ept_pointers_status { diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index 6dd77e426889..d0b297583df8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -1403,6 +1403,10 @@ static u64 kvm_get_arch_capabilities(void) /* KVM does not emulate MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL. */ data &= ~ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR; + + /* Guests don't need to know "Fill buffer clear control" exists */ + data &= ~ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR_CTRL; + return data; } From 4cc40b1022bbfe6da2dda489006b7ab6548bcd61 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Poimboeuf Date: Mon, 23 May 2022 09:11:49 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0428/1091] x86/speculation/mmio: Print SMT warning commit 1dc6ff02c8bf77d71b9b5d11cbc9df77cfb28626 upstream Similar to MDS and TAA, print a warning if SMT is enabled for the MMIO Stale Data vulnerability. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 67fed9168b5f..09d02b1f6f71 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -1215,6 +1215,7 @@ static void update_mds_branch_idle(void) #define MDS_MSG_SMT "MDS CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.html for more details.\n" #define TAA_MSG_SMT "TAA CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.html for more details.\n" +#define MMIO_MSG_SMT "MMIO Stale Data CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.html for more details.\n" void cpu_bugs_smt_update(void) { @@ -1259,6 +1260,16 @@ void cpu_bugs_smt_update(void) break; } + switch (mmio_mitigation) { + case MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW: + case MMIO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED: + if (sched_smt_active()) + pr_warn_once(MMIO_MSG_SMT); + break; + case MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF: + break; + } + mutex_unlock(&spec_ctrl_mutex); } From a31bd366116cb157fc20d5cdc8a2fd1c0d39ac38 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Thu, 16 Jun 2022 13:23:32 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0429/1091] Linux 5.4.199 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220614183721.656018793@linuxfoundation.org Tested-by: Florian Fainelli Tested-by: Shuah Khan Tested-by: Sudip Mukherjee Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing Tested-by: Guenter Roeck Tested-by: Hulk Robot Tested-by: Jon Hunter Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Makefile | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index 1c99e688da21..a8d2f2a1c052 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 VERSION = 5 PATCHLEVEL = 4 -SUBLEVEL = 198 +SUBLEVEL = 199 EXTRAVERSION = NAME = Kleptomaniac Octopus From 10f5759c4e297f0dd9b0b80b267fc67a7d1c47c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Wed, 15 Jun 2022 09:12:44 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0430/1091] Revert "ext4: verify dir block before splitting it" This reverts commit 17034d45ec443fb0e3c0e7297f9cd10f70446064 which is commit 46c116b920ebec58031f0a78c5ea9599b0d2a371 upstream, as it breaks the build in Android kernel builds due to out-of-tree changes that were never merged upstream. Bug: 236690716 Fixes: bc1a5b8c02ae ("Merge 4.14.283 into android-4.14-stable") Cc: Daniel Rosenberg Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Change-Id: I08929715fb488a7d1977300e84d0940a9bf4dc98 --- fs/ext4/namei.c | 32 +++++++++++--------------------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/namei.c b/fs/ext4/namei.c index 57bd8ceca65f..6b7a0cef023c 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/namei.c +++ b/fs/ext4/namei.c @@ -273,9 +273,9 @@ static struct dx_frame *dx_probe(struct ext4_filename *fname, struct dx_hash_info *hinfo, struct dx_frame *frame); static void dx_release(struct dx_frame *frames); -static int dx_make_map(struct inode *dir, struct buffer_head *bh, - struct dx_hash_info *hinfo, - struct dx_map_entry *map_tail); +static int dx_make_map(struct inode *dir, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de, + unsigned blocksize, struct dx_hash_info *hinfo, + struct dx_map_entry map[]); static void dx_sort_map(struct dx_map_entry *map, unsigned count); static struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *dx_move_dirents(struct inode *dir, char *from, char *to, struct dx_map_entry *offsets, @@ -1262,23 +1262,15 @@ static inline int search_dirblock(struct buffer_head *bh, * Create map of hash values, offsets, and sizes, stored at end of block. * Returns number of entries mapped. */ -static int dx_make_map(struct inode *dir, struct buffer_head *bh, - struct dx_hash_info *hinfo, +static int dx_make_map(struct inode *dir, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de, + unsigned blocksize, struct dx_hash_info *hinfo, struct dx_map_entry *map_tail) { int count = 0; - struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *)bh->b_data; - unsigned int buflen = bh->b_size; - char *base = bh->b_data; + char *base = (char *) de; struct dx_hash_info h = *hinfo; - if (ext4_has_metadata_csum(dir->i_sb)) - buflen -= sizeof(struct ext4_dir_entry_tail); - - while ((char *) de < base + buflen) { - if (ext4_check_dir_entry(dir, NULL, de, bh, base, buflen, - ((char *)de) - base)) - return -EFSCORRUPTED; + while ((char *) de < base + blocksize) { if (de->name_len && de->inode) { if (ext4_hash_in_dirent(dir)) h.hash = EXT4_DIRENT_HASH(de); @@ -1291,7 +1283,8 @@ static int dx_make_map(struct inode *dir, struct buffer_head *bh, count++; cond_resched(); } - de = ext4_next_entry(de, dir->i_sb->s_blocksize); + /* XXX: do we need to check rec_len == 0 case? -Chris */ + de = ext4_next_entry(de, blocksize); } return count; } @@ -1957,11 +1950,8 @@ static struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *do_split(handle_t *handle, struct inode *dir, /* create map in the end of data2 block */ map = (struct dx_map_entry *) (data2 + blocksize); - count = dx_make_map(dir, *bh, hinfo, map); - if (count < 0) { - err = count; - goto journal_error; - } + count = dx_make_map(dir, (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) data1, + blocksize, hinfo, map); map -= count; dx_sort_map(map, count); /* Ensure that neither split block is over half full */ From cf729493b63297f5c702c632a3abcbb00321cf04 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Tue, 21 Jun 2022 14:43:21 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0431/1091] Revert "ext4: fix use-after-free in ext4_rename_dir_prepare" This reverts commit eaecf7ebfd5dd09038a80b14be46b844f54cfc5c which is commit 0be698ecbe4471fcad80e81ec6a05001421041b3 upstream as it breaks the build in Android kernel builds due to out-of-tree changes that were never merged upstream. Bug: 236690716 Fixes: bc1a5b8c02ae ("Merge 4.14.283 into android-4.14-stable") Cc: Daniel Rosenberg Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Change-Id: I511f362fecb21bdc53fb3a93bb9772be96e7f985 --- fs/ext4/namei.c | 30 +++--------------------------- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/namei.c b/fs/ext4/namei.c index 6b7a0cef023c..4983d10130c8 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/namei.c +++ b/fs/ext4/namei.c @@ -3570,9 +3570,6 @@ static struct buffer_head *ext4_get_first_dir_block(handle_t *handle, struct buffer_head *bh; if (!ext4_has_inline_data(inode)) { - struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de; - unsigned int offset; - /* The first directory block must not be a hole, so * treat it as DIRENT_HTREE */ @@ -3581,30 +3578,9 @@ static struct buffer_head *ext4_get_first_dir_block(handle_t *handle, *retval = PTR_ERR(bh); return NULL; } - - de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) bh->b_data; - if (ext4_check_dir_entry(inode, NULL, de, bh, bh->b_data, - bh->b_size, 0) || - le32_to_cpu(de->inode) != inode->i_ino || - strcmp(".", de->name)) { - EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "directory missing '.'"); - brelse(bh); - *retval = -EFSCORRUPTED; - return NULL; - } - offset = ext4_rec_len_from_disk(de->rec_len, - inode->i_sb->s_blocksize); - de = ext4_next_entry(de, inode->i_sb->s_blocksize); - if (ext4_check_dir_entry(inode, NULL, de, bh, bh->b_data, - bh->b_size, offset) || - le32_to_cpu(de->inode) == 0 || strcmp("..", de->name)) { - EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "directory missing '..'"); - brelse(bh); - *retval = -EFSCORRUPTED; - return NULL; - } - *parent_de = de; - + *parent_de = ext4_next_entry( + (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *)bh->b_data, + inode->i_sb->s_blocksize); return bh; } From f91da317e6fa40152a77b2e553d1b3a040cf6023 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Al Viro Date: Sun, 31 Jan 2021 14:37:39 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 0432/1091] 9p: missing chunk of "fs/9p: Don't update file type when updating file attributes" commit b577d0cd2104fdfcf0ded3707540a12be8ddd8b0 upstream. In commit 45089142b149 Aneesh had missed one (admittedly, very unlikely to hit) case in v9fs_stat2inode_dotl(). However, the same considerations apply there as well - we have no business whatsoever to change ->i_rdev or the file type. Cc: Tadeusz Struk Signed-off-by: Al Viro Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/9p/vfs_inode_dotl.c | 10 +++------- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/9p/vfs_inode_dotl.c b/fs/9p/vfs_inode_dotl.c index 60328b21c5fb..9795fe0f1ba2 100644 --- a/fs/9p/vfs_inode_dotl.c +++ b/fs/9p/vfs_inode_dotl.c @@ -641,14 +641,10 @@ v9fs_stat2inode_dotl(struct p9_stat_dotl *stat, struct inode *inode, if (stat->st_result_mask & P9_STATS_NLINK) set_nlink(inode, stat->st_nlink); if (stat->st_result_mask & P9_STATS_MODE) { - inode->i_mode = stat->st_mode; - if ((S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode)) || - (S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode))) - init_special_inode(inode, inode->i_mode, - inode->i_rdev); + mode = stat->st_mode & S_IALLUGO; + mode |= inode->i_mode & ~S_IALLUGO; + inode->i_mode = mode; } - if (stat->st_result_mask & P9_STATS_RDEV) - inode->i_rdev = new_decode_dev(stat->st_rdev); if (!(flags & V9FS_STAT2INODE_KEEP_ISIZE) && stat->st_result_mask & P9_STATS_SIZE) v9fs_i_size_write(inode, stat->st_size); From e804587ecdcde138ab2d4394ba3cd5ac5efaea3b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yuntao Wang Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 22:26:22 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0433/1091] bpf: Fix incorrect memory charge cost calculation in stack_map_alloc() commit b45043192b3e481304062938a6561da2ceea46a6 upstream. This is a backport of the original upstream patch for 5.4/5.10. The original upstream patch has been applied to 5.4/5.10 branches, which simply removed the line: cost += n_buckets * (value_size + sizeof(struct stack_map_bucket)); This is correct for upstream branch but incorrect for 5.4/5.10 branches, as the 5.4/5.10 branches do not have the commit 370868107bf6 ("bpf: Eliminate rlimit-based memory accounting for stackmap maps"), so the bpf_map_charge_init() function has not been removed. Currently the bpf_map_charge_init() function in 5.4/5.10 branches takes a wrong memory charge cost, the attr->max_entries * (sizeof(struct stack_map_bucket) + (u64)value_size)) part is missing, let's fix it. Cc: # 5.4.y Cc: # 5.10.y Signed-off-by: Yuntao Wang Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- kernel/bpf/stackmap.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c b/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c index 768ffd603787..811071c227f1 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c @@ -117,7 +117,8 @@ static struct bpf_map *stack_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr) return ERR_PTR(-E2BIG); cost = n_buckets * sizeof(struct stack_map_bucket *) + sizeof(*smap); - err = bpf_map_charge_init(&mem, cost); + err = bpf_map_charge_init(&mem, cost + attr->max_entries * + (sizeof(struct stack_map_bucket) + (u64)value_size)); if (err) return ERR_PTR(err); From 76101f1b7f59f71aeb1c58fa1027e96a748a38cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Martin Faltesek Date: Mon, 6 Jun 2022 21:57:29 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 0434/1091] nfc: st21nfca: fix incorrect sizing calculations in EVT_TRANSACTION commit f2e19b36593caed4c977c2f55aeba7408aeb2132 upstream. The transaction buffer is allocated by using the size of the packet buf, and subtracting two which seem intended to remove the two tags which are not present in the target structure. This calculation leads to under counting memory because of differences between the packet contents and the target structure. The aid_len field is a u8 in the packet, but a u32 in the structure, resulting in at least 3 bytes always being under counted. Further, the aid data is a variable length field in the packet, but fixed in the structure, so if this field is less than the max, the difference is added to the under counting. The last validation check for transaction->params_len is also incorrect since it employs the same accounting error. To fix, perform validation checks progressively to safely reach the next field, to determine the size of both buffers and verify both tags. Once all validation checks pass, allocate the buffer and copy the data. This eliminates freeing memory on the error path, as those checks are moved ahead of memory allocation. Fixes: 26fc6c7f02cb ("NFC: st21nfca: Add HCI transaction event support") Fixes: 4fbcc1a4cb20 ("nfc: st21nfca: Fix potential buffer overflows in EVT_TRANSACTION") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Martin Faltesek Reviewed-by: Guenter Roeck Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/nfc/st21nfca/se.c | 67 +++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/nfc/st21nfca/se.c b/drivers/nfc/st21nfca/se.c index ccaace2a5b0e..d41636504246 100644 --- a/drivers/nfc/st21nfca/se.c +++ b/drivers/nfc/st21nfca/se.c @@ -304,6 +304,8 @@ int st21nfca_connectivity_event_received(struct nfc_hci_dev *hdev, u8 host, int r = 0; struct device *dev = &hdev->ndev->dev; struct nfc_evt_transaction *transaction; + u32 aid_len; + u8 params_len; pr_debug("connectivity gate event: %x\n", event); @@ -312,51 +314,48 @@ int st21nfca_connectivity_event_received(struct nfc_hci_dev *hdev, u8 host, r = nfc_se_connectivity(hdev->ndev, host); break; case ST21NFCA_EVT_TRANSACTION: - /* - * According to specification etsi 102 622 + /* According to specification etsi 102 622 * 11.2.2.4 EVT_TRANSACTION Table 52 * Description Tag Length * AID 81 5 to 16 * PARAMETERS 82 0 to 255 + * + * The key differences are aid storage length is variably sized + * in the packet, but fixed in nfc_evt_transaction, and that the aid_len + * is u8 in the packet, but u32 in the structure, and the tags in + * the packet are not included in nfc_evt_transaction. + * + * size in bytes: 1 1 5-16 1 1 0-255 + * offset: 0 1 2 aid_len + 2 aid_len + 3 aid_len + 4 + * member name: aid_tag(M) aid_len aid params_tag(M) params_len params + * example: 0x81 5-16 X 0x82 0-255 X */ - if (skb->len < NFC_MIN_AID_LENGTH + 2 || - skb->data[0] != NFC_EVT_TRANSACTION_AID_TAG) + if (skb->len < 2 || skb->data[0] != NFC_EVT_TRANSACTION_AID_TAG) return -EPROTO; - transaction = (struct nfc_evt_transaction *)devm_kzalloc(dev, - skb->len - 2, GFP_KERNEL); + aid_len = skb->data[1]; + + if (skb->len < aid_len + 4 || aid_len > sizeof(transaction->aid)) + return -EPROTO; + + params_len = skb->data[aid_len + 3]; + + /* Verify PARAMETERS tag is (82), and final check that there is enough + * space in the packet to read everything. + */ + if ((skb->data[aid_len + 2] != NFC_EVT_TRANSACTION_PARAMS_TAG) || + (skb->len < aid_len + 4 + params_len)) + return -EPROTO; + + transaction = devm_kzalloc(dev, sizeof(*transaction) + params_len, GFP_KERNEL); if (!transaction) return -ENOMEM; - transaction->aid_len = skb->data[1]; + transaction->aid_len = aid_len; + transaction->params_len = params_len; - /* Checking if the length of the AID is valid */ - if (transaction->aid_len > sizeof(transaction->aid)) { - devm_kfree(dev, transaction); - return -EINVAL; - } - - memcpy(transaction->aid, &skb->data[2], - transaction->aid_len); - - /* Check next byte is PARAMETERS tag (82) */ - if (skb->data[transaction->aid_len + 2] != - NFC_EVT_TRANSACTION_PARAMS_TAG) { - devm_kfree(dev, transaction); - return -EPROTO; - } - - transaction->params_len = skb->data[transaction->aid_len + 3]; - - /* Total size is allocated (skb->len - 2) minus fixed array members */ - if (transaction->params_len > ((skb->len - 2) - - sizeof(struct nfc_evt_transaction))) { - devm_kfree(dev, transaction); - return -EINVAL; - } - - memcpy(transaction->params, skb->data + - transaction->aid_len + 4, transaction->params_len); + memcpy(transaction->aid, &skb->data[2], aid_len); + memcpy(transaction->params, &skb->data[aid_len + 4], params_len); r = nfc_se_transaction(hdev->ndev, host, transaction); break; From 97126d2f65b38342aaeedf991c183fe72e7c9993 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 13:22:28 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0435/1091] crypto: blake2s - generic C library implementation and selftest commit 66d7fb94e4ffe5acc589e0b2b4710aecc1f07a28 upstream. The C implementation was originally based on Samuel Neves' public domain reference implementation but has since been heavily modified for the kernel. We're able to do compile-time optimizations by moving some scaffolding around the final function into the header file. Information: https://blake2.net/ Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Samuel Neves Co-developed-by: Samuel Neves [ardb: - move from lib/zinc to lib/crypto - remove simd handling - rewrote selftest for better coverage - use fixed digest length for blake2s_hmac() and rename to blake2s256_hmac() ] Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu [Jason: for stable, skip kconfig and wire up directly, and skip the arch hooks; optimized implementations need not be backported.] Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/crypto/blake2s.h | 106 +++++ include/crypto/internal/blake2s.h | 19 + lib/crypto/Makefile | 6 + lib/crypto/blake2s-generic.c | 111 ++++++ lib/crypto/blake2s-selftest.c | 622 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ lib/crypto/blake2s.c | 115 ++++++ 6 files changed, 979 insertions(+) create mode 100644 include/crypto/blake2s.h create mode 100644 include/crypto/internal/blake2s.h create mode 100644 lib/crypto/blake2s-generic.c create mode 100644 lib/crypto/blake2s-selftest.c create mode 100644 lib/crypto/blake2s.c diff --git a/include/crypto/blake2s.h b/include/crypto/blake2s.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..b471deac28ff --- /dev/null +++ b/include/crypto/blake2s.h @@ -0,0 +1,106 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR MIT */ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. + */ + +#ifndef BLAKE2S_H +#define BLAKE2S_H + +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +enum blake2s_lengths { + BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE = 64, + BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE = 32, + BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE = 32, + + BLAKE2S_128_HASH_SIZE = 16, + BLAKE2S_160_HASH_SIZE = 20, + BLAKE2S_224_HASH_SIZE = 28, + BLAKE2S_256_HASH_SIZE = 32, +}; + +struct blake2s_state { + u32 h[8]; + u32 t[2]; + u32 f[2]; + u8 buf[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE]; + unsigned int buflen; + unsigned int outlen; +}; + +enum blake2s_iv { + BLAKE2S_IV0 = 0x6A09E667UL, + BLAKE2S_IV1 = 0xBB67AE85UL, + BLAKE2S_IV2 = 0x3C6EF372UL, + BLAKE2S_IV3 = 0xA54FF53AUL, + BLAKE2S_IV4 = 0x510E527FUL, + BLAKE2S_IV5 = 0x9B05688CUL, + BLAKE2S_IV6 = 0x1F83D9ABUL, + BLAKE2S_IV7 = 0x5BE0CD19UL, +}; + +void blake2s_update(struct blake2s_state *state, const u8 *in, size_t inlen); +void blake2s_final(struct blake2s_state *state, u8 *out); + +static inline void blake2s_init_param(struct blake2s_state *state, + const u32 param) +{ + *state = (struct blake2s_state){{ + BLAKE2S_IV0 ^ param, + BLAKE2S_IV1, + BLAKE2S_IV2, + BLAKE2S_IV3, + BLAKE2S_IV4, + BLAKE2S_IV5, + BLAKE2S_IV6, + BLAKE2S_IV7, + }}; +} + +static inline void blake2s_init(struct blake2s_state *state, + const size_t outlen) +{ + blake2s_init_param(state, 0x01010000 | outlen); + state->outlen = outlen; +} + +static inline void blake2s_init_key(struct blake2s_state *state, + const size_t outlen, const void *key, + const size_t keylen) +{ + WARN_ON(IS_ENABLED(DEBUG) && (!outlen || outlen > BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE || + !key || !keylen || keylen > BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE)); + + blake2s_init_param(state, 0x01010000 | keylen << 8 | outlen); + memcpy(state->buf, key, keylen); + state->buflen = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; + state->outlen = outlen; +} + +static inline void blake2s(u8 *out, const u8 *in, const u8 *key, + const size_t outlen, const size_t inlen, + const size_t keylen) +{ + struct blake2s_state state; + + WARN_ON(IS_ENABLED(DEBUG) && ((!in && inlen > 0) || !out || !outlen || + outlen > BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE || keylen > BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE || + (!key && keylen))); + + if (keylen) + blake2s_init_key(&state, outlen, key, keylen); + else + blake2s_init(&state, outlen); + + blake2s_update(&state, in, inlen); + blake2s_final(&state, out); +} + +void blake2s256_hmac(u8 *out, const u8 *in, const u8 *key, const size_t inlen, + const size_t keylen); + +#endif /* BLAKE2S_H */ diff --git a/include/crypto/internal/blake2s.h b/include/crypto/internal/blake2s.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..941693effc7d --- /dev/null +++ b/include/crypto/internal/blake2s.h @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR MIT */ + +#ifndef BLAKE2S_INTERNAL_H +#define BLAKE2S_INTERNAL_H + +#include + +void blake2s_compress_generic(struct blake2s_state *state,const u8 *block, + size_t nblocks, const u32 inc); + +void blake2s_compress_arch(struct blake2s_state *state,const u8 *block, + size_t nblocks, const u32 inc); + +static inline void blake2s_set_lastblock(struct blake2s_state *state) +{ + state->f[0] = -1; +} + +#endif /* BLAKE2S_INTERNAL_H */ diff --git a/lib/crypto/Makefile b/lib/crypto/Makefile index cbe0b6a6450d..9d7feabacd1d 100644 --- a/lib/crypto/Makefile +++ b/lib/crypto/Makefile @@ -11,3 +11,9 @@ libdes-y := des.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256) += libsha256.o libsha256-y := sha256.o + +obj-y += libblake2s.o +libblake2s-y += blake2s.o blake2s-generic.o +ifneq ($(CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS),y) +libblake2s-y += blake2s-selftest.o +endif diff --git a/lib/crypto/blake2s-generic.c b/lib/crypto/blake2s-generic.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..04ff8df24513 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/crypto/blake2s-generic.c @@ -0,0 +1,111 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR MIT +/* + * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. + * + * This is an implementation of the BLAKE2s hash and PRF functions. + * + * Information: https://blake2.net/ + * + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +static const u8 blake2s_sigma[10][16] = { + { 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 }, + { 14, 10, 4, 8, 9, 15, 13, 6, 1, 12, 0, 2, 11, 7, 5, 3 }, + { 11, 8, 12, 0, 5, 2, 15, 13, 10, 14, 3, 6, 7, 1, 9, 4 }, + { 7, 9, 3, 1, 13, 12, 11, 14, 2, 6, 5, 10, 4, 0, 15, 8 }, + { 9, 0, 5, 7, 2, 4, 10, 15, 14, 1, 11, 12, 6, 8, 3, 13 }, + { 2, 12, 6, 10, 0, 11, 8, 3, 4, 13, 7, 5, 15, 14, 1, 9 }, + { 12, 5, 1, 15, 14, 13, 4, 10, 0, 7, 6, 3, 9, 2, 8, 11 }, + { 13, 11, 7, 14, 12, 1, 3, 9, 5, 0, 15, 4, 8, 6, 2, 10 }, + { 6, 15, 14, 9, 11, 3, 0, 8, 12, 2, 13, 7, 1, 4, 10, 5 }, + { 10, 2, 8, 4, 7, 6, 1, 5, 15, 11, 9, 14, 3, 12, 13, 0 }, +}; + +static inline void blake2s_increment_counter(struct blake2s_state *state, + const u32 inc) +{ + state->t[0] += inc; + state->t[1] += (state->t[0] < inc); +} + +void blake2s_compress_generic(struct blake2s_state *state,const u8 *block, + size_t nblocks, const u32 inc) +{ + u32 m[16]; + u32 v[16]; + int i; + + WARN_ON(IS_ENABLED(DEBUG) && + (nblocks > 1 && inc != BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE)); + + while (nblocks > 0) { + blake2s_increment_counter(state, inc); + memcpy(m, block, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE); + le32_to_cpu_array(m, ARRAY_SIZE(m)); + memcpy(v, state->h, 32); + v[ 8] = BLAKE2S_IV0; + v[ 9] = BLAKE2S_IV1; + v[10] = BLAKE2S_IV2; + v[11] = BLAKE2S_IV3; + v[12] = BLAKE2S_IV4 ^ state->t[0]; + v[13] = BLAKE2S_IV5 ^ state->t[1]; + v[14] = BLAKE2S_IV6 ^ state->f[0]; + v[15] = BLAKE2S_IV7 ^ state->f[1]; + +#define G(r, i, a, b, c, d) do { \ + a += b + m[blake2s_sigma[r][2 * i + 0]]; \ + d = ror32(d ^ a, 16); \ + c += d; \ + b = ror32(b ^ c, 12); \ + a += b + m[blake2s_sigma[r][2 * i + 1]]; \ + d = ror32(d ^ a, 8); \ + c += d; \ + b = ror32(b ^ c, 7); \ +} while (0) + +#define ROUND(r) do { \ + G(r, 0, v[0], v[ 4], v[ 8], v[12]); \ + G(r, 1, v[1], v[ 5], v[ 9], v[13]); \ + G(r, 2, v[2], v[ 6], v[10], v[14]); \ + G(r, 3, v[3], v[ 7], v[11], v[15]); \ + G(r, 4, v[0], v[ 5], v[10], v[15]); \ + G(r, 5, v[1], v[ 6], v[11], v[12]); \ + G(r, 6, v[2], v[ 7], v[ 8], v[13]); \ + G(r, 7, v[3], v[ 4], v[ 9], v[14]); \ +} while (0) + ROUND(0); + ROUND(1); + ROUND(2); + ROUND(3); + ROUND(4); + ROUND(5); + ROUND(6); + ROUND(7); + ROUND(8); + ROUND(9); + +#undef G +#undef ROUND + + for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) + state->h[i] ^= v[i] ^ v[i + 8]; + + block += BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; + --nblocks; + } +} + +EXPORT_SYMBOL(blake2s_compress_generic); + +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2"); +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("BLAKE2s hash function"); +MODULE_AUTHOR("Jason A. Donenfeld "); diff --git a/lib/crypto/blake2s-selftest.c b/lib/crypto/blake2s-selftest.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..79ef404a990d --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/crypto/blake2s-selftest.c @@ -0,0 +1,622 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR MIT +/* + * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. + */ + +#include +#include + +/* + * blake2s_testvecs[] generated with the program below (using libb2-dev and + * libssl-dev [OpenSSL]) + * + * #include + * #include + * #include + * + * #include + * #include + * + * #define BLAKE2S_TESTVEC_COUNT 256 + * + * static void print_vec(const uint8_t vec[], int len) + * { + * int i; + * + * printf(" { "); + * for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { + * if (i && (i % 12) == 0) + * printf("\n "); + * printf("0x%02x, ", vec[i]); + * } + * printf("},\n"); + * } + * + * int main(void) + * { + * uint8_t key[BLAKE2S_KEYBYTES]; + * uint8_t buf[BLAKE2S_TESTVEC_COUNT]; + * uint8_t hash[BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES]; + * int i, j; + * + * key[0] = key[1] = 1; + * for (i = 2; i < BLAKE2S_KEYBYTES; ++i) + * key[i] = key[i - 2] + key[i - 1]; + * + * for (i = 0; i < BLAKE2S_TESTVEC_COUNT; ++i) + * buf[i] = (uint8_t)i; + * + * printf("static const u8 blake2s_testvecs[][BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] __initconst = {\n"); + * + * for (i = 0; i < BLAKE2S_TESTVEC_COUNT; ++i) { + * int outlen = 1 + i % BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES; + * int keylen = (13 * i) % (BLAKE2S_KEYBYTES + 1); + * + * blake2s(hash, buf, key + BLAKE2S_KEYBYTES - keylen, outlen, i, + * keylen); + * print_vec(hash, outlen); + * } + * printf("};\n\n"); + * + * printf("static const u8 blake2s_hmac_testvecs[][BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] __initconst = {\n"); + * + * HMAC(EVP_blake2s256(), key, sizeof(key), buf, sizeof(buf), hash, NULL); + * print_vec(hash, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES); + * + * HMAC(EVP_blake2s256(), buf, sizeof(buf), key, sizeof(key), hash, NULL); + * print_vec(hash, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES); + * + * printf("};\n"); + * + * return 0; + *} + */ +static const u8 blake2s_testvecs[][BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] __initconst = { + { 0xa1, }, + { 0x7c, 0x89, }, + { 0x74, 0x0e, 0xd4, }, + { 0x47, 0x0c, 0x21, 0x15, }, + { 0x18, 0xd6, 0x9c, 0xa6, 0xc4, }, + { 0x13, 0x5d, 0x16, 0x63, 0x2e, 0xf9, }, + { 0x2c, 0xb5, 0x04, 0xb7, 0x99, 0xe2, 0x73, }, + { 0x9a, 0x0f, 0xd2, 0x39, 0xd6, 0x68, 0x1b, 0x92, }, + { 0xc8, 0xde, 0x7a, 0xea, 0x2f, 0xf4, 0xd2, 0xe3, 0x2b, }, + { 0x5b, 0xf9, 0x43, 0x52, 0x0c, 0x12, 0xba, 0xb5, 0x93, 0x9f, }, + { 0xc6, 0x2c, 0x4e, 0x80, 0xfc, 0x32, 0x5b, 0x33, 0xb8, 0xb8, 0x0a, }, + { 0xa7, 0x5c, 0xfd, 0x3a, 0xcc, 0xbf, 0x90, 0xca, 0xb7, 0x97, 0xde, 0xd8, }, + { 0x66, 0xca, 0x3c, 0xc4, 0x19, 0xef, 0x92, 0x66, 0x3f, 0x21, 0x8f, 0xda, + 0xb7, }, + { 0xba, 0xe5, 0xbb, 0x30, 0x25, 0x94, 0x6d, 0xc3, 0x89, 0x09, 0xc4, 0x25, + 0x52, 0x3e, }, + { 0xa2, 0xef, 0x0e, 0x52, 0x0b, 0x5f, 0xa2, 0x01, 0x6d, 0x0a, 0x25, 0xbc, + 0x57, 0xe2, 0x27, }, + { 0x4f, 0xe0, 0xf9, 0x52, 0x12, 0xda, 0x84, 0xb7, 0xab, 0xae, 0xb0, 0xa6, + 0x47, 0x2a, 0xc7, 0xf5, }, + { 0x56, 0xe7, 0xa8, 0x1c, 0x4c, 0xca, 0xed, 0x90, 0x31, 0xec, 0x87, 0x43, + 0xe7, 0x72, 0x08, 0xec, 0xbe, }, + { 0x7e, 0xdf, 0x80, 0x1c, 0x93, 0x33, 0xfd, 0x53, 0x44, 0xba, 0xfd, 0x96, + 0xe1, 0xbb, 0xb5, 0x65, 0xa5, 0x00, }, + { 0xec, 0x6b, 0xed, 0xf7, 0x7b, 0x62, 0x1d, 0x7d, 0xf4, 0x82, 0xf3, 0x1e, + 0x18, 0xff, 0x2b, 0xc4, 0x06, 0x20, 0x2a, }, + { 0x74, 0x98, 0xd7, 0x68, 0x63, 0xed, 0x87, 0xe4, 0x5d, 0x8d, 0x9e, 0x1d, + 0xfd, 0x2a, 0xbb, 0x86, 0xac, 0xe9, 0x2a, 0x89, }, + { 0x89, 0xc3, 0x88, 0xce, 0x2b, 0x33, 0x1e, 0x10, 0xd1, 0x37, 0x20, 0x86, + 0x28, 0x43, 0x70, 0xd9, 0xfb, 0x96, 0xd9, 0xb5, 0xd3, }, + { 0xcb, 0x56, 0x74, 0x41, 0x8d, 0x80, 0x01, 0x9a, 0x6b, 0x38, 0xe1, 0x41, + 0xad, 0x9c, 0x62, 0x74, 0xce, 0x35, 0xd5, 0x6c, 0x89, 0x6e, }, + { 0x79, 0xaf, 0x94, 0x59, 0x99, 0x26, 0xe1, 0xc9, 0x34, 0xfe, 0x7c, 0x22, + 0xf7, 0x43, 0xd7, 0x65, 0xd4, 0x48, 0x18, 0xac, 0x3d, 0xfd, 0x93, }, + { 0x85, 0x0d, 0xff, 0xb8, 0x3e, 0x87, 0x41, 0xb0, 0x95, 0xd3, 0x3d, 0x00, + 0x47, 0x55, 0x9e, 0xd2, 0x69, 0xea, 0xbf, 0xe9, 0x7a, 0x2d, 0x61, 0x45, }, + { 0x03, 0xe0, 0x85, 0xec, 0x54, 0xb5, 0x16, 0x53, 0xa8, 0xc4, 0x71, 0xe9, + 0x6a, 0xe7, 0xcb, 0xc4, 0x15, 0x02, 0xfc, 0x34, 0xa4, 0xa4, 0x28, 0x13, + 0xd1, }, + { 0xe3, 0x34, 0x4b, 0xe1, 0xd0, 0x4b, 0x55, 0x61, 0x8f, 0xc0, 0x24, 0x05, + 0xe6, 0xe0, 0x3d, 0x70, 0x24, 0x4d, 0xda, 0xb8, 0x91, 0x05, 0x29, 0x07, + 0x01, 0x3e, }, + { 0x61, 0xff, 0x01, 0x72, 0xb1, 0x4d, 0xf6, 0xfe, 0xd1, 0xd1, 0x08, 0x74, + 0xe6, 0x91, 0x44, 0xeb, 0x61, 0xda, 0x40, 0xaf, 0xfc, 0x8c, 0x91, 0x6b, + 0xec, 0x13, 0xed, }, + { 0xd4, 0x40, 0xd2, 0xa0, 0x7f, 0xc1, 0x58, 0x0c, 0x85, 0xa0, 0x86, 0xc7, + 0x86, 0xb9, 0x61, 0xc9, 0xea, 0x19, 0x86, 0x1f, 0xab, 0x07, 0xce, 0x37, + 0x72, 0x67, 0x09, 0xfc, }, + { 0x9e, 0xf8, 0x18, 0x67, 0x93, 0x10, 0x9b, 0x39, 0x75, 0xe8, 0x8b, 0x38, + 0x82, 0x7d, 0xb8, 0xb7, 0xa5, 0xaf, 0xe6, 0x6a, 0x22, 0x5e, 0x1f, 0x9c, + 0x95, 0x29, 0x19, 0xf2, 0x4b, }, + { 0xc8, 0x62, 0x25, 0xf5, 0x98, 0xc9, 0xea, 0xe5, 0x29, 0x3a, 0xd3, 0x22, + 0xeb, 0xeb, 0x07, 0x7c, 0x15, 0x07, 0xee, 0x15, 0x61, 0xbb, 0x05, 0x30, + 0x99, 0x7f, 0x11, 0xf6, 0x0a, 0x1d, }, + { 0x68, 0x70, 0xf7, 0x90, 0xa1, 0x8b, 0x1f, 0x0f, 0xbb, 0xce, 0xd2, 0x0e, + 0x33, 0x1f, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x78, 0xa8, 0xa6, 0x81, 0x66, 0xab, 0x8d, 0xcd, + 0x58, 0x55, 0x3a, 0x0b, 0x7a, 0xdb, 0xb5, }, + { 0xdd, 0x35, 0xd2, 0xb4, 0xf6, 0xc7, 0xea, 0xab, 0x64, 0x24, 0x4e, 0xfe, + 0xe5, 0x3d, 0x4e, 0x95, 0x8b, 0x6d, 0x6c, 0xbc, 0xb0, 0xf8, 0x88, 0x61, + 0x09, 0xb7, 0x78, 0xa3, 0x31, 0xfe, 0xd9, 0x2f, }, + { 0x0a, }, + { 0x6e, 0xd4, }, + { 0x64, 0xe9, 0xd1, }, + { 0x30, 0xdd, 0x71, 0xef, }, + { 0x11, 0xb5, 0x0c, 0x87, 0xc9, }, + { 0x06, 0x1c, 0x6d, 0x04, 0x82, 0xd0, }, + { 0x5c, 0x42, 0x0b, 0xee, 0xc5, 0x9c, 0xb2, }, + { 0xe8, 0x29, 0xd6, 0xb4, 0x5d, 0xf7, 0x2b, 0x93, }, + { 0x18, 0xca, 0x27, 0x72, 0x43, 0x39, 0x16, 0xbc, 0x6a, }, + { 0x39, 0x8f, 0xfd, 0x64, 0xf5, 0x57, 0x23, 0xb0, 0x45, 0xf8, }, + { 0xbb, 0x3a, 0x78, 0x6b, 0x02, 0x1d, 0x0b, 0x16, 0xe3, 0xb2, 0x9a, }, + { 0xb8, 0xb4, 0x0b, 0xe5, 0xd4, 0x1d, 0x0d, 0x85, 0x49, 0x91, 0x35, 0xfa, }, + { 0x6d, 0x48, 0x2a, 0x0c, 0x42, 0x08, 0xbd, 0xa9, 0x78, 0x6f, 0x18, 0xaf, + 0xe2, }, + { 0x10, 0x45, 0xd4, 0x58, 0x88, 0xec, 0x4e, 0x1e, 0xf6, 0x14, 0x92, 0x64, + 0x7e, 0xb0, }, + { 0x8b, 0x0b, 0x95, 0xee, 0x92, 0xc6, 0x3b, 0x91, 0xf1, 0x1e, 0xeb, 0x51, + 0x98, 0x0a, 0x8d, }, + { 0xa3, 0x50, 0x4d, 0xa5, 0x1d, 0x03, 0x68, 0xe9, 0x57, 0x78, 0xd6, 0x04, + 0xf1, 0xc3, 0x94, 0xd8, }, + { 0xb8, 0x66, 0x6e, 0xdd, 0x46, 0x15, 0xae, 0x3d, 0x83, 0x7e, 0xcf, 0xe7, + 0x2c, 0xe8, 0x8f, 0xc7, 0x34, }, + { 0x2e, 0xc0, 0x1f, 0x29, 0xea, 0xf6, 0xb9, 0xe2, 0xc2, 0x93, 0xeb, 0x41, + 0x0d, 0xf0, 0x0a, 0x13, 0x0e, 0xa2, }, + { 0x71, 0xb8, 0x33, 0xa9, 0x1b, 0xac, 0xf1, 0xb5, 0x42, 0x8f, 0x5e, 0x81, + 0x34, 0x43, 0xb7, 0xa4, 0x18, 0x5c, 0x47, }, + { 0xda, 0x45, 0xb8, 0x2e, 0x82, 0x1e, 0xc0, 0x59, 0x77, 0x9d, 0xfa, 0xb4, + 0x1c, 0x5e, 0xa0, 0x2b, 0x33, 0x96, 0x5a, 0x58, }, + { 0xe3, 0x09, 0x05, 0xa9, 0xeb, 0x48, 0x13, 0xad, 0x71, 0x88, 0x81, 0x9a, + 0x3e, 0x2c, 0xe1, 0x23, 0x99, 0x13, 0x35, 0x9f, 0xb5, }, + { 0xb7, 0x86, 0x2d, 0x16, 0xe1, 0x04, 0x00, 0x47, 0x47, 0x61, 0x31, 0xfb, + 0x14, 0xac, 0xd8, 0xe9, 0xe3, 0x49, 0xbd, 0xf7, 0x9c, 0x3f, }, + { 0x7f, 0xd9, 0x95, 0xa8, 0xa7, 0xa0, 0xcc, 0xba, 0xef, 0xb1, 0x0a, 0xa9, + 0x21, 0x62, 0x08, 0x0f, 0x1b, 0xff, 0x7b, 0x9d, 0xae, 0xb2, 0x95, }, + { 0x85, 0x99, 0xea, 0x33, 0xe0, 0x56, 0xff, 0x13, 0xc6, 0x61, 0x8c, 0xf9, + 0x57, 0x05, 0x03, 0x11, 0xf9, 0xfb, 0x3a, 0xf7, 0xce, 0xbb, 0x52, 0x30, }, + { 0xb2, 0x72, 0x9c, 0xf8, 0x77, 0x4e, 0x8f, 0x6b, 0x01, 0x6c, 0xff, 0x4e, + 0x4f, 0x02, 0xd2, 0xbc, 0xeb, 0x51, 0x28, 0x99, 0x50, 0xab, 0xc4, 0x42, + 0xe3, }, + { 0x8b, 0x0a, 0xb5, 0x90, 0x8f, 0xf5, 0x7b, 0xdd, 0xba, 0x47, 0x37, 0xc9, + 0x2a, 0xd5, 0x4b, 0x25, 0x08, 0x8b, 0x02, 0x17, 0xa7, 0x9e, 0x6b, 0x6e, + 0xe3, 0x90, }, + { 0x90, 0xdd, 0xf7, 0x75, 0xa7, 0xa3, 0x99, 0x5e, 0x5b, 0x7d, 0x75, 0xc3, + 0x39, 0x6b, 0xa0, 0xe2, 0x44, 0x53, 0xb1, 0x9e, 0xc8, 0xf1, 0x77, 0x10, + 0x58, 0x06, 0x9a, }, + { 0x99, 0x52, 0xf0, 0x49, 0xa8, 0x8c, 0xec, 0xa6, 0x97, 0x32, 0x13, 0xb5, + 0xf7, 0xa3, 0x8e, 0xfb, 0x4b, 0x59, 0x31, 0x3d, 0x01, 0x59, 0x98, 0x5d, + 0x53, 0x03, 0x1a, 0x39, }, + { 0x9f, 0xe0, 0xc2, 0xe5, 0x5d, 0x93, 0xd6, 0x9b, 0x47, 0x8f, 0x9b, 0xe0, + 0x26, 0x35, 0x84, 0x20, 0x1d, 0xc5, 0x53, 0x10, 0x0f, 0x22, 0xb9, 0xb5, + 0xd4, 0x36, 0xb1, 0xac, 0x73, }, + { 0x30, 0x32, 0x20, 0x3b, 0x10, 0x28, 0xec, 0x1f, 0x4f, 0x9b, 0x47, 0x59, + 0xeb, 0x7b, 0xee, 0x45, 0xfb, 0x0c, 0x49, 0xd8, 0x3d, 0x69, 0xbd, 0x90, + 0x2c, 0xf0, 0x9e, 0x8d, 0xbf, 0xd5, }, + { 0x2a, 0x37, 0x73, 0x7f, 0xf9, 0x96, 0x19, 0xaa, 0x25, 0xd8, 0x13, 0x28, + 0x01, 0x29, 0x89, 0xdf, 0x6e, 0x0c, 0x9b, 0x43, 0x44, 0x51, 0xe9, 0x75, + 0x26, 0x0c, 0xb7, 0x87, 0x66, 0x0b, 0x5f, }, + { 0x23, 0xdf, 0x96, 0x68, 0x91, 0x86, 0xd0, 0x93, 0x55, 0x33, 0x24, 0xf6, + 0xba, 0x08, 0x75, 0x5b, 0x59, 0x11, 0x69, 0xb8, 0xb9, 0xe5, 0x2c, 0x77, + 0x02, 0xf6, 0x47, 0xee, 0x81, 0xdd, 0xb9, 0x06, }, + { 0x9d, }, + { 0x9d, 0x7d, }, + { 0xfd, 0xc3, 0xda, }, + { 0xe8, 0x82, 0xcd, 0x21, }, + { 0xc3, 0x1d, 0x42, 0x4c, 0x74, }, + { 0xe9, 0xda, 0xf1, 0xa2, 0xe5, 0x7c, }, + { 0x52, 0xb8, 0x6f, 0x81, 0x5c, 0x3a, 0x4c, }, + { 0x5b, 0x39, 0x26, 0xfc, 0x92, 0x5e, 0xe0, 0x49, }, + { 0x59, 0xe4, 0x7c, 0x93, 0x1c, 0xf9, 0x28, 0x93, 0xde, }, + { 0xde, 0xdf, 0xb2, 0x43, 0x61, 0x0b, 0x86, 0x16, 0x4c, 0x2e, }, + { 0x14, 0x8f, 0x75, 0x51, 0xaf, 0xb9, 0xee, 0x51, 0x5a, 0xae, 0x23, }, + { 0x43, 0x5f, 0x50, 0xd5, 0x70, 0xb0, 0x5b, 0x87, 0xf5, 0xd9, 0xb3, 0x6d, }, + { 0x66, 0x0a, 0x64, 0x93, 0x79, 0x71, 0x94, 0x40, 0xb7, 0x68, 0x2d, 0xd3, + 0x63, }, + { 0x15, 0x00, 0xc4, 0x0c, 0x7d, 0x1b, 0x10, 0xa9, 0x73, 0x1b, 0x90, 0x6f, + 0xe6, 0xa9, }, + { 0x34, 0x75, 0xf3, 0x86, 0x8f, 0x56, 0xcf, 0x2a, 0x0a, 0xf2, 0x62, 0x0a, + 0xf6, 0x0e, 0x20, }, + { 0xb1, 0xde, 0xc9, 0xf5, 0xdb, 0xf3, 0x2f, 0x4c, 0xd6, 0x41, 0x7d, 0x39, + 0x18, 0x3e, 0xc7, 0xc3, }, + { 0xc5, 0x89, 0xb2, 0xf8, 0xb8, 0xc0, 0xa3, 0xb9, 0x3b, 0x10, 0x6d, 0x7c, + 0x92, 0xfc, 0x7f, 0x34, 0x41, }, + { 0xc4, 0xd8, 0xef, 0xba, 0xef, 0xd2, 0xaa, 0xc5, 0x6c, 0x8e, 0x3e, 0xbb, + 0x12, 0xfc, 0x0f, 0x72, 0xbf, 0x0f, }, + { 0xdd, 0x91, 0xd1, 0x15, 0x9e, 0x7d, 0xf8, 0xc1, 0xb9, 0x14, 0x63, 0x96, + 0xb5, 0xcb, 0x83, 0x1d, 0x35, 0x1c, 0xec, }, + { 0xa9, 0xf8, 0x52, 0xc9, 0x67, 0x76, 0x2b, 0xad, 0xfb, 0xd8, 0x3a, 0xa6, + 0x74, 0x02, 0xae, 0xb8, 0x25, 0x2c, 0x63, 0x49, }, + { 0x77, 0x1f, 0x66, 0x70, 0xfd, 0x50, 0x29, 0xaa, 0xeb, 0xdc, 0xee, 0xba, + 0x75, 0x98, 0xdc, 0x93, 0x12, 0x3f, 0xdc, 0x7c, 0x38, }, + { 0xe2, 0xe1, 0x89, 0x5c, 0x37, 0x38, 0x6a, 0xa3, 0x40, 0xac, 0x3f, 0xb0, + 0xca, 0xfc, 0xa7, 0xf3, 0xea, 0xf9, 0x0f, 0x5d, 0x8e, 0x39, }, + { 0x0f, 0x67, 0xc8, 0x38, 0x01, 0xb1, 0xb7, 0xb8, 0xa2, 0xe7, 0x0a, 0x6d, + 0xd2, 0x63, 0x69, 0x9e, 0xcc, 0xf0, 0xf2, 0xbe, 0x9b, 0x98, 0xdd, }, + { 0x13, 0xe1, 0x36, 0x30, 0xfe, 0xc6, 0x01, 0x8a, 0xa1, 0x63, 0x96, 0x59, + 0xc2, 0xa9, 0x68, 0x3f, 0x58, 0xd4, 0x19, 0x0c, 0x40, 0xf3, 0xde, 0x02, }, + { 0xa3, 0x9e, 0xce, 0xda, 0x42, 0xee, 0x8c, 0x6c, 0x5a, 0x7d, 0xdc, 0x89, + 0x02, 0x77, 0xdd, 0xe7, 0x95, 0xbb, 0xff, 0x0d, 0xa4, 0xb5, 0x38, 0x1e, + 0xaf, }, + { 0x9a, 0xf6, 0xb5, 0x9a, 0x4f, 0xa9, 0x4f, 0x2c, 0x35, 0x3c, 0x24, 0xdc, + 0x97, 0x6f, 0xd9, 0xa1, 0x7d, 0x1a, 0x85, 0x0b, 0xf5, 0xda, 0x2e, 0xe7, + 0xb1, 0x1d, }, + { 0x84, 0x1e, 0x8e, 0x3d, 0x45, 0xa5, 0xf2, 0x27, 0xf3, 0x31, 0xfe, 0xb9, + 0xfb, 0xc5, 0x45, 0x99, 0x99, 0xdd, 0x93, 0x43, 0x02, 0xee, 0x58, 0xaf, + 0xee, 0x6a, 0xbe, }, + { 0x07, 0x2f, 0xc0, 0xa2, 0x04, 0xc4, 0xab, 0x7c, 0x26, 0xbb, 0xa8, 0xd8, + 0xe3, 0x1c, 0x75, 0x15, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x02, 0x6a, 0xf0, 0x86, 0xe9, 0xcd, + 0x5c, 0xef, 0xa3, 0x25, }, + { 0x2f, 0x3b, 0x1f, 0xb5, 0x91, 0x8f, 0x86, 0xe0, 0xdc, 0x31, 0x48, 0xb6, + 0xa1, 0x8c, 0xfd, 0x75, 0xbb, 0x7d, 0x3d, 0xc1, 0xf0, 0x10, 0x9a, 0xd8, + 0x4b, 0x0e, 0xe3, 0x94, 0x9f, }, + { 0x29, 0xbb, 0x8f, 0x6c, 0xd1, 0xf2, 0xb6, 0xaf, 0xe5, 0xe3, 0x2d, 0xdc, + 0x6f, 0xa4, 0x53, 0x88, 0xd8, 0xcf, 0x4d, 0x45, 0x42, 0x62, 0xdb, 0xdf, + 0xf8, 0x45, 0xc2, 0x13, 0xec, 0x35, }, + { 0x06, 0x3c, 0xe3, 0x2c, 0x15, 0xc6, 0x43, 0x03, 0x81, 0xfb, 0x08, 0x76, + 0x33, 0xcb, 0x02, 0xc1, 0xba, 0x33, 0xe5, 0xe0, 0xd1, 0x92, 0xa8, 0x46, + 0x28, 0x3f, 0x3e, 0x9d, 0x2c, 0x44, 0x54, }, + { 0xea, 0xbb, 0x96, 0xf8, 0xd1, 0x8b, 0x04, 0x11, 0x40, 0x78, 0x42, 0x02, + 0x19, 0xd1, 0xbc, 0x65, 0x92, 0xd3, 0xc3, 0xd6, 0xd9, 0x19, 0xe7, 0xc3, + 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0x29, 0x1d, 0x41, + 0x1d, 0xe6, 0x47, 0x8f, 0x8c, 0x2b, 0xea, 0x8f, 0xf0, 0xff, 0x21, 0x70, + 0x88, }, + { 0x12, 0x18, 0x95, 0xa6, 0x59, 0xb1, 0x31, 0x24, 0x45, 0x67, 0x55, 0xa4, + 0x1a, 0x2d, 0x48, 0x67, 0x1b, 0x43, 0x88, 0x2d, 0x8e, 0xa0, 0x70, 0xb3, + 0xc6, 0xbb, }, + { 0xe7, 0xb1, 0x1d, 0xb2, 0x76, 0x4d, 0x68, 0x68, 0x68, 0x23, 0x02, 0x55, + 0x3a, 0xe2, 0xe5, 0xd5, 0x4b, 0x43, 0xf9, 0x34, 0x77, 0x5c, 0xa1, 0xf5, + 0x55, 0xfd, 0x4f, }, + { 0x8c, 0x87, 0x5a, 0x08, 0x3a, 0x73, 0xad, 0x61, 0xe1, 0xe7, 0x99, 0x7e, + 0xf0, 0x5d, 0xe9, 0x5d, 0x16, 0x43, 0x80, 0x2f, 0xd0, 0x66, 0x34, 0xe2, + 0x42, 0x64, 0x3b, 0x1a, }, + { 0x39, 0xc1, 0x99, 0xcf, 0x22, 0xbf, 0x16, 0x8f, 0x9f, 0x80, 0x7f, 0x95, + 0x0a, 0x05, 0x67, 0x27, 0xe7, 0x15, 0xdf, 0x9d, 0xb2, 0xfe, 0x1c, 0xb5, + 0x1d, 0x60, 0x8f, 0x8a, 0x1d, }, + { 0x9b, 0x6e, 0x08, 0x09, 0x06, 0x73, 0xab, 0x68, 0x02, 0x62, 0x1a, 0xe4, + 0xd4, 0xdf, 0xc7, 0x02, 0x4c, 0x6a, 0x5f, 0xfd, 0x23, 0xac, 0xae, 0x6d, + 0x43, 0xa4, 0x7a, 0x50, 0x60, 0x3c, }, + { 0x1d, 0xb4, 0xc6, 0xe1, 0xb1, 0x4b, 0xe3, 0xf2, 0xe2, 0x1a, 0x73, 0x1b, + 0xa0, 0x92, 0xa7, 0xf5, 0xff, 0x8f, 0x8b, 0x5d, 0xdf, 0xa8, 0x04, 0xb3, + 0xb0, 0xf7, 0xcc, 0x12, 0xfa, 0x35, 0x46, }, + { 0x49, 0x45, 0x97, 0x11, 0x0f, 0x1c, 0x60, 0x8e, 0xe8, 0x47, 0x30, 0xcf, + 0x60, 0xa8, 0x71, 0xc5, 0x1b, 0xe9, 0x39, 0x4d, 0x49, 0xb6, 0x12, 0x1f, + 0x24, 0xab, 0x37, 0xff, 0x83, 0xc2, 0xe1, 0x3a, }, + { 0x60, }, + { 0x24, 0x26, }, + { 0x47, 0xeb, 0xc9, }, + { 0x4a, 0xd0, 0xbc, 0xf0, }, + { 0x8e, 0x2b, 0xc9, 0x85, 0x3c, }, + { 0xa2, 0x07, 0x15, 0xb8, 0x12, 0x74, }, + { 0x0f, 0xdb, 0x5b, 0x33, 0x69, 0xfe, 0x4b, }, + { 0xa2, 0x86, 0x54, 0xf4, 0xfd, 0xb2, 0xd4, 0xe6, }, + { 0xbb, 0x84, 0x78, 0x49, 0x27, 0x8e, 0x61, 0xda, 0x60, }, + { 0x04, 0xc3, 0xcd, 0xaa, 0x8f, 0xa7, 0x03, 0xc9, 0xf9, 0xb6, }, + { 0xf8, 0x27, 0x1d, 0x61, 0xdc, 0x21, 0x42, 0xdd, 0xad, 0x92, 0x40, }, + { 0x12, 0x87, 0xdf, 0xc2, 0x41, 0x45, 0x5a, 0x36, 0x48, 0x5b, 0x51, 0x2b, }, + { 0xbb, 0x37, 0x5d, 0x1f, 0xf1, 0x68, 0x7a, 0xc4, 0xa5, 0xd2, 0xa4, 0x91, + 0x8d, }, + { 0x5b, 0x27, 0xd1, 0x04, 0x54, 0x52, 0x9f, 0xa3, 0x47, 0x86, 0x33, 0x33, + 0xbf, 0xa0, }, + { 0xcf, 0x04, 0xea, 0xf8, 0x03, 0x2a, 0x43, 0xff, 0xa6, 0x68, 0x21, 0x4c, + 0xd5, 0x4b, 0xed, }, + { 0xaf, 0xb8, 0xbc, 0x63, 0x0f, 0x18, 0x4d, 0xe2, 0x7a, 0xdd, 0x46, 0x44, + 0xc8, 0x24, 0x0a, 0xb7, }, + { 0x3e, 0xdc, 0x36, 0xe4, 0x89, 0xb1, 0xfa, 0xc6, 0x40, 0x93, 0x2e, 0x75, + 0xb2, 0x15, 0xd1, 0xb1, 0x10, }, + { 0x6c, 0xd8, 0x20, 0x3b, 0x82, 0x79, 0xf9, 0xc8, 0xbc, 0x9d, 0xe0, 0x35, + 0xbe, 0x1b, 0x49, 0x1a, 0xbc, 0x3a, }, + { 0x78, 0x65, 0x2c, 0xbe, 0x35, 0x67, 0xdc, 0x78, 0xd4, 0x41, 0xf6, 0xc9, + 0xde, 0xde, 0x1f, 0x18, 0x13, 0x31, 0x11, }, + { 0x8a, 0x7f, 0xb1, 0x33, 0x8f, 0x0c, 0x3c, 0x0a, 0x06, 0x61, 0xf0, 0x47, + 0x29, 0x1b, 0x29, 0xbc, 0x1c, 0x47, 0xef, 0x7a, }, + { 0x65, 0x91, 0xf1, 0xe6, 0xb3, 0x96, 0xd3, 0x8c, 0xc2, 0x4a, 0x59, 0x35, + 0x72, 0x8e, 0x0b, 0x9a, 0x87, 0xca, 0x34, 0x7b, 0x63, }, + { 0x5f, 0x08, 0x87, 0x80, 0x56, 0x25, 0x89, 0x77, 0x61, 0x8c, 0x64, 0xa1, + 0x59, 0x6d, 0x59, 0x62, 0xe8, 0x4a, 0xc8, 0x58, 0x99, 0xd1, }, + { 0x23, 0x87, 0x1d, 0xed, 0x6f, 0xf2, 0x91, 0x90, 0xe2, 0xfe, 0x43, 0x21, + 0xaf, 0x97, 0xc6, 0xbc, 0xd7, 0x15, 0xc7, 0x2d, 0x08, 0x77, 0x91, }, + { 0x90, 0x47, 0x9a, 0x9e, 0x3a, 0xdf, 0xf3, 0xc9, 0x4c, 0x1e, 0xa7, 0xd4, + 0x6a, 0x32, 0x90, 0xfe, 0xb7, 0xb6, 0x7b, 0xfa, 0x96, 0x61, 0xfb, 0xa4, }, + { 0xb1, 0x67, 0x60, 0x45, 0xb0, 0x96, 0xc5, 0x15, 0x9f, 0x4d, 0x26, 0xd7, + 0x9d, 0xf1, 0xf5, 0x6d, 0x21, 0x00, 0x94, 0x31, 0x64, 0x94, 0xd3, 0xa7, + 0xd3, }, + { 0x02, 0x3e, 0xaf, 0xf3, 0x79, 0x73, 0xa5, 0xf5, 0xcc, 0x7a, 0x7f, 0xfb, + 0x79, 0x2b, 0x85, 0x8c, 0x88, 0x72, 0x06, 0xbe, 0xfe, 0xaf, 0xc1, 0x16, + 0xa6, 0xd6, }, + { 0x2a, 0xb0, 0x1a, 0xe5, 0xaa, 0x6e, 0xb3, 0xae, 0x53, 0x85, 0x33, 0x80, + 0x75, 0xae, 0x30, 0xe6, 0xb8, 0x72, 0x42, 0xf6, 0x25, 0x4f, 0x38, 0x88, + 0x55, 0xd1, 0xa9, }, + { 0x90, 0xd8, 0x0c, 0xc0, 0x93, 0x4b, 0x4f, 0x9e, 0x65, 0x6c, 0xa1, 0x54, + 0xa6, 0xf6, 0x6e, 0xca, 0xd2, 0xbb, 0x7e, 0x6a, 0x1c, 0xd3, 0xce, 0x46, + 0xef, 0xb0, 0x00, 0x8d, }, + { 0xed, 0x9c, 0x49, 0xcd, 0xc2, 0xde, 0x38, 0x0e, 0xe9, 0x98, 0x6c, 0xc8, + 0x90, 0x9e, 0x3c, 0xd4, 0xd3, 0xeb, 0x88, 0x32, 0xc7, 0x28, 0xe3, 0x94, + 0x1c, 0x9f, 0x8b, 0xf3, 0xcb, }, + { 0xac, 0xe7, 0x92, 0x16, 0xb4, 0x14, 0xa0, 0xe4, 0x04, 0x79, 0xa2, 0xf4, + 0x31, 0xe6, 0x0c, 0x26, 0xdc, 0xbf, 0x2f, 0x69, 0x1b, 0x55, 0x94, 0x67, + 0xda, 0x0c, 0xd7, 0x32, 0x1f, 0xef, }, + { 0x68, 0x63, 0x85, 0x57, 0x95, 0x9e, 0x42, 0x27, 0x41, 0x43, 0x42, 0x02, + 0xa5, 0x78, 0xa7, 0xc6, 0x43, 0xc1, 0x6a, 0xba, 0x70, 0x80, 0xcd, 0x04, + 0xb6, 0x78, 0x76, 0x29, 0xf3, 0xe8, 0xa0, }, + { 0xe6, 0xac, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0xf0, 0xc0, 0xf7, 0xf7, 0xe3, 0x3e, 0x4e, 0x28, + 0x0f, 0x59, 0xb2, 0x67, 0x9e, 0x84, 0x34, 0x42, 0x96, 0x30, 0x2b, 0xca, + 0x49, 0xb6, 0xc5, 0x9a, 0x84, 0x59, 0xa7, 0x81, }, + { 0x7e, }, + { 0x1e, 0x21, }, + { 0x26, 0xd3, 0xdd, }, + { 0x2c, 0xd4, 0xb3, 0x3d, }, + { 0x86, 0x7b, 0x76, 0x3c, 0xf0, }, + { 0x12, 0xc3, 0x70, 0x1d, 0x55, 0x18, }, + { 0x96, 0xc2, 0xbd, 0x61, 0x55, 0xf4, 0x24, }, + { 0x20, 0x51, 0xf7, 0x86, 0x58, 0x8f, 0x07, 0x2a, }, + { 0x93, 0x15, 0xa8, 0x1d, 0xda, 0x97, 0xee, 0x0e, 0x6c, }, + { 0x39, 0x93, 0xdf, 0xd5, 0x0e, 0xca, 0xdc, 0x7a, 0x92, 0xce, }, + { 0x60, 0xd5, 0xfd, 0xf5, 0x1b, 0x26, 0x82, 0x26, 0x73, 0x02, 0xbc, }, + { 0x98, 0xf2, 0x34, 0xe1, 0xf5, 0xfb, 0x00, 0xac, 0x10, 0x4a, 0x38, 0x9f, }, + { 0xda, 0x3a, 0x92, 0x8a, 0xd0, 0xcd, 0x12, 0xcd, 0x15, 0xbb, 0xab, 0x77, + 0x66, }, + { 0xa2, 0x92, 0x1a, 0xe5, 0xca, 0x0c, 0x30, 0x75, 0xeb, 0xaf, 0x00, 0x31, + 0x55, 0x66, }, + { 0x06, 0xea, 0xfd, 0x3e, 0x86, 0x38, 0x62, 0x4e, 0xa9, 0x12, 0xa4, 0x12, + 0x43, 0xbf, 0xa1, }, + { 0xe4, 0x71, 0x7b, 0x94, 0xdb, 0xa0, 0xd2, 0xff, 0x9b, 0xeb, 0xad, 0x8e, + 0x95, 0x8a, 0xc5, 0xed, }, + { 0x25, 0x5a, 0x77, 0x71, 0x41, 0x0e, 0x7a, 0xe9, 0xed, 0x0c, 0x10, 0xef, + 0xf6, 0x2b, 0x3a, 0xba, 0x60, }, + { 0xee, 0xe2, 0xa3, 0x67, 0x64, 0x1d, 0xc6, 0x04, 0xc4, 0xe1, 0x68, 0xd2, + 0x6e, 0xd2, 0x91, 0x75, 0x53, 0x07, }, + { 0xe0, 0xf6, 0x4d, 0x8f, 0x68, 0xfc, 0x06, 0x7e, 0x18, 0x79, 0x7f, 0x2b, + 0x6d, 0xef, 0x46, 0x7f, 0xab, 0xb2, 0xad, }, + { 0x3d, 0x35, 0x88, 0x9f, 0x2e, 0xcf, 0x96, 0x45, 0x07, 0x60, 0x71, 0x94, + 0x00, 0x8d, 0xbf, 0xf4, 0xef, 0x46, 0x2e, 0x3c, }, + { 0x43, 0xcf, 0x98, 0xf7, 0x2d, 0xf4, 0x17, 0xe7, 0x8c, 0x05, 0x2d, 0x9b, + 0x24, 0xfb, 0x4d, 0xea, 0x4a, 0xec, 0x01, 0x25, 0x29, }, + { 0x8e, 0x73, 0x9a, 0x78, 0x11, 0xfe, 0x48, 0xa0, 0x3b, 0x1a, 0x26, 0xdf, + 0x25, 0xe9, 0x59, 0x1c, 0x70, 0x07, 0x9f, 0xdc, 0xa0, 0xa6, }, + { 0xe8, 0x47, 0x71, 0xc7, 0x3e, 0xdf, 0xb5, 0x13, 0xb9, 0x85, 0x13, 0xa8, + 0x54, 0x47, 0x6e, 0x59, 0x96, 0x09, 0x13, 0x5f, 0x82, 0x16, 0x0b, }, + { 0xfb, 0xc0, 0x8c, 0x03, 0x21, 0xb3, 0xc4, 0xb5, 0x43, 0x32, 0x6c, 0xea, + 0x7f, 0xa8, 0x43, 0x91, 0xe8, 0x4e, 0x3f, 0xbf, 0x45, 0x58, 0x6a, 0xa3, }, + { 0x55, 0xf8, 0xf3, 0x00, 0x76, 0x09, 0xef, 0x69, 0x5d, 0xd2, 0x8a, 0xf2, + 0x65, 0xc3, 0xcb, 0x9b, 0x43, 0xfd, 0xb1, 0x7e, 0x7f, 0xa1, 0x94, 0xb0, + 0xd7, }, + { 0xaa, 0x13, 0xc1, 0x51, 0x40, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0x4c, 0x0a, 0x95, 0x64, 0x7b, + 0xd1, 0x96, 0xb6, 0x56, 0xb4, 0x5b, 0xcf, 0xd6, 0xd9, 0x15, 0x97, 0xdd, + 0xb6, 0xef, }, + { 0xaf, 0xb7, 0x36, 0xb0, 0x04, 0xdb, 0xd7, 0x9c, 0x9a, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xf6, + 0x1f, 0x12, 0x21, 0x2d, 0x59, 0x30, 0x54, 0xab, 0x27, 0x61, 0xa3, 0x57, + 0xef, 0xf8, 0x53, }, + { 0x97, 0x34, 0x45, 0x3e, 0xce, 0x7c, 0x35, 0xa2, 0xda, 0x9f, 0x4b, 0x46, + 0x6c, 0x11, 0x67, 0xff, 0x2f, 0x76, 0x58, 0x15, 0x71, 0xfa, 0x44, 0x89, + 0x89, 0xfd, 0xf7, 0x99, }, + { 0x1f, 0xb1, 0x62, 0xeb, 0x83, 0xc5, 0x9c, 0x89, 0xf9, 0x2c, 0xd2, 0x03, + 0x61, 0xbc, 0xbb, 0xa5, 0x74, 0x0e, 0x9b, 0x7e, 0x82, 0x3e, 0x70, 0x0a, + 0xa9, 0x8f, 0x2b, 0x59, 0xfb, }, + { 0xf8, 0xca, 0x5e, 0x3a, 0x4f, 0x9e, 0x10, 0x69, 0x10, 0xd5, 0x4c, 0xeb, + 0x1a, 0x0f, 0x3c, 0x6a, 0x98, 0xf5, 0xb0, 0x97, 0x5b, 0x37, 0x2f, 0x0d, + 0xbd, 0x42, 0x4b, 0x69, 0xa1, 0x82, }, + { 0x12, 0x8c, 0x6d, 0x52, 0x08, 0xef, 0x74, 0xb2, 0xe6, 0xaa, 0xd3, 0xb0, + 0x26, 0xb0, 0xd9, 0x94, 0xb6, 0x11, 0x45, 0x0e, 0x36, 0x71, 0x14, 0x2d, + 0x41, 0x8c, 0x21, 0x53, 0x31, 0xe9, 0x68, }, + { 0xee, 0xea, 0x0d, 0x89, 0x47, 0x7e, 0x72, 0xd1, 0xd8, 0xce, 0x58, 0x4c, + 0x94, 0x1f, 0x0d, 0x51, 0x08, 0xa3, 0xb6, 0x3d, 0xe7, 0x82, 0x46, 0x92, + 0xd6, 0x98, 0x6b, 0x07, 0x10, 0x65, 0x52, 0x65, }, +}; + +static const u8 blake2s_hmac_testvecs[][BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] __initconst = { + { 0xce, 0xe1, 0x57, 0x69, 0x82, 0xdc, 0xbf, 0x43, 0xad, 0x56, 0x4c, 0x70, + 0xed, 0x68, 0x16, 0x96, 0xcf, 0xa4, 0x73, 0xe8, 0xe8, 0xfc, 0x32, 0x79, + 0x08, 0x0a, 0x75, 0x82, 0xda, 0x3f, 0x05, 0x11, }, + { 0x77, 0x2f, 0x0c, 0x71, 0x41, 0xf4, 0x4b, 0x2b, 0xb3, 0xc6, 0xb6, 0xf9, + 0x60, 0xde, 0xe4, 0x52, 0x38, 0x66, 0xe8, 0xbf, 0x9b, 0x96, 0xc4, 0x9f, + 0x60, 0xd9, 0x24, 0x37, 0x99, 0xd6, 0xec, 0x31, }, +}; + +bool __init blake2s_selftest(void) +{ + u8 key[BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE]; + u8 buf[ARRAY_SIZE(blake2s_testvecs)]; + u8 hash[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE]; + struct blake2s_state state; + bool success = true; + int i, l; + + key[0] = key[1] = 1; + for (i = 2; i < sizeof(key); ++i) + key[i] = key[i - 2] + key[i - 1]; + + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf); ++i) + buf[i] = (u8)i; + + for (i = l = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(blake2s_testvecs); l = (l + 37) % ++i) { + int outlen = 1 + i % BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE; + int keylen = (13 * i) % (BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE + 1); + + blake2s(hash, buf, key + BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE - keylen, outlen, i, + keylen); + if (memcmp(hash, blake2s_testvecs[i], outlen)) { + pr_err("blake2s self-test %d: FAIL\n", i + 1); + success = false; + } + + if (!keylen) + blake2s_init(&state, outlen); + else + blake2s_init_key(&state, outlen, + key + BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE - keylen, + keylen); + + blake2s_update(&state, buf, l); + blake2s_update(&state, buf + l, i - l); + blake2s_final(&state, hash); + if (memcmp(hash, blake2s_testvecs[i], outlen)) { + pr_err("blake2s init/update/final self-test %d: FAIL\n", + i + 1); + success = false; + } + } + + if (success) { + blake2s256_hmac(hash, buf, key, sizeof(buf), sizeof(key)); + success &= !memcmp(hash, blake2s_hmac_testvecs[0], BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE); + + blake2s256_hmac(hash, key, buf, sizeof(key), sizeof(buf)); + success &= !memcmp(hash, blake2s_hmac_testvecs[1], BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE); + + if (!success) + pr_err("blake2s256_hmac self-test: FAIL\n"); + } + + return success; +} diff --git a/lib/crypto/blake2s.c b/lib/crypto/blake2s.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..4cf856ee80ca --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/crypto/blake2s.c @@ -0,0 +1,115 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR MIT +/* + * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. + * + * This is an implementation of the BLAKE2s hash and PRF functions. + * + * Information: https://blake2.net/ + * + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +bool blake2s_selftest(void); + +void blake2s_update(struct blake2s_state *state, const u8 *in, size_t inlen) +{ + const size_t fill = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE - state->buflen; + + if (unlikely(!inlen)) + return; + if (inlen > fill) { + memcpy(state->buf + state->buflen, in, fill); + blake2s_compress_generic(state, state->buf, 1, + BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE); + state->buflen = 0; + in += fill; + inlen -= fill; + } + if (inlen > BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE) { + const size_t nblocks = DIV_ROUND_UP(inlen, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE); + /* Hash one less (full) block than strictly possible */ + blake2s_compress_generic(state, in, nblocks - 1, + BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE); + in += BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE * (nblocks - 1); + inlen -= BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE * (nblocks - 1); + } + memcpy(state->buf + state->buflen, in, inlen); + state->buflen += inlen; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(blake2s_update); + +void blake2s_final(struct blake2s_state *state, u8 *out) +{ + WARN_ON(IS_ENABLED(DEBUG) && !out); + blake2s_set_lastblock(state); + memset(state->buf + state->buflen, 0, + BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE - state->buflen); /* Padding */ + blake2s_compress_generic(state, state->buf, 1, state->buflen); + cpu_to_le32_array(state->h, ARRAY_SIZE(state->h)); + memcpy(out, state->h, state->outlen); + memzero_explicit(state, sizeof(*state)); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(blake2s_final); + +void blake2s256_hmac(u8 *out, const u8 *in, const u8 *key, const size_t inlen, + const size_t keylen) +{ + struct blake2s_state state; + u8 x_key[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(u32)) = { 0 }; + u8 i_hash[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(u32)); + int i; + + if (keylen > BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE) { + blake2s_init(&state, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE); + blake2s_update(&state, key, keylen); + blake2s_final(&state, x_key); + } else + memcpy(x_key, key, keylen); + + for (i = 0; i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; ++i) + x_key[i] ^= 0x36; + + blake2s_init(&state, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE); + blake2s_update(&state, x_key, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE); + blake2s_update(&state, in, inlen); + blake2s_final(&state, i_hash); + + for (i = 0; i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; ++i) + x_key[i] ^= 0x5c ^ 0x36; + + blake2s_init(&state, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE); + blake2s_update(&state, x_key, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE); + blake2s_update(&state, i_hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE); + blake2s_final(&state, i_hash); + + memcpy(out, i_hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE); + memzero_explicit(x_key, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE); + memzero_explicit(i_hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(blake2s256_hmac); + +static int __init mod_init(void) +{ + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS) && + WARN_ON(!blake2s_selftest())) + return -ENODEV; + return 0; +} + +static void __exit mod_exit(void) +{ +} + +module_init(mod_init); +module_exit(mod_exit); +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2"); +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("BLAKE2s hash function"); +MODULE_AUTHOR("Jason A. Donenfeld "); From c4f48374407b2b5cc57f15e58c6a8ec9dc714cbd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Tue, 11 Jan 2022 14:37:41 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0436/1091] lib/crypto: blake2s: move hmac construction into wireguard commit d8d83d8ab0a453e17e68b3a3bed1f940c34b8646 upstream. Basically nobody should use blake2s in an HMAC construction; it already has a keyed variant. But unfortunately for historical reasons, Noise, used by WireGuard, uses HKDF quite strictly, which means we have to use this. Because this really shouldn't be used by others, this commit moves it into wireguard's noise.c locally, so that kernels that aren't using WireGuard don't get this superfluous code baked in. On m68k systems, this shaves off ~314 bytes. Cc: Herbert Xu Tested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel [Jason: for stable, skip the wireguard changes, since this kernel doesn't have wireguard.] Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/crypto/blake2s.h | 3 --- lib/crypto/blake2s-selftest.c | 31 ----------------------------- lib/crypto/blake2s.c | 37 ----------------------------------- 3 files changed, 71 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/crypto/blake2s.h b/include/crypto/blake2s.h index b471deac28ff..00472cb95ead 100644 --- a/include/crypto/blake2s.h +++ b/include/crypto/blake2s.h @@ -100,7 +100,4 @@ static inline void blake2s(u8 *out, const u8 *in, const u8 *key, blake2s_final(&state, out); } -void blake2s256_hmac(u8 *out, const u8 *in, const u8 *key, const size_t inlen, - const size_t keylen); - #endif /* BLAKE2S_H */ diff --git a/lib/crypto/blake2s-selftest.c b/lib/crypto/blake2s-selftest.c index 79ef404a990d..7a9edc96dddd 100644 --- a/lib/crypto/blake2s-selftest.c +++ b/lib/crypto/blake2s-selftest.c @@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ * #include * * #include - * #include * * #define BLAKE2S_TESTVEC_COUNT 256 * @@ -58,16 +57,6 @@ * } * printf("};\n\n"); * - * printf("static const u8 blake2s_hmac_testvecs[][BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] __initconst = {\n"); - * - * HMAC(EVP_blake2s256(), key, sizeof(key), buf, sizeof(buf), hash, NULL); - * print_vec(hash, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES); - * - * HMAC(EVP_blake2s256(), buf, sizeof(buf), key, sizeof(key), hash, NULL); - * print_vec(hash, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES); - * - * printf("};\n"); - * * return 0; *} */ @@ -554,15 +543,6 @@ static const u8 blake2s_testvecs[][BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] __initconst = { 0xd6, 0x98, 0x6b, 0x07, 0x10, 0x65, 0x52, 0x65, }, }; -static const u8 blake2s_hmac_testvecs[][BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] __initconst = { - { 0xce, 0xe1, 0x57, 0x69, 0x82, 0xdc, 0xbf, 0x43, 0xad, 0x56, 0x4c, 0x70, - 0xed, 0x68, 0x16, 0x96, 0xcf, 0xa4, 0x73, 0xe8, 0xe8, 0xfc, 0x32, 0x79, - 0x08, 0x0a, 0x75, 0x82, 0xda, 0x3f, 0x05, 0x11, }, - { 0x77, 0x2f, 0x0c, 0x71, 0x41, 0xf4, 0x4b, 0x2b, 0xb3, 0xc6, 0xb6, 0xf9, - 0x60, 0xde, 0xe4, 0x52, 0x38, 0x66, 0xe8, 0xbf, 0x9b, 0x96, 0xc4, 0x9f, - 0x60, 0xd9, 0x24, 0x37, 0x99, 0xd6, 0xec, 0x31, }, -}; - bool __init blake2s_selftest(void) { u8 key[BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE]; @@ -607,16 +587,5 @@ bool __init blake2s_selftest(void) } } - if (success) { - blake2s256_hmac(hash, buf, key, sizeof(buf), sizeof(key)); - success &= !memcmp(hash, blake2s_hmac_testvecs[0], BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE); - - blake2s256_hmac(hash, key, buf, sizeof(key), sizeof(buf)); - success &= !memcmp(hash, blake2s_hmac_testvecs[1], BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE); - - if (!success) - pr_err("blake2s256_hmac self-test: FAIL\n"); - } - return success; } diff --git a/lib/crypto/blake2s.c b/lib/crypto/blake2s.c index 4cf856ee80ca..536fce87555b 100644 --- a/lib/crypto/blake2s.c +++ b/lib/crypto/blake2s.c @@ -59,43 +59,6 @@ void blake2s_final(struct blake2s_state *state, u8 *out) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(blake2s_final); -void blake2s256_hmac(u8 *out, const u8 *in, const u8 *key, const size_t inlen, - const size_t keylen) -{ - struct blake2s_state state; - u8 x_key[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(u32)) = { 0 }; - u8 i_hash[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(u32)); - int i; - - if (keylen > BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE) { - blake2s_init(&state, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE); - blake2s_update(&state, key, keylen); - blake2s_final(&state, x_key); - } else - memcpy(x_key, key, keylen); - - for (i = 0; i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; ++i) - x_key[i] ^= 0x36; - - blake2s_init(&state, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE); - blake2s_update(&state, x_key, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE); - blake2s_update(&state, in, inlen); - blake2s_final(&state, i_hash); - - for (i = 0; i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; ++i) - x_key[i] ^= 0x5c ^ 0x36; - - blake2s_init(&state, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE); - blake2s_update(&state, x_key, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE); - blake2s_update(&state, i_hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE); - blake2s_final(&state, i_hash); - - memcpy(out, i_hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE); - memzero_explicit(x_key, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE); - memzero_explicit(i_hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(blake2s256_hmac); - static int __init mod_init(void) { if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS) && From 996fba14fa353f07b44f16ea2590827a4d102fd4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Tue, 11 Jan 2022 18:58:43 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0437/1091] lib/crypto: sha1: re-roll loops to reduce code size commit 9a1536b093bb5bf60689021275fd24d513bb8db0 upstream. With SHA-1 no longer being used for anything performance oriented, and also soon to be phased out entirely, we can make up for the space added by unrolled BLAKE2s by simply re-rolling SHA-1. Since SHA-1 is so much more complex, re-rolling it more or less takes care of the code size added by BLAKE2s. And eventually, hopefully we'll see SHA-1 removed entirely from most small kernel builds. Cc: Herbert Xu Cc: Ard Biesheuvel Tested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- lib/sha1.c | 95 ++++++++---------------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 81 deletions(-) diff --git a/lib/sha1.c b/lib/sha1.c index 1d96d2c02b82..bad46695476b 100644 --- a/lib/sha1.c +++ b/lib/sha1.c @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include /* @@ -55,7 +56,8 @@ #define SHA_ROUND(t, input, fn, constant, A, B, C, D, E) do { \ __u32 TEMP = input(t); setW(t, TEMP); \ E += TEMP + rol32(A,5) + (fn) + (constant); \ - B = ror32(B, 2); } while (0) + B = ror32(B, 2); \ + TEMP = E; E = D; D = C; C = B; B = A; A = TEMP; } while (0) #define T_0_15(t, A, B, C, D, E) SHA_ROUND(t, SHA_SRC, (((C^D)&B)^D) , 0x5a827999, A, B, C, D, E ) #define T_16_19(t, A, B, C, D, E) SHA_ROUND(t, SHA_MIX, (((C^D)&B)^D) , 0x5a827999, A, B, C, D, E ) @@ -82,6 +84,7 @@ void sha_transform(__u32 *digest, const char *data, __u32 *array) { __u32 A, B, C, D, E; + unsigned int i = 0; A = digest[0]; B = digest[1]; @@ -90,94 +93,24 @@ void sha_transform(__u32 *digest, const char *data, __u32 *array) E = digest[4]; /* Round 1 - iterations 0-16 take their input from 'data' */ - T_0_15( 0, A, B, C, D, E); - T_0_15( 1, E, A, B, C, D); - T_0_15( 2, D, E, A, B, C); - T_0_15( 3, C, D, E, A, B); - T_0_15( 4, B, C, D, E, A); - T_0_15( 5, A, B, C, D, E); - T_0_15( 6, E, A, B, C, D); - T_0_15( 7, D, E, A, B, C); - T_0_15( 8, C, D, E, A, B); - T_0_15( 9, B, C, D, E, A); - T_0_15(10, A, B, C, D, E); - T_0_15(11, E, A, B, C, D); - T_0_15(12, D, E, A, B, C); - T_0_15(13, C, D, E, A, B); - T_0_15(14, B, C, D, E, A); - T_0_15(15, A, B, C, D, E); + for (; i < 16; ++i) + T_0_15(i, A, B, C, D, E); /* Round 1 - tail. Input from 512-bit mixing array */ - T_16_19(16, E, A, B, C, D); - T_16_19(17, D, E, A, B, C); - T_16_19(18, C, D, E, A, B); - T_16_19(19, B, C, D, E, A); + for (; i < 20; ++i) + T_16_19(i, A, B, C, D, E); /* Round 2 */ - T_20_39(20, A, B, C, D, E); - T_20_39(21, E, A, B, C, D); - T_20_39(22, D, E, A, B, C); - T_20_39(23, C, D, E, A, B); - T_20_39(24, B, C, D, E, A); - T_20_39(25, A, B, C, D, E); - T_20_39(26, E, A, B, C, D); - T_20_39(27, D, E, A, B, C); - T_20_39(28, C, D, E, A, B); - T_20_39(29, B, C, D, E, A); - T_20_39(30, A, B, C, D, E); - T_20_39(31, E, A, B, C, D); - T_20_39(32, D, E, A, B, C); - T_20_39(33, C, D, E, A, B); - T_20_39(34, B, C, D, E, A); - T_20_39(35, A, B, C, D, E); - T_20_39(36, E, A, B, C, D); - T_20_39(37, D, E, A, B, C); - T_20_39(38, C, D, E, A, B); - T_20_39(39, B, C, D, E, A); + for (; i < 40; ++i) + T_20_39(i, A, B, C, D, E); /* Round 3 */ - T_40_59(40, A, B, C, D, E); - T_40_59(41, E, A, B, C, D); - T_40_59(42, D, E, A, B, C); - T_40_59(43, C, D, E, A, B); - T_40_59(44, B, C, D, E, A); - T_40_59(45, A, B, C, D, E); - T_40_59(46, E, A, B, C, D); - T_40_59(47, D, E, A, B, C); - T_40_59(48, C, D, E, A, B); - T_40_59(49, B, C, D, E, A); - T_40_59(50, A, B, C, D, E); - T_40_59(51, E, A, B, C, D); - T_40_59(52, D, E, A, B, C); - T_40_59(53, C, D, E, A, B); - T_40_59(54, B, C, D, E, A); - T_40_59(55, A, B, C, D, E); - T_40_59(56, E, A, B, C, D); - T_40_59(57, D, E, A, B, C); - T_40_59(58, C, D, E, A, B); - T_40_59(59, B, C, D, E, A); + for (; i < 60; ++i) + T_40_59(i, A, B, C, D, E); /* Round 4 */ - T_60_79(60, A, B, C, D, E); - T_60_79(61, E, A, B, C, D); - T_60_79(62, D, E, A, B, C); - T_60_79(63, C, D, E, A, B); - T_60_79(64, B, C, D, E, A); - T_60_79(65, A, B, C, D, E); - T_60_79(66, E, A, B, C, D); - T_60_79(67, D, E, A, B, C); - T_60_79(68, C, D, E, A, B); - T_60_79(69, B, C, D, E, A); - T_60_79(70, A, B, C, D, E); - T_60_79(71, E, A, B, C, D); - T_60_79(72, D, E, A, B, C); - T_60_79(73, C, D, E, A, B); - T_60_79(74, B, C, D, E, A); - T_60_79(75, A, B, C, D, E); - T_60_79(76, E, A, B, C, D); - T_60_79(77, D, E, A, B, C); - T_60_79(78, C, D, E, A, B); - T_60_79(79, B, C, D, E, A); + for (; i < 80; ++i) + T_60_79(i, A, B, C, D, E); digest[0] += A; digest[1] += B; From 927fc225af29b50847fb6fe8d9294fdd7f4febc9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Arnd Bergmann Date: Fri, 7 Sep 2018 11:10:23 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0438/1091] compat_ioctl: remove /dev/random commands commit 507e4e2b430b6a27b66f4745564ecaee7967737f upstream. These are all handled by the random driver, so instead of listing each ioctl, we can use the generic compat_ptr_ioctl() helper. Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 1 + fs/compat_ioctl.c | 7 ------- 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 19bfbaf13598..812a6013cc16 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -2190,6 +2190,7 @@ const struct file_operations random_fops = { .write = random_write, .poll = random_poll, .unlocked_ioctl = random_ioctl, + .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl, .fasync = random_fasync, .llseek = noop_llseek, }; diff --git a/fs/compat_ioctl.c b/fs/compat_ioctl.c index e0226b2138d6..8fcc53d83af2 100644 --- a/fs/compat_ioctl.c +++ b/fs/compat_ioctl.c @@ -808,13 +808,6 @@ COMPATIBLE_IOCTL(WDIOC_SETTIMEOUT) COMPATIBLE_IOCTL(WDIOC_GETTIMEOUT) COMPATIBLE_IOCTL(WDIOC_SETPRETIMEOUT) COMPATIBLE_IOCTL(WDIOC_GETPRETIMEOUT) -/* Big R */ -COMPATIBLE_IOCTL(RNDGETENTCNT) -COMPATIBLE_IOCTL(RNDADDTOENTCNT) -COMPATIBLE_IOCTL(RNDGETPOOL) -COMPATIBLE_IOCTL(RNDADDENTROPY) -COMPATIBLE_IOCTL(RNDZAPENTCNT) -COMPATIBLE_IOCTL(RNDCLEARPOOL) /* Bluetooth */ COMPATIBLE_IOCTL(HCIDEVUP) COMPATIBLE_IOCTL(HCIDEVDOWN) From 69ef3109d42238fc89bb3ce9231f4c86c499796c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2019 18:24:55 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0439/1091] random: don't forget compat_ioctl on urandom commit 4aa37c463764052c68c5c430af2a67b5d784c1e0 upstream. Recently, there's been some compat ioctl cleanup, in which large hardcoded lists were replaced with compat_ptr_ioctl. One of these changes involved removing the random.c hardcoded list entries and adding a compat ioctl function pointer to the random.c fops. In the process, urandom was forgotten about, so this commit fixes that oversight. Fixes: 507e4e2b430b ("compat_ioctl: remove /dev/random commands") Cc: Arnd Bergmann Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191217172455.186395-1-Jason@zx2c4.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 812a6013cc16..1a281eeaa365 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -2199,6 +2199,7 @@ const struct file_operations urandom_fops = { .read = urandom_read, .write = random_write, .unlocked_ioctl = random_ioctl, + .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl, .fasync = random_fasync, .llseek = noop_llseek, }; From 69441ba56f137c2457e3b8488f51d4b6e36d1694 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andy Lutomirski Date: Mon, 23 Dec 2019 00:20:44 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 0440/1091] random: Don't wake crng_init_wait when crng_init == 1 commit 4c8d062186d9923c09488716b2fb1b829b5b8006 upstream. crng_init_wait is only used to wayt for crng_init to be set to 2, so there's no point to waking it when crng_init is set to 1. Remove the unnecessary wake_up_interruptible() call. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/6fbc0bfcbfc1fa2c76fd574f5b6f552b11be7fde.1577088521.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 1a281eeaa365..db3fdaf48bf2 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -999,7 +999,6 @@ static size_t crng_fast_load(const char *cp, size_t len) if (crng_init_cnt >= CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) { invalidate_batched_entropy(); crng_init = 1; - wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait); pr_notice("random: fast init done\n"); } return ret; From 479d39707ff74ddf46de49b92ec997d0fd710b06 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andy Lutomirski Date: Mon, 23 Dec 2019 00:20:45 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 0441/1091] random: Add a urandom_read_nowait() for random APIs that don't warn commit c6f1deb158789abba02a7eba600747843eeb3a57 upstream. /dev/random and getrandom() never warn. Split the meat of urandom_read() into urandom_read_nowarn() and leave the warning code in urandom_read(). This has no effect on kernel behavior, but it makes subsequent patches more straightforward. It also makes the fact that getrandom() never warns more obvious. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/c87ab200588de746431d9f916501ef11e5242b13.1577088521.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 21 +++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index db3fdaf48bf2..57bfd79868e9 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -2042,12 +2042,23 @@ random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos) return _random_read(file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK, buf, nbytes); } +static ssize_t +urandom_read_nowarn(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, + loff_t *ppos) +{ + int ret; + + nbytes = min_t(size_t, nbytes, INT_MAX >> (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3)); + ret = extract_crng_user(buf, nbytes); + trace_urandom_read(8 * nbytes, 0, ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool)); + return ret; +} + static ssize_t urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos) { unsigned long flags; static int maxwarn = 10; - int ret; if (!crng_ready() && maxwarn > 0) { maxwarn--; @@ -2059,10 +2070,8 @@ urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos) crng_init_cnt = 0; spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags); } - nbytes = min_t(size_t, nbytes, INT_MAX >> (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3)); - ret = extract_crng_user(buf, nbytes); - trace_urandom_read(8 * nbytes, 0, ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool)); - return ret; + + return urandom_read_nowarn(file, buf, nbytes, ppos); } static __poll_t @@ -2224,7 +2233,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count, if (unlikely(ret)) return ret; } - return urandom_read(NULL, buf, count, NULL); + return urandom_read_nowarn(NULL, buf, count, NULL); } /******************************************************************** From 7f9f864af02180f130ed4c34eed14c642c26ea9b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andy Lutomirski Date: Mon, 23 Dec 2019 00:20:46 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 0442/1091] random: add GRND_INSECURE to return best-effort non-cryptographic bytes commit 75551dbf112c992bc6c99a972990b3f272247e23 upstream. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/d5473b56cf1fa900ca4bd2b3fc1e5b8874399919.1577088521.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 11 +++++++++-- include/uapi/linux/random.h | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 57bfd79868e9..8b061dfb1950 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -2217,7 +2217,14 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count, { int ret; - if (flags & ~(GRND_NONBLOCK|GRND_RANDOM)) + if (flags & ~(GRND_NONBLOCK|GRND_RANDOM|GRND_INSECURE)) + return -EINVAL; + + /* + * Requesting insecure and blocking randomness at the same time makes + * no sense. + */ + if ((flags & (GRND_INSECURE|GRND_RANDOM)) == (GRND_INSECURE|GRND_RANDOM)) return -EINVAL; if (count > INT_MAX) @@ -2226,7 +2233,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count, if (flags & GRND_RANDOM) return _random_read(flags & GRND_NONBLOCK, buf, count); - if (!crng_ready()) { + if (!(flags & GRND_INSECURE) && !crng_ready()) { if (flags & GRND_NONBLOCK) return -EAGAIN; ret = wait_for_random_bytes(); diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/random.h b/include/uapi/linux/random.h index 26ee91300e3e..c092d20088d3 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/random.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/random.h @@ -49,8 +49,10 @@ struct rand_pool_info { * * GRND_NONBLOCK Don't block and return EAGAIN instead * GRND_RANDOM Use the /dev/random pool instead of /dev/urandom + * GRND_INSECURE Return non-cryptographic random bytes */ #define GRND_NONBLOCK 0x0001 #define GRND_RANDOM 0x0002 +#define GRND_INSECURE 0x0004 #endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_RANDOM_H */ From c4edc1055c1171f0d84183eb70f855bd3346e0e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andy Lutomirski Date: Mon, 23 Dec 2019 00:20:47 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 0443/1091] random: ignore GRND_RANDOM in getentropy(2) commit 48446f198f9adcb499b30332488dfd5bc3f176f6 upstream. The separate blocking pool is going away. Start by ignoring GRND_RANDOM in getentropy(2). This should not materially break any API. Any code that worked without this change should work at least as well with this change. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/705c5a091b63cc5da70c99304bb97e0109be0a26.1577088521.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 3 --- include/uapi/linux/random.h | 2 +- 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 8b061dfb1950..79d37a48a983 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -2230,9 +2230,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count, if (count > INT_MAX) count = INT_MAX; - if (flags & GRND_RANDOM) - return _random_read(flags & GRND_NONBLOCK, buf, count); - if (!(flags & GRND_INSECURE) && !crng_ready()) { if (flags & GRND_NONBLOCK) return -EAGAIN; diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/random.h b/include/uapi/linux/random.h index c092d20088d3..dcc1b3e6106f 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/random.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/random.h @@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ struct rand_pool_info { * Flags for getrandom(2) * * GRND_NONBLOCK Don't block and return EAGAIN instead - * GRND_RANDOM Use the /dev/random pool instead of /dev/urandom + * GRND_RANDOM No effect * GRND_INSECURE Return non-cryptographic random bytes */ #define GRND_NONBLOCK 0x0001 From 940cbc47b3695a8600bcfd4e2b602ef38c23e102 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andy Lutomirski Date: Mon, 23 Dec 2019 00:20:48 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 0444/1091] random: make /dev/random be almost like /dev/urandom commit 30c08efec8884fb106b8e57094baa51bb4c44e32 upstream. This patch changes the read semantics of /dev/random to be the same as /dev/urandom except that reads will block until the CRNG is ready. None of the cleanups that this enables have been done yet. As a result, this gives a warning about an unused function. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/5e6ac8831c6cf2e56a7a4b39616d1732b2bdd06c.1577088521.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 54 +++++++++++-------------------------------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 79d37a48a983..5aabff94270a 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -354,7 +354,6 @@ #define INPUT_POOL_WORDS (1 << (INPUT_POOL_SHIFT-5)) #define OUTPUT_POOL_SHIFT 10 #define OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS (1 << (OUTPUT_POOL_SHIFT-5)) -#define SEC_XFER_SIZE 512 #define EXTRACT_SIZE 10 @@ -804,7 +803,6 @@ retry: if (entropy_bits >= random_read_wakeup_bits && wq_has_sleeper(&random_read_wait)) { wake_up_interruptible(&random_read_wait); - kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN); } /* If the input pool is getting full, and the blocking * pool has room, send some entropy to the blocking @@ -2005,43 +2003,6 @@ void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk) } #endif -static ssize_t -_random_read(int nonblock, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes) -{ - ssize_t n; - - if (nbytes == 0) - return 0; - - nbytes = min_t(size_t, nbytes, SEC_XFER_SIZE); - while (1) { - n = extract_entropy_user(&blocking_pool, buf, nbytes); - if (n < 0) - return n; - trace_random_read(n*8, (nbytes-n)*8, - ENTROPY_BITS(&blocking_pool), - ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool)); - if (n > 0) - return n; - - /* Pool is (near) empty. Maybe wait and retry. */ - if (nonblock) - return -EAGAIN; - - wait_event_interruptible(random_read_wait, - blocking_pool.initialized && - (ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) >= random_read_wakeup_bits)); - if (signal_pending(current)) - return -ERESTARTSYS; - } -} - -static ssize_t -random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos) -{ - return _random_read(file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK, buf, nbytes); -} - static ssize_t urandom_read_nowarn(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos) @@ -2074,15 +2035,26 @@ urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos) return urandom_read_nowarn(file, buf, nbytes, ppos); } +static ssize_t +random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos) +{ + int ret; + + ret = wait_for_random_bytes(); + if (ret != 0) + return ret; + return urandom_read_nowarn(file, buf, nbytes, ppos); +} + static __poll_t random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table * wait) { __poll_t mask; - poll_wait(file, &random_read_wait, wait); + poll_wait(file, &crng_init_wait, wait); poll_wait(file, &random_write_wait, wait); mask = 0; - if (ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) >= random_read_wakeup_bits) + if (crng_ready()) mask |= EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM; if (ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) < random_write_wakeup_bits) mask |= EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM; From a9564e14c6dda49a64654ca589d57c3252b8bbaf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andy Lutomirski Date: Mon, 23 Dec 2019 00:20:49 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 0445/1091] random: remove the blocking pool commit 90ea1c6436d26e62496616fb5891e00819ff4849 upstream. There is no longer any interface to read data from the blocking pool, so remove it. This enables quite a bit of code deletion, much of which will be done in subsequent patches. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/511225a224bf0a291149d3c0b8b45393cd03ab96.1577088521.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 106 ------------------------------------------ 1 file changed, 106 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 5aabff94270a..54d1f8408ae5 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -470,7 +470,6 @@ static const struct poolinfo { /* * Static global variables */ -static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_read_wait); static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_write_wait); static struct fasync_struct *fasync; @@ -531,7 +530,6 @@ struct entropy_store { __u32 *pool; const char *name; struct entropy_store *pull; - struct work_struct push_work; /* read-write data: */ unsigned long last_pulled; @@ -550,9 +548,7 @@ static ssize_t _extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf, size_t nbytes, int fips); static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r); -static void push_to_pool(struct work_struct *work); static __u32 input_pool_data[INPUT_POOL_WORDS] __latent_entropy; -static __u32 blocking_pool_data[OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS] __latent_entropy; static struct entropy_store input_pool = { .poolinfo = &poolinfo_table[0], @@ -561,16 +557,6 @@ static struct entropy_store input_pool = { .pool = input_pool_data }; -static struct entropy_store blocking_pool = { - .poolinfo = &poolinfo_table[1], - .name = "blocking", - .pull = &input_pool, - .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(blocking_pool.lock), - .pool = blocking_pool_data, - .push_work = __WORK_INITIALIZER(blocking_pool.push_work, - push_to_pool), -}; - static __u32 const twist_table[8] = { 0x00000000, 0x3b6e20c8, 0x76dc4190, 0x4db26158, 0xedb88320, 0xd6d6a3e8, 0x9b64c2b0, 0xa00ae278 }; @@ -766,15 +752,11 @@ retry: entropy_count = 0; } else if (entropy_count > pool_size) entropy_count = pool_size; - if ((r == &blocking_pool) && !r->initialized && - (entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT) > 128) - has_initialized = 1; if (cmpxchg(&r->entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig) goto retry; if (has_initialized) { r->initialized = 1; - wake_up_interruptible(&random_read_wait); kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN); } @@ -783,7 +765,6 @@ retry: if (r == &input_pool) { int entropy_bits = entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT; - struct entropy_store *other = &blocking_pool; if (crng_init < 2) { if (entropy_bits < 128) @@ -791,27 +772,6 @@ retry: crng_reseed(&primary_crng, r); entropy_bits = r->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT; } - - /* initialize the blocking pool if necessary */ - if (entropy_bits >= random_read_wakeup_bits && - !other->initialized) { - schedule_work(&other->push_work); - return; - } - - /* should we wake readers? */ - if (entropy_bits >= random_read_wakeup_bits && - wq_has_sleeper(&random_read_wait)) { - wake_up_interruptible(&random_read_wait); - } - /* If the input pool is getting full, and the blocking - * pool has room, send some entropy to the blocking - * pool. - */ - if (!work_pending(&other->push_work) && - (ENTROPY_BITS(r) > 6 * r->poolinfo->poolbytes) && - (ENTROPY_BITS(other) <= 6 * other->poolinfo->poolbytes)) - schedule_work(&other->push_work); } } @@ -1442,22 +1402,6 @@ static void _xfer_secondary_pool(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes) credit_entropy_bits(r, bytes*8); } -/* - * Used as a workqueue function so that when the input pool is getting - * full, we can "spill over" some entropy to the output pools. That - * way the output pools can store some of the excess entropy instead - * of letting it go to waste. - */ -static void push_to_pool(struct work_struct *work) -{ - struct entropy_store *r = container_of(work, struct entropy_store, - push_work); - BUG_ON(!r); - _xfer_secondary_pool(r, random_read_wakeup_bits/8); - trace_push_to_pool(r->name, r->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT, - r->pull->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT); -} - /* * This function decides how many bytes to actually take from the * given pool, and also debits the entropy count accordingly. @@ -1636,54 +1580,6 @@ static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf, return _extract_entropy(r, buf, nbytes, fips_enabled); } -/* - * This function extracts randomness from the "entropy pool", and - * returns it in a userspace buffer. - */ -static ssize_t extract_entropy_user(struct entropy_store *r, void __user *buf, - size_t nbytes) -{ - ssize_t ret = 0, i; - __u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE]; - int large_request = (nbytes > 256); - - trace_extract_entropy_user(r->name, nbytes, ENTROPY_BITS(r), _RET_IP_); - if (!r->initialized && r->pull) { - xfer_secondary_pool(r, ENTROPY_BITS(r->pull)/8); - if (!r->initialized) - return 0; - } - xfer_secondary_pool(r, nbytes); - nbytes = account(r, nbytes, 0, 0); - - while (nbytes) { - if (large_request && need_resched()) { - if (signal_pending(current)) { - if (ret == 0) - ret = -ERESTARTSYS; - break; - } - schedule(); - } - - extract_buf(r, tmp); - i = min_t(int, nbytes, EXTRACT_SIZE); - if (copy_to_user(buf, tmp, i)) { - ret = -EFAULT; - break; - } - - nbytes -= i; - buf += i; - ret += i; - } - - /* Wipe data just returned from memory */ - memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); - - return ret; -} - #define warn_unseeded_randomness(previous) \ _warn_unseeded_randomness(__func__, (void *) _RET_IP_, (previous)) @@ -1974,7 +1870,6 @@ static void __init init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r) int __init rand_initialize(void) { init_std_data(&input_pool); - init_std_data(&blocking_pool); if (crng_need_final_init) crng_finalize_init(&primary_crng); crng_initialize(&primary_crng); @@ -2145,7 +2040,6 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; input_pool.entropy_count = 0; - blocking_pool.entropy_count = 0; return 0; case RNDRESEEDCRNG: if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) From ec134003cc39216302878f747ba8befec8cd8a00 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andy Lutomirski Date: Mon, 23 Dec 2019 00:20:50 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 0446/1091] random: delete code to pull data into pools commit 84df7cdfbb215a34657b39f4257dab739efa2df9 upstream. There is no pool that pulls, so it was just dead code. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/4a05fe0c7a5c831389ef4aea51d24528ac8682c7.1577088521.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 40 ---------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 40 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 54d1f8408ae5..a5643d78f72f 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -529,10 +529,8 @@ struct entropy_store { const struct poolinfo *poolinfo; __u32 *pool; const char *name; - struct entropy_store *pull; /* read-write data: */ - unsigned long last_pulled; spinlock_t lock; unsigned short add_ptr; unsigned short input_rotate; @@ -1367,41 +1365,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_disk_randomness); * *********************************************************************/ -/* - * This utility inline function is responsible for transferring entropy - * from the primary pool to the secondary extraction pool. We make - * sure we pull enough for a 'catastrophic reseed'. - */ -static void _xfer_secondary_pool(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes); -static void xfer_secondary_pool(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes) -{ - if (!r->pull || - r->entropy_count >= (nbytes << (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3)) || - r->entropy_count > r->poolinfo->poolfracbits) - return; - - _xfer_secondary_pool(r, nbytes); -} - -static void _xfer_secondary_pool(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes) -{ - __u32 tmp[OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS]; - - int bytes = nbytes; - - /* pull at least as much as a wakeup */ - bytes = max_t(int, bytes, random_read_wakeup_bits / 8); - /* but never more than the buffer size */ - bytes = min_t(int, bytes, sizeof(tmp)); - - trace_xfer_secondary_pool(r->name, bytes * 8, nbytes * 8, - ENTROPY_BITS(r), ENTROPY_BITS(r->pull)); - bytes = extract_entropy(r->pull, tmp, bytes, - random_read_wakeup_bits / 8, 0); - mix_pool_bytes(r, tmp, bytes); - credit_entropy_bits(r, bytes*8); -} - /* * This function decides how many bytes to actually take from the * given pool, and also debits the entropy count accordingly. @@ -1565,7 +1528,6 @@ static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf, spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags); trace_extract_entropy(r->name, EXTRACT_SIZE, ENTROPY_BITS(r), _RET_IP_); - xfer_secondary_pool(r, EXTRACT_SIZE); extract_buf(r, tmp); spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags); memcpy(r->last_data, tmp, EXTRACT_SIZE); @@ -1574,7 +1536,6 @@ static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf, } trace_extract_entropy(r->name, nbytes, ENTROPY_BITS(r), _RET_IP_); - xfer_secondary_pool(r, nbytes); nbytes = account(r, nbytes, min, reserved); return _extract_entropy(r, buf, nbytes, fips_enabled); @@ -1846,7 +1807,6 @@ static void __init init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r) ktime_t now = ktime_get_real(); unsigned long rv; - r->last_pulled = jiffies; mix_pool_bytes(r, &now, sizeof(now)); for (i = r->poolinfo->poolbytes; i > 0; i -= sizeof(rv)) { if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) && From 4431c366fe2320d8510053c5f3b9410b0a2c51ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andy Lutomirski Date: Mon, 23 Dec 2019 00:20:51 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 0447/1091] random: remove kernel.random.read_wakeup_threshold commit c95ea0c69ffda19381c116db2be23c7e654dac98 upstream. It has no effect any more, so remove it. We can revert this if there is some user code that expects to be able to set this sysctl. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/a74ed2cf0b5a5451428a246a9239f5bc4e29358f.1577088521.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 18 +----------------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index a5643d78f72f..91482f72c40e 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -369,12 +369,6 @@ #define ENTROPY_SHIFT 3 #define ENTROPY_BITS(r) ((r)->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT) -/* - * The minimum number of bits of entropy before we wake up a read on - * /dev/random. Should be enough to do a significant reseed. - */ -static int random_read_wakeup_bits = 64; - /* * If the entropy count falls under this number of bits, then we * should wake up processes which are selecting or polling on write @@ -2076,8 +2070,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count, #include -static int min_read_thresh = 8, min_write_thresh; -static int max_read_thresh = OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS * 32; +static int min_write_thresh; static int max_write_thresh = INPUT_POOL_WORDS * 32; static int random_min_urandom_seed = 60; static char sysctl_bootid[16]; @@ -2152,15 +2145,6 @@ struct ctl_table random_table[] = { .proc_handler = proc_do_entropy, .data = &input_pool.entropy_count, }, - { - .procname = "read_wakeup_threshold", - .data = &random_read_wakeup_bits, - .maxlen = sizeof(int), - .mode = 0644, - .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, - .extra1 = &min_read_thresh, - .extra2 = &max_read_thresh, - }, { .procname = "write_wakeup_threshold", .data = &random_write_wakeup_bits, From 9f757cad20b7b809e2c6e97728ea370333a797c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yangtao Li Date: Tue, 7 Jan 2020 16:10:28 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 0448/1091] random: remove unnecessary unlikely() commit 870e05b1b18814911cb2703a977f447cb974f0f9 upstream. WARN_ON() already contains an unlikely(), so it's not necessary to use unlikely. Signed-off-by: Yangtao Li Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190607182517.28266-1-tiny.windzz@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 6 ++---- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 91482f72c40e..22c76e8732d1 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -737,10 +737,9 @@ retry: } while (unlikely(entropy_count < pool_size-2 && pnfrac)); } - if (unlikely(entropy_count < 0)) { + if (WARN_ON(entropy_count < 0)) { pr_warn("random: negative entropy/overflow: pool %s count %d\n", r->name, entropy_count); - WARN_ON(1); entropy_count = 0; } else if (entropy_count > pool_size) entropy_count = pool_size; @@ -1384,10 +1383,9 @@ retry: if (ibytes < min) ibytes = 0; - if (unlikely(entropy_count < 0)) { + if (WARN_ON(entropy_count < 0)) { pr_warn("random: negative entropy count: pool %s count %d\n", r->name, entropy_count); - WARN_ON(1); entropy_count = 0; } nfrac = ibytes << (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3); From f3375cfe31bc6e74189cdfa6276e7f6266c82c20 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yangtao Li Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2019 14:25:14 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 0449/1091] random: convert to ENTROPY_BITS for better code readability commit 12faac30d157970fdbfa171bbeb1fb88350303b1 upstream. Signed-off-by: Yangtao Li Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190607182517.28266-2-tiny.windzz@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 22c76e8732d1..0e6541659007 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -761,7 +761,7 @@ retry: if (entropy_bits < 128) return; crng_reseed(&primary_crng, r); - entropy_bits = r->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT; + entropy_bits = ENTROPY_BITS(r); } } } @@ -1398,8 +1398,7 @@ retry: goto retry; trace_debit_entropy(r->name, 8 * ibytes); - if (ibytes && - (r->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT) < random_write_wakeup_bits) { + if (ibytes && ENTROPY_BITS(r) < random_write_wakeup_bits) { wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait); kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT); } From 2c53d6d6a7be2b2b719cef7df9074b5fae5d4bca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yangtao Li Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2019 14:25:15 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 0450/1091] random: Add and use pr_fmt() commit 12cd53aff5ea0359b1dac91fcd9ddc7b9e646588 upstream. Prefix all printk/pr_ messages with "random: " to make the logging a bit more consistent. Miscellanea: o Convert a printks to pr_notice o Whitespace to align to open parentheses o Remove embedded "random: " from pr_* as pr_fmt adds it Signed-off-by: Yangtao Li Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190607182517.28266-3-tiny.windzz@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 21 ++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 0e6541659007..3bd7a77069a2 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -307,6 +307,8 @@ * Eastlake, Steve Crocker, and Jeff Schiller. */ +#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt + #include #include #include @@ -738,7 +740,7 @@ retry: } if (WARN_ON(entropy_count < 0)) { - pr_warn("random: negative entropy/overflow: pool %s count %d\n", + pr_warn("negative entropy/overflow: pool %s count %d\n", r->name, entropy_count); entropy_count = 0; } else if (entropy_count > pool_size) @@ -834,7 +836,7 @@ static void crng_initialize(struct crng_state *crng) invalidate_batched_entropy(); numa_crng_init(); crng_init = 2; - pr_notice("random: crng done (trusting CPU's manufacturer)\n"); + pr_notice("crng done (trusting CPU's manufacturer)\n"); } crng->init_time = jiffies - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL - 1; } @@ -858,14 +860,12 @@ static void crng_finalize_init(struct crng_state *crng) kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN); pr_notice("crng init done\n"); if (unseeded_warning.missed) { - pr_notice("random: %d get_random_xx warning(s) missed " - "due to ratelimiting\n", + pr_notice("%d get_random_xx warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n", unseeded_warning.missed); unseeded_warning.missed = 0; } if (urandom_warning.missed) { - pr_notice("random: %d urandom warning(s) missed " - "due to ratelimiting\n", + pr_notice("%d urandom warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n", urandom_warning.missed); urandom_warning.missed = 0; } @@ -948,7 +948,7 @@ static size_t crng_fast_load(const char *cp, size_t len) if (crng_init_cnt >= CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) { invalidate_batched_entropy(); crng_init = 1; - pr_notice("random: fast init done\n"); + pr_notice("fast init done\n"); } return ret; } @@ -1384,7 +1384,7 @@ retry: ibytes = 0; if (WARN_ON(entropy_count < 0)) { - pr_warn("random: negative entropy count: pool %s count %d\n", + pr_warn("negative entropy count: pool %s count %d\n", r->name, entropy_count); entropy_count = 0; } @@ -1870,9 +1870,8 @@ urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos) if (!crng_ready() && maxwarn > 0) { maxwarn--; if (__ratelimit(&urandom_warning)) - printk(KERN_NOTICE "random: %s: uninitialized " - "urandom read (%zd bytes read)\n", - current->comm, nbytes); + pr_notice("%s: uninitialized urandom read (%zd bytes read)\n", + current->comm, nbytes); spin_lock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags); crng_init_cnt = 0; spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags); From 898498bb4414ebcaff689e5ced6c9b4ff80fa1f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yangtao Li Date: Tue, 7 Jan 2020 16:55:34 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 0451/1091] random: fix typo in add_timer_randomness() commit 727d499a6f4f29b6abdb635032f5e53e5905aedb upstream. s/entimate/estimate Signed-off-by: Yangtao Li Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190607182517.28266-4-tiny.windzz@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 3bd7a77069a2..5ce31f02467a 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -1215,7 +1215,7 @@ static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned num) /* * delta is now minimum absolute delta. * Round down by 1 bit on general principles, - * and limit entropy entimate to 12 bits. + * and limit entropy estimate to 12 bits. */ credit_entropy_bits(r, min_t(int, fls(delta>>1), 11)); } From c070b07aaf34c3222b2b498c68c8c429958318b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yangtao Li Date: Tue, 7 Jan 2020 16:56:11 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 0452/1091] random: remove some dead code of poolinfo commit 09a6d00a42ce0e63e2a15be3d070974bcc656ec7 upstream. Since it is not being used, so delete it. Signed-off-by: Yangtao Li Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190607182517.28266-5-tiny.windzz@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 30 ------------------------------ 1 file changed, 30 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 5ce31f02467a..628bd61f9031 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -431,36 +431,6 @@ static const struct poolinfo { /* was: x^128 + x^103 + x^76 + x^51 +x^25 + x + 1 */ /* x^128 + x^104 + x^76 + x^51 +x^25 + x + 1 */ { S(128), 104, 76, 51, 25, 1 }, - /* was: x^32 + x^26 + x^20 + x^14 + x^7 + x + 1 */ - /* x^32 + x^26 + x^19 + x^14 + x^7 + x + 1 */ - { S(32), 26, 19, 14, 7, 1 }, -#if 0 - /* x^2048 + x^1638 + x^1231 + x^819 + x^411 + x + 1 -- 115 */ - { S(2048), 1638, 1231, 819, 411, 1 }, - - /* x^1024 + x^817 + x^615 + x^412 + x^204 + x + 1 -- 290 */ - { S(1024), 817, 615, 412, 204, 1 }, - - /* x^1024 + x^819 + x^616 + x^410 + x^207 + x^2 + 1 -- 115 */ - { S(1024), 819, 616, 410, 207, 2 }, - - /* x^512 + x^411 + x^308 + x^208 + x^104 + x + 1 -- 225 */ - { S(512), 411, 308, 208, 104, 1 }, - - /* x^512 + x^409 + x^307 + x^206 + x^102 + x^2 + 1 -- 95 */ - { S(512), 409, 307, 206, 102, 2 }, - /* x^512 + x^409 + x^309 + x^205 + x^103 + x^2 + 1 -- 95 */ - { S(512), 409, 309, 205, 103, 2 }, - - /* x^256 + x^205 + x^155 + x^101 + x^52 + x + 1 -- 125 */ - { S(256), 205, 155, 101, 52, 1 }, - - /* x^128 + x^103 + x^78 + x^51 + x^27 + x^2 + 1 -- 70 */ - { S(128), 103, 78, 51, 27, 2 }, - - /* x^64 + x^52 + x^39 + x^26 + x^14 + x + 1 -- 15 */ - { S(64), 52, 39, 26, 14, 1 }, -#endif }; /* From c13b9c3627d81d9f2e0b7e45b9647a1fa0e5b341 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mark Rutland Date: Mon, 10 Feb 2020 13:00:12 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0453/1091] random: split primary/secondary crng init paths commit 5cbe0f13b51ac2fb2fd55902cff8d0077fc084c0 upstream. Currently crng_initialize() is used for both the primary CRNG and secondary CRNGs. While we wish to share common logic, we need to do a number of additional things for the primary CRNG, and this would be easier to deal with were these handled in separate functions. This patch splits crng_initialize() into crng_initialize_primary() and crng_initialize_secondary(), with common logic factored out into a crng_init_try_arch() helper. There should be no functional change as a result of this patch. Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland Cc: Mark Brown Cc: Theodore Ts'o Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200210130015.17664-2-mark.rutland@arm.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 628bd61f9031..58cb828b4b13 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -782,27 +782,37 @@ static int __init parse_trust_cpu(char *arg) } early_param("random.trust_cpu", parse_trust_cpu); -static void crng_initialize(struct crng_state *crng) +static bool crng_init_try_arch(struct crng_state *crng) { int i; - int arch_init = 1; + bool arch_init = true; unsigned long rv; - memcpy(&crng->state[0], "expand 32-byte k", 16); - if (crng == &primary_crng) - _extract_entropy(&input_pool, &crng->state[4], - sizeof(__u32) * 12, 0); - else - _get_random_bytes(&crng->state[4], sizeof(__u32) * 12); for (i = 4; i < 16; i++) { if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) && !arch_get_random_long(&rv)) { rv = random_get_entropy(); - arch_init = 0; + arch_init = false; } crng->state[i] ^= rv; } - if (trust_cpu && arch_init && crng == &primary_crng) { + + return arch_init; +} + +static void crng_initialize_secondary(struct crng_state *crng) +{ + memcpy(&crng->state[0], "expand 32-byte k", 16); + _get_random_bytes(&crng->state[4], sizeof(__u32) * 12); + crng_init_try_arch(crng); + crng->init_time = jiffies - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL - 1; +} + +static void __init crng_initialize_primary(struct crng_state *crng) +{ + memcpy(&crng->state[0], "expand 32-byte k", 16); + _extract_entropy(&input_pool, &crng->state[4], sizeof(__u32) * 12, 0); + if (crng_init_try_arch(crng) && trust_cpu) { invalidate_batched_entropy(); numa_crng_init(); crng_init = 2; @@ -853,7 +863,7 @@ static void do_numa_crng_init(struct work_struct *work) crng = kmalloc_node(sizeof(struct crng_state), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL, i); spin_lock_init(&crng->lock); - crng_initialize(crng); + crng_initialize_secondary(crng); pool[i] = crng; } /* pairs with READ_ONCE() in select_crng() */ @@ -1793,7 +1803,7 @@ int __init rand_initialize(void) init_std_data(&input_pool); if (crng_need_final_init) crng_finalize_init(&primary_crng); - crng_initialize(&primary_crng); + crng_initialize_primary(&primary_crng); crng_global_init_time = jiffies; if (ratelimit_disable) { urandom_warning.interval = 0; From 98f749e2972874fd9c5651b21fb32e9613462541 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mark Rutland Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2020 12:09:12 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0454/1091] random: avoid warnings for !CONFIG_NUMA builds commit ab9a7e27044b87ff2be47b8f8e095400e7fccc44 upstream. As crng_initialize_secondary() is only called by do_numa_crng_init(), and the latter is under ifdeffery for CONFIG_NUMA, when CONFIG_NUMA is not selected the compiler will warn that the former is unused: | drivers/char/random.c:820:13: warning: 'crng_initialize_secondary' defined but not used [-Wunused-function] | 820 | static void crng_initialize_secondary(struct crng_state *crng) | | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Stephen reports that this happens for x86_64 noallconfig builds. We could move crng_initialize_secondary() and crng_init_try_arch() under the CONFIG_NUMA ifdeffery, but this has the unfortunate property of separating them from crng_initialize_primary() and crng_init_try_arch_early() respectively. Instead, let's mark crng_initialize_secondary() as __maybe_unused. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200310121747.GA49602@lakrids.cambridge.arm.com Fixes: 5cbe0f13b51a ("random: split primary/secondary crng init paths") Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland Cc: Theodore Ts'o Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 58cb828b4b13..71ff7a59d12e 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -800,7 +800,7 @@ static bool crng_init_try_arch(struct crng_state *crng) return arch_init; } -static void crng_initialize_secondary(struct crng_state *crng) +static void __maybe_unused crng_initialize_secondary(struct crng_state *crng) { memcpy(&crng->state[0], "expand 32-byte k", 16); _get_random_bytes(&crng->state[4], sizeof(__u32) * 12); From 35e28a05f6596b1c9aaa73965105e5f04447afd5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Richard Henderson Date: Fri, 10 Jan 2020 14:54:13 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0455/1091] x86: Remove arch_has_random, arch_has_random_seed commit 5f2ed7f5b99b54389b74e53309677831ac9cb9d7 upstream. Use the expansion of these macros directly in arch_get_random_*. These symbols are currently part of the generic archrandom.h interface, but are currently unused and can be removed. Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200110145422.49141-2-broonie@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h | 12 ++++-------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h index af45e1452f09..feb59461046c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h @@ -73,10 +73,6 @@ static inline bool rdseed_int(unsigned int *v) return ok; } -/* Conditional execution based on CPU type */ -#define arch_has_random() static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDRAND) -#define arch_has_random_seed() static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDSEED) - /* * These are the generic interfaces; they must not be declared if the * stubs in are to be invoked, @@ -86,22 +82,22 @@ static inline bool rdseed_int(unsigned int *v) static inline bool arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v) { - return arch_has_random() ? rdrand_long(v) : false; + return static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDRAND) ? rdrand_long(v) : false; } static inline bool arch_get_random_int(unsigned int *v) { - return arch_has_random() ? rdrand_int(v) : false; + return static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDRAND) ? rdrand_int(v) : false; } static inline bool arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v) { - return arch_has_random_seed() ? rdseed_long(v) : false; + return static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDSEED) ? rdseed_long(v) : false; } static inline bool arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v) { - return arch_has_random_seed() ? rdseed_int(v) : false; + return static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDSEED) ? rdseed_int(v) : false; } extern void x86_init_rdrand(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); From aab52172d9f989ddd2b00366095d908b5048aae0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Richard Henderson Date: Fri, 10 Jan 2020 14:54:14 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0456/1091] powerpc: Remove arch_has_random, arch_has_random_seed commit cbac004995a0ce8453bdc555fab579e2bdb842a6 upstream. These symbols are currently part of the generic archrandom.h interface, but are currently unused and can be removed. Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200110145422.49141-3-broonie@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/powerpc/include/asm/archrandom.h | 10 ---------- 1 file changed, 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/archrandom.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/archrandom.h index a09595f00cab..2fa7cdfbba24 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/archrandom.h +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/archrandom.h @@ -34,16 +34,6 @@ static inline int arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v) return rc; } - -static inline int arch_has_random(void) -{ - return 0; -} - -static inline int arch_has_random_seed(void) -{ - return !!ppc_md.get_random_seed; -} #endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM */ #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_POWERNV From a95ed04e21dade4a1d572e2653b663695a58fca2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Richard Henderson Date: Fri, 10 Jan 2020 14:54:15 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0457/1091] s390: Remove arch_has_random, arch_has_random_seed commit 5e054c820f59bbb9714d5767f5f476581c309ca8 upstream. These symbols are currently part of the generic archrandom.h interface, but are currently unused and can be removed. Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200110145422.49141-4-broonie@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/s390/include/asm/archrandom.h | 12 ------------ 1 file changed, 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/archrandom.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/archrandom.h index c67b82dfa558..9a6835137a16 100644 --- a/arch/s390/include/asm/archrandom.h +++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/archrandom.h @@ -21,18 +21,6 @@ extern atomic64_t s390_arch_random_counter; bool s390_arch_random_generate(u8 *buf, unsigned int nbytes); -static inline bool arch_has_random(void) -{ - return false; -} - -static inline bool arch_has_random_seed(void) -{ - if (static_branch_likely(&s390_arch_random_available)) - return true; - return false; -} - static inline bool arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v) { return false; From 15f93060b718e440556b2c7adc04853a85ffed49 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Richard Henderson Date: Fri, 10 Jan 2020 14:54:16 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0458/1091] linux/random.h: Remove arch_has_random, arch_has_random_seed commit 647f50d5d9d933b644b29c54f13ac52af1b1774d upstream. The arm64 version of archrandom.h will need to be able to test for support and read the random number without preemption, so a separate query predicate is not practical. Since this part of the generic interface is unused, remove it. Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200110145422.49141-5-broonie@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/linux/random.h | 8 -------- 1 file changed, 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h index 5b3ec7d2791f..5f4ce432482d 100644 --- a/include/linux/random.h +++ b/include/linux/random.h @@ -126,10 +126,6 @@ static inline bool arch_get_random_int(unsigned int *v) { return 0; } -static inline bool arch_has_random(void) -{ - return 0; -} static inline bool arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v) { return 0; @@ -138,10 +134,6 @@ static inline bool arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v) { return 0; } -static inline bool arch_has_random_seed(void) -{ - return 0; -} #endif #endif /* _LINUX_RANDOM_H */ From 0222f9f1d168639d9ba1fce2847b983a318a7bb6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Richard Henderson Date: Fri, 10 Jan 2020 14:54:17 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0459/1091] linux/random.h: Use false with bool commit 66f5ae899ada79c0e9a3d8d954f93a72344cd350 upstream. Keep the generic fallback versions in sync with the other architecture specific implementations and use the proper name for false. Suggested-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200110145422.49141-6-broonie@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/linux/random.h | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h index 5f4ce432482d..57fa7d52ef73 100644 --- a/include/linux/random.h +++ b/include/linux/random.h @@ -120,19 +120,19 @@ unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range); #else static inline bool arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v) { - return 0; + return false; } static inline bool arch_get_random_int(unsigned int *v) { - return 0; + return false; } static inline bool arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v) { - return 0; + return false; } static inline bool arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v) { - return 0; + return false; } #endif From 89533373e11c07d728053a6bce86f0f6adb56581 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Richard Henderson Date: Fri, 10 Jan 2020 14:54:18 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0460/1091] linux/random.h: Mark CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM functions __must_check commit 904caa6413c87aacbf7d0682da617c39ca18cf1a upstream. We must not use the pointer output without validating the success of the random read. Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200110145422.49141-7-broonie@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/linux/random.h | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h index 57fa7d52ef73..0efabaaf1eb6 100644 --- a/include/linux/random.h +++ b/include/linux/random.h @@ -118,19 +118,19 @@ unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range); #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM # include #else -static inline bool arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v) +static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v) { return false; } -static inline bool arch_get_random_int(unsigned int *v) +static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_int(unsigned int *v) { return false; } -static inline bool arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v) +static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v) { return false; } -static inline bool arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v) +static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v) { return false; } From 41b0d3e86c503c9508b07cb0e55e5cdcb58bafbc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Richard Henderson Date: Fri, 10 Jan 2020 14:54:20 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0461/1091] powerpc: Use bool in archrandom.h commit 98dcfce69729f9ce0fb14f96a39bbdba21429597 upstream. The generic interface uses bool not int; match that. Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200110145422.49141-9-broonie@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/powerpc/include/asm/archrandom.h | 17 +++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/archrandom.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/archrandom.h index 2fa7cdfbba24..f0f16b4fc5ea 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/archrandom.h +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/archrandom.h @@ -6,27 +6,28 @@ #include -static inline int arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v) +static inline bool arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v) { - return 0; + return false; } -static inline int arch_get_random_int(unsigned int *v) +static inline bool arch_get_random_int(unsigned int *v) { - return 0; + return false; } -static inline int arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v) +static inline bool arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v) { if (ppc_md.get_random_seed) return ppc_md.get_random_seed(v); - return 0; + return false; } -static inline int arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v) + +static inline bool arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v) { unsigned long val; - int rc; + bool rc; rc = arch_get_random_seed_long(&val); if (rc) From ad3fce669105fd8ab16f03e0a1077be4e00b7e11 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mark Rutland Date: Mon, 10 Feb 2020 13:00:13 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0462/1091] random: add arch_get_random_*long_early() commit 253d3194c2b58152fe830fd27c2fd83ebc6fe5ee upstream. Some architectures (e.g. arm64) can have heterogeneous CPUs, and the boot CPU may be able to provide entropy while secondary CPUs cannot. On such systems, arch_get_random_long() and arch_get_random_seed_long() will fail unless support for RNG instructions has been detected on all CPUs. This prevents the boot CPU from being able to provide (potentially) trusted entropy when seeding the primary CRNG. To make it possible to seed the primary CRNG from the boot CPU without adversely affecting the runtime versions of arch_get_random_long() and arch_get_random_seed_long(), this patch adds new early versions of the functions used when initializing the primary CRNG. Default implementations are provided atop of the existing arch_get_random_long() and arch_get_random_seed_long() so that only architectures with such constraints need to provide the new helpers. There should be no functional change as a result of this patch. Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland Cc: Mark Brown Cc: Theodore Ts'o Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200210130015.17664-3-mark.rutland@arm.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++++- include/linux/random.h | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 71ff7a59d12e..bd628a9f3954 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -800,6 +800,24 @@ static bool crng_init_try_arch(struct crng_state *crng) return arch_init; } +static bool __init crng_init_try_arch_early(struct crng_state *crng) +{ + int i; + bool arch_init = true; + unsigned long rv; + + for (i = 4; i < 16; i++) { + if (!arch_get_random_seed_long_early(&rv) && + !arch_get_random_long_early(&rv)) { + rv = random_get_entropy(); + arch_init = false; + } + crng->state[i] ^= rv; + } + + return arch_init; +} + static void __maybe_unused crng_initialize_secondary(struct crng_state *crng) { memcpy(&crng->state[0], "expand 32-byte k", 16); @@ -812,7 +830,7 @@ static void __init crng_initialize_primary(struct crng_state *crng) { memcpy(&crng->state[0], "expand 32-byte k", 16); _extract_entropy(&input_pool, &crng->state[4], sizeof(__u32) * 12, 0); - if (crng_init_try_arch(crng) && trust_cpu) { + if (crng_init_try_arch_early(crng) && trust_cpu) { invalidate_batched_entropy(); numa_crng_init(); crng_init = 2; diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h index 0efabaaf1eb6..f45b8be3e3c4 100644 --- a/include/linux/random.h +++ b/include/linux/random.h @@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ #ifndef _LINUX_RANDOM_H #define _LINUX_RANDOM_H +#include +#include #include #include @@ -136,4 +138,24 @@ static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v) } #endif +/* + * Called from the boot CPU during startup; not valid to call once + * secondary CPUs are up and preemption is possible. + */ +#ifndef arch_get_random_seed_long_early +static inline bool __init arch_get_random_seed_long_early(unsigned long *v) +{ + WARN_ON(system_state != SYSTEM_BOOTING); + return arch_get_random_seed_long(v); +} +#endif + +#ifndef arch_get_random_long_early +static inline bool __init arch_get_random_long_early(unsigned long *v) +{ + WARN_ON(system_state != SYSTEM_BOOTING); + return arch_get_random_long(v); +} +#endif + #endif /* _LINUX_RANDOM_H */ From 610f0b439a6b4af4689fd791e60e1fbd25330f62 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ard Biesheuvel Date: Thu, 5 Nov 2020 16:29:44 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0463/1091] random: avoid arch_get_random_seed_long() when collecting IRQ randomness commit 390596c9959c2a4f5b456df339f0604df3d55fe0 upstream. When reseeding the CRNG periodically, arch_get_random_seed_long() is called to obtain entropy from an architecture specific source if one is implemented. In most cases, these are special instructions, but in some cases, such as on ARM, we may want to back this using firmware calls, which are considerably more expensive. Another call to arch_get_random_seed_long() exists in the CRNG driver, in add_interrupt_randomness(), which collects entropy by capturing inter-interrupt timing and relying on interrupt jitter to provide random bits. This is done by keeping a per-CPU state, and mixing in the IRQ number, the cycle counter and the return address every time an interrupt is taken, and mixing this per-CPU state into the entropy pool every 64 invocations, or at least once per second. The entropy that is gathered this way is credited as 1 bit of entropy. Every time this happens, arch_get_random_seed_long() is invoked, and the result is mixed in as well, and also credited with 1 bit of entropy. This means that arch_get_random_seed_long() is called at least once per second on every CPU, which seems excessive, and doesn't really scale, especially in a virtualization scenario where CPUs may be oversubscribed: in cases where arch_get_random_seed_long() is backed by an instruction that actually goes back to a shared hardware entropy source (such as RNDRRS on ARM), we will end up hitting it hundreds of times per second. So let's drop the call to arch_get_random_seed_long() from add_interrupt_randomness(), and instead, rely on crng_reseed() to call the arch hook to get random seed material from the platform. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel Reviewed-by: Andre Przywara Tested-by: Andre Przywara Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers Acked-by: Marc Zyngier Reviewed-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201105152944.16953-1-ardb@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Will Deacon Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 15 +-------------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index bd628a9f3954..46e238849fa8 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -1281,8 +1281,6 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags) cycles_t cycles = random_get_entropy(); __u32 c_high, j_high; __u64 ip; - unsigned long seed; - int credit = 0; if (cycles == 0) cycles = get_reg(fast_pool, regs); @@ -1318,23 +1316,12 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags) fast_pool->last = now; __mix_pool_bytes(r, &fast_pool->pool, sizeof(fast_pool->pool)); - - /* - * If we have architectural seed generator, produce a seed and - * add it to the pool. For the sake of paranoia don't let the - * architectural seed generator dominate the input from the - * interrupt noise. - */ - if (arch_get_random_seed_long(&seed)) { - __mix_pool_bytes(r, &seed, sizeof(seed)); - credit = 1; - } spin_unlock(&r->lock); fast_pool->count = 0; /* award one bit for the contents of the fast pool */ - credit_entropy_bits(r, credit + 1); + credit_entropy_bits(r, 1); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_interrupt_randomness); From 967e3a136f9b7974cd1c31e28cc201f28c59ff64 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers Date: Sun, 21 Mar 2021 22:14:00 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0464/1091] random: remove dead code left over from blocking pool commit 118a4417e14348b2e46f5e467da8444ec4757a45 upstream. Remove some dead code that was left over following commit 90ea1c6436d2 ("random: remove the blocking pool"). Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Jann Horn Cc: Theodore Ts'o Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 17 ++----- include/trace/events/random.h | 83 ----------------------------------- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 97 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 46e238849fa8..1ed29a217a00 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -501,7 +501,6 @@ struct entropy_store { unsigned short add_ptr; unsigned short input_rotate; int entropy_count; - unsigned int initialized:1; unsigned int last_data_init:1; __u8 last_data[EXTRACT_SIZE]; }; @@ -661,7 +660,7 @@ static void process_random_ready_list(void) */ static void credit_entropy_bits(struct entropy_store *r, int nbits) { - int entropy_count, orig, has_initialized = 0; + int entropy_count, orig; const int pool_size = r->poolinfo->poolfracbits; int nfrac = nbits << ENTROPY_SHIFT; @@ -718,23 +717,14 @@ retry: if (cmpxchg(&r->entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig) goto retry; - if (has_initialized) { - r->initialized = 1; - kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN); - } - trace_credit_entropy_bits(r->name, nbits, entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT, _RET_IP_); if (r == &input_pool) { int entropy_bits = entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT; - if (crng_init < 2) { - if (entropy_bits < 128) - return; + if (crng_init < 2 && entropy_bits >= 128) crng_reseed(&primary_crng, r); - entropy_bits = ENTROPY_BITS(r); - } } } @@ -1392,8 +1382,7 @@ retry: } /* - * This function does the actual extraction for extract_entropy and - * extract_entropy_user. + * This function does the actual extraction for extract_entropy. * * Note: we assume that .poolwords is a multiple of 16 words. */ diff --git a/include/trace/events/random.h b/include/trace/events/random.h index 32c10a515e2d..07a99b883f1c 100644 --- a/include/trace/events/random.h +++ b/include/trace/events/random.h @@ -85,28 +85,6 @@ TRACE_EVENT(credit_entropy_bits, __entry->entropy_count, (void *)__entry->IP) ); -TRACE_EVENT(push_to_pool, - TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int pool_bits, int input_bits), - - TP_ARGS(pool_name, pool_bits, input_bits), - - TP_STRUCT__entry( - __field( const char *, pool_name ) - __field( int, pool_bits ) - __field( int, input_bits ) - ), - - TP_fast_assign( - __entry->pool_name = pool_name; - __entry->pool_bits = pool_bits; - __entry->input_bits = input_bits; - ), - - TP_printk("%s: pool_bits %d input_pool_bits %d", - __entry->pool_name, __entry->pool_bits, - __entry->input_bits) -); - TRACE_EVENT(debit_entropy, TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int debit_bits), @@ -161,35 +139,6 @@ TRACE_EVENT(add_disk_randomness, MINOR(__entry->dev), __entry->input_bits) ); -TRACE_EVENT(xfer_secondary_pool, - TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int xfer_bits, int request_bits, - int pool_entropy, int input_entropy), - - TP_ARGS(pool_name, xfer_bits, request_bits, pool_entropy, - input_entropy), - - TP_STRUCT__entry( - __field( const char *, pool_name ) - __field( int, xfer_bits ) - __field( int, request_bits ) - __field( int, pool_entropy ) - __field( int, input_entropy ) - ), - - TP_fast_assign( - __entry->pool_name = pool_name; - __entry->xfer_bits = xfer_bits; - __entry->request_bits = request_bits; - __entry->pool_entropy = pool_entropy; - __entry->input_entropy = input_entropy; - ), - - TP_printk("pool %s xfer_bits %d request_bits %d pool_entropy %d " - "input_entropy %d", __entry->pool_name, __entry->xfer_bits, - __entry->request_bits, __entry->pool_entropy, - __entry->input_entropy) -); - DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(random__get_random_bytes, TP_PROTO(int nbytes, unsigned long IP), @@ -253,38 +202,6 @@ DEFINE_EVENT(random__extract_entropy, extract_entropy, TP_ARGS(pool_name, nbytes, entropy_count, IP) ); -DEFINE_EVENT(random__extract_entropy, extract_entropy_user, - TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int nbytes, int entropy_count, - unsigned long IP), - - TP_ARGS(pool_name, nbytes, entropy_count, IP) -); - -TRACE_EVENT(random_read, - TP_PROTO(int got_bits, int need_bits, int pool_left, int input_left), - - TP_ARGS(got_bits, need_bits, pool_left, input_left), - - TP_STRUCT__entry( - __field( int, got_bits ) - __field( int, need_bits ) - __field( int, pool_left ) - __field( int, input_left ) - ), - - TP_fast_assign( - __entry->got_bits = got_bits; - __entry->need_bits = need_bits; - __entry->pool_left = pool_left; - __entry->input_left = input_left; - ), - - TP_printk("got_bits %d still_needed_bits %d " - "blocking_pool_entropy_left %d input_entropy_left %d", - __entry->got_bits, __entry->got_bits, __entry->pool_left, - __entry->input_left) -); - TRACE_EVENT(urandom_read, TP_PROTO(int got_bits, int pool_left, int input_left), From f850f3643d6b4f6ef1813489c8807c494ae8358c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Tue, 30 Nov 2021 13:43:15 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 0465/1091] MAINTAINERS: co-maintain random.c commit 58e1100fdc5990b0cc0d4beaf2562a92e621ac7d upstream. random.c is a bit understaffed, and folks want more prompt reviews. I've got the crypto background and the interest to do these reviews, and have authored parts of the file already. Cc: Theodore Ts'o Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- MAINTAINERS | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 1407008df749..f45d6548a4aa 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -13640,6 +13640,7 @@ F: arch/mips/configs/generic/board-ranchu.config RANDOM NUMBER DRIVER M: "Theodore Ts'o" +M: Jason A. Donenfeld S: Maintained F: drivers/char/random.c From 09342a544c4b712513921840accca5de75535b1a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers Date: Wed, 23 Dec 2020 00:09:58 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 0466/1091] crypto: blake2s - include instead of commit bbda6e0f1303953c855ee3669655a81b69fbe899 upstream. Address the following checkpatch warning: WARNING: Use #include instead of Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/crypto/blake2s.h | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/crypto/blake2s.h b/include/crypto/blake2s.h index 00472cb95ead..23eda9b3bc4d 100644 --- a/include/crypto/blake2s.h +++ b/include/crypto/blake2s.h @@ -6,12 +6,11 @@ #ifndef BLAKE2S_H #define BLAKE2S_H +#include #include #include #include -#include - enum blake2s_lengths { BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE = 64, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE = 32, From 3cc36a4aa1ca5611fdf77a147ce306a44fee3151 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers Date: Wed, 23 Dec 2020 00:09:57 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 0467/1091] crypto: blake2s - adjust include guard naming commit 8786841bc2020f7f2513a6c74e64912f07b9c0dc upstream. Use the full path in the include guards for the BLAKE2s headers to avoid ambiguity and to match the convention for most files in include/crypto/. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/crypto/blake2s.h | 6 +++--- include/crypto/internal/blake2s.h | 6 +++--- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/crypto/blake2s.h b/include/crypto/blake2s.h index 23eda9b3bc4d..d439496fa6ba 100644 --- a/include/crypto/blake2s.h +++ b/include/crypto/blake2s.h @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. */ -#ifndef BLAKE2S_H -#define BLAKE2S_H +#ifndef _CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_H +#define _CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_H #include #include @@ -99,4 +99,4 @@ static inline void blake2s(u8 *out, const u8 *in, const u8 *key, blake2s_final(&state, out); } -#endif /* BLAKE2S_H */ +#endif /* _CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_H */ diff --git a/include/crypto/internal/blake2s.h b/include/crypto/internal/blake2s.h index 941693effc7d..3ba066845b69 100644 --- a/include/crypto/internal/blake2s.h +++ b/include/crypto/internal/blake2s.h @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR MIT */ -#ifndef BLAKE2S_INTERNAL_H -#define BLAKE2S_INTERNAL_H +#ifndef _CRYPTO_INTERNAL_BLAKE2S_H +#define _CRYPTO_INTERNAL_BLAKE2S_H #include @@ -16,4 +16,4 @@ static inline void blake2s_set_lastblock(struct blake2s_state *state) state->f[0] = -1; } -#endif /* BLAKE2S_INTERNAL_H */ +#endif /* _CRYPTO_INTERNAL_BLAKE2S_H */ From 2580b0b3fd5a680e284ddb6dbaa8bfdabcbcb2b3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mark Brown Date: Wed, 1 Dec 2021 17:44:49 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0468/1091] random: document add_hwgenerator_randomness() with other input functions commit 2b6c6e3d9ce3aa0e547ac25d60e06fe035cd9f79 upstream. The section at the top of random.c which documents the input functions available does not document add_hwgenerator_randomness() which might lead a reader to overlook it. Add a brief note about it. Signed-off-by: Mark Brown [Jason: reorganize position of function in doc comment and also document add_bootloader_randomness() while we're at it.] Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 1ed29a217a00..12a48d91e20c 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -202,6 +202,9 @@ * unsigned int value); * void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags); * void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk); + * void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count, + * size_t entropy); + * void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size); * * add_device_randomness() is for adding data to the random pool that * is likely to differ between two devices (or possibly even per boot). @@ -228,6 +231,14 @@ * particular randomness source. They do this by keeping track of the * first and second order deltas of the event timings. * + * add_hwgenerator_randomness() is for true hardware RNGs, and will credit + * entropy as specified by the caller. If the entropy pool is full it will + * block until more entropy is needed. + * + * add_bootloader_randomness() is the same as add_hwgenerator_randomness() or + * add_device_randomness(), depending on whether or not the configuration + * option CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is set. + * * Ensuring unpredictability at system startup * ============================================ * From 6e6ae70c1eac27d3f58726a8f1037269ab2e81ab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior Date: Tue, 7 Dec 2021 13:17:33 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0469/1091] random: remove unused irq_flags argument from add_interrupt_randomness() commit 703f7066f40599c290babdb79dd61319264987e9 upstream. Since commit ee3e00e9e7101 ("random: use registers from interrupted code for CPU's w/o a cycle counter") the irq_flags argument is no longer used. Remove unused irq_flags. Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Dexuan Cui Cc: H. Peter Anvin Cc: Haiyang Zhang Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: K. Y. Srinivasan Cc: Stephen Hemminger Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Wei Liu Cc: linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org Cc: x86@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior Acked-by: Wei Liu Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c | 2 +- drivers/char/random.c | 4 ++-- drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c | 2 +- include/linux/random.h | 2 +- kernel/irq/handle.c | 2 +- 5 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c index 1c2f9baf8483..51d95c4b692c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c @@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ __visible void __irq_entry hv_stimer0_vector_handler(struct pt_regs *regs) inc_irq_stat(hyperv_stimer0_count); if (hv_stimer0_handler) hv_stimer0_handler(); - add_interrupt_randomness(HYPERV_STIMER0_VECTOR, 0); + add_interrupt_randomness(HYPERV_STIMER0_VECTOR); ack_APIC_irq(); exiting_irq(); diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 12a48d91e20c..288bcc5ce6f0 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ * void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size); * void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, * unsigned int value); - * void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags); + * void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq); * void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk); * void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count, * size_t entropy); @@ -1273,7 +1273,7 @@ static __u32 get_reg(struct fast_pool *f, struct pt_regs *regs) return *ptr; } -void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags) +void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) { struct entropy_store *r; struct fast_pool *fast_pool = this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness); diff --git a/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c b/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c index 943654ded73d..56918274c48c 100644 --- a/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c +++ b/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c @@ -1303,7 +1303,7 @@ static void vmbus_isr(void) tasklet_schedule(&hv_cpu->msg_dpc); } - add_interrupt_randomness(HYPERVISOR_CALLBACK_VECTOR, 0); + add_interrupt_randomness(HYPERVISOR_CALLBACK_VECTOR); } /* diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h index f45b8be3e3c4..c45b2693e51f 100644 --- a/include/linux/random.h +++ b/include/linux/random.h @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ static inline void add_latent_entropy(void) {} extern void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, unsigned int value) __latent_entropy; -extern void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags) __latent_entropy; +extern void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) __latent_entropy; extern void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes); extern int wait_for_random_bytes(void); diff --git a/kernel/irq/handle.c b/kernel/irq/handle.c index a4ace611f47f..d2d7559ecbfe 100644 --- a/kernel/irq/handle.c +++ b/kernel/irq/handle.c @@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ irqreturn_t handle_irq_event_percpu(struct irq_desc *desc) retval = __handle_irq_event_percpu(desc, &flags); - add_interrupt_randomness(desc->irq_data.irq, flags); + add_interrupt_randomness(desc->irq_data.irq); if (!noirqdebug) note_interrupt(desc, retval); From c2f0a89cd1d5a00c5bf48060987cf53ada93d4b0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Tue, 21 Dec 2021 16:31:27 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0470/1091] random: use BLAKE2s instead of SHA1 in extraction commit 9f9eff85a008b095eafc5f4ecbaf5aca689271c1 upstream. This commit addresses one of the lower hanging fruits of the RNG: its usage of SHA1. BLAKE2s is generally faster, and certainly more secure, than SHA1, which has [1] been [2] really [3] very [4] broken [5]. Additionally, the current construction in the RNG doesn't use the full SHA1 function, as specified, and allows overwriting the IV with RDRAND output in an undocumented way, even in the case when RDRAND isn't set to "trusted", which means potential malicious IV choices. And its short length means that keeping only half of it secret when feeding back into the mixer gives us only 2^80 bits of forward secrecy. In other words, not only is the choice of hash function dated, but the use of it isn't really great either. This commit aims to fix both of these issues while also keeping the general structure and semantics as close to the original as possible. Specifically: a) Rather than overwriting the hash IV with RDRAND, we put it into BLAKE2's documented "salt" and "personal" fields, which were specifically created for this type of usage. b) Since this function feeds the full hash result back into the entropy collector, we only return from it half the length of the hash, just as it was done before. This increases the construction's forward secrecy from 2^80 to a much more comfortable 2^128. c) Rather than using the raw "sha1_transform" function alone, we instead use the full proper BLAKE2s function, with finalization. This also has the advantage of supplying 16 bytes at a time rather than SHA1's 10 bytes, which, in addition to having a faster compression function to begin with, means faster extraction in general. On an Intel i7-11850H, this commit makes initial seeding around 131% faster. BLAKE2s itself has the nice property of internally being based on the ChaCha permutation, which the RNG is already using for expansion, so there shouldn't be any issue with newness, funkiness, or surprising CPU behavior, since it's based on something already in use. [1] https://eprint.iacr.org/2005/010.pdf [2] https://www.iacr.org/archive/crypto2005/36210017/36210017.pdf [3] https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/967.pdf [4] https://shattered.io/static/shattered.pdf [5] https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec20-leurent.pdf Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Reviewed-by: Jean-Philippe Aumasson Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 70 +++++++++++++++++++------------------------ 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 288bcc5ce6f0..72636fadd675 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -1,8 +1,7 @@ /* * random.c -- A strong random number generator * - * Copyright (C) 2017 Jason A. Donenfeld . All - * Rights Reserved. + * Copyright (C) 2017-2022 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. * * Copyright Matt Mackall , 2003, 2004, 2005 * @@ -78,12 +77,12 @@ * an *estimate* of how many bits of randomness have been stored into * the random number generator's internal state. * - * When random bytes are desired, they are obtained by taking the SHA - * hash of the contents of the "entropy pool". The SHA hash avoids + * When random bytes are desired, they are obtained by taking the BLAKE2s + * hash of the contents of the "entropy pool". The BLAKE2s hash avoids * exposing the internal state of the entropy pool. It is believed to * be computationally infeasible to derive any useful information - * about the input of SHA from its output. Even if it is possible to - * analyze SHA in some clever way, as long as the amount of data + * about the input of BLAKE2s from its output. Even if it is possible to + * analyze BLAKE2s in some clever way, as long as the amount of data * returned from the generator is less than the inherent entropy in * the pool, the output data is totally unpredictable. For this * reason, the routine decreases its internal estimate of how many @@ -93,7 +92,7 @@ * If this estimate goes to zero, the routine can still generate * random numbers; however, an attacker may (at least in theory) be * able to infer the future output of the generator from prior - * outputs. This requires successful cryptanalysis of SHA, which is + * outputs. This requires successful cryptanalysis of BLAKE2s, which is * not believed to be feasible, but there is a remote possibility. * Nonetheless, these numbers should be useful for the vast majority * of purposes. @@ -348,6 +347,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -367,10 +367,7 @@ #define INPUT_POOL_WORDS (1 << (INPUT_POOL_SHIFT-5)) #define OUTPUT_POOL_SHIFT 10 #define OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS (1 << (OUTPUT_POOL_SHIFT-5)) -#define EXTRACT_SIZE 10 - - -#define LONGS(x) (((x) + sizeof(unsigned long) - 1)/sizeof(unsigned long)) +#define EXTRACT_SIZE (BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE / 2) /* * To allow fractional bits to be tracked, the entropy_count field is @@ -406,7 +403,7 @@ static int random_write_wakeup_bits = 28 * OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS; * Thanks to Colin Plumb for suggesting this. * * The mixing operation is much less sensitive than the output hash, - * where we use SHA-1. All that we want of mixing operation is that + * where we use BLAKE2s. All that we want of mixing operation is that * it be a good non-cryptographic hash; i.e. it not produce collisions * when fed "random" data of the sort we expect to see. As long as * the pool state differs for different inputs, we have preserved the @@ -1399,56 +1396,49 @@ retry: */ static void extract_buf(struct entropy_store *r, __u8 *out) { - int i; - union { - __u32 w[5]; - unsigned long l[LONGS(20)]; - } hash; - __u32 workspace[SHA_WORKSPACE_WORDS]; + struct blake2s_state state __aligned(__alignof__(unsigned long)); + u8 hash[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE]; + unsigned long *salt; unsigned long flags; + blake2s_init(&state, sizeof(hash)); + /* * If we have an architectural hardware random number - * generator, use it for SHA's initial vector + * generator, use it for BLAKE2's salt & personal fields. */ - sha_init(hash.w); - for (i = 0; i < LONGS(20); i++) { + for (salt = (unsigned long *)&state.h[4]; + salt < (unsigned long *)&state.h[8]; ++salt) { unsigned long v; if (!arch_get_random_long(&v)) break; - hash.l[i] = v; + *salt ^= v; } - /* Generate a hash across the pool, 16 words (512 bits) at a time */ + /* Generate a hash across the pool */ spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags); - for (i = 0; i < r->poolinfo->poolwords; i += 16) - sha_transform(hash.w, (__u8 *)(r->pool + i), workspace); + blake2s_update(&state, (const u8 *)r->pool, + r->poolinfo->poolwords * sizeof(*r->pool)); + blake2s_final(&state, hash); /* final zeros out state */ /* * We mix the hash back into the pool to prevent backtracking * attacks (where the attacker knows the state of the pool * plus the current outputs, and attempts to find previous - * ouputs), unless the hash function can be inverted. By - * mixing at least a SHA1 worth of hash data back, we make + * outputs), unless the hash function can be inverted. By + * mixing at least a hash worth of hash data back, we make * brute-forcing the feedback as hard as brute-forcing the * hash. */ - __mix_pool_bytes(r, hash.w, sizeof(hash.w)); + __mix_pool_bytes(r, hash, sizeof(hash)); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags); - memzero_explicit(workspace, sizeof(workspace)); - - /* - * In case the hash function has some recognizable output - * pattern, we fold it in half. Thus, we always feed back - * twice as much data as we output. + /* Note that EXTRACT_SIZE is half of hash size here, because above + * we've dumped the full length back into mixer. By reducing the + * amount that we emit, we retain a level of forward secrecy. */ - hash.w[0] ^= hash.w[3]; - hash.w[1] ^= hash.w[4]; - hash.w[2] ^= rol32(hash.w[2], 16); - - memcpy(out, &hash, EXTRACT_SIZE); - memzero_explicit(&hash, sizeof(hash)); + memcpy(out, hash, EXTRACT_SIZE); + memzero_explicit(hash, sizeof(hash)); } static ssize_t _extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf, From d76758c71209dbed496504f52905c007e5173152 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Fri, 24 Dec 2021 19:17:58 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0471/1091] random: do not sign extend bytes for rotation when mixing commit 0d9488ffbf2faddebc6bac055bfa6c93b94056a3 upstream. By using `char` instead of `unsigned char`, certain platforms will sign extend the byte when `w = rol32(*bytes++, input_rotate)` is called, meaning that bit 7 is overrepresented when mixing. This isn't a real problem (unless the mixer itself is already broken) since it's still invertible, but it's not quite correct either. Fix this by using an explicit unsigned type. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 72636fadd675..a32f79c1cc02 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -548,7 +548,7 @@ static void _mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in, unsigned long i, tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5; int input_rotate; int wordmask = r->poolinfo->poolwords - 1; - const char *bytes = in; + const unsigned char *bytes = in; __u32 w; tap1 = r->poolinfo->tap1; From afce74c0c04f84504ed2390c5c842a8c31b0ed04 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Wed, 29 Dec 2021 22:10:04 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0472/1091] random: do not re-init if crng_reseed completes before primary init commit 9c3ddde3f811aabbb83778a2a615bf141b4909ef upstream. If the bootloader supplies sufficient material and crng_reseed() is called very early on, but not too early that wqs aren't available yet, then we might transition to crng_init==2 before rand_initialize()'s call to crng_initialize_primary() made. Then, when crng_initialize_primary() is called, if we're trusting the CPU's RDRAND instructions, we'll needlessly reinitialize the RNG and emit a message about it. This is mostly harmless, as numa_crng_init() will allocate and then free what it just allocated, and excessive calls to invalidate_batched_entropy() aren't so harmful. But it is funky and the extra message is confusing, so avoid the re-initialization all together by checking for crng_init < 2 in crng_initialize_primary(), just as we already do in crng_reseed(). Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index a32f79c1cc02..10bdf0bf778f 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -828,7 +828,7 @@ static void __init crng_initialize_primary(struct crng_state *crng) { memcpy(&crng->state[0], "expand 32-byte k", 16); _extract_entropy(&input_pool, &crng->state[4], sizeof(__u32) * 12, 0); - if (crng_init_try_arch_early(crng) && trust_cpu) { + if (crng_init_try_arch_early(crng) && trust_cpu && crng_init < 2) { invalidate_batched_entropy(); numa_crng_init(); crng_init = 2; From 346c4a697c290fbf1eca180b0cb728c2b897ac82 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Wed, 29 Dec 2021 22:10:06 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0473/1091] random: mix bootloader randomness into pool commit 57826feeedb63b091f807ba8325d736775d39afd upstream. If we're trusting bootloader randomness, crng_fast_load() is called by add_hwgenerator_randomness(), which sets us to crng_init==1. However, usually it is only called once for an initial 64-byte push, so bootloader entropy will not mix any bytes into the input pool. So it's conceivable that crng_init==1 when crng_initialize_primary() is called later, but then the input pool is empty. When that happens, the crng state key will be overwritten with extracted output from the empty input pool. That's bad. In contrast, if we're not trusting bootloader randomness, we call crng_slow_load() *and* we call mix_pool_bytes(), so that later crng_initialize_primary() isn't drawing on nothing. In order to prevent crng_initialize_primary() from extracting an empty pool, have the trusted bootloader case mirror that of the untrusted bootloader case, mixing the input into the pool. [linux@dominikbrodowski.net: rewrite commit message] Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 10bdf0bf778f..a79412176201 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -2299,6 +2299,7 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count, if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) { size_t ret = crng_fast_load(buffer, count); + mix_pool_bytes(poolp, buffer, ret); count -= ret; buffer += ret; if (!count || crng_init == 0) From 565b3af16894a9e7dcdd9113f51194bba50ee37d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dominik Brodowski Date: Wed, 29 Dec 2021 22:10:07 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0474/1091] random: harmonize "crng init done" messages commit 161212c7fd1d9069b232785c75492e50941e2ea8 upstream. We print out "crng init done" for !TRUST_CPU, so we should also print out the same for TRUST_CPU. Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index a79412176201..42f39cf7a029 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -832,7 +832,7 @@ static void __init crng_initialize_primary(struct crng_state *crng) invalidate_batched_entropy(); numa_crng_init(); crng_init = 2; - pr_notice("crng done (trusting CPU's manufacturer)\n"); + pr_notice("crng init done (trusting CPU's manufacturer)\n"); } crng->init_time = jiffies - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL - 1; } From 922d082e3363d81772690447f5fb5cd06ba7205d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Thu, 30 Dec 2021 15:59:26 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0475/1091] random: use IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NUMA) instead of ifdefs commit 7b87324112df2e1f9b395217361626362dcfb9fb upstream. Rather than an awkward combination of ifdefs and __maybe_unused, we can ensure more source gets parsed, regardless of the configuration, by using IS_ENABLED for the CONFIG_NUMA conditional code. This makes things cleaner and easier to follow. I've confirmed that on !CONFIG_NUMA, we don't wind up with excess code by accident; the generated object file is the same. Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 30 +++++++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 42f39cf7a029..4bb5bfae1756 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -760,7 +760,6 @@ static int credit_entropy_bits_safe(struct entropy_store *r, int nbits) static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_init_wait); -#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA /* * Hack to deal with crazy userspace progams when they are all trying * to access /dev/urandom in parallel. The programs are almost @@ -768,7 +767,6 @@ static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_init_wait); * their brain damage. */ static struct crng_state **crng_node_pool __read_mostly; -#endif static void invalidate_batched_entropy(void); static void numa_crng_init(void); @@ -816,7 +814,7 @@ static bool __init crng_init_try_arch_early(struct crng_state *crng) return arch_init; } -static void __maybe_unused crng_initialize_secondary(struct crng_state *crng) +static void crng_initialize_secondary(struct crng_state *crng) { memcpy(&crng->state[0], "expand 32-byte k", 16); _get_random_bytes(&crng->state[4], sizeof(__u32) * 12); @@ -867,7 +865,6 @@ static void crng_finalize_init(struct crng_state *crng) } } -#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA static void do_numa_crng_init(struct work_struct *work) { int i; @@ -894,29 +891,24 @@ static DECLARE_WORK(numa_crng_init_work, do_numa_crng_init); static void numa_crng_init(void) { - schedule_work(&numa_crng_init_work); + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NUMA)) + schedule_work(&numa_crng_init_work); } static struct crng_state *select_crng(void) { - struct crng_state **pool; - int nid = numa_node_id(); + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NUMA)) { + struct crng_state **pool; + int nid = numa_node_id(); - /* pairs with cmpxchg_release() in do_numa_crng_init() */ - pool = READ_ONCE(crng_node_pool); - if (pool && pool[nid]) - return pool[nid]; + /* pairs with cmpxchg_release() in do_numa_crng_init() */ + pool = READ_ONCE(crng_node_pool); + if (pool && pool[nid]) + return pool[nid]; + } return &primary_crng; } -#else -static void numa_crng_init(void) {} - -static struct crng_state *select_crng(void) -{ - return &primary_crng; -} -#endif /* * crng_fast_load() can be called by code in the interrupt service From cfc69065005ea11e39f80c463519787977e376a1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers Date: Sun, 21 Mar 2021 22:13:47 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0476/1091] random: initialize ChaCha20 constants with correct endianness commit a181e0fdb2164268274453b5b291589edbb9b22d upstream. On big endian CPUs, the ChaCha20-based CRNG is using the wrong endianness for the ChaCha20 constants. This doesn't matter cryptographically, but technically it means it's not ChaCha20 anymore. Fix it to always use the standard constants. Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Jann Horn Cc: Theodore Ts'o Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 4 ++-- include/crypto/chacha.h | 8 ++++++++ 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 4bb5bfae1756..895cd5e57428 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -816,7 +816,7 @@ static bool __init crng_init_try_arch_early(struct crng_state *crng) static void crng_initialize_secondary(struct crng_state *crng) { - memcpy(&crng->state[0], "expand 32-byte k", 16); + chacha_init_consts(crng->state); _get_random_bytes(&crng->state[4], sizeof(__u32) * 12); crng_init_try_arch(crng); crng->init_time = jiffies - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL - 1; @@ -824,7 +824,7 @@ static void crng_initialize_secondary(struct crng_state *crng) static void __init crng_initialize_primary(struct crng_state *crng) { - memcpy(&crng->state[0], "expand 32-byte k", 16); + chacha_init_consts(crng->state); _extract_entropy(&input_pool, &crng->state[4], sizeof(__u32) * 12, 0); if (crng_init_try_arch_early(crng) && trust_cpu && crng_init < 2) { invalidate_batched_entropy(); diff --git a/include/crypto/chacha.h b/include/crypto/chacha.h index d1e723c6a37d..d517ea4be167 100644 --- a/include/crypto/chacha.h +++ b/include/crypto/chacha.h @@ -51,4 +51,12 @@ int crypto_chacha12_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key, int crypto_chacha_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req); int crypto_xchacha_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req); +static inline void chacha_init_consts(u32 *state) +{ + state[0] = 0x61707865; /* "expa" */ + state[1] = 0x3320646e; /* "nd 3" */ + state[2] = 0x79622d32; /* "2-by" */ + state[3] = 0x6b206574; /* "te k" */ +} + #endif /* _CRYPTO_CHACHA_H */ From 8b4695640bc56a88b2dc76a1ec4ab2a6b709c7f0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dominik Brodowski Date: Fri, 31 Dec 2021 09:26:08 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0477/1091] random: early initialization of ChaCha constants commit 96562f286884e2db89c74215b199a1084b5fb7f7 upstream. Previously, the ChaCha constants for the primary pool were only initialized in crng_initialize_primary(), called by rand_initialize(). However, some randomness is actually extracted from the primary pool beforehand, e.g. by kmem_cache_create(). Therefore, statically initialize the ChaCha constants for the primary pool. Cc: Herbert Xu Cc: "David S. Miller" Cc: Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 5 ++++- include/crypto/chacha.h | 15 +++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 895cd5e57428..dcacdcf87c36 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -458,6 +458,10 @@ struct crng_state { static struct crng_state primary_crng = { .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(primary_crng.lock), + .state[0] = CHACHA_CONSTANT_EXPA, + .state[1] = CHACHA_CONSTANT_ND_3, + .state[2] = CHACHA_CONSTANT_2_BY, + .state[3] = CHACHA_CONSTANT_TE_K, }; /* @@ -824,7 +828,6 @@ static void crng_initialize_secondary(struct crng_state *crng) static void __init crng_initialize_primary(struct crng_state *crng) { - chacha_init_consts(crng->state); _extract_entropy(&input_pool, &crng->state[4], sizeof(__u32) * 12, 0); if (crng_init_try_arch_early(crng) && trust_cpu && crng_init < 2) { invalidate_batched_entropy(); diff --git a/include/crypto/chacha.h b/include/crypto/chacha.h index d517ea4be167..542f896115f4 100644 --- a/include/crypto/chacha.h +++ b/include/crypto/chacha.h @@ -51,12 +51,19 @@ int crypto_chacha12_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key, int crypto_chacha_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req); int crypto_xchacha_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req); +enum chacha_constants { /* expand 32-byte k */ + CHACHA_CONSTANT_EXPA = 0x61707865U, + CHACHA_CONSTANT_ND_3 = 0x3320646eU, + CHACHA_CONSTANT_2_BY = 0x79622d32U, + CHACHA_CONSTANT_TE_K = 0x6b206574U +}; + static inline void chacha_init_consts(u32 *state) { - state[0] = 0x61707865; /* "expa" */ - state[1] = 0x3320646e; /* "nd 3" */ - state[2] = 0x79622d32; /* "2-by" */ - state[3] = 0x6b206574; /* "te k" */ + state[0] = CHACHA_CONSTANT_EXPA; + state[1] = CHACHA_CONSTANT_ND_3; + state[2] = CHACHA_CONSTANT_2_BY; + state[3] = CHACHA_CONSTANT_TE_K; } #endif /* _CRYPTO_CHACHA_H */ From 8d7c55563ed035bfdd7cec6d68f0100b079d3150 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Thu, 30 Dec 2021 17:50:52 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0478/1091] random: avoid superfluous call to RDRAND in CRNG extraction commit 2ee25b6968b1b3c66ffa408de23d023c1bce81cf upstream. RDRAND is not fast. RDRAND is actually quite slow. We've known this for a while, which is why functions like get_random_u{32,64} were converted to use batching of our ChaCha-based CRNG instead. Yet CRNG extraction still includes a call to RDRAND, in the hot path of every call to get_random_bytes(), /dev/urandom, and getrandom(2). This call to RDRAND here seems quite superfluous. CRNG is already extracting things based on a 256-bit key, based on good entropy, which is then reseeded periodically, updated, backtrack-mutated, and so forth. The CRNG extraction construction is something that we're already relying on to be secure and solid. If it's not, that's a serious problem, and it's unlikely that mixing in a measly 32 bits from RDRAND is going to alleviate things. And in the case where the CRNG doesn't have enough entropy yet, we're already initializing the ChaCha key row with RDRAND in crng_init_try_arch_early(). Removing the call to RDRAND improves performance on an i7-11850H by 370%. In other words, the vast majority of the work done by extract_crng() prior to this commit was devoted to fetching 32 bits of RDRAND. Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 4 +--- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index dcacdcf87c36..a01f865a9970 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -1024,7 +1024,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r) static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, __u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]) { - unsigned long v, flags, init_time; + unsigned long flags, init_time; if (crng_ready()) { init_time = READ_ONCE(crng->init_time); @@ -1034,8 +1034,6 @@ static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, &input_pool : NULL); } spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags); - if (arch_get_random_long(&v)) - crng->state[14] ^= v; chacha20_block(&crng->state[0], out); if (crng->state[12] == 0) crng->state[13]++; From 0a7e658102694aff969093c2fcb93ce1f9615ef2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jann Horn Date: Mon, 3 Jan 2022 16:59:31 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0479/1091] random: don't reset crng_init_cnt on urandom_read() commit 6c8e11e08a5b74bb8a5cdd5cbc1e5143df0fba72 upstream. At the moment, urandom_read() (used for /dev/urandom) resets crng_init_cnt to zero when it is called at crng_init<2. This is inconsistent: We do it for /dev/urandom reads, but not for the equivalent getrandom(GRND_INSECURE). (And worse, as Jason pointed out, we're only doing this as long as maxwarn>0.) crng_init_cnt is only read in crng_fast_load(); it is relevant at crng_init==0 for determining when to switch to crng_init==1 (and where in the RNG state array to write). As far as I understand: - crng_init==0 means "we have nothing, we might just be returning the same exact numbers on every boot on every machine, we don't even have non-cryptographic randomness; we should shove every bit of entropy we can get into the RNG immediately" - crng_init==1 means "well we have something, it might not be cryptographic, but at least we're not gonna return the same data every time or whatever, it's probably good enough for TCP and ASLR and stuff; we now have time to build up actual cryptographic entropy in the input pool" - crng_init==2 means "this is supposed to be cryptographically secure now, but we'll keep adding more entropy just to be sure". The current code means that if someone is pulling data from /dev/urandom fast enough at crng_init==0, we'll keep resetting crng_init_cnt, and we'll never make forward progress to crng_init==1. It seems to be intended to prevent an attacker from bruteforcing the contents of small individual RNG inputs on the way from crng_init==0 to crng_init==1, but that's misguided; crng_init==1 isn't supposed to provide proper cryptographic security anyway, RNG users who care about getting secure RNG output have to wait until crng_init==2. This code was inconsistent, and it probably made things worse - just get rid of it. Signed-off-by: Jann Horn Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 4 ---- 1 file changed, 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index a01f865a9970..e972dc4c633a 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -1832,7 +1832,6 @@ urandom_read_nowarn(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, static ssize_t urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos) { - unsigned long flags; static int maxwarn = 10; if (!crng_ready() && maxwarn > 0) { @@ -1840,9 +1839,6 @@ urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos) if (__ratelimit(&urandom_warning)) pr_notice("%s: uninitialized urandom read (%zd bytes read)\n", current->comm, nbytes); - spin_lock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags); - crng_init_cnt = 0; - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags); } return urandom_read_nowarn(file, buf, nbytes, ppos); From 5c3818e3bd7b7005a2d81010ff38e65831a27352 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Schspa Shi Date: Fri, 14 Jan 2022 16:12:16 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0480/1091] random: fix typo in comments commit c0a8a61e7abbf66729687ee63659ee25983fbb1e upstream. s/or/for Signed-off-by: Schspa Shi Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index e972dc4c633a..ccb00a0cf067 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ * =============================== * * There are four exported interfaces; two for use within the kernel, - * and two or use from userspace. + * and two for use from userspace. * * Exported interfaces ---- userspace output * ----------------------------------------- From 4ac4c7f057fffd8434b682c7f45c8da29e9a914d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Sun, 9 Jan 2022 17:32:02 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0481/1091] random: cleanup poolinfo abstraction commit 91ec0fe138f107232cb36bc6112211db37cb5306 upstream. Now that we're only using one polynomial, we can cleanup its representation into constants, instead of passing around pointers dynamically to select different polynomials. This improves the codegen and makes the code a bit more straightforward. Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 67 +++++++++++++++++++------------------------ 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index ccb00a0cf067..070274e47f02 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -431,14 +431,20 @@ static int random_write_wakeup_bits = 28 * OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS; * polynomial which improves the resulting TGFSR polynomial to be * irreducible, which we have made here. */ -static const struct poolinfo { - int poolbitshift, poolwords, poolbytes, poolfracbits; -#define S(x) ilog2(x)+5, (x), (x)*4, (x) << (ENTROPY_SHIFT+5) - int tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5; -} poolinfo_table[] = { - /* was: x^128 + x^103 + x^76 + x^51 +x^25 + x + 1 */ +enum poolinfo { + POOL_WORDS = 128, + POOL_WORDMASK = POOL_WORDS - 1, + POOL_BYTES = POOL_WORDS * sizeof(u32), + POOL_BITS = POOL_BYTES * 8, + POOL_BITSHIFT = ilog2(POOL_WORDS) + 5, + POOL_FRACBITS = POOL_WORDS << (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 5), + /* x^128 + x^104 + x^76 + x^51 +x^25 + x + 1 */ - { S(128), 104, 76, 51, 25, 1 }, + POOL_TAP1 = 104, + POOL_TAP2 = 76, + POOL_TAP3 = 51, + POOL_TAP4 = 25, + POOL_TAP5 = 1 }; /* @@ -504,7 +510,6 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(ratelimit_disable, "Disable random ratelimit suppression"); struct entropy_store; struct entropy_store { /* read-only data: */ - const struct poolinfo *poolinfo; __u32 *pool; const char *name; @@ -526,7 +531,6 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r); static __u32 input_pool_data[INPUT_POOL_WORDS] __latent_entropy; static struct entropy_store input_pool = { - .poolinfo = &poolinfo_table[0], .name = "input", .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(input_pool.lock), .pool = input_pool_data @@ -549,33 +553,26 @@ static __u32 const twist_table[8] = { static void _mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in, int nbytes) { - unsigned long i, tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5; + unsigned long i; int input_rotate; - int wordmask = r->poolinfo->poolwords - 1; const unsigned char *bytes = in; __u32 w; - tap1 = r->poolinfo->tap1; - tap2 = r->poolinfo->tap2; - tap3 = r->poolinfo->tap3; - tap4 = r->poolinfo->tap4; - tap5 = r->poolinfo->tap5; - input_rotate = r->input_rotate; i = r->add_ptr; /* mix one byte at a time to simplify size handling and churn faster */ while (nbytes--) { w = rol32(*bytes++, input_rotate); - i = (i - 1) & wordmask; + i = (i - 1) & POOL_WORDMASK; /* XOR in the various taps */ w ^= r->pool[i]; - w ^= r->pool[(i + tap1) & wordmask]; - w ^= r->pool[(i + tap2) & wordmask]; - w ^= r->pool[(i + tap3) & wordmask]; - w ^= r->pool[(i + tap4) & wordmask]; - w ^= r->pool[(i + tap5) & wordmask]; + w ^= r->pool[(i + POOL_TAP1) & POOL_WORDMASK]; + w ^= r->pool[(i + POOL_TAP2) & POOL_WORDMASK]; + w ^= r->pool[(i + POOL_TAP3) & POOL_WORDMASK]; + w ^= r->pool[(i + POOL_TAP4) & POOL_WORDMASK]; + w ^= r->pool[(i + POOL_TAP5) & POOL_WORDMASK]; /* Mix the result back in with a twist */ r->pool[i] = (w >> 3) ^ twist_table[w & 7]; @@ -673,7 +670,6 @@ static void process_random_ready_list(void) static void credit_entropy_bits(struct entropy_store *r, int nbits) { int entropy_count, orig; - const int pool_size = r->poolinfo->poolfracbits; int nfrac = nbits << ENTROPY_SHIFT; if (!nbits) @@ -707,25 +703,25 @@ retry: * turns no matter how large nbits is. */ int pnfrac = nfrac; - const int s = r->poolinfo->poolbitshift + ENTROPY_SHIFT + 2; + const int s = POOL_BITSHIFT + ENTROPY_SHIFT + 2; /* The +2 corresponds to the /4 in the denominator */ do { - unsigned int anfrac = min(pnfrac, pool_size/2); + unsigned int anfrac = min(pnfrac, POOL_FRACBITS/2); unsigned int add = - ((pool_size - entropy_count)*anfrac*3) >> s; + ((POOL_FRACBITS - entropy_count)*anfrac*3) >> s; entropy_count += add; pnfrac -= anfrac; - } while (unlikely(entropy_count < pool_size-2 && pnfrac)); + } while (unlikely(entropy_count < POOL_FRACBITS-2 && pnfrac)); } if (WARN_ON(entropy_count < 0)) { pr_warn("negative entropy/overflow: pool %s count %d\n", r->name, entropy_count); entropy_count = 0; - } else if (entropy_count > pool_size) - entropy_count = pool_size; + } else if (entropy_count > POOL_FRACBITS) + entropy_count = POOL_FRACBITS; if (cmpxchg(&r->entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig) goto retry; @@ -742,13 +738,11 @@ retry: static int credit_entropy_bits_safe(struct entropy_store *r, int nbits) { - const int nbits_max = r->poolinfo->poolwords * 32; - if (nbits < 0) return -EINVAL; /* Cap the value to avoid overflows */ - nbits = min(nbits, nbits_max); + nbits = min(nbits, POOL_BITS); credit_entropy_bits(r, nbits); return 0; @@ -1344,7 +1338,7 @@ static size_t account(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes, int min, int entropy_count, orig, have_bytes; size_t ibytes, nfrac; - BUG_ON(r->entropy_count > r->poolinfo->poolfracbits); + BUG_ON(r->entropy_count > POOL_FRACBITS); /* Can we pull enough? */ retry: @@ -1410,8 +1404,7 @@ static void extract_buf(struct entropy_store *r, __u8 *out) /* Generate a hash across the pool */ spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags); - blake2s_update(&state, (const u8 *)r->pool, - r->poolinfo->poolwords * sizeof(*r->pool)); + blake2s_update(&state, (const u8 *)r->pool, POOL_BYTES); blake2s_final(&state, hash); /* final zeros out state */ /* @@ -1767,7 +1760,7 @@ static void __init init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r) unsigned long rv; mix_pool_bytes(r, &now, sizeof(now)); - for (i = r->poolinfo->poolbytes; i > 0; i -= sizeof(rv)) { + for (i = POOL_BYTES; i > 0; i -= sizeof(rv)) { if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) && !arch_get_random_long(&rv)) rv = random_get_entropy(); From adcbbb44ccc197af578e594bd1530b70410add70 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Sun, 9 Jan 2022 17:48:58 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0482/1091] random: cleanup integer types commit d38bb0853589c939573ea50e9cb64f733e0e273d upstream. Rather than using the userspace type, __uXX, switch to using uXX. And rather than using variously chosen `char *` or `unsigned char *`, use `u8 *` uniformly for things that aren't strings, in the case where we are doing byte-by-byte traversal. Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 105 +++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 070274e47f02..e10745fabff2 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -457,7 +457,7 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(random_ready_list_lock); static LIST_HEAD(random_ready_list); struct crng_state { - __u32 state[16]; + u32 state[16]; unsigned long init_time; spinlock_t lock; }; @@ -484,9 +484,9 @@ static bool crng_need_final_init = false; static int crng_init_cnt = 0; static unsigned long crng_global_init_time = 0; #define CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH (2*CHACHA_KEY_SIZE) -static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, __u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]); +static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]); static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng, - __u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE], int used); + u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE], int used); static void process_random_ready_list(void); static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes); @@ -510,16 +510,16 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(ratelimit_disable, "Disable random ratelimit suppression"); struct entropy_store; struct entropy_store { /* read-only data: */ - __u32 *pool; + u32 *pool; const char *name; /* read-write data: */ spinlock_t lock; - unsigned short add_ptr; - unsigned short input_rotate; + u16 add_ptr; + u16 input_rotate; int entropy_count; unsigned int last_data_init:1; - __u8 last_data[EXTRACT_SIZE]; + u8 last_data[EXTRACT_SIZE]; }; static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf, @@ -528,7 +528,7 @@ static ssize_t _extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf, size_t nbytes, int fips); static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r); -static __u32 input_pool_data[INPUT_POOL_WORDS] __latent_entropy; +static u32 input_pool_data[INPUT_POOL_WORDS] __latent_entropy; static struct entropy_store input_pool = { .name = "input", @@ -536,7 +536,7 @@ static struct entropy_store input_pool = { .pool = input_pool_data }; -static __u32 const twist_table[8] = { +static u32 const twist_table[8] = { 0x00000000, 0x3b6e20c8, 0x76dc4190, 0x4db26158, 0xedb88320, 0xd6d6a3e8, 0x9b64c2b0, 0xa00ae278 }; @@ -555,8 +555,8 @@ static void _mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in, { unsigned long i; int input_rotate; - const unsigned char *bytes = in; - __u32 w; + const u8 *bytes = in; + u32 w; input_rotate = r->input_rotate; i = r->add_ptr; @@ -609,10 +609,10 @@ static void mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in, } struct fast_pool { - __u32 pool[4]; + u32 pool[4]; unsigned long last; - unsigned short reg_idx; - unsigned char count; + u16 reg_idx; + u8 count; }; /* @@ -622,8 +622,8 @@ struct fast_pool { */ static void fast_mix(struct fast_pool *f) { - __u32 a = f->pool[0], b = f->pool[1]; - __u32 c = f->pool[2], d = f->pool[3]; + u32 a = f->pool[0], b = f->pool[1]; + u32 c = f->pool[2], d = f->pool[3]; a += b; c += d; b = rol32(b, 6); d = rol32(d, 27); @@ -815,14 +815,14 @@ static bool __init crng_init_try_arch_early(struct crng_state *crng) static void crng_initialize_secondary(struct crng_state *crng) { chacha_init_consts(crng->state); - _get_random_bytes(&crng->state[4], sizeof(__u32) * 12); + _get_random_bytes(&crng->state[4], sizeof(u32) * 12); crng_init_try_arch(crng); crng->init_time = jiffies - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL - 1; } static void __init crng_initialize_primary(struct crng_state *crng) { - _extract_entropy(&input_pool, &crng->state[4], sizeof(__u32) * 12, 0); + _extract_entropy(&input_pool, &crng->state[4], sizeof(u32) * 12, 0); if (crng_init_try_arch_early(crng) && trust_cpu && crng_init < 2) { invalidate_batched_entropy(); numa_crng_init(); @@ -912,10 +912,10 @@ static struct crng_state *select_crng(void) * path. So we can't afford to dilly-dally. Returns the number of * bytes processed from cp. */ -static size_t crng_fast_load(const char *cp, size_t len) +static size_t crng_fast_load(const u8 *cp, size_t len) { unsigned long flags; - char *p; + u8 *p; size_t ret = 0; if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags)) @@ -924,7 +924,7 @@ static size_t crng_fast_load(const char *cp, size_t len) spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags); return 0; } - p = (unsigned char *) &primary_crng.state[4]; + p = (u8 *) &primary_crng.state[4]; while (len > 0 && crng_init_cnt < CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) { p[crng_init_cnt % CHACHA_KEY_SIZE] ^= *cp; cp++; crng_init_cnt++; len--; ret++; @@ -952,14 +952,14 @@ static size_t crng_fast_load(const char *cp, size_t len) * like a fixed DMI table (for example), which might very well be * unique to the machine, but is otherwise unvarying. */ -static int crng_slow_load(const char *cp, size_t len) +static int crng_slow_load(const u8 *cp, size_t len) { unsigned long flags; - static unsigned char lfsr = 1; - unsigned char tmp; - unsigned i, max = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE; - const char * src_buf = cp; - char * dest_buf = (char *) &primary_crng.state[4]; + static u8 lfsr = 1; + u8 tmp; + unsigned int i, max = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE; + const u8 * src_buf = cp; + u8 * dest_buf = (u8 *) &primary_crng.state[4]; if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags)) return 0; @@ -988,8 +988,8 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r) unsigned long flags; int i, num; union { - __u8 block[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]; - __u32 key[8]; + u8 block[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]; + u32 key[8]; } buf; if (r) { @@ -1016,7 +1016,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r) } static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, - __u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]) + u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]) { unsigned long flags, init_time; @@ -1034,7 +1034,7 @@ static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags); } -static void extract_crng(__u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]) +static void extract_crng(u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]) { _extract_crng(select_crng(), out); } @@ -1044,26 +1044,26 @@ static void extract_crng(__u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]) * enough) to mutate the CRNG key to provide backtracking protection. */ static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng, - __u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE], int used) + u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE], int used) { unsigned long flags; - __u32 *s, *d; + u32 *s, *d; int i; - used = round_up(used, sizeof(__u32)); + used = round_up(used, sizeof(u32)); if (used + CHACHA_KEY_SIZE > CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE) { extract_crng(tmp); used = 0; } spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags); - s = (__u32 *) &tmp[used]; + s = (u32 *) &tmp[used]; d = &crng->state[4]; for (i=0; i < 8; i++) *d++ ^= *s++; spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags); } -static void crng_backtrack_protect(__u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE], int used) +static void crng_backtrack_protect(u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE], int used) { _crng_backtrack_protect(select_crng(), tmp, used); } @@ -1071,7 +1071,7 @@ static void crng_backtrack_protect(__u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE], int used) static ssize_t extract_crng_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes) { ssize_t ret = 0, i = CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE; - __u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(4); + u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(4); int large_request = (nbytes > 256); while (nbytes) { @@ -1159,8 +1159,8 @@ static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned num) struct entropy_store *r; struct { long jiffies; - unsigned cycles; - unsigned num; + unsigned int cycles; + unsigned int num; } sample; long delta, delta2, delta3; @@ -1242,15 +1242,15 @@ static void add_interrupt_bench(cycles_t start) #define add_interrupt_bench(x) #endif -static __u32 get_reg(struct fast_pool *f, struct pt_regs *regs) +static u32 get_reg(struct fast_pool *f, struct pt_regs *regs) { - __u32 *ptr = (__u32 *) regs; + u32 *ptr = (u32 *) regs; unsigned int idx; if (regs == NULL) return 0; idx = READ_ONCE(f->reg_idx); - if (idx >= sizeof(struct pt_regs) / sizeof(__u32)) + if (idx >= sizeof(struct pt_regs) / sizeof(u32)) idx = 0; ptr += idx++; WRITE_ONCE(f->reg_idx, idx); @@ -1264,8 +1264,8 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) struct pt_regs *regs = get_irq_regs(); unsigned long now = jiffies; cycles_t cycles = random_get_entropy(); - __u32 c_high, j_high; - __u64 ip; + u32 c_high, j_high; + u64 ip; if (cycles == 0) cycles = get_reg(fast_pool, regs); @@ -1283,8 +1283,7 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) { if ((fast_pool->count >= 64) && - crng_fast_load((char *) fast_pool->pool, - sizeof(fast_pool->pool)) > 0) { + crng_fast_load((u8 *)fast_pool->pool, sizeof(fast_pool->pool)) > 0) { fast_pool->count = 0; fast_pool->last = now; } @@ -1381,7 +1380,7 @@ retry: * * Note: we assume that .poolwords is a multiple of 16 words. */ -static void extract_buf(struct entropy_store *r, __u8 *out) +static void extract_buf(struct entropy_store *r, u8 *out) { struct blake2s_state state __aligned(__alignof__(unsigned long)); u8 hash[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE]; @@ -1431,7 +1430,7 @@ static ssize_t _extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf, size_t nbytes, int fips) { ssize_t ret = 0, i; - __u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE]; + u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE]; unsigned long flags; while (nbytes) { @@ -1469,7 +1468,7 @@ static ssize_t _extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf, static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf, size_t nbytes, int min, int reserved) { - __u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE]; + u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE]; unsigned long flags; /* if last_data isn't primed, we need EXTRACT_SIZE extra bytes */ @@ -1531,7 +1530,7 @@ static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(const char *func_name, void *caller, */ static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes) { - __u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(4); + u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(4); trace_get_random_bytes(nbytes, _RET_IP_); @@ -1725,7 +1724,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(del_random_ready_callback); int __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes) { int left = nbytes; - char *p = buf; + u8 *p = buf; trace_get_random_bytes_arch(left, _RET_IP_); while (left) { @@ -1867,7 +1866,7 @@ static int write_pool(struct entropy_store *r, const char __user *buffer, size_t count) { size_t bytes; - __u32 t, buf[16]; + u32 t, buf[16]; const char __user *p = buffer; while (count > 0) { @@ -1877,7 +1876,7 @@ write_pool(struct entropy_store *r, const char __user *buffer, size_t count) if (copy_from_user(&buf, p, bytes)) return -EFAULT; - for (b = bytes ; b > 0 ; b -= sizeof(__u32), i++) { + for (b = bytes; b > 0; b -= sizeof(u32), i++) { if (!arch_get_random_int(&t)) break; buf[i] ^= t; From 12f17e3f3a14ecd6b9ec5d402afa8b75a2c122ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Wed, 12 Jan 2022 15:22:30 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0483/1091] random: remove incomplete last_data logic commit a4bfa9b31802c14ff5847123c12b98d5e36b3985 upstream. There were a few things added under the "if (fips_enabled)" banner, which never really got completed, and the FIPS people anyway are choosing a different direction. Rather than keep around this halfbaked code, get rid of it so that we can focus on a single design of the RNG rather than two designs. Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 40 ++++------------------------------------ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index e10745fabff2..971a8941637c 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -337,8 +337,6 @@ #include #include #include -#include -#include #include #include #include @@ -518,14 +516,12 @@ struct entropy_store { u16 add_ptr; u16 input_rotate; int entropy_count; - unsigned int last_data_init:1; - u8 last_data[EXTRACT_SIZE]; }; static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf, size_t nbytes, int min, int rsvd); static ssize_t _extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf, - size_t nbytes, int fips); + size_t nbytes); static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r); static u32 input_pool_data[INPUT_POOL_WORDS] __latent_entropy; @@ -822,7 +818,7 @@ static void crng_initialize_secondary(struct crng_state *crng) static void __init crng_initialize_primary(struct crng_state *crng) { - _extract_entropy(&input_pool, &crng->state[4], sizeof(u32) * 12, 0); + _extract_entropy(&input_pool, &crng->state[4], sizeof(u32) * 12); if (crng_init_try_arch_early(crng) && trust_cpu && crng_init < 2) { invalidate_batched_entropy(); numa_crng_init(); @@ -1427,22 +1423,13 @@ static void extract_buf(struct entropy_store *r, u8 *out) } static ssize_t _extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf, - size_t nbytes, int fips) + size_t nbytes) { ssize_t ret = 0, i; u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE]; - unsigned long flags; while (nbytes) { extract_buf(r, tmp); - - if (fips) { - spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags); - if (!memcmp(tmp, r->last_data, EXTRACT_SIZE)) - panic("Hardware RNG duplicated output!\n"); - memcpy(r->last_data, tmp, EXTRACT_SIZE); - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags); - } i = min_t(int, nbytes, EXTRACT_SIZE); memcpy(buf, tmp, i); nbytes -= i; @@ -1468,28 +1455,9 @@ static ssize_t _extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf, static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf, size_t nbytes, int min, int reserved) { - u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE]; - unsigned long flags; - - /* if last_data isn't primed, we need EXTRACT_SIZE extra bytes */ - if (fips_enabled) { - spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags); - if (!r->last_data_init) { - r->last_data_init = 1; - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags); - trace_extract_entropy(r->name, EXTRACT_SIZE, - ENTROPY_BITS(r), _RET_IP_); - extract_buf(r, tmp); - spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags); - memcpy(r->last_data, tmp, EXTRACT_SIZE); - } - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags); - } - trace_extract_entropy(r->name, nbytes, ENTROPY_BITS(r), _RET_IP_); nbytes = account(r, nbytes, min, reserved); - - return _extract_entropy(r, buf, nbytes, fips_enabled); + return _extract_entropy(r, buf, nbytes); } #define warn_unseeded_randomness(previous) \ From 14652d8642802afd4fb3c7f6640b9bba57f63f5c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Wed, 12 Jan 2022 15:28:21 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0484/1091] random: remove unused extract_entropy() reserved argument commit 8b2d953b91e7f60200c24067ab17b77cc7bfd0d4 upstream. This argument is always set to zero, as a result of us not caring about keeping a certain amount reserved in the pool these days. So just remove it and cleanup the function signatures. Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 17 +++++++---------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 971a8941637c..f87a57b3c86a 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -519,7 +519,7 @@ struct entropy_store { }; static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf, - size_t nbytes, int min, int rsvd); + size_t nbytes, int min); static ssize_t _extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf, size_t nbytes); @@ -989,7 +989,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r) } buf; if (r) { - num = extract_entropy(r, &buf, 32, 16, 0); + num = extract_entropy(r, &buf, 32, 16); if (num == 0) return; } else { @@ -1327,8 +1327,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_disk_randomness); * This function decides how many bytes to actually take from the * given pool, and also debits the entropy count accordingly. */ -static size_t account(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes, int min, - int reserved) +static size_t account(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes, int min) { int entropy_count, orig, have_bytes; size_t ibytes, nfrac; @@ -1342,7 +1341,7 @@ retry: /* never pull more than available */ have_bytes = entropy_count >> (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3); - if ((have_bytes -= reserved) < 0) + if (have_bytes < 0) have_bytes = 0; ibytes = min_t(size_t, ibytes, have_bytes); if (ibytes < min) @@ -1448,15 +1447,13 @@ static ssize_t _extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf, * returns it in a buffer. * * The min parameter specifies the minimum amount we can pull before - * failing to avoid races that defeat catastrophic reseeding while the - * reserved parameter indicates how much entropy we must leave in the - * pool after each pull to avoid starving other readers. + * failing to avoid races that defeat catastrophic reseeding. */ static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf, - size_t nbytes, int min, int reserved) + size_t nbytes, int min) { trace_extract_entropy(r->name, nbytes, ENTROPY_BITS(r), _RET_IP_); - nbytes = account(r, nbytes, min, reserved); + nbytes = account(r, nbytes, min); return _extract_entropy(r, buf, nbytes); } From 74cb3093f2de5a882df2613f30283bc63ae54a6d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Wed, 12 Jan 2022 17:18:08 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0485/1091] random: rather than entropy_store abstraction, use global commit 90ed1e67e896cc8040a523f8428fc02f9b164394 upstream. Originally, the RNG used several pools, so having things abstracted out over a generic entropy_store object made sense. These days, there's only one input pool, and then an uneven mix of usage via the abstraction and usage via &input_pool. Rather than this uneasy mixture, just get rid of the abstraction entirely and have things always use the global. This simplifies the code and makes reading it a bit easier. Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 219 +++++++++++++++------------------- include/trace/events/random.h | 56 ++++----- 2 files changed, 117 insertions(+), 158 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index f87a57b3c86a..97a0835c9f55 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -375,7 +375,7 @@ * credit_entropy_bits() needs to be 64 bits wide. */ #define ENTROPY_SHIFT 3 -#define ENTROPY_BITS(r) ((r)->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT) +#define ENTROPY_BITS() (input_pool.entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT) /* * If the entropy count falls under this number of bits, then we @@ -505,33 +505,27 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(ratelimit_disable, "Disable random ratelimit suppression"); * **********************************************************************/ -struct entropy_store; -struct entropy_store { +static u32 input_pool_data[INPUT_POOL_WORDS] __latent_entropy; + +static struct { /* read-only data: */ u32 *pool; - const char *name; /* read-write data: */ spinlock_t lock; u16 add_ptr; u16 input_rotate; int entropy_count; -}; - -static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf, - size_t nbytes, int min); -static ssize_t _extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf, - size_t nbytes); - -static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r); -static u32 input_pool_data[INPUT_POOL_WORDS] __latent_entropy; - -static struct entropy_store input_pool = { - .name = "input", +} input_pool = { .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(input_pool.lock), .pool = input_pool_data }; +static ssize_t extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes, int min); +static ssize_t _extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes); + +static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, bool use_input_pool); + static u32 const twist_table[8] = { 0x00000000, 0x3b6e20c8, 0x76dc4190, 0x4db26158, 0xedb88320, 0xd6d6a3e8, 0x9b64c2b0, 0xa00ae278 }; @@ -546,16 +540,15 @@ static u32 const twist_table[8] = { * it's cheap to do so and helps slightly in the expected case where * the entropy is concentrated in the low-order bits. */ -static void _mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in, - int nbytes) +static void _mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, int nbytes) { unsigned long i; int input_rotate; const u8 *bytes = in; u32 w; - input_rotate = r->input_rotate; - i = r->add_ptr; + input_rotate = input_pool.input_rotate; + i = input_pool.add_ptr; /* mix one byte at a time to simplify size handling and churn faster */ while (nbytes--) { @@ -563,15 +556,15 @@ static void _mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in, i = (i - 1) & POOL_WORDMASK; /* XOR in the various taps */ - w ^= r->pool[i]; - w ^= r->pool[(i + POOL_TAP1) & POOL_WORDMASK]; - w ^= r->pool[(i + POOL_TAP2) & POOL_WORDMASK]; - w ^= r->pool[(i + POOL_TAP3) & POOL_WORDMASK]; - w ^= r->pool[(i + POOL_TAP4) & POOL_WORDMASK]; - w ^= r->pool[(i + POOL_TAP5) & POOL_WORDMASK]; + w ^= input_pool.pool[i]; + w ^= input_pool.pool[(i + POOL_TAP1) & POOL_WORDMASK]; + w ^= input_pool.pool[(i + POOL_TAP2) & POOL_WORDMASK]; + w ^= input_pool.pool[(i + POOL_TAP3) & POOL_WORDMASK]; + w ^= input_pool.pool[(i + POOL_TAP4) & POOL_WORDMASK]; + w ^= input_pool.pool[(i + POOL_TAP5) & POOL_WORDMASK]; /* Mix the result back in with a twist */ - r->pool[i] = (w >> 3) ^ twist_table[w & 7]; + input_pool.pool[i] = (w >> 3) ^ twist_table[w & 7]; /* * Normally, we add 7 bits of rotation to the pool. @@ -582,26 +575,24 @@ static void _mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in, input_rotate = (input_rotate + (i ? 7 : 14)) & 31; } - r->input_rotate = input_rotate; - r->add_ptr = i; + input_pool.input_rotate = input_rotate; + input_pool.add_ptr = i; } -static void __mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in, - int nbytes) +static void __mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, int nbytes) { - trace_mix_pool_bytes_nolock(r->name, nbytes, _RET_IP_); - _mix_pool_bytes(r, in, nbytes); + trace_mix_pool_bytes_nolock(nbytes, _RET_IP_); + _mix_pool_bytes(in, nbytes); } -static void mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in, - int nbytes) +static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, int nbytes) { unsigned long flags; - trace_mix_pool_bytes(r->name, nbytes, _RET_IP_); - spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags); - _mix_pool_bytes(r, in, nbytes); - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags); + trace_mix_pool_bytes(nbytes, _RET_IP_); + spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags); + _mix_pool_bytes(in, nbytes); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags); } struct fast_pool { @@ -663,16 +654,16 @@ static void process_random_ready_list(void) * Use credit_entropy_bits_safe() if the value comes from userspace * or otherwise should be checked for extreme values. */ -static void credit_entropy_bits(struct entropy_store *r, int nbits) +static void credit_entropy_bits(int nbits) { - int entropy_count, orig; + int entropy_count, entropy_bits, orig; int nfrac = nbits << ENTROPY_SHIFT; if (!nbits) return; retry: - entropy_count = orig = READ_ONCE(r->entropy_count); + entropy_count = orig = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count); if (nfrac < 0) { /* Debit */ entropy_count += nfrac; @@ -713,26 +704,21 @@ retry: } if (WARN_ON(entropy_count < 0)) { - pr_warn("negative entropy/overflow: pool %s count %d\n", - r->name, entropy_count); + pr_warn("negative entropy/overflow: count %d\n", entropy_count); entropy_count = 0; } else if (entropy_count > POOL_FRACBITS) entropy_count = POOL_FRACBITS; - if (cmpxchg(&r->entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig) + if (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig) goto retry; - trace_credit_entropy_bits(r->name, nbits, - entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT, _RET_IP_); + trace_credit_entropy_bits(nbits, entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT, _RET_IP_); - if (r == &input_pool) { - int entropy_bits = entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT; - - if (crng_init < 2 && entropy_bits >= 128) - crng_reseed(&primary_crng, r); - } + entropy_bits = entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT; + if (crng_init < 2 && entropy_bits >= 128) + crng_reseed(&primary_crng, true); } -static int credit_entropy_bits_safe(struct entropy_store *r, int nbits) +static int credit_entropy_bits_safe(int nbits) { if (nbits < 0) return -EINVAL; @@ -740,7 +726,7 @@ static int credit_entropy_bits_safe(struct entropy_store *r, int nbits) /* Cap the value to avoid overflows */ nbits = min(nbits, POOL_BITS); - credit_entropy_bits(r, nbits); + credit_entropy_bits(nbits); return 0; } @@ -818,7 +804,7 @@ static void crng_initialize_secondary(struct crng_state *crng) static void __init crng_initialize_primary(struct crng_state *crng) { - _extract_entropy(&input_pool, &crng->state[4], sizeof(u32) * 12); + _extract_entropy(&crng->state[4], sizeof(u32) * 12); if (crng_init_try_arch_early(crng) && trust_cpu && crng_init < 2) { invalidate_batched_entropy(); numa_crng_init(); @@ -979,7 +965,7 @@ static int crng_slow_load(const u8 *cp, size_t len) return 1; } -static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r) +static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, bool use_input_pool) { unsigned long flags; int i, num; @@ -988,8 +974,8 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r) u32 key[8]; } buf; - if (r) { - num = extract_entropy(r, &buf, 32, 16); + if (use_input_pool) { + num = extract_entropy(&buf, 32, 16); if (num == 0) return; } else { @@ -1020,8 +1006,7 @@ static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, init_time = READ_ONCE(crng->init_time); if (time_after(READ_ONCE(crng_global_init_time), init_time) || time_after(jiffies, init_time + CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL)) - crng_reseed(crng, crng == &primary_crng ? - &input_pool : NULL); + crng_reseed(crng, crng == &primary_crng); } spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags); chacha20_block(&crng->state[0], out); @@ -1132,8 +1117,8 @@ void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size) trace_add_device_randomness(size, _RET_IP_); spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags); - _mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, buf, size); - _mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, &time, sizeof(time)); + _mix_pool_bytes(buf, size); + _mix_pool_bytes(&time, sizeof(time)); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_device_randomness); @@ -1152,7 +1137,6 @@ static struct timer_rand_state input_timer_state = INIT_TIMER_RAND_STATE; */ static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned num) { - struct entropy_store *r; struct { long jiffies; unsigned int cycles; @@ -1163,8 +1147,7 @@ static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned num) sample.jiffies = jiffies; sample.cycles = random_get_entropy(); sample.num = num; - r = &input_pool; - mix_pool_bytes(r, &sample, sizeof(sample)); + mix_pool_bytes(&sample, sizeof(sample)); /* * Calculate number of bits of randomness we probably added. @@ -1196,7 +1179,7 @@ static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned num) * Round down by 1 bit on general principles, * and limit entropy estimate to 12 bits. */ - credit_entropy_bits(r, min_t(int, fls(delta>>1), 11)); + credit_entropy_bits(min_t(int, fls(delta>>1), 11)); } void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, @@ -1211,7 +1194,7 @@ void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, last_value = value; add_timer_randomness(&input_timer_state, (type << 4) ^ code ^ (code >> 4) ^ value); - trace_add_input_randomness(ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool)); + trace_add_input_randomness(ENTROPY_BITS()); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_input_randomness); @@ -1255,7 +1238,6 @@ static u32 get_reg(struct fast_pool *f, struct pt_regs *regs) void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) { - struct entropy_store *r; struct fast_pool *fast_pool = this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness); struct pt_regs *regs = get_irq_regs(); unsigned long now = jiffies; @@ -1290,18 +1272,17 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) !time_after(now, fast_pool->last + HZ)) return; - r = &input_pool; - if (!spin_trylock(&r->lock)) + if (!spin_trylock(&input_pool.lock)) return; fast_pool->last = now; - __mix_pool_bytes(r, &fast_pool->pool, sizeof(fast_pool->pool)); - spin_unlock(&r->lock); + __mix_pool_bytes(&fast_pool->pool, sizeof(fast_pool->pool)); + spin_unlock(&input_pool.lock); fast_pool->count = 0; /* award one bit for the contents of the fast pool */ - credit_entropy_bits(r, 1); + credit_entropy_bits(1); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_interrupt_randomness); @@ -1312,7 +1293,7 @@ void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk) return; /* first major is 1, so we get >= 0x200 here */ add_timer_randomness(disk->random, 0x100 + disk_devt(disk)); - trace_add_disk_randomness(disk_devt(disk), ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool)); + trace_add_disk_randomness(disk_devt(disk), ENTROPY_BITS()); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_disk_randomness); #endif @@ -1327,16 +1308,16 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_disk_randomness); * This function decides how many bytes to actually take from the * given pool, and also debits the entropy count accordingly. */ -static size_t account(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes, int min) +static size_t account(size_t nbytes, int min) { int entropy_count, orig, have_bytes; size_t ibytes, nfrac; - BUG_ON(r->entropy_count > POOL_FRACBITS); + BUG_ON(input_pool.entropy_count > POOL_FRACBITS); /* Can we pull enough? */ retry: - entropy_count = orig = READ_ONCE(r->entropy_count); + entropy_count = orig = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count); ibytes = nbytes; /* never pull more than available */ have_bytes = entropy_count >> (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3); @@ -1348,8 +1329,7 @@ retry: ibytes = 0; if (WARN_ON(entropy_count < 0)) { - pr_warn("negative entropy count: pool %s count %d\n", - r->name, entropy_count); + pr_warn("negative entropy count: count %d\n", entropy_count); entropy_count = 0; } nfrac = ibytes << (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3); @@ -1358,11 +1338,11 @@ retry: else entropy_count = 0; - if (cmpxchg(&r->entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig) + if (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig) goto retry; - trace_debit_entropy(r->name, 8 * ibytes); - if (ibytes && ENTROPY_BITS(r) < random_write_wakeup_bits) { + trace_debit_entropy(8 * ibytes); + if (ibytes && ENTROPY_BITS() < random_write_wakeup_bits) { wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait); kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT); } @@ -1375,7 +1355,7 @@ retry: * * Note: we assume that .poolwords is a multiple of 16 words. */ -static void extract_buf(struct entropy_store *r, u8 *out) +static void extract_buf(u8 *out) { struct blake2s_state state __aligned(__alignof__(unsigned long)); u8 hash[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE]; @@ -1397,8 +1377,8 @@ static void extract_buf(struct entropy_store *r, u8 *out) } /* Generate a hash across the pool */ - spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags); - blake2s_update(&state, (const u8 *)r->pool, POOL_BYTES); + spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags); + blake2s_update(&state, (const u8 *)input_pool.pool, POOL_BYTES); blake2s_final(&state, hash); /* final zeros out state */ /* @@ -1410,8 +1390,8 @@ static void extract_buf(struct entropy_store *r, u8 *out) * brute-forcing the feedback as hard as brute-forcing the * hash. */ - __mix_pool_bytes(r, hash, sizeof(hash)); - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags); + __mix_pool_bytes(hash, sizeof(hash)); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags); /* Note that EXTRACT_SIZE is half of hash size here, because above * we've dumped the full length back into mixer. By reducing the @@ -1421,14 +1401,13 @@ static void extract_buf(struct entropy_store *r, u8 *out) memzero_explicit(hash, sizeof(hash)); } -static ssize_t _extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf, - size_t nbytes) +static ssize_t _extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes) { ssize_t ret = 0, i; u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE]; while (nbytes) { - extract_buf(r, tmp); + extract_buf(tmp); i = min_t(int, nbytes, EXTRACT_SIZE); memcpy(buf, tmp, i); nbytes -= i; @@ -1449,12 +1428,11 @@ static ssize_t _extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf, * The min parameter specifies the minimum amount we can pull before * failing to avoid races that defeat catastrophic reseeding. */ -static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf, - size_t nbytes, int min) +static ssize_t extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes, int min) { - trace_extract_entropy(r->name, nbytes, ENTROPY_BITS(r), _RET_IP_); - nbytes = account(r, nbytes, min); - return _extract_entropy(r, buf, nbytes); + trace_extract_entropy(nbytes, ENTROPY_BITS(), _RET_IP_); + nbytes = account(nbytes, min); + return _extract_entropy(buf, nbytes); } #define warn_unseeded_randomness(previous) \ @@ -1539,7 +1517,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes); */ static void entropy_timer(struct timer_list *t) { - credit_entropy_bits(&input_pool, 1); + credit_entropy_bits(1); } /* @@ -1563,14 +1541,14 @@ static void try_to_generate_entropy(void) while (!crng_ready()) { if (!timer_pending(&stack.timer)) mod_timer(&stack.timer, jiffies+1); - mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, &stack.now, sizeof(stack.now)); + mix_pool_bytes(&stack.now, sizeof(stack.now)); schedule(); stack.now = random_get_entropy(); } del_timer_sync(&stack.timer); destroy_timer_on_stack(&stack.timer); - mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, &stack.now, sizeof(stack.now)); + mix_pool_bytes(&stack.now, sizeof(stack.now)); } /* @@ -1711,26 +1689,24 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch); /* * init_std_data - initialize pool with system data * - * @r: pool to initialize - * * This function clears the pool's entropy count and mixes some system * data into the pool to prepare it for use. The pool is not cleared * as that can only decrease the entropy in the pool. */ -static void __init init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r) +static void __init init_std_data(void) { int i; ktime_t now = ktime_get_real(); unsigned long rv; - mix_pool_bytes(r, &now, sizeof(now)); + mix_pool_bytes(&now, sizeof(now)); for (i = POOL_BYTES; i > 0; i -= sizeof(rv)) { if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) && !arch_get_random_long(&rv)) rv = random_get_entropy(); - mix_pool_bytes(r, &rv, sizeof(rv)); + mix_pool_bytes(&rv, sizeof(rv)); } - mix_pool_bytes(r, utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname()))); + mix_pool_bytes(utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname()))); } /* @@ -1745,7 +1721,7 @@ static void __init init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r) */ int __init rand_initialize(void) { - init_std_data(&input_pool); + init_std_data(); if (crng_need_final_init) crng_finalize_init(&primary_crng); crng_initialize_primary(&primary_crng); @@ -1782,7 +1758,7 @@ urandom_read_nowarn(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, nbytes = min_t(size_t, nbytes, INT_MAX >> (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3)); ret = extract_crng_user(buf, nbytes); - trace_urandom_read(8 * nbytes, 0, ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool)); + trace_urandom_read(8 * nbytes, 0, ENTROPY_BITS()); return ret; } @@ -1822,13 +1798,13 @@ random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table * wait) mask = 0; if (crng_ready()) mask |= EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM; - if (ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) < random_write_wakeup_bits) + if (ENTROPY_BITS() < random_write_wakeup_bits) mask |= EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM; return mask; } static int -write_pool(struct entropy_store *r, const char __user *buffer, size_t count) +write_pool(const char __user *buffer, size_t count) { size_t bytes; u32 t, buf[16]; @@ -1850,7 +1826,7 @@ write_pool(struct entropy_store *r, const char __user *buffer, size_t count) count -= bytes; p += bytes; - mix_pool_bytes(r, buf, bytes); + mix_pool_bytes(buf, bytes); cond_resched(); } @@ -1862,7 +1838,7 @@ static ssize_t random_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer, { size_t ret; - ret = write_pool(&input_pool, buffer, count); + ret = write_pool(buffer, count); if (ret) return ret; @@ -1878,7 +1854,7 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) switch (cmd) { case RNDGETENTCNT: /* inherently racy, no point locking */ - ent_count = ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool); + ent_count = ENTROPY_BITS(); if (put_user(ent_count, p)) return -EFAULT; return 0; @@ -1887,7 +1863,7 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) return -EPERM; if (get_user(ent_count, p)) return -EFAULT; - return credit_entropy_bits_safe(&input_pool, ent_count); + return credit_entropy_bits_safe(ent_count); case RNDADDENTROPY: if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; @@ -1897,11 +1873,10 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) return -EINVAL; if (get_user(size, p++)) return -EFAULT; - retval = write_pool(&input_pool, (const char __user *)p, - size); + retval = write_pool((const char __user *)p, size); if (retval < 0) return retval; - return credit_entropy_bits_safe(&input_pool, ent_count); + return credit_entropy_bits_safe(ent_count); case RNDZAPENTCNT: case RNDCLEARPOOL: /* @@ -1917,7 +1892,7 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) return -EPERM; if (crng_init < 2) return -ENODATA; - crng_reseed(&primary_crng, &input_pool); + crng_reseed(&primary_crng, true); WRITE_ONCE(crng_global_init_time, jiffies - 1); return 0; default: @@ -2241,11 +2216,9 @@ randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range) void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count, size_t entropy) { - struct entropy_store *poolp = &input_pool; - if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) { size_t ret = crng_fast_load(buffer, count); - mix_pool_bytes(poolp, buffer, ret); + mix_pool_bytes(buffer, ret); count -= ret; buffer += ret; if (!count || crng_init == 0) @@ -2258,9 +2231,9 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count, */ wait_event_interruptible(random_write_wait, !system_wq || kthread_should_stop() || - ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) <= random_write_wakeup_bits); - mix_pool_bytes(poolp, buffer, count); - credit_entropy_bits(poolp, entropy); + ENTROPY_BITS() <= random_write_wakeup_bits); + mix_pool_bytes(buffer, count); + credit_entropy_bits(entropy); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_hwgenerator_randomness); diff --git a/include/trace/events/random.h b/include/trace/events/random.h index 07a99b883f1c..8f60803edb24 100644 --- a/include/trace/events/random.h +++ b/include/trace/events/random.h @@ -28,80 +28,71 @@ TRACE_EVENT(add_device_randomness, ); DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(random__mix_pool_bytes, - TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int bytes, unsigned long IP), + TP_PROTO(int bytes, unsigned long IP), - TP_ARGS(pool_name, bytes, IP), + TP_ARGS(bytes, IP), TP_STRUCT__entry( - __field( const char *, pool_name ) __field( int, bytes ) __field(unsigned long, IP ) ), TP_fast_assign( - __entry->pool_name = pool_name; __entry->bytes = bytes; __entry->IP = IP; ), - TP_printk("%s pool: bytes %d caller %pS", - __entry->pool_name, __entry->bytes, (void *)__entry->IP) + TP_printk("input pool: bytes %d caller %pS", + __entry->bytes, (void *)__entry->IP) ); DEFINE_EVENT(random__mix_pool_bytes, mix_pool_bytes, - TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int bytes, unsigned long IP), + TP_PROTO(int bytes, unsigned long IP), - TP_ARGS(pool_name, bytes, IP) + TP_ARGS(bytes, IP) ); DEFINE_EVENT(random__mix_pool_bytes, mix_pool_bytes_nolock, - TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int bytes, unsigned long IP), + TP_PROTO(int bytes, unsigned long IP), - TP_ARGS(pool_name, bytes, IP) + TP_ARGS(bytes, IP) ); TRACE_EVENT(credit_entropy_bits, - TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int bits, int entropy_count, - unsigned long IP), + TP_PROTO(int bits, int entropy_count, unsigned long IP), - TP_ARGS(pool_name, bits, entropy_count, IP), + TP_ARGS(bits, entropy_count, IP), TP_STRUCT__entry( - __field( const char *, pool_name ) __field( int, bits ) __field( int, entropy_count ) __field(unsigned long, IP ) ), TP_fast_assign( - __entry->pool_name = pool_name; __entry->bits = bits; __entry->entropy_count = entropy_count; __entry->IP = IP; ), - TP_printk("%s pool: bits %d entropy_count %d caller %pS", - __entry->pool_name, __entry->bits, - __entry->entropy_count, (void *)__entry->IP) + TP_printk("input pool: bits %d entropy_count %d caller %pS", + __entry->bits, __entry->entropy_count, (void *)__entry->IP) ); TRACE_EVENT(debit_entropy, - TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int debit_bits), + TP_PROTO(int debit_bits), - TP_ARGS(pool_name, debit_bits), + TP_ARGS( debit_bits), TP_STRUCT__entry( - __field( const char *, pool_name ) __field( int, debit_bits ) ), TP_fast_assign( - __entry->pool_name = pool_name; __entry->debit_bits = debit_bits; ), - TP_printk("%s: debit_bits %d", __entry->pool_name, - __entry->debit_bits) + TP_printk("input pool: debit_bits %d", __entry->debit_bits) ); TRACE_EVENT(add_input_randomness, @@ -170,36 +161,31 @@ DEFINE_EVENT(random__get_random_bytes, get_random_bytes_arch, ); DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(random__extract_entropy, - TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int nbytes, int entropy_count, - unsigned long IP), + TP_PROTO(int nbytes, int entropy_count, unsigned long IP), - TP_ARGS(pool_name, nbytes, entropy_count, IP), + TP_ARGS(nbytes, entropy_count, IP), TP_STRUCT__entry( - __field( const char *, pool_name ) __field( int, nbytes ) __field( int, entropy_count ) __field(unsigned long, IP ) ), TP_fast_assign( - __entry->pool_name = pool_name; __entry->nbytes = nbytes; __entry->entropy_count = entropy_count; __entry->IP = IP; ), - TP_printk("%s pool: nbytes %d entropy_count %d caller %pS", - __entry->pool_name, __entry->nbytes, __entry->entropy_count, - (void *)__entry->IP) + TP_printk("input pool: nbytes %d entropy_count %d caller %pS", + __entry->nbytes, __entry->entropy_count, (void *)__entry->IP) ); DEFINE_EVENT(random__extract_entropy, extract_entropy, - TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int nbytes, int entropy_count, - unsigned long IP), + TP_PROTO(int nbytes, int entropy_count, unsigned long IP), - TP_ARGS(pool_name, nbytes, entropy_count, IP) + TP_ARGS(nbytes, entropy_count, IP) ); TRACE_EVENT(urandom_read, From e35576c4cb18f16a5b8eb9f5c00410e90faf0c82 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2022 15:51:06 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0486/1091] random: remove unused OUTPUT_POOL constants commit 0f63702718c91d89c922081ac1e6baeddc2d8b1a upstream. We no longer have an output pool. Rather, we have just a wakeup bits threshold for /dev/random reads, presumably so that processes don't hang. This value, random_write_wakeup_bits, is configurable anyway. So all the no longer usefully named OUTPUT_POOL constants were doing was setting a reasonable default for random_write_wakeup_bits. This commit gets rid of the constants and just puts it all in the default value of random_write_wakeup_bits. Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 4 +--- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 97a0835c9f55..df4d86b5245b 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -363,8 +363,6 @@ */ #define INPUT_POOL_SHIFT 12 #define INPUT_POOL_WORDS (1 << (INPUT_POOL_SHIFT-5)) -#define OUTPUT_POOL_SHIFT 10 -#define OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS (1 << (OUTPUT_POOL_SHIFT-5)) #define EXTRACT_SIZE (BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE / 2) /* @@ -382,7 +380,7 @@ * should wake up processes which are selecting or polling on write * access to /dev/random. */ -static int random_write_wakeup_bits = 28 * OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS; +static int random_write_wakeup_bits = 28 * (1 << 5); /* * Originally, we used a primitive polynomial of degree .poolwords From 0fe4a64fd94664183b3caea059f0fcaec42ee751 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2022 16:11:21 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0487/1091] random: de-duplicate INPUT_POOL constants commit 5b87adf30f1464477169a1d653e9baf8c012bbfe upstream. We already had the POOL_* constants, so deduplicate the older INPUT_POOL ones. As well, fold EXTRACT_SIZE into the poolinfo enum, since it's related. Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 17 ++++++----------- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index df4d86b5245b..8184b963d7be 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -358,13 +358,6 @@ /* #define ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH */ -/* - * Configuration information - */ -#define INPUT_POOL_SHIFT 12 -#define INPUT_POOL_WORDS (1 << (INPUT_POOL_SHIFT-5)) -#define EXTRACT_SIZE (BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE / 2) - /* * To allow fractional bits to be tracked, the entropy_count field is * denominated in units of 1/8th bits. @@ -440,7 +433,9 @@ enum poolinfo { POOL_TAP2 = 76, POOL_TAP3 = 51, POOL_TAP4 = 25, - POOL_TAP5 = 1 + POOL_TAP5 = 1, + + EXTRACT_SIZE = BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE / 2 }; /* @@ -503,7 +498,7 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(ratelimit_disable, "Disable random ratelimit suppression"); * **********************************************************************/ -static u32 input_pool_data[INPUT_POOL_WORDS] __latent_entropy; +static u32 input_pool_data[POOL_WORDS] __latent_entropy; static struct { /* read-only data: */ @@ -1961,7 +1956,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count, #include static int min_write_thresh; -static int max_write_thresh = INPUT_POOL_WORDS * 32; +static int max_write_thresh = POOL_BITS; static int random_min_urandom_seed = 60; static char sysctl_bootid[16]; @@ -2018,7 +2013,7 @@ static int proc_do_entropy(struct ctl_table *table, int write, return proc_dointvec(&fake_table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); } -static int sysctl_poolsize = INPUT_POOL_WORDS * 32; +static int sysctl_poolsize = POOL_BITS; extern struct ctl_table random_table[]; struct ctl_table random_table[] = { { From 1b6f1d32a85833468f2e596843ccbe56fa871ae9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Fri, 14 Jan 2022 16:48:35 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0488/1091] random: prepend remaining pool constants with POOL_ commit b3d51c1f542113342ddfbf6007e38a684b9dbec9 upstream. The other pool constants are prepended with POOL_, but not these last ones. Rename them. This will then let us move them into the enum in the following commit. Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 8184b963d7be..3f848bb472ec 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -362,11 +362,11 @@ * To allow fractional bits to be tracked, the entropy_count field is * denominated in units of 1/8th bits. * - * 2*(ENTROPY_SHIFT + poolbitshift) must <= 31, or the multiply in + * 2*(POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT + poolbitshift) must <= 31, or the multiply in * credit_entropy_bits() needs to be 64 bits wide. */ -#define ENTROPY_SHIFT 3 -#define ENTROPY_BITS() (input_pool.entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT) +#define POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT 3 +#define POOL_ENTROPY_BITS() (input_pool.entropy_count >> POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT) /* * If the entropy count falls under this number of bits, then we @@ -426,7 +426,7 @@ enum poolinfo { POOL_BYTES = POOL_WORDS * sizeof(u32), POOL_BITS = POOL_BYTES * 8, POOL_BITSHIFT = ilog2(POOL_WORDS) + 5, - POOL_FRACBITS = POOL_WORDS << (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 5), + POOL_FRACBITS = POOL_WORDS << (POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT + 5), /* x^128 + x^104 + x^76 + x^51 +x^25 + x + 1 */ POOL_TAP1 = 104, @@ -650,7 +650,7 @@ static void process_random_ready_list(void) static void credit_entropy_bits(int nbits) { int entropy_count, entropy_bits, orig; - int nfrac = nbits << ENTROPY_SHIFT; + int nfrac = nbits << POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT; if (!nbits) return; @@ -683,7 +683,7 @@ retry: * turns no matter how large nbits is. */ int pnfrac = nfrac; - const int s = POOL_BITSHIFT + ENTROPY_SHIFT + 2; + const int s = POOL_BITSHIFT + POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT + 2; /* The +2 corresponds to the /4 in the denominator */ do { @@ -704,9 +704,9 @@ retry: if (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig) goto retry; - trace_credit_entropy_bits(nbits, entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT, _RET_IP_); + trace_credit_entropy_bits(nbits, entropy_count >> POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT, _RET_IP_); - entropy_bits = entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT; + entropy_bits = entropy_count >> POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT; if (crng_init < 2 && entropy_bits >= 128) crng_reseed(&primary_crng, true); } @@ -1187,7 +1187,7 @@ void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, last_value = value; add_timer_randomness(&input_timer_state, (type << 4) ^ code ^ (code >> 4) ^ value); - trace_add_input_randomness(ENTROPY_BITS()); + trace_add_input_randomness(POOL_ENTROPY_BITS()); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_input_randomness); @@ -1286,7 +1286,7 @@ void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk) return; /* first major is 1, so we get >= 0x200 here */ add_timer_randomness(disk->random, 0x100 + disk_devt(disk)); - trace_add_disk_randomness(disk_devt(disk), ENTROPY_BITS()); + trace_add_disk_randomness(disk_devt(disk), POOL_ENTROPY_BITS()); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_disk_randomness); #endif @@ -1313,7 +1313,7 @@ retry: entropy_count = orig = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count); ibytes = nbytes; /* never pull more than available */ - have_bytes = entropy_count >> (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3); + have_bytes = entropy_count >> (POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3); if (have_bytes < 0) have_bytes = 0; @@ -1325,7 +1325,7 @@ retry: pr_warn("negative entropy count: count %d\n", entropy_count); entropy_count = 0; } - nfrac = ibytes << (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3); + nfrac = ibytes << (POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3); if ((size_t) entropy_count > nfrac) entropy_count -= nfrac; else @@ -1335,7 +1335,7 @@ retry: goto retry; trace_debit_entropy(8 * ibytes); - if (ibytes && ENTROPY_BITS() < random_write_wakeup_bits) { + if (ibytes && POOL_ENTROPY_BITS() < random_write_wakeup_bits) { wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait); kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT); } @@ -1423,7 +1423,7 @@ static ssize_t _extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes) */ static ssize_t extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes, int min) { - trace_extract_entropy(nbytes, ENTROPY_BITS(), _RET_IP_); + trace_extract_entropy(nbytes, POOL_ENTROPY_BITS(), _RET_IP_); nbytes = account(nbytes, min); return _extract_entropy(buf, nbytes); } @@ -1749,9 +1749,9 @@ urandom_read_nowarn(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, { int ret; - nbytes = min_t(size_t, nbytes, INT_MAX >> (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3)); + nbytes = min_t(size_t, nbytes, INT_MAX >> (POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3)); ret = extract_crng_user(buf, nbytes); - trace_urandom_read(8 * nbytes, 0, ENTROPY_BITS()); + trace_urandom_read(8 * nbytes, 0, POOL_ENTROPY_BITS()); return ret; } @@ -1791,7 +1791,7 @@ random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table * wait) mask = 0; if (crng_ready()) mask |= EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM; - if (ENTROPY_BITS() < random_write_wakeup_bits) + if (POOL_ENTROPY_BITS() < random_write_wakeup_bits) mask |= EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM; return mask; } @@ -1847,7 +1847,7 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) switch (cmd) { case RNDGETENTCNT: /* inherently racy, no point locking */ - ent_count = ENTROPY_BITS(); + ent_count = POOL_ENTROPY_BITS(); if (put_user(ent_count, p)) return -EFAULT; return 0; @@ -2005,7 +2005,7 @@ static int proc_do_entropy(struct ctl_table *table, int write, struct ctl_table fake_table; int entropy_count; - entropy_count = *(int *)table->data >> ENTROPY_SHIFT; + entropy_count = *(int *)table->data >> POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT; fake_table.data = &entropy_count; fake_table.maxlen = sizeof(entropy_count); @@ -2224,7 +2224,7 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count, */ wait_event_interruptible(random_write_wait, !system_wq || kthread_should_stop() || - ENTROPY_BITS() <= random_write_wakeup_bits); + POOL_ENTROPY_BITS() <= random_write_wakeup_bits); mix_pool_bytes(buffer, count); credit_entropy_bits(entropy); } From 4f5400ca7fc1173db7d72697b33f352d7f780a6a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2022 18:18:48 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0489/1091] random: cleanup fractional entropy shift constants commit 18263c4e8e62f7329f38f5eadc568751242ca89c upstream. The entropy estimator is calculated in terms of 1/8 bits, which means there are various constants where things are shifted by 3. Move these into our pool info enum with the other relevant constants. While we're at it, move an English assertion about sizes into a proper BUILD_BUG_ON so that the compiler can ensure this invariant. Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 28 +++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 3f848bb472ec..629e69ac0ab2 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -358,16 +358,6 @@ /* #define ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH */ -/* - * To allow fractional bits to be tracked, the entropy_count field is - * denominated in units of 1/8th bits. - * - * 2*(POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT + poolbitshift) must <= 31, or the multiply in - * credit_entropy_bits() needs to be 64 bits wide. - */ -#define POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT 3 -#define POOL_ENTROPY_BITS() (input_pool.entropy_count >> POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT) - /* * If the entropy count falls under this number of bits, then we * should wake up processes which are selecting or polling on write @@ -425,8 +415,13 @@ enum poolinfo { POOL_WORDMASK = POOL_WORDS - 1, POOL_BYTES = POOL_WORDS * sizeof(u32), POOL_BITS = POOL_BYTES * 8, - POOL_BITSHIFT = ilog2(POOL_WORDS) + 5, - POOL_FRACBITS = POOL_WORDS << (POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT + 5), + POOL_BITSHIFT = ilog2(POOL_BITS), + + /* To allow fractional bits to be tracked, the entropy_count field is + * denominated in units of 1/8th bits. */ + POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT = 3, +#define POOL_ENTROPY_BITS() (input_pool.entropy_count >> POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT) + POOL_FRACBITS = POOL_BITS << POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT, /* x^128 + x^104 + x^76 + x^51 +x^25 + x + 1 */ POOL_TAP1 = 104, @@ -652,6 +647,9 @@ static void credit_entropy_bits(int nbits) int entropy_count, entropy_bits, orig; int nfrac = nbits << POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT; + /* Ensure that the multiplication can avoid being 64 bits wide. */ + BUILD_BUG_ON(2 * (POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT + POOL_BITSHIFT) > 31); + if (!nbits) return; @@ -687,13 +685,13 @@ retry: /* The +2 corresponds to the /4 in the denominator */ do { - unsigned int anfrac = min(pnfrac, POOL_FRACBITS/2); + unsigned int anfrac = min(pnfrac, POOL_FRACBITS / 2); unsigned int add = - ((POOL_FRACBITS - entropy_count)*anfrac*3) >> s; + ((POOL_FRACBITS - entropy_count) * anfrac * 3) >> s; entropy_count += add; pnfrac -= anfrac; - } while (unlikely(entropy_count < POOL_FRACBITS-2 && pnfrac)); + } while (unlikely(entropy_count < POOL_FRACBITS - 2 && pnfrac)); } if (WARN_ON(entropy_count < 0)) { From 86eac12b1cf58a0c2ea8f3718e6ce8e6e4393b56 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Sat, 15 Jan 2022 14:40:04 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0490/1091] random: access input_pool_data directly rather than through pointer commit 6c0eace6e1499712583b6ee62d95161e8b3449f5 upstream. This gets rid of another abstraction we no longer need. It would be nice if we could instead make pool an array rather than a pointer, but the latent entropy plugin won't be able to do its magic in that case. So instead we put all accesses to the input pool's actual data through the input_pool_data array directly. Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 21 ++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 629e69ac0ab2..14f73682e795 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -496,17 +496,12 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(ratelimit_disable, "Disable random ratelimit suppression"); static u32 input_pool_data[POOL_WORDS] __latent_entropy; static struct { - /* read-only data: */ - u32 *pool; - - /* read-write data: */ spinlock_t lock; u16 add_ptr; u16 input_rotate; int entropy_count; } input_pool = { .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(input_pool.lock), - .pool = input_pool_data }; static ssize_t extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes, int min); @@ -544,15 +539,15 @@ static void _mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, int nbytes) i = (i - 1) & POOL_WORDMASK; /* XOR in the various taps */ - w ^= input_pool.pool[i]; - w ^= input_pool.pool[(i + POOL_TAP1) & POOL_WORDMASK]; - w ^= input_pool.pool[(i + POOL_TAP2) & POOL_WORDMASK]; - w ^= input_pool.pool[(i + POOL_TAP3) & POOL_WORDMASK]; - w ^= input_pool.pool[(i + POOL_TAP4) & POOL_WORDMASK]; - w ^= input_pool.pool[(i + POOL_TAP5) & POOL_WORDMASK]; + w ^= input_pool_data[i]; + w ^= input_pool_data[(i + POOL_TAP1) & POOL_WORDMASK]; + w ^= input_pool_data[(i + POOL_TAP2) & POOL_WORDMASK]; + w ^= input_pool_data[(i + POOL_TAP3) & POOL_WORDMASK]; + w ^= input_pool_data[(i + POOL_TAP4) & POOL_WORDMASK]; + w ^= input_pool_data[(i + POOL_TAP5) & POOL_WORDMASK]; /* Mix the result back in with a twist */ - input_pool.pool[i] = (w >> 3) ^ twist_table[w & 7]; + input_pool_data[i] = (w >> 3) ^ twist_table[w & 7]; /* * Normally, we add 7 bits of rotation to the pool. @@ -1369,7 +1364,7 @@ static void extract_buf(u8 *out) /* Generate a hash across the pool */ spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags); - blake2s_update(&state, (const u8 *)input_pool.pool, POOL_BYTES); + blake2s_update(&state, (const u8 *)input_pool_data, POOL_BYTES); blake2s_final(&state, hash); /* final zeros out state */ /* From 56de23dcf9d00c529af403d01a4741d1ec8408c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Sat, 15 Jan 2022 14:57:22 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0491/1091] random: selectively clang-format where it makes sense commit 248045b8dea5a32ddc0aa44193d6bc70c4b9cd8e upstream. This is an old driver that has seen a lot of different eras of kernel coding style. In an effort to make it easier to code for, unify the coding style around the current norm, by accepting some of -- but certainly not all of -- the suggestions from clang-format. This should remove ambiguity in coding style, especially with regards to spacing, when code is being changed or amended. Consequently it also makes code review easier on the eyes, following one uniform style rather than several. Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 201 ++++++++++++++++++++---------------------- 1 file changed, 95 insertions(+), 106 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 14f73682e795..169820275ed4 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ * * The primary kernel interface is * - * void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes); + * void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes); * * This interface will return the requested number of random bytes, * and place it in the requested buffer. This is equivalent to a @@ -132,10 +132,10 @@ * * For less critical applications, there are the functions: * - * u32 get_random_u32() - * u64 get_random_u64() - * unsigned int get_random_int() - * unsigned long get_random_long() + * u32 get_random_u32() + * u64 get_random_u64() + * unsigned int get_random_int() + * unsigned long get_random_long() * * These are produced by a cryptographic RNG seeded from get_random_bytes, * and so do not deplete the entropy pool as much. These are recommended @@ -197,10 +197,10 @@ * from the devices are: * * void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size); - * void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, + * void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, * unsigned int value); * void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq); - * void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk); + * void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk); * void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count, * size_t entropy); * void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size); @@ -296,8 +296,8 @@ * /dev/random and /dev/urandom created already, they can be created * by using the commands: * - * mknod /dev/random c 1 8 - * mknod /dev/urandom c 1 9 + * mknod /dev/random c 1 8 + * mknod /dev/urandom c 1 9 * * Acknowledgements: * ================= @@ -443,9 +443,9 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(random_ready_list_lock); static LIST_HEAD(random_ready_list); struct crng_state { - u32 state[16]; - unsigned long init_time; - spinlock_t lock; + u32 state[16]; + unsigned long init_time; + spinlock_t lock; }; static struct crng_state primary_crng = { @@ -469,7 +469,7 @@ static bool crng_need_final_init = false; #define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init > 1)) static int crng_init_cnt = 0; static unsigned long crng_global_init_time = 0; -#define CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH (2*CHACHA_KEY_SIZE) +#define CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH (2 * CHACHA_KEY_SIZE) static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]); static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng, u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE], int used); @@ -509,7 +509,7 @@ static ssize_t _extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes); static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, bool use_input_pool); -static u32 const twist_table[8] = { +static const u32 twist_table[8] = { 0x00000000, 0x3b6e20c8, 0x76dc4190, 0x4db26158, 0xedb88320, 0xd6d6a3e8, 0x9b64c2b0, 0xa00ae278 }; @@ -579,10 +579,10 @@ static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, int nbytes) } struct fast_pool { - u32 pool[4]; - unsigned long last; - u16 reg_idx; - u8 count; + u32 pool[4]; + unsigned long last; + u16 reg_idx; + u8 count; }; /* @@ -710,7 +710,7 @@ static int credit_entropy_bits_safe(int nbits) return -EINVAL; /* Cap the value to avoid overflows */ - nbits = min(nbits, POOL_BITS); + nbits = min(nbits, POOL_BITS); credit_entropy_bits(nbits); return 0; @@ -722,7 +722,7 @@ static int credit_entropy_bits_safe(int nbits) * *********************************************************************/ -#define CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL (300*HZ) +#define CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL (300 * HZ) static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_init_wait); @@ -746,9 +746,9 @@ early_param("random.trust_cpu", parse_trust_cpu); static bool crng_init_try_arch(struct crng_state *crng) { - int i; - bool arch_init = true; - unsigned long rv; + int i; + bool arch_init = true; + unsigned long rv; for (i = 4; i < 16; i++) { if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) && @@ -764,9 +764,9 @@ static bool crng_init_try_arch(struct crng_state *crng) static bool __init crng_init_try_arch_early(struct crng_state *crng) { - int i; - bool arch_init = true; - unsigned long rv; + int i; + bool arch_init = true; + unsigned long rv; for (i = 4; i < 16; i++) { if (!arch_get_random_seed_long_early(&rv) && @@ -836,7 +836,7 @@ static void do_numa_crng_init(struct work_struct *work) struct crng_state *crng; struct crng_state **pool; - pool = kcalloc(nr_node_ids, sizeof(*pool), GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOFAIL); + pool = kcalloc(nr_node_ids, sizeof(*pool), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL); for_each_online_node(i) { crng = kmalloc_node(sizeof(struct crng_state), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL, i); @@ -892,7 +892,7 @@ static size_t crng_fast_load(const u8 *cp, size_t len) spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags); return 0; } - p = (u8 *) &primary_crng.state[4]; + p = (u8 *)&primary_crng.state[4]; while (len > 0 && crng_init_cnt < CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) { p[crng_init_cnt % CHACHA_KEY_SIZE] ^= *cp; cp++; crng_init_cnt++; len--; ret++; @@ -922,12 +922,12 @@ static size_t crng_fast_load(const u8 *cp, size_t len) */ static int crng_slow_load(const u8 *cp, size_t len) { - unsigned long flags; - static u8 lfsr = 1; - u8 tmp; - unsigned int i, max = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE; - const u8 * src_buf = cp; - u8 * dest_buf = (u8 *) &primary_crng.state[4]; + unsigned long flags; + static u8 lfsr = 1; + u8 tmp; + unsigned int i, max = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE; + const u8 *src_buf = cp; + u8 *dest_buf = (u8 *)&primary_crng.state[4]; if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags)) return 0; @@ -938,7 +938,7 @@ static int crng_slow_load(const u8 *cp, size_t len) if (len > max) max = len; - for (i = 0; i < max ; i++) { + for (i = 0; i < max; i++) { tmp = lfsr; lfsr >>= 1; if (tmp & 1) @@ -953,11 +953,11 @@ static int crng_slow_load(const u8 *cp, size_t len) static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, bool use_input_pool) { - unsigned long flags; - int i, num; + unsigned long flags; + int i, num; union { - u8 block[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]; - u32 key[8]; + u8 block[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]; + u32 key[8]; } buf; if (use_input_pool) { @@ -971,11 +971,11 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, bool use_input_pool) } spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags); for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { - unsigned long rv; + unsigned long rv; if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) && !arch_get_random_long(&rv)) rv = random_get_entropy(); - crng->state[i+4] ^= buf.key[i] ^ rv; + crng->state[i + 4] ^= buf.key[i] ^ rv; } memzero_explicit(&buf, sizeof(buf)); WRITE_ONCE(crng->init_time, jiffies); @@ -983,8 +983,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, bool use_input_pool) crng_finalize_init(crng); } -static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, - u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]) +static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]) { unsigned long flags, init_time; @@ -1013,9 +1012,9 @@ static void extract_crng(u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]) static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng, u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE], int used) { - unsigned long flags; - u32 *s, *d; - int i; + unsigned long flags; + u32 *s, *d; + int i; used = round_up(used, sizeof(u32)); if (used + CHACHA_KEY_SIZE > CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE) { @@ -1023,9 +1022,9 @@ static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng, used = 0; } spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags); - s = (u32 *) &tmp[used]; + s = (u32 *)&tmp[used]; d = &crng->state[4]; - for (i=0; i < 8; i++) + for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) *d++ ^= *s++; spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags); } @@ -1070,7 +1069,6 @@ static ssize_t extract_crng_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes) return ret; } - /********************************************************************* * * Entropy input management @@ -1165,11 +1163,11 @@ static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned num) * Round down by 1 bit on general principles, * and limit entropy estimate to 12 bits. */ - credit_entropy_bits(min_t(int, fls(delta>>1), 11)); + credit_entropy_bits(min_t(int, fls(delta >> 1), 11)); } void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, - unsigned int value) + unsigned int value) { static unsigned char last_value; @@ -1189,19 +1187,19 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct fast_pool, irq_randomness); #ifdef ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH static unsigned long avg_cycles, avg_deviation; -#define AVG_SHIFT 8 /* Exponential average factor k=1/256 */ -#define FIXED_1_2 (1 << (AVG_SHIFT-1)) +#define AVG_SHIFT 8 /* Exponential average factor k=1/256 */ +#define FIXED_1_2 (1 << (AVG_SHIFT - 1)) static void add_interrupt_bench(cycles_t start) { - long delta = random_get_entropy() - start; + long delta = random_get_entropy() - start; - /* Use a weighted moving average */ - delta = delta - ((avg_cycles + FIXED_1_2) >> AVG_SHIFT); - avg_cycles += delta; - /* And average deviation */ - delta = abs(delta) - ((avg_deviation + FIXED_1_2) >> AVG_SHIFT); - avg_deviation += delta; + /* Use a weighted moving average */ + delta = delta - ((avg_cycles + FIXED_1_2) >> AVG_SHIFT); + avg_cycles += delta; + /* And average deviation */ + delta = abs(delta) - ((avg_deviation + FIXED_1_2) >> AVG_SHIFT); + avg_deviation += delta; } #else #define add_interrupt_bench(x) @@ -1209,7 +1207,7 @@ static void add_interrupt_bench(cycles_t start) static u32 get_reg(struct fast_pool *f, struct pt_regs *regs) { - u32 *ptr = (u32 *) regs; + u32 *ptr = (u32 *)regs; unsigned int idx; if (regs == NULL) @@ -1224,12 +1222,12 @@ static u32 get_reg(struct fast_pool *f, struct pt_regs *regs) void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) { - struct fast_pool *fast_pool = this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness); - struct pt_regs *regs = get_irq_regs(); - unsigned long now = jiffies; - cycles_t cycles = random_get_entropy(); - u32 c_high, j_high; - u64 ip; + struct fast_pool *fast_pool = this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness); + struct pt_regs *regs = get_irq_regs(); + unsigned long now = jiffies; + cycles_t cycles = random_get_entropy(); + u32 c_high, j_high; + u64 ip; if (cycles == 0) cycles = get_reg(fast_pool, regs); @@ -1239,8 +1237,8 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) fast_pool->pool[1] ^= now ^ c_high; ip = regs ? instruction_pointer(regs) : _RET_IP_; fast_pool->pool[2] ^= ip; - fast_pool->pool[3] ^= (sizeof(ip) > 4) ? ip >> 32 : - get_reg(fast_pool, regs); + fast_pool->pool[3] ^= + (sizeof(ip) > 4) ? ip >> 32 : get_reg(fast_pool, regs); fast_mix(fast_pool); add_interrupt_bench(cycles); @@ -1254,8 +1252,7 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) return; } - if ((fast_pool->count < 64) && - !time_after(now, fast_pool->last + HZ)) + if ((fast_pool->count < 64) && !time_after(now, fast_pool->last + HZ)) return; if (!spin_trylock(&input_pool.lock)) @@ -1319,7 +1316,7 @@ retry: entropy_count = 0; } nfrac = ibytes << (POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3); - if ((size_t) entropy_count > nfrac) + if ((size_t)entropy_count > nfrac) entropy_count -= nfrac; else entropy_count = 0; @@ -1422,10 +1419,9 @@ static ssize_t extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes, int min) } #define warn_unseeded_randomness(previous) \ - _warn_unseeded_randomness(__func__, (void *) _RET_IP_, (previous)) + _warn_unseeded_randomness(__func__, (void *)_RET_IP_, (previous)) -static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(const char *func_name, void *caller, - void **previous) +static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(const char *func_name, void *caller, void **previous) { #ifdef CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM const bool print_once = false; @@ -1433,8 +1429,7 @@ static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(const char *func_name, void *caller, static bool print_once __read_mostly; #endif - if (print_once || - crng_ready() || + if (print_once || crng_ready() || (previous && (caller == READ_ONCE(*previous)))) return; WRITE_ONCE(*previous, caller); @@ -1442,9 +1437,8 @@ static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(const char *func_name, void *caller, print_once = true; #endif if (__ratelimit(&unseeded_warning)) - printk_deferred(KERN_NOTICE "random: %s called from %pS " - "with crng_init=%d\n", func_name, caller, - crng_init); + printk_deferred(KERN_NOTICE "random: %s called from %pS with crng_init=%d\n", + func_name, caller, crng_init); } /* @@ -1487,7 +1481,6 @@ void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes); - /* * Each time the timer fires, we expect that we got an unpredictable * jump in the cycle counter. Even if the timer is running on another @@ -1526,7 +1519,7 @@ static void try_to_generate_entropy(void) timer_setup_on_stack(&stack.timer, entropy_timer, 0); while (!crng_ready()) { if (!timer_pending(&stack.timer)) - mod_timer(&stack.timer, jiffies+1); + mod_timer(&stack.timer, jiffies + 1); mix_pool_bytes(&stack.now, sizeof(stack.now)); schedule(); stack.now = random_get_entropy(); @@ -1736,9 +1729,8 @@ void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk) } #endif -static ssize_t -urandom_read_nowarn(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, - loff_t *ppos) +static ssize_t urandom_read_nowarn(struct file *file, char __user *buf, + size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos) { int ret; @@ -1748,8 +1740,8 @@ urandom_read_nowarn(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, return ret; } -static ssize_t -urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos) +static ssize_t urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, + loff_t *ppos) { static int maxwarn = 10; @@ -1763,8 +1755,8 @@ urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos) return urandom_read_nowarn(file, buf, nbytes, ppos); } -static ssize_t -random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos) +static ssize_t random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, + loff_t *ppos) { int ret; @@ -1774,8 +1766,7 @@ random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos) return urandom_read_nowarn(file, buf, nbytes, ppos); } -static __poll_t -random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table * wait) +static __poll_t random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait) { __poll_t mask; @@ -1789,8 +1780,7 @@ random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table * wait) return mask; } -static int -write_pool(const char __user *buffer, size_t count) +static int write_pool(const char __user *buffer, size_t count) { size_t bytes; u32 t, buf[16]; @@ -1892,9 +1882,9 @@ static int random_fasync(int fd, struct file *filp, int on) } const struct file_operations random_fops = { - .read = random_read, + .read = random_read, .write = random_write, - .poll = random_poll, + .poll = random_poll, .unlocked_ioctl = random_ioctl, .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl, .fasync = random_fasync, @@ -1902,7 +1892,7 @@ const struct file_operations random_fops = { }; const struct file_operations urandom_fops = { - .read = urandom_read, + .read = urandom_read, .write = random_write, .unlocked_ioctl = random_ioctl, .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl, @@ -1910,19 +1900,19 @@ const struct file_operations urandom_fops = { .llseek = noop_llseek, }; -SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count, - unsigned int, flags) +SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count, unsigned int, + flags) { int ret; - if (flags & ~(GRND_NONBLOCK|GRND_RANDOM|GRND_INSECURE)) + if (flags & ~(GRND_NONBLOCK | GRND_RANDOM | GRND_INSECURE)) return -EINVAL; /* * Requesting insecure and blocking randomness at the same time makes * no sense. */ - if ((flags & (GRND_INSECURE|GRND_RANDOM)) == (GRND_INSECURE|GRND_RANDOM)) + if ((flags & (GRND_INSECURE | GRND_RANDOM)) == (GRND_INSECURE | GRND_RANDOM)) return -EINVAL; if (count > INT_MAX) @@ -2070,7 +2060,7 @@ struct ctl_table random_table[] = { #endif { } }; -#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */ +#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */ struct batched_entropy { union { @@ -2090,7 +2080,7 @@ struct batched_entropy { * point prior. */ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u64) = { - .batch_lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(batched_entropy_u64.lock), + .batch_lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(batched_entropy_u64.lock), }; u64 get_random_u64(void) @@ -2115,7 +2105,7 @@ u64 get_random_u64(void) EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u64); static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u32) = { - .batch_lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(batched_entropy_u32.lock), + .batch_lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(batched_entropy_u32.lock), }; u32 get_random_u32(void) { @@ -2147,7 +2137,7 @@ static void invalidate_batched_entropy(void) int cpu; unsigned long flags; - for_each_possible_cpu (cpu) { + for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { struct batched_entropy *batched_entropy; batched_entropy = per_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u32, cpu); @@ -2176,8 +2166,7 @@ static void invalidate_batched_entropy(void) * Return: A page aligned address within [start, start + range). On error, * @start is returned. */ -unsigned long -randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range) +unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range) { if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(start)) { range -= PAGE_ALIGN(start) - start; From 811e333c4eb2ece7feb972469cdc6f0e4cbe7382 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Mon, 17 Jan 2022 18:43:02 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0492/1091] random: simplify arithmetic function flow in account() commit a254a0e4093fce8c832414a83940736067eed515 upstream. Now that have_bytes is never modified, we can simplify this function. First, we move the check for negative entropy_count to be first. That ensures that subsequent reads of this will be non-negative. Then, have_bytes and ibytes can be folded into their one use site in the min_t() function. Suggested-by: Dominik Brodowski Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 17 ++++++----------- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 169820275ed4..f4f901e3cac7 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -1293,7 +1293,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_disk_randomness); */ static size_t account(size_t nbytes, int min) { - int entropy_count, orig, have_bytes; + int entropy_count, orig; size_t ibytes, nfrac; BUG_ON(input_pool.entropy_count > POOL_FRACBITS); @@ -1301,20 +1301,15 @@ static size_t account(size_t nbytes, int min) /* Can we pull enough? */ retry: entropy_count = orig = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count); - ibytes = nbytes; - /* never pull more than available */ - have_bytes = entropy_count >> (POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3); - - if (have_bytes < 0) - have_bytes = 0; - ibytes = min_t(size_t, ibytes, have_bytes); - if (ibytes < min) - ibytes = 0; - if (WARN_ON(entropy_count < 0)) { pr_warn("negative entropy count: count %d\n", entropy_count); entropy_count = 0; } + + /* never pull more than available */ + ibytes = min_t(size_t, nbytes, entropy_count >> (POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3)); + if (ibytes < min) + ibytes = 0; nfrac = ibytes << (POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3); if ((size_t)entropy_count > nfrac) entropy_count -= nfrac; From 0b9f9b94f1ea1fbe6b542ba3002e070b3d8d6d43 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dominik Brodowski Date: Tue, 25 Jan 2022 21:14:57 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0493/1091] random: continually use hwgenerator randomness commit c321e907aa4803d562d6e70ebed9444ad082f953 upstream. The rngd kernel thread may sleep indefinitely if the entropy count is kept above random_write_wakeup_bits by other entropy sources. To make best use of multiple sources of randomness, mix entropy from hardware RNGs into the pool at least once within CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL. Cc: Herbert Xu Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index f4f901e3cac7..3013e8b5ba34 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -2195,13 +2195,15 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count, return; } - /* Suspend writing if we're above the trickle threshold. + /* Throttle writing if we're above the trickle threshold. * We'll be woken up again once below random_write_wakeup_thresh, - * or when the calling thread is about to terminate. + * when the calling thread is about to terminate, or once + * CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL has lapsed. */ - wait_event_interruptible(random_write_wait, + wait_event_interruptible_timeout(random_write_wait, !system_wq || kthread_should_stop() || - POOL_ENTROPY_BITS() <= random_write_wakeup_bits); + POOL_ENTROPY_BITS() <= random_write_wakeup_bits, + CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL); mix_pool_bytes(buffer, count); credit_entropy_bits(entropy); } From 88609b892fddeeacd0e0981286c384bd49911b14 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dominik Brodowski Date: Sun, 30 Jan 2022 22:03:19 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0494/1091] random: access primary_pool directly rather than through pointer commit ebf7606388732ecf2821ca21087e9446cb4a5b57 upstream. Both crng_initialize_primary() and crng_init_try_arch_early() are only called for the primary_pool. Accessing it directly instead of through a function parameter simplifies the code. Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 14 +++++++------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 3013e8b5ba34..af509b355504 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -762,7 +762,7 @@ static bool crng_init_try_arch(struct crng_state *crng) return arch_init; } -static bool __init crng_init_try_arch_early(struct crng_state *crng) +static bool __init crng_init_try_arch_early(void) { int i; bool arch_init = true; @@ -774,7 +774,7 @@ static bool __init crng_init_try_arch_early(struct crng_state *crng) rv = random_get_entropy(); arch_init = false; } - crng->state[i] ^= rv; + primary_crng.state[i] ^= rv; } return arch_init; @@ -788,16 +788,16 @@ static void crng_initialize_secondary(struct crng_state *crng) crng->init_time = jiffies - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL - 1; } -static void __init crng_initialize_primary(struct crng_state *crng) +static void __init crng_initialize_primary(void) { - _extract_entropy(&crng->state[4], sizeof(u32) * 12); - if (crng_init_try_arch_early(crng) && trust_cpu && crng_init < 2) { + _extract_entropy(&primary_crng.state[4], sizeof(u32) * 12); + if (crng_init_try_arch_early() && trust_cpu && crng_init < 2) { invalidate_batched_entropy(); numa_crng_init(); crng_init = 2; pr_notice("crng init done (trusting CPU's manufacturer)\n"); } - crng->init_time = jiffies - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL - 1; + primary_crng.init_time = jiffies - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL - 1; } static void crng_finalize_init(struct crng_state *crng) @@ -1698,7 +1698,7 @@ int __init rand_initialize(void) init_std_data(); if (crng_need_final_init) crng_finalize_init(&primary_crng); - crng_initialize_primary(&primary_crng); + crng_initialize_primary(); crng_global_init_time = jiffies; if (ratelimit_disable) { urandom_warning.interval = 0; From 99a0f8e22d4cf45c9bcfac0fb76468678688261f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dominik Brodowski Date: Sun, 30 Jan 2022 22:03:20 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0495/1091] random: only call crng_finalize_init() for primary_crng commit 9d5505f1eebeca778074a0260ed077fd85f8792c upstream. crng_finalize_init() returns instantly if it is called for another pool than primary_crng. The test whether crng_finalize_init() is still required can be moved to the relevant caller in crng_reseed(), and crng_need_final_init can be reset to false if crng_finalize_init() is called with workqueues ready. Then, no previous callsite will call crng_finalize_init() unless it is needed, and we can get rid of the superfluous function parameter. Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index af509b355504..12cdd9294da1 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -800,10 +800,8 @@ static void __init crng_initialize_primary(void) primary_crng.init_time = jiffies - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL - 1; } -static void crng_finalize_init(struct crng_state *crng) +static void crng_finalize_init(void) { - if (crng != &primary_crng || crng_init >= 2) - return; if (!system_wq) { /* We can't call numa_crng_init until we have workqueues, * so mark this for processing later. */ @@ -814,6 +812,7 @@ static void crng_finalize_init(struct crng_state *crng) invalidate_batched_entropy(); numa_crng_init(); crng_init = 2; + crng_need_final_init = false; process_random_ready_list(); wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait); kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN); @@ -980,7 +979,8 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, bool use_input_pool) memzero_explicit(&buf, sizeof(buf)); WRITE_ONCE(crng->init_time, jiffies); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags); - crng_finalize_init(crng); + if (crng == &primary_crng && crng_init < 2) + crng_finalize_init(); } static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]) @@ -1697,7 +1697,7 @@ int __init rand_initialize(void) { init_std_data(); if (crng_need_final_init) - crng_finalize_init(&primary_crng); + crng_finalize_init(); crng_initialize_primary(); crng_global_init_time = jiffies; if (ratelimit_disable) { From 4e5814bd2e75fffa2cd34a6bcb369d71227d0cb3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Sun, 16 Jan 2022 14:23:10 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0496/1091] random: use computational hash for entropy extraction commit 6e8ec2552c7d13991148e551e3325a624d73fac6 upstream. The current 4096-bit LFSR used for entropy collection had a few desirable attributes for the context in which it was created. For example, the state was huge, which meant that /dev/random would be able to output quite a bit of accumulated entropy before blocking. It was also, in its time, quite fast at accumulating entropy byte-by-byte, which matters given the varying contexts in which mix_pool_bytes() is called. And its diffusion was relatively high, which meant that changes would ripple across several words of state rather quickly. However, it also suffers from a few security vulnerabilities. In particular, inputs learned by an attacker can be undone, but moreover, if the state of the pool leaks, its contents can be controlled and entirely zeroed out. I've demonstrated this attack with this SMT2 script, , which Boolector/CaDiCal solves in a matter of seconds on a single core of my laptop, resulting in little proof of concept C demonstrators such as . For basically all recent formal models of RNGs, these attacks represent a significant cryptographic flaw. But how does this manifest practically? If an attacker has access to the system to such a degree that he can learn the internal state of the RNG, arguably there are other lower hanging vulnerabilities -- side-channel, infoleak, or otherwise -- that might have higher priority. On the other hand, seed files are frequently used on systems that have a hard time generating much entropy on their own, and these seed files, being files, often leak or are duplicated and distributed accidentally, or are even seeded over the Internet intentionally, where their contents might be recorded or tampered with. Seen this way, an otherwise quasi-implausible vulnerability is a bit more practical than initially thought. Another aspect of the current mix_pool_bytes() function is that, while its performance was arguably competitive for the time in which it was created, it's no longer considered so. This patch improves performance significantly: on a high-end CPU, an i7-11850H, it improves performance of mix_pool_bytes() by 225%, and on a low-end CPU, a Cortex-A7, it improves performance by 103%. This commit replaces the LFSR of mix_pool_bytes() with a straight- forward cryptographic hash function, BLAKE2s, which is already in use for pool extraction. Universal hashing with a secret seed was considered too, something along the lines of , but the requirement for a secret seed makes for a chicken & egg problem. Instead we go with a formally proven scheme using a computational hash function, described in sections 5.1, 6.4, and B.1.8 of . BLAKE2s outputs 256 bits, which should give us an appropriate amount of min-entropy accumulation, and a wide enough margin of collision resistance against active attacks. mix_pool_bytes() becomes a simple call to blake2s_update(), for accumulation, while the extraction step becomes a blake2s_final() to generate a seed, with which we can then do a HKDF-like or BLAKE2X-like expansion, the first part of which we fold back as an init key for subsequent blake2s_update()s, and the rest we produce to the caller. This then is provided to our CRNG like usual. In that expansion step, we make opportunistic use of 32 bytes of RDRAND output, just as before. We also always reseed the crng with 32 bytes, unconditionally, or not at all, rather than sometimes with 16 as before, as we don't win anything by limiting beyond the 16 byte threshold. Going for a hash function as an entropy collector is a conservative, proven approach. The result of all this is a much simpler and much less bespoke construction than what's there now, which not only plugs a vulnerability but also improves performance considerably. Cc: Theodore Ts'o Cc: Dominik Brodowski Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Reviewed-by: Jean-Philippe Aumasson Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 304 ++++++++---------------------------------- 1 file changed, 55 insertions(+), 249 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 12cdd9294da1..e63daee1b406 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -42,61 +42,6 @@ */ /* - * (now, with legal B.S. out of the way.....) - * - * This routine gathers environmental noise from device drivers, etc., - * and returns good random numbers, suitable for cryptographic use. - * Besides the obvious cryptographic uses, these numbers are also good - * for seeding TCP sequence numbers, and other places where it is - * desirable to have numbers which are not only random, but hard to - * predict by an attacker. - * - * Theory of operation - * =================== - * - * Computers are very predictable devices. Hence it is extremely hard - * to produce truly random numbers on a computer --- as opposed to - * pseudo-random numbers, which can easily generated by using a - * algorithm. Unfortunately, it is very easy for attackers to guess - * the sequence of pseudo-random number generators, and for some - * applications this is not acceptable. So instead, we must try to - * gather "environmental noise" from the computer's environment, which - * must be hard for outside attackers to observe, and use that to - * generate random numbers. In a Unix environment, this is best done - * from inside the kernel. - * - * Sources of randomness from the environment include inter-keyboard - * timings, inter-interrupt timings from some interrupts, and other - * events which are both (a) non-deterministic and (b) hard for an - * outside observer to measure. Randomness from these sources are - * added to an "entropy pool", which is mixed using a CRC-like function. - * This is not cryptographically strong, but it is adequate assuming - * the randomness is not chosen maliciously, and it is fast enough that - * the overhead of doing it on every interrupt is very reasonable. - * As random bytes are mixed into the entropy pool, the routines keep - * an *estimate* of how many bits of randomness have been stored into - * the random number generator's internal state. - * - * When random bytes are desired, they are obtained by taking the BLAKE2s - * hash of the contents of the "entropy pool". The BLAKE2s hash avoids - * exposing the internal state of the entropy pool. It is believed to - * be computationally infeasible to derive any useful information - * about the input of BLAKE2s from its output. Even if it is possible to - * analyze BLAKE2s in some clever way, as long as the amount of data - * returned from the generator is less than the inherent entropy in - * the pool, the output data is totally unpredictable. For this - * reason, the routine decreases its internal estimate of how many - * bits of "true randomness" are contained in the entropy pool as it - * outputs random numbers. - * - * If this estimate goes to zero, the routine can still generate - * random numbers; however, an attacker may (at least in theory) be - * able to infer the future output of the generator from prior - * outputs. This requires successful cryptanalysis of BLAKE2s, which is - * not believed to be feasible, but there is a remote possibility. - * Nonetheless, these numbers should be useful for the vast majority - * of purposes. - * * Exported interfaces ---- output * =============================== * @@ -298,23 +243,6 @@ * * mknod /dev/random c 1 8 * mknod /dev/urandom c 1 9 - * - * Acknowledgements: - * ================= - * - * Ideas for constructing this random number generator were derived - * from Pretty Good Privacy's random number generator, and from private - * discussions with Phil Karn. Colin Plumb provided a faster random - * number generator, which speed up the mixing function of the entropy - * pool, taken from PGPfone. Dale Worley has also contributed many - * useful ideas and suggestions to improve this driver. - * - * Any flaws in the design are solely my responsibility, and should - * not be attributed to the Phil, Colin, or any of authors of PGP. - * - * Further background information on this topic may be obtained from - * RFC 1750, "Randomness Recommendations for Security", by Donald - * Eastlake, Steve Crocker, and Jeff Schiller. */ #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt @@ -358,79 +286,15 @@ /* #define ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH */ -/* - * If the entropy count falls under this number of bits, then we - * should wake up processes which are selecting or polling on write - * access to /dev/random. - */ -static int random_write_wakeup_bits = 28 * (1 << 5); - -/* - * Originally, we used a primitive polynomial of degree .poolwords - * over GF(2). The taps for various sizes are defined below. They - * were chosen to be evenly spaced except for the last tap, which is 1 - * to get the twisting happening as fast as possible. - * - * For the purposes of better mixing, we use the CRC-32 polynomial as - * well to make a (modified) twisted Generalized Feedback Shift - * Register. (See M. Matsumoto & Y. Kurita, 1992. Twisted GFSR - * generators. ACM Transactions on Modeling and Computer Simulation - * 2(3):179-194. Also see M. Matsumoto & Y. Kurita, 1994. Twisted - * GFSR generators II. ACM Transactions on Modeling and Computer - * Simulation 4:254-266) - * - * Thanks to Colin Plumb for suggesting this. - * - * The mixing operation is much less sensitive than the output hash, - * where we use BLAKE2s. All that we want of mixing operation is that - * it be a good non-cryptographic hash; i.e. it not produce collisions - * when fed "random" data of the sort we expect to see. As long as - * the pool state differs for different inputs, we have preserved the - * input entropy and done a good job. The fact that an intelligent - * attacker can construct inputs that will produce controlled - * alterations to the pool's state is not important because we don't - * consider such inputs to contribute any randomness. The only - * property we need with respect to them is that the attacker can't - * increase his/her knowledge of the pool's state. Since all - * additions are reversible (knowing the final state and the input, - * you can reconstruct the initial state), if an attacker has any - * uncertainty about the initial state, he/she can only shuffle that - * uncertainty about, but never cause any collisions (which would - * decrease the uncertainty). - * - * Our mixing functions were analyzed by Lacharme, Roeck, Strubel, and - * Videau in their paper, "The Linux Pseudorandom Number Generator - * Revisited" (see: http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/251.pdf). In their - * paper, they point out that we are not using a true Twisted GFSR, - * since Matsumoto & Kurita used a trinomial feedback polynomial (that - * is, with only three taps, instead of the six that we are using). - * As a result, the resulting polynomial is neither primitive nor - * irreducible, and hence does not have a maximal period over - * GF(2**32). They suggest a slight change to the generator - * polynomial which improves the resulting TGFSR polynomial to be - * irreducible, which we have made here. - */ enum poolinfo { - POOL_WORDS = 128, - POOL_WORDMASK = POOL_WORDS - 1, - POOL_BYTES = POOL_WORDS * sizeof(u32), - POOL_BITS = POOL_BYTES * 8, + POOL_BITS = BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE * 8, POOL_BITSHIFT = ilog2(POOL_BITS), /* To allow fractional bits to be tracked, the entropy_count field is * denominated in units of 1/8th bits. */ POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT = 3, #define POOL_ENTROPY_BITS() (input_pool.entropy_count >> POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT) - POOL_FRACBITS = POOL_BITS << POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT, - - /* x^128 + x^104 + x^76 + x^51 +x^25 + x + 1 */ - POOL_TAP1 = 104, - POOL_TAP2 = 76, - POOL_TAP3 = 51, - POOL_TAP4 = 25, - POOL_TAP5 = 1, - - EXTRACT_SIZE = BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE / 2 + POOL_FRACBITS = POOL_BITS << POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT }; /* @@ -438,6 +302,12 @@ enum poolinfo { */ static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_write_wait); static struct fasync_struct *fasync; +/* + * If the entropy count falls under this number of bits, then we + * should wake up processes which are selecting or polling on write + * access to /dev/random. + */ +static int random_write_wakeup_bits = POOL_BITS * 3 / 4; static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(random_ready_list_lock); static LIST_HEAD(random_ready_list); @@ -493,73 +363,31 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(ratelimit_disable, "Disable random ratelimit suppression"); * **********************************************************************/ -static u32 input_pool_data[POOL_WORDS] __latent_entropy; - static struct { + struct blake2s_state hash; spinlock_t lock; - u16 add_ptr; - u16 input_rotate; int entropy_count; } input_pool = { + .hash.h = { BLAKE2S_IV0 ^ (0x01010000 | BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE), + BLAKE2S_IV1, BLAKE2S_IV2, BLAKE2S_IV3, BLAKE2S_IV4, + BLAKE2S_IV5, BLAKE2S_IV6, BLAKE2S_IV7 }, + .hash.outlen = BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE, .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(input_pool.lock), }; -static ssize_t extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes, int min); -static ssize_t _extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes); +static bool extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes, int min); +static void _extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes); static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, bool use_input_pool); -static const u32 twist_table[8] = { - 0x00000000, 0x3b6e20c8, 0x76dc4190, 0x4db26158, - 0xedb88320, 0xd6d6a3e8, 0x9b64c2b0, 0xa00ae278 }; - /* * This function adds bytes into the entropy "pool". It does not * update the entropy estimate. The caller should call * credit_entropy_bits if this is appropriate. - * - * The pool is stirred with a primitive polynomial of the appropriate - * degree, and then twisted. We twist by three bits at a time because - * it's cheap to do so and helps slightly in the expected case where - * the entropy is concentrated in the low-order bits. */ static void _mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, int nbytes) { - unsigned long i; - int input_rotate; - const u8 *bytes = in; - u32 w; - - input_rotate = input_pool.input_rotate; - i = input_pool.add_ptr; - - /* mix one byte at a time to simplify size handling and churn faster */ - while (nbytes--) { - w = rol32(*bytes++, input_rotate); - i = (i - 1) & POOL_WORDMASK; - - /* XOR in the various taps */ - w ^= input_pool_data[i]; - w ^= input_pool_data[(i + POOL_TAP1) & POOL_WORDMASK]; - w ^= input_pool_data[(i + POOL_TAP2) & POOL_WORDMASK]; - w ^= input_pool_data[(i + POOL_TAP3) & POOL_WORDMASK]; - w ^= input_pool_data[(i + POOL_TAP4) & POOL_WORDMASK]; - w ^= input_pool_data[(i + POOL_TAP5) & POOL_WORDMASK]; - - /* Mix the result back in with a twist */ - input_pool_data[i] = (w >> 3) ^ twist_table[w & 7]; - - /* - * Normally, we add 7 bits of rotation to the pool. - * At the beginning of the pool, add an extra 7 bits - * rotation, so that successive passes spread the - * input bits across the pool evenly. - */ - input_rotate = (input_rotate + (i ? 7 : 14)) & 31; - } - - input_pool.input_rotate = input_rotate; - input_pool.add_ptr = i; + blake2s_update(&input_pool.hash, in, nbytes); } static void __mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, int nbytes) @@ -953,15 +781,14 @@ static int crng_slow_load(const u8 *cp, size_t len) static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, bool use_input_pool) { unsigned long flags; - int i, num; + int i; union { u8 block[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]; u32 key[8]; } buf; if (use_input_pool) { - num = extract_entropy(&buf, 32, 16); - if (num == 0) + if (!extract_entropy(&buf, 32, 16)) return; } else { _extract_crng(&primary_crng, buf.block); @@ -1329,74 +1156,48 @@ retry: } /* - * This function does the actual extraction for extract_entropy. - * - * Note: we assume that .poolwords is a multiple of 16 words. + * This is an HKDF-like construction for using the hashed collected entropy + * as a PRF key, that's then expanded block-by-block. */ -static void extract_buf(u8 *out) +static void _extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes) { - struct blake2s_state state __aligned(__alignof__(unsigned long)); - u8 hash[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE]; - unsigned long *salt; unsigned long flags; + u8 seed[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE], next_key[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE]; + struct { + unsigned long rdrand[32 / sizeof(long)]; + size_t counter; + } block; + size_t i; - blake2s_init(&state, sizeof(hash)); - - /* - * If we have an architectural hardware random number - * generator, use it for BLAKE2's salt & personal fields. - */ - for (salt = (unsigned long *)&state.h[4]; - salt < (unsigned long *)&state.h[8]; ++salt) { - unsigned long v; - if (!arch_get_random_long(&v)) - break; - *salt ^= v; + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(block.rdrand); ++i) { + if (!arch_get_random_long(&block.rdrand[i])) + block.rdrand[i] = random_get_entropy(); } - /* Generate a hash across the pool */ spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags); - blake2s_update(&state, (const u8 *)input_pool_data, POOL_BYTES); - blake2s_final(&state, hash); /* final zeros out state */ - /* - * We mix the hash back into the pool to prevent backtracking - * attacks (where the attacker knows the state of the pool - * plus the current outputs, and attempts to find previous - * outputs), unless the hash function can be inverted. By - * mixing at least a hash worth of hash data back, we make - * brute-forcing the feedback as hard as brute-forcing the - * hash. - */ - __mix_pool_bytes(hash, sizeof(hash)); + /* seed = HASHPRF(last_key, entropy_input) */ + blake2s_final(&input_pool.hash, seed); + + /* next_key = HASHPRF(seed, RDRAND || 0) */ + block.counter = 0; + blake2s(next_key, (u8 *)&block, seed, sizeof(next_key), sizeof(block), sizeof(seed)); + blake2s_init_key(&input_pool.hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE, next_key, sizeof(next_key)); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags); - - /* Note that EXTRACT_SIZE is half of hash size here, because above - * we've dumped the full length back into mixer. By reducing the - * amount that we emit, we retain a level of forward secrecy. - */ - memcpy(out, hash, EXTRACT_SIZE); - memzero_explicit(hash, sizeof(hash)); -} - -static ssize_t _extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes) -{ - ssize_t ret = 0, i; - u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE]; + memzero_explicit(next_key, sizeof(next_key)); while (nbytes) { - extract_buf(tmp); - i = min_t(int, nbytes, EXTRACT_SIZE); - memcpy(buf, tmp, i); + i = min_t(size_t, nbytes, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE); + /* output = HASHPRF(seed, RDRAND || ++counter) */ + ++block.counter; + blake2s(buf, (u8 *)&block, seed, i, sizeof(block), sizeof(seed)); nbytes -= i; buf += i; - ret += i; } - /* Wipe data just returned from memory */ - memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); - - return ret; + memzero_explicit(seed, sizeof(seed)); + memzero_explicit(&block, sizeof(block)); } /* @@ -1404,13 +1205,18 @@ static ssize_t _extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes) * returns it in a buffer. * * The min parameter specifies the minimum amount we can pull before - * failing to avoid races that defeat catastrophic reseeding. + * failing to avoid races that defeat catastrophic reseeding. If we + * have less than min entropy available, we return false and buf is + * not filled. */ -static ssize_t extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes, int min) +static bool extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes, int min) { trace_extract_entropy(nbytes, POOL_ENTROPY_BITS(), _RET_IP_); - nbytes = account(nbytes, min); - return _extract_entropy(buf, nbytes); + if (account(nbytes, min)) { + _extract_entropy(buf, nbytes); + return true; + } + return false; } #define warn_unseeded_randomness(previous) \ @@ -1674,7 +1480,7 @@ static void __init init_std_data(void) unsigned long rv; mix_pool_bytes(&now, sizeof(now)); - for (i = POOL_BYTES; i > 0; i -= sizeof(rv)) { + for (i = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; i > 0; i -= sizeof(rv)) { if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) && !arch_get_random_long(&rv)) rv = random_get_entropy(); From a1a2bae5ef93f00ad66a6dbd1f930f912f2a33ee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Wed, 2 Feb 2022 13:30:03 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0497/1091] random: simplify entropy debiting commit 9c07f57869e90140080cfc282cc628d123e27704 upstream. Our pool is 256 bits, and we only ever use all of it or don't use it at all, which is decided by whether or not it has at least 128 bits in it. So we can drastically simplify the accounting and cmpxchg loop to do exactly this. While we're at it, we move the minimum bit size into a constant so it can be shared between the two places where it matters. The reason we want any of this is for the case in which an attacker has compromised the current state, and then bruteforces small amounts of entropy added to it. By demanding a particular minimum amount of entropy be present before reseeding, we make that bruteforcing difficult. Note that this rationale no longer includes anything about /dev/random blocking at the right moment, since /dev/random no longer blocks (except for at ~boot), but rather uses the crng. In a former life, /dev/random was different and therefore required a more nuanced account(), but this is no longer. Behaviorally, nothing changes here. This is just a simplification of the code. Cc: Theodore Ts'o Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 91 ++++++++--------------------------- include/trace/events/random.h | 30 +++--------- 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 94 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index e63daee1b406..cc941961fd26 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -289,12 +289,14 @@ enum poolinfo { POOL_BITS = BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE * 8, POOL_BITSHIFT = ilog2(POOL_BITS), + POOL_MIN_BITS = POOL_BITS / 2, /* To allow fractional bits to be tracked, the entropy_count field is * denominated in units of 1/8th bits. */ POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT = 3, #define POOL_ENTROPY_BITS() (input_pool.entropy_count >> POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT) - POOL_FRACBITS = POOL_BITS << POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT + POOL_FRACBITS = POOL_BITS << POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT, + POOL_MIN_FRACBITS = POOL_MIN_BITS << POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT }; /* @@ -375,8 +377,7 @@ static struct { .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(input_pool.lock), }; -static bool extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes, int min); -static void _extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes); +static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes); static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, bool use_input_pool); @@ -467,7 +468,7 @@ static void process_random_ready_list(void) */ static void credit_entropy_bits(int nbits) { - int entropy_count, entropy_bits, orig; + int entropy_count, orig; int nfrac = nbits << POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT; /* Ensure that the multiplication can avoid being 64 bits wide. */ @@ -527,8 +528,7 @@ retry: trace_credit_entropy_bits(nbits, entropy_count >> POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT, _RET_IP_); - entropy_bits = entropy_count >> POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT; - if (crng_init < 2 && entropy_bits >= 128) + if (crng_init < 2 && entropy_count >= POOL_MIN_FRACBITS) crng_reseed(&primary_crng, true); } @@ -618,7 +618,7 @@ static void crng_initialize_secondary(struct crng_state *crng) static void __init crng_initialize_primary(void) { - _extract_entropy(&primary_crng.state[4], sizeof(u32) * 12); + extract_entropy(&primary_crng.state[4], sizeof(u32) * 12); if (crng_init_try_arch_early() && trust_cpu && crng_init < 2) { invalidate_batched_entropy(); numa_crng_init(); @@ -788,8 +788,17 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, bool use_input_pool) } buf; if (use_input_pool) { - if (!extract_entropy(&buf, 32, 16)) - return; + int entropy_count; + do { + entropy_count = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count); + if (entropy_count < POOL_MIN_FRACBITS) + return; + } while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, entropy_count, 0) != entropy_count); + extract_entropy(buf.key, sizeof(buf.key)); + if (random_write_wakeup_bits) { + wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait); + kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT); + } } else { _extract_crng(&primary_crng, buf.block); _crng_backtrack_protect(&primary_crng, buf.block, @@ -1114,52 +1123,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_disk_randomness); * *********************************************************************/ -/* - * This function decides how many bytes to actually take from the - * given pool, and also debits the entropy count accordingly. - */ -static size_t account(size_t nbytes, int min) -{ - int entropy_count, orig; - size_t ibytes, nfrac; - - BUG_ON(input_pool.entropy_count > POOL_FRACBITS); - - /* Can we pull enough? */ -retry: - entropy_count = orig = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count); - if (WARN_ON(entropy_count < 0)) { - pr_warn("negative entropy count: count %d\n", entropy_count); - entropy_count = 0; - } - - /* never pull more than available */ - ibytes = min_t(size_t, nbytes, entropy_count >> (POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3)); - if (ibytes < min) - ibytes = 0; - nfrac = ibytes << (POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3); - if ((size_t)entropy_count > nfrac) - entropy_count -= nfrac; - else - entropy_count = 0; - - if (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig) - goto retry; - - trace_debit_entropy(8 * ibytes); - if (ibytes && POOL_ENTROPY_BITS() < random_write_wakeup_bits) { - wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait); - kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT); - } - - return ibytes; -} - /* * This is an HKDF-like construction for using the hashed collected entropy * as a PRF key, that's then expanded block-by-block. */ -static void _extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes) +static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes) { unsigned long flags; u8 seed[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE], next_key[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE]; @@ -1169,6 +1137,8 @@ static void _extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes) } block; size_t i; + trace_extract_entropy(nbytes, POOL_ENTROPY_BITS()); + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(block.rdrand); ++i) { if (!arch_get_random_long(&block.rdrand[i])) block.rdrand[i] = random_get_entropy(); @@ -1200,25 +1170,6 @@ static void _extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes) memzero_explicit(&block, sizeof(block)); } -/* - * This function extracts randomness from the "entropy pool", and - * returns it in a buffer. - * - * The min parameter specifies the minimum amount we can pull before - * failing to avoid races that defeat catastrophic reseeding. If we - * have less than min entropy available, we return false and buf is - * not filled. - */ -static bool extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes, int min) -{ - trace_extract_entropy(nbytes, POOL_ENTROPY_BITS(), _RET_IP_); - if (account(nbytes, min)) { - _extract_entropy(buf, nbytes); - return true; - } - return false; -} - #define warn_unseeded_randomness(previous) \ _warn_unseeded_randomness(__func__, (void *)_RET_IP_, (previous)) diff --git a/include/trace/events/random.h b/include/trace/events/random.h index 8f60803edb24..6f3a9b90ce81 100644 --- a/include/trace/events/random.h +++ b/include/trace/events/random.h @@ -79,22 +79,6 @@ TRACE_EVENT(credit_entropy_bits, __entry->bits, __entry->entropy_count, (void *)__entry->IP) ); -TRACE_EVENT(debit_entropy, - TP_PROTO(int debit_bits), - - TP_ARGS( debit_bits), - - TP_STRUCT__entry( - __field( int, debit_bits ) - ), - - TP_fast_assign( - __entry->debit_bits = debit_bits; - ), - - TP_printk("input pool: debit_bits %d", __entry->debit_bits) -); - TRACE_EVENT(add_input_randomness, TP_PROTO(int input_bits), @@ -161,31 +145,29 @@ DEFINE_EVENT(random__get_random_bytes, get_random_bytes_arch, ); DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(random__extract_entropy, - TP_PROTO(int nbytes, int entropy_count, unsigned long IP), + TP_PROTO(int nbytes, int entropy_count), - TP_ARGS(nbytes, entropy_count, IP), + TP_ARGS(nbytes, entropy_count), TP_STRUCT__entry( __field( int, nbytes ) __field( int, entropy_count ) - __field(unsigned long, IP ) ), TP_fast_assign( __entry->nbytes = nbytes; __entry->entropy_count = entropy_count; - __entry->IP = IP; ), - TP_printk("input pool: nbytes %d entropy_count %d caller %pS", - __entry->nbytes, __entry->entropy_count, (void *)__entry->IP) + TP_printk("input pool: nbytes %d entropy_count %d", + __entry->nbytes, __entry->entropy_count) ); DEFINE_EVENT(random__extract_entropy, extract_entropy, - TP_PROTO(int nbytes, int entropy_count, unsigned long IP), + TP_PROTO(int nbytes, int entropy_count), - TP_ARGS(nbytes, entropy_count, IP) + TP_ARGS(nbytes, entropy_count) ); TRACE_EVENT(urandom_read, From 373ef51f3e8ac62ee12aeb53f0ca81ec50160b0b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Thu, 3 Feb 2022 13:28:06 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0498/1091] random: use linear min-entropy accumulation crediting MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit c570449094844527577c5c914140222cb1893e3f upstream. 30e37ec516ae ("random: account for entropy loss due to overwrites") assumed that adding new entropy to the LFSR pool probabilistically cancelled out old entropy there, so entropy was credited asymptotically, approximating Shannon entropy of independent sources (rather than a stronger min-entropy notion) using 1/8th fractional bits and replacing a constant 2-2/√𝑒 term (~0.786938) with 3/4 (0.75) to slightly underestimate it. This wasn't superb, but it was perhaps better than nothing, so that's what was done. Which entropy specifically was being cancelled out and how much precisely each time is hard to tell, though as I showed with the attack code in my previous commit, a motivated adversary with sufficient information can actually cancel out everything. Since we're no longer using an LFSR for entropy accumulation, this probabilistic cancellation is no longer relevant. Rather, we're now using a computational hash function as the accumulator and we've switched to working in the random oracle model, from which we can now revisit the question of min-entropy accumulation, which is done in detail in . Consider a long input bit string that is built by concatenating various smaller independent input bit strings. Each one of these inputs has a designated min-entropy, which is what we're passing to credit_entropy_bits(h). When we pass the concatenation of these to a random oracle, it means that an adversary trying to receive back the same reply as us would need to become certain about each part of the concatenated bit string we passed in, which means becoming certain about all of those h values. That means we can estimate the accumulation by simply adding up the h values in calls to credit_entropy_bits(h); there's no probabilistic cancellation at play like there was said to be for the LFSR. Incidentally, this is also what other entropy accumulators based on computational hash functions do as well. So this commit replaces credit_entropy_bits(h) with essentially `total = min(POOL_BITS, total + h)`, done with a cmpxchg loop as before. What if we're wrong and the above is nonsense? It's not, but let's assume we don't want the actual _behavior_ of the code to change much. Currently that behavior is not extracting from the input pool until it has 128 bits of entropy in it. With the old algorithm, we'd hit that magic 128 number after roughly 256 calls to credit_entropy_bits(1). So, we can retain more or less the old behavior by waiting to extract from the input pool until it hits 256 bits of entropy using the new code. For people concerned about this change, it means that there's not that much practical behavioral change. And for folks actually trying to model the behavior rigorously, it means that we have an even higher margin against attacks. Cc: Theodore Ts'o Cc: Dominik Brodowski Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers Reviewed-by: Jean-Philippe Aumasson Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 114 ++++++++---------------------------------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 94 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index cc941961fd26..c39bef965744 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -286,17 +286,9 @@ /* #define ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH */ -enum poolinfo { +enum { POOL_BITS = BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE * 8, - POOL_BITSHIFT = ilog2(POOL_BITS), - POOL_MIN_BITS = POOL_BITS / 2, - - /* To allow fractional bits to be tracked, the entropy_count field is - * denominated in units of 1/8th bits. */ - POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT = 3, -#define POOL_ENTROPY_BITS() (input_pool.entropy_count >> POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT) - POOL_FRACBITS = POOL_BITS << POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT, - POOL_MIN_FRACBITS = POOL_MIN_BITS << POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT + POOL_MIN_BITS = POOL_BITS /* No point in settling for less. */ }; /* @@ -309,7 +301,7 @@ static struct fasync_struct *fasync; * should wake up processes which are selecting or polling on write * access to /dev/random. */ -static int random_write_wakeup_bits = POOL_BITS * 3 / 4; +static int random_write_wakeup_bits = POOL_MIN_BITS; static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(random_ready_list_lock); static LIST_HEAD(random_ready_list); @@ -469,66 +461,18 @@ static void process_random_ready_list(void) static void credit_entropy_bits(int nbits) { int entropy_count, orig; - int nfrac = nbits << POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT; - - /* Ensure that the multiplication can avoid being 64 bits wide. */ - BUILD_BUG_ON(2 * (POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT + POOL_BITSHIFT) > 31); if (!nbits) return; -retry: - entropy_count = orig = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count); - if (nfrac < 0) { - /* Debit */ - entropy_count += nfrac; - } else { - /* - * Credit: we have to account for the possibility of - * overwriting already present entropy. Even in the - * ideal case of pure Shannon entropy, new contributions - * approach the full value asymptotically: - * - * entropy <- entropy + (pool_size - entropy) * - * (1 - exp(-add_entropy/pool_size)) - * - * For add_entropy <= pool_size/2 then - * (1 - exp(-add_entropy/pool_size)) >= - * (add_entropy/pool_size)*0.7869... - * so we can approximate the exponential with - * 3/4*add_entropy/pool_size and still be on the - * safe side by adding at most pool_size/2 at a time. - * - * The use of pool_size-2 in the while statement is to - * prevent rounding artifacts from making the loop - * arbitrarily long; this limits the loop to log2(pool_size)*2 - * turns no matter how large nbits is. - */ - int pnfrac = nfrac; - const int s = POOL_BITSHIFT + POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT + 2; - /* The +2 corresponds to the /4 in the denominator */ + do { + orig = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count); + entropy_count = min(POOL_BITS, orig + nbits); + } while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig); - do { - unsigned int anfrac = min(pnfrac, POOL_FRACBITS / 2); - unsigned int add = - ((POOL_FRACBITS - entropy_count) * anfrac * 3) >> s; + trace_credit_entropy_bits(nbits, entropy_count, _RET_IP_); - entropy_count += add; - pnfrac -= anfrac; - } while (unlikely(entropy_count < POOL_FRACBITS - 2 && pnfrac)); - } - - if (WARN_ON(entropy_count < 0)) { - pr_warn("negative entropy/overflow: count %d\n", entropy_count); - entropy_count = 0; - } else if (entropy_count > POOL_FRACBITS) - entropy_count = POOL_FRACBITS; - if (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig) - goto retry; - - trace_credit_entropy_bits(nbits, entropy_count >> POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT, _RET_IP_); - - if (crng_init < 2 && entropy_count >= POOL_MIN_FRACBITS) + if (crng_init < 2 && entropy_count >= POOL_MIN_BITS) crng_reseed(&primary_crng, true); } @@ -791,7 +735,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, bool use_input_pool) int entropy_count; do { entropy_count = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count); - if (entropy_count < POOL_MIN_FRACBITS) + if (entropy_count < POOL_MIN_BITS) return; } while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, entropy_count, 0) != entropy_count); extract_entropy(buf.key, sizeof(buf.key)); @@ -1014,7 +958,7 @@ void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, last_value = value; add_timer_randomness(&input_timer_state, (type << 4) ^ code ^ (code >> 4) ^ value); - trace_add_input_randomness(POOL_ENTROPY_BITS()); + trace_add_input_randomness(input_pool.entropy_count); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_input_randomness); @@ -1112,7 +1056,7 @@ void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk) return; /* first major is 1, so we get >= 0x200 here */ add_timer_randomness(disk->random, 0x100 + disk_devt(disk)); - trace_add_disk_randomness(disk_devt(disk), POOL_ENTROPY_BITS()); + trace_add_disk_randomness(disk_devt(disk), input_pool.entropy_count); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_disk_randomness); #endif @@ -1137,7 +1081,7 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes) } block; size_t i; - trace_extract_entropy(nbytes, POOL_ENTROPY_BITS()); + trace_extract_entropy(nbytes, input_pool.entropy_count); for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(block.rdrand); ++i) { if (!arch_get_random_long(&block.rdrand[i])) @@ -1486,9 +1430,9 @@ static ssize_t urandom_read_nowarn(struct file *file, char __user *buf, { int ret; - nbytes = min_t(size_t, nbytes, INT_MAX >> (POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3)); + nbytes = min_t(size_t, nbytes, INT_MAX >> 6); ret = extract_crng_user(buf, nbytes); - trace_urandom_read(8 * nbytes, 0, POOL_ENTROPY_BITS()); + trace_urandom_read(8 * nbytes, 0, input_pool.entropy_count); return ret; } @@ -1527,7 +1471,7 @@ static __poll_t random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait) mask = 0; if (crng_ready()) mask |= EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM; - if (POOL_ENTROPY_BITS() < random_write_wakeup_bits) + if (input_pool.entropy_count < random_write_wakeup_bits) mask |= EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM; return mask; } @@ -1582,8 +1526,7 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) switch (cmd) { case RNDGETENTCNT: /* inherently racy, no point locking */ - ent_count = POOL_ENTROPY_BITS(); - if (put_user(ent_count, p)) + if (put_user(input_pool.entropy_count, p)) return -EFAULT; return 0; case RNDADDTOENTCNT: @@ -1731,23 +1674,6 @@ static int proc_do_uuid(struct ctl_table *table, int write, return proc_dostring(&fake_table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); } -/* - * Return entropy available scaled to integral bits - */ -static int proc_do_entropy(struct ctl_table *table, int write, - void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) -{ - struct ctl_table fake_table; - int entropy_count; - - entropy_count = *(int *)table->data >> POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT; - - fake_table.data = &entropy_count; - fake_table.maxlen = sizeof(entropy_count); - - return proc_dointvec(&fake_table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); -} - static int sysctl_poolsize = POOL_BITS; extern struct ctl_table random_table[]; struct ctl_table random_table[] = { @@ -1760,10 +1686,10 @@ struct ctl_table random_table[] = { }, { .procname = "entropy_avail", + .data = &input_pool.entropy_count, .maxlen = sizeof(int), .mode = 0444, - .proc_handler = proc_do_entropy, - .data = &input_pool.entropy_count, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, }, { .procname = "write_wakeup_threshold", @@ -1959,7 +1885,7 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count, */ wait_event_interruptible_timeout(random_write_wait, !system_wq || kthread_should_stop() || - POOL_ENTROPY_BITS() <= random_write_wakeup_bits, + input_pool.entropy_count <= random_write_wakeup_bits, CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL); mix_pool_bytes(buffer, count); credit_entropy_bits(entropy); From 42a9a7e807505b485f7c6a7ffb0ffb7dab8e1b51 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Sat, 5 Feb 2022 14:00:58 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0499/1091] random: always wake up entropy writers after extraction commit 489c7fc44b5740d377e8cfdbf0851036e493af00 upstream. Now that POOL_BITS == POOL_MIN_BITS, we must unconditionally wake up entropy writers after every extraction. Therefore there's no point of write_wakeup_threshold, so we can move it to the dustbin of unused compatibility sysctls. While we're at it, we can fix a small comparison where we were waking up after <= min rather than < min. Cc: Theodore Ts'o Suggested-by: Eric Biggers Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++- drivers/char/random.c | 36 +++++++---------- 2 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst index 7b477fa19534..89214744eae2 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst @@ -862,9 +862,49 @@ The kernel command line parameter printk.devkmsg= overrides this and is a one-time setting until next reboot: once set, it cannot be changed by this sysctl interface anymore. +pty +=== -randomize_va_space: -=================== +See Documentation/filesystems/devpts.rst. + + +random +====== + +This is a directory, with the following entries: + +* ``boot_id``: a UUID generated the first time this is retrieved, and + unvarying after that; + +* ``entropy_avail``: the pool's entropy count, in bits; + +* ``poolsize``: the entropy pool size, in bits; + +* ``urandom_min_reseed_secs``: obsolete (used to determine the minimum + number of seconds between urandom pool reseeding). This file is + writable for compatibility purposes, but writing to it has no effect + on any RNG behavior. + +* ``uuid``: a UUID generated every time this is retrieved (this can + thus be used to generate UUIDs at will); + +* ``write_wakeup_threshold``: when the entropy count drops below this + (as a number of bits), processes waiting to write to ``/dev/random`` + are woken up. This file is writable for compatibility purposes, but + writing to it has no effect on any RNG behavior. + +If ``drivers/char/random.c`` is built with ``ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH`` +defined, these additional entries are present: + +* ``add_interrupt_avg_cycles``: the average number of cycles between + interrupts used to feed the pool; + +* ``add_interrupt_avg_deviation``: the standard deviation seen on the + number of cycles between interrupts used to feed the pool. + + +randomize_va_space +================== This option can be used to select the type of process address space randomization that is used in the system, for architectures diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index c39bef965744..cb0edf43ad8f 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -296,12 +296,6 @@ enum { */ static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_write_wait); static struct fasync_struct *fasync; -/* - * If the entropy count falls under this number of bits, then we - * should wake up processes which are selecting or polling on write - * access to /dev/random. - */ -static int random_write_wakeup_bits = POOL_MIN_BITS; static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(random_ready_list_lock); static LIST_HEAD(random_ready_list); @@ -739,10 +733,8 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, bool use_input_pool) return; } while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, entropy_count, 0) != entropy_count); extract_entropy(buf.key, sizeof(buf.key)); - if (random_write_wakeup_bits) { - wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait); - kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT); - } + wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait); + kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT); } else { _extract_crng(&primary_crng, buf.block); _crng_backtrack_protect(&primary_crng, buf.block, @@ -1471,7 +1463,7 @@ static __poll_t random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait) mask = 0; if (crng_ready()) mask |= EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM; - if (input_pool.entropy_count < random_write_wakeup_bits) + if (input_pool.entropy_count < POOL_MIN_BITS) mask |= EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM; return mask; } @@ -1556,7 +1548,10 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) */ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; - input_pool.entropy_count = 0; + if (xchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, 0)) { + wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait); + kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT); + } return 0; case RNDRESEEDCRNG: if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) @@ -1633,9 +1628,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count, unsigned int, #include -static int min_write_thresh; -static int max_write_thresh = POOL_BITS; static int random_min_urandom_seed = 60; +static int random_write_wakeup_bits = POOL_MIN_BITS; +static int sysctl_poolsize = POOL_BITS; static char sysctl_bootid[16]; /* @@ -1674,7 +1669,6 @@ static int proc_do_uuid(struct ctl_table *table, int write, return proc_dostring(&fake_table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); } -static int sysctl_poolsize = POOL_BITS; extern struct ctl_table random_table[]; struct ctl_table random_table[] = { { @@ -1696,9 +1690,7 @@ struct ctl_table random_table[] = { .data = &random_write_wakeup_bits, .maxlen = sizeof(int), .mode = 0644, - .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, - .extra1 = &min_write_thresh, - .extra2 = &max_write_thresh, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, }, { .procname = "urandom_min_reseed_secs", @@ -1879,13 +1871,13 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count, } /* Throttle writing if we're above the trickle threshold. - * We'll be woken up again once below random_write_wakeup_thresh, - * when the calling thread is about to terminate, or once - * CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL has lapsed. + * We'll be woken up again once below POOL_MIN_BITS, when + * the calling thread is about to terminate, or once + * CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL has elapsed. */ wait_event_interruptible_timeout(random_write_wait, !system_wq || kthread_should_stop() || - input_pool.entropy_count <= random_write_wakeup_bits, + input_pool.entropy_count < POOL_MIN_BITS, CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL); mix_pool_bytes(buffer, count); credit_entropy_bits(entropy); From 4ef908fb81d9f2033657d071ad92c18a84f57550 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Fri, 4 Feb 2022 01:45:53 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0500/1091] random: make credit_entropy_bits() always safe commit a49c010e61e1938be851f5e49ac219d49b704103 upstream. This is called from various hwgenerator drivers, so rather than having one "safe" version for userspace and one "unsafe" version for the kernel, just make everything safe; the checks are cheap and sensible to have anyway. Reported-by: Sultan Alsawaf Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 29 +++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index cb0edf43ad8f..28ca5b4c0e18 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -447,18 +447,15 @@ static void process_random_ready_list(void) spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_list_lock, flags); } -/* - * Credit (or debit) the entropy store with n bits of entropy. - * Use credit_entropy_bits_safe() if the value comes from userspace - * or otherwise should be checked for extreme values. - */ static void credit_entropy_bits(int nbits) { int entropy_count, orig; - if (!nbits) + if (nbits <= 0) return; + nbits = min(nbits, POOL_BITS); + do { orig = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count); entropy_count = min(POOL_BITS, orig + nbits); @@ -470,18 +467,6 @@ static void credit_entropy_bits(int nbits) crng_reseed(&primary_crng, true); } -static int credit_entropy_bits_safe(int nbits) -{ - if (nbits < 0) - return -EINVAL; - - /* Cap the value to avoid overflows */ - nbits = min(nbits, POOL_BITS); - - credit_entropy_bits(nbits); - return 0; -} - /********************************************************************* * * CRNG using CHACHA20 @@ -1526,7 +1511,10 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) return -EPERM; if (get_user(ent_count, p)) return -EFAULT; - return credit_entropy_bits_safe(ent_count); + if (ent_count < 0) + return -EINVAL; + credit_entropy_bits(ent_count); + return 0; case RNDADDENTROPY: if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; @@ -1539,7 +1527,8 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) retval = write_pool((const char __user *)p, size); if (retval < 0) return retval; - return credit_entropy_bits_safe(ent_count); + credit_entropy_bits(ent_count); + return 0; case RNDZAPENTCNT: case RNDCLEARPOOL: /* From 6c89115792215809651fa0169f44129e1fdde5f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers Date: Fri, 4 Feb 2022 14:17:33 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 0501/1091] random: remove use_input_pool parameter from crng_reseed() commit 5d58ea3a31cc98b9fa563f6921d3d043bf0103d1 upstream. The primary_crng is always reseeded from the input_pool, while the NUMA crngs are always reseeded from the primary_crng. Remove the redundant 'use_input_pool' parameter from crng_reseed() and just directly check whether the crng is the primary_crng. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 28ca5b4c0e18..1b79f4ed6208 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ static struct { static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes); -static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, bool use_input_pool); +static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng); /* * This function adds bytes into the entropy "pool". It does not @@ -464,7 +464,7 @@ static void credit_entropy_bits(int nbits) trace_credit_entropy_bits(nbits, entropy_count, _RET_IP_); if (crng_init < 2 && entropy_count >= POOL_MIN_BITS) - crng_reseed(&primary_crng, true); + crng_reseed(&primary_crng); } /********************************************************************* @@ -701,7 +701,7 @@ static int crng_slow_load(const u8 *cp, size_t len) return 1; } -static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, bool use_input_pool) +static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng) { unsigned long flags; int i; @@ -710,7 +710,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, bool use_input_pool) u32 key[8]; } buf; - if (use_input_pool) { + if (crng == &primary_crng) { int entropy_count; do { entropy_count = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count); @@ -748,7 +748,7 @@ static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]) init_time = READ_ONCE(crng->init_time); if (time_after(READ_ONCE(crng_global_init_time), init_time) || time_after(jiffies, init_time + CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL)) - crng_reseed(crng, crng == &primary_crng); + crng_reseed(crng); } spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags); chacha20_block(&crng->state[0], out); @@ -1547,7 +1547,7 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) return -EPERM; if (crng_init < 2) return -ENODATA; - crng_reseed(&primary_crng, true); + crng_reseed(&primary_crng); WRITE_ONCE(crng_global_init_time, jiffies - 1); return 0; default: From 7229c6d90a1a0e08223ea34abceeb2aec58c6b76 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Fri, 28 Jan 2022 23:29:45 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0502/1091] random: remove batched entropy locking MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 77760fd7f7ae3dfd03668204e708d1568d75447d upstream. Rather than use spinlocks to protect batched entropy, we can instead disable interrupts locally, since we're dealing with per-cpu data, and manage resets with a basic generation counter. At the same time, we can't quite do this on PREEMPT_RT, where we still want spinlocks-as- mutexes semantics. So we use a local_lock_t, which provides the right behavior for each. Because this is a per-cpu lock, that generation counter is still doing the necessary CPU-to-CPU communication. This should improve performance a bit. It will also fix the linked splat that Jonathan received with a PROVE_RAW_LOCK_NESTING=y. Reviewed-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski Reported-by: Jonathan Neuschäfer Tested-by: Jonathan Neuschäfer Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YfMa0QgsjCVdRAvJ@latitude/ Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++----------------------- 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 1b79f4ed6208..5bc3f692ff8b 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -1721,13 +1721,15 @@ struct ctl_table random_table[] = { }; #endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */ +static atomic_t batch_generation = ATOMIC_INIT(0); + struct batched_entropy { union { u64 entropy_u64[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u64)]; u32 entropy_u32[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)]; }; unsigned int position; - spinlock_t batch_lock; + int generation; }; /* @@ -1738,9 +1740,7 @@ struct batched_entropy { * wait_for_random_bytes() should be called and return 0 at least once at any * point prior. */ -static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u64) = { - .batch_lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(batched_entropy_u64.lock), -}; +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u64); u64 get_random_u64(void) { @@ -1748,67 +1748,63 @@ u64 get_random_u64(void) unsigned long flags; struct batched_entropy *batch; static void *previous; + int next_gen; warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous); + local_irq_save(flags); batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u64); - spin_lock_irqsave(&batch->batch_lock, flags); - if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u64) == 0) { + + next_gen = atomic_read(&batch_generation); + if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u64) == 0 || + next_gen != batch->generation) { extract_crng((u8 *)batch->entropy_u64); batch->position = 0; + batch->generation = next_gen; } + ret = batch->entropy_u64[batch->position++]; - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&batch->batch_lock, flags); + local_irq_restore(flags); return ret; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u64); -static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u32) = { - .batch_lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(batched_entropy_u32.lock), -}; +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u32); + u32 get_random_u32(void) { u32 ret; unsigned long flags; struct batched_entropy *batch; static void *previous; + int next_gen; warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous); + local_irq_save(flags); batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u32); - spin_lock_irqsave(&batch->batch_lock, flags); - if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u32) == 0) { + + next_gen = atomic_read(&batch_generation); + if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u32) == 0 || + next_gen != batch->generation) { extract_crng((u8 *)batch->entropy_u32); batch->position = 0; + batch->generation = next_gen; } + ret = batch->entropy_u32[batch->position++]; - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&batch->batch_lock, flags); + local_irq_restore(flags); return ret; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u32); /* It's important to invalidate all potential batched entropy that might * be stored before the crng is initialized, which we can do lazily by - * simply resetting the counter to zero so that it's re-extracted on the - * next usage. */ + * bumping the generation counter. + */ static void invalidate_batched_entropy(void) { - int cpu; - unsigned long flags; - - for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { - struct batched_entropy *batched_entropy; - - batched_entropy = per_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u32, cpu); - spin_lock_irqsave(&batched_entropy->batch_lock, flags); - batched_entropy->position = 0; - spin_unlock(&batched_entropy->batch_lock); - - batched_entropy = per_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u64, cpu); - spin_lock(&batched_entropy->batch_lock); - batched_entropy->position = 0; - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&batched_entropy->batch_lock, flags); - } + atomic_inc(&batch_generation); } /** From 72db8151c8890b0e14fa660cff56a9cf01b687fd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dominik Brodowski Date: Sat, 5 Feb 2022 11:34:57 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0503/1091] random: fix locking in crng_fast_load() commit 7c2fe2b32bf76441ff5b7a425b384e5f75aa530a upstream. crng_init is protected by primary_crng->lock, so keep holding that lock when incrementing crng_init from 0 to 1 in crng_fast_load(). The call to pr_notice() can wait until the lock is released; this code path cannot be reached twice, as crng_fast_load() aborts early if crng_init > 0. Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 5bc3f692ff8b..950687bded4f 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -647,12 +647,13 @@ static size_t crng_fast_load(const u8 *cp, size_t len) p[crng_init_cnt % CHACHA_KEY_SIZE] ^= *cp; cp++; crng_init_cnt++; len--; ret++; } - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags); if (crng_init_cnt >= CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) { invalidate_batched_entropy(); crng_init = 1; - pr_notice("fast init done\n"); } + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags); + if (crng_init == 1) + pr_notice("fast init done\n"); return ret; } From c15fc80b7df040da1dc497201fb76b34daeb2b30 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2022 12:18:33 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0504/1091] random: use RDSEED instead of RDRAND in entropy extraction commit 28f425e573e906a4c15f8392cc2b1561ef448595 upstream. When /dev/random was directly connected with entropy extraction, without any expansion stage, extract_buf() was called for every 10 bytes of data read from /dev/random. For that reason, RDRAND was used rather than RDSEED. At the same time, crng_reseed() was still only called every 5 minutes, so there RDSEED made sense. Those olden days were also a time when the entropy collector did not use a cryptographic hash function, which meant most bets were off in terms of real preimage resistance. For that reason too it didn't matter _that_ much whether RDSEED was mixed in before or after entropy extraction; both choices were sort of bad. But now we have a cryptographic hash function at work, and with that we get real preimage resistance. We also now only call extract_entropy() every 5 minutes, rather than every 10 bytes. This allows us to do two important things. First, we can switch to using RDSEED in extract_entropy(), as Dominik suggested. Second, we can ensure that RDSEED input always goes into the cryptographic hash function with other things before being used directly. This eliminates a category of attacks in which the CPU knows the current state of the crng and knows that we're going to xor RDSEED into it, and so it computes a malicious RDSEED. By going through our hash function, it would require the CPU to compute a preimage on the fly, which isn't going to happen. Cc: Theodore Ts'o Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Suggested-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 22 +++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 950687bded4f..28ed0efa514a 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -727,13 +727,8 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng) CHACHA_KEY_SIZE); } spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags); - for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { - unsigned long rv; - if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) && - !arch_get_random_long(&rv)) - rv = random_get_entropy(); - crng->state[i + 4] ^= buf.key[i] ^ rv; - } + for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) + crng->state[i + 4] ^= buf.key[i]; memzero_explicit(&buf, sizeof(buf)); WRITE_ONCE(crng->init_time, jiffies); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags); @@ -1054,16 +1049,17 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes) unsigned long flags; u8 seed[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE], next_key[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE]; struct { - unsigned long rdrand[32 / sizeof(long)]; + unsigned long rdseed[32 / sizeof(long)]; size_t counter; } block; size_t i; trace_extract_entropy(nbytes, input_pool.entropy_count); - for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(block.rdrand); ++i) { - if (!arch_get_random_long(&block.rdrand[i])) - block.rdrand[i] = random_get_entropy(); + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(block.rdseed); ++i) { + if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&block.rdseed[i]) && + !arch_get_random_long(&block.rdseed[i])) + block.rdseed[i] = random_get_entropy(); } spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags); @@ -1071,7 +1067,7 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes) /* seed = HASHPRF(last_key, entropy_input) */ blake2s_final(&input_pool.hash, seed); - /* next_key = HASHPRF(seed, RDRAND || 0) */ + /* next_key = HASHPRF(seed, RDSEED || 0) */ block.counter = 0; blake2s(next_key, (u8 *)&block, seed, sizeof(next_key), sizeof(block), sizeof(seed)); blake2s_init_key(&input_pool.hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE, next_key, sizeof(next_key)); @@ -1081,7 +1077,7 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes) while (nbytes) { i = min_t(size_t, nbytes, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE); - /* output = HASHPRF(seed, RDRAND || ++counter) */ + /* output = HASHPRF(seed, RDSEED || ++counter) */ ++block.counter; blake2s(buf, (u8 *)&block, seed, i, sizeof(block), sizeof(seed)); nbytes -= i; From 817315517af9057b9043d76c862ec18c8174d5bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Sun, 6 Feb 2022 23:51:41 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0505/1091] random: get rid of secondary crngs commit a9412d510ab9a9ba411fea612903631d2e1f1601 upstream. As the comment said, this is indeed a "hack". Since it was introduced, it's been a constant state machine nightmare, with lots of subtle early boot issues and a wildly complex set of machinery to keep everything in sync. Rather than continuing to play whack-a-mole with this approach, this commit simply removes it entirely. This commit is preparation for "random: use simpler fast key erasure flow on per-cpu keys" in this series, which introduces a simpler (and faster) mechanism to accomplish the same thing. Cc: Theodore Ts'o Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 229 ++++++++++-------------------------------- 1 file changed, 55 insertions(+), 174 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 28ed0efa514a..fdd4acc4dbb2 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -323,14 +323,11 @@ static struct crng_state primary_crng = { * its value (from 0->1->2). */ static int crng_init = 0; -static bool crng_need_final_init = false; #define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init > 1)) static int crng_init_cnt = 0; -static unsigned long crng_global_init_time = 0; #define CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH (2 * CHACHA_KEY_SIZE) -static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]); -static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng, - u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE], int used); +static void extract_crng(u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]); +static void crng_backtrack_protect(u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE], int used); static void process_random_ready_list(void); static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes); @@ -365,7 +362,7 @@ static struct { static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes); -static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng); +static void crng_reseed(void); /* * This function adds bytes into the entropy "pool". It does not @@ -464,7 +461,7 @@ static void credit_entropy_bits(int nbits) trace_credit_entropy_bits(nbits, entropy_count, _RET_IP_); if (crng_init < 2 && entropy_count >= POOL_MIN_BITS) - crng_reseed(&primary_crng); + crng_reseed(); } /********************************************************************* @@ -477,16 +474,7 @@ static void credit_entropy_bits(int nbits) static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_init_wait); -/* - * Hack to deal with crazy userspace progams when they are all trying - * to access /dev/urandom in parallel. The programs are almost - * certainly doing something terribly wrong, but we'll work around - * their brain damage. - */ -static struct crng_state **crng_node_pool __read_mostly; - static void invalidate_batched_entropy(void); -static void numa_crng_init(void); static bool trust_cpu __ro_after_init = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU); static int __init parse_trust_cpu(char *arg) @@ -495,24 +483,6 @@ static int __init parse_trust_cpu(char *arg) } early_param("random.trust_cpu", parse_trust_cpu); -static bool crng_init_try_arch(struct crng_state *crng) -{ - int i; - bool arch_init = true; - unsigned long rv; - - for (i = 4; i < 16; i++) { - if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) && - !arch_get_random_long(&rv)) { - rv = random_get_entropy(); - arch_init = false; - } - crng->state[i] ^= rv; - } - - return arch_init; -} - static bool __init crng_init_try_arch_early(void) { int i; @@ -531,100 +501,17 @@ static bool __init crng_init_try_arch_early(void) return arch_init; } -static void crng_initialize_secondary(struct crng_state *crng) -{ - chacha_init_consts(crng->state); - _get_random_bytes(&crng->state[4], sizeof(u32) * 12); - crng_init_try_arch(crng); - crng->init_time = jiffies - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL - 1; -} - -static void __init crng_initialize_primary(void) +static void __init crng_initialize(void) { extract_entropy(&primary_crng.state[4], sizeof(u32) * 12); if (crng_init_try_arch_early() && trust_cpu && crng_init < 2) { invalidate_batched_entropy(); - numa_crng_init(); crng_init = 2; pr_notice("crng init done (trusting CPU's manufacturer)\n"); } primary_crng.init_time = jiffies - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL - 1; } -static void crng_finalize_init(void) -{ - if (!system_wq) { - /* We can't call numa_crng_init until we have workqueues, - * so mark this for processing later. */ - crng_need_final_init = true; - return; - } - - invalidate_batched_entropy(); - numa_crng_init(); - crng_init = 2; - crng_need_final_init = false; - process_random_ready_list(); - wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait); - kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN); - pr_notice("crng init done\n"); - if (unseeded_warning.missed) { - pr_notice("%d get_random_xx warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n", - unseeded_warning.missed); - unseeded_warning.missed = 0; - } - if (urandom_warning.missed) { - pr_notice("%d urandom warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n", - urandom_warning.missed); - urandom_warning.missed = 0; - } -} - -static void do_numa_crng_init(struct work_struct *work) -{ - int i; - struct crng_state *crng; - struct crng_state **pool; - - pool = kcalloc(nr_node_ids, sizeof(*pool), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL); - for_each_online_node(i) { - crng = kmalloc_node(sizeof(struct crng_state), - GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL, i); - spin_lock_init(&crng->lock); - crng_initialize_secondary(crng); - pool[i] = crng; - } - /* pairs with READ_ONCE() in select_crng() */ - if (cmpxchg_release(&crng_node_pool, NULL, pool) != NULL) { - for_each_node(i) - kfree(pool[i]); - kfree(pool); - } -} - -static DECLARE_WORK(numa_crng_init_work, do_numa_crng_init); - -static void numa_crng_init(void) -{ - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NUMA)) - schedule_work(&numa_crng_init_work); -} - -static struct crng_state *select_crng(void) -{ - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NUMA)) { - struct crng_state **pool; - int nid = numa_node_id(); - - /* pairs with cmpxchg_release() in do_numa_crng_init() */ - pool = READ_ONCE(crng_node_pool); - if (pool && pool[nid]) - return pool[nid]; - } - - return &primary_crng; -} - /* * crng_fast_load() can be called by code in the interrupt service * path. So we can't afford to dilly-dally. Returns the number of @@ -702,68 +589,71 @@ static int crng_slow_load(const u8 *cp, size_t len) return 1; } -static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng) +static void crng_reseed(void) { unsigned long flags; - int i; + int i, entropy_count; union { u8 block[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]; u32 key[8]; } buf; - if (crng == &primary_crng) { - int entropy_count; - do { - entropy_count = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count); - if (entropy_count < POOL_MIN_BITS) - return; - } while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, entropy_count, 0) != entropy_count); - extract_entropy(buf.key, sizeof(buf.key)); - wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait); - kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT); - } else { - _extract_crng(&primary_crng, buf.block); - _crng_backtrack_protect(&primary_crng, buf.block, - CHACHA_KEY_SIZE); - } - spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags); + do { + entropy_count = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count); + if (entropy_count < POOL_MIN_BITS) + return; + } while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, entropy_count, 0) != entropy_count); + extract_entropy(buf.key, sizeof(buf.key)); + wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait); + kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT); + + spin_lock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags); for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) - crng->state[i + 4] ^= buf.key[i]; + primary_crng.state[i + 4] ^= buf.key[i]; memzero_explicit(&buf, sizeof(buf)); - WRITE_ONCE(crng->init_time, jiffies); - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags); - if (crng == &primary_crng && crng_init < 2) - crng_finalize_init(); -} - -static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]) -{ - unsigned long flags, init_time; - - if (crng_ready()) { - init_time = READ_ONCE(crng->init_time); - if (time_after(READ_ONCE(crng_global_init_time), init_time) || - time_after(jiffies, init_time + CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL)) - crng_reseed(crng); + WRITE_ONCE(primary_crng.init_time, jiffies); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags); + if (crng_init < 2) { + invalidate_batched_entropy(); + crng_init = 2; + process_random_ready_list(); + wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait); + kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN); + pr_notice("crng init done\n"); + if (unseeded_warning.missed) { + pr_notice("%d get_random_xx warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n", + unseeded_warning.missed); + unseeded_warning.missed = 0; + } + if (urandom_warning.missed) { + pr_notice("%d urandom warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n", + urandom_warning.missed); + urandom_warning.missed = 0; + } } - spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags); - chacha20_block(&crng->state[0], out); - if (crng->state[12] == 0) - crng->state[13]++; - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags); } static void extract_crng(u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]) { - _extract_crng(select_crng(), out); + unsigned long flags, init_time; + + if (crng_ready()) { + init_time = READ_ONCE(primary_crng.init_time); + if (time_after(jiffies, init_time + CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL)) + crng_reseed(); + } + spin_lock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags); + chacha20_block(&primary_crng.state[0], out); + if (primary_crng.state[12] == 0) + primary_crng.state[13]++; + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags); } /* * Use the leftover bytes from the CRNG block output (if there is * enough) to mutate the CRNG key to provide backtracking protection. */ -static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng, - u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE], int used) +static void crng_backtrack_protect(u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE], int used) { unsigned long flags; u32 *s, *d; @@ -774,17 +664,12 @@ static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng, extract_crng(tmp); used = 0; } - spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags); + spin_lock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags); s = (u32 *)&tmp[used]; - d = &crng->state[4]; + d = &primary_crng.state[4]; for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) *d++ ^= *s++; - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags); -} - -static void crng_backtrack_protect(u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE], int used) -{ - _crng_backtrack_protect(select_crng(), tmp, used); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags); } static ssize_t extract_crng_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes) @@ -1371,10 +1256,7 @@ static void __init init_std_data(void) int __init rand_initialize(void) { init_std_data(); - if (crng_need_final_init) - crng_finalize_init(); - crng_initialize_primary(); - crng_global_init_time = jiffies; + crng_initialize(); if (ratelimit_disable) { urandom_warning.interval = 0; unseeded_warning.interval = 0; @@ -1544,8 +1426,7 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) return -EPERM; if (crng_init < 2) return -ENODATA; - crng_reseed(&primary_crng); - WRITE_ONCE(crng_global_init_time, jiffies - 1); + crng_reseed(); return 0; default: return -EINVAL; From d3d3c1c214c3a36918d1368d4105e0f616f45eed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2022 12:40:14 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0506/1091] random: inline leaves of rand_initialize() commit 8566417221fcec51346ec164e920dacb979c6b5f upstream. This is a preparatory commit for the following one. We simply inline the various functions that rand_initialize() calls that have no other callers. The compiler was doing this anyway before. Doing this will allow us to reorganize this after. We can then move the trust_cpu and parse_trust_cpu definitions a bit closer to where they're actually used, which makes the code easier to read. Cc: Theodore Ts'o Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 92 ++++++++++++++++--------------------------- 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 58 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index fdd4acc4dbb2..8225bebbb7d8 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -476,42 +476,6 @@ static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_init_wait); static void invalidate_batched_entropy(void); -static bool trust_cpu __ro_after_init = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU); -static int __init parse_trust_cpu(char *arg) -{ - return kstrtobool(arg, &trust_cpu); -} -early_param("random.trust_cpu", parse_trust_cpu); - -static bool __init crng_init_try_arch_early(void) -{ - int i; - bool arch_init = true; - unsigned long rv; - - for (i = 4; i < 16; i++) { - if (!arch_get_random_seed_long_early(&rv) && - !arch_get_random_long_early(&rv)) { - rv = random_get_entropy(); - arch_init = false; - } - primary_crng.state[i] ^= rv; - } - - return arch_init; -} - -static void __init crng_initialize(void) -{ - extract_entropy(&primary_crng.state[4], sizeof(u32) * 12); - if (crng_init_try_arch_early() && trust_cpu && crng_init < 2) { - invalidate_batched_entropy(); - crng_init = 2; - pr_notice("crng init done (trusting CPU's manufacturer)\n"); - } - primary_crng.init_time = jiffies - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL - 1; -} - /* * crng_fast_load() can be called by code in the interrupt service * path. So we can't afford to dilly-dally. Returns the number of @@ -1220,28 +1184,12 @@ int __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch); -/* - * init_std_data - initialize pool with system data - * - * This function clears the pool's entropy count and mixes some system - * data into the pool to prepare it for use. The pool is not cleared - * as that can only decrease the entropy in the pool. - */ -static void __init init_std_data(void) +static bool trust_cpu __ro_after_init = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU); +static int __init parse_trust_cpu(char *arg) { - int i; - ktime_t now = ktime_get_real(); - unsigned long rv; - - mix_pool_bytes(&now, sizeof(now)); - for (i = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; i > 0; i -= sizeof(rv)) { - if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) && - !arch_get_random_long(&rv)) - rv = random_get_entropy(); - mix_pool_bytes(&rv, sizeof(rv)); - } - mix_pool_bytes(utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname()))); + return kstrtobool(arg, &trust_cpu); } +early_param("random.trust_cpu", parse_trust_cpu); /* * Note that setup_arch() may call add_device_randomness() @@ -1255,8 +1203,36 @@ static void __init init_std_data(void) */ int __init rand_initialize(void) { - init_std_data(); - crng_initialize(); + int i; + ktime_t now = ktime_get_real(); + bool arch_init = true; + unsigned long rv; + + mix_pool_bytes(&now, sizeof(now)); + for (i = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; i > 0; i -= sizeof(rv)) { + if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) && + !arch_get_random_long(&rv)) + rv = random_get_entropy(); + mix_pool_bytes(&rv, sizeof(rv)); + } + mix_pool_bytes(utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname()))); + + extract_entropy(&primary_crng.state[4], sizeof(u32) * 12); + for (i = 4; i < 16; i++) { + if (!arch_get_random_seed_long_early(&rv) && + !arch_get_random_long_early(&rv)) { + rv = random_get_entropy(); + arch_init = false; + } + primary_crng.state[i] ^= rv; + } + if (arch_init && trust_cpu && crng_init < 2) { + invalidate_batched_entropy(); + crng_init = 2; + pr_notice("crng init done (trusting CPU's manufacturer)\n"); + } + primary_crng.init_time = jiffies - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL - 1; + if (ratelimit_disable) { urandom_warning.interval = 0; unseeded_warning.interval = 0; From 574c8839504b96faed80ee813f403227284dfd4b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2022 12:44:28 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0507/1091] random: ensure early RDSEED goes through mixer on init commit a02cf3d0dd77244fd5333ac48d78871de459ae6d upstream. Continuing the reasoning of "random: use RDSEED instead of RDRAND in entropy extraction" from this series, at init time we also don't want to be xoring RDSEED directly into the crng. Instead it's safer to put it into our entropy collector and then re-extract it, so that it goes through a hash function with preimage resistance. As a matter of hygiene, we also order these now so that the RDSEED byte are hashed in first, followed by the bytes that are likely more predictable (e.g. utsname()). Cc: Theodore Ts'o Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 16 +++++----------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 8225bebbb7d8..5e4db59fcbb8 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -1208,24 +1208,18 @@ int __init rand_initialize(void) bool arch_init = true; unsigned long rv; - mix_pool_bytes(&now, sizeof(now)); for (i = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; i > 0; i -= sizeof(rv)) { - if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) && - !arch_get_random_long(&rv)) - rv = random_get_entropy(); - mix_pool_bytes(&rv, sizeof(rv)); - } - mix_pool_bytes(utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname()))); - - extract_entropy(&primary_crng.state[4], sizeof(u32) * 12); - for (i = 4; i < 16; i++) { if (!arch_get_random_seed_long_early(&rv) && !arch_get_random_long_early(&rv)) { rv = random_get_entropy(); arch_init = false; } - primary_crng.state[i] ^= rv; + mix_pool_bytes(&rv, sizeof(rv)); } + mix_pool_bytes(&now, sizeof(now)); + mix_pool_bytes(utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname()))); + + extract_entropy(&primary_crng.state[4], sizeof(u32) * 12); if (arch_init && trust_cpu && crng_init < 2) { invalidate_batched_entropy(); crng_init = 2; From a3562bf4e8c9d043c88da228ca9574d9d84185af Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2022 13:00:11 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0508/1091] random: do not xor RDRAND when writing into /dev/random commit 91c2afca290ed3034841c8c8532e69ed9e16cf34 upstream. Continuing the reasoning of "random: ensure early RDSEED goes through mixer on init", we don't want RDRAND interacting with anything without going through the mixer function, as a backdoored CPU could presumably cancel out data during an xor, which it'd have a harder time doing when being forced through a cryptographic hash function. There's actually no need at all to be calling RDRAND in write_pool(), because before we extract from the pool, we always do so with 32 bytes of RDSEED hashed in at that stage. Xoring at this stage is needless and introduces a minor liability. Cc: Theodore Ts'o Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 14 ++------------ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 5e4db59fcbb8..ad1cc7177b91 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -1305,25 +1305,15 @@ static __poll_t random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait) static int write_pool(const char __user *buffer, size_t count) { size_t bytes; - u32 t, buf[16]; + u8 buf[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE]; const char __user *p = buffer; while (count > 0) { - int b, i = 0; - bytes = min(count, sizeof(buf)); - if (copy_from_user(&buf, p, bytes)) + if (copy_from_user(buf, p, bytes)) return -EFAULT; - - for (b = bytes; b > 0; b -= sizeof(u32), i++) { - if (!arch_get_random_int(&t)) - break; - buf[i] ^= t; - } - count -= bytes; p += bytes; - mix_pool_bytes(buf, bytes); cond_resched(); } From ea9941fd6e26a94c2d0c66c0980188ce011911ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2022 01:56:35 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0509/1091] random: absorb fast pool into input pool after fast load commit c30c575db4858f0bbe5e315ff2e529c782f33a1f upstream. During crng_init == 0, we never credit entropy in add_interrupt_ randomness(), but instead dump it directly into the primary_crng. That's fine, except for the fact that we then wind up throwing away that entropy later when we switch to extracting from the input pool and xoring into (and later in this series overwriting) the primary_crng key. The two other early init sites -- add_hwgenerator_randomness()'s use crng_fast_load() and add_device_ randomness()'s use of crng_slow_load() -- always additionally give their inputs to the input pool. But not add_interrupt_randomness(). This commit fixes that shortcoming by calling mix_pool_bytes() after crng_fast_load() in add_interrupt_randomness(). That's partially verboten on PREEMPT_RT, where it implies taking spinlock_t from an IRQ handler. But this also only happens during early boot and then never again after that. Plus it's a trylock so it has the same considerations as calling crng_fast_load(), which we're already using. Cc: Theodore Ts'o Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers Suggested-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index ad1cc7177b91..2aa8aff0b616 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -850,6 +850,10 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) crng_fast_load((u8 *)fast_pool->pool, sizeof(fast_pool->pool)) > 0) { fast_pool->count = 0; fast_pool->last = now; + if (spin_trylock(&input_pool.lock)) { + _mix_pool_bytes(&fast_pool->pool, sizeof(fast_pool->pool)); + spin_unlock(&input_pool.lock); + } } return; } From cee3c70569008276ff0729b38a5e8b292bf1f7b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Mon, 7 Feb 2022 15:08:49 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0510/1091] random: use simpler fast key erasure flow on per-cpu keys MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 186873c549df11b63e17062f863654e1501e1524 upstream. Rather than the clunky NUMA full ChaCha state system we had prior, this commit is closer to the original "fast key erasure RNG" proposal from , by simply treating ChaCha keys on a per-cpu basis. All entropy is extracted to a base crng key of 32 bytes. This base crng has a birthdate and a generation counter. When we go to take bytes from the crng, we first check if the birthdate is too old; if it is, we reseed per usual. Then we start working on a per-cpu crng. This per-cpu crng makes sure that it has the same generation counter as the base crng. If it doesn't, it does fast key erasure with the base crng key and uses the output as its new per-cpu key, and then updates its local generation counter. Then, using this per-cpu state, we do ordinary fast key erasure. Half of this first block is used to overwrite the per-cpu crng key for the next call -- this is the fast key erasure RNG idea -- and the other half, along with the ChaCha state, is returned to the caller. If the caller desires more than this remaining half, it can generate more ChaCha blocks, unlocked, using the now detached ChaCha state that was just returned. Crypto-wise, this is more or less what we were doing before, but this simply makes it more explicit and ensures that we always have backtrack protection by not playing games with a shared block counter. The flow looks like this: ──extract()──► base_crng.key ◄──memcpy()───┐ │ │ └──chacha()──────┬─► new_base_key └─► crngs[n].key ◄──memcpy()───┐ │ │ └──chacha()───┬─► new_key └─► random_bytes │ └────► There are a few hairy details around early init. Just as was done before, prior to having gathered enough entropy, crng_fast_load() and crng_slow_load() dump bytes directly into the base crng, and when we go to take bytes from the crng, in that case, we're doing fast key erasure with the base crng rather than the fast unlocked per-cpu crngs. This is fine as that's only the state of affairs during very early boot; once the crng initializes we never use these paths again. In the process of all this, the APIs into the crng become a bit simpler: we have get_random_bytes(buf, len) and get_random_bytes_user(buf, len), which both do what you'd expect. All of the details of fast key erasure and per-cpu selection happen only in a very short critical section of crng_make_state(), which selects the right per-cpu key, does the fast key erasure, and returns a local state to the caller's stack. So, we no longer have a need for a separate backtrack function, as this happens all at once here. The API then allows us to extend backtrack protection to batched entropy without really having to do much at all. The result is a bit simpler than before and has fewer foot guns. The init time state machine also gets a lot simpler as we don't need to wait for workqueues to come online and do deferred work. And the multi-core performance should be increased significantly, by virtue of having hardly any locking on the fast path. Cc: Theodore Ts'o Cc: Dominik Brodowski Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior Reviewed-by: Jann Horn Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 395 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 229 insertions(+), 166 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 2aa8aff0b616..3b3380dc3f95 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -67,63 +67,19 @@ * Exported interfaces ---- kernel output * -------------------------------------- * - * The primary kernel interface is + * The primary kernel interfaces are: * * void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes); - * - * This interface will return the requested number of random bytes, - * and place it in the requested buffer. This is equivalent to a - * read from /dev/urandom. - * - * For less critical applications, there are the functions: - * * u32 get_random_u32() * u64 get_random_u64() * unsigned int get_random_int() * unsigned long get_random_long() * - * These are produced by a cryptographic RNG seeded from get_random_bytes, - * and so do not deplete the entropy pool as much. These are recommended - * for most in-kernel operations *if the result is going to be stored in - * the kernel*. - * - * Specifically, the get_random_int() family do not attempt to do - * "anti-backtracking". If you capture the state of the kernel (e.g. - * by snapshotting the VM), you can figure out previous get_random_int() - * return values. But if the value is stored in the kernel anyway, - * this is not a problem. - * - * It *is* safe to expose get_random_int() output to attackers (e.g. as - * network cookies); given outputs 1..n, it's not feasible to predict - * outputs 0 or n+1. The only concern is an attacker who breaks into - * the kernel later; the get_random_int() engine is not reseeded as - * often as the get_random_bytes() one. - * - * get_random_bytes() is needed for keys that need to stay secret after - * they are erased from the kernel. For example, any key that will - * be wrapped and stored encrypted. And session encryption keys: we'd - * like to know that after the session is closed and the keys erased, - * the plaintext is unrecoverable to someone who recorded the ciphertext. - * - * But for network ports/cookies, stack canaries, PRNG seeds, address - * space layout randomization, session *authentication* keys, or other - * applications where the sensitive data is stored in the kernel in - * plaintext for as long as it's sensitive, the get_random_int() family - * is just fine. - * - * Consider ASLR. We want to keep the address space secret from an - * outside attacker while the process is running, but once the address - * space is torn down, it's of no use to an attacker any more. And it's - * stored in kernel data structures as long as it's alive, so worrying - * about an attacker's ability to extrapolate it from the get_random_int() - * CRNG is silly. - * - * Even some cryptographic keys are safe to generate with get_random_int(). - * In particular, keys for SipHash are generally fine. Here, knowledge - * of the key authorizes you to do something to a kernel object (inject - * packets to a network connection, or flood a hash table), and the - * key is stored with the object being protected. Once it goes away, - * we no longer care if anyone knows the key. + * These interfaces will return the requested number of random bytes + * into the given buffer or as a return value. This is equivalent to a + * read from /dev/urandom. The get_random_{u32,u64,int,long}() family + * of functions may be higher performance for one-off random integers, + * because they do a bit of buffering. * * prandom_u32() * ------------- @@ -300,20 +256,6 @@ static struct fasync_struct *fasync; static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(random_ready_list_lock); static LIST_HEAD(random_ready_list); -struct crng_state { - u32 state[16]; - unsigned long init_time; - spinlock_t lock; -}; - -static struct crng_state primary_crng = { - .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(primary_crng.lock), - .state[0] = CHACHA_CONSTANT_EXPA, - .state[1] = CHACHA_CONSTANT_ND_3, - .state[2] = CHACHA_CONSTANT_2_BY, - .state[3] = CHACHA_CONSTANT_TE_K, -}; - /* * crng_init = 0 --> Uninitialized * 1 --> Initialized @@ -325,9 +267,6 @@ static struct crng_state primary_crng = { static int crng_init = 0; #define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init > 1)) static int crng_init_cnt = 0; -#define CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH (2 * CHACHA_KEY_SIZE) -static void extract_crng(u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]); -static void crng_backtrack_protect(u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE], int used); static void process_random_ready_list(void); static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes); @@ -470,7 +409,28 @@ static void credit_entropy_bits(int nbits) * *********************************************************************/ -#define CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL (300 * HZ) +enum { + CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL = 300 * HZ, + CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH = 2 * CHACHA_KEY_SIZE +}; + +static struct { + u8 key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(long)); + unsigned long birth; + unsigned long generation; + spinlock_t lock; +} base_crng = { + .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(base_crng.lock) +}; + +struct crng { + u8 key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE]; + unsigned long generation; +}; + +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct crng, crngs) = { + .generation = ULONG_MAX +}; static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_init_wait); @@ -487,22 +447,22 @@ static size_t crng_fast_load(const u8 *cp, size_t len) u8 *p; size_t ret = 0; - if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags)) + if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags)) return 0; if (crng_init != 0) { - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags); return 0; } - p = (u8 *)&primary_crng.state[4]; + p = base_crng.key; while (len > 0 && crng_init_cnt < CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) { - p[crng_init_cnt % CHACHA_KEY_SIZE] ^= *cp; + p[crng_init_cnt % sizeof(base_crng.key)] ^= *cp; cp++; crng_init_cnt++; len--; ret++; } if (crng_init_cnt >= CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) { invalidate_batched_entropy(); crng_init = 1; } - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags); if (crng_init == 1) pr_notice("fast init done\n"); return ret; @@ -527,14 +487,14 @@ static int crng_slow_load(const u8 *cp, size_t len) unsigned long flags; static u8 lfsr = 1; u8 tmp; - unsigned int i, max = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE; + unsigned int i, max = sizeof(base_crng.key); const u8 *src_buf = cp; - u8 *dest_buf = (u8 *)&primary_crng.state[4]; + u8 *dest_buf = base_crng.key; - if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags)) + if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags)) return 0; if (crng_init != 0) { - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags); return 0; } if (len > max) @@ -545,38 +505,50 @@ static int crng_slow_load(const u8 *cp, size_t len) lfsr >>= 1; if (tmp & 1) lfsr ^= 0xE1; - tmp = dest_buf[i % CHACHA_KEY_SIZE]; - dest_buf[i % CHACHA_KEY_SIZE] ^= src_buf[i % len] ^ lfsr; + tmp = dest_buf[i % sizeof(base_crng.key)]; + dest_buf[i % sizeof(base_crng.key)] ^= src_buf[i % len] ^ lfsr; lfsr += (tmp << 3) | (tmp >> 5); } - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags); return 1; } static void crng_reseed(void) { unsigned long flags; - int i, entropy_count; - union { - u8 block[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]; - u32 key[8]; - } buf; + int entropy_count; + unsigned long next_gen; + u8 key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE]; + /* + * First we make sure we have POOL_MIN_BITS of entropy in the pool, + * and then we drain all of it. Only then can we extract a new key. + */ do { entropy_count = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count); if (entropy_count < POOL_MIN_BITS) return; } while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, entropy_count, 0) != entropy_count); - extract_entropy(buf.key, sizeof(buf.key)); + extract_entropy(key, sizeof(key)); wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait); kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT); - spin_lock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags); - for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) - primary_crng.state[i + 4] ^= buf.key[i]; - memzero_explicit(&buf, sizeof(buf)); - WRITE_ONCE(primary_crng.init_time, jiffies); - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags); + /* + * We copy the new key into the base_crng, overwriting the old one, + * and update the generation counter. We avoid hitting ULONG_MAX, + * because the per-cpu crngs are initialized to ULONG_MAX, so this + * forces new CPUs that come online to always initialize. + */ + spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags); + memcpy(base_crng.key, key, sizeof(base_crng.key)); + next_gen = base_crng.generation + 1; + if (next_gen == ULONG_MAX) + ++next_gen; + WRITE_ONCE(base_crng.generation, next_gen); + WRITE_ONCE(base_crng.birth, jiffies); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags); + memzero_explicit(key, sizeof(key)); + if (crng_init < 2) { invalidate_batched_entropy(); crng_init = 2; @@ -597,77 +569,143 @@ static void crng_reseed(void) } } -static void extract_crng(u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]) +/* + * The general form here is based on a "fast key erasure RNG" from + * . It generates a ChaCha + * block using the provided key, and then immediately overwites that + * key with half the block. It returns the resultant ChaCha state to the + * user, along with the second half of the block containing 32 bytes of + * random data that may be used; random_data_len may not be greater than + * 32. + */ +static void crng_fast_key_erasure(u8 key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE], + u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)], + u8 *random_data, size_t random_data_len) { - unsigned long flags, init_time; + u8 first_block[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]; - if (crng_ready()) { - init_time = READ_ONCE(primary_crng.init_time); - if (time_after(jiffies, init_time + CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL)) - crng_reseed(); - } - spin_lock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags); - chacha20_block(&primary_crng.state[0], out); - if (primary_crng.state[12] == 0) - primary_crng.state[13]++; - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags); + BUG_ON(random_data_len > 32); + + chacha_init_consts(chacha_state); + memcpy(&chacha_state[4], key, CHACHA_KEY_SIZE); + memset(&chacha_state[12], 0, sizeof(u32) * 4); + chacha20_block(chacha_state, first_block); + + memcpy(key, first_block, CHACHA_KEY_SIZE); + memcpy(random_data, first_block + CHACHA_KEY_SIZE, random_data_len); + memzero_explicit(first_block, sizeof(first_block)); } /* - * Use the leftover bytes from the CRNG block output (if there is - * enough) to mutate the CRNG key to provide backtracking protection. + * This function returns a ChaCha state that you may use for generating + * random data. It also returns up to 32 bytes on its own of random data + * that may be used; random_data_len may not be greater than 32. */ -static void crng_backtrack_protect(u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE], int used) +static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)], + u8 *random_data, size_t random_data_len) { unsigned long flags; - u32 *s, *d; - int i; + struct crng *crng; - used = round_up(used, sizeof(u32)); - if (used + CHACHA_KEY_SIZE > CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE) { - extract_crng(tmp); - used = 0; + BUG_ON(random_data_len > 32); + + /* + * For the fast path, we check whether we're ready, unlocked first, and + * then re-check once locked later. In the case where we're really not + * ready, we do fast key erasure with the base_crng directly, because + * this is what crng_{fast,slow}_load mutate during early init. + */ + if (unlikely(!crng_ready())) { + bool ready; + + spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags); + ready = crng_ready(); + if (!ready) + crng_fast_key_erasure(base_crng.key, chacha_state, + random_data, random_data_len); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags); + if (!ready) + return; } - spin_lock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags); - s = (u32 *)&tmp[used]; - d = &primary_crng.state[4]; - for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) - *d++ ^= *s++; - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags); + + /* + * If the base_crng is more than 5 minutes old, we reseed, which + * in turn bumps the generation counter that we check below. + */ + if (unlikely(time_after(jiffies, READ_ONCE(base_crng.birth) + CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL))) + crng_reseed(); + + local_irq_save(flags); + crng = raw_cpu_ptr(&crngs); + + /* + * If our per-cpu crng is older than the base_crng, then it means + * somebody reseeded the base_crng. In that case, we do fast key + * erasure on the base_crng, and use its output as the new key + * for our per-cpu crng. This brings us up to date with base_crng. + */ + if (unlikely(crng->generation != READ_ONCE(base_crng.generation))) { + spin_lock(&base_crng.lock); + crng_fast_key_erasure(base_crng.key, chacha_state, + crng->key, sizeof(crng->key)); + crng->generation = base_crng.generation; + spin_unlock(&base_crng.lock); + } + + /* + * Finally, when we've made it this far, our per-cpu crng has an up + * to date key, and we can do fast key erasure with it to produce + * some random data and a ChaCha state for the caller. All other + * branches of this function are "unlikely", so most of the time we + * should wind up here immediately. + */ + crng_fast_key_erasure(crng->key, chacha_state, random_data, random_data_len); + local_irq_restore(flags); } -static ssize_t extract_crng_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes) +static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes) { - ssize_t ret = 0, i = CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE; - u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(4); - int large_request = (nbytes > 256); + bool large_request = nbytes > 256; + ssize_t ret = 0, len; + u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)]; + u8 output[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]; + + if (!nbytes) + return 0; + + len = min_t(ssize_t, 32, nbytes); + crng_make_state(chacha_state, output, len); + + if (copy_to_user(buf, output, len)) + return -EFAULT; + nbytes -= len; + buf += len; + ret += len; while (nbytes) { if (large_request && need_resched()) { - if (signal_pending(current)) { - if (ret == 0) - ret = -ERESTARTSYS; + if (signal_pending(current)) break; - } schedule(); } - extract_crng(tmp); - i = min_t(int, nbytes, CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE); - if (copy_to_user(buf, tmp, i)) { + chacha20_block(chacha_state, output); + if (unlikely(chacha_state[12] == 0)) + ++chacha_state[13]; + + len = min_t(ssize_t, nbytes, CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE); + if (copy_to_user(buf, output, len)) { ret = -EFAULT; break; } - nbytes -= i; - buf += i; - ret += i; + nbytes -= len; + buf += len; + ret += len; } - crng_backtrack_protect(tmp, i); - - /* Wipe data just written to memory */ - memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); + memzero_explicit(chacha_state, sizeof(chacha_state)); + memzero_explicit(output, sizeof(output)); return ret; } @@ -976,23 +1014,36 @@ static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(const char *func_name, void *caller, void */ static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes) { - u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(4); + u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)]; + u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]; + ssize_t len; trace_get_random_bytes(nbytes, _RET_IP_); - while (nbytes >= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE) { - extract_crng(buf); - buf += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE; + if (!nbytes) + return; + + len = min_t(ssize_t, 32, nbytes); + crng_make_state(chacha_state, buf, len); + nbytes -= len; + buf += len; + + while (nbytes) { + if (nbytes < CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE) { + chacha20_block(chacha_state, tmp); + memcpy(buf, tmp, nbytes); + memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); + break; + } + + chacha20_block(chacha_state, buf); + if (unlikely(chacha_state[12] == 0)) + ++chacha_state[13]; nbytes -= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE; + buf += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE; } - if (nbytes > 0) { - extract_crng(tmp); - memcpy(buf, tmp, nbytes); - crng_backtrack_protect(tmp, nbytes); - } else - crng_backtrack_protect(tmp, CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE); - memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); + memzero_explicit(chacha_state, sizeof(chacha_state)); } void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes) @@ -1223,13 +1274,12 @@ int __init rand_initialize(void) mix_pool_bytes(&now, sizeof(now)); mix_pool_bytes(utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname()))); - extract_entropy(&primary_crng.state[4], sizeof(u32) * 12); + extract_entropy(base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key)); if (arch_init && trust_cpu && crng_init < 2) { invalidate_batched_entropy(); crng_init = 2; pr_notice("crng init done (trusting CPU's manufacturer)\n"); } - primary_crng.init_time = jiffies - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL - 1; if (ratelimit_disable) { urandom_warning.interval = 0; @@ -1261,7 +1311,7 @@ static ssize_t urandom_read_nowarn(struct file *file, char __user *buf, int ret; nbytes = min_t(size_t, nbytes, INT_MAX >> 6); - ret = extract_crng_user(buf, nbytes); + ret = get_random_bytes_user(buf, nbytes); trace_urandom_read(8 * nbytes, 0, input_pool.entropy_count); return ret; } @@ -1567,8 +1617,15 @@ static atomic_t batch_generation = ATOMIC_INIT(0); struct batched_entropy { union { - u64 entropy_u64[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u64)]; - u32 entropy_u32[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)]; + /* + * We make this 1.5x a ChaCha block, so that we get the + * remaining 32 bytes from fast key erasure, plus one full + * block from the detached ChaCha state. We can increase + * the size of this later if needed so long as we keep the + * formula of (integer_blocks + 0.5) * CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE. + */ + u64 entropy_u64[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 3 / (2 * sizeof(u64))]; + u32 entropy_u32[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 3 / (2 * sizeof(u32))]; }; unsigned int position; int generation; @@ -1576,13 +1633,13 @@ struct batched_entropy { /* * Get a random word for internal kernel use only. The quality of the random - * number is good as /dev/urandom, but there is no backtrack protection, with - * the goal of being quite fast and not depleting entropy. In order to ensure - * that the randomness provided by this function is okay, the function - * wait_for_random_bytes() should be called and return 0 at least once at any - * point prior. + * number is good as /dev/urandom. In order to ensure that the randomness + * provided by this function is okay, the function wait_for_random_bytes() + * should be called and return 0 at least once at any point prior. */ -static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u64); +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u64) = { + .position = UINT_MAX +}; u64 get_random_u64(void) { @@ -1598,20 +1655,24 @@ u64 get_random_u64(void) batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u64); next_gen = atomic_read(&batch_generation); - if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u64) == 0 || + if (batch->position >= ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u64) || next_gen != batch->generation) { - extract_crng((u8 *)batch->entropy_u64); + _get_random_bytes(batch->entropy_u64, sizeof(batch->entropy_u64)); batch->position = 0; batch->generation = next_gen; } - ret = batch->entropy_u64[batch->position++]; + ret = batch->entropy_u64[batch->position]; + batch->entropy_u64[batch->position] = 0; + ++batch->position; local_irq_restore(flags); return ret; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u64); -static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u32); +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u32) = { + .position = UINT_MAX +}; u32 get_random_u32(void) { @@ -1627,14 +1688,16 @@ u32 get_random_u32(void) batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u32); next_gen = atomic_read(&batch_generation); - if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u32) == 0 || + if (batch->position >= ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u32) || next_gen != batch->generation) { - extract_crng((u8 *)batch->entropy_u32); + _get_random_bytes(batch->entropy_u32, sizeof(batch->entropy_u32)); batch->position = 0; batch->generation = next_gen; } - ret = batch->entropy_u32[batch->position++]; + ret = batch->entropy_u32[batch->position]; + batch->entropy_u32[batch->position] = 0; + ++batch->position; local_irq_restore(flags); return ret; } From 3eed6af93ecd0da5573355f0d14c954bb1ae0e81 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2022 19:23:17 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0511/1091] random: use hash function for crng_slow_load() commit 66e4c2b9541503d721e936cc3898c9f25f4591ff upstream. Since we have a hash function that's really fast, and the goal of crng_slow_load() is reportedly to "touch all of the crng's state", we can just hash the old state together with the new state and call it a day. This way we dont need to reason about another LFSR or worry about various attacks there. This code is only ever used at early boot and then never again. Cc: Theodore Ts'o Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 40 ++++++++++++++-------------------------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 3b3380dc3f95..8f15e2236eed 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -475,42 +475,30 @@ static size_t crng_fast_load(const u8 *cp, size_t len) * all), and (2) it doesn't have the performance constraints of * crng_fast_load(). * - * So we do something more comprehensive which is guaranteed to touch - * all of the primary_crng's state, and which uses a LFSR with a - * period of 255 as part of the mixing algorithm. Finally, we do - * *not* advance crng_init_cnt since buffer we may get may be something - * like a fixed DMI table (for example), which might very well be - * unique to the machine, but is otherwise unvarying. + * So, we simply hash the contents in with the current key. Finally, + * we do *not* advance crng_init_cnt since buffer we may get may be + * something like a fixed DMI table (for example), which might very + * well be unique to the machine, but is otherwise unvarying. */ -static int crng_slow_load(const u8 *cp, size_t len) +static void crng_slow_load(const u8 *cp, size_t len) { unsigned long flags; - static u8 lfsr = 1; - u8 tmp; - unsigned int i, max = sizeof(base_crng.key); - const u8 *src_buf = cp; - u8 *dest_buf = base_crng.key; + struct blake2s_state hash; + + blake2s_init(&hash, sizeof(base_crng.key)); if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags)) - return 0; + return; if (crng_init != 0) { spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags); - return 0; + return; } - if (len > max) - max = len; - for (i = 0; i < max; i++) { - tmp = lfsr; - lfsr >>= 1; - if (tmp & 1) - lfsr ^= 0xE1; - tmp = dest_buf[i % sizeof(base_crng.key)]; - dest_buf[i % sizeof(base_crng.key)] ^= src_buf[i % len] ^ lfsr; - lfsr += (tmp << 3) | (tmp >> 5); - } + blake2s_update(&hash, base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key)); + blake2s_update(&hash, cp, len); + blake2s_final(&hash, base_crng.key); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags); - return 1; } static void crng_reseed(void) From b530684129b271e4c3450143c58b60f951dd776a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2022 14:43:25 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0512/1091] random: make more consistent use of integer types commit 04ec96b768c9dd43946b047c3da60dcc66431370 upstream. We've been using a flurry of int, unsigned int, size_t, and ssize_t. Let's unify all of this into size_t where it makes sense, as it does in most places, and leave ssize_t for return values with possible errors. In addition, keeping with the convention of other functions in this file, functions that are dealing with raw bytes now take void * consistently instead of a mix of that and u8 *, because much of the time we're actually passing some other structure that is then interpreted as bytes by the function. We also take the opportunity to fix the outdated and incorrect comment in get_random_bytes_arch(). Cc: Theodore Ts'o Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Reviewed-by: Jann Horn Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 123 +++++++++++++++------------------- include/linux/hw_random.h | 2 +- include/linux/random.h | 10 +-- include/trace/events/random.h | 79 +++++++++++----------- 4 files changed, 99 insertions(+), 115 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 8f15e2236eed..858e2c247dc2 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ * * The primary kernel interfaces are: * - * void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes); + * void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes); * u32 get_random_u32() * u64 get_random_u64() * unsigned int get_random_int() @@ -97,14 +97,14 @@ * The current exported interfaces for gathering environmental noise * from the devices are: * - * void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size); + * void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size); * void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, * unsigned int value); * void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq); * void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk); - * void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count, + * void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count, * size_t entropy); - * void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size); + * void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size); * * add_device_randomness() is for adding data to the random pool that * is likely to differ between two devices (or possibly even per boot). @@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ static int crng_init = 0; #define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init > 1)) static int crng_init_cnt = 0; static void process_random_ready_list(void); -static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes); +static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes); static struct ratelimit_state unseeded_warning = RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT("warn_unseeded_randomness", HZ, 3); @@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(ratelimit_disable, "Disable random ratelimit suppression"); static struct { struct blake2s_state hash; spinlock_t lock; - int entropy_count; + unsigned int entropy_count; } input_pool = { .hash.h = { BLAKE2S_IV0 ^ (0x01010000 | BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE), BLAKE2S_IV1, BLAKE2S_IV2, BLAKE2S_IV3, BLAKE2S_IV4, @@ -308,18 +308,12 @@ static void crng_reseed(void); * update the entropy estimate. The caller should call * credit_entropy_bits if this is appropriate. */ -static void _mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, int nbytes) +static void _mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, size_t nbytes) { blake2s_update(&input_pool.hash, in, nbytes); } -static void __mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, int nbytes) -{ - trace_mix_pool_bytes_nolock(nbytes, _RET_IP_); - _mix_pool_bytes(in, nbytes); -} - -static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, int nbytes) +static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, size_t nbytes) { unsigned long flags; @@ -383,18 +377,18 @@ static void process_random_ready_list(void) spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_list_lock, flags); } -static void credit_entropy_bits(int nbits) +static void credit_entropy_bits(size_t nbits) { - int entropy_count, orig; + unsigned int entropy_count, orig, add; - if (nbits <= 0) + if (!nbits) return; - nbits = min(nbits, POOL_BITS); + add = min_t(size_t, nbits, POOL_BITS); do { orig = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count); - entropy_count = min(POOL_BITS, orig + nbits); + entropy_count = min_t(unsigned int, POOL_BITS, orig + add); } while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig); trace_credit_entropy_bits(nbits, entropy_count, _RET_IP_); @@ -441,10 +435,10 @@ static void invalidate_batched_entropy(void); * path. So we can't afford to dilly-dally. Returns the number of * bytes processed from cp. */ -static size_t crng_fast_load(const u8 *cp, size_t len) +static size_t crng_fast_load(const void *cp, size_t len) { unsigned long flags; - u8 *p; + const u8 *src = (const u8 *)cp; size_t ret = 0; if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags)) @@ -453,10 +447,9 @@ static size_t crng_fast_load(const u8 *cp, size_t len) spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags); return 0; } - p = base_crng.key; while (len > 0 && crng_init_cnt < CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) { - p[crng_init_cnt % sizeof(base_crng.key)] ^= *cp; - cp++; crng_init_cnt++; len--; ret++; + base_crng.key[crng_init_cnt % sizeof(base_crng.key)] ^= *src; + src++; crng_init_cnt++; len--; ret++; } if (crng_init_cnt >= CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) { invalidate_batched_entropy(); @@ -480,7 +473,7 @@ static size_t crng_fast_load(const u8 *cp, size_t len) * something like a fixed DMI table (for example), which might very * well be unique to the machine, but is otherwise unvarying. */ -static void crng_slow_load(const u8 *cp, size_t len) +static void crng_slow_load(const void *cp, size_t len) { unsigned long flags; struct blake2s_state hash; @@ -654,14 +647,15 @@ static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)], static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes) { bool large_request = nbytes > 256; - ssize_t ret = 0, len; + ssize_t ret = 0; + size_t len; u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)]; u8 output[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]; if (!nbytes) return 0; - len = min_t(ssize_t, 32, nbytes); + len = min_t(size_t, 32, nbytes); crng_make_state(chacha_state, output, len); if (copy_to_user(buf, output, len)) @@ -681,7 +675,7 @@ static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes) if (unlikely(chacha_state[12] == 0)) ++chacha_state[13]; - len = min_t(ssize_t, nbytes, CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE); + len = min_t(size_t, nbytes, CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE); if (copy_to_user(buf, output, len)) { ret = -EFAULT; break; @@ -719,7 +713,7 @@ struct timer_rand_state { * the entropy pool having similar initial state across largely * identical devices. */ -void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size) +void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size) { unsigned long time = random_get_entropy() ^ jiffies; unsigned long flags; @@ -747,7 +741,7 @@ static struct timer_rand_state input_timer_state = INIT_TIMER_RAND_STATE; * keyboard scan codes, and 256 upwards for interrupts. * */ -static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned num) +static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned int num) { struct { long jiffies; @@ -791,7 +785,7 @@ static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned num) * Round down by 1 bit on general principles, * and limit entropy estimate to 12 bits. */ - credit_entropy_bits(min_t(int, fls(delta >> 1), 11)); + credit_entropy_bits(min_t(unsigned int, fls(delta >> 1), 11)); } void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, @@ -872,8 +866,8 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) add_interrupt_bench(cycles); if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) { - if ((fast_pool->count >= 64) && - crng_fast_load((u8 *)fast_pool->pool, sizeof(fast_pool->pool)) > 0) { + if (fast_pool->count >= 64 && + crng_fast_load(fast_pool->pool, sizeof(fast_pool->pool)) > 0) { fast_pool->count = 0; fast_pool->last = now; if (spin_trylock(&input_pool.lock)) { @@ -891,7 +885,7 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) return; fast_pool->last = now; - __mix_pool_bytes(&fast_pool->pool, sizeof(fast_pool->pool)); + _mix_pool_bytes(&fast_pool->pool, sizeof(fast_pool->pool)); spin_unlock(&input_pool.lock); fast_pool->count = 0; @@ -1000,18 +994,18 @@ static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(const char *func_name, void *caller, void * wait_for_random_bytes() should be called and return 0 at least once * at any point prior. */ -static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes) +static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes) { u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)]; u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]; - ssize_t len; + size_t len; trace_get_random_bytes(nbytes, _RET_IP_); if (!nbytes) return; - len = min_t(ssize_t, 32, nbytes); + len = min_t(size_t, 32, nbytes); crng_make_state(chacha_state, buf, len); nbytes -= len; buf += len; @@ -1034,7 +1028,7 @@ static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes) memzero_explicit(chacha_state, sizeof(chacha_state)); } -void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes) +void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes) { static void *previous; @@ -1195,25 +1189,19 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(del_random_ready_callback); /* * This function will use the architecture-specific hardware random - * number generator if it is available. The arch-specific hw RNG will - * almost certainly be faster than what we can do in software, but it - * is impossible to verify that it is implemented securely (as - * opposed, to, say, the AES encryption of a sequence number using a - * key known by the NSA). So it's useful if we need the speed, but - * only if we're willing to trust the hardware manufacturer not to - * have put in a back door. - * - * Return number of bytes filled in. + * number generator if it is available. It is not recommended for + * use. Use get_random_bytes() instead. It returns the number of + * bytes filled in. */ -int __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes) +size_t __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, size_t nbytes) { - int left = nbytes; + size_t left = nbytes; u8 *p = buf; trace_get_random_bytes_arch(left, _RET_IP_); while (left) { unsigned long v; - int chunk = min_t(int, left, sizeof(unsigned long)); + size_t chunk = min_t(size_t, left, sizeof(unsigned long)); if (!arch_get_random_long(&v)) break; @@ -1246,12 +1234,12 @@ early_param("random.trust_cpu", parse_trust_cpu); */ int __init rand_initialize(void) { - int i; + size_t i; ktime_t now = ktime_get_real(); bool arch_init = true; unsigned long rv; - for (i = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; i > 0; i -= sizeof(rv)) { + for (i = 0; i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; i += sizeof(rv)) { if (!arch_get_random_seed_long_early(&rv) && !arch_get_random_long_early(&rv)) { rv = random_get_entropy(); @@ -1300,7 +1288,7 @@ static ssize_t urandom_read_nowarn(struct file *file, char __user *buf, nbytes = min_t(size_t, nbytes, INT_MAX >> 6); ret = get_random_bytes_user(buf, nbytes); - trace_urandom_read(8 * nbytes, 0, input_pool.entropy_count); + trace_urandom_read(nbytes, input_pool.entropy_count); return ret; } @@ -1344,19 +1332,18 @@ static __poll_t random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait) return mask; } -static int write_pool(const char __user *buffer, size_t count) +static int write_pool(const char __user *ubuf, size_t count) { - size_t bytes; - u8 buf[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE]; - const char __user *p = buffer; + size_t len; + u8 block[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE]; - while (count > 0) { - bytes = min(count, sizeof(buf)); - if (copy_from_user(buf, p, bytes)) + while (count) { + len = min(count, sizeof(block)); + if (copy_from_user(block, ubuf, len)) return -EFAULT; - count -= bytes; - p += bytes; - mix_pool_bytes(buf, bytes); + count -= len; + ubuf += len; + mix_pool_bytes(block, len); cond_resched(); } @@ -1366,7 +1353,7 @@ static int write_pool(const char __user *buffer, size_t count) static ssize_t random_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { - size_t ret; + int ret; ret = write_pool(buffer, count); if (ret) @@ -1462,8 +1449,6 @@ const struct file_operations urandom_fops = { SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count, unsigned int, flags) { - int ret; - if (flags & ~(GRND_NONBLOCK | GRND_RANDOM | GRND_INSECURE)) return -EINVAL; @@ -1478,6 +1463,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count, unsigned int, count = INT_MAX; if (!(flags & GRND_INSECURE) && !crng_ready()) { + int ret; + if (flags & GRND_NONBLOCK) return -EAGAIN; ret = wait_for_random_bytes(); @@ -1736,7 +1723,7 @@ unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range) * Those devices may produce endless random bits and will be throttled * when our pool is full. */ -void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count, +void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count, size_t entropy) { if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) { @@ -1767,7 +1754,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_hwgenerator_randomness); * it would be regarded as device data. * The decision is controlled by CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER. */ -void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size) +void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size) { if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER)) add_hwgenerator_randomness(buf, size, size * 8); diff --git a/include/linux/hw_random.h b/include/linux/hw_random.h index 8e6dd908da21..1a9fc38f8938 100644 --- a/include/linux/hw_random.h +++ b/include/linux/hw_random.h @@ -61,6 +61,6 @@ extern int devm_hwrng_register(struct device *dev, struct hwrng *rng); extern void hwrng_unregister(struct hwrng *rng); extern void devm_hwrng_unregister(struct device *dve, struct hwrng *rng); /** Feed random bits into the pool. */ -extern void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count, size_t entropy); +extern void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count, size_t entropy); #endif /* LINUX_HWRANDOM_H_ */ diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h index c45b2693e51f..e92efb39779c 100644 --- a/include/linux/random.h +++ b/include/linux/random.h @@ -20,8 +20,8 @@ struct random_ready_callback { struct module *owner; }; -extern void add_device_randomness(const void *, unsigned int); -extern void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *, unsigned int); +extern void add_device_randomness(const void *, size_t); +extern void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *, size_t); #if defined(LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN) && !defined(__CHECKER__) static inline void add_latent_entropy(void) @@ -37,13 +37,13 @@ extern void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, unsigned int value) __latent_entropy; extern void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) __latent_entropy; -extern void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes); +extern void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes); extern int wait_for_random_bytes(void); extern int __init rand_initialize(void); extern bool rng_is_initialized(void); extern int add_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy); extern void del_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy); -extern int __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes); +extern size_t __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, size_t nbytes); #ifndef MODULE extern const struct file_operations random_fops, urandom_fops; @@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ static inline unsigned long get_random_canary(void) /* Calls wait_for_random_bytes() and then calls get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes). * Returns the result of the call to wait_for_random_bytes. */ -static inline int get_random_bytes_wait(void *buf, int nbytes) +static inline int get_random_bytes_wait(void *buf, size_t nbytes) { int ret = wait_for_random_bytes(); get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes); diff --git a/include/trace/events/random.h b/include/trace/events/random.h index 6f3a9b90ce81..29ebb6200663 100644 --- a/include/trace/events/random.h +++ b/include/trace/events/random.h @@ -9,13 +9,13 @@ #include TRACE_EVENT(add_device_randomness, - TP_PROTO(int bytes, unsigned long IP), + TP_PROTO(size_t bytes, unsigned long IP), TP_ARGS(bytes, IP), TP_STRUCT__entry( - __field( int, bytes ) - __field(unsigned long, IP ) + __field(size_t, bytes ) + __field(unsigned long, IP ) ), TP_fast_assign( @@ -23,18 +23,18 @@ TRACE_EVENT(add_device_randomness, __entry->IP = IP; ), - TP_printk("bytes %d caller %pS", + TP_printk("bytes %zu caller %pS", __entry->bytes, (void *)__entry->IP) ); DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(random__mix_pool_bytes, - TP_PROTO(int bytes, unsigned long IP), + TP_PROTO(size_t bytes, unsigned long IP), TP_ARGS(bytes, IP), TP_STRUCT__entry( - __field( int, bytes ) - __field(unsigned long, IP ) + __field(size_t, bytes ) + __field(unsigned long, IP ) ), TP_fast_assign( @@ -42,12 +42,12 @@ DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(random__mix_pool_bytes, __entry->IP = IP; ), - TP_printk("input pool: bytes %d caller %pS", + TP_printk("input pool: bytes %zu caller %pS", __entry->bytes, (void *)__entry->IP) ); DEFINE_EVENT(random__mix_pool_bytes, mix_pool_bytes, - TP_PROTO(int bytes, unsigned long IP), + TP_PROTO(size_t bytes, unsigned long IP), TP_ARGS(bytes, IP) ); @@ -59,13 +59,13 @@ DEFINE_EVENT(random__mix_pool_bytes, mix_pool_bytes_nolock, ); TRACE_EVENT(credit_entropy_bits, - TP_PROTO(int bits, int entropy_count, unsigned long IP), + TP_PROTO(size_t bits, size_t entropy_count, unsigned long IP), TP_ARGS(bits, entropy_count, IP), TP_STRUCT__entry( - __field( int, bits ) - __field( int, entropy_count ) + __field(size_t, bits ) + __field(size_t, entropy_count ) __field(unsigned long, IP ) ), @@ -75,34 +75,34 @@ TRACE_EVENT(credit_entropy_bits, __entry->IP = IP; ), - TP_printk("input pool: bits %d entropy_count %d caller %pS", + TP_printk("input pool: bits %zu entropy_count %zu caller %pS", __entry->bits, __entry->entropy_count, (void *)__entry->IP) ); TRACE_EVENT(add_input_randomness, - TP_PROTO(int input_bits), + TP_PROTO(size_t input_bits), TP_ARGS(input_bits), TP_STRUCT__entry( - __field( int, input_bits ) + __field(size_t, input_bits ) ), TP_fast_assign( __entry->input_bits = input_bits; ), - TP_printk("input_pool_bits %d", __entry->input_bits) + TP_printk("input_pool_bits %zu", __entry->input_bits) ); TRACE_EVENT(add_disk_randomness, - TP_PROTO(dev_t dev, int input_bits), + TP_PROTO(dev_t dev, size_t input_bits), TP_ARGS(dev, input_bits), TP_STRUCT__entry( - __field( dev_t, dev ) - __field( int, input_bits ) + __field(dev_t, dev ) + __field(size_t, input_bits ) ), TP_fast_assign( @@ -110,17 +110,17 @@ TRACE_EVENT(add_disk_randomness, __entry->input_bits = input_bits; ), - TP_printk("dev %d,%d input_pool_bits %d", MAJOR(__entry->dev), + TP_printk("dev %d,%d input_pool_bits %zu", MAJOR(__entry->dev), MINOR(__entry->dev), __entry->input_bits) ); DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(random__get_random_bytes, - TP_PROTO(int nbytes, unsigned long IP), + TP_PROTO(size_t nbytes, unsigned long IP), TP_ARGS(nbytes, IP), TP_STRUCT__entry( - __field( int, nbytes ) + __field(size_t, nbytes ) __field(unsigned long, IP ) ), @@ -129,29 +129,29 @@ DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(random__get_random_bytes, __entry->IP = IP; ), - TP_printk("nbytes %d caller %pS", __entry->nbytes, (void *)__entry->IP) + TP_printk("nbytes %zu caller %pS", __entry->nbytes, (void *)__entry->IP) ); DEFINE_EVENT(random__get_random_bytes, get_random_bytes, - TP_PROTO(int nbytes, unsigned long IP), + TP_PROTO(size_t nbytes, unsigned long IP), TP_ARGS(nbytes, IP) ); DEFINE_EVENT(random__get_random_bytes, get_random_bytes_arch, - TP_PROTO(int nbytes, unsigned long IP), + TP_PROTO(size_t nbytes, unsigned long IP), TP_ARGS(nbytes, IP) ); DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(random__extract_entropy, - TP_PROTO(int nbytes, int entropy_count), + TP_PROTO(size_t nbytes, size_t entropy_count), TP_ARGS(nbytes, entropy_count), TP_STRUCT__entry( - __field( int, nbytes ) - __field( int, entropy_count ) + __field( size_t, nbytes ) + __field( size_t, entropy_count ) ), TP_fast_assign( @@ -159,37 +159,34 @@ DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(random__extract_entropy, __entry->entropy_count = entropy_count; ), - TP_printk("input pool: nbytes %d entropy_count %d", + TP_printk("input pool: nbytes %zu entropy_count %zu", __entry->nbytes, __entry->entropy_count) ); DEFINE_EVENT(random__extract_entropy, extract_entropy, - TP_PROTO(int nbytes, int entropy_count), + TP_PROTO(size_t nbytes, size_t entropy_count), TP_ARGS(nbytes, entropy_count) ); TRACE_EVENT(urandom_read, - TP_PROTO(int got_bits, int pool_left, int input_left), + TP_PROTO(size_t nbytes, size_t entropy_count), - TP_ARGS(got_bits, pool_left, input_left), + TP_ARGS(nbytes, entropy_count), TP_STRUCT__entry( - __field( int, got_bits ) - __field( int, pool_left ) - __field( int, input_left ) + __field( size_t, nbytes ) + __field( size_t, entropy_count ) ), TP_fast_assign( - __entry->got_bits = got_bits; - __entry->pool_left = pool_left; - __entry->input_left = input_left; + __entry->nbytes = nbytes; + __entry->entropy_count = entropy_count; ), - TP_printk("got_bits %d nonblocking_pool_entropy_left %d " - "input_entropy_left %d", __entry->got_bits, - __entry->pool_left, __entry->input_left) + TP_printk("reading: nbytes %zu entropy_count %zu", + __entry->nbytes, __entry->entropy_count) ); #endif /* _TRACE_RANDOM_H */ From 21da00f8cb3a138ff8416497bd36a887f8869243 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Mon, 7 Feb 2022 23:37:13 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0513/1091] random: remove outdated INT_MAX >> 6 check in urandom_read() commit 434537ae54ad37e93555de21b6ac8133d6d773a9 upstream. In 79a8468747c5 ("random: check for increase of entropy_count because of signed conversion"), a number of checks were added around what values were passed to account(), because account() was doing fancy fixed point fractional arithmetic, and a user had some ability to pass large values directly into it. One of things in that commit was limiting those values to INT_MAX >> 6. The first >> 3 was for bytes to bits, and the next >> 3 was for bits to 1/8 fractional bits. However, for several years now, urandom reads no longer touch entropy accounting, and so this check serves no purpose. The current flow is: urandom_read_nowarn()-->get_random_bytes_user()-->chacha20_block() Of course, we don't want that size_t to be truncated when adding it into the ssize_t. But we arrive at urandom_read_nowarn() in the first place either via ordinary fops, which limits reads to MAX_RW_COUNT, or via getrandom() which limits reads to INT_MAX. Cc: Theodore Ts'o Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Reviewed-by: Jann Horn Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 858e2c247dc2..db95d79a9303 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -1284,9 +1284,8 @@ void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk) static ssize_t urandom_read_nowarn(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos) { - int ret; + ssize_t ret; - nbytes = min_t(size_t, nbytes, INT_MAX >> 6); ret = get_random_bytes_user(buf, nbytes); trace_urandom_read(nbytes, input_pool.entropy_count); return ret; From b1d5611381500b29a243b21288e8a33482f56bf2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2022 18:42:13 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0514/1091] random: zero buffer after reading entropy from userspace commit 7b5164fb1279bf0251371848e40bae646b59b3a8 upstream. This buffer may contain entropic data that shouldn't stick around longer than needed, so zero out the temporary buffer at the end of write_pool(). Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Reviewed-by: Jann Horn Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 11 ++++++++--- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index db95d79a9303..9e894baed1b5 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -1334,19 +1334,24 @@ static __poll_t random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait) static int write_pool(const char __user *ubuf, size_t count) { size_t len; + int ret = 0; u8 block[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE]; while (count) { len = min(count, sizeof(block)); - if (copy_from_user(block, ubuf, len)) - return -EFAULT; + if (copy_from_user(block, ubuf, len)) { + ret = -EFAULT; + goto out; + } count -= len; ubuf += len; mix_pool_bytes(block, len); cond_resched(); } - return 0; +out: + memzero_explicit(block, sizeof(block)); + return ret; } static ssize_t random_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer, From d8a6684950c15d82fd06f3ff728898b1d1845493 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dominik Brodowski Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2022 19:57:06 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0515/1091] random: fix locking for crng_init in crng_reseed() commit 7191c628fe07b70d3f37de736d173d1b115396ed upstream. crng_init is protected by primary_crng->lock. Therefore, we need to hold this lock when increasing crng_init to 2. As we shouldn't hold this lock for too long, only hold it for those parts which require protection. Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 9e894baed1b5..6276f04f02d2 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -500,6 +500,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(void) int entropy_count; unsigned long next_gen; u8 key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE]; + bool finalize_init = false; /* * First we make sure we have POOL_MIN_BITS of entropy in the pool, @@ -527,12 +528,14 @@ static void crng_reseed(void) ++next_gen; WRITE_ONCE(base_crng.generation, next_gen); WRITE_ONCE(base_crng.birth, jiffies); - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags); - memzero_explicit(key, sizeof(key)); - if (crng_init < 2) { invalidate_batched_entropy(); crng_init = 2; + finalize_init = true; + } + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags); + memzero_explicit(key, sizeof(key)); + if (finalize_init) { process_random_ready_list(); wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait); kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN); From 4a14a5a6969a9239e610b50a0c3204acc6e8c7fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2022 22:46:48 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0516/1091] random: tie batched entropy generation to base_crng generation commit 0791e8b655cc373718f0f58800fdc625a3447ac5 upstream. Now that we have an explicit base_crng generation counter, we don't need a separate one for batched entropy. Rather, we can just move the generation forward every time we change crng_init state or update the base_crng key. Cc: Theodore Ts'o Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 29 ++++++++--------------------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 6276f04f02d2..f83fa5c37843 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -428,8 +428,6 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct crng, crngs) = { static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_init_wait); -static void invalidate_batched_entropy(void); - /* * crng_fast_load() can be called by code in the interrupt service * path. So we can't afford to dilly-dally. Returns the number of @@ -452,7 +450,7 @@ static size_t crng_fast_load(const void *cp, size_t len) src++; crng_init_cnt++; len--; ret++; } if (crng_init_cnt >= CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) { - invalidate_batched_entropy(); + ++base_crng.generation; crng_init = 1; } spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags); @@ -529,7 +527,6 @@ static void crng_reseed(void) WRITE_ONCE(base_crng.generation, next_gen); WRITE_ONCE(base_crng.birth, jiffies); if (crng_init < 2) { - invalidate_batched_entropy(); crng_init = 2; finalize_init = true; } @@ -1254,8 +1251,9 @@ int __init rand_initialize(void) mix_pool_bytes(utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname()))); extract_entropy(base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key)); + ++base_crng.generation; + if (arch_init && trust_cpu && crng_init < 2) { - invalidate_batched_entropy(); crng_init = 2; pr_notice("crng init done (trusting CPU's manufacturer)\n"); } @@ -1595,8 +1593,6 @@ struct ctl_table random_table[] = { }; #endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */ -static atomic_t batch_generation = ATOMIC_INIT(0); - struct batched_entropy { union { /* @@ -1609,8 +1605,8 @@ struct batched_entropy { u64 entropy_u64[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 3 / (2 * sizeof(u64))]; u32 entropy_u32[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 3 / (2 * sizeof(u32))]; }; + unsigned long generation; unsigned int position; - int generation; }; /* @@ -1629,14 +1625,14 @@ u64 get_random_u64(void) unsigned long flags; struct batched_entropy *batch; static void *previous; - int next_gen; + unsigned long next_gen; warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous); local_irq_save(flags); batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u64); - next_gen = atomic_read(&batch_generation); + next_gen = READ_ONCE(base_crng.generation); if (batch->position >= ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u64) || next_gen != batch->generation) { _get_random_bytes(batch->entropy_u64, sizeof(batch->entropy_u64)); @@ -1662,14 +1658,14 @@ u32 get_random_u32(void) unsigned long flags; struct batched_entropy *batch; static void *previous; - int next_gen; + unsigned long next_gen; warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous); local_irq_save(flags); batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u32); - next_gen = atomic_read(&batch_generation); + next_gen = READ_ONCE(base_crng.generation); if (batch->position >= ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u32) || next_gen != batch->generation) { _get_random_bytes(batch->entropy_u32, sizeof(batch->entropy_u32)); @@ -1685,15 +1681,6 @@ u32 get_random_u32(void) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u32); -/* It's important to invalidate all potential batched entropy that might - * be stored before the crng is initialized, which we can do lazily by - * bumping the generation counter. - */ -static void invalidate_batched_entropy(void) -{ - atomic_inc(&batch_generation); -} - /** * randomize_page - Generate a random, page aligned address * @start: The smallest acceptable address the caller will take. From d68883956d36375907b7ae2c48220c1cafc2f957 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2022 16:35:24 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0517/1091] random: remove ifdef'd out interrupt bench commit 95e6060c20a7f5db60163274c5222a725ac118f9 upstream. With tools like kbench9000 giving more finegrained responses, and this basically never having been used ever since it was initially added, let's just get rid of this. There *is* still work to be done on the interrupt handler, but this really isn't the way it's being developed. Cc: Theodore Ts'o Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst | 9 ----- drivers/char/random.c | 40 --------------------- 2 files changed, 49 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst index 89214744eae2..05fa8c9d63a7 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst @@ -893,15 +893,6 @@ This is a directory, with the following entries: are woken up. This file is writable for compatibility purposes, but writing to it has no effect on any RNG behavior. -If ``drivers/char/random.c`` is built with ``ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH`` -defined, these additional entries are present: - -* ``add_interrupt_avg_cycles``: the average number of cycles between - interrupts used to feed the pool; - -* ``add_interrupt_avg_deviation``: the standard deviation seen on the - number of cycles between interrupts used to feed the pool. - randomize_va_space ================== diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index f83fa5c37843..17c66efb31bf 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -240,8 +240,6 @@ #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS #include -/* #define ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH */ - enum { POOL_BITS = BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE * 8, POOL_MIN_BITS = POOL_BITS /* No point in settling for less. */ @@ -806,27 +804,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_input_randomness); static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct fast_pool, irq_randomness); -#ifdef ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH -static unsigned long avg_cycles, avg_deviation; - -#define AVG_SHIFT 8 /* Exponential average factor k=1/256 */ -#define FIXED_1_2 (1 << (AVG_SHIFT - 1)) - -static void add_interrupt_bench(cycles_t start) -{ - long delta = random_get_entropy() - start; - - /* Use a weighted moving average */ - delta = delta - ((avg_cycles + FIXED_1_2) >> AVG_SHIFT); - avg_cycles += delta; - /* And average deviation */ - delta = abs(delta) - ((avg_deviation + FIXED_1_2) >> AVG_SHIFT); - avg_deviation += delta; -} -#else -#define add_interrupt_bench(x) -#endif - static u32 get_reg(struct fast_pool *f, struct pt_regs *regs) { u32 *ptr = (u32 *)regs; @@ -863,7 +840,6 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) (sizeof(ip) > 4) ? ip >> 32 : get_reg(fast_pool, regs); fast_mix(fast_pool); - add_interrupt_bench(cycles); if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) { if (fast_pool->count >= 64 && @@ -1573,22 +1549,6 @@ struct ctl_table random_table[] = { .mode = 0444, .proc_handler = proc_do_uuid, }, -#ifdef ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH - { - .procname = "add_interrupt_avg_cycles", - .data = &avg_cycles, - .maxlen = sizeof(avg_cycles), - .mode = 0444, - .proc_handler = proc_doulongvec_minmax, - }, - { - .procname = "add_interrupt_avg_deviation", - .data = &avg_deviation, - .maxlen = sizeof(avg_deviation), - .mode = 0444, - .proc_handler = proc_doulongvec_minmax, - }, -#endif { } }; #endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */ From 776927dfd4ac619c478241290a5b030fa90631e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2022 16:40:44 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0518/1091] random: remove unused tracepoints commit 14c174633f349cb41ea90c2c0aaddac157012f74 upstream. These explicit tracepoints aren't really used and show sign of aging. It's work to keep these up to date, and before I attempted to keep them up to date, they weren't up to date, which indicates that they're not really used. These days there are better ways of introspecting anyway. Cc: Theodore Ts'o Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 30 +----- include/trace/events/random.h | 195 ---------------------------------- lib/random32.c | 2 + 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 222 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 include/trace/events/random.h diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 17c66efb31bf..7997fdf58797 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -237,9 +237,6 @@ #include #include -#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS -#include - enum { POOL_BITS = BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE * 8, POOL_MIN_BITS = POOL_BITS /* No point in settling for less. */ @@ -315,7 +312,6 @@ static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, size_t nbytes) { unsigned long flags; - trace_mix_pool_bytes(nbytes, _RET_IP_); spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags); _mix_pool_bytes(in, nbytes); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags); @@ -389,8 +385,6 @@ static void credit_entropy_bits(size_t nbits) entropy_count = min_t(unsigned int, POOL_BITS, orig + add); } while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig); - trace_credit_entropy_bits(nbits, entropy_count, _RET_IP_); - if (crng_init < 2 && entropy_count >= POOL_MIN_BITS) crng_reseed(); } @@ -719,7 +713,6 @@ void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size) if (!crng_ready() && size) crng_slow_load(buf, size); - trace_add_device_randomness(size, _RET_IP_); spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags); _mix_pool_bytes(buf, size); _mix_pool_bytes(&time, sizeof(time)); @@ -798,7 +791,6 @@ void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, last_value = value; add_timer_randomness(&input_timer_state, (type << 4) ^ code ^ (code >> 4) ^ value); - trace_add_input_randomness(input_pool.entropy_count); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_input_randomness); @@ -878,7 +870,6 @@ void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk) return; /* first major is 1, so we get >= 0x200 here */ add_timer_randomness(disk->random, 0x100 + disk_devt(disk)); - trace_add_disk_randomness(disk_devt(disk), input_pool.entropy_count); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_disk_randomness); #endif @@ -903,8 +894,6 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes) } block; size_t i; - trace_extract_entropy(nbytes, input_pool.entropy_count); - for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(block.rdseed); ++i) { if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&block.rdseed[i]) && !arch_get_random_long(&block.rdseed[i])) @@ -976,8 +965,6 @@ static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes) u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]; size_t len; - trace_get_random_bytes(nbytes, _RET_IP_); - if (!nbytes) return; @@ -1174,7 +1161,6 @@ size_t __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, size_t nbytes) size_t left = nbytes; u8 *p = buf; - trace_get_random_bytes_arch(left, _RET_IP_); while (left) { unsigned long v; size_t chunk = min_t(size_t, left, sizeof(unsigned long)); @@ -1258,16 +1244,6 @@ void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk) } #endif -static ssize_t urandom_read_nowarn(struct file *file, char __user *buf, - size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos) -{ - ssize_t ret; - - ret = get_random_bytes_user(buf, nbytes); - trace_urandom_read(nbytes, input_pool.entropy_count); - return ret; -} - static ssize_t urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos) { @@ -1280,7 +1256,7 @@ static ssize_t urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, current->comm, nbytes); } - return urandom_read_nowarn(file, buf, nbytes, ppos); + return get_random_bytes_user(buf, nbytes); } static ssize_t random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, @@ -1291,7 +1267,7 @@ static ssize_t random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, ret = wait_for_random_bytes(); if (ret != 0) return ret; - return urandom_read_nowarn(file, buf, nbytes, ppos); + return get_random_bytes_user(buf, nbytes); } static __poll_t random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait) @@ -1452,7 +1428,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count, unsigned int, if (unlikely(ret)) return ret; } - return urandom_read_nowarn(NULL, buf, count, NULL); + return get_random_bytes_user(buf, count); } /******************************************************************** diff --git a/include/trace/events/random.h b/include/trace/events/random.h deleted file mode 100644 index 29ebb6200663..000000000000 --- a/include/trace/events/random.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,195 +0,0 @@ -/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ -#undef TRACE_SYSTEM -#define TRACE_SYSTEM random - -#if !defined(_TRACE_RANDOM_H) || defined(TRACE_HEADER_MULTI_READ) -#define _TRACE_RANDOM_H - -#include -#include - -TRACE_EVENT(add_device_randomness, - TP_PROTO(size_t bytes, unsigned long IP), - - TP_ARGS(bytes, IP), - - TP_STRUCT__entry( - __field(size_t, bytes ) - __field(unsigned long, IP ) - ), - - TP_fast_assign( - __entry->bytes = bytes; - __entry->IP = IP; - ), - - TP_printk("bytes %zu caller %pS", - __entry->bytes, (void *)__entry->IP) -); - -DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(random__mix_pool_bytes, - TP_PROTO(size_t bytes, unsigned long IP), - - TP_ARGS(bytes, IP), - - TP_STRUCT__entry( - __field(size_t, bytes ) - __field(unsigned long, IP ) - ), - - TP_fast_assign( - __entry->bytes = bytes; - __entry->IP = IP; - ), - - TP_printk("input pool: bytes %zu caller %pS", - __entry->bytes, (void *)__entry->IP) -); - -DEFINE_EVENT(random__mix_pool_bytes, mix_pool_bytes, - TP_PROTO(size_t bytes, unsigned long IP), - - TP_ARGS(bytes, IP) -); - -DEFINE_EVENT(random__mix_pool_bytes, mix_pool_bytes_nolock, - TP_PROTO(int bytes, unsigned long IP), - - TP_ARGS(bytes, IP) -); - -TRACE_EVENT(credit_entropy_bits, - TP_PROTO(size_t bits, size_t entropy_count, unsigned long IP), - - TP_ARGS(bits, entropy_count, IP), - - TP_STRUCT__entry( - __field(size_t, bits ) - __field(size_t, entropy_count ) - __field(unsigned long, IP ) - ), - - TP_fast_assign( - __entry->bits = bits; - __entry->entropy_count = entropy_count; - __entry->IP = IP; - ), - - TP_printk("input pool: bits %zu entropy_count %zu caller %pS", - __entry->bits, __entry->entropy_count, (void *)__entry->IP) -); - -TRACE_EVENT(add_input_randomness, - TP_PROTO(size_t input_bits), - - TP_ARGS(input_bits), - - TP_STRUCT__entry( - __field(size_t, input_bits ) - ), - - TP_fast_assign( - __entry->input_bits = input_bits; - ), - - TP_printk("input_pool_bits %zu", __entry->input_bits) -); - -TRACE_EVENT(add_disk_randomness, - TP_PROTO(dev_t dev, size_t input_bits), - - TP_ARGS(dev, input_bits), - - TP_STRUCT__entry( - __field(dev_t, dev ) - __field(size_t, input_bits ) - ), - - TP_fast_assign( - __entry->dev = dev; - __entry->input_bits = input_bits; - ), - - TP_printk("dev %d,%d input_pool_bits %zu", MAJOR(__entry->dev), - MINOR(__entry->dev), __entry->input_bits) -); - -DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(random__get_random_bytes, - TP_PROTO(size_t nbytes, unsigned long IP), - - TP_ARGS(nbytes, IP), - - TP_STRUCT__entry( - __field(size_t, nbytes ) - __field(unsigned long, IP ) - ), - - TP_fast_assign( - __entry->nbytes = nbytes; - __entry->IP = IP; - ), - - TP_printk("nbytes %zu caller %pS", __entry->nbytes, (void *)__entry->IP) -); - -DEFINE_EVENT(random__get_random_bytes, get_random_bytes, - TP_PROTO(size_t nbytes, unsigned long IP), - - TP_ARGS(nbytes, IP) -); - -DEFINE_EVENT(random__get_random_bytes, get_random_bytes_arch, - TP_PROTO(size_t nbytes, unsigned long IP), - - TP_ARGS(nbytes, IP) -); - -DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(random__extract_entropy, - TP_PROTO(size_t nbytes, size_t entropy_count), - - TP_ARGS(nbytes, entropy_count), - - TP_STRUCT__entry( - __field( size_t, nbytes ) - __field( size_t, entropy_count ) - ), - - TP_fast_assign( - __entry->nbytes = nbytes; - __entry->entropy_count = entropy_count; - ), - - TP_printk("input pool: nbytes %zu entropy_count %zu", - __entry->nbytes, __entry->entropy_count) -); - - -DEFINE_EVENT(random__extract_entropy, extract_entropy, - TP_PROTO(size_t nbytes, size_t entropy_count), - - TP_ARGS(nbytes, entropy_count) -); - -TRACE_EVENT(urandom_read, - TP_PROTO(size_t nbytes, size_t entropy_count), - - TP_ARGS(nbytes, entropy_count), - - TP_STRUCT__entry( - __field( size_t, nbytes ) - __field( size_t, entropy_count ) - ), - - TP_fast_assign( - __entry->nbytes = nbytes; - __entry->entropy_count = entropy_count; - ), - - TP_printk("reading: nbytes %zu entropy_count %zu", - __entry->nbytes, __entry->entropy_count) -); - -#endif /* _TRACE_RANDOM_H */ - -/* This part must be outside protection */ -#include diff --git a/lib/random32.c b/lib/random32.c index 9085b1172015..42cbb70e09d8 100644 --- a/lib/random32.c +++ b/lib/random32.c @@ -38,6 +38,8 @@ #include #include #include +#include +#include #include /** From e280b79c3127ac5eb9e1e696d8f07b0afb4d16eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2022 16:43:57 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0519/1091] random: add proper SPDX header commit a07fdae346c35c6ba286af1c88e0effcfa330bf9 upstream. Convert the current license into the SPDX notation of "(GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause)". This infers GPL-2.0 from the text "ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions" and it infers BSD-3-Clause from the verbatim BSD 3 clause license in the file. Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Theodore Ts'o Cc: Dominik Brodowski Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 37 +------------------------------------ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 36 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 7997fdf58797..ef31d6d5caa7 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -1,44 +1,9 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause) /* - * random.c -- A strong random number generator - * * Copyright (C) 2017-2022 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. - * * Copyright Matt Mackall , 2003, 2004, 2005 - * * Copyright Theodore Ts'o, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999. All * rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety, - * including the disclaimer of warranties. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote - * products derived from this software without specific prior - * written permission. - * - * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of - * the GNU General Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are - * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions. (This clause is - * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and - * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.) - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES - * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ALL OF - * WHICH ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE - * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR - * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR - * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF - * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT - * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE - * USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF NOT ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH - * DAMAGE. */ /* From 47c56790d51cd00d9f49878e7442d4d5a81e7398 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2022 17:01:27 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0520/1091] random: deobfuscate irq u32/u64 contributions commit b2f408fe403800c91a49f6589d95b6759ce1b30b upstream. In the irq handler, we fill out 16 bytes differently on 32-bit and 64-bit platforms, and for 32-bit vs 64-bit cycle counters, which doesn't always correspond with the bitness of the platform. Whether or not you like this strangeness, it is a matter of fact. But it might not be a fact you well realized until now, because the code that loaded the irq info into 4 32-bit words was quite confusing. Instead, this commit makes everything explicit by having separate (compile-time) branches for 32-bit and 64-bit types. Cc: Theodore Ts'o Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index ef31d6d5caa7..4a09cfdc0f2e 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -283,7 +283,10 @@ static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, size_t nbytes) } struct fast_pool { - u32 pool[4]; + union { + u32 pool32[4]; + u64 pool64[2]; + }; unsigned long last; u16 reg_idx; u8 count; @@ -294,10 +297,10 @@ struct fast_pool { * collector. It's hardcoded for an 128 bit pool and assumes that any * locks that might be needed are taken by the caller. */ -static void fast_mix(struct fast_pool *f) +static void fast_mix(u32 pool[4]) { - u32 a = f->pool[0], b = f->pool[1]; - u32 c = f->pool[2], d = f->pool[3]; + u32 a = pool[0], b = pool[1]; + u32 c = pool[2], d = pool[3]; a += b; c += d; b = rol32(b, 6); d = rol32(d, 27); @@ -315,9 +318,8 @@ static void fast_mix(struct fast_pool *f) b = rol32(b, 16); d = rol32(d, 14); d ^= a; b ^= c; - f->pool[0] = a; f->pool[1] = b; - f->pool[2] = c; f->pool[3] = d; - f->count++; + pool[0] = a; pool[1] = b; + pool[2] = c; pool[3] = d; } static void process_random_ready_list(void) @@ -782,29 +784,34 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) struct pt_regs *regs = get_irq_regs(); unsigned long now = jiffies; cycles_t cycles = random_get_entropy(); - u32 c_high, j_high; - u64 ip; if (cycles == 0) cycles = get_reg(fast_pool, regs); - c_high = (sizeof(cycles) > 4) ? cycles >> 32 : 0; - j_high = (sizeof(now) > 4) ? now >> 32 : 0; - fast_pool->pool[0] ^= cycles ^ j_high ^ irq; - fast_pool->pool[1] ^= now ^ c_high; - ip = regs ? instruction_pointer(regs) : _RET_IP_; - fast_pool->pool[2] ^= ip; - fast_pool->pool[3] ^= - (sizeof(ip) > 4) ? ip >> 32 : get_reg(fast_pool, regs); - fast_mix(fast_pool); + if (sizeof(cycles) == 8) + fast_pool->pool64[0] ^= cycles ^ rol64(now, 32) ^ irq; + else { + fast_pool->pool32[0] ^= cycles ^ irq; + fast_pool->pool32[1] ^= now; + } + + if (sizeof(unsigned long) == 8) + fast_pool->pool64[1] ^= regs ? instruction_pointer(regs) : _RET_IP_; + else { + fast_pool->pool32[2] ^= regs ? instruction_pointer(regs) : _RET_IP_; + fast_pool->pool32[3] ^= get_reg(fast_pool, regs); + } + + fast_mix(fast_pool->pool32); + ++fast_pool->count; if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) { if (fast_pool->count >= 64 && - crng_fast_load(fast_pool->pool, sizeof(fast_pool->pool)) > 0) { + crng_fast_load(fast_pool->pool32, sizeof(fast_pool->pool32)) > 0) { fast_pool->count = 0; fast_pool->last = now; if (spin_trylock(&input_pool.lock)) { - _mix_pool_bytes(&fast_pool->pool, sizeof(fast_pool->pool)); + _mix_pool_bytes(&fast_pool->pool32, sizeof(fast_pool->pool32)); spin_unlock(&input_pool.lock); } } @@ -818,7 +825,7 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) return; fast_pool->last = now; - _mix_pool_bytes(&fast_pool->pool, sizeof(fast_pool->pool)); + _mix_pool_bytes(&fast_pool->pool32, sizeof(fast_pool->pool32)); spin_unlock(&input_pool.lock); fast_pool->count = 0; From 904e6123c400bb961a737a06eff02b69d8926359 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2022 12:19:49 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0521/1091] random: introduce drain_entropy() helper to declutter crng_reseed() commit 246c03dd899164d0186b6d685d6387f228c28d93 upstream. In preparation for separating responsibilities, break out the entropy count management part of crng_reseed() into its own function. No functional changes. Cc: Theodore Ts'o Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 4a09cfdc0f2e..b4f5b2ef91a1 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -260,6 +260,7 @@ static struct { }; static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes); +static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes); static void crng_reseed(void); @@ -454,23 +455,13 @@ static void crng_slow_load(const void *cp, size_t len) static void crng_reseed(void) { unsigned long flags; - int entropy_count; unsigned long next_gen; u8 key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE]; bool finalize_init = false; - /* - * First we make sure we have POOL_MIN_BITS of entropy in the pool, - * and then we drain all of it. Only then can we extract a new key. - */ - do { - entropy_count = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count); - if (entropy_count < POOL_MIN_BITS) - return; - } while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, entropy_count, 0) != entropy_count); - extract_entropy(key, sizeof(key)); - wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait); - kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT); + /* Only reseed if we can, to prevent brute forcing a small amount of new bits. */ + if (!drain_entropy(key, sizeof(key))) + return; /* * We copy the new key into the base_crng, overwriting the old one, @@ -898,6 +889,25 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes) memzero_explicit(&block, sizeof(block)); } +/* + * First we make sure we have POOL_MIN_BITS of entropy in the pool, and then we + * set the entropy count to zero (but don't actually touch any data). Only then + * can we extract a new key with extract_entropy(). + */ +static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes) +{ + unsigned int entropy_count; + do { + entropy_count = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count); + if (entropy_count < POOL_MIN_BITS) + return false; + } while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, entropy_count, 0) != entropy_count); + extract_entropy(buf, nbytes); + wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait); + kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT); + return true; +} + #define warn_unseeded_randomness(previous) \ _warn_unseeded_randomness(__func__, (void *)_RET_IP_, (previous)) From cee64be60591598091ad83fe86485e7212a0f0e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2022 12:28:33 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0522/1091] random: remove useless header comment commit 6071a6c0fba2d747742cadcbb3ba26ed756ed73b upstream. This really adds nothing at all useful. Cc: Theodore Ts'o Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/linux/random.h | 6 +----- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h index e92efb39779c..37e1e8c43d7e 100644 --- a/include/linux/random.h +++ b/include/linux/random.h @@ -1,9 +1,5 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ -/* - * include/linux/random.h - * - * Include file for the random number generator. - */ + #ifndef _LINUX_RANDOM_H #define _LINUX_RANDOM_H From 22e3db57ab94021bed71224b118989b4a7253ad6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2022 13:41:41 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0523/1091] random: remove whitespace and reorder includes commit 87e7d5abad0cbc9312dea7f889a57d294c1a5fcc upstream. This is purely cosmetic. Future work involves figuring out which of these headers we need and which we don't. Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index b4f5b2ef91a1..abde90345c37 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -193,11 +193,10 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include - #include -#include #include #include #include From c12dfec1aacfd1a9dc5789e0304ad459a3c578aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2022 12:53:34 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0524/1091] random: group initialization wait functions commit 5f1bb112006b104b3e2a1e1b39bbb9b2617581e6 upstream. This pulls all of the readiness waiting-focused functions into the first labeled section. No functional changes. Cc: Theodore Ts'o Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 347 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 179 insertions(+), 168 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index abde90345c37..3654b8a1a562 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -201,6 +201,185 @@ #include #include +/********************************************************************* + * + * Initialization and readiness waiting. + * + * Much of the RNG infrastructure is devoted to various dependencies + * being able to wait until the RNG has collected enough entropy and + * is ready for safe consumption. + * + *********************************************************************/ + +/* + * crng_init = 0 --> Uninitialized + * 1 --> Initialized + * 2 --> Initialized from input_pool + * + * crng_init is protected by base_crng->lock, and only increases + * its value (from 0->1->2). + */ +static int crng_init = 0; +#define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init > 1)) +/* Various types of waiters for crng_init->2 transition. */ +static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_init_wait); +static struct fasync_struct *fasync; +static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(random_ready_list_lock); +static LIST_HEAD(random_ready_list); + +/* Control how we warn userspace. */ +static struct ratelimit_state unseeded_warning = + RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT("warn_unseeded_randomness", HZ, 3); +static struct ratelimit_state urandom_warning = + RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT("warn_urandom_randomness", HZ, 3); +static int ratelimit_disable __read_mostly; +module_param_named(ratelimit_disable, ratelimit_disable, int, 0644); +MODULE_PARM_DESC(ratelimit_disable, "Disable random ratelimit suppression"); + +/* + * Returns whether or not the input pool has been seeded and thus guaranteed + * to supply cryptographically secure random numbers. This applies to: the + * /dev/urandom device, the get_random_bytes function, and the get_random_{u32, + * ,u64,int,long} family of functions. + * + * Returns: true if the input pool has been seeded. + * false if the input pool has not been seeded. + */ +bool rng_is_initialized(void) +{ + return crng_ready(); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(rng_is_initialized); + +/* Used by wait_for_random_bytes(), and considered an entropy collector, below. */ +static void try_to_generate_entropy(void); + +/* + * Wait for the input pool to be seeded and thus guaranteed to supply + * cryptographically secure random numbers. This applies to: the /dev/urandom + * device, the get_random_bytes function, and the get_random_{u32,u64,int,long} + * family of functions. Using any of these functions without first calling + * this function forfeits the guarantee of security. + * + * Returns: 0 if the input pool has been seeded. + * -ERESTARTSYS if the function was interrupted by a signal. + */ +int wait_for_random_bytes(void) +{ + if (likely(crng_ready())) + return 0; + + do { + int ret; + ret = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(crng_init_wait, crng_ready(), HZ); + if (ret) + return ret > 0 ? 0 : ret; + + try_to_generate_entropy(); + } while (!crng_ready()); + + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_random_bytes); + +/* + * Add a callback function that will be invoked when the input + * pool is initialised. + * + * returns: 0 if callback is successfully added + * -EALREADY if pool is already initialised (callback not called) + * -ENOENT if module for callback is not alive + */ +int add_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy) +{ + struct module *owner; + unsigned long flags; + int err = -EALREADY; + + if (crng_ready()) + return err; + + owner = rdy->owner; + if (!try_module_get(owner)) + return -ENOENT; + + spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_list_lock, flags); + if (crng_ready()) + goto out; + + owner = NULL; + + list_add(&rdy->list, &random_ready_list); + err = 0; + +out: + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_list_lock, flags); + + module_put(owner); + + return err; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_random_ready_callback); + +/* + * Delete a previously registered readiness callback function. + */ +void del_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy) +{ + unsigned long flags; + struct module *owner = NULL; + + spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_list_lock, flags); + if (!list_empty(&rdy->list)) { + list_del_init(&rdy->list); + owner = rdy->owner; + } + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_list_lock, flags); + + module_put(owner); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(del_random_ready_callback); + +static void process_random_ready_list(void) +{ + unsigned long flags; + struct random_ready_callback *rdy, *tmp; + + spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_list_lock, flags); + list_for_each_entry_safe(rdy, tmp, &random_ready_list, list) { + struct module *owner = rdy->owner; + + list_del_init(&rdy->list); + rdy->func(rdy); + module_put(owner); + } + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_list_lock, flags); +} + +#define warn_unseeded_randomness(previous) \ + _warn_unseeded_randomness(__func__, (void *)_RET_IP_, (previous)) + +static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(const char *func_name, void *caller, void **previous) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM + const bool print_once = false; +#else + static bool print_once __read_mostly; +#endif + + if (print_once || crng_ready() || + (previous && (caller == READ_ONCE(*previous)))) + return; + WRITE_ONCE(*previous, caller); +#ifndef CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM + print_once = true; +#endif + if (__ratelimit(&unseeded_warning)) + printk_deferred(KERN_NOTICE "random: %s called from %pS with crng_init=%d\n", + func_name, caller, crng_init); +} + + enum { POOL_BITS = BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE * 8, POOL_MIN_BITS = POOL_BITS /* No point in settling for less. */ @@ -210,34 +389,8 @@ enum { * Static global variables */ static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_write_wait); -static struct fasync_struct *fasync; -static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(random_ready_list_lock); -static LIST_HEAD(random_ready_list); - -/* - * crng_init = 0 --> Uninitialized - * 1 --> Initialized - * 2 --> Initialized from input_pool - * - * crng_init is protected by primary_crng->lock, and only increases - * its value (from 0->1->2). - */ -static int crng_init = 0; -#define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init > 1)) static int crng_init_cnt = 0; -static void process_random_ready_list(void); -static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes); - -static struct ratelimit_state unseeded_warning = - RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT("warn_unseeded_randomness", HZ, 3); -static struct ratelimit_state urandom_warning = - RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT("warn_urandom_randomness", HZ, 3); - -static int ratelimit_disable __read_mostly; - -module_param_named(ratelimit_disable, ratelimit_disable, int, 0644); -MODULE_PARM_DESC(ratelimit_disable, "Disable random ratelimit suppression"); /********************************************************************** * @@ -322,22 +475,6 @@ static void fast_mix(u32 pool[4]) pool[2] = c; pool[3] = d; } -static void process_random_ready_list(void) -{ - unsigned long flags; - struct random_ready_callback *rdy, *tmp; - - spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_list_lock, flags); - list_for_each_entry_safe(rdy, tmp, &random_ready_list, list) { - struct module *owner = rdy->owner; - - list_del_init(&rdy->list); - rdy->func(rdy); - module_put(owner); - } - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_list_lock, flags); -} - static void credit_entropy_bits(size_t nbits) { unsigned int entropy_count, orig, add; @@ -385,8 +522,6 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct crng, crngs) = { .generation = ULONG_MAX }; -static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_init_wait); - /* * crng_fast_load() can be called by code in the interrupt service * path. So we can't afford to dilly-dally. Returns the number of @@ -907,29 +1042,6 @@ static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes) return true; } -#define warn_unseeded_randomness(previous) \ - _warn_unseeded_randomness(__func__, (void *)_RET_IP_, (previous)) - -static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(const char *func_name, void *caller, void **previous) -{ -#ifdef CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM - const bool print_once = false; -#else - static bool print_once __read_mostly; -#endif - - if (print_once || crng_ready() || - (previous && (caller == READ_ONCE(*previous)))) - return; - WRITE_ONCE(*previous, caller); -#ifndef CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM - print_once = true; -#endif - if (__ratelimit(&unseeded_warning)) - printk_deferred(KERN_NOTICE "random: %s called from %pS with crng_init=%d\n", - func_name, caller, crng_init); -} - /* * This function is the exported kernel interface. It returns some * number of good random numbers, suitable for key generation, seeding @@ -1030,107 +1142,6 @@ static void try_to_generate_entropy(void) mix_pool_bytes(&stack.now, sizeof(stack.now)); } -/* - * Wait for the urandom pool to be seeded and thus guaranteed to supply - * cryptographically secure random numbers. This applies to: the /dev/urandom - * device, the get_random_bytes function, and the get_random_{u32,u64,int,long} - * family of functions. Using any of these functions without first calling - * this function forfeits the guarantee of security. - * - * Returns: 0 if the urandom pool has been seeded. - * -ERESTARTSYS if the function was interrupted by a signal. - */ -int wait_for_random_bytes(void) -{ - if (likely(crng_ready())) - return 0; - - do { - int ret; - ret = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(crng_init_wait, crng_ready(), HZ); - if (ret) - return ret > 0 ? 0 : ret; - - try_to_generate_entropy(); - } while (!crng_ready()); - - return 0; -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_random_bytes); - -/* - * Returns whether or not the urandom pool has been seeded and thus guaranteed - * to supply cryptographically secure random numbers. This applies to: the - * /dev/urandom device, the get_random_bytes function, and the get_random_{u32, - * ,u64,int,long} family of functions. - * - * Returns: true if the urandom pool has been seeded. - * false if the urandom pool has not been seeded. - */ -bool rng_is_initialized(void) -{ - return crng_ready(); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(rng_is_initialized); - -/* - * Add a callback function that will be invoked when the nonblocking - * pool is initialised. - * - * returns: 0 if callback is successfully added - * -EALREADY if pool is already initialised (callback not called) - * -ENOENT if module for callback is not alive - */ -int add_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy) -{ - struct module *owner; - unsigned long flags; - int err = -EALREADY; - - if (crng_ready()) - return err; - - owner = rdy->owner; - if (!try_module_get(owner)) - return -ENOENT; - - spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_list_lock, flags); - if (crng_ready()) - goto out; - - owner = NULL; - - list_add(&rdy->list, &random_ready_list); - err = 0; - -out: - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_list_lock, flags); - - module_put(owner); - - return err; -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_random_ready_callback); - -/* - * Delete a previously registered readiness callback function. - */ -void del_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy) -{ - unsigned long flags; - struct module *owner = NULL; - - spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_list_lock, flags); - if (!list_empty(&rdy->list)) { - list_del_init(&rdy->list); - owner = rdy->owner; - } - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_list_lock, flags); - - module_put(owner); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(del_random_ready_callback); - /* * This function will use the architecture-specific hardware random * number generator if it is available. It is not recommended for From a8786d54762fa2ebbfe984ffb15411e504e0c4aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2022 12:53:34 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0525/1091] random: group crng functions commit 3655adc7089da4f8ca74cec8fcef73ea5101430e upstream. This pulls all of the crng-focused functions into the second labeled section. No functional changes. Cc: Theodore Ts'o Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 992 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 510 insertions(+), 482 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 3654b8a1a562..0df9bc48ba42 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -380,6 +380,516 @@ static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(const char *func_name, void *caller, void } +/********************************************************************* + * + * Fast key erasure RNG, the "crng". + * + * These functions expand entropy from the entropy extractor into + * long streams for external consumption using the "fast key erasure" + * RNG described at . + * + * There are a few exported interfaces for use by other drivers: + * + * void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes) + * u32 get_random_u32() + * u64 get_random_u64() + * unsigned int get_random_int() + * unsigned long get_random_long() + * + * These interfaces will return the requested number of random bytes + * into the given buffer or as a return value. This is equivalent to + * a read from /dev/urandom. The integer family of functions may be + * higher performance for one-off random integers, because they do a + * bit of buffering. + * + *********************************************************************/ + +enum { + CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL = 300 * HZ, + CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH = 2 * CHACHA_KEY_SIZE +}; + +static struct { + u8 key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(long)); + unsigned long birth; + unsigned long generation; + spinlock_t lock; +} base_crng = { + .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(base_crng.lock) +}; + +struct crng { + u8 key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE]; + unsigned long generation; +}; + +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct crng, crngs) = { + .generation = ULONG_MAX +}; + +/* Used by crng_reseed() to extract a new seed from the input pool. */ +static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes); + +/* + * This extracts a new crng key from the input pool, but only if there is a + * sufficient amount of entropy available, in order to mitigate bruteforcing + * of newly added bits. + */ +static void crng_reseed(void) +{ + unsigned long flags; + unsigned long next_gen; + u8 key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE]; + bool finalize_init = false; + + /* Only reseed if we can, to prevent brute forcing a small amount of new bits. */ + if (!drain_entropy(key, sizeof(key))) + return; + + /* + * We copy the new key into the base_crng, overwriting the old one, + * and update the generation counter. We avoid hitting ULONG_MAX, + * because the per-cpu crngs are initialized to ULONG_MAX, so this + * forces new CPUs that come online to always initialize. + */ + spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags); + memcpy(base_crng.key, key, sizeof(base_crng.key)); + next_gen = base_crng.generation + 1; + if (next_gen == ULONG_MAX) + ++next_gen; + WRITE_ONCE(base_crng.generation, next_gen); + WRITE_ONCE(base_crng.birth, jiffies); + if (crng_init < 2) { + crng_init = 2; + finalize_init = true; + } + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags); + memzero_explicit(key, sizeof(key)); + if (finalize_init) { + process_random_ready_list(); + wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait); + kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN); + pr_notice("crng init done\n"); + if (unseeded_warning.missed) { + pr_notice("%d get_random_xx warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n", + unseeded_warning.missed); + unseeded_warning.missed = 0; + } + if (urandom_warning.missed) { + pr_notice("%d urandom warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n", + urandom_warning.missed); + urandom_warning.missed = 0; + } + } +} + +/* + * This generates a ChaCha block using the provided key, and then + * immediately overwites that key with half the block. It returns + * the resultant ChaCha state to the user, along with the second + * half of the block containing 32 bytes of random data that may + * be used; random_data_len may not be greater than 32. + */ +static void crng_fast_key_erasure(u8 key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE], + u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)], + u8 *random_data, size_t random_data_len) +{ + u8 first_block[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]; + + BUG_ON(random_data_len > 32); + + chacha_init_consts(chacha_state); + memcpy(&chacha_state[4], key, CHACHA_KEY_SIZE); + memset(&chacha_state[12], 0, sizeof(u32) * 4); + chacha20_block(chacha_state, first_block); + + memcpy(key, first_block, CHACHA_KEY_SIZE); + memcpy(random_data, first_block + CHACHA_KEY_SIZE, random_data_len); + memzero_explicit(first_block, sizeof(first_block)); +} + +/* + * This function returns a ChaCha state that you may use for generating + * random data. It also returns up to 32 bytes on its own of random data + * that may be used; random_data_len may not be greater than 32. + */ +static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)], + u8 *random_data, size_t random_data_len) +{ + unsigned long flags; + struct crng *crng; + + BUG_ON(random_data_len > 32); + + /* + * For the fast path, we check whether we're ready, unlocked first, and + * then re-check once locked later. In the case where we're really not + * ready, we do fast key erasure with the base_crng directly, because + * this is what crng_{fast,slow}_load mutate during early init. + */ + if (unlikely(!crng_ready())) { + bool ready; + + spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags); + ready = crng_ready(); + if (!ready) + crng_fast_key_erasure(base_crng.key, chacha_state, + random_data, random_data_len); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags); + if (!ready) + return; + } + + /* + * If the base_crng is more than 5 minutes old, we reseed, which + * in turn bumps the generation counter that we check below. + */ + if (unlikely(time_after(jiffies, READ_ONCE(base_crng.birth) + CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL))) + crng_reseed(); + + local_irq_save(flags); + crng = raw_cpu_ptr(&crngs); + + /* + * If our per-cpu crng is older than the base_crng, then it means + * somebody reseeded the base_crng. In that case, we do fast key + * erasure on the base_crng, and use its output as the new key + * for our per-cpu crng. This brings us up to date with base_crng. + */ + if (unlikely(crng->generation != READ_ONCE(base_crng.generation))) { + spin_lock(&base_crng.lock); + crng_fast_key_erasure(base_crng.key, chacha_state, + crng->key, sizeof(crng->key)); + crng->generation = base_crng.generation; + spin_unlock(&base_crng.lock); + } + + /* + * Finally, when we've made it this far, our per-cpu crng has an up + * to date key, and we can do fast key erasure with it to produce + * some random data and a ChaCha state for the caller. All other + * branches of this function are "unlikely", so most of the time we + * should wind up here immediately. + */ + crng_fast_key_erasure(crng->key, chacha_state, random_data, random_data_len); + local_irq_restore(flags); +} + +/* + * This function is for crng_init == 0 only. + * + * crng_fast_load() can be called by code in the interrupt service + * path. So we can't afford to dilly-dally. Returns the number of + * bytes processed from cp. + */ +static size_t crng_fast_load(const void *cp, size_t len) +{ + static int crng_init_cnt = 0; + unsigned long flags; + const u8 *src = (const u8 *)cp; + size_t ret = 0; + + if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags)) + return 0; + if (crng_init != 0) { + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags); + return 0; + } + while (len > 0 && crng_init_cnt < CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) { + base_crng.key[crng_init_cnt % sizeof(base_crng.key)] ^= *src; + src++; crng_init_cnt++; len--; ret++; + } + if (crng_init_cnt >= CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) { + ++base_crng.generation; + crng_init = 1; + } + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags); + if (crng_init == 1) + pr_notice("fast init done\n"); + return ret; +} + +/* + * This function is for crng_init == 0 only. + * + * crng_slow_load() is called by add_device_randomness, which has two + * attributes. (1) We can't trust the buffer passed to it is + * guaranteed to be unpredictable (so it might not have any entropy at + * all), and (2) it doesn't have the performance constraints of + * crng_fast_load(). + * + * So, we simply hash the contents in with the current key. Finally, + * we do *not* advance crng_init_cnt since buffer we may get may be + * something like a fixed DMI table (for example), which might very + * well be unique to the machine, but is otherwise unvarying. + */ +static void crng_slow_load(const void *cp, size_t len) +{ + unsigned long flags; + struct blake2s_state hash; + + blake2s_init(&hash, sizeof(base_crng.key)); + + if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags)) + return; + if (crng_init != 0) { + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags); + return; + } + + blake2s_update(&hash, base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key)); + blake2s_update(&hash, cp, len); + blake2s_final(&hash, base_crng.key); + + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags); +} + +static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes) +{ + u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)]; + u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]; + size_t len; + + if (!nbytes) + return; + + len = min_t(size_t, 32, nbytes); + crng_make_state(chacha_state, buf, len); + nbytes -= len; + buf += len; + + while (nbytes) { + if (nbytes < CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE) { + chacha20_block(chacha_state, tmp); + memcpy(buf, tmp, nbytes); + memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); + break; + } + + chacha20_block(chacha_state, buf); + if (unlikely(chacha_state[12] == 0)) + ++chacha_state[13]; + nbytes -= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE; + buf += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE; + } + + memzero_explicit(chacha_state, sizeof(chacha_state)); +} + +/* + * This function is the exported kernel interface. It returns some + * number of good random numbers, suitable for key generation, seeding + * TCP sequence numbers, etc. It does not rely on the hardware random + * number generator. For random bytes direct from the hardware RNG + * (when available), use get_random_bytes_arch(). In order to ensure + * that the randomness provided by this function is okay, the function + * wait_for_random_bytes() should be called and return 0 at least once + * at any point prior. + */ +void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes) +{ + static void *previous; + + warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous); + _get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes); + +static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes) +{ + bool large_request = nbytes > 256; + ssize_t ret = 0; + size_t len; + u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)]; + u8 output[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]; + + if (!nbytes) + return 0; + + len = min_t(size_t, 32, nbytes); + crng_make_state(chacha_state, output, len); + + if (copy_to_user(buf, output, len)) + return -EFAULT; + nbytes -= len; + buf += len; + ret += len; + + while (nbytes) { + if (large_request && need_resched()) { + if (signal_pending(current)) + break; + schedule(); + } + + chacha20_block(chacha_state, output); + if (unlikely(chacha_state[12] == 0)) + ++chacha_state[13]; + + len = min_t(size_t, nbytes, CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE); + if (copy_to_user(buf, output, len)) { + ret = -EFAULT; + break; + } + + nbytes -= len; + buf += len; + ret += len; + } + + memzero_explicit(chacha_state, sizeof(chacha_state)); + memzero_explicit(output, sizeof(output)); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Batched entropy returns random integers. The quality of the random + * number is good as /dev/urandom. In order to ensure that the randomness + * provided by this function is okay, the function wait_for_random_bytes() + * should be called and return 0 at least once at any point prior. + */ +struct batched_entropy { + union { + /* + * We make this 1.5x a ChaCha block, so that we get the + * remaining 32 bytes from fast key erasure, plus one full + * block from the detached ChaCha state. We can increase + * the size of this later if needed so long as we keep the + * formula of (integer_blocks + 0.5) * CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE. + */ + u64 entropy_u64[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 3 / (2 * sizeof(u64))]; + u32 entropy_u32[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 3 / (2 * sizeof(u32))]; + }; + unsigned long generation; + unsigned int position; +}; + + +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u64) = { + .position = UINT_MAX +}; + +u64 get_random_u64(void) +{ + u64 ret; + unsigned long flags; + struct batched_entropy *batch; + static void *previous; + unsigned long next_gen; + + warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous); + + local_irq_save(flags); + batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u64); + + next_gen = READ_ONCE(base_crng.generation); + if (batch->position >= ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u64) || + next_gen != batch->generation) { + _get_random_bytes(batch->entropy_u64, sizeof(batch->entropy_u64)); + batch->position = 0; + batch->generation = next_gen; + } + + ret = batch->entropy_u64[batch->position]; + batch->entropy_u64[batch->position] = 0; + ++batch->position; + local_irq_restore(flags); + return ret; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u64); + +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u32) = { + .position = UINT_MAX +}; + +u32 get_random_u32(void) +{ + u32 ret; + unsigned long flags; + struct batched_entropy *batch; + static void *previous; + unsigned long next_gen; + + warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous); + + local_irq_save(flags); + batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u32); + + next_gen = READ_ONCE(base_crng.generation); + if (batch->position >= ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u32) || + next_gen != batch->generation) { + _get_random_bytes(batch->entropy_u32, sizeof(batch->entropy_u32)); + batch->position = 0; + batch->generation = next_gen; + } + + ret = batch->entropy_u32[batch->position]; + batch->entropy_u32[batch->position] = 0; + ++batch->position; + local_irq_restore(flags); + return ret; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u32); + +/** + * randomize_page - Generate a random, page aligned address + * @start: The smallest acceptable address the caller will take. + * @range: The size of the area, starting at @start, within which the + * random address must fall. + * + * If @start + @range would overflow, @range is capped. + * + * NOTE: Historical use of randomize_range, which this replaces, presumed that + * @start was already page aligned. We now align it regardless. + * + * Return: A page aligned address within [start, start + range). On error, + * @start is returned. + */ +unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range) +{ + if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(start)) { + range -= PAGE_ALIGN(start) - start; + start = PAGE_ALIGN(start); + } + + if (start > ULONG_MAX - range) + range = ULONG_MAX - start; + + range >>= PAGE_SHIFT; + + if (range == 0) + return start; + + return start + (get_random_long() % range << PAGE_SHIFT); +} + +/* + * This function will use the architecture-specific hardware random + * number generator if it is available. It is not recommended for + * use. Use get_random_bytes() instead. It returns the number of + * bytes filled in. + */ +size_t __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, size_t nbytes) +{ + size_t left = nbytes; + u8 *p = buf; + + while (left) { + unsigned long v; + size_t chunk = min_t(size_t, left, sizeof(unsigned long)); + + if (!arch_get_random_long(&v)) + break; + + memcpy(p, &v, chunk); + p += chunk; + left -= chunk; + } + + return nbytes - left; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch); + enum { POOL_BITS = BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE * 8, POOL_MIN_BITS = POOL_BITS /* No point in settling for less. */ @@ -390,8 +900,6 @@ enum { */ static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_write_wait); -static int crng_init_cnt = 0; - /********************************************************************** * * OS independent entropy store. Here are the functions which handle @@ -493,288 +1001,6 @@ static void credit_entropy_bits(size_t nbits) crng_reseed(); } -/********************************************************************* - * - * CRNG using CHACHA20 - * - *********************************************************************/ - -enum { - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL = 300 * HZ, - CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH = 2 * CHACHA_KEY_SIZE -}; - -static struct { - u8 key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(long)); - unsigned long birth; - unsigned long generation; - spinlock_t lock; -} base_crng = { - .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(base_crng.lock) -}; - -struct crng { - u8 key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE]; - unsigned long generation; -}; - -static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct crng, crngs) = { - .generation = ULONG_MAX -}; - -/* - * crng_fast_load() can be called by code in the interrupt service - * path. So we can't afford to dilly-dally. Returns the number of - * bytes processed from cp. - */ -static size_t crng_fast_load(const void *cp, size_t len) -{ - unsigned long flags; - const u8 *src = (const u8 *)cp; - size_t ret = 0; - - if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags)) - return 0; - if (crng_init != 0) { - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags); - return 0; - } - while (len > 0 && crng_init_cnt < CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) { - base_crng.key[crng_init_cnt % sizeof(base_crng.key)] ^= *src; - src++; crng_init_cnt++; len--; ret++; - } - if (crng_init_cnt >= CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) { - ++base_crng.generation; - crng_init = 1; - } - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags); - if (crng_init == 1) - pr_notice("fast init done\n"); - return ret; -} - -/* - * crng_slow_load() is called by add_device_randomness, which has two - * attributes. (1) We can't trust the buffer passed to it is - * guaranteed to be unpredictable (so it might not have any entropy at - * all), and (2) it doesn't have the performance constraints of - * crng_fast_load(). - * - * So, we simply hash the contents in with the current key. Finally, - * we do *not* advance crng_init_cnt since buffer we may get may be - * something like a fixed DMI table (for example), which might very - * well be unique to the machine, but is otherwise unvarying. - */ -static void crng_slow_load(const void *cp, size_t len) -{ - unsigned long flags; - struct blake2s_state hash; - - blake2s_init(&hash, sizeof(base_crng.key)); - - if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags)) - return; - if (crng_init != 0) { - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags); - return; - } - - blake2s_update(&hash, base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key)); - blake2s_update(&hash, cp, len); - blake2s_final(&hash, base_crng.key); - - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags); -} - -static void crng_reseed(void) -{ - unsigned long flags; - unsigned long next_gen; - u8 key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE]; - bool finalize_init = false; - - /* Only reseed if we can, to prevent brute forcing a small amount of new bits. */ - if (!drain_entropy(key, sizeof(key))) - return; - - /* - * We copy the new key into the base_crng, overwriting the old one, - * and update the generation counter. We avoid hitting ULONG_MAX, - * because the per-cpu crngs are initialized to ULONG_MAX, so this - * forces new CPUs that come online to always initialize. - */ - spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags); - memcpy(base_crng.key, key, sizeof(base_crng.key)); - next_gen = base_crng.generation + 1; - if (next_gen == ULONG_MAX) - ++next_gen; - WRITE_ONCE(base_crng.generation, next_gen); - WRITE_ONCE(base_crng.birth, jiffies); - if (crng_init < 2) { - crng_init = 2; - finalize_init = true; - } - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags); - memzero_explicit(key, sizeof(key)); - if (finalize_init) { - process_random_ready_list(); - wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait); - kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN); - pr_notice("crng init done\n"); - if (unseeded_warning.missed) { - pr_notice("%d get_random_xx warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n", - unseeded_warning.missed); - unseeded_warning.missed = 0; - } - if (urandom_warning.missed) { - pr_notice("%d urandom warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n", - urandom_warning.missed); - urandom_warning.missed = 0; - } - } -} - -/* - * The general form here is based on a "fast key erasure RNG" from - * . It generates a ChaCha - * block using the provided key, and then immediately overwites that - * key with half the block. It returns the resultant ChaCha state to the - * user, along with the second half of the block containing 32 bytes of - * random data that may be used; random_data_len may not be greater than - * 32. - */ -static void crng_fast_key_erasure(u8 key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE], - u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)], - u8 *random_data, size_t random_data_len) -{ - u8 first_block[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]; - - BUG_ON(random_data_len > 32); - - chacha_init_consts(chacha_state); - memcpy(&chacha_state[4], key, CHACHA_KEY_SIZE); - memset(&chacha_state[12], 0, sizeof(u32) * 4); - chacha20_block(chacha_state, first_block); - - memcpy(key, first_block, CHACHA_KEY_SIZE); - memcpy(random_data, first_block + CHACHA_KEY_SIZE, random_data_len); - memzero_explicit(first_block, sizeof(first_block)); -} - -/* - * This function returns a ChaCha state that you may use for generating - * random data. It also returns up to 32 bytes on its own of random data - * that may be used; random_data_len may not be greater than 32. - */ -static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)], - u8 *random_data, size_t random_data_len) -{ - unsigned long flags; - struct crng *crng; - - BUG_ON(random_data_len > 32); - - /* - * For the fast path, we check whether we're ready, unlocked first, and - * then re-check once locked later. In the case where we're really not - * ready, we do fast key erasure with the base_crng directly, because - * this is what crng_{fast,slow}_load mutate during early init. - */ - if (unlikely(!crng_ready())) { - bool ready; - - spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags); - ready = crng_ready(); - if (!ready) - crng_fast_key_erasure(base_crng.key, chacha_state, - random_data, random_data_len); - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags); - if (!ready) - return; - } - - /* - * If the base_crng is more than 5 minutes old, we reseed, which - * in turn bumps the generation counter that we check below. - */ - if (unlikely(time_after(jiffies, READ_ONCE(base_crng.birth) + CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL))) - crng_reseed(); - - local_irq_save(flags); - crng = raw_cpu_ptr(&crngs); - - /* - * If our per-cpu crng is older than the base_crng, then it means - * somebody reseeded the base_crng. In that case, we do fast key - * erasure on the base_crng, and use its output as the new key - * for our per-cpu crng. This brings us up to date with base_crng. - */ - if (unlikely(crng->generation != READ_ONCE(base_crng.generation))) { - spin_lock(&base_crng.lock); - crng_fast_key_erasure(base_crng.key, chacha_state, - crng->key, sizeof(crng->key)); - crng->generation = base_crng.generation; - spin_unlock(&base_crng.lock); - } - - /* - * Finally, when we've made it this far, our per-cpu crng has an up - * to date key, and we can do fast key erasure with it to produce - * some random data and a ChaCha state for the caller. All other - * branches of this function are "unlikely", so most of the time we - * should wind up here immediately. - */ - crng_fast_key_erasure(crng->key, chacha_state, random_data, random_data_len); - local_irq_restore(flags); -} - -static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes) -{ - bool large_request = nbytes > 256; - ssize_t ret = 0; - size_t len; - u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)]; - u8 output[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]; - - if (!nbytes) - return 0; - - len = min_t(size_t, 32, nbytes); - crng_make_state(chacha_state, output, len); - - if (copy_to_user(buf, output, len)) - return -EFAULT; - nbytes -= len; - buf += len; - ret += len; - - while (nbytes) { - if (large_request && need_resched()) { - if (signal_pending(current)) - break; - schedule(); - } - - chacha20_block(chacha_state, output); - if (unlikely(chacha_state[12] == 0)) - ++chacha_state[13]; - - len = min_t(size_t, nbytes, CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE); - if (copy_to_user(buf, output, len)) { - ret = -EFAULT; - break; - } - - nbytes -= len; - buf += len; - ret += len; - } - - memzero_explicit(chacha_state, sizeof(chacha_state)); - memzero_explicit(output, sizeof(output)); - return ret; -} - /********************************************************************* * * Entropy input management @@ -1042,57 +1268,6 @@ static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes) return true; } -/* - * This function is the exported kernel interface. It returns some - * number of good random numbers, suitable for key generation, seeding - * TCP sequence numbers, etc. It does not rely on the hardware random - * number generator. For random bytes direct from the hardware RNG - * (when available), use get_random_bytes_arch(). In order to ensure - * that the randomness provided by this function is okay, the function - * wait_for_random_bytes() should be called and return 0 at least once - * at any point prior. - */ -static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes) -{ - u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)]; - u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]; - size_t len; - - if (!nbytes) - return; - - len = min_t(size_t, 32, nbytes); - crng_make_state(chacha_state, buf, len); - nbytes -= len; - buf += len; - - while (nbytes) { - if (nbytes < CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE) { - chacha20_block(chacha_state, tmp); - memcpy(buf, tmp, nbytes); - memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); - break; - } - - chacha20_block(chacha_state, buf); - if (unlikely(chacha_state[12] == 0)) - ++chacha_state[13]; - nbytes -= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE; - buf += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE; - } - - memzero_explicit(chacha_state, sizeof(chacha_state)); -} - -void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes) -{ - static void *previous; - - warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous); - _get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes); - /* * Each time the timer fires, we expect that we got an unpredictable * jump in the cycle counter. Even if the timer is running on another @@ -1142,33 +1317,6 @@ static void try_to_generate_entropy(void) mix_pool_bytes(&stack.now, sizeof(stack.now)); } -/* - * This function will use the architecture-specific hardware random - * number generator if it is available. It is not recommended for - * use. Use get_random_bytes() instead. It returns the number of - * bytes filled in. - */ -size_t __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, size_t nbytes) -{ - size_t left = nbytes; - u8 *p = buf; - - while (left) { - unsigned long v; - size_t chunk = min_t(size_t, left, sizeof(unsigned long)); - - if (!arch_get_random_long(&v)) - break; - - memcpy(p, &v, chunk); - p += chunk; - left -= chunk; - } - - return nbytes - left; -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch); - static bool trust_cpu __ro_after_init = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU); static int __init parse_trust_cpu(char *arg) { @@ -1521,126 +1669,6 @@ struct ctl_table random_table[] = { }; #endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */ -struct batched_entropy { - union { - /* - * We make this 1.5x a ChaCha block, so that we get the - * remaining 32 bytes from fast key erasure, plus one full - * block from the detached ChaCha state. We can increase - * the size of this later if needed so long as we keep the - * formula of (integer_blocks + 0.5) * CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE. - */ - u64 entropy_u64[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 3 / (2 * sizeof(u64))]; - u32 entropy_u32[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 3 / (2 * sizeof(u32))]; - }; - unsigned long generation; - unsigned int position; -}; - -/* - * Get a random word for internal kernel use only. The quality of the random - * number is good as /dev/urandom. In order to ensure that the randomness - * provided by this function is okay, the function wait_for_random_bytes() - * should be called and return 0 at least once at any point prior. - */ -static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u64) = { - .position = UINT_MAX -}; - -u64 get_random_u64(void) -{ - u64 ret; - unsigned long flags; - struct batched_entropy *batch; - static void *previous; - unsigned long next_gen; - - warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous); - - local_irq_save(flags); - batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u64); - - next_gen = READ_ONCE(base_crng.generation); - if (batch->position >= ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u64) || - next_gen != batch->generation) { - _get_random_bytes(batch->entropy_u64, sizeof(batch->entropy_u64)); - batch->position = 0; - batch->generation = next_gen; - } - - ret = batch->entropy_u64[batch->position]; - batch->entropy_u64[batch->position] = 0; - ++batch->position; - local_irq_restore(flags); - return ret; -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u64); - -static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u32) = { - .position = UINT_MAX -}; - -u32 get_random_u32(void) -{ - u32 ret; - unsigned long flags; - struct batched_entropy *batch; - static void *previous; - unsigned long next_gen; - - warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous); - - local_irq_save(flags); - batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u32); - - next_gen = READ_ONCE(base_crng.generation); - if (batch->position >= ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u32) || - next_gen != batch->generation) { - _get_random_bytes(batch->entropy_u32, sizeof(batch->entropy_u32)); - batch->position = 0; - batch->generation = next_gen; - } - - ret = batch->entropy_u32[batch->position]; - batch->entropy_u32[batch->position] = 0; - ++batch->position; - local_irq_restore(flags); - return ret; -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u32); - -/** - * randomize_page - Generate a random, page aligned address - * @start: The smallest acceptable address the caller will take. - * @range: The size of the area, starting at @start, within which the - * random address must fall. - * - * If @start + @range would overflow, @range is capped. - * - * NOTE: Historical use of randomize_range, which this replaces, presumed that - * @start was already page aligned. We now align it regardless. - * - * Return: A page aligned address within [start, start + range). On error, - * @start is returned. - */ -unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range) -{ - if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(start)) { - range -= PAGE_ALIGN(start) - start; - start = PAGE_ALIGN(start); - } - - if (start > ULONG_MAX - range) - range = ULONG_MAX - start; - - range >>= PAGE_SHIFT; - - if (range == 0) - return start; - - return start + (get_random_long() % range << PAGE_SHIFT); -} - /* Interface for in-kernel drivers of true hardware RNGs. * Those devices may produce endless random bits and will be throttled * when our pool is full. From f2d587c493fce558421223f50dd4a9eededec7fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2022 12:53:34 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0526/1091] random: group entropy extraction functions commit a5ed7cb1a7732ef11959332d507889fbc39ebbb4 upstream. This pulls all of the entropy extraction-focused functions into the third labeled section. No functional changes. Cc: Theodore Ts'o Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 218 +++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- 1 file changed, 110 insertions(+), 108 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 0df9bc48ba42..d97516ccefcf 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -890,23 +890,36 @@ size_t __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, size_t nbytes) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch); + +/********************************************************************** + * + * Entropy accumulation and extraction routines. + * + * Callers may add entropy via: + * + * static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, size_t nbytes) + * + * After which, if added entropy should be credited: + * + * static void credit_entropy_bits(size_t nbits) + * + * Finally, extract entropy via these two, with the latter one + * setting the entropy count to zero and extracting only if there + * is POOL_MIN_BITS entropy credited prior: + * + * static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes) + * static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes) + * + **********************************************************************/ + enum { POOL_BITS = BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE * 8, POOL_MIN_BITS = POOL_BITS /* No point in settling for less. */ }; -/* - * Static global variables - */ +/* For notifying userspace should write into /dev/random. */ static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_write_wait); -/********************************************************************** - * - * OS independent entropy store. Here are the functions which handle - * storing entropy in an entropy pool. - * - **********************************************************************/ - static struct { struct blake2s_state hash; spinlock_t lock; @@ -919,21 +932,16 @@ static struct { .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(input_pool.lock), }; -static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes); -static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes); - -static void crng_reseed(void); +static void _mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, size_t nbytes) +{ + blake2s_update(&input_pool.hash, in, nbytes); +} /* * This function adds bytes into the entropy "pool". It does not * update the entropy estimate. The caller should call * credit_entropy_bits if this is appropriate. */ -static void _mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, size_t nbytes) -{ - blake2s_update(&input_pool.hash, in, nbytes); -} - static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, size_t nbytes) { unsigned long flags; @@ -943,6 +951,89 @@ static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, size_t nbytes) spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags); } +static void credit_entropy_bits(size_t nbits) +{ + unsigned int entropy_count, orig, add; + + if (!nbits) + return; + + add = min_t(size_t, nbits, POOL_BITS); + + do { + orig = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count); + entropy_count = min_t(unsigned int, POOL_BITS, orig + add); + } while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig); + + if (crng_init < 2 && entropy_count >= POOL_MIN_BITS) + crng_reseed(); +} + +/* + * This is an HKDF-like construction for using the hashed collected entropy + * as a PRF key, that's then expanded block-by-block. + */ +static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes) +{ + unsigned long flags; + u8 seed[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE], next_key[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE]; + struct { + unsigned long rdseed[32 / sizeof(long)]; + size_t counter; + } block; + size_t i; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(block.rdseed); ++i) { + if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&block.rdseed[i]) && + !arch_get_random_long(&block.rdseed[i])) + block.rdseed[i] = random_get_entropy(); + } + + spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags); + + /* seed = HASHPRF(last_key, entropy_input) */ + blake2s_final(&input_pool.hash, seed); + + /* next_key = HASHPRF(seed, RDSEED || 0) */ + block.counter = 0; + blake2s(next_key, (u8 *)&block, seed, sizeof(next_key), sizeof(block), sizeof(seed)); + blake2s_init_key(&input_pool.hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE, next_key, sizeof(next_key)); + + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags); + memzero_explicit(next_key, sizeof(next_key)); + + while (nbytes) { + i = min_t(size_t, nbytes, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE); + /* output = HASHPRF(seed, RDSEED || ++counter) */ + ++block.counter; + blake2s(buf, (u8 *)&block, seed, i, sizeof(block), sizeof(seed)); + nbytes -= i; + buf += i; + } + + memzero_explicit(seed, sizeof(seed)); + memzero_explicit(&block, sizeof(block)); +} + +/* + * First we make sure we have POOL_MIN_BITS of entropy in the pool, and then we + * set the entropy count to zero (but don't actually touch any data). Only then + * can we extract a new key with extract_entropy(). + */ +static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes) +{ + unsigned int entropy_count; + do { + entropy_count = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count); + if (entropy_count < POOL_MIN_BITS) + return false; + } while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, entropy_count, 0) != entropy_count); + extract_entropy(buf, nbytes); + wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait); + kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT); + return true; +} + struct fast_pool { union { u32 pool32[4]; @@ -983,24 +1074,6 @@ static void fast_mix(u32 pool[4]) pool[2] = c; pool[3] = d; } -static void credit_entropy_bits(size_t nbits) -{ - unsigned int entropy_count, orig, add; - - if (!nbits) - return; - - add = min_t(size_t, nbits, POOL_BITS); - - do { - orig = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count); - entropy_count = min_t(unsigned int, POOL_BITS, orig + add); - } while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig); - - if (crng_init < 2 && entropy_count >= POOL_MIN_BITS) - crng_reseed(); -} - /********************************************************************* * * Entropy input management @@ -1197,77 +1270,6 @@ void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk) EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_disk_randomness); #endif -/********************************************************************* - * - * Entropy extraction routines - * - *********************************************************************/ - -/* - * This is an HKDF-like construction for using the hashed collected entropy - * as a PRF key, that's then expanded block-by-block. - */ -static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes) -{ - unsigned long flags; - u8 seed[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE], next_key[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE]; - struct { - unsigned long rdseed[32 / sizeof(long)]; - size_t counter; - } block; - size_t i; - - for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(block.rdseed); ++i) { - if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&block.rdseed[i]) && - !arch_get_random_long(&block.rdseed[i])) - block.rdseed[i] = random_get_entropy(); - } - - spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags); - - /* seed = HASHPRF(last_key, entropy_input) */ - blake2s_final(&input_pool.hash, seed); - - /* next_key = HASHPRF(seed, RDSEED || 0) */ - block.counter = 0; - blake2s(next_key, (u8 *)&block, seed, sizeof(next_key), sizeof(block), sizeof(seed)); - blake2s_init_key(&input_pool.hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE, next_key, sizeof(next_key)); - - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags); - memzero_explicit(next_key, sizeof(next_key)); - - while (nbytes) { - i = min_t(size_t, nbytes, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE); - /* output = HASHPRF(seed, RDSEED || ++counter) */ - ++block.counter; - blake2s(buf, (u8 *)&block, seed, i, sizeof(block), sizeof(seed)); - nbytes -= i; - buf += i; - } - - memzero_explicit(seed, sizeof(seed)); - memzero_explicit(&block, sizeof(block)); -} - -/* - * First we make sure we have POOL_MIN_BITS of entropy in the pool, and then we - * set the entropy count to zero (but don't actually touch any data). Only then - * can we extract a new key with extract_entropy(). - */ -static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes) -{ - unsigned int entropy_count; - do { - entropy_count = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count); - if (entropy_count < POOL_MIN_BITS) - return false; - } while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, entropy_count, 0) != entropy_count); - extract_entropy(buf, nbytes); - wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait); - kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT); - return true; -} - /* * Each time the timer fires, we expect that we got an unpredictable * jump in the cycle counter. Even if the timer is running on another From 565a66043bdf848f5f0f517aabc8cbf1795462f4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2022 12:53:34 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0527/1091] random: group entropy collection functions commit 92c653cf14400946f376a29b828d6af7e01f38dd upstream. This pulls all of the entropy collection-focused functions into the fourth labeled section. No functional changes. Cc: Theodore Ts'o Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 370 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 206 insertions(+), 164 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index d97516ccefcf..cb674d7d5a66 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -1034,60 +1034,112 @@ static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes) return true; } -struct fast_pool { - union { - u32 pool32[4]; - u64 pool64[2]; - }; - unsigned long last; - u16 reg_idx; - u8 count; -}; + +/********************************************************************** + * + * Entropy collection routines. + * + * The following exported functions are used for pushing entropy into + * the above entropy accumulation routines: + * + * void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size); + * void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, + * unsigned int value); + * void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk); + * void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count, + * size_t entropy); + * void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size); + * void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq); + * + * add_device_randomness() adds data to the input pool that + * is likely to differ between two devices (or possibly even per boot). + * This would be things like MAC addresses or serial numbers, or the + * read-out of the RTC. This does *not* credit any actual entropy to + * the pool, but it initializes the pool to different values for devices + * that might otherwise be identical and have very little entropy + * available to them (particularly common in the embedded world). + * + * add_input_randomness() uses the input layer interrupt timing, as well + * as the event type information from the hardware. + * + * add_disk_randomness() uses what amounts to the seek time of block + * layer request events, on a per-disk_devt basis, as input to the + * entropy pool. Note that high-speed solid state drives with very low + * seek times do not make for good sources of entropy, as their seek + * times are usually fairly consistent. + * + * The above two routines try to estimate how many bits of entropy + * to credit. They do this by keeping track of the first and second + * order deltas of the event timings. + * + * add_hwgenerator_randomness() is for true hardware RNGs, and will credit + * entropy as specified by the caller. If the entropy pool is full it will + * block until more entropy is needed. + * + * add_bootloader_randomness() is the same as add_hwgenerator_randomness() or + * add_device_randomness(), depending on whether or not the configuration + * option CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is set. + * + * add_interrupt_randomness() uses the interrupt timing as random + * inputs to the entropy pool. Using the cycle counters and the irq source + * as inputs, it feeds the input pool roughly once a second or after 64 + * interrupts, crediting 1 bit of entropy for whichever comes first. + * + **********************************************************************/ + +static bool trust_cpu __ro_after_init = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU); +static int __init parse_trust_cpu(char *arg) +{ + return kstrtobool(arg, &trust_cpu); +} +early_param("random.trust_cpu", parse_trust_cpu); /* - * This is a fast mixing routine used by the interrupt randomness - * collector. It's hardcoded for an 128 bit pool and assumes that any - * locks that might be needed are taken by the caller. + * The first collection of entropy occurs at system boot while interrupts + * are still turned off. Here we push in RDSEED, a timestamp, and utsname(). + * Depending on the above configuration knob, RDSEED may be considered + * sufficient for initialization. Note that much earlier setup may already + * have pushed entropy into the input pool by the time we get here. */ -static void fast_mix(u32 pool[4]) +int __init rand_initialize(void) { - u32 a = pool[0], b = pool[1]; - u32 c = pool[2], d = pool[3]; + size_t i; + ktime_t now = ktime_get_real(); + bool arch_init = true; + unsigned long rv; - a += b; c += d; - b = rol32(b, 6); d = rol32(d, 27); - d ^= a; b ^= c; + for (i = 0; i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; i += sizeof(rv)) { + if (!arch_get_random_seed_long_early(&rv) && + !arch_get_random_long_early(&rv)) { + rv = random_get_entropy(); + arch_init = false; + } + mix_pool_bytes(&rv, sizeof(rv)); + } + mix_pool_bytes(&now, sizeof(now)); + mix_pool_bytes(utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname()))); - a += b; c += d; - b = rol32(b, 16); d = rol32(d, 14); - d ^= a; b ^= c; + extract_entropy(base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key)); + ++base_crng.generation; - a += b; c += d; - b = rol32(b, 6); d = rol32(d, 27); - d ^= a; b ^= c; + if (arch_init && trust_cpu && crng_init < 2) { + crng_init = 2; + pr_notice("crng init done (trusting CPU's manufacturer)\n"); + } - a += b; c += d; - b = rol32(b, 16); d = rol32(d, 14); - d ^= a; b ^= c; - - pool[0] = a; pool[1] = b; - pool[2] = c; pool[3] = d; + if (ratelimit_disable) { + urandom_warning.interval = 0; + unseeded_warning.interval = 0; + } + return 0; } -/********************************************************************* - * - * Entropy input management - * - *********************************************************************/ - /* There is one of these per entropy source */ struct timer_rand_state { cycles_t last_time; long last_delta, last_delta2; }; -#define INIT_TIMER_RAND_STATE { INITIAL_JIFFIES, }; - /* * Add device- or boot-specific data to the input pool to help * initialize it. @@ -1111,8 +1163,6 @@ void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_device_randomness); -static struct timer_rand_state input_timer_state = INIT_TIMER_RAND_STATE; - /* * This function adds entropy to the entropy "pool" by using timing * delays. It uses the timer_rand_state structure to make an estimate @@ -1174,8 +1224,9 @@ void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, unsigned int value) { static unsigned char last_value; + static struct timer_rand_state input_timer_state = { INITIAL_JIFFIES }; - /* ignore autorepeat and the like */ + /* Ignore autorepeat and the like. */ if (value == last_value) return; @@ -1185,6 +1236,119 @@ void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_input_randomness); +#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK +void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk) +{ + if (!disk || !disk->random) + return; + /* First major is 1, so we get >= 0x200 here. */ + add_timer_randomness(disk->random, 0x100 + disk_devt(disk)); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_disk_randomness); + +void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk) +{ + struct timer_rand_state *state; + + /* + * If kzalloc returns null, we just won't use that entropy + * source. + */ + state = kzalloc(sizeof(struct timer_rand_state), GFP_KERNEL); + if (state) { + state->last_time = INITIAL_JIFFIES; + disk->random = state; + } +} +#endif + +/* + * Interface for in-kernel drivers of true hardware RNGs. + * Those devices may produce endless random bits and will be throttled + * when our pool is full. + */ +void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count, + size_t entropy) +{ + if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) { + size_t ret = crng_fast_load(buffer, count); + mix_pool_bytes(buffer, ret); + count -= ret; + buffer += ret; + if (!count || crng_init == 0) + return; + } + + /* + * Throttle writing if we're above the trickle threshold. + * We'll be woken up again once below POOL_MIN_BITS, when + * the calling thread is about to terminate, or once + * CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL has elapsed. + */ + wait_event_interruptible_timeout(random_write_wait, + !system_wq || kthread_should_stop() || + input_pool.entropy_count < POOL_MIN_BITS, + CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL); + mix_pool_bytes(buffer, count); + credit_entropy_bits(entropy); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_hwgenerator_randomness); + +/* + * Handle random seed passed by bootloader. + * If the seed is trustworthy, it would be regarded as hardware RNGs. Otherwise + * it would be regarded as device data. + * The decision is controlled by CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER. + */ +void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size) +{ + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER)) + add_hwgenerator_randomness(buf, size, size * 8); + else + add_device_randomness(buf, size); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_bootloader_randomness); + +struct fast_pool { + union { + u32 pool32[4]; + u64 pool64[2]; + }; + unsigned long last; + u16 reg_idx; + u8 count; +}; + +/* + * This is a fast mixing routine used by the interrupt randomness + * collector. It's hardcoded for an 128 bit pool and assumes that any + * locks that might be needed are taken by the caller. + */ +static void fast_mix(u32 pool[4]) +{ + u32 a = pool[0], b = pool[1]; + u32 c = pool[2], d = pool[3]; + + a += b; c += d; + b = rol32(b, 6); d = rol32(d, 27); + d ^= a; b ^= c; + + a += b; c += d; + b = rol32(b, 16); d = rol32(d, 14); + d ^= a; b ^= c; + + a += b; c += d; + b = rol32(b, 6); d = rol32(d, 27); + d ^= a; b ^= c; + + a += b; c += d; + b = rol32(b, 16); d = rol32(d, 14); + d ^= a; b ^= c; + + pool[0] = a; pool[1] = b; + pool[2] = c; pool[3] = d; +} + static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct fast_pool, irq_randomness); static u32 get_reg(struct fast_pool *f, struct pt_regs *regs) @@ -1254,22 +1418,11 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) fast_pool->count = 0; - /* award one bit for the contents of the fast pool */ + /* Award one bit for the contents of the fast pool. */ credit_entropy_bits(1); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_interrupt_randomness); -#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK -void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk) -{ - if (!disk || !disk->random) - return; - /* first major is 1, so we get >= 0x200 here */ - add_timer_randomness(disk->random, 0x100 + disk_devt(disk)); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_disk_randomness); -#endif - /* * Each time the timer fires, we expect that we got an unpredictable * jump in the cycle counter. Even if the timer is running on another @@ -1319,73 +1472,6 @@ static void try_to_generate_entropy(void) mix_pool_bytes(&stack.now, sizeof(stack.now)); } -static bool trust_cpu __ro_after_init = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU); -static int __init parse_trust_cpu(char *arg) -{ - return kstrtobool(arg, &trust_cpu); -} -early_param("random.trust_cpu", parse_trust_cpu); - -/* - * Note that setup_arch() may call add_device_randomness() - * long before we get here. This allows seeding of the pools - * with some platform dependent data very early in the boot - * process. But it limits our options here. We must use - * statically allocated structures that already have all - * initializations complete at compile time. We should also - * take care not to overwrite the precious per platform data - * we were given. - */ -int __init rand_initialize(void) -{ - size_t i; - ktime_t now = ktime_get_real(); - bool arch_init = true; - unsigned long rv; - - for (i = 0; i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; i += sizeof(rv)) { - if (!arch_get_random_seed_long_early(&rv) && - !arch_get_random_long_early(&rv)) { - rv = random_get_entropy(); - arch_init = false; - } - mix_pool_bytes(&rv, sizeof(rv)); - } - mix_pool_bytes(&now, sizeof(now)); - mix_pool_bytes(utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname()))); - - extract_entropy(base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key)); - ++base_crng.generation; - - if (arch_init && trust_cpu && crng_init < 2) { - crng_init = 2; - pr_notice("crng init done (trusting CPU's manufacturer)\n"); - } - - if (ratelimit_disable) { - urandom_warning.interval = 0; - unseeded_warning.interval = 0; - } - return 0; -} - -#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK -void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk) -{ - struct timer_rand_state *state; - - /* - * If kzalloc returns null, we just won't use that entropy - * source. - */ - state = kzalloc(sizeof(struct timer_rand_state), GFP_KERNEL); - if (state) { - state->last_time = INITIAL_JIFFIES; - disk->random = state; - } -} -#endif - static ssize_t urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos) { @@ -1670,47 +1756,3 @@ struct ctl_table random_table[] = { { } }; #endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */ - -/* Interface for in-kernel drivers of true hardware RNGs. - * Those devices may produce endless random bits and will be throttled - * when our pool is full. - */ -void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count, - size_t entropy) -{ - if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) { - size_t ret = crng_fast_load(buffer, count); - mix_pool_bytes(buffer, ret); - count -= ret; - buffer += ret; - if (!count || crng_init == 0) - return; - } - - /* Throttle writing if we're above the trickle threshold. - * We'll be woken up again once below POOL_MIN_BITS, when - * the calling thread is about to terminate, or once - * CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL has elapsed. - */ - wait_event_interruptible_timeout(random_write_wait, - !system_wq || kthread_should_stop() || - input_pool.entropy_count < POOL_MIN_BITS, - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL); - mix_pool_bytes(buffer, count); - credit_entropy_bits(entropy); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_hwgenerator_randomness); - -/* Handle random seed passed by bootloader. - * If the seed is trustworthy, it would be regarded as hardware RNGs. Otherwise - * it would be regarded as device data. - * The decision is controlled by CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER. - */ -void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size) -{ - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER)) - add_hwgenerator_randomness(buf, size, size * 8); - else - add_device_randomness(buf, size); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_bootloader_randomness); From d946084180eeef73b6bbca5bf12a08a4853f5497 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2022 12:53:34 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0528/1091] random: group userspace read/write functions commit a6adf8e7a605250b911e94793fd077933709ff9e upstream. This pulls all of the userspace read/write-focused functions into the fifth labeled section. No functional changes. Cc: Theodore Ts'o Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 131 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 80 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index cb674d7d5a66..d8730a4caecf 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -1472,30 +1472,61 @@ static void try_to_generate_entropy(void) mix_pool_bytes(&stack.now, sizeof(stack.now)); } -static ssize_t urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, - loff_t *ppos) -{ - static int maxwarn = 10; - if (!crng_ready() && maxwarn > 0) { - maxwarn--; - if (__ratelimit(&urandom_warning)) - pr_notice("%s: uninitialized urandom read (%zd bytes read)\n", - current->comm, nbytes); +/********************************************************************** + * + * Userspace reader/writer interfaces. + * + * getrandom(2) is the primary modern interface into the RNG and should + * be used in preference to anything else. + * + * Reading from /dev/random has the same functionality as calling + * getrandom(2) with flags=0. In earlier versions, however, it had + * vastly different semantics and should therefore be avoided, to + * prevent backwards compatibility issues. + * + * Reading from /dev/urandom has the same functionality as calling + * getrandom(2) with flags=GRND_INSECURE. Because it does not block + * waiting for the RNG to be ready, it should not be used. + * + * Writing to either /dev/random or /dev/urandom adds entropy to + * the input pool but does not credit it. + * + * Polling on /dev/random indicates when the RNG is initialized, on + * the read side, and when it wants new entropy, on the write side. + * + * Both /dev/random and /dev/urandom have the same set of ioctls for + * adding entropy, getting the entropy count, zeroing the count, and + * reseeding the crng. + * + **********************************************************************/ + +SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count, unsigned int, + flags) +{ + if (flags & ~(GRND_NONBLOCK | GRND_RANDOM | GRND_INSECURE)) + return -EINVAL; + + /* + * Requesting insecure and blocking randomness at the same time makes + * no sense. + */ + if ((flags & (GRND_INSECURE | GRND_RANDOM)) == (GRND_INSECURE | GRND_RANDOM)) + return -EINVAL; + + if (count > INT_MAX) + count = INT_MAX; + + if (!(flags & GRND_INSECURE) && !crng_ready()) { + int ret; + + if (flags & GRND_NONBLOCK) + return -EAGAIN; + ret = wait_for_random_bytes(); + if (unlikely(ret)) + return ret; } - - return get_random_bytes_user(buf, nbytes); -} - -static ssize_t random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, - loff_t *ppos) -{ - int ret; - - ret = wait_for_random_bytes(); - if (ret != 0) - return ret; - return get_random_bytes_user(buf, nbytes); + return get_random_bytes_user(buf, count); } static __poll_t random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait) @@ -1547,6 +1578,32 @@ static ssize_t random_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer, return (ssize_t)count; } +static ssize_t urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, + loff_t *ppos) +{ + static int maxwarn = 10; + + if (!crng_ready() && maxwarn > 0) { + maxwarn--; + if (__ratelimit(&urandom_warning)) + pr_notice("%s: uninitialized urandom read (%zd bytes read)\n", + current->comm, nbytes); + } + + return get_random_bytes_user(buf, nbytes); +} + +static ssize_t random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, + loff_t *ppos) +{ + int ret; + + ret = wait_for_random_bytes(); + if (ret != 0) + return ret; + return get_random_bytes_user(buf, nbytes); +} + static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) { int size, ent_count; @@ -1555,7 +1612,7 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) switch (cmd) { case RNDGETENTCNT: - /* inherently racy, no point locking */ + /* Inherently racy, no point locking. */ if (put_user(input_pool.entropy_count, p)) return -EFAULT; return 0; @@ -1631,34 +1688,6 @@ const struct file_operations urandom_fops = { .llseek = noop_llseek, }; -SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count, unsigned int, - flags) -{ - if (flags & ~(GRND_NONBLOCK | GRND_RANDOM | GRND_INSECURE)) - return -EINVAL; - - /* - * Requesting insecure and blocking randomness at the same time makes - * no sense. - */ - if ((flags & (GRND_INSECURE | GRND_RANDOM)) == (GRND_INSECURE | GRND_RANDOM)) - return -EINVAL; - - if (count > INT_MAX) - count = INT_MAX; - - if (!(flags & GRND_INSECURE) && !crng_ready()) { - int ret; - - if (flags & GRND_NONBLOCK) - return -EAGAIN; - ret = wait_for_random_bytes(); - if (unlikely(ret)) - return ret; - } - return get_random_bytes_user(buf, count); -} - /******************************************************************** * * Sysctl interface From c0e35949c73601d98fabca0f7448929a04a22e5e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2022 12:53:34 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0529/1091] random: group sysctl functions commit 0deff3c43206c24e746b1410f11125707ad3040e upstream. This pulls all of the sysctl-focused functions into the sixth labeled section. No functional changes. Cc: Theodore Ts'o Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index d8730a4caecf..f76ea073b1cd 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -1688,9 +1688,34 @@ const struct file_operations urandom_fops = { .llseek = noop_llseek, }; + /******************************************************************** * - * Sysctl interface + * Sysctl interface. + * + * These are partly unused legacy knobs with dummy values to not break + * userspace and partly still useful things. They are usually accessible + * in /proc/sys/kernel/random/ and are as follows: + * + * - boot_id - a UUID representing the current boot. + * + * - uuid - a random UUID, different each time the file is read. + * + * - poolsize - the number of bits of entropy that the input pool can + * hold, tied to the POOL_BITS constant. + * + * - entropy_avail - the number of bits of entropy currently in the + * input pool. Always <= poolsize. + * + * - write_wakeup_threshold - the amount of entropy in the input pool + * below which write polls to /dev/random will unblock, requesting + * more entropy, tied to the POOL_MIN_BITS constant. It is writable + * to avoid breaking old userspaces, but writing to it does not + * change any behavior of the RNG. + * + * - urandom_min_reseed_secs - fixed to the meaningless value "60". + * It is writable to avoid breaking old userspaces, but writing + * to it does not change any behavior of the RNG. * ********************************************************************/ @@ -1698,8 +1723,8 @@ const struct file_operations urandom_fops = { #include -static int random_min_urandom_seed = 60; -static int random_write_wakeup_bits = POOL_MIN_BITS; +static int sysctl_random_min_urandom_seed = 60; +static int sysctl_random_write_wakeup_bits = POOL_MIN_BITS; static int sysctl_poolsize = POOL_BITS; static char sysctl_bootid[16]; @@ -1757,14 +1782,14 @@ struct ctl_table random_table[] = { }, { .procname = "write_wakeup_threshold", - .data = &random_write_wakeup_bits, + .data = &sysctl_random_write_wakeup_bits, .maxlen = sizeof(int), .mode = 0644, .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, }, { .procname = "urandom_min_reseed_secs", - .data = &random_min_urandom_seed, + .data = &sysctl_random_min_urandom_seed, .maxlen = sizeof(int), .mode = 0644, .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, From 944d1bd0e5beac1552b44cb3d07605467d8ddf86 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2022 12:29:33 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0530/1091] random: rewrite header introductory comment commit 5f75d9f3babea8ae0a2d06724656874f41d317f5 upstream. Now that we've re-documented the various sections, we can remove the outdated text here and replace it with a high-level overview. Cc: Theodore Ts'o Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 177 +++++------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 159 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index f76ea073b1cd..05d483b3ee4b 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -2,168 +2,27 @@ /* * Copyright (C) 2017-2022 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. * Copyright Matt Mackall , 2003, 2004, 2005 - * Copyright Theodore Ts'o, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999. All - * rights reserved. - */ - -/* - * Exported interfaces ---- output - * =============================== + * Copyright Theodore Ts'o, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999. All rights reserved. * - * There are four exported interfaces; two for use within the kernel, - * and two for use from userspace. + * This driver produces cryptographically secure pseudorandom data. It is divided + * into roughly six sections, each with a section header: * - * Exported interfaces ---- userspace output - * ----------------------------------------- + * - Initialization and readiness waiting. + * - Fast key erasure RNG, the "crng". + * - Entropy accumulation and extraction routines. + * - Entropy collection routines. + * - Userspace reader/writer interfaces. + * - Sysctl interface. * - * The userspace interfaces are two character devices /dev/random and - * /dev/urandom. /dev/random is suitable for use when very high - * quality randomness is desired (for example, for key generation or - * one-time pads), as it will only return a maximum of the number of - * bits of randomness (as estimated by the random number generator) - * contained in the entropy pool. - * - * The /dev/urandom device does not have this limit, and will return - * as many bytes as are requested. As more and more random bytes are - * requested without giving time for the entropy pool to recharge, - * this will result in random numbers that are merely cryptographically - * strong. For many applications, however, this is acceptable. - * - * Exported interfaces ---- kernel output - * -------------------------------------- - * - * The primary kernel interfaces are: - * - * void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes); - * u32 get_random_u32() - * u64 get_random_u64() - * unsigned int get_random_int() - * unsigned long get_random_long() - * - * These interfaces will return the requested number of random bytes - * into the given buffer or as a return value. This is equivalent to a - * read from /dev/urandom. The get_random_{u32,u64,int,long}() family - * of functions may be higher performance for one-off random integers, - * because they do a bit of buffering. - * - * prandom_u32() - * ------------- - * - * For even weaker applications, see the pseudorandom generator - * prandom_u32(), prandom_max(), and prandom_bytes(). If the random - * numbers aren't security-critical at all, these are *far* cheaper. - * Useful for self-tests, random error simulation, randomized backoffs, - * and any other application where you trust that nobody is trying to - * maliciously mess with you by guessing the "random" numbers. - * - * Exported interfaces ---- input - * ============================== - * - * The current exported interfaces for gathering environmental noise - * from the devices are: - * - * void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size); - * void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, - * unsigned int value); - * void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq); - * void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk); - * void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count, - * size_t entropy); - * void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size); - * - * add_device_randomness() is for adding data to the random pool that - * is likely to differ between two devices (or possibly even per boot). - * This would be things like MAC addresses or serial numbers, or the - * read-out of the RTC. This does *not* add any actual entropy to the - * pool, but it initializes the pool to different values for devices - * that might otherwise be identical and have very little entropy - * available to them (particularly common in the embedded world). - * - * add_input_randomness() uses the input layer interrupt timing, as well as - * the event type information from the hardware. - * - * add_interrupt_randomness() uses the interrupt timing as random - * inputs to the entropy pool. Using the cycle counters and the irq source - * as inputs, it feeds the randomness roughly once a second. - * - * add_disk_randomness() uses what amounts to the seek time of block - * layer request events, on a per-disk_devt basis, as input to the - * entropy pool. Note that high-speed solid state drives with very low - * seek times do not make for good sources of entropy, as their seek - * times are usually fairly consistent. - * - * All of these routines try to estimate how many bits of randomness a - * particular randomness source. They do this by keeping track of the - * first and second order deltas of the event timings. - * - * add_hwgenerator_randomness() is for true hardware RNGs, and will credit - * entropy as specified by the caller. If the entropy pool is full it will - * block until more entropy is needed. - * - * add_bootloader_randomness() is the same as add_hwgenerator_randomness() or - * add_device_randomness(), depending on whether or not the configuration - * option CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is set. - * - * Ensuring unpredictability at system startup - * ============================================ - * - * When any operating system starts up, it will go through a sequence - * of actions that are fairly predictable by an adversary, especially - * if the start-up does not involve interaction with a human operator. - * This reduces the actual number of bits of unpredictability in the - * entropy pool below the value in entropy_count. In order to - * counteract this effect, it helps to carry information in the - * entropy pool across shut-downs and start-ups. To do this, put the - * following lines an appropriate script which is run during the boot - * sequence: - * - * echo "Initializing random number generator..." - * random_seed=/var/run/random-seed - * # Carry a random seed from start-up to start-up - * # Load and then save the whole entropy pool - * if [ -f $random_seed ]; then - * cat $random_seed >/dev/urandom - * else - * touch $random_seed - * fi - * chmod 600 $random_seed - * dd if=/dev/urandom of=$random_seed count=1 bs=512 - * - * and the following lines in an appropriate script which is run as - * the system is shutdown: - * - * # Carry a random seed from shut-down to start-up - * # Save the whole entropy pool - * echo "Saving random seed..." - * random_seed=/var/run/random-seed - * touch $random_seed - * chmod 600 $random_seed - * dd if=/dev/urandom of=$random_seed count=1 bs=512 - * - * For example, on most modern systems using the System V init - * scripts, such code fragments would be found in - * /etc/rc.d/init.d/random. On older Linux systems, the correct script - * location might be in /etc/rcb.d/rc.local or /etc/rc.d/rc.0. - * - * Effectively, these commands cause the contents of the entropy pool - * to be saved at shut-down time and reloaded into the entropy pool at - * start-up. (The 'dd' in the addition to the bootup script is to - * make sure that /etc/random-seed is different for every start-up, - * even if the system crashes without executing rc.0.) Even with - * complete knowledge of the start-up activities, predicting the state - * of the entropy pool requires knowledge of the previous history of - * the system. - * - * Configuring the /dev/random driver under Linux - * ============================================== - * - * The /dev/random driver under Linux uses minor numbers 8 and 9 of - * the /dev/mem major number (#1). So if your system does not have - * /dev/random and /dev/urandom created already, they can be created - * by using the commands: - * - * mknod /dev/random c 1 8 - * mknod /dev/urandom c 1 9 + * The high level overview is that there is one input pool, into which + * various pieces of data are hashed. Some of that data is then "credited" as + * having a certain number of bits of entropy. When enough bits of entropy are + * available, the hash is finalized and handed as a key to a stream cipher that + * expands it indefinitely for various consumers. This key is periodically + * refreshed as the various entropy collectors, described below, add data to the + * input pool and credit it. There is currently no Fortuna-like scheduler + * involved, which can lead to malicious entropy sources causing a premature + * reseed, and the entropy estimates are, at best, conservative guesses. */ #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt From 4a61bf7f9b189f0378fd8dbcf5cc6ea6abb205f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Fri, 4 Feb 2022 16:15:46 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0531/1091] random: defer fast pool mixing to worker MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 58340f8e952b613e0ead0bed58b97b05bf4743c5 upstream. On PREEMPT_RT, it's problematic to take spinlocks from hard irq handlers. We can fix this by deferring to a workqueue the dumping of the fast pool into the input pool. We accomplish this with some careful rules on fast_pool->count: - When it's incremented to >= 64, we schedule the work. - If the top bit is set, we never schedule the work, even if >= 64. - The worker is responsible for setting it back to 0 when it's done. There are two small issues around using workqueues for this purpose that we work around. The first issue is that mix_interrupt_randomness() might be migrated to another CPU during CPU hotplug. This issue is rectified by checking that it hasn't been migrated (after disabling irqs). If it has been migrated, then we set the count to zero, so that when the CPU comes online again, it can requeue the work. As part of this, we switch to using an atomic_t, so that the increment in the irq handler doesn't wipe out the zeroing if the CPU comes back online while this worker is running. The second issue is that, though relatively minor in effect, we probably want to make sure we get a consistent view of the pool onto the stack, in case it's interrupted by an irq while reading. To do this, we don't reenable irqs until after the copy. There are only 18 instructions between the cli and sti, so this is a pretty tiny window. Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Theodore Ts'o Cc: Jonathan Neuschäfer Acked-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior Reviewed-by: Sultan Alsawaf Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 63 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 05d483b3ee4b..d97349ed9e9c 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -1173,9 +1173,10 @@ struct fast_pool { u32 pool32[4]; u64 pool64[2]; }; + struct work_struct mix; unsigned long last; + atomic_t count; u16 reg_idx; - u8 count; }; /* @@ -1225,12 +1226,49 @@ static u32 get_reg(struct fast_pool *f, struct pt_regs *regs) return *ptr; } +static void mix_interrupt_randomness(struct work_struct *work) +{ + struct fast_pool *fast_pool = container_of(work, struct fast_pool, mix); + u32 pool[4]; + + /* Check to see if we're running on the wrong CPU due to hotplug. */ + local_irq_disable(); + if (fast_pool != this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness)) { + local_irq_enable(); + /* + * If we are unlucky enough to have been moved to another CPU, + * during CPU hotplug while the CPU was shutdown then we set + * our count to zero atomically so that when the CPU comes + * back online, it can enqueue work again. The _release here + * pairs with the atomic_inc_return_acquire in + * add_interrupt_randomness(). + */ + atomic_set_release(&fast_pool->count, 0); + return; + } + + /* + * Copy the pool to the stack so that the mixer always has a + * consistent view, before we reenable irqs again. + */ + memcpy(pool, fast_pool->pool32, sizeof(pool)); + atomic_set(&fast_pool->count, 0); + fast_pool->last = jiffies; + local_irq_enable(); + + mix_pool_bytes(pool, sizeof(pool)); + credit_entropy_bits(1); + memzero_explicit(pool, sizeof(pool)); +} + void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) { + enum { MIX_INFLIGHT = 1U << 31 }; struct fast_pool *fast_pool = this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness); struct pt_regs *regs = get_irq_regs(); unsigned long now = jiffies; cycles_t cycles = random_get_entropy(); + unsigned int new_count; if (cycles == 0) cycles = get_reg(fast_pool, regs); @@ -1250,12 +1288,13 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) } fast_mix(fast_pool->pool32); - ++fast_pool->count; + /* The _acquire here pairs with the atomic_set_release in mix_interrupt_randomness(). */ + new_count = (unsigned int)atomic_inc_return_acquire(&fast_pool->count); if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) { - if (fast_pool->count >= 64 && + if (new_count >= 64 && crng_fast_load(fast_pool->pool32, sizeof(fast_pool->pool32)) > 0) { - fast_pool->count = 0; + atomic_set(&fast_pool->count, 0); fast_pool->last = now; if (spin_trylock(&input_pool.lock)) { _mix_pool_bytes(&fast_pool->pool32, sizeof(fast_pool->pool32)); @@ -1265,20 +1304,16 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) return; } - if ((fast_pool->count < 64) && !time_after(now, fast_pool->last + HZ)) + if (new_count & MIX_INFLIGHT) return; - if (!spin_trylock(&input_pool.lock)) + if (new_count < 64 && !time_after(now, fast_pool->last + HZ)) return; - fast_pool->last = now; - _mix_pool_bytes(&fast_pool->pool32, sizeof(fast_pool->pool32)); - spin_unlock(&input_pool.lock); - - fast_pool->count = 0; - - /* Award one bit for the contents of the fast pool. */ - credit_entropy_bits(1); + if (unlikely(!fast_pool->mix.func)) + INIT_WORK(&fast_pool->mix, mix_interrupt_randomness); + atomic_or(MIX_INFLIGHT, &fast_pool->count); + queue_work_on(raw_smp_processor_id(), system_highpri_wq, &fast_pool->mix); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_interrupt_randomness); From 49567f94773596c504874dcc09a68ffb4954839d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Sat, 12 Feb 2022 01:26:17 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0532/1091] random: do not take pool spinlock at boot commit afba0b80b977b2a8f16234f2acd982f82710ba33 upstream. Since rand_initialize() is run while interrupts are still off and nothing else is running, we don't need to repeatedly take and release the pool spinlock, especially in the RDSEED loop. Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index d97349ed9e9c..bb19f698a28d 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -973,10 +973,10 @@ int __init rand_initialize(void) rv = random_get_entropy(); arch_init = false; } - mix_pool_bytes(&rv, sizeof(rv)); + _mix_pool_bytes(&rv, sizeof(rv)); } - mix_pool_bytes(&now, sizeof(now)); - mix_pool_bytes(utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname()))); + _mix_pool_bytes(&now, sizeof(now)); + _mix_pool_bytes(utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname()))); extract_entropy(base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key)); ++base_crng.generation; From 20788eb4ce7073085a83a94cc2b0cba2f26972e4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Sat, 12 Feb 2022 23:54:09 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0533/1091] random: unify early init crng load accounting commit da792c6d5f59a76c10a310c5d4c93428fd18f996 upstream. crng_fast_load() and crng_slow_load() have different semantics: - crng_fast_load() xors and accounts with crng_init_cnt. - crng_slow_load() hashes and doesn't account. However add_hwgenerator_randomness() can afford to hash (it's called from a kthread), and it should account. Additionally, ones that can afford to hash don't need to take a trylock but can take a normal lock. So, we combine these into one function, crng_pre_init_inject(), which allows us to control these in a uniform way. This will make it simpler later to simplify this all down when the time comes for that. Cc: Theodore Ts'o Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 112 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 58 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index bb19f698a28d..1f6c7dbec4d8 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -384,7 +384,7 @@ static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)], * For the fast path, we check whether we're ready, unlocked first, and * then re-check once locked later. In the case where we're really not * ready, we do fast key erasure with the base_crng directly, because - * this is what crng_{fast,slow}_load mutate during early init. + * this is what crng_pre_init_inject() mutates during early init. */ if (unlikely(!crng_ready())) { bool ready; @@ -435,72 +435,75 @@ static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)], } /* - * This function is for crng_init == 0 only. + * This function is for crng_init == 0 only. It loads entropy directly + * into the crng's key, without going through the input pool. It is, + * generally speaking, not very safe, but we use this only at early + * boot time when it's better to have something there rather than + * nothing. * - * crng_fast_load() can be called by code in the interrupt service - * path. So we can't afford to dilly-dally. Returns the number of - * bytes processed from cp. + * There are two paths, a slow one and a fast one. The slow one + * hashes the input along with the current key. The fast one simply + * xors it in, and should only be used from interrupt context. + * + * If account is set, then the crng_init_cnt counter is incremented. + * This shouldn't be set by functions like add_device_randomness(), + * where we can't trust the buffer passed to it is guaranteed to be + * unpredictable (so it might not have any entropy at all). + * + * Returns the number of bytes processed from input, which is bounded + * by CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH if account is true. */ -static size_t crng_fast_load(const void *cp, size_t len) +static size_t crng_pre_init_inject(const void *input, size_t len, + bool fast, bool account) { static int crng_init_cnt = 0; unsigned long flags; - const u8 *src = (const u8 *)cp; - size_t ret = 0; - if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags)) - return 0; + if (fast) { + if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags)) + return 0; + } else { + spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags); + } + if (crng_init != 0) { spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags); return 0; } - while (len > 0 && crng_init_cnt < CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) { - base_crng.key[crng_init_cnt % sizeof(base_crng.key)] ^= *src; - src++; crng_init_cnt++; len--; ret++; + + if (account) + len = min_t(size_t, len, CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH - crng_init_cnt); + + if (fast) { + const u8 *src = input; + size_t i; + + for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) + base_crng.key[(crng_init_cnt + i) % + sizeof(base_crng.key)] ^= src[i]; + } else { + struct blake2s_state hash; + + blake2s_init(&hash, sizeof(base_crng.key)); + blake2s_update(&hash, base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key)); + blake2s_update(&hash, input, len); + blake2s_final(&hash, base_crng.key); } - if (crng_init_cnt >= CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) { - ++base_crng.generation; - crng_init = 1; + + if (account) { + crng_init_cnt += len; + if (crng_init_cnt >= CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) { + ++base_crng.generation; + crng_init = 1; + } } + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags); + if (crng_init == 1) pr_notice("fast init done\n"); - return ret; -} -/* - * This function is for crng_init == 0 only. - * - * crng_slow_load() is called by add_device_randomness, which has two - * attributes. (1) We can't trust the buffer passed to it is - * guaranteed to be unpredictable (so it might not have any entropy at - * all), and (2) it doesn't have the performance constraints of - * crng_fast_load(). - * - * So, we simply hash the contents in with the current key. Finally, - * we do *not* advance crng_init_cnt since buffer we may get may be - * something like a fixed DMI table (for example), which might very - * well be unique to the machine, but is otherwise unvarying. - */ -static void crng_slow_load(const void *cp, size_t len) -{ - unsigned long flags; - struct blake2s_state hash; - - blake2s_init(&hash, sizeof(base_crng.key)); - - if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags)) - return; - if (crng_init != 0) { - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags); - return; - } - - blake2s_update(&hash, base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key)); - blake2s_update(&hash, cp, len); - blake2s_final(&hash, base_crng.key); - - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags); + return len; } static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes) @@ -1013,7 +1016,7 @@ void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size) unsigned long flags; if (!crng_ready() && size) - crng_slow_load(buf, size); + crng_pre_init_inject(buf, size, false, false); spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags); _mix_pool_bytes(buf, size); @@ -1130,7 +1133,7 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count, size_t entropy) { if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) { - size_t ret = crng_fast_load(buffer, count); + size_t ret = crng_pre_init_inject(buffer, count, false, true); mix_pool_bytes(buffer, ret); count -= ret; buffer += ret; @@ -1293,7 +1296,8 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) { if (new_count >= 64 && - crng_fast_load(fast_pool->pool32, sizeof(fast_pool->pool32)) > 0) { + crng_pre_init_inject(fast_pool->pool32, sizeof(fast_pool->pool32), + true, true) > 0) { atomic_set(&fast_pool->count, 0); fast_pool->last = now; if (spin_trylock(&input_pool.lock)) { From ff607fc7607d043643ac2f157d4e732fe4007f66 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Sat, 12 Feb 2022 23:57:38 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0534/1091] random: check for crng_init == 0 in add_device_randomness() commit 1daf2f387652bf3a7044aea042f5023b3f6b189b upstream. This has no real functional change, as crng_pre_init_inject() (and before that, crng_slow_init()) always checks for == 0, not >= 2. So correct the outer unlocked change to reflect that. Before this used crng_ready(), which was not correct. Cc: Theodore Ts'o Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 1f6c7dbec4d8..b50dc9baca8b 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -1015,7 +1015,7 @@ void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size) unsigned long time = random_get_entropy() ^ jiffies; unsigned long flags; - if (!crng_ready() && size) + if (crng_init == 0 && size) crng_pre_init_inject(buf, size, false, false); spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags); From a7f8f385bb6ff3f736ed4fc5242fb2b3679aeb32 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Sun, 13 Feb 2022 16:17:01 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0535/1091] random: pull add_hwgenerator_randomness() declaration into random.h commit b777c38239fec5a528e59f55b379e31b1a187524 upstream. add_hwgenerator_randomness() is a function implemented and documented inside of random.c. It is the way that hardware RNGs push data into it. Therefore, it should be declared in random.h. Otherwise sparse complains with: random.c:1137:6: warning: symbol 'add_hwgenerator_randomness' was not declared. Should it be static? The alternative would be to include hw_random.h into random.c, but that wouldn't really be good for anything except slowing down compile time. Cc: Matt Mackall Cc: Theodore Ts'o Acked-by: Herbert Xu Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/hw_random/core.c | 1 + include/linux/hw_random.h | 2 -- include/linux/random.h | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c index 8d53b8ef545c..559ca503b7b6 100644 --- a/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c +++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include diff --git a/include/linux/hw_random.h b/include/linux/hw_random.h index 1a9fc38f8938..aa1d4da03538 100644 --- a/include/linux/hw_random.h +++ b/include/linux/hw_random.h @@ -60,7 +60,5 @@ extern int devm_hwrng_register(struct device *dev, struct hwrng *rng); /** Unregister a Hardware Random Number Generator driver. */ extern void hwrng_unregister(struct hwrng *rng); extern void devm_hwrng_unregister(struct device *dve, struct hwrng *rng); -/** Feed random bits into the pool. */ -extern void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count, size_t entropy); #endif /* LINUX_HWRANDOM_H_ */ diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h index 37e1e8c43d7e..d7354de9351e 100644 --- a/include/linux/random.h +++ b/include/linux/random.h @@ -32,6 +32,8 @@ static inline void add_latent_entropy(void) {} extern void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, unsigned int value) __latent_entropy; extern void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) __latent_entropy; +extern void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count, + size_t entropy); extern void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes); extern int wait_for_random_bytes(void); From 62cd795e465a5774f3542bb2fb7b5c7362bc3bab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Sun, 13 Feb 2022 22:48:04 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0536/1091] random: clear fast pool, crng, and batches in cpuhp bring up commit 3191dd5a1179ef0fad5a050a1702ae98b6251e8f upstream. For the irq randomness fast pool, rather than having to use expensive atomics, which were visibly the most expensive thing in the entire irq handler, simply take care of the extreme edge case of resetting count to zero in the cpuhp online handler, just after workqueues have been reenabled. This simplifies the code a bit and lets us use vanilla variables rather than atomics, and performance should be improved. As well, very early on when the CPU comes up, while interrupts are still disabled, we clear out the per-cpu crng and its batches, so that it always starts with fresh randomness. Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Theodore Ts'o Cc: Sultan Alsawaf Cc: Dominik Brodowski Acked-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- include/linux/cpuhotplug.h | 2 ++ include/linux/random.h | 5 +++ kernel/cpu.c | 11 +++++++ 4 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index b50dc9baca8b..656be615dd93 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -693,6 +693,25 @@ u32 get_random_u32(void) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u32); +#ifdef CONFIG_SMP +/* + * This function is called when the CPU is coming up, with entry + * CPUHP_RANDOM_PREPARE, which comes before CPUHP_WORKQUEUE_PREP. + */ +int random_prepare_cpu(unsigned int cpu) +{ + /* + * When the cpu comes back online, immediately invalidate both + * the per-cpu crng and all batches, so that we serve fresh + * randomness. + */ + per_cpu_ptr(&crngs, cpu)->generation = ULONG_MAX; + per_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u32, cpu)->position = UINT_MAX; + per_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u64, cpu)->position = UINT_MAX; + return 0; +} +#endif + /** * randomize_page - Generate a random, page aligned address * @start: The smallest acceptable address the caller will take. @@ -1178,7 +1197,7 @@ struct fast_pool { }; struct work_struct mix; unsigned long last; - atomic_t count; + unsigned int count; u16 reg_idx; }; @@ -1214,6 +1233,29 @@ static void fast_mix(u32 pool[4]) static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct fast_pool, irq_randomness); +#ifdef CONFIG_SMP +/* + * This function is called when the CPU has just come online, with + * entry CPUHP_AP_RANDOM_ONLINE, just after CPUHP_AP_WORKQUEUE_ONLINE. + */ +int random_online_cpu(unsigned int cpu) +{ + /* + * During CPU shutdown and before CPU onlining, add_interrupt_ + * randomness() may schedule mix_interrupt_randomness(), and + * set the MIX_INFLIGHT flag. However, because the worker can + * be scheduled on a different CPU during this period, that + * flag will never be cleared. For that reason, we zero out + * the flag here, which runs just after workqueues are onlined + * for the CPU again. This also has the effect of setting the + * irq randomness count to zero so that new accumulated irqs + * are fresh. + */ + per_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness, cpu)->count = 0; + return 0; +} +#endif + static u32 get_reg(struct fast_pool *f, struct pt_regs *regs) { u32 *ptr = (u32 *)regs; @@ -1238,15 +1280,6 @@ static void mix_interrupt_randomness(struct work_struct *work) local_irq_disable(); if (fast_pool != this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness)) { local_irq_enable(); - /* - * If we are unlucky enough to have been moved to another CPU, - * during CPU hotplug while the CPU was shutdown then we set - * our count to zero atomically so that when the CPU comes - * back online, it can enqueue work again. The _release here - * pairs with the atomic_inc_return_acquire in - * add_interrupt_randomness(). - */ - atomic_set_release(&fast_pool->count, 0); return; } @@ -1255,7 +1288,7 @@ static void mix_interrupt_randomness(struct work_struct *work) * consistent view, before we reenable irqs again. */ memcpy(pool, fast_pool->pool32, sizeof(pool)); - atomic_set(&fast_pool->count, 0); + fast_pool->count = 0; fast_pool->last = jiffies; local_irq_enable(); @@ -1291,14 +1324,13 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) } fast_mix(fast_pool->pool32); - /* The _acquire here pairs with the atomic_set_release in mix_interrupt_randomness(). */ - new_count = (unsigned int)atomic_inc_return_acquire(&fast_pool->count); + new_count = ++fast_pool->count; if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) { if (new_count >= 64 && crng_pre_init_inject(fast_pool->pool32, sizeof(fast_pool->pool32), true, true) > 0) { - atomic_set(&fast_pool->count, 0); + fast_pool->count = 0; fast_pool->last = now; if (spin_trylock(&input_pool.lock)) { _mix_pool_bytes(&fast_pool->pool32, sizeof(fast_pool->pool32)); @@ -1316,7 +1348,7 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) if (unlikely(!fast_pool->mix.func)) INIT_WORK(&fast_pool->mix, mix_interrupt_randomness); - atomic_or(MIX_INFLIGHT, &fast_pool->count); + fast_pool->count |= MIX_INFLIGHT; queue_work_on(raw_smp_processor_id(), system_highpri_wq, &fast_pool->mix); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_interrupt_randomness); diff --git a/include/linux/cpuhotplug.h b/include/linux/cpuhotplug.h index bd1f23536b1b..15835f37bd5f 100644 --- a/include/linux/cpuhotplug.h +++ b/include/linux/cpuhotplug.h @@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ enum cpuhp_state { CPUHP_LUSTRE_CFS_DEAD, CPUHP_AP_ARM_CACHE_B15_RAC_DEAD, CPUHP_PADATA_DEAD, + CPUHP_RANDOM_PREPARE, CPUHP_WORKQUEUE_PREP, CPUHP_POWER_NUMA_PREPARE, CPUHP_HRTIMERS_PREPARE, @@ -177,6 +178,7 @@ enum cpuhp_state { CPUHP_AP_PERF_POWERPC_TRACE_IMC_ONLINE, CPUHP_AP_WATCHDOG_ONLINE, CPUHP_AP_WORKQUEUE_ONLINE, + CPUHP_AP_RANDOM_ONLINE, CPUHP_AP_RCUTREE_ONLINE, CPUHP_AP_BASE_CACHEINFO_ONLINE, CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN, diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h index d7354de9351e..6148b8d1ccf3 100644 --- a/include/linux/random.h +++ b/include/linux/random.h @@ -156,4 +156,9 @@ static inline bool __init arch_get_random_long_early(unsigned long *v) } #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_SMP +extern int random_prepare_cpu(unsigned int cpu); +extern int random_online_cpu(unsigned int cpu); +#endif + #endif /* _LINUX_RANDOM_H */ diff --git a/kernel/cpu.c b/kernel/cpu.c index 06c009489892..c08456af0c7f 100644 --- a/kernel/cpu.c +++ b/kernel/cpu.c @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS @@ -1459,6 +1460,11 @@ static struct cpuhp_step cpuhp_hp_states[] = { .startup.single = perf_event_init_cpu, .teardown.single = perf_event_exit_cpu, }, + [CPUHP_RANDOM_PREPARE] = { + .name = "random:prepare", + .startup.single = random_prepare_cpu, + .teardown.single = NULL, + }, [CPUHP_WORKQUEUE_PREP] = { .name = "workqueue:prepare", .startup.single = workqueue_prepare_cpu, @@ -1575,6 +1581,11 @@ static struct cpuhp_step cpuhp_hp_states[] = { .startup.single = workqueue_online_cpu, .teardown.single = workqueue_offline_cpu, }, + [CPUHP_AP_RANDOM_ONLINE] = { + .name = "random:online", + .startup.single = random_online_cpu, + .teardown.single = NULL, + }, [CPUHP_AP_RCUTREE_ONLINE] = { .name = "RCU/tree:online", .startup.single = rcutree_online_cpu, From ac0081dec7d63282cc947a8e0b139d36b935c365 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Tue, 22 Feb 2022 13:46:10 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0537/1091] random: round-robin registers as ulong, not u32 commit da3951ebdcd1cb1d5c750e08cd05aee7b0c04d9a upstream. When the interrupt handler does not have a valid cycle counter, it calls get_reg() to read a register from the irq stack, in round-robin. Currently it does this assuming that registers are 32-bit. This is _probably_ the case, and probably all platforms without cycle counters are in fact 32-bit platforms. But maybe not, and either way, it's not quite correct. This commit fixes that to deal with `unsigned long` rather than `u32`. Cc: Theodore Ts'o Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 656be615dd93..f9355d613407 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -1256,15 +1256,15 @@ int random_online_cpu(unsigned int cpu) } #endif -static u32 get_reg(struct fast_pool *f, struct pt_regs *regs) +static unsigned long get_reg(struct fast_pool *f, struct pt_regs *regs) { - u32 *ptr = (u32 *)regs; + unsigned long *ptr = (unsigned long *)regs; unsigned int idx; if (regs == NULL) return 0; idx = READ_ONCE(f->reg_idx); - if (idx >= sizeof(struct pt_regs) / sizeof(u32)) + if (idx >= sizeof(struct pt_regs) / sizeof(unsigned long)) idx = 0; ptr += idx++; WRITE_ONCE(f->reg_idx, idx); From 4d5151cc288a32dab11b40401723b9023b27086c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Tue, 22 Feb 2022 14:01:57 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0538/1091] random: only wake up writers after zap if threshold was passed commit a3f9e8910e1584d7725ef7d5ac870920d42d0bb4 upstream. The only time that we need to wake up /dev/random writers on RNDCLEARPOOL/RNDZAPPOOL is when we're changing from a value that is greater than or equal to POOL_MIN_BITS to zero, because if we're changing from below POOL_MIN_BITS to zero, the writers are already unblocked. Cc: Theodore Ts'o Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index f9355d613407..70b551383a34 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -1577,7 +1577,7 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) */ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; - if (xchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, 0)) { + if (xchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, 0) >= POOL_MIN_BITS) { wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait); kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT); } From 673637c4c9e0f37c5cf1a3326d5db917e58ec503 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Thu, 24 Feb 2022 23:04:56 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0539/1091] random: cleanup UUID handling commit 64276a9939ff414f2f0db38036cf4e1a0a703394 upstream. Rather than hard coding various lengths, we can use the right constants. Strings should be `char *` while buffers should be `u8 *`. Rather than have a nonsensical and unused maxlength, just remove it. Finally, use snprintf instead of sprintf, just out of good hygiene. As well, remove the old comment about returning a binary UUID via the binary sysctl syscall. That syscall was removed from the kernel in 5.5, and actually, the "uuid_strategy" function and related infrastructure for even serving it via the binary sysctl syscall was removed with 894d2491153a ("sysctl drivers: Remove dead binary sysctl support") back in 2.6.33. Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 29 +++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 70b551383a34..06e523ab0945 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -1656,22 +1656,25 @@ const struct file_operations urandom_fops = { static int sysctl_random_min_urandom_seed = 60; static int sysctl_random_write_wakeup_bits = POOL_MIN_BITS; static int sysctl_poolsize = POOL_BITS; -static char sysctl_bootid[16]; +static u8 sysctl_bootid[UUID_SIZE]; /* * This function is used to return both the bootid UUID, and random - * UUID. The difference is in whether table->data is NULL; if it is, + * UUID. The difference is in whether table->data is NULL; if it is, * then a new UUID is generated and returned to the user. - * - * If the user accesses this via the proc interface, the UUID will be - * returned as an ASCII string in the standard UUID format; if via the - * sysctl system call, as 16 bytes of binary data. */ static int proc_do_uuid(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) { - struct ctl_table fake_table; - unsigned char buf[64], tmp_uuid[16], *uuid; + u8 tmp_uuid[UUID_SIZE], *uuid; + char uuid_string[UUID_STRING_LEN + 1]; + struct ctl_table fake_table = { + .data = uuid_string, + .maxlen = UUID_STRING_LEN + }; + + if (write) + return -EPERM; uuid = table->data; if (!uuid) { @@ -1686,12 +1689,8 @@ static int proc_do_uuid(struct ctl_table *table, int write, spin_unlock(&bootid_spinlock); } - sprintf(buf, "%pU", uuid); - - fake_table.data = buf; - fake_table.maxlen = sizeof(buf); - - return proc_dostring(&fake_table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); + snprintf(uuid_string, sizeof(uuid_string), "%pU", uuid); + return proc_dostring(&fake_table, 0, buffer, lenp, ppos); } extern struct ctl_table random_table[]; @@ -1727,13 +1726,11 @@ struct ctl_table random_table[] = { { .procname = "boot_id", .data = &sysctl_bootid, - .maxlen = 16, .mode = 0444, .proc_handler = proc_do_uuid, }, { .procname = "uuid", - .maxlen = 16, .mode = 0444, .proc_handler = proc_do_uuid, }, From 219c84fe93e543ae3d2acda4fa4488c161920dc6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Thu, 24 Feb 2022 18:30:58 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0540/1091] random: unify cycles_t and jiffies usage and types commit abded93ec1e9692920fe309f07f40bd1035f2940 upstream. random_get_entropy() returns a cycles_t, not an unsigned long, which is sometimes 64 bits on various 32-bit platforms, including x86. Conversely, jiffies is always unsigned long. This commit fixes things to use cycles_t for fields that use random_get_entropy(), named "cycles", and unsigned long for fields that use jiffies, named "now". It's also good to mix in a cycles_t and a jiffies in the same way for both add_device_randomness and add_timer_randomness, rather than using xor in one case. Finally, we unify the order of these volatile reads, always reading the more precise cycles counter, and then jiffies, so that the cycle counter is as close to the event as possible. Cc: Theodore Ts'o Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++---------------------- 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 06e523ab0945..7c87a6d12b91 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -1015,12 +1015,6 @@ int __init rand_initialize(void) return 0; } -/* There is one of these per entropy source */ -struct timer_rand_state { - cycles_t last_time; - long last_delta, last_delta2; -}; - /* * Add device- or boot-specific data to the input pool to help * initialize it. @@ -1031,19 +1025,26 @@ struct timer_rand_state { */ void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size) { - unsigned long time = random_get_entropy() ^ jiffies; - unsigned long flags; + cycles_t cycles = random_get_entropy(); + unsigned long flags, now = jiffies; if (crng_init == 0 && size) crng_pre_init_inject(buf, size, false, false); spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags); + _mix_pool_bytes(&cycles, sizeof(cycles)); + _mix_pool_bytes(&now, sizeof(now)); _mix_pool_bytes(buf, size); - _mix_pool_bytes(&time, sizeof(time)); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_device_randomness); +/* There is one of these per entropy source */ +struct timer_rand_state { + unsigned long last_time; + long last_delta, last_delta2; +}; + /* * This function adds entropy to the entropy "pool" by using timing * delays. It uses the timer_rand_state structure to make an estimate @@ -1052,29 +1053,26 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_device_randomness); * The number "num" is also added to the pool - it should somehow describe * the type of event which just happened. This is currently 0-255 for * keyboard scan codes, and 256 upwards for interrupts. - * */ static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned int num) { - struct { - long jiffies; - unsigned int cycles; - unsigned int num; - } sample; + cycles_t cycles = random_get_entropy(); + unsigned long flags, now = jiffies; long delta, delta2, delta3; - sample.jiffies = jiffies; - sample.cycles = random_get_entropy(); - sample.num = num; - mix_pool_bytes(&sample, sizeof(sample)); + spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags); + _mix_pool_bytes(&cycles, sizeof(cycles)); + _mix_pool_bytes(&now, sizeof(now)); + _mix_pool_bytes(&num, sizeof(num)); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags); /* * Calculate number of bits of randomness we probably added. * We take into account the first, second and third-order deltas * in order to make our estimate. */ - delta = sample.jiffies - READ_ONCE(state->last_time); - WRITE_ONCE(state->last_time, sample.jiffies); + delta = now - READ_ONCE(state->last_time); + WRITE_ONCE(state->last_time, now); delta2 = delta - READ_ONCE(state->last_delta); WRITE_ONCE(state->last_delta, delta); @@ -1300,10 +1298,10 @@ static void mix_interrupt_randomness(struct work_struct *work) void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) { enum { MIX_INFLIGHT = 1U << 31 }; + cycles_t cycles = random_get_entropy(); + unsigned long now = jiffies; struct fast_pool *fast_pool = this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness); struct pt_regs *regs = get_irq_regs(); - unsigned long now = jiffies; - cycles_t cycles = random_get_entropy(); unsigned int new_count; if (cycles == 0) @@ -1378,28 +1376,28 @@ static void entropy_timer(struct timer_list *t) static void try_to_generate_entropy(void) { struct { - unsigned long now; + cycles_t cycles; struct timer_list timer; } stack; - stack.now = random_get_entropy(); + stack.cycles = random_get_entropy(); /* Slow counter - or none. Don't even bother */ - if (stack.now == random_get_entropy()) + if (stack.cycles == random_get_entropy()) return; timer_setup_on_stack(&stack.timer, entropy_timer, 0); while (!crng_ready()) { if (!timer_pending(&stack.timer)) mod_timer(&stack.timer, jiffies + 1); - mix_pool_bytes(&stack.now, sizeof(stack.now)); + mix_pool_bytes(&stack.cycles, sizeof(stack.cycles)); schedule(); - stack.now = random_get_entropy(); + stack.cycles = random_get_entropy(); } del_timer_sync(&stack.timer); destroy_timer_on_stack(&stack.timer); - mix_pool_bytes(&stack.now, sizeof(stack.now)); + mix_pool_bytes(&stack.cycles, sizeof(stack.cycles)); } From 75d95c1b5deacf8b063a98fb863f7672ec35ca62 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Sun, 13 Feb 2022 18:25:07 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0541/1091] random: do crng pre-init loading in worker rather than irq commit c2a7de4feb6e09f23af7accc0f882a8fa92e7ae5 upstream. Taking spinlocks from IRQ context is generally problematic for PREEMPT_RT. That is, in part, why we take trylocks instead. However, a spin_try_lock() is also problematic since another spin_lock() invocation can potentially PI-boost the wrong task, as the spin_try_lock() is invoked from an IRQ-context, so the task on CPU (random task or idle) is not the actual owner. Additionally, by deferring the crng pre-init loading to the worker, we can use the cryptographic hash function rather than xor, which is perhaps a meaningful difference when considering this data has only been through the relatively weak fast_mix() function. The biggest downside of this approach is that the pre-init loading is now deferred until later, which means things that need random numbers after interrupts are enabled, but before workqueues are running -- or before this particular worker manages to run -- are going to get into trouble. Hopefully in the real world, this window is rather small, especially since this code won't run until 64 interrupts had occurred. Cc: Sultan Alsawaf Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Eric Biggers Cc: Theodore Ts'o Acked-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 65 +++++++++++++------------------------------ 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 7c87a6d12b91..148e5f624980 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -441,10 +441,6 @@ static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)], * boot time when it's better to have something there rather than * nothing. * - * There are two paths, a slow one and a fast one. The slow one - * hashes the input along with the current key. The fast one simply - * xors it in, and should only be used from interrupt context. - * * If account is set, then the crng_init_cnt counter is incremented. * This shouldn't be set by functions like add_device_randomness(), * where we can't trust the buffer passed to it is guaranteed to be @@ -453,19 +449,15 @@ static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)], * Returns the number of bytes processed from input, which is bounded * by CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH if account is true. */ -static size_t crng_pre_init_inject(const void *input, size_t len, - bool fast, bool account) +static size_t crng_pre_init_inject(const void *input, size_t len, bool account) { static int crng_init_cnt = 0; + struct blake2s_state hash; unsigned long flags; - if (fast) { - if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags)) - return 0; - } else { - spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags); - } + blake2s_init(&hash, sizeof(base_crng.key)); + spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags); if (crng_init != 0) { spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags); return 0; @@ -474,21 +466,9 @@ static size_t crng_pre_init_inject(const void *input, size_t len, if (account) len = min_t(size_t, len, CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH - crng_init_cnt); - if (fast) { - const u8 *src = input; - size_t i; - - for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) - base_crng.key[(crng_init_cnt + i) % - sizeof(base_crng.key)] ^= src[i]; - } else { - struct blake2s_state hash; - - blake2s_init(&hash, sizeof(base_crng.key)); - blake2s_update(&hash, base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key)); - blake2s_update(&hash, input, len); - blake2s_final(&hash, base_crng.key); - } + blake2s_update(&hash, base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key)); + blake2s_update(&hash, input, len); + blake2s_final(&hash, base_crng.key); if (account) { crng_init_cnt += len; @@ -1029,7 +1009,7 @@ void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size) unsigned long flags, now = jiffies; if (crng_init == 0 && size) - crng_pre_init_inject(buf, size, false, false); + crng_pre_init_inject(buf, size, false); spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags); _mix_pool_bytes(&cycles, sizeof(cycles)); @@ -1150,7 +1130,7 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count, size_t entropy) { if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) { - size_t ret = crng_pre_init_inject(buffer, count, false, true); + size_t ret = crng_pre_init_inject(buffer, count, true); mix_pool_bytes(buffer, ret); count -= ret; buffer += ret; @@ -1290,8 +1270,14 @@ static void mix_interrupt_randomness(struct work_struct *work) fast_pool->last = jiffies; local_irq_enable(); - mix_pool_bytes(pool, sizeof(pool)); - credit_entropy_bits(1); + if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) { + crng_pre_init_inject(pool, sizeof(pool), true); + mix_pool_bytes(pool, sizeof(pool)); + } else { + mix_pool_bytes(pool, sizeof(pool)); + credit_entropy_bits(1); + } + memzero_explicit(pool, sizeof(pool)); } @@ -1324,24 +1310,11 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) fast_mix(fast_pool->pool32); new_count = ++fast_pool->count; - if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) { - if (new_count >= 64 && - crng_pre_init_inject(fast_pool->pool32, sizeof(fast_pool->pool32), - true, true) > 0) { - fast_pool->count = 0; - fast_pool->last = now; - if (spin_trylock(&input_pool.lock)) { - _mix_pool_bytes(&fast_pool->pool32, sizeof(fast_pool->pool32)); - spin_unlock(&input_pool.lock); - } - } - return; - } - if (new_count & MIX_INFLIGHT) return; - if (new_count < 64 && !time_after(now, fast_pool->last + HZ)) + if (new_count < 64 && (!time_after(now, fast_pool->last + HZ) || + unlikely(crng_init == 0))) return; if (unlikely(!fast_pool->mix.func)) From ed409757100bd6aa20732e7581896f689c0bee4b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2022 13:57:57 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0542/1091] random: give sysctl_random_min_urandom_seed a more sensible value commit d0efdf35a6a71d307a250199af6fce122a7c7e11 upstream. This isn't used by anything or anywhere, but we can't delete it due to compatibility. So at least give it the correct value of what it's supposed to be instead of a garbage one. Cc: Theodore Ts'o Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 148e5f624980..eaea63ad6a5d 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -1614,7 +1614,7 @@ const struct file_operations urandom_fops = { * to avoid breaking old userspaces, but writing to it does not * change any behavior of the RNG. * - * - urandom_min_reseed_secs - fixed to the meaningless value "60". + * - urandom_min_reseed_secs - fixed to the value CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL. * It is writable to avoid breaking old userspaces, but writing * to it does not change any behavior of the RNG. * @@ -1624,7 +1624,7 @@ const struct file_operations urandom_fops = { #include -static int sysctl_random_min_urandom_seed = 60; +static int sysctl_random_min_urandom_seed = CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL / HZ; static int sysctl_random_write_wakeup_bits = POOL_MIN_BITS; static int sysctl_poolsize = POOL_BITS; static u8 sysctl_bootid[UUID_SIZE]; From 1ae73fb2a6351b6f864da010295237c4d87d834e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2022 14:00:52 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0543/1091] random: don't let 644 read-only sysctls be written to commit 77553cf8f44863b31da242cf24671d76ddb61597 upstream. We leave around these old sysctls for compatibility, and we keep them "writable" for compatibility, but even after writing, we should keep reporting the same value. This is consistent with how userspaces tend to use sysctl_random_write_wakeup_bits, writing to it, and then later reading from it and using the value. Cc: Theodore Ts'o Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index eaea63ad6a5d..cf1e8d6230d1 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -1664,6 +1664,13 @@ static int proc_do_uuid(struct ctl_table *table, int write, return proc_dostring(&fake_table, 0, buffer, lenp, ppos); } +/* The same as proc_dointvec, but writes don't change anything. */ +static int proc_do_rointvec(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void __user *buffer, + size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) +{ + return write ? 0 : proc_dointvec(table, 0, buffer, lenp, ppos); +} + extern struct ctl_table random_table[]; struct ctl_table random_table[] = { { @@ -1685,14 +1692,14 @@ struct ctl_table random_table[] = { .data = &sysctl_random_write_wakeup_bits, .maxlen = sizeof(int), .mode = 0644, - .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, + .proc_handler = proc_do_rointvec, }, { .procname = "urandom_min_reseed_secs", .data = &sysctl_random_min_urandom_seed, .maxlen = sizeof(int), .mode = 0644, - .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, + .proc_handler = proc_do_rointvec, }, { .procname = "boot_id", From 631503001ccf6ff08e816a2edecba0f9f939fab7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Tue, 1 Mar 2022 20:03:49 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0544/1091] random: replace custom notifier chain with standard one commit 5acd35487dc911541672b3ffc322851769c32a56 upstream. We previously rolled our own randomness readiness notifier, which only has two users in the whole kernel. Replace this with a more standard atomic notifier block that serves the same purpose with less code. Also unexport the symbols, because no modules use it, only unconditional builtins. The only drawback is that it's possible for a notification handler returning the "stop" code to prevent further processing, but given that there are only two users, and that we're unexporting this anyway, that doesn't seem like a significant drawback for the simplification we receive here. Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman Cc: Theodore Ts'o Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski [Jason: for stable, also backported to crypto/drbg.c, not unexporting.] Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- crypto/drbg.c | 17 +++++------ drivers/char/random.c | 69 +++++++++++++----------------------------- include/crypto/drbg.h | 2 +- include/linux/random.h | 10 ++---- lib/random32.c | 13 +++++--- lib/vsprintf.c | 10 +++--- 6 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 74 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/drbg.c b/crypto/drbg.c index 04379ca624cd..7c8d9ac99b55 100644 --- a/crypto/drbg.c +++ b/crypto/drbg.c @@ -1478,12 +1478,13 @@ static int drbg_generate_long(struct drbg_state *drbg, return 0; } -static void drbg_schedule_async_seed(struct random_ready_callback *rdy) +static int drbg_schedule_async_seed(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long action, void *data) { - struct drbg_state *drbg = container_of(rdy, struct drbg_state, + struct drbg_state *drbg = container_of(nb, struct drbg_state, random_ready); schedule_work(&drbg->seed_work); + return 0; } static int drbg_prepare_hrng(struct drbg_state *drbg) @@ -1496,10 +1497,8 @@ static int drbg_prepare_hrng(struct drbg_state *drbg) INIT_WORK(&drbg->seed_work, drbg_async_seed); - drbg->random_ready.owner = THIS_MODULE; - drbg->random_ready.func = drbg_schedule_async_seed; - - err = add_random_ready_callback(&drbg->random_ready); + drbg->random_ready.notifier_call = drbg_schedule_async_seed; + err = register_random_ready_notifier(&drbg->random_ready); switch (err) { case 0: @@ -1510,7 +1509,7 @@ static int drbg_prepare_hrng(struct drbg_state *drbg) /* fall through */ default: - drbg->random_ready.func = NULL; + drbg->random_ready.notifier_call = NULL; return err; } @@ -1616,8 +1615,8 @@ free_everything: */ static int drbg_uninstantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg) { - if (drbg->random_ready.func) { - del_random_ready_callback(&drbg->random_ready); + if (drbg->random_ready.notifier_call) { + unregister_random_ready_notifier(&drbg->random_ready); cancel_work_sync(&drbg->seed_work); crypto_free_rng(drbg->jent); drbg->jent = NULL; diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index cf1e8d6230d1..af84ca3c8d77 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -83,8 +83,8 @@ static int crng_init = 0; /* Various types of waiters for crng_init->2 transition. */ static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_init_wait); static struct fasync_struct *fasync; -static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(random_ready_list_lock); -static LIST_HEAD(random_ready_list); +static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(random_ready_chain_lock); +static RAW_NOTIFIER_HEAD(random_ready_chain); /* Control how we warn userspace. */ static struct ratelimit_state unseeded_warning = @@ -147,72 +147,45 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_random_bytes); * * returns: 0 if callback is successfully added * -EALREADY if pool is already initialised (callback not called) - * -ENOENT if module for callback is not alive */ -int add_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy) +int register_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb) { - struct module *owner; unsigned long flags; - int err = -EALREADY; + int ret = -EALREADY; if (crng_ready()) - return err; + return ret; - owner = rdy->owner; - if (!try_module_get(owner)) - return -ENOENT; - - spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_list_lock, flags); - if (crng_ready()) - goto out; - - owner = NULL; - - list_add(&rdy->list, &random_ready_list); - err = 0; - -out: - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_list_lock, flags); - - module_put(owner); - - return err; + spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_chain_lock, flags); + if (!crng_ready()) + ret = raw_notifier_chain_register(&random_ready_chain, nb); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_chain_lock, flags); + return ret; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_random_ready_callback); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(register_random_ready_notifier); /* * Delete a previously registered readiness callback function. */ -void del_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy) +int unregister_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb) { unsigned long flags; - struct module *owner = NULL; + int ret; - spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_list_lock, flags); - if (!list_empty(&rdy->list)) { - list_del_init(&rdy->list); - owner = rdy->owner; - } - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_list_lock, flags); - - module_put(owner); + spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_chain_lock, flags); + ret = raw_notifier_chain_unregister(&random_ready_chain, nb); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_chain_lock, flags); + return ret; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(del_random_ready_callback); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_random_ready_notifier); static void process_random_ready_list(void) { unsigned long flags; - struct random_ready_callback *rdy, *tmp; - spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_list_lock, flags); - list_for_each_entry_safe(rdy, tmp, &random_ready_list, list) { - struct module *owner = rdy->owner; - - list_del_init(&rdy->list); - rdy->func(rdy); - module_put(owner); - } - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_list_lock, flags); + spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_chain_lock, flags); + raw_notifier_call_chain(&random_ready_chain, 0, NULL); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_chain_lock, flags); } #define warn_unseeded_randomness(previous) \ diff --git a/include/crypto/drbg.h b/include/crypto/drbg.h index 8c9af21efce1..97b386c1fcc9 100644 --- a/include/crypto/drbg.h +++ b/include/crypto/drbg.h @@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ struct drbg_state { const struct drbg_state_ops *d_ops; const struct drbg_core *core; struct drbg_string test_data; - struct random_ready_callback random_ready; + struct notifier_block random_ready; }; static inline __u8 drbg_statelen(struct drbg_state *drbg) diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h index 6148b8d1ccf3..d4abda9e2348 100644 --- a/include/linux/random.h +++ b/include/linux/random.h @@ -10,11 +10,7 @@ #include -struct random_ready_callback { - struct list_head list; - void (*func)(struct random_ready_callback *rdy); - struct module *owner; -}; +struct notifier_block; extern void add_device_randomness(const void *, size_t); extern void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *, size_t); @@ -39,8 +35,8 @@ extern void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes); extern int wait_for_random_bytes(void); extern int __init rand_initialize(void); extern bool rng_is_initialized(void); -extern int add_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy); -extern void del_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy); +extern int register_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb); +extern int unregister_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb); extern size_t __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, size_t nbytes); #ifndef MODULE diff --git a/lib/random32.c b/lib/random32.c index 42cbb70e09d8..339624191b51 100644 --- a/lib/random32.c +++ b/lib/random32.c @@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include /** @@ -546,9 +547,11 @@ static void prandom_reseed(struct timer_list *unused) * To avoid worrying about whether it's safe to delay that interrupt * long enough to seed all CPUs, just schedule an immediate timer event. */ -static void prandom_timer_start(struct random_ready_callback *unused) +static int prandom_timer_start(struct notifier_block *nb, + unsigned long action, void *data) { mod_timer(&seed_timer, jiffies); + return 0; } /* @@ -557,13 +560,13 @@ static void prandom_timer_start(struct random_ready_callback *unused) */ static int __init prandom_init_late(void) { - static struct random_ready_callback random_ready = { - .func = prandom_timer_start + static struct notifier_block random_ready = { + .notifier_call = prandom_timer_start }; - int ret = add_random_ready_callback(&random_ready); + int ret = register_random_ready_notifier(&random_ready); if (ret == -EALREADY) { - prandom_timer_start(&random_ready); + prandom_timer_start(&random_ready, 0, NULL); ret = 0; } return ret; diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c index 2766d1b2c301..393623bf3258 100644 --- a/lib/vsprintf.c +++ b/lib/vsprintf.c @@ -731,14 +731,16 @@ static void enable_ptr_key_workfn(struct work_struct *work) static DECLARE_WORK(enable_ptr_key_work, enable_ptr_key_workfn); -static void fill_random_ptr_key(struct random_ready_callback *unused) +static int fill_random_ptr_key(struct notifier_block *nb, + unsigned long action, void *data) { /* This may be in an interrupt handler. */ queue_work(system_unbound_wq, &enable_ptr_key_work); + return 0; } -static struct random_ready_callback random_ready = { - .func = fill_random_ptr_key +static struct notifier_block random_ready = { + .notifier_call = fill_random_ptr_key }; static int __init initialize_ptr_random(void) @@ -752,7 +754,7 @@ static int __init initialize_ptr_random(void) return 0; } - ret = add_random_ready_callback(&random_ready); + ret = register_random_ready_notifier(&random_ready); if (!ret) { return 0; } else if (ret == -EALREADY) { From ad4c6bd98c545c142968dcea2fe8e14d17dd9b8c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2022 14:58:44 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0545/1091] random: use SipHash as interrupt entropy accumulator commit f5eab0e2db4f881fb2b62b3fdad5b9be673dd7ae upstream. The current fast_mix() function is a piece of classic mailing list crypto, where it just sort of sprung up by an anonymous author without a lot of real analysis of what precisely it was accomplishing. As an ARX permutation alone, there are some easily searchable differential trails in it, and as a means of preventing malicious interrupts, it completely fails, since it xors new data into the entire state every time. It can't really be analyzed as a random permutation, because it clearly isn't, and it can't be analyzed as an interesting linear algebraic structure either, because it's also not that. There really is very little one can say about it in terms of entropy accumulation. It might diffuse bits, some of the time, maybe, we hope, I guess. But for the most part, it fails to accomplish anything concrete. As a reminder, the simple goal of add_interrupt_randomness() is to simply accumulate entropy until ~64 interrupts have elapsed, and then dump it into the main input pool, which uses a cryptographic hash. It would be nice to have something cryptographically strong in the interrupt handler itself, in case a malicious interrupt compromises a per-cpu fast pool within the 64 interrupts / 1 second window, and then inside of that same window somehow can control its return address and cycle counter, even if that's a bit far fetched. However, with a very CPU-limited budget, actually doing that remains an active research project (and perhaps there'll be something useful for Linux to come out of it). And while the abundance of caution would be nice, this isn't *currently* the security model, and we don't yet have a fast enough solution to make it our security model. Plus there's not exactly a pressing need to do that. (And for the avoidance of doubt, the actual cluster of 64 accumulated interrupts still gets dumped into our cryptographically secure input pool.) So, for now we are going to stick with the existing interrupt security model, which assumes that each cluster of 64 interrupt data samples is mostly non-malicious and not colluding with an infoleaker. With this as our goal, we have a few more choices, simply aiming to accumulate entropy, while discarding the least amount of it. We know from that random oracles, instantiated as computational hash functions, make good entropy accumulators and extractors, which is the justification for using BLAKE2s in the main input pool. As mentioned, we don't have that luxury here, but we also don't have the same security model requirements, because we're assuming that there aren't malicious inputs. A pseudorandom function instance can approximately behave like a random oracle, provided that the key is uniformly random. But since we're not concerned with malicious inputs, we can pick a fixed key, which is not secret, knowing that "nature" won't interact with a sufficiently chosen fixed key by accident. So we pick a PRF with a fixed initial key, and accumulate into it continuously, dumping the result every 64 interrupts into our cryptographically secure input pool. For this, we make use of SipHash-1-x on 64-bit and HalfSipHash-1-x on 32-bit, which are already in use in the kernel's hsiphash family of functions and achieve the same performance as the function they replace. It would be nice to do two rounds, but we don't exactly have the CPU budget handy for that, and one round alone is already sufficient. As mentioned, we start with a fixed initial key (zeros is fine), and allow SipHash's symmetry breaking constants to turn that into a useful starting point. Also, since we're dumping the result (or half of it on 64-bit so as to tax our hash function the same amount on all platforms) into the cryptographically secure input pool, there's no point in finalizing SipHash's output, since it'll wind up being finalized by something much stronger. This means that all we need to do is use the ordinary round function word-by-word, as normal SipHash does. Simplified, the flow is as follows: Initialize: siphash_state_t state; siphash_init(&state, key={0, 0, 0, 0}); Update (accumulate) on interrupt: siphash_update(&state, interrupt_data_and_timing); Dump into input pool after 64 interrupts: blake2s_update(&input_pool, &state, sizeof(state) / 2); The result of all of this is that the security model is unchanged from before -- we assume non-malicious inputs -- yet we now implement that model with a stronger argument. I would like to emphasize, again, that the purpose of this commit is to improve the existing design, by making it analyzable, without changing any fundamental assumptions. There may well be value down the road in changing up the existing design, using something cryptographically strong, or simply using a ring buffer of samples rather than having a fast_mix() at all, or changing which and how much data we collect each interrupt so that we can use something linear, or a variety of other ideas. This commit does not invalidate the potential for those in the future. For example, in the future, if we're able to characterize the data we're collecting on each interrupt, we may be able to inch toward information theoretic accumulators. shows that `s = ror32(s, 7) ^ x` and `s = ror64(s, 19) ^ x` make very good accumulators for 2-monotone distributions, which would apply to timestamp counters, like random_get_entropy() or jiffies, but would not apply to our current combination of the two values, or to the various function addresses and register values we mix in. Alternatively, shows that max-period linear functions with no non-trivial invariant subspace make good extractors, used in the form `s = f(s) ^ x`. However, this only works if the input data is both identical and independent, and obviously a collection of address values and counters fails; so it goes with theoretical papers. Future directions here may involve trying to characterize more precisely what we actually need to collect in the interrupt handler, and building something specific around that. However, as mentioned, the morass of data we're gathering at the interrupt handler presently defies characterization, and so we use SipHash for now, which works well and performs well. Cc: Theodore Ts'o Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman Reviewed-by: Jean-Philippe Aumasson Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 94 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 55 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index af84ca3c8d77..498d82419143 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -1142,48 +1142,51 @@ void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size) EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_bootloader_randomness); struct fast_pool { - union { - u32 pool32[4]; - u64 pool64[2]; - }; struct work_struct mix; + unsigned long pool[4]; unsigned long last; unsigned int count; u16 reg_idx; }; +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct fast_pool, irq_randomness) = { +#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT + /* SipHash constants */ + .pool = { 0x736f6d6570736575UL, 0x646f72616e646f6dUL, + 0x6c7967656e657261UL, 0x7465646279746573UL } +#else + /* HalfSipHash constants */ + .pool = { 0, 0, 0x6c796765U, 0x74656462U } +#endif +}; + /* - * This is a fast mixing routine used by the interrupt randomness - * collector. It's hardcoded for an 128 bit pool and assumes that any - * locks that might be needed are taken by the caller. + * This is [Half]SipHash-1-x, starting from an empty key. Because + * the key is fixed, it assumes that its inputs are non-malicious, + * and therefore this has no security on its own. s represents the + * 128 or 256-bit SipHash state, while v represents a 128-bit input. */ -static void fast_mix(u32 pool[4]) +static void fast_mix(unsigned long s[4], const unsigned long *v) { - u32 a = pool[0], b = pool[1]; - u32 c = pool[2], d = pool[3]; + size_t i; - a += b; c += d; - b = rol32(b, 6); d = rol32(d, 27); - d ^= a; b ^= c; - - a += b; c += d; - b = rol32(b, 16); d = rol32(d, 14); - d ^= a; b ^= c; - - a += b; c += d; - b = rol32(b, 6); d = rol32(d, 27); - d ^= a; b ^= c; - - a += b; c += d; - b = rol32(b, 16); d = rol32(d, 14); - d ^= a; b ^= c; - - pool[0] = a; pool[1] = b; - pool[2] = c; pool[3] = d; + for (i = 0; i < 16 / sizeof(long); ++i) { + s[3] ^= v[i]; +#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT + s[0] += s[1]; s[1] = rol64(s[1], 13); s[1] ^= s[0]; s[0] = rol64(s[0], 32); + s[2] += s[3]; s[3] = rol64(s[3], 16); s[3] ^= s[2]; + s[0] += s[3]; s[3] = rol64(s[3], 21); s[3] ^= s[0]; + s[2] += s[1]; s[1] = rol64(s[1], 17); s[1] ^= s[2]; s[2] = rol64(s[2], 32); +#else + s[0] += s[1]; s[1] = rol32(s[1], 5); s[1] ^= s[0]; s[0] = rol32(s[0], 16); + s[2] += s[3]; s[3] = rol32(s[3], 8); s[3] ^= s[2]; + s[0] += s[3]; s[3] = rol32(s[3], 7); s[3] ^= s[0]; + s[2] += s[1]; s[1] = rol32(s[1], 13); s[1] ^= s[2]; s[2] = rol32(s[2], 16); +#endif + s[0] ^= v[i]; + } } -static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct fast_pool, irq_randomness); - #ifdef CONFIG_SMP /* * This function is called when the CPU has just come online, with @@ -1225,7 +1228,15 @@ static unsigned long get_reg(struct fast_pool *f, struct pt_regs *regs) static void mix_interrupt_randomness(struct work_struct *work) { struct fast_pool *fast_pool = container_of(work, struct fast_pool, mix); - u32 pool[4]; + /* + * The size of the copied stack pool is explicitly 16 bytes so that we + * tax mix_pool_byte()'s compression function the same amount on all + * platforms. This means on 64-bit we copy half the pool into this, + * while on 32-bit we copy all of it. The entropy is supposed to be + * sufficiently dispersed between bits that in the sponge-like + * half case, on average we don't wind up "losing" some. + */ + u8 pool[16]; /* Check to see if we're running on the wrong CPU due to hotplug. */ local_irq_disable(); @@ -1238,7 +1249,7 @@ static void mix_interrupt_randomness(struct work_struct *work) * Copy the pool to the stack so that the mixer always has a * consistent view, before we reenable irqs again. */ - memcpy(pool, fast_pool->pool32, sizeof(pool)); + memcpy(pool, fast_pool->pool, sizeof(pool)); fast_pool->count = 0; fast_pool->last = jiffies; local_irq_enable(); @@ -1262,25 +1273,30 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) struct fast_pool *fast_pool = this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness); struct pt_regs *regs = get_irq_regs(); unsigned int new_count; + union { + u32 u32[4]; + u64 u64[2]; + unsigned long longs[16 / sizeof(long)]; + } irq_data; if (cycles == 0) cycles = get_reg(fast_pool, regs); if (sizeof(cycles) == 8) - fast_pool->pool64[0] ^= cycles ^ rol64(now, 32) ^ irq; + irq_data.u64[0] = cycles ^ rol64(now, 32) ^ irq; else { - fast_pool->pool32[0] ^= cycles ^ irq; - fast_pool->pool32[1] ^= now; + irq_data.u32[0] = cycles ^ irq; + irq_data.u32[1] = now; } if (sizeof(unsigned long) == 8) - fast_pool->pool64[1] ^= regs ? instruction_pointer(regs) : _RET_IP_; + irq_data.u64[1] = regs ? instruction_pointer(regs) : _RET_IP_; else { - fast_pool->pool32[2] ^= regs ? instruction_pointer(regs) : _RET_IP_; - fast_pool->pool32[3] ^= get_reg(fast_pool, regs); + irq_data.u32[2] = regs ? instruction_pointer(regs) : _RET_IP_; + irq_data.u32[3] = get_reg(fast_pool, regs); } - fast_mix(fast_pool->pool32); + fast_mix(fast_pool->pool, irq_data.longs); new_count = ++fast_pool->count; if (new_count & MIX_INFLIGHT) From 905759e0fc17a71b30d36da13d15c3cc733a0c46 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Tue, 8 Mar 2022 11:20:17 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0546/1091] random: make consistent usage of crng_ready() commit a96cfe2d427064325ecbf56df8816c6b871ec285 upstream. Rather than sometimes checking `crng_init < 2`, we should always use the crng_ready() macro, so that should we change anything later, it's consistent. Additionally, that macro already has a likely() around it, which means we don't need to open code our own likely() and unlikely() annotations. Cc: Theodore Ts'o Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 19 +++++++------------ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 498d82419143..6bcd109f11cc 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -125,18 +125,13 @@ static void try_to_generate_entropy(void); */ int wait_for_random_bytes(void) { - if (likely(crng_ready())) - return 0; - - do { + while (!crng_ready()) { int ret; ret = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(crng_init_wait, crng_ready(), HZ); if (ret) return ret > 0 ? 0 : ret; - try_to_generate_entropy(); - } while (!crng_ready()); - + } return 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_random_bytes); @@ -291,7 +286,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(void) ++next_gen; WRITE_ONCE(base_crng.generation, next_gen); WRITE_ONCE(base_crng.birth, jiffies); - if (crng_init < 2) { + if (!crng_ready()) { crng_init = 2; finalize_init = true; } @@ -359,7 +354,7 @@ static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)], * ready, we do fast key erasure with the base_crng directly, because * this is what crng_pre_init_inject() mutates during early init. */ - if (unlikely(!crng_ready())) { + if (!crng_ready()) { bool ready; spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags); @@ -799,7 +794,7 @@ static void credit_entropy_bits(size_t nbits) entropy_count = min_t(unsigned int, POOL_BITS, orig + add); } while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig); - if (crng_init < 2 && entropy_count >= POOL_MIN_BITS) + if (!crng_ready() && entropy_count >= POOL_MIN_BITS) crng_reseed(); } @@ -956,7 +951,7 @@ int __init rand_initialize(void) extract_entropy(base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key)); ++base_crng.generation; - if (arch_init && trust_cpu && crng_init < 2) { + if (arch_init && trust_cpu && !crng_ready()) { crng_init = 2; pr_notice("crng init done (trusting CPU's manufacturer)\n"); } @@ -1545,7 +1540,7 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) case RNDRESEEDCRNG: if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; - if (crng_init < 2) + if (!crng_ready()) return -ENODATA; crng_reseed(); return 0; From 3a53b818bb0e49de53a6ece93125ad81ffcf49b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Tue, 8 Mar 2022 23:32:34 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0547/1091] random: reseed more often immediately after booting commit 7a7ff644aeaf071d433caffb3b8ea57354b55bd3 upstream. In order to chip away at the "premature first" problem, we augment our existing entropy accounting with more frequent reseedings at boot. The idea is that at boot, we're getting entropy from various places, and we're not very sure which of early boot entropy is good and which isn't. Even when we're crediting the entropy, we're still not totally certain that it's any good. Since boot is the one time (aside from a compromise) that we have zero entropy, it's important that we shepherd entropy into the crng fairly often. At the same time, we don't want a "premature next" problem, whereby an attacker can brute force individual bits of added entropy. In lieu of going full-on Fortuna (for now), we can pick a simpler strategy of just reseeding more often during the first 5 minutes after boot. This is still bounded by the 256-bit entropy credit requirement, so we'll skip a reseeding if we haven't reached that, but in case entropy /is/ coming in, this ensures that it makes its way into the crng rather rapidly during these early stages. Ordinarily we reseed if the previous reseeding is 300 seconds old. This commit changes things so that for the first 600 seconds of boot time, we reseed if the previous reseeding is uptime / 2 seconds old. That means that we'll reseed at the very least double the uptime of the previous reseeding. Cc: Theodore Ts'o Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 6bcd109f11cc..2246d0f0b8ac 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -335,6 +335,28 @@ static void crng_fast_key_erasure(u8 key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE], memzero_explicit(first_block, sizeof(first_block)); } +/* + * Return whether the crng seed is considered to be sufficiently + * old that a reseeding might be attempted. This happens if the last + * reseeding was CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL ago, or during early boot, at + * an interval proportional to the uptime. + */ +static bool crng_has_old_seed(void) +{ + static bool early_boot = true; + unsigned long interval = CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL; + + if (unlikely(READ_ONCE(early_boot))) { + time64_t uptime = ktime_get_seconds(); + if (uptime >= CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL / HZ * 2) + WRITE_ONCE(early_boot, false); + else + interval = max_t(unsigned int, 5 * HZ, + (unsigned int)uptime / 2 * HZ); + } + return time_after(jiffies, READ_ONCE(base_crng.birth) + interval); +} + /* * This function returns a ChaCha state that you may use for generating * random data. It also returns up to 32 bytes on its own of random data @@ -368,10 +390,10 @@ static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)], } /* - * If the base_crng is more than 5 minutes old, we reseed, which - * in turn bumps the generation counter that we check below. + * If the base_crng is old enough, we try to reseed, which in turn + * bumps the generation counter that we check below. */ - if (unlikely(time_after(jiffies, READ_ONCE(base_crng.birth) + CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL))) + if (unlikely(crng_has_old_seed())) crng_reseed(); local_irq_save(flags); From 8320bc665c29d1e58acf6730f34e95110d442d1e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Tue, 8 Mar 2022 10:12:16 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0548/1091] random: check for signal and try earlier when generating entropy commit 3e504d2026eb6c8762cd6040ae57db166516824a upstream. Rather than waiting a full second in an interruptable waiter before trying to generate entropy, try to generate entropy first and wait second. While waiting one second might give an extra second for getting entropy from elsewhere, we're already pretty late in the init process here, and whatever else is generating entropy will still continue to contribute. This has implications on signal handling: we call try_to_generate_entropy() from wait_for_random_bytes(), and wait_for_random_bytes() always uses wait_event_interruptible_timeout() when waiting, since it's called by userspace code in restartable contexts, where signals can pend. Since try_to_generate_entropy() now runs first, if a signal is pending, it's necessary for try_to_generate_entropy() to check for signals, since it won't hit the wait until after try_to_generate_entropy() has returned. And even before this change, when entering a busy loop in try_to_generate_entropy(), we should have been checking to see if any signals are pending, so that a process doesn't get stuck in that loop longer than expected. Cc: Theodore Ts'o Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 2246d0f0b8ac..583979ba0fbc 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -127,10 +127,11 @@ int wait_for_random_bytes(void) { while (!crng_ready()) { int ret; + + try_to_generate_entropy(); ret = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(crng_init_wait, crng_ready(), HZ); if (ret) return ret > 0 ? 0 : ret; - try_to_generate_entropy(); } return 0; } @@ -1366,7 +1367,7 @@ static void try_to_generate_entropy(void) return; timer_setup_on_stack(&stack.timer, entropy_timer, 0); - while (!crng_ready()) { + while (!crng_ready() && !signal_pending(current)) { if (!timer_pending(&stack.timer)) mod_timer(&stack.timer, jiffies + 1); mix_pool_bytes(&stack.cycles, sizeof(stack.cycles)); From a08d52a6081bce0f4db67bea7a12d87610cd8cd8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Mon, 21 Mar 2022 18:48:05 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 0549/1091] random: skip fast_init if hwrng provides large chunk of entropy commit af704c856e888fb044b058d731d61b46eeec499d upstream. At boot time, EFI calls add_bootloader_randomness(), which in turn calls add_hwgenerator_randomness(). Currently add_hwgenerator_randomness() feeds the first 64 bytes of randomness to the "fast init" non-crypto-grade phase. But if add_hwgenerator_randomness() gets called with more than POOL_MIN_BITS of entropy, there's no point in passing it off to the "fast init" stage, since that's enough entropy to bootstrap the real RNG. The "fast init" stage is just there to provide _something_ in the case where we don't have enough entropy to properly bootstrap the RNG. But if we do have enough entropy to bootstrap the RNG, the current logic doesn't serve a purpose. So, in the case where we're passed greater than or equal to POOL_MIN_BITS of entropy, this commit makes us skip the "fast init" phase. Cc: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 583979ba0fbc..146b17cd9aaf 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -1120,7 +1120,7 @@ void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk) void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count, size_t entropy) { - if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) { + if (unlikely(crng_init == 0 && entropy < POOL_MIN_BITS)) { size_t ret = crng_pre_init_inject(buffer, count, true); mix_pool_bytes(buffer, ret); count -= ret; From 81ea8a609b48fe8c98fbe6b32c2d4b70e899e617 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Tue, 22 Mar 2022 21:43:12 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 0550/1091] random: treat bootloader trust toggle the same way as cpu trust toggle commit d97c68d178fbf8aaaf21b69b446f2dfb13909316 upstream. If CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU is set, the RNG initializes using RDRAND. But, the user can disable (or enable) this behavior by setting `random.trust_cpu=0/1` on the kernel command line. This allows system builders to do reasonable things while avoiding howls from tinfoil hatters. (Or vice versa.) CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is basically the same thing, but regards the seed passed via EFI or device tree, which might come from RDRAND or a TPM or somewhere else. In order to allow distros to more easily enable this while avoiding those same howls (or vice versa), this commit adds the corresponding `random.trust_bootloader=0/1` toggle. Cc: Theodore Ts'o Cc: Graham Christensen Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Link: https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/pull/165355 Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 6 ++++++ drivers/char/Kconfig | 3 ++- drivers/char/random.c | 8 +++++++- 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index cad17c7a311e..db9d53b879f8 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -3842,6 +3842,12 @@ fully seed the kernel's CRNG. Default is controlled by CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU. + random.trust_bootloader={on,off} + [KNL] Enable or disable trusting the use of a + seed passed by the bootloader (if available) to + fully seed the kernel's CRNG. Default is controlled + by CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER. + ras=option[,option,...] [KNL] RAS-specific options cec_disable [X86] diff --git a/drivers/char/Kconfig b/drivers/char/Kconfig index df0fc997dc3e..0a811d5f5e00 100644 --- a/drivers/char/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/char/Kconfig @@ -559,4 +559,5 @@ config RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER device randomness. Say Y here to assume the entropy provided by the booloader is trustworthy so it will be added to the kernel's entropy pool. Otherwise, say N here so it will be regarded as device input that - only mixes the entropy pool. \ No newline at end of file + only mixes the entropy pool. This can also be configured at boot with + "random.trust_bootloader=on/off". diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 146b17cd9aaf..1f46f531e851 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -940,11 +940,17 @@ static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes) **********************************************************************/ static bool trust_cpu __ro_after_init = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU); +static bool trust_bootloader __ro_after_init = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER); static int __init parse_trust_cpu(char *arg) { return kstrtobool(arg, &trust_cpu); } +static int __init parse_trust_bootloader(char *arg) +{ + return kstrtobool(arg, &trust_bootloader); +} early_param("random.trust_cpu", parse_trust_cpu); +early_param("random.trust_bootloader", parse_trust_bootloader); /* * The first collection of entropy occurs at system boot while interrupts @@ -1152,7 +1158,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_hwgenerator_randomness); */ void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size) { - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER)) + if (trust_bootloader) add_hwgenerator_randomness(buf, size, size * 8); else add_device_randomness(buf, size); From 0aba75c6173d6cdad2df6e5f69cf68a7e5d2ae3e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Tue, 22 Mar 2022 22:21:52 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 0551/1091] random: re-add removed comment about get_random_{u32,u64} reseeding commit dd7aa36e535797926d8eb311da7151919130139d upstream. The comment about get_random_{u32,u64}() not invoking reseeding got added in an unrelated commit, that then was recently reverted by 0313bc278dac ("Revert "random: block in /dev/urandom""). So this adds that little comment snippet back, and improves the wording a bit too. Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 1f46f531e851..f95c02c71724 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -226,9 +226,10 @@ static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(const char *func_name, void *caller, void * * These interfaces will return the requested number of random bytes * into the given buffer or as a return value. This is equivalent to - * a read from /dev/urandom. The integer family of functions may be - * higher performance for one-off random integers, because they do a - * bit of buffering. + * a read from /dev/urandom. The u32, u64, int, and long family of + * functions may be higher performance for one-off random integers, + * because they do a bit of buffering and do not invoke reseeding + * until the buffer is emptied. * *********************************************************************/ From 1d53d5a0973ea47c14e111f17729f5a67eab6945 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Thu, 31 Mar 2022 11:01:01 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 0552/1091] random: mix build-time latent entropy into pool at init commit 1754abb3e7583c570666fa1e1ee5b317e88c89a0 upstream. Prior, the "input_pool_data" array needed no real initialization, and so it was easy to mark it with __latent_entropy to populate it during compile-time. In switching to using a hash function, this required us to specifically initialize it to some specific state, which means we dropped the __latent_entropy attribute. An unfortunate side effect was this meant the pool was no longer seeded using compile-time random data. In order to bring this back, we declare an array in rand_initialize() with __latent_entropy and call mix_pool_bytes() on that at init, which accomplishes the same thing as before. We make this __initconst, so that it doesn't take up space at runtime after init. Fixes: 6e8ec2552c7d ("random: use computational hash for entropy extraction") Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index f95c02c71724..f04f888ab563 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -967,6 +967,11 @@ int __init rand_initialize(void) bool arch_init = true; unsigned long rv; +#if defined(LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN) + static const u8 compiletime_seed[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE] __initconst __latent_entropy; + _mix_pool_bytes(compiletime_seed, sizeof(compiletime_seed)); +#endif + for (i = 0; i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; i += sizeof(rv)) { if (!arch_get_random_seed_long_early(&rv) && !arch_get_random_long_early(&rv)) { From 95aed891f7bef7cacd72fad1dbe5459470237a3a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jan Varho Date: Mon, 4 Apr 2022 19:42:30 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 0553/1091] random: do not split fast init input in add_hwgenerator_randomness() commit 527a9867af29ff89f278d037db704e0ed50fb666 upstream. add_hwgenerator_randomness() tries to only use the required amount of input for fast init, but credits all the entropy, rather than a fraction of it. Since it's hard to determine how much entropy is left over out of a non-unformly random sample, either give it all to fast init or credit it, but don't attempt to do both. In the process, we can clean up the injection code to no longer need to return a value. Signed-off-by: Jan Varho [Jason: expanded commit message] Fixes: 73c7733f122e ("random: do not throw away excess input to crng_fast_load") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.17+, requires af704c856e88 Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 23 ++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index f04f888ab563..85b386666e0b 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -437,11 +437,8 @@ static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)], * This shouldn't be set by functions like add_device_randomness(), * where we can't trust the buffer passed to it is guaranteed to be * unpredictable (so it might not have any entropy at all). - * - * Returns the number of bytes processed from input, which is bounded - * by CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH if account is true. */ -static size_t crng_pre_init_inject(const void *input, size_t len, bool account) +static void crng_pre_init_inject(const void *input, size_t len, bool account) { static int crng_init_cnt = 0; struct blake2s_state hash; @@ -452,18 +449,15 @@ static size_t crng_pre_init_inject(const void *input, size_t len, bool account) spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags); if (crng_init != 0) { spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags); - return 0; + return; } - if (account) - len = min_t(size_t, len, CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH - crng_init_cnt); - blake2s_update(&hash, base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key)); blake2s_update(&hash, input, len); blake2s_final(&hash, base_crng.key); if (account) { - crng_init_cnt += len; + crng_init_cnt += min_t(size_t, len, CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH - crng_init_cnt); if (crng_init_cnt >= CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) { ++base_crng.generation; crng_init = 1; @@ -474,8 +468,6 @@ static size_t crng_pre_init_inject(const void *input, size_t len, bool account) if (crng_init == 1) pr_notice("fast init done\n"); - - return len; } static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes) @@ -1133,12 +1125,9 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count, size_t entropy) { if (unlikely(crng_init == 0 && entropy < POOL_MIN_BITS)) { - size_t ret = crng_pre_init_inject(buffer, count, true); - mix_pool_bytes(buffer, ret); - count -= ret; - buffer += ret; - if (!count || crng_init == 0) - return; + crng_pre_init_inject(buffer, count, true); + mix_pool_bytes(buffer, count); + return; } /* From 0e8030c9e03d87ba37f1e78f8b4b6e6f1794fbcb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Tue, 5 Apr 2022 16:40:51 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0554/1091] random: do not allow user to keep crng key around on stack commit aba120cc101788544aa3e2c30c8da88513892350 upstream. The fast key erasure RNG design relies on the key that's used to be used and then discarded. We do this, making judicious use of memzero_explicit(). However, reads to /dev/urandom and calls to getrandom() involve a copy_to_user(), and userspace can use FUSE or userfaultfd, or make a massive call, dynamically remap memory addresses as it goes, and set the process priority to idle, in order to keep a kernel stack alive indefinitely. By probing /proc/sys/kernel/random/entropy_avail to learn when the crng key is refreshed, a malicious userspace could mount this attack every 5 minutes thereafter, breaking the crng's forward secrecy. In order to fix this, we just overwrite the stack's key with the first 32 bytes of the "free" fast key erasure output. If we're returning <= 32 bytes to the user, then we can still return those bytes directly, so that short reads don't become slower. And for long reads, the difference is hopefully lost in the amortization, so it doesn't change much, with that amortization helping variously for medium reads. We don't need to do this for get_random_bytes() and the various kernel-space callers, and later, if we ever switch to always batching, this won't be necessary either, so there's no need to change the API of these functions. Cc: Theodore Ts'o Reviewed-by: Jann Horn Fixes: c92e040d575a ("random: add backtracking protection to the CRNG") Fixes: 186873c549df ("random: use simpler fast key erasure flow on per-cpu keys") Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 85b386666e0b..42b5b3f5e9bf 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -532,19 +532,29 @@ static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes) if (!nbytes) return 0; - len = min_t(size_t, 32, nbytes); - crng_make_state(chacha_state, output, len); + /* + * Immediately overwrite the ChaCha key at index 4 with random + * bytes, in case userspace causes copy_to_user() below to sleep + * forever, so that we still retain forward secrecy in that case. + */ + crng_make_state(chacha_state, (u8 *)&chacha_state[4], CHACHA_KEY_SIZE); + /* + * However, if we're doing a read of len <= 32, we don't need to + * use chacha_state after, so we can simply return those bytes to + * the user directly. + */ + if (nbytes <= CHACHA_KEY_SIZE) { + ret = copy_to_user(buf, &chacha_state[4], nbytes) ? -EFAULT : nbytes; + goto out_zero_chacha; + } - if (copy_to_user(buf, output, len)) - return -EFAULT; - nbytes -= len; - buf += len; - ret += len; - - while (nbytes) { + do { if (large_request && need_resched()) { - if (signal_pending(current)) + if (signal_pending(current)) { + if (!ret) + ret = -ERESTARTSYS; break; + } schedule(); } @@ -561,10 +571,11 @@ static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes) nbytes -= len; buf += len; ret += len; - } + } while (nbytes); - memzero_explicit(chacha_state, sizeof(chacha_state)); memzero_explicit(output, sizeof(output)); +out_zero_chacha: + memzero_explicit(chacha_state, sizeof(chacha_state)); return ret; } From 2ce859d91fe99f60f201709fdf281050a365bdd5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jann Horn Date: Tue, 5 Apr 2022 18:39:31 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0555/1091] random: check for signal_pending() outside of need_resched() check commit 1448769c9cdb69ad65287f4f7ab58bc5f2f5d7ba upstream. signal_pending() checks TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL and TIF_SIGPENDING, which signal that the task should bail out of the syscall when possible. This is a separate concept from need_resched(), which checks TIF_NEED_RESCHED, signaling that the task should preempt. In particular, with the current code, the signal_pending() bailout probably won't work reliably. Change this to look like other functions that read lots of data, such as read_zero(). Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Jann Horn Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 42b5b3f5e9bf..a9681a442d89 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -549,13 +549,13 @@ static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes) } do { - if (large_request && need_resched()) { + if (large_request) { if (signal_pending(current)) { if (!ret) ret = -ERESTARTSYS; break; } - schedule(); + cond_resched(); } chacha20_block(chacha_state, output); From 70788723da704e6565eb82db7a2444867c4f37ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Wed, 6 Apr 2022 02:36:16 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0556/1091] random: check for signals every PAGE_SIZE chunk of /dev/[u]random commit e3c1c4fd9e6d14059ed93ebfe15e1c57793b1a05 upstream. In 1448769c9cdb ("random: check for signal_pending() outside of need_resched() check"), Jann pointed out that we previously were only checking the TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL and TIF_SIGPENDING flags if the process had TIF_NEED_RESCHED set, which meant in practice, super long reads to /dev/[u]random would delay signal handling by a long time. I tried this using the below program, and indeed I wasn't able to interrupt a /dev/urandom read until after several megabytes had been read. The bug he fixed has always been there, and so code that reads from /dev/urandom without checking the return value of read() has mostly worked for a long time, for most sizes, not just for <= 256. Maybe it makes sense to keep that code working. The reason it was so small prior, ignoring the fact that it didn't work anyway, was likely because /dev/random used to block, and that could happen for pretty large lengths of time while entropy was gathered. But now, it's just a chacha20 call, which is extremely fast and is just operating on pure data, without having to wait for some external event. In that sense, /dev/[u]random is a lot more like /dev/zero. Taking a page out of /dev/zero's read_zero() function, it always returns at least one chunk, and then checks for signals after each chunk. Chunk sizes there are of length PAGE_SIZE. Let's just copy the same thing for /dev/[u]random, and check for signals and cond_resched() for every PAGE_SIZE amount of data. This makes the behavior more consistent with expectations, and should mitigate the impact of Jann's fix for the age-old signal check bug. ---- test program ---- #include #include #include #include static unsigned char x[~0U]; static void handle(int) { } int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { pid_t pid = getpid(), child; signal(SIGUSR1, handle); if (!(child = fork())) { for (;;) kill(pid, SIGUSR1); } pause(); printf("interrupted after reading %zd bytes\n", getrandom(x, sizeof(x), 0)); kill(child, SIGTERM); return 0; } Cc: Jann Horn Cc: Theodore Ts'o Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 17 +++++++---------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index a9681a442d89..ca75dab018ea 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -523,7 +523,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes); static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes) { - bool large_request = nbytes > 256; ssize_t ret = 0; size_t len; u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)]; @@ -549,15 +548,6 @@ static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes) } do { - if (large_request) { - if (signal_pending(current)) { - if (!ret) - ret = -ERESTARTSYS; - break; - } - cond_resched(); - } - chacha20_block(chacha_state, output); if (unlikely(chacha_state[12] == 0)) ++chacha_state[13]; @@ -571,6 +561,13 @@ static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes) nbytes -= len; buf += len; ret += len; + + BUILD_BUG_ON(PAGE_SIZE % CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE != 0); + if (!(ret % PAGE_SIZE) && nbytes) { + if (signal_pending(current)) + break; + cond_resched(); + } } while (nbytes); memzero_explicit(output, sizeof(output)); From fe156368f9877e1e73ba1e532ab9d39a2793bffb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Thu, 7 Apr 2022 21:23:08 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0557/1091] random: allow partial reads if later user copies fail commit 5209aed5137880fa229746cb521f715e55596460 upstream. Rather than failing entirely if a copy_to_user() fails at some point, instead we should return a partial read for the amount that succeeded prior, unless none succeeded at all, in which case we return -EFAULT as before. This makes it consistent with other reader interfaces. For example, the following snippet for /dev/zero outputs "4" followed by "1": int fd; void *x = mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_WRITE, MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0); assert(x != MAP_FAILED); fd = open("/dev/zero", O_RDONLY); assert(fd >= 0); printf("%zd\n", read(fd, x, 4)); printf("%zd\n", read(fd, x + 4095, 4)); close(fd); This brings that same standard behavior to the various RNG reader interfaces. While we're at it, we can streamline the loop logic a little bit. Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds Cc: Jann Horn Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 22 ++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index ca75dab018ea..e811fb158319 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -523,8 +523,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes); static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes) { - ssize_t ret = 0; - size_t len; + size_t len, left, ret = 0; u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)]; u8 output[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]; @@ -543,37 +542,40 @@ static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes) * the user directly. */ if (nbytes <= CHACHA_KEY_SIZE) { - ret = copy_to_user(buf, &chacha_state[4], nbytes) ? -EFAULT : nbytes; + ret = nbytes - copy_to_user(buf, &chacha_state[4], nbytes); goto out_zero_chacha; } - do { + for (;;) { chacha20_block(chacha_state, output); if (unlikely(chacha_state[12] == 0)) ++chacha_state[13]; len = min_t(size_t, nbytes, CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE); - if (copy_to_user(buf, output, len)) { - ret = -EFAULT; + left = copy_to_user(buf, output, len); + if (left) { + ret += len - left; break; } - nbytes -= len; buf += len; ret += len; + nbytes -= len; + if (!nbytes) + break; BUILD_BUG_ON(PAGE_SIZE % CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE != 0); - if (!(ret % PAGE_SIZE) && nbytes) { + if (ret % PAGE_SIZE == 0) { if (signal_pending(current)) break; cond_resched(); } - } while (nbytes); + } memzero_explicit(output, sizeof(output)); out_zero_chacha: memzero_explicit(chacha_state, sizeof(chacha_state)); - return ret; + return ret ? ret : -EFAULT; } /* From ec07b3494517c1cd3f8f64b20369687d172b69f1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Fri, 8 Apr 2022 18:14:57 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0558/1091] random: make random_get_entropy() return an unsigned long commit b0c3e796f24b588b862b61ce235d3c9417dc8983 upstream. Some implementations were returning type `unsigned long`, while others that fell back to get_cycles() were implicitly returning a `cycles_t` or an untyped constant int literal. That makes for weird and confusing code, and basically all code in the kernel already handled it like it was an `unsigned long`. I recently tried to handle it as the largest type it could be, a `cycles_t`, but doing so doesn't really help with much. Instead let's just make random_get_entropy() return an unsigned long all the time. This also matches the commonly used `arch_get_random_long()` function, so now RDRAND and RDTSC return the same sized integer, which means one can fallback to the other more gracefully. Cc: Dominik Brodowski Cc: Theodore Ts'o Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 20 +++++++------------- include/linux/timex.h | 2 +- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index e811fb158319..30f1188be556 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -1010,7 +1010,7 @@ int __init rand_initialize(void) */ void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size) { - cycles_t cycles = random_get_entropy(); + unsigned long cycles = random_get_entropy(); unsigned long flags, now = jiffies; if (crng_init == 0 && size) @@ -1041,8 +1041,7 @@ struct timer_rand_state { */ static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned int num) { - cycles_t cycles = random_get_entropy(); - unsigned long flags, now = jiffies; + unsigned long cycles = random_get_entropy(), now = jiffies, flags; long delta, delta2, delta3; spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags); @@ -1297,8 +1296,7 @@ static void mix_interrupt_randomness(struct work_struct *work) void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) { enum { MIX_INFLIGHT = 1U << 31 }; - cycles_t cycles = random_get_entropy(); - unsigned long now = jiffies; + unsigned long cycles = random_get_entropy(), now = jiffies; struct fast_pool *fast_pool = this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness); struct pt_regs *regs = get_irq_regs(); unsigned int new_count; @@ -1311,16 +1309,12 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) if (cycles == 0) cycles = get_reg(fast_pool, regs); - if (sizeof(cycles) == 8) + if (sizeof(unsigned long) == 8) { irq_data.u64[0] = cycles ^ rol64(now, 32) ^ irq; - else { + irq_data.u64[1] = regs ? instruction_pointer(regs) : _RET_IP_; + } else { irq_data.u32[0] = cycles ^ irq; irq_data.u32[1] = now; - } - - if (sizeof(unsigned long) == 8) - irq_data.u64[1] = regs ? instruction_pointer(regs) : _RET_IP_; - else { irq_data.u32[2] = regs ? instruction_pointer(regs) : _RET_IP_; irq_data.u32[3] = get_reg(fast_pool, regs); } @@ -1367,7 +1361,7 @@ static void entropy_timer(struct timer_list *t) static void try_to_generate_entropy(void) { struct { - cycles_t cycles; + unsigned long cycles; struct timer_list timer; } stack; diff --git a/include/linux/timex.h b/include/linux/timex.h index ce0859763670..e5154378076d 100644 --- a/include/linux/timex.h +++ b/include/linux/timex.h @@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ * By default we use get_cycles() for this purpose, but individual * architectures may override this in their asm/timex.h header file. */ -#define random_get_entropy() get_cycles() +#define random_get_entropy() ((unsigned long)get_cycles()) #endif /* From 465425748359762cc29e90ec44250570c419d024 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Mon, 18 Apr 2022 20:57:31 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0559/1091] random: document crng_fast_key_erasure() destination possibility commit 8717627d6ac53251ee012c3c7aca392f29f38a42 upstream. This reverts 35a33ff3807d ("random: use memmove instead of memcpy for remaining 32 bytes"), which was made on a totally bogus basis. The thing it was worried about overlapping came from the stack, not from one of its arguments, as Eric pointed out. But the fact that this confusion even happened draws attention to the fact that it's a bit non-obvious that the random_data parameter can alias chacha_state, and in fact should do so when the caller can't rely on the stack being cleared in a timely manner. So this commit documents that. Reported-by: Eric Biggers Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 30f1188be556..fc30b43c3b3b 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -318,6 +318,13 @@ static void crng_reseed(void) * the resultant ChaCha state to the user, along with the second * half of the block containing 32 bytes of random data that may * be used; random_data_len may not be greater than 32. + * + * The returned ChaCha state contains within it a copy of the old + * key value, at index 4, so the state should always be zeroed out + * immediately after using in order to maintain forward secrecy. + * If the state cannot be erased in a timely manner, then it is + * safer to set the random_data parameter to &chacha_state[4] so + * that this function overwrites it before returning. */ static void crng_fast_key_erasure(u8 key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE], u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)], From b88ae87b100c8a4de13a9783ef47dd4d314064bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Tue, 3 May 2022 21:43:58 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0560/1091] random: fix sysctl documentation nits commit 069c4ea6871c18bd368f27756e0f91ffb524a788 upstream. A semicolon was missing, and the almost-alphabetical-but-not ordering was confusing, so regroup these by category instead. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst index 05fa8c9d63a7..9715685be6e3 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst @@ -876,6 +876,9 @@ This is a directory, with the following entries: * ``boot_id``: a UUID generated the first time this is retrieved, and unvarying after that; +* ``uuid``: a UUID generated every time this is retrieved (this can + thus be used to generate UUIDs at will); + * ``entropy_avail``: the pool's entropy count, in bits; * ``poolsize``: the entropy pool size, in bits; @@ -883,10 +886,7 @@ This is a directory, with the following entries: * ``urandom_min_reseed_secs``: obsolete (used to determine the minimum number of seconds between urandom pool reseeding). This file is writable for compatibility purposes, but writing to it has no effect - on any RNG behavior. - -* ``uuid``: a UUID generated every time this is retrieved (this can - thus be used to generate UUIDs at will); + on any RNG behavior; * ``write_wakeup_threshold``: when the entropy count drops below this (as a number of bits), processes waiting to write to ``/dev/random`` From 5fac86663976502668fb00889ddbb6ec6d6341d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Thu, 5 May 2022 02:20:22 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0561/1091] init: call time_init() before rand_initialize() commit fe222a6ca2d53c38433cba5d3be62a39099e708e upstream. Currently time_init() is called after rand_initialize(), but rand_initialize() makes use of the timer on various platforms, and sometimes this timer needs to be initialized by time_init() first. In order for random_get_entropy() to not return zero during early boot when it's potentially used as an entropy source, reverse the order of these two calls. The block doing random initialization was right before time_init() before, so changing the order shouldn't have any complicated effects. Cc: Andrew Morton Reviewed-by: Stafford Horne Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- init/main.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c index d292daabd9a2..51b1a88438ff 100644 --- a/init/main.c +++ b/init/main.c @@ -680,11 +680,13 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init start_kernel(void) hrtimers_init(); softirq_init(); timekeeping_init(); + time_init(); /* * For best initial stack canary entropy, prepare it after: * - setup_arch() for any UEFI RNG entropy and boot cmdline access * - timekeeping_init() for ktime entropy used in rand_initialize() + * - time_init() for making random_get_entropy() work on some platforms * - rand_initialize() to get any arch-specific entropy like RDRAND * - add_latent_entropy() to get any latent entropy * - adding command line entropy @@ -694,7 +696,6 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init start_kernel(void) add_device_randomness(command_line, strlen(command_line)); boot_init_stack_canary(); - time_init(); perf_event_init(); profile_init(); call_function_init(); From 73385644490a8c9a8b316bf1c7038c80d61fb697 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Sat, 23 Apr 2022 21:11:41 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0562/1091] ia64: define get_cycles macro for arch-override commit 57c0900b91d8891ab43f0e6b464d059fda51d102 upstream. Itanium defines a get_cycles() function, but it does not do the usual `#define get_cycles get_cycles` dance, making it impossible for generic code to see if an arch-specific function was defined. While the get_cycles() ifdef is not currently used, the following timekeeping patch in this series will depend on the macro existing (or not existing) when defining random_get_entropy(). Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Arnd Bergmann Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/ia64/include/asm/timex.h | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/ia64/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/ia64/include/asm/timex.h index 869a3ac6bf23..7ccc077a60be 100644 --- a/arch/ia64/include/asm/timex.h +++ b/arch/ia64/include/asm/timex.h @@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ get_cycles (void) ret = ia64_getreg(_IA64_REG_AR_ITC); return ret; } +#define get_cycles get_cycles extern void ia64_cpu_local_tick (void); extern unsigned long long ia64_native_sched_clock (void); From 80459abc9feeefc2640c1f071b318114ab1fd99b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Sat, 23 Apr 2022 21:11:41 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0563/1091] s390: define get_cycles macro for arch-override commit 2e3df523256cb9836de8441e9c791a796759bb3c upstream. S390x defines a get_cycles() function, but it does not do the usual `#define get_cycles get_cycles` dance, making it impossible for generic code to see if an arch-specific function was defined. While the get_cycles() ifdef is not currently used, the following timekeeping patch in this series will depend on the macro existing (or not existing) when defining random_get_entropy(). Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Arnd Bergmann Cc: Vasily Gorbik Cc: Alexander Gordeev Cc: Christian Borntraeger Cc: Sven Schnelle Acked-by: Heiko Carstens Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/s390/include/asm/timex.h | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/timex.h index b6a4ce9dafaf..99a7e028232d 100644 --- a/arch/s390/include/asm/timex.h +++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/timex.h @@ -177,6 +177,7 @@ static inline cycles_t get_cycles(void) { return (cycles_t) get_tod_clock() >> 2; } +#define get_cycles get_cycles int get_phys_clock(unsigned long *clock); void init_cpu_timer(void); From 5f0b77ca1978ce98d630a3e2b7274a3fec6c53c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Sat, 23 Apr 2022 21:11:41 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0564/1091] parisc: define get_cycles macro for arch-override commit 8865bbe6ba1120e67f72201b7003a16202cd42be upstream. PA-RISC defines a get_cycles() function, but it does not do the usual `#define get_cycles get_cycles` dance, making it impossible for generic code to see if an arch-specific function was defined. While the get_cycles() ifdef is not currently used, the following timekeeping patch in this series will depend on the macro existing (or not existing) when defining random_get_entropy(). Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Arnd Bergmann Acked-by: Helge Deller Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/parisc/include/asm/timex.h | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/parisc/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/parisc/include/asm/timex.h index 45537cd4d1d3..1cd2bd3eef33 100644 --- a/arch/parisc/include/asm/timex.h +++ b/arch/parisc/include/asm/timex.h @@ -12,9 +12,10 @@ typedef unsigned long cycles_t; -static inline cycles_t get_cycles (void) +static inline cycles_t get_cycles(void) { return mfctl(16); } +#define get_cycles get_cycles #endif From 10455a367c33cf015363d610926d579d73e15a48 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Sat, 23 Apr 2022 21:11:41 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0565/1091] alpha: define get_cycles macro for arch-override commit 1097710bc9660e1e588cf2186a35db3d95c4d258 upstream. Alpha defines a get_cycles() function, but it does not do the usual `#define get_cycles get_cycles` dance, making it impossible for generic code to see if an arch-specific function was defined. While the get_cycles() ifdef is not currently used, the following timekeeping patch in this series will depend on the macro existing (or not existing) when defining random_get_entropy(). Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Arnd Bergmann Cc: Richard Henderson Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky Acked-by: Matt Turner Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/alpha/include/asm/timex.h | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/alpha/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/alpha/include/asm/timex.h index b565cc6f408e..f89798da8a14 100644 --- a/arch/alpha/include/asm/timex.h +++ b/arch/alpha/include/asm/timex.h @@ -28,5 +28,6 @@ static inline cycles_t get_cycles (void) __asm__ __volatile__ ("rpcc %0" : "=r"(ret)); return ret; } +#define get_cycles get_cycles #endif From eb2f9d72f32ac9357537b1c099e355dd9915206a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Sat, 23 Apr 2022 21:11:41 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0566/1091] powerpc: define get_cycles macro for arch-override commit 408835832158df0357e18e96da7f2d1ed6b80e7f upstream. PowerPC defines a get_cycles() function, but it does not do the usual `#define get_cycles get_cycles` dance, making it impossible for generic code to see if an arch-specific function was defined. While the get_cycles() ifdef is not currently used, the following timekeeping patch in this series will depend on the macro existing (or not existing) when defining random_get_entropy(). Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Arnd Bergmann Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt Cc: Paul Mackerras Acked-by: Michael Ellerman Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/powerpc/include/asm/timex.h | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/timex.h index 6047402b0a4d..5405cb2fe65a 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/timex.h +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/timex.h @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ static inline cycles_t get_cycles(void) return mftb(); } +#define get_cycles get_cycles #endif /* __KERNEL__ */ #endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_TIMEX_H */ From a7d04ca9da61e5760587c686a6af6390470bbf49 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Sun, 10 Apr 2022 16:49:50 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0567/1091] timekeeping: Add raw clock fallback for random_get_entropy() commit 1366992e16bddd5e2d9a561687f367f9f802e2e4 upstream. The addition of random_get_entropy_fallback() provides access to whichever time source has the highest frequency, which is useful for gathering entropy on platforms without available cycle counters. It's not necessarily as good as being able to quickly access a cycle counter that the CPU has, but it's still something, even when it falls back to being jiffies-based. In the event that a given arch does not define get_cycles(), falling back to the get_cycles() default implementation that returns 0 is really not the best we can do. Instead, at least calling random_get_entropy_fallback() would be preferable, because that always needs to return _something_, even falling back to jiffies eventually. It's not as though random_get_entropy_fallback() is super high precision or guaranteed to be entropic, but basically anything that's not zero all the time is better than returning zero all the time. Finally, since random_get_entropy_fallback() is used during extremely early boot when randomizing freelists in mm_init(), it can be called before timekeeping has been initialized. In that case there really is nothing we can do; jiffies hasn't even started ticking yet. So just give up and return 0. Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Arnd Bergmann Cc: Theodore Ts'o Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/linux/timex.h | 8 ++++++++ kernel/time/timekeeping.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/linux/timex.h b/include/linux/timex.h index e5154378076d..2efab9a806a9 100644 --- a/include/linux/timex.h +++ b/include/linux/timex.h @@ -62,6 +62,8 @@ #include #include +unsigned long random_get_entropy_fallback(void); + #include #ifndef random_get_entropy @@ -74,8 +76,14 @@ * * By default we use get_cycles() for this purpose, but individual * architectures may override this in their asm/timex.h header file. + * If a given arch does not have get_cycles(), then we fallback to + * using random_get_entropy_fallback(). */ +#ifdef get_cycles #define random_get_entropy() ((unsigned long)get_cycles()) +#else +#define random_get_entropy() random_get_entropy_fallback() +#endif #endif /* diff --git a/kernel/time/timekeeping.c b/kernel/time/timekeeping.c index 36ed8bad3909..e23c9e765a5f 100644 --- a/kernel/time/timekeeping.c +++ b/kernel/time/timekeeping.c @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -2304,6 +2305,20 @@ static int timekeeping_validate_timex(const struct __kernel_timex *txc) return 0; } +/** + * random_get_entropy_fallback - Returns the raw clock source value, + * used by random.c for platforms with no valid random_get_entropy(). + */ +unsigned long random_get_entropy_fallback(void) +{ + struct tk_read_base *tkr = &tk_core.timekeeper.tkr_mono; + struct clocksource *clock = READ_ONCE(tkr->clock); + + if (unlikely(timekeeping_suspended || !clock)) + return 0; + return clock->read(clock); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(random_get_entropy_fallback); /** * do_adjtimex() - Accessor function to NTP __do_adjtimex function From 36f38f838c5b8631be3c75915888d79e71888c78 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Fri, 8 Apr 2022 18:03:13 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0568/1091] m68k: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero commit 0f392c95391f2d708b12971a07edaa7973f9eece upstream. In the event that random_get_entropy() can't access a cycle counter or similar, falling back to returning 0 is really not the best we can do. Instead, at least calling random_get_entropy_fallback() would be preferable, because that always needs to return _something_, even falling back to jiffies eventually. It's not as though random_get_entropy_fallback() is super high precision or guaranteed to be entropic, but basically anything that's not zero all the time is better than returning zero all the time. Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Arnd Bergmann Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/m68k/include/asm/timex.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/m68k/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/m68k/include/asm/timex.h index 6a21d9358280..f4a7a340f4ca 100644 --- a/arch/m68k/include/asm/timex.h +++ b/arch/m68k/include/asm/timex.h @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ static inline unsigned long random_get_entropy(void) { if (mach_random_get_entropy) return mach_random_get_entropy(); - return 0; + return random_get_entropy_fallback(); } #define random_get_entropy random_get_entropy From 6fa912f987faa03add4031822df13e4999a8cbac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Fri, 8 Apr 2022 18:03:13 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0569/1091] mips: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of just c0 random commit 1c99c6a7c3c599a68321b01b9ec243215ede5a68 upstream. For situations in which we don't have a c0 counter register available, we've been falling back to reading the c0 "random" register, which is usually bounded by the amount of TLB entries and changes every other cycle or so. This means it wraps extremely often. We can do better by combining this fast-changing counter with a potentially slower-changing counter from random_get_entropy_fallback() in the more significant bits. This commit combines the two, taking into account that the changing bits are in a different bit position depending on the CPU model. In addition, we previously were falling back to 0 for ancient CPUs that Linux does not support anyway; remove that dead path entirely. Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Arnd Bergmann Tested-by: Maciej W. Rozycki Acked-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/mips/include/asm/timex.h | 17 ++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/mips/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/mips/include/asm/timex.h index 8026baf46e72..2e107886f97a 100644 --- a/arch/mips/include/asm/timex.h +++ b/arch/mips/include/asm/timex.h @@ -76,25 +76,24 @@ static inline cycles_t get_cycles(void) else return 0; /* no usable counter */ } +#define get_cycles get_cycles /* * Like get_cycles - but where c0_count is not available we desperately * use c0_random in an attempt to get at least a little bit of entropy. - * - * R6000 and R6000A neither have a count register nor a random register. - * That leaves no entropy source in the CPU itself. */ static inline unsigned long random_get_entropy(void) { - unsigned int prid = read_c0_prid(); - unsigned int imp = prid & PRID_IMP_MASK; + unsigned int c0_random; - if (can_use_mips_counter(prid)) + if (can_use_mips_counter(read_c0_prid())) return read_c0_count(); - else if (likely(imp != PRID_IMP_R6000 && imp != PRID_IMP_R6000A)) - return read_c0_random(); + + if (cpu_has_3kex) + c0_random = (read_c0_random() >> 8) & 0x3f; else - return 0; /* no usable register */ + c0_random = read_c0_random() & 0x3f; + return (random_get_entropy_fallback() << 6) | (0x3f - c0_random); } #define random_get_entropy random_get_entropy From db1d13fe4c80355c39b498042370a5247014a4e3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Fri, 8 Apr 2022 18:03:13 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0570/1091] arm: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero commit ff8a8f59c99f6a7c656387addc4d9f2247d75077 upstream. In the event that random_get_entropy() can't access a cycle counter or similar, falling back to returning 0 is really not the best we can do. Instead, at least calling random_get_entropy_fallback() would be preferable, because that always needs to return _something_, even falling back to jiffies eventually. It's not as though random_get_entropy_fallback() is super high precision or guaranteed to be entropic, but basically anything that's not zero all the time is better than returning zero all the time. Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Arnd Bergmann Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm/include/asm/timex.h | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/timex.h index 7c3b3671d6c2..6d1337c169cd 100644 --- a/arch/arm/include/asm/timex.h +++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/timex.h @@ -11,5 +11,6 @@ typedef unsigned long cycles_t; #define get_cycles() ({ cycles_t c; read_current_timer(&c) ? 0 : c; }) +#define random_get_entropy() (((unsigned long)get_cycles()) ?: random_get_entropy_fallback()) #endif From f2a6e8727084524dd98caa7c8a445cfe28ceb3c4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Fri, 8 Apr 2022 18:03:13 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0571/1091] nios2: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero commit c04e72700f2293013dab40208e809369378f224c upstream. In the event that random_get_entropy() can't access a cycle counter or similar, falling back to returning 0 is really not the best we can do. Instead, at least calling random_get_entropy_fallback() would be preferable, because that always needs to return _something_, even falling back to jiffies eventually. It's not as though random_get_entropy_fallback() is super high precision or guaranteed to be entropic, but basically anything that's not zero all the time is better than returning zero all the time. Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Arnd Bergmann Acked-by: Dinh Nguyen Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/nios2/include/asm/timex.h | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/nios2/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/nios2/include/asm/timex.h index a769f871b28d..40a1adc9bd03 100644 --- a/arch/nios2/include/asm/timex.h +++ b/arch/nios2/include/asm/timex.h @@ -8,5 +8,8 @@ typedef unsigned long cycles_t; extern cycles_t get_cycles(void); +#define get_cycles get_cycles + +#define random_get_entropy() (((unsigned long)get_cycles()) ?: random_get_entropy_fallback()) #endif From 0cc41e2c73f70bed08767adfd609182446d3db60 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Fri, 8 Apr 2022 18:03:13 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0572/1091] x86/tsc: Use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero commit 3bd4abc07a267e6a8b33d7f8717136e18f921c53 upstream. In the event that random_get_entropy() can't access a cycle counter or similar, falling back to returning 0 is suboptimal. Instead, fallback to calling random_get_entropy_fallback(), which isn't extremely high precision or guaranteed to be entropic, but is certainly better than returning zero all the time. If CONFIG_X86_TSC=n, then it's possible for the kernel to run on systems without RDTSC, such as 486 and certain 586, so the fallback code is only required for that case. As well, fix up both the new function and the get_cycles() function from which it was derived to use cpu_feature_enabled() rather than boot_cpu_has(), and use !IS_ENABLED() instead of #ifndef. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Arnd Bergmann Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: x86@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/include/asm/timex.h | 9 +++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/tsc.h | 7 +++---- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/timex.h index a4a8b1b16c0c..956e4145311b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/timex.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/timex.h @@ -5,6 +5,15 @@ #include #include +static inline unsigned long random_get_entropy(void) +{ + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_TSC) && + !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_TSC)) + return random_get_entropy_fallback(); + return rdtsc(); +} +#define random_get_entropy random_get_entropy + /* Assume we use the PIT time source for the clock tick */ #define CLOCK_TICK_RATE PIT_TICK_RATE diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/tsc.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/tsc.h index 8a0c25c6bf09..f1ea8f0c8b12 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/tsc.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/tsc.h @@ -22,13 +22,12 @@ extern void disable_TSC(void); static inline cycles_t get_cycles(void) { -#ifndef CONFIG_X86_TSC - if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_TSC)) + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_TSC) && + !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_TSC)) return 0; -#endif - return rdtsc(); } +#define get_cycles get_cycles extern struct system_counterval_t convert_art_to_tsc(u64 art); extern struct system_counterval_t convert_art_ns_to_tsc(u64 art_ns); From 9dfc14590c5deed09d420688d7a028c6b074c981 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Fri, 8 Apr 2022 18:03:13 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0573/1091] um: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero commit 9f13fb0cd11ed2327abff69f6501a2c124c88b5a upstream. In the event that random_get_entropy() can't access a cycle counter or similar, falling back to returning 0 is really not the best we can do. Instead, at least calling random_get_entropy_fallback() would be preferable, because that always needs to return _something_, even falling back to jiffies eventually. It's not as though random_get_entropy_fallback() is super high precision or guaranteed to be entropic, but basically anything that's not zero all the time is better than returning zero all the time. This is accomplished by just including the asm-generic code like on other architectures, which means we can get rid of the empty stub function here. Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Arnd Bergmann Cc: Richard Weinberger Cc: Anton Ivanov Acked-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/um/include/asm/timex.h | 9 ++------- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/um/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/um/include/asm/timex.h index e392a9a5bc9b..9f27176adb26 100644 --- a/arch/um/include/asm/timex.h +++ b/arch/um/include/asm/timex.h @@ -2,13 +2,8 @@ #ifndef __UM_TIMEX_H #define __UM_TIMEX_H -typedef unsigned long cycles_t; - -static inline cycles_t get_cycles (void) -{ - return 0; -} - #define CLOCK_TICK_RATE (HZ) +#include + #endif From fa15650b51f684aa0dfff7112e3998f7085b160f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Fri, 8 Apr 2022 18:03:13 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0574/1091] sparc: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero commit ac9756c79797bb98972736b13cfb239fd2cffb79 upstream. In the event that random_get_entropy() can't access a cycle counter or similar, falling back to returning 0 is really not the best we can do. Instead, at least calling random_get_entropy_fallback() would be preferable, because that always needs to return _something_, even falling back to jiffies eventually. It's not as though random_get_entropy_fallback() is super high precision or guaranteed to be entropic, but basically anything that's not zero all the time is better than returning zero all the time. This is accomplished by just including the asm-generic code like on other architectures, which means we can get rid of the empty stub function here. Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Arnd Bergmann Cc: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/sparc/include/asm/timex_32.h | 4 +--- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/sparc/include/asm/timex_32.h b/arch/sparc/include/asm/timex_32.h index 542915b46209..f86326a6f89e 100644 --- a/arch/sparc/include/asm/timex_32.h +++ b/arch/sparc/include/asm/timex_32.h @@ -9,8 +9,6 @@ #define CLOCK_TICK_RATE 1193180 /* Underlying HZ */ -/* XXX Maybe do something better at some point... -DaveM */ -typedef unsigned long cycles_t; -#define get_cycles() (0) +#include #endif From 9bfbcb37e5f6f251cb81bd8288fe8b9106183a01 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Fri, 8 Apr 2022 18:03:13 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0575/1091] xtensa: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero commit e10e2f58030c5c211d49042a8c2a1b93d40b2ffb upstream. In the event that random_get_entropy() can't access a cycle counter or similar, falling back to returning 0 is really not the best we can do. Instead, at least calling random_get_entropy_fallback() would be preferable, because that always needs to return _something_, even falling back to jiffies eventually. It's not as though random_get_entropy_fallback() is super high precision or guaranteed to be entropic, but basically anything that's not zero all the time is better than returning zero all the time. This is accomplished by just including the asm-generic code like on other architectures, which means we can get rid of the empty stub function here. Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Arnd Bergmann Acked-by: Max Filippov Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/xtensa/include/asm/timex.h | 6 ++---- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/xtensa/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/xtensa/include/asm/timex.h index 233ec75e60c6..3f2462f2d027 100644 --- a/arch/xtensa/include/asm/timex.h +++ b/arch/xtensa/include/asm/timex.h @@ -29,10 +29,6 @@ extern unsigned long ccount_freq; -typedef unsigned long long cycles_t; - -#define get_cycles() (0) - void local_timer_setup(unsigned cpu); /* @@ -59,4 +55,6 @@ static inline void set_linux_timer (unsigned long ccompare) xtensa_set_sr(ccompare, SREG_CCOMPARE + LINUX_TIMER); } +#include + #endif /* _XTENSA_TIMEX_H */ From e247ea8d97bfa94be1e9f735861ca8bd29a2fe3f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Tue, 12 Apr 2022 19:59:57 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0576/1091] random: insist on random_get_entropy() existing in order to simplify commit 4b758eda851eb9336ca86a0041a4d3da55f66511 upstream. All platforms are now guaranteed to provide some value for random_get_entropy(). In case some bug leads to this not being so, we print a warning, because that indicates that something is really very wrong (and likely other things are impacted too). This should never be hit, but it's a good and cheap way of finding out if something ever is problematic. Since we now have viable fallback code for random_get_entropy() on all platforms, which is, in the worst case, not worse than jiffies, we can count on getting the best possible value out of it. That means there's no longer a use for using jiffies as entropy input. It also means we no longer have a reason for doing the round-robin register flow in the IRQ handler, which was always of fairly dubious value. Instead we can greatly simplify the IRQ handler inputs and also unify the construction between 64-bits and 32-bits. We now collect the cycle counter and the return address, since those are the two things that matter. Because the return address and the irq number are likely related, to the extent we mix in the irq number, we can just xor it into the top unchanging bytes of the return address, rather than the bottom changing bytes of the cycle counter as before. Then, we can do a fixed 2 rounds of SipHash/HSipHash. Finally, we use the same construction of hashing only half of the [H]SipHash state on 32-bit and 64-bit. We're not actually discarding any entropy, since that entropy is carried through until the next time. And more importantly, it lets us do the same sponge-like construction everywhere. Cc: Theodore Ts'o Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 86 +++++++++++++------------------------------ 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 60 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index fc30b43c3b3b..9cd23a5fb8db 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -1017,15 +1017,14 @@ int __init rand_initialize(void) */ void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size) { - unsigned long cycles = random_get_entropy(); - unsigned long flags, now = jiffies; + unsigned long entropy = random_get_entropy(); + unsigned long flags; if (crng_init == 0 && size) crng_pre_init_inject(buf, size, false); spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags); - _mix_pool_bytes(&cycles, sizeof(cycles)); - _mix_pool_bytes(&now, sizeof(now)); + _mix_pool_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy)); _mix_pool_bytes(buf, size); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags); } @@ -1048,12 +1047,11 @@ struct timer_rand_state { */ static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned int num) { - unsigned long cycles = random_get_entropy(), now = jiffies, flags; + unsigned long entropy = random_get_entropy(), now = jiffies, flags; long delta, delta2, delta3; spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags); - _mix_pool_bytes(&cycles, sizeof(cycles)); - _mix_pool_bytes(&now, sizeof(now)); + _mix_pool_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy)); _mix_pool_bytes(&num, sizeof(num)); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags); @@ -1181,7 +1179,6 @@ struct fast_pool { unsigned long pool[4]; unsigned long last; unsigned int count; - u16 reg_idx; }; static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct fast_pool, irq_randomness) = { @@ -1199,13 +1196,13 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct fast_pool, irq_randomness) = { * This is [Half]SipHash-1-x, starting from an empty key. Because * the key is fixed, it assumes that its inputs are non-malicious, * and therefore this has no security on its own. s represents the - * 128 or 256-bit SipHash state, while v represents a 128-bit input. + * four-word SipHash state, while v represents a two-word input. */ -static void fast_mix(unsigned long s[4], const unsigned long *v) +static void fast_mix(unsigned long s[4], const unsigned long v[2]) { size_t i; - for (i = 0; i < 16 / sizeof(long); ++i) { + for (i = 0; i < 2; ++i) { s[3] ^= v[i]; #ifdef CONFIG_64BIT s[0] += s[1]; s[1] = rol64(s[1], 13); s[1] ^= s[0]; s[0] = rol64(s[0], 32); @@ -1245,33 +1242,17 @@ int random_online_cpu(unsigned int cpu) } #endif -static unsigned long get_reg(struct fast_pool *f, struct pt_regs *regs) -{ - unsigned long *ptr = (unsigned long *)regs; - unsigned int idx; - - if (regs == NULL) - return 0; - idx = READ_ONCE(f->reg_idx); - if (idx >= sizeof(struct pt_regs) / sizeof(unsigned long)) - idx = 0; - ptr += idx++; - WRITE_ONCE(f->reg_idx, idx); - return *ptr; -} - static void mix_interrupt_randomness(struct work_struct *work) { struct fast_pool *fast_pool = container_of(work, struct fast_pool, mix); /* - * The size of the copied stack pool is explicitly 16 bytes so that we - * tax mix_pool_byte()'s compression function the same amount on all - * platforms. This means on 64-bit we copy half the pool into this, - * while on 32-bit we copy all of it. The entropy is supposed to be - * sufficiently dispersed between bits that in the sponge-like - * half case, on average we don't wind up "losing" some. + * The size of the copied stack pool is explicitly 2 longs so that we + * only ever ingest half of the siphash output each time, retaining + * the other half as the next "key" that carries over. The entropy is + * supposed to be sufficiently dispersed between bits so on average + * we don't wind up "losing" some. */ - u8 pool[16]; + unsigned long pool[2]; /* Check to see if we're running on the wrong CPU due to hotplug. */ local_irq_disable(); @@ -1303,36 +1284,21 @@ static void mix_interrupt_randomness(struct work_struct *work) void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) { enum { MIX_INFLIGHT = 1U << 31 }; - unsigned long cycles = random_get_entropy(), now = jiffies; + unsigned long entropy = random_get_entropy(); struct fast_pool *fast_pool = this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness); struct pt_regs *regs = get_irq_regs(); unsigned int new_count; - union { - u32 u32[4]; - u64 u64[2]; - unsigned long longs[16 / sizeof(long)]; - } irq_data; - if (cycles == 0) - cycles = get_reg(fast_pool, regs); - - if (sizeof(unsigned long) == 8) { - irq_data.u64[0] = cycles ^ rol64(now, 32) ^ irq; - irq_data.u64[1] = regs ? instruction_pointer(regs) : _RET_IP_; - } else { - irq_data.u32[0] = cycles ^ irq; - irq_data.u32[1] = now; - irq_data.u32[2] = regs ? instruction_pointer(regs) : _RET_IP_; - irq_data.u32[3] = get_reg(fast_pool, regs); - } - - fast_mix(fast_pool->pool, irq_data.longs); + fast_mix(fast_pool->pool, (unsigned long[2]){ + entropy, + (regs ? instruction_pointer(regs) : _RET_IP_) ^ swab(irq) + }); new_count = ++fast_pool->count; if (new_count & MIX_INFLIGHT) return; - if (new_count < 64 && (!time_after(now, fast_pool->last + HZ) || + if (new_count < 64 && (!time_is_before_jiffies(fast_pool->last + HZ) || unlikely(crng_init == 0))) return; @@ -1368,28 +1334,28 @@ static void entropy_timer(struct timer_list *t) static void try_to_generate_entropy(void) { struct { - unsigned long cycles; + unsigned long entropy; struct timer_list timer; } stack; - stack.cycles = random_get_entropy(); + stack.entropy = random_get_entropy(); /* Slow counter - or none. Don't even bother */ - if (stack.cycles == random_get_entropy()) + if (stack.entropy == random_get_entropy()) return; timer_setup_on_stack(&stack.timer, entropy_timer, 0); while (!crng_ready() && !signal_pending(current)) { if (!timer_pending(&stack.timer)) mod_timer(&stack.timer, jiffies + 1); - mix_pool_bytes(&stack.cycles, sizeof(stack.cycles)); + mix_pool_bytes(&stack.entropy, sizeof(stack.entropy)); schedule(); - stack.cycles = random_get_entropy(); + stack.entropy = random_get_entropy(); } del_timer_sync(&stack.timer); destroy_timer_on_stack(&stack.timer); - mix_pool_bytes(&stack.cycles, sizeof(stack.cycles)); + mix_pool_bytes(&stack.entropy, sizeof(stack.entropy)); } From c44f8b3863768ef09771ed42f23a386771bd95a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Tue, 3 May 2022 14:14:32 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0577/1091] random: do not use batches when !crng_ready() commit cbe89e5a375a51bbb952929b93fa973416fea74e upstream. It's too hard to keep the batches synchronized, and pointless anyway, since in !crng_ready(), we're updating the base_crng key really often, where batching only hurts. So instead, if the crng isn't ready, just call into get_random_bytes(). At this stage nothing is performance critical anyhow. Cc: Theodore Ts'o Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 14 +++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 9cd23a5fb8db..7bb48b410e01 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -465,10 +465,8 @@ static void crng_pre_init_inject(const void *input, size_t len, bool account) if (account) { crng_init_cnt += min_t(size_t, len, CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH - crng_init_cnt); - if (crng_init_cnt >= CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) { - ++base_crng.generation; + if (crng_init_cnt >= CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) crng_init = 1; - } } spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags); @@ -622,6 +620,11 @@ u64 get_random_u64(void) warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous); + if (!crng_ready()) { + _get_random_bytes(&ret, sizeof(ret)); + return ret; + } + local_irq_save(flags); batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u64); @@ -655,6 +658,11 @@ u32 get_random_u32(void) warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous); + if (!crng_ready()) { + _get_random_bytes(&ret, sizeof(ret)); + return ret; + } + local_irq_save(flags); batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u32); From e739d5bd1466e750fbf077893e9c18fc2a9be5be Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Sat, 30 Apr 2022 15:08:20 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0578/1091] random: use first 128 bits of input as fast init commit 5c3b747ef54fa2a7318776777f6044540d99f721 upstream. Before, the first 64 bytes of input, regardless of how entropic it was, would be used to mutate the crng base key directly, and none of those bytes would be credited as having entropy. Then 256 bits of credited input would be accumulated, and only then would the rng transition from the earlier "fast init" phase into being actually initialized. The thinking was that by mixing and matching fast init and real init, an attacker who compromised the fast init state, considered easy to do given how little entropy might be in those first 64 bytes, would then be able to bruteforce bits from the actual initialization. By keeping these separate, bruteforcing became impossible. However, by not crediting potentially creditable bits from those first 64 bytes of input, we delay initialization, and actually make the problem worse, because it means the user is drawing worse random numbers for a longer period of time. Instead, we can take the first 128 bits as fast init, and allow them to be credited, and then hold off on the next 128 bits until they've accumulated. This is still a wide enough margin to prevent bruteforcing the rng state, while still initializing much faster. Then, rather than trying to piecemeal inject into the base crng key at various points, instead just extract from the pool when we need it, for the crng_init==0 phase. Performance may even be better for the various inputs here, since there are likely more calls to mix_pool_bytes() then there are to get_random_bytes() during this phase of system execution. Since the preinit injection code is gone, bootloader randomness can then do something significantly more straight forward, removing the weird system_wq hack in hwgenerator randomness. Cc: Theodore Ts'o Cc: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 146 ++++++++++++++---------------------------- 1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 97 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 7bb48b410e01..530f6b02ef39 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -233,10 +233,7 @@ static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(const char *func_name, void *caller, void * *********************************************************************/ -enum { - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL = 300 * HZ, - CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH = 2 * CHACHA_KEY_SIZE -}; +enum { CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL = 300 * HZ }; static struct { u8 key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(long)); @@ -258,6 +255,8 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct crng, crngs) = { /* Used by crng_reseed() to extract a new seed from the input pool. */ static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes); +/* Used by crng_make_state() to extract a new seed when crng_init==0. */ +static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes); /* * This extracts a new crng key from the input pool, but only if there is a @@ -382,17 +381,20 @@ static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)], /* * For the fast path, we check whether we're ready, unlocked first, and * then re-check once locked later. In the case where we're really not - * ready, we do fast key erasure with the base_crng directly, because - * this is what crng_pre_init_inject() mutates during early init. + * ready, we do fast key erasure with the base_crng directly, extracting + * when crng_init==0. */ if (!crng_ready()) { bool ready; spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags); ready = crng_ready(); - if (!ready) + if (!ready) { + if (crng_init == 0) + extract_entropy(base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key)); crng_fast_key_erasure(base_crng.key, chacha_state, random_data, random_data_len); + } spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags); if (!ready) return; @@ -433,48 +435,6 @@ static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)], local_irq_restore(flags); } -/* - * This function is for crng_init == 0 only. It loads entropy directly - * into the crng's key, without going through the input pool. It is, - * generally speaking, not very safe, but we use this only at early - * boot time when it's better to have something there rather than - * nothing. - * - * If account is set, then the crng_init_cnt counter is incremented. - * This shouldn't be set by functions like add_device_randomness(), - * where we can't trust the buffer passed to it is guaranteed to be - * unpredictable (so it might not have any entropy at all). - */ -static void crng_pre_init_inject(const void *input, size_t len, bool account) -{ - static int crng_init_cnt = 0; - struct blake2s_state hash; - unsigned long flags; - - blake2s_init(&hash, sizeof(base_crng.key)); - - spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags); - if (crng_init != 0) { - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags); - return; - } - - blake2s_update(&hash, base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key)); - blake2s_update(&hash, input, len); - blake2s_final(&hash, base_crng.key); - - if (account) { - crng_init_cnt += min_t(size_t, len, CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH - crng_init_cnt); - if (crng_init_cnt >= CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) - crng_init = 1; - } - - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags); - - if (crng_init == 1) - pr_notice("fast init done\n"); -} - static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes) { u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)]; @@ -784,7 +744,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch); enum { POOL_BITS = BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE * 8, - POOL_MIN_BITS = POOL_BITS /* No point in settling for less. */ + POOL_MIN_BITS = POOL_BITS, /* No point in settling for less. */ + POOL_FAST_INIT_BITS = POOL_MIN_BITS / 2 }; /* For notifying userspace should write into /dev/random. */ @@ -821,24 +782,6 @@ static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, size_t nbytes) spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags); } -static void credit_entropy_bits(size_t nbits) -{ - unsigned int entropy_count, orig, add; - - if (!nbits) - return; - - add = min_t(size_t, nbits, POOL_BITS); - - do { - orig = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count); - entropy_count = min_t(unsigned int, POOL_BITS, orig + add); - } while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig); - - if (!crng_ready() && entropy_count >= POOL_MIN_BITS) - crng_reseed(); -} - /* * This is an HKDF-like construction for using the hashed collected entropy * as a PRF key, that's then expanded block-by-block. @@ -904,6 +847,33 @@ static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes) return true; } +static void credit_entropy_bits(size_t nbits) +{ + unsigned int entropy_count, orig, add; + unsigned long flags; + + if (!nbits) + return; + + add = min_t(size_t, nbits, POOL_BITS); + + do { + orig = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count); + entropy_count = min_t(unsigned int, POOL_BITS, orig + add); + } while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig); + + if (!crng_ready() && entropy_count >= POOL_MIN_BITS) + crng_reseed(); + else if (unlikely(crng_init == 0 && entropy_count >= POOL_FAST_INIT_BITS)) { + spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags); + if (crng_init == 0) { + extract_entropy(base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key)); + crng_init = 1; + } + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags); + } +} + /********************************************************************** * @@ -946,9 +916,9 @@ static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes) * entropy as specified by the caller. If the entropy pool is full it will * block until more entropy is needed. * - * add_bootloader_randomness() is the same as add_hwgenerator_randomness() or - * add_device_randomness(), depending on whether or not the configuration - * option CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is set. + * add_bootloader_randomness() is called by bootloader drivers, such as EFI + * and device tree, and credits its input depending on whether or not the + * configuration option CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is set. * * add_interrupt_randomness() uses the interrupt timing as random * inputs to the entropy pool. Using the cycle counters and the irq source @@ -1028,9 +998,6 @@ void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size) unsigned long entropy = random_get_entropy(); unsigned long flags; - if (crng_init == 0 && size) - crng_pre_init_inject(buf, size, false); - spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags); _mix_pool_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy)); _mix_pool_bytes(buf, size); @@ -1146,12 +1113,6 @@ void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk) void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count, size_t entropy) { - if (unlikely(crng_init == 0 && entropy < POOL_MIN_BITS)) { - crng_pre_init_inject(buffer, count, true); - mix_pool_bytes(buffer, count); - return; - } - /* * Throttle writing if we're above the trickle threshold. * We'll be woken up again once below POOL_MIN_BITS, when @@ -1159,7 +1120,7 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count, * CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL has elapsed. */ wait_event_interruptible_timeout(random_write_wait, - !system_wq || kthread_should_stop() || + kthread_should_stop() || input_pool.entropy_count < POOL_MIN_BITS, CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL); mix_pool_bytes(buffer, count); @@ -1168,17 +1129,14 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count, EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_hwgenerator_randomness); /* - * Handle random seed passed by bootloader. - * If the seed is trustworthy, it would be regarded as hardware RNGs. Otherwise - * it would be regarded as device data. - * The decision is controlled by CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER. + * Handle random seed passed by bootloader, and credit it if + * CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is set. */ void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size) { + mix_pool_bytes(buf, size); if (trust_bootloader) - add_hwgenerator_randomness(buf, size, size * 8); - else - add_device_randomness(buf, size); + credit_entropy_bits(size * 8); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_bootloader_randomness); @@ -1278,13 +1236,8 @@ static void mix_interrupt_randomness(struct work_struct *work) fast_pool->last = jiffies; local_irq_enable(); - if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) { - crng_pre_init_inject(pool, sizeof(pool), true); - mix_pool_bytes(pool, sizeof(pool)); - } else { - mix_pool_bytes(pool, sizeof(pool)); - credit_entropy_bits(1); - } + mix_pool_bytes(pool, sizeof(pool)); + credit_entropy_bits(1); memzero_explicit(pool, sizeof(pool)); } @@ -1306,8 +1259,7 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) if (new_count & MIX_INFLIGHT) return; - if (new_count < 64 && (!time_is_before_jiffies(fast_pool->last + HZ) || - unlikely(crng_init == 0))) + if (new_count < 64 && !time_is_before_jiffies(fast_pool->last + HZ)) return; if (unlikely(!fast_pool->mix.func)) From 58da574f105a8b2e483780fd43aad252db3af03c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Sat, 30 Apr 2022 22:03:29 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0579/1091] random: do not pretend to handle premature next security model commit e85c0fc1d94c52483a603651748d4c76d6aa1c6b upstream. Per the thread linked below, "premature next" is not considered to be a realistic threat model, and leads to more serious security problems. "Premature next" is the scenario in which: - Attacker compromises the current state of a fully initialized RNG via some kind of infoleak. - New bits of entropy are added directly to the key used to generate the /dev/urandom stream, without any buffering or pooling. - Attacker then, somehow having read access to /dev/urandom, samples RNG output and brute forces the individual new bits that were added. - Result: the RNG never "recovers" from the initial compromise, a so-called violation of what academics term "post-compromise security". The usual solutions to this involve some form of delaying when entropy gets mixed into the crng. With Fortuna, this involves multiple input buckets. With what the Linux RNG was trying to do prior, this involves entropy estimation. However, by delaying when entropy gets mixed in, it also means that RNG compromises are extremely dangerous during the window of time before the RNG has gathered enough entropy, during which time nonces may become predictable (or repeated), ephemeral keys may not be secret, and so forth. Moreover, it's unclear how realistic "premature next" is from an attack perspective, if these attacks even make sense in practice. Put together -- and discussed in more detail in the thread below -- these constitute grounds for just doing away with the current code that pretends to handle premature next. I say "pretends" because it wasn't doing an especially great job at it either; should we change our mind about this direction, we would probably implement Fortuna to "fix" the "problem", in which case, removing the pretend solution still makes sense. This also reduces the crng reseed period from 5 minutes down to 1 minute. The rationale from the thread might lead us toward reducing that even further in the future (or even eliminating it), but that remains a topic of a future commit. At a high level, this patch changes semantics from: Before: Seed for the first time after 256 "bits" of estimated entropy have been accumulated since the system booted. Thereafter, reseed once every five minutes, but only if 256 new "bits" have been accumulated since the last reseeding. After: Seed for the first time after 256 "bits" of estimated entropy have been accumulated since the system booted. Thereafter, reseed once every minute. Most of this patch is renaming and removing: POOL_MIN_BITS becomes POOL_INIT_BITS, credit_entropy_bits() becomes credit_init_bits(), crng_reseed() loses its "force" parameter since it's now always true, the drain_entropy() function no longer has any use so it's removed, entropy estimation is skipped if we've already init'd, the various notifiers for "low on entropy" are now only active prior to init, and finally, some documentation comments are cleaned up here and there. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YmlMGx6+uigkGiZ0@zx2c4.com/ Cc: Theodore Ts'o Cc: Nadia Heninger Cc: Tom Ristenpart Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 176 +++++++++++++++--------------------------- 1 file changed, 63 insertions(+), 113 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 530f6b02ef39..cfe269f7cc04 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -15,14 +15,12 @@ * - Sysctl interface. * * The high level overview is that there is one input pool, into which - * various pieces of data are hashed. Some of that data is then "credited" as - * having a certain number of bits of entropy. When enough bits of entropy are - * available, the hash is finalized and handed as a key to a stream cipher that - * expands it indefinitely for various consumers. This key is periodically - * refreshed as the various entropy collectors, described below, add data to the - * input pool and credit it. There is currently no Fortuna-like scheduler - * involved, which can lead to malicious entropy sources causing a premature - * reseed, and the entropy estimates are, at best, conservative guesses. + * various pieces of data are hashed. Prior to initialization, some of that + * data is then "credited" as having a certain number of bits of entropy. + * When enough bits of entropy are available, the hash is finalized and + * handed as a key to a stream cipher that expands it indefinitely for + * various consumers. This key is periodically refreshed as the various + * entropy collectors, described below, add data to the input pool. */ #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt @@ -233,7 +231,10 @@ static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(const char *func_name, void *caller, void * *********************************************************************/ -enum { CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL = 300 * HZ }; +enum { + CRNG_RESEED_START_INTERVAL = HZ, + CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL = 60 * HZ +}; static struct { u8 key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(long)); @@ -253,16 +254,10 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct crng, crngs) = { .generation = ULONG_MAX }; -/* Used by crng_reseed() to extract a new seed from the input pool. */ -static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes); -/* Used by crng_make_state() to extract a new seed when crng_init==0. */ +/* Used by crng_reseed() and crng_make_state() to extract a new seed from the input pool. */ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes); -/* - * This extracts a new crng key from the input pool, but only if there is a - * sufficient amount of entropy available, in order to mitigate bruteforcing - * of newly added bits. - */ +/* This extracts a new crng key from the input pool. */ static void crng_reseed(void) { unsigned long flags; @@ -270,9 +265,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(void) u8 key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE]; bool finalize_init = false; - /* Only reseed if we can, to prevent brute forcing a small amount of new bits. */ - if (!drain_entropy(key, sizeof(key))) - return; + extract_entropy(key, sizeof(key)); /* * We copy the new key into the base_crng, overwriting the old one, @@ -344,10 +337,10 @@ static void crng_fast_key_erasure(u8 key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE], } /* - * Return whether the crng seed is considered to be sufficiently - * old that a reseeding might be attempted. This happens if the last - * reseeding was CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL ago, or during early boot, at - * an interval proportional to the uptime. + * Return whether the crng seed is considered to be sufficiently old + * that a reseeding is needed. This happens if the last reseeding + * was CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL ago, or during early boot, at an interval + * proportional to the uptime. */ static bool crng_has_old_seed(void) { @@ -359,7 +352,7 @@ static bool crng_has_old_seed(void) if (uptime >= CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL / HZ * 2) WRITE_ONCE(early_boot, false); else - interval = max_t(unsigned int, 5 * HZ, + interval = max_t(unsigned int, CRNG_RESEED_START_INTERVAL, (unsigned int)uptime / 2 * HZ); } return time_after(jiffies, READ_ONCE(base_crng.birth) + interval); @@ -401,8 +394,8 @@ static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)], } /* - * If the base_crng is old enough, we try to reseed, which in turn - * bumps the generation counter that we check below. + * If the base_crng is old enough, we reseed, which in turn bumps the + * generation counter that we check below. */ if (unlikely(crng_has_old_seed())) crng_reseed(); @@ -731,30 +724,24 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch); * * After which, if added entropy should be credited: * - * static void credit_entropy_bits(size_t nbits) + * static void credit_init_bits(size_t nbits) * - * Finally, extract entropy via these two, with the latter one - * setting the entropy count to zero and extracting only if there - * is POOL_MIN_BITS entropy credited prior: + * Finally, extract entropy via: * * static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes) - * static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes) * **********************************************************************/ enum { POOL_BITS = BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE * 8, - POOL_MIN_BITS = POOL_BITS, /* No point in settling for less. */ - POOL_FAST_INIT_BITS = POOL_MIN_BITS / 2 + POOL_INIT_BITS = POOL_BITS, /* No point in settling for less. */ + POOL_FAST_INIT_BITS = POOL_INIT_BITS / 2 }; -/* For notifying userspace should write into /dev/random. */ -static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_write_wait); - static struct { struct blake2s_state hash; spinlock_t lock; - unsigned int entropy_count; + unsigned int init_bits; } input_pool = { .hash.h = { BLAKE2S_IV0 ^ (0x01010000 | BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE), BLAKE2S_IV1, BLAKE2S_IV2, BLAKE2S_IV3, BLAKE2S_IV4, @@ -769,9 +756,9 @@ static void _mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, size_t nbytes) } /* - * This function adds bytes into the entropy "pool". It does not - * update the entropy estimate. The caller should call - * credit_entropy_bits if this is appropriate. + * This function adds bytes into the input pool. It does not + * update the initialization bit counter; the caller should call + * credit_init_bits if this is appropriate. */ static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, size_t nbytes) { @@ -828,43 +815,24 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes) memzero_explicit(&block, sizeof(block)); } -/* - * First we make sure we have POOL_MIN_BITS of entropy in the pool, and then we - * set the entropy count to zero (but don't actually touch any data). Only then - * can we extract a new key with extract_entropy(). - */ -static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes) +static void credit_init_bits(size_t nbits) { - unsigned int entropy_count; - do { - entropy_count = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count); - if (entropy_count < POOL_MIN_BITS) - return false; - } while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, entropy_count, 0) != entropy_count); - extract_entropy(buf, nbytes); - wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait); - kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT); - return true; -} - -static void credit_entropy_bits(size_t nbits) -{ - unsigned int entropy_count, orig, add; + unsigned int init_bits, orig, add; unsigned long flags; - if (!nbits) + if (crng_ready() || !nbits) return; add = min_t(size_t, nbits, POOL_BITS); do { - orig = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count); - entropy_count = min_t(unsigned int, POOL_BITS, orig + add); - } while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig); + orig = READ_ONCE(input_pool.init_bits); + init_bits = min_t(unsigned int, POOL_BITS, orig + add); + } while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.init_bits, orig, init_bits) != orig); - if (!crng_ready() && entropy_count >= POOL_MIN_BITS) + if (!crng_ready() && init_bits >= POOL_INIT_BITS) crng_reseed(); - else if (unlikely(crng_init == 0 && entropy_count >= POOL_FAST_INIT_BITS)) { + else if (unlikely(crng_init == 0 && init_bits >= POOL_FAST_INIT_BITS)) { spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags); if (crng_init == 0) { extract_entropy(base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key)); @@ -970,13 +938,10 @@ int __init rand_initialize(void) _mix_pool_bytes(&now, sizeof(now)); _mix_pool_bytes(utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname()))); - extract_entropy(base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key)); - ++base_crng.generation; - - if (arch_init && trust_cpu && !crng_ready()) { - crng_init = 2; - pr_notice("crng init done (trusting CPU's manufacturer)\n"); - } + if (crng_ready()) + crng_reseed(); + else if (arch_init && trust_cpu) + credit_init_bits(BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE * 8); if (ratelimit_disable) { urandom_warning.interval = 0; @@ -1030,6 +995,9 @@ static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned int nu _mix_pool_bytes(&num, sizeof(num)); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags); + if (crng_ready()) + return; + /* * Calculate number of bits of randomness we probably added. * We take into account the first, second and third-order deltas @@ -1060,7 +1028,7 @@ static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned int nu * Round down by 1 bit on general principles, * and limit entropy estimate to 12 bits. */ - credit_entropy_bits(min_t(unsigned int, fls(delta >> 1), 11)); + credit_init_bits(min_t(unsigned int, fls(delta >> 1), 11)); } void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, @@ -1113,18 +1081,15 @@ void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk) void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count, size_t entropy) { - /* - * Throttle writing if we're above the trickle threshold. - * We'll be woken up again once below POOL_MIN_BITS, when - * the calling thread is about to terminate, or once - * CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL has elapsed. - */ - wait_event_interruptible_timeout(random_write_wait, - kthread_should_stop() || - input_pool.entropy_count < POOL_MIN_BITS, - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL); mix_pool_bytes(buffer, count); - credit_entropy_bits(entropy); + credit_init_bits(entropy); + + /* + * Throttle writing to once every CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL, unless + * we're not yet initialized. + */ + if (!kthread_should_stop() && crng_ready()) + schedule_timeout_interruptible(CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_hwgenerator_randomness); @@ -1136,7 +1101,7 @@ void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size) { mix_pool_bytes(buf, size); if (trust_bootloader) - credit_entropy_bits(size * 8); + credit_init_bits(size * 8); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_bootloader_randomness); @@ -1237,7 +1202,7 @@ static void mix_interrupt_randomness(struct work_struct *work) local_irq_enable(); mix_pool_bytes(pool, sizeof(pool)); - credit_entropy_bits(1); + credit_init_bits(1); memzero_explicit(pool, sizeof(pool)); } @@ -1284,7 +1249,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_interrupt_randomness); */ static void entropy_timer(struct timer_list *t) { - credit_entropy_bits(1); + credit_init_bits(1); } /* @@ -1377,16 +1342,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count, unsigned int, static __poll_t random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait) { - __poll_t mask; - poll_wait(file, &crng_init_wait, wait); - poll_wait(file, &random_write_wait, wait); - mask = 0; - if (crng_ready()) - mask |= EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM; - if (input_pool.entropy_count < POOL_MIN_BITS) - mask |= EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM; - return mask; + return crng_ready() ? EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM : EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM; } static int write_pool(const char __user *ubuf, size_t count) @@ -1459,7 +1416,7 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) switch (cmd) { case RNDGETENTCNT: /* Inherently racy, no point locking. */ - if (put_user(input_pool.entropy_count, p)) + if (put_user(input_pool.init_bits, p)) return -EFAULT; return 0; case RNDADDTOENTCNT: @@ -1469,7 +1426,7 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) return -EFAULT; if (ent_count < 0) return -EINVAL; - credit_entropy_bits(ent_count); + credit_init_bits(ent_count); return 0; case RNDADDENTROPY: if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) @@ -1483,20 +1440,13 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) retval = write_pool((const char __user *)p, size); if (retval < 0) return retval; - credit_entropy_bits(ent_count); + credit_init_bits(ent_count); return 0; case RNDZAPENTCNT: case RNDCLEARPOOL: - /* - * Clear the entropy pool counters. We no longer clear - * the entropy pool, as that's silly. - */ + /* No longer has any effect. */ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; - if (xchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, 0) >= POOL_MIN_BITS) { - wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait); - kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT); - } return 0; case RNDRESEEDCRNG: if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) @@ -1555,7 +1505,7 @@ const struct file_operations urandom_fops = { * * - write_wakeup_threshold - the amount of entropy in the input pool * below which write polls to /dev/random will unblock, requesting - * more entropy, tied to the POOL_MIN_BITS constant. It is writable + * more entropy, tied to the POOL_INIT_BITS constant. It is writable * to avoid breaking old userspaces, but writing to it does not * change any behavior of the RNG. * @@ -1570,7 +1520,7 @@ const struct file_operations urandom_fops = { #include static int sysctl_random_min_urandom_seed = CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL / HZ; -static int sysctl_random_write_wakeup_bits = POOL_MIN_BITS; +static int sysctl_random_write_wakeup_bits = POOL_INIT_BITS; static int sysctl_poolsize = POOL_BITS; static u8 sysctl_bootid[UUID_SIZE]; @@ -1627,7 +1577,7 @@ struct ctl_table random_table[] = { }, { .procname = "entropy_avail", - .data = &input_pool.entropy_count, + .data = &input_pool.init_bits, .maxlen = sizeof(int), .mode = 0444, .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, From 6d4203a2cddcb345dee61331af845434a57040fd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Fri, 6 May 2022 18:27:38 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0580/1091] random: order timer entropy functions below interrupt functions commit a4b5c26b79ffdfcfb816c198f2fc2b1e7b5b580f upstream. There are no code changes here; this is just a reordering of functions, so that in subsequent commits, the timer entropy functions can call into the interrupt ones. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 238 +++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- 1 file changed, 119 insertions(+), 119 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index cfe269f7cc04..993684792ec4 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -851,13 +851,13 @@ static void credit_init_bits(size_t nbits) * the above entropy accumulation routines: * * void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size); - * void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, - * unsigned int value); - * void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk); * void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count, * size_t entropy); * void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size); * void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq); + * void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, + * unsigned int value); + * void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk); * * add_device_randomness() adds data to the input pool that * is likely to differ between two devices (or possibly even per boot). @@ -867,19 +867,6 @@ static void credit_init_bits(size_t nbits) * that might otherwise be identical and have very little entropy * available to them (particularly common in the embedded world). * - * add_input_randomness() uses the input layer interrupt timing, as well - * as the event type information from the hardware. - * - * add_disk_randomness() uses what amounts to the seek time of block - * layer request events, on a per-disk_devt basis, as input to the - * entropy pool. Note that high-speed solid state drives with very low - * seek times do not make for good sources of entropy, as their seek - * times are usually fairly consistent. - * - * The above two routines try to estimate how many bits of entropy - * to credit. They do this by keeping track of the first and second - * order deltas of the event timings. - * * add_hwgenerator_randomness() is for true hardware RNGs, and will credit * entropy as specified by the caller. If the entropy pool is full it will * block until more entropy is needed. @@ -893,6 +880,19 @@ static void credit_init_bits(size_t nbits) * as inputs, it feeds the input pool roughly once a second or after 64 * interrupts, crediting 1 bit of entropy for whichever comes first. * + * add_input_randomness() uses the input layer interrupt timing, as well + * as the event type information from the hardware. + * + * add_disk_randomness() uses what amounts to the seek time of block + * layer request events, on a per-disk_devt basis, as input to the + * entropy pool. Note that high-speed solid state drives with very low + * seek times do not make for good sources of entropy, as their seek + * times are usually fairly consistent. + * + * The last two routines try to estimate how many bits of entropy + * to credit. They do this by keeping track of the first and second + * order deltas of the event timings. + * **********************************************************************/ static bool trust_cpu __ro_after_init = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU); @@ -970,109 +970,6 @@ void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_device_randomness); -/* There is one of these per entropy source */ -struct timer_rand_state { - unsigned long last_time; - long last_delta, last_delta2; -}; - -/* - * This function adds entropy to the entropy "pool" by using timing - * delays. It uses the timer_rand_state structure to make an estimate - * of how many bits of entropy this call has added to the pool. - * - * The number "num" is also added to the pool - it should somehow describe - * the type of event which just happened. This is currently 0-255 for - * keyboard scan codes, and 256 upwards for interrupts. - */ -static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned int num) -{ - unsigned long entropy = random_get_entropy(), now = jiffies, flags; - long delta, delta2, delta3; - - spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags); - _mix_pool_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy)); - _mix_pool_bytes(&num, sizeof(num)); - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags); - - if (crng_ready()) - return; - - /* - * Calculate number of bits of randomness we probably added. - * We take into account the first, second and third-order deltas - * in order to make our estimate. - */ - delta = now - READ_ONCE(state->last_time); - WRITE_ONCE(state->last_time, now); - - delta2 = delta - READ_ONCE(state->last_delta); - WRITE_ONCE(state->last_delta, delta); - - delta3 = delta2 - READ_ONCE(state->last_delta2); - WRITE_ONCE(state->last_delta2, delta2); - - if (delta < 0) - delta = -delta; - if (delta2 < 0) - delta2 = -delta2; - if (delta3 < 0) - delta3 = -delta3; - if (delta > delta2) - delta = delta2; - if (delta > delta3) - delta = delta3; - - /* - * delta is now minimum absolute delta. - * Round down by 1 bit on general principles, - * and limit entropy estimate to 12 bits. - */ - credit_init_bits(min_t(unsigned int, fls(delta >> 1), 11)); -} - -void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, - unsigned int value) -{ - static unsigned char last_value; - static struct timer_rand_state input_timer_state = { INITIAL_JIFFIES }; - - /* Ignore autorepeat and the like. */ - if (value == last_value) - return; - - last_value = value; - add_timer_randomness(&input_timer_state, - (type << 4) ^ code ^ (code >> 4) ^ value); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_input_randomness); - -#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK -void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk) -{ - if (!disk || !disk->random) - return; - /* First major is 1, so we get >= 0x200 here. */ - add_timer_randomness(disk->random, 0x100 + disk_devt(disk)); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_disk_randomness); - -void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk) -{ - struct timer_rand_state *state; - - /* - * If kzalloc returns null, we just won't use that entropy - * source. - */ - state = kzalloc(sizeof(struct timer_rand_state), GFP_KERNEL); - if (state) { - state->last_time = INITIAL_JIFFIES; - disk->random = state; - } -} -#endif - /* * Interface for in-kernel drivers of true hardware RNGs. * Those devices may produce endless random bits and will be throttled @@ -1234,6 +1131,109 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_interrupt_randomness); +/* There is one of these per entropy source */ +struct timer_rand_state { + unsigned long last_time; + long last_delta, last_delta2; +}; + +/* + * This function adds entropy to the entropy "pool" by using timing + * delays. It uses the timer_rand_state structure to make an estimate + * of how many bits of entropy this call has added to the pool. + * + * The number "num" is also added to the pool - it should somehow describe + * the type of event which just happened. This is currently 0-255 for + * keyboard scan codes, and 256 upwards for interrupts. + */ +static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned int num) +{ + unsigned long entropy = random_get_entropy(), now = jiffies, flags; + long delta, delta2, delta3; + + spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags); + _mix_pool_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy)); + _mix_pool_bytes(&num, sizeof(num)); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags); + + if (crng_ready()) + return; + + /* + * Calculate number of bits of randomness we probably added. + * We take into account the first, second and third-order deltas + * in order to make our estimate. + */ + delta = now - READ_ONCE(state->last_time); + WRITE_ONCE(state->last_time, now); + + delta2 = delta - READ_ONCE(state->last_delta); + WRITE_ONCE(state->last_delta, delta); + + delta3 = delta2 - READ_ONCE(state->last_delta2); + WRITE_ONCE(state->last_delta2, delta2); + + if (delta < 0) + delta = -delta; + if (delta2 < 0) + delta2 = -delta2; + if (delta3 < 0) + delta3 = -delta3; + if (delta > delta2) + delta = delta2; + if (delta > delta3) + delta = delta3; + + /* + * delta is now minimum absolute delta. + * Round down by 1 bit on general principles, + * and limit entropy estimate to 12 bits. + */ + credit_init_bits(min_t(unsigned int, fls(delta >> 1), 11)); +} + +void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, + unsigned int value) +{ + static unsigned char last_value; + static struct timer_rand_state input_timer_state = { INITIAL_JIFFIES }; + + /* Ignore autorepeat and the like. */ + if (value == last_value) + return; + + last_value = value; + add_timer_randomness(&input_timer_state, + (type << 4) ^ code ^ (code >> 4) ^ value); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_input_randomness); + +#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK +void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk) +{ + if (!disk || !disk->random) + return; + /* First major is 1, so we get >= 0x200 here. */ + add_timer_randomness(disk->random, 0x100 + disk_devt(disk)); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_disk_randomness); + +void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk) +{ + struct timer_rand_state *state; + + /* + * If kzalloc returns null, we just won't use that entropy + * source. + */ + state = kzalloc(sizeof(struct timer_rand_state), GFP_KERNEL); + if (state) { + state->last_time = INITIAL_JIFFIES; + disk->random = state; + } +} +#endif + /* * Each time the timer fires, we expect that we got an unpredictable * jump in the cycle counter. Even if the timer is running on another From bf3b51eb0f1316abbab7d4124aeada109b75cf08 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Fri, 6 May 2022 18:30:51 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0581/1091] random: do not use input pool from hard IRQs commit e3e33fc2ea7fcefd0d761db9d6219f83b4248f5c upstream. Years ago, a separate fast pool was added for interrupts, so that the cost associated with taking the input pool spinlocks and mixing into it would be avoided in places where latency is critical. However, one oversight was that add_input_randomness() and add_disk_randomness() still sometimes are called directly from the interrupt handler, rather than being deferred to a thread. This means that some unlucky interrupts will be caught doing a blake2s_compress() call and potentially spinning on input_pool.lock, which can also be taken by unprivileged users by writing into /dev/urandom. In order to fix this, add_timer_randomness() now checks whether it is being called from a hard IRQ and if so, just mixes into the per-cpu IRQ fast pool using fast_mix(), which is much faster and can be done lock-free. A nice consequence of this, as well, is that it means hard IRQ context FPU support is likely no longer useful. The entropy estimation algorithm used by add_timer_randomness() is also somewhat different than the one used for add_interrupt_randomness(). The former looks at deltas of deltas of deltas, while the latter just waits for 64 interrupts for one bit or for one second since the last bit. In order to bridge these, and since add_interrupt_randomness() runs after an add_timer_randomness() that's called from hard IRQ, we add to the fast pool credit the related amount, and then subtract one to account for add_interrupt_randomness()'s contribution. A downside of this, however, is that the num argument is potentially attacker controlled, which puts a bit more pressure on the fast_mix() sponge to do more than it's really intended to do. As a mitigating factor, the first 96 bits of input aren't attacker controlled (a cycle counter followed by zeros), which means it's essentially two rounds of siphash rather than one, which is somewhat better. It's also not that much different from add_interrupt_randomness()'s use of the irq stack instruction pointer register. Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Filipe Manana Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Theodore Ts'o Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 993684792ec4..aec2e048601a 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -1081,6 +1081,7 @@ static void mix_interrupt_randomness(struct work_struct *work) * we don't wind up "losing" some. */ unsigned long pool[2]; + unsigned int count; /* Check to see if we're running on the wrong CPU due to hotplug. */ local_irq_disable(); @@ -1094,12 +1095,13 @@ static void mix_interrupt_randomness(struct work_struct *work) * consistent view, before we reenable irqs again. */ memcpy(pool, fast_pool->pool, sizeof(pool)); + count = fast_pool->count; fast_pool->count = 0; fast_pool->last = jiffies; local_irq_enable(); mix_pool_bytes(pool, sizeof(pool)); - credit_init_bits(1); + credit_init_bits(max(1u, (count & U16_MAX) / 64)); memzero_explicit(pool, sizeof(pool)); } @@ -1139,22 +1141,30 @@ struct timer_rand_state { /* * This function adds entropy to the entropy "pool" by using timing - * delays. It uses the timer_rand_state structure to make an estimate - * of how many bits of entropy this call has added to the pool. - * - * The number "num" is also added to the pool - it should somehow describe - * the type of event which just happened. This is currently 0-255 for - * keyboard scan codes, and 256 upwards for interrupts. + * delays. It uses the timer_rand_state structure to make an estimate + * of how many bits of entropy this call has added to the pool. The + * value "num" is also added to the pool; it should somehow describe + * the type of event that just happened. */ static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned int num) { unsigned long entropy = random_get_entropy(), now = jiffies, flags; long delta, delta2, delta3; + unsigned int bits; - spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags); - _mix_pool_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy)); - _mix_pool_bytes(&num, sizeof(num)); - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags); + /* + * If we're in a hard IRQ, add_interrupt_randomness() will be called + * sometime after, so mix into the fast pool. + */ + if (in_irq()) { + fast_mix(this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness)->pool, + (unsigned long[2]){ entropy, num }); + } else { + spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags); + _mix_pool_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy)); + _mix_pool_bytes(&num, sizeof(num)); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags); + } if (crng_ready()) return; @@ -1185,11 +1195,22 @@ static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned int nu delta = delta3; /* - * delta is now minimum absolute delta. - * Round down by 1 bit on general principles, - * and limit entropy estimate to 12 bits. + * delta is now minimum absolute delta. Round down by 1 bit + * on general principles, and limit entropy estimate to 11 bits. */ - credit_init_bits(min_t(unsigned int, fls(delta >> 1), 11)); + bits = min(fls(delta >> 1), 11); + + /* + * As mentioned above, if we're in a hard IRQ, add_interrupt_randomness() + * will run after this, which uses a different crediting scheme of 1 bit + * per every 64 interrupts. In order to let that function do accounting + * close to the one in this function, we credit a full 64/64 bit per bit, + * and then subtract one to account for the extra one added. + */ + if (in_irq()) + this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness)->count += max(1u, bits * 64) - 1; + else + credit_init_bits(bits); } void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, From e4e8a9f8a616a540c0afc8c8c49a12047b896ac1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Fri, 6 May 2022 23:19:43 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0582/1091] random: help compiler out with fast_mix() by using simpler arguments commit 791332b3cbb080510954a4c152ce02af8832eac9 upstream. Now that fast_mix() has more than one caller, gcc no longer inlines it. That's fine. But it also doesn't handle the compound literal argument we pass it very efficiently, nor does it handle the loop as well as it could. So just expand the code to spell out this function so that it generates the same code as it did before. Performance-wise, this now behaves as it did before the last commit. The difference in actual code size on x86 is 45 bytes, which is less than a cache line. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index aec2e048601a..5c4b12b8328f 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -1026,25 +1026,30 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct fast_pool, irq_randomness) = { * and therefore this has no security on its own. s represents the * four-word SipHash state, while v represents a two-word input. */ -static void fast_mix(unsigned long s[4], const unsigned long v[2]) +static void fast_mix(unsigned long s[4], unsigned long v1, unsigned long v2) { - size_t i; - - for (i = 0; i < 2; ++i) { - s[3] ^= v[i]; #ifdef CONFIG_64BIT - s[0] += s[1]; s[1] = rol64(s[1], 13); s[1] ^= s[0]; s[0] = rol64(s[0], 32); - s[2] += s[3]; s[3] = rol64(s[3], 16); s[3] ^= s[2]; - s[0] += s[3]; s[3] = rol64(s[3], 21); s[3] ^= s[0]; - s[2] += s[1]; s[1] = rol64(s[1], 17); s[1] ^= s[2]; s[2] = rol64(s[2], 32); +#define PERM() do { \ + s[0] += s[1]; s[1] = rol64(s[1], 13); s[1] ^= s[0]; s[0] = rol64(s[0], 32); \ + s[2] += s[3]; s[3] = rol64(s[3], 16); s[3] ^= s[2]; \ + s[0] += s[3]; s[3] = rol64(s[3], 21); s[3] ^= s[0]; \ + s[2] += s[1]; s[1] = rol64(s[1], 17); s[1] ^= s[2]; s[2] = rol64(s[2], 32); \ +} while (0) #else - s[0] += s[1]; s[1] = rol32(s[1], 5); s[1] ^= s[0]; s[0] = rol32(s[0], 16); - s[2] += s[3]; s[3] = rol32(s[3], 8); s[3] ^= s[2]; - s[0] += s[3]; s[3] = rol32(s[3], 7); s[3] ^= s[0]; - s[2] += s[1]; s[1] = rol32(s[1], 13); s[1] ^= s[2]; s[2] = rol32(s[2], 16); +#define PERM() do { \ + s[0] += s[1]; s[1] = rol32(s[1], 5); s[1] ^= s[0]; s[0] = rol32(s[0], 16); \ + s[2] += s[3]; s[3] = rol32(s[3], 8); s[3] ^= s[2]; \ + s[0] += s[3]; s[3] = rol32(s[3], 7); s[3] ^= s[0]; \ + s[2] += s[1]; s[1] = rol32(s[1], 13); s[1] ^= s[2]; s[2] = rol32(s[2], 16); \ +} while (0) #endif - s[0] ^= v[i]; - } + + s[3] ^= v1; + PERM(); + s[0] ^= v1; + s[3] ^= v2; + PERM(); + s[0] ^= v2; } #ifdef CONFIG_SMP @@ -1114,10 +1119,8 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) struct pt_regs *regs = get_irq_regs(); unsigned int new_count; - fast_mix(fast_pool->pool, (unsigned long[2]){ - entropy, - (regs ? instruction_pointer(regs) : _RET_IP_) ^ swab(irq) - }); + fast_mix(fast_pool->pool, entropy, + (regs ? instruction_pointer(regs) : _RET_IP_) ^ swab(irq)); new_count = ++fast_pool->count; if (new_count & MIX_INFLIGHT) @@ -1157,8 +1160,7 @@ static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned int nu * sometime after, so mix into the fast pool. */ if (in_irq()) { - fast_mix(this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness)->pool, - (unsigned long[2]){ entropy, num }); + fast_mix(this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness)->pool, entropy, num); } else { spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags); _mix_pool_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy)); From 55d64df3ad5b8f6c8262b2992e27b447caadc1e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Sat, 7 May 2022 14:03:46 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0583/1091] siphash: use one source of truth for siphash permutations commit e73aaae2fa9024832e1f42e30c787c7baf61d014 upstream. The SipHash family of permutations is currently used in three places: - siphash.c itself, used in the ordinary way it was intended. - random32.c, in a construction from an anonymous contributor. - random.c, as part of its fast_mix function. Each one of these places reinvents the wheel with the same C code, same rotation constants, and same symmetry-breaking constants. This commit tidies things up a bit by placing macros for the permutations and constants into siphash.h, where each of the three .c users can access them. It also leaves a note dissuading more users of them from emerging. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 30 +++++++----------------------- include/linux/prandom.h | 23 +++++++---------------- include/linux/siphash.h | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ lib/siphash.c | 32 ++++++++++---------------------- 4 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 61 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 5c4b12b8328f..f23e0b49d78b 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -1011,12 +1012,11 @@ struct fast_pool { static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct fast_pool, irq_randomness) = { #ifdef CONFIG_64BIT - /* SipHash constants */ - .pool = { 0x736f6d6570736575UL, 0x646f72616e646f6dUL, - 0x6c7967656e657261UL, 0x7465646279746573UL } +#define FASTMIX_PERM SIPHASH_PERMUTATION + .pool = { SIPHASH_CONST_0, SIPHASH_CONST_1, SIPHASH_CONST_2, SIPHASH_CONST_3 } #else - /* HalfSipHash constants */ - .pool = { 0, 0, 0x6c796765U, 0x74656462U } +#define FASTMIX_PERM HSIPHASH_PERMUTATION + .pool = { HSIPHASH_CONST_0, HSIPHASH_CONST_1, HSIPHASH_CONST_2, HSIPHASH_CONST_3 } #endif }; @@ -1028,27 +1028,11 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct fast_pool, irq_randomness) = { */ static void fast_mix(unsigned long s[4], unsigned long v1, unsigned long v2) { -#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT -#define PERM() do { \ - s[0] += s[1]; s[1] = rol64(s[1], 13); s[1] ^= s[0]; s[0] = rol64(s[0], 32); \ - s[2] += s[3]; s[3] = rol64(s[3], 16); s[3] ^= s[2]; \ - s[0] += s[3]; s[3] = rol64(s[3], 21); s[3] ^= s[0]; \ - s[2] += s[1]; s[1] = rol64(s[1], 17); s[1] ^= s[2]; s[2] = rol64(s[2], 32); \ -} while (0) -#else -#define PERM() do { \ - s[0] += s[1]; s[1] = rol32(s[1], 5); s[1] ^= s[0]; s[0] = rol32(s[0], 16); \ - s[2] += s[3]; s[3] = rol32(s[3], 8); s[3] ^= s[2]; \ - s[0] += s[3]; s[3] = rol32(s[3], 7); s[3] ^= s[0]; \ - s[2] += s[1]; s[1] = rol32(s[1], 13); s[1] ^= s[2]; s[2] = rol32(s[2], 16); \ -} while (0) -#endif - s[3] ^= v1; - PERM(); + FASTMIX_PERM(s[0], s[1], s[2], s[3]); s[0] ^= v1; s[3] ^= v2; - PERM(); + FASTMIX_PERM(s[0], s[1], s[2], s[3]); s[0] ^= v2; } diff --git a/include/linux/prandom.h b/include/linux/prandom.h index e20339c78a84..709e8e69fb39 100644 --- a/include/linux/prandom.h +++ b/include/linux/prandom.h @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #include #include +#include u32 prandom_u32(void); void prandom_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes); @@ -21,15 +22,10 @@ void prandom_reseed_late(void); * The core SipHash round function. Each line can be executed in * parallel given enough CPU resources. */ -#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) ( \ - v0 += v1, v1 = rol64(v1, 13), v2 += v3, v3 = rol64(v3, 16), \ - v1 ^= v0, v0 = rol64(v0, 32), v3 ^= v2, \ - v0 += v3, v3 = rol64(v3, 21), v2 += v1, v1 = rol64(v1, 17), \ - v3 ^= v0, v1 ^= v2, v2 = rol64(v2, 32) \ -) +#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) SIPHASH_PERMUTATION(v0, v1, v2, v3) -#define PRND_K0 (0x736f6d6570736575 ^ 0x6c7967656e657261) -#define PRND_K1 (0x646f72616e646f6d ^ 0x7465646279746573) +#define PRND_K0 (SIPHASH_CONST_0 ^ SIPHASH_CONST_2) +#define PRND_K1 (SIPHASH_CONST_1 ^ SIPHASH_CONST_3) #elif BITS_PER_LONG == 32 /* @@ -37,14 +33,9 @@ void prandom_reseed_late(void); * This is weaker, but 32-bit machines are not used for high-traffic * applications, so there is less output for an attacker to analyze. */ -#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) ( \ - v0 += v1, v1 = rol32(v1, 5), v2 += v3, v3 = rol32(v3, 8), \ - v1 ^= v0, v0 = rol32(v0, 16), v3 ^= v2, \ - v0 += v3, v3 = rol32(v3, 7), v2 += v1, v1 = rol32(v1, 13), \ - v3 ^= v0, v1 ^= v2, v2 = rol32(v2, 16) \ -) -#define PRND_K0 0x6c796765 -#define PRND_K1 0x74656462 +#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) HSIPHASH_PERMUTATION(v0, v1, v2, v3) +#define PRND_K0 (HSIPHASH_CONST_0 ^ HSIPHASH_CONST_2) +#define PRND_K1 (HSIPHASH_CONST_1 ^ HSIPHASH_CONST_3) #else #error Unsupported BITS_PER_LONG diff --git a/include/linux/siphash.h b/include/linux/siphash.h index 0cda61855d90..0bb5ecd507be 100644 --- a/include/linux/siphash.h +++ b/include/linux/siphash.h @@ -136,4 +136,32 @@ static inline u32 hsiphash(const void *data, size_t len, return ___hsiphash_aligned(data, len, key); } +/* + * These macros expose the raw SipHash and HalfSipHash permutations. + * Do not use them directly! If you think you have a use for them, + * be sure to CC the maintainer of this file explaining why. + */ + +#define SIPHASH_PERMUTATION(a, b, c, d) ( \ + (a) += (b), (b) = rol64((b), 13), (b) ^= (a), (a) = rol64((a), 32), \ + (c) += (d), (d) = rol64((d), 16), (d) ^= (c), \ + (a) += (d), (d) = rol64((d), 21), (d) ^= (a), \ + (c) += (b), (b) = rol64((b), 17), (b) ^= (c), (c) = rol64((c), 32)) + +#define SIPHASH_CONST_0 0x736f6d6570736575ULL +#define SIPHASH_CONST_1 0x646f72616e646f6dULL +#define SIPHASH_CONST_2 0x6c7967656e657261ULL +#define SIPHASH_CONST_3 0x7465646279746573ULL + +#define HSIPHASH_PERMUTATION(a, b, c, d) ( \ + (a) += (b), (b) = rol32((b), 5), (b) ^= (a), (a) = rol32((a), 16), \ + (c) += (d), (d) = rol32((d), 8), (d) ^= (c), \ + (a) += (d), (d) = rol32((d), 7), (d) ^= (a), \ + (c) += (b), (b) = rol32((b), 13), (b) ^= (c), (c) = rol32((c), 16)) + +#define HSIPHASH_CONST_0 0U +#define HSIPHASH_CONST_1 0U +#define HSIPHASH_CONST_2 0x6c796765U +#define HSIPHASH_CONST_3 0x74656462U + #endif /* _LINUX_SIPHASH_H */ diff --git a/lib/siphash.c b/lib/siphash.c index 025f0cbf6d7a..b4055b1cc2f6 100644 --- a/lib/siphash.c +++ b/lib/siphash.c @@ -18,19 +18,13 @@ #include #endif -#define SIPROUND \ - do { \ - v0 += v1; v1 = rol64(v1, 13); v1 ^= v0; v0 = rol64(v0, 32); \ - v2 += v3; v3 = rol64(v3, 16); v3 ^= v2; \ - v0 += v3; v3 = rol64(v3, 21); v3 ^= v0; \ - v2 += v1; v1 = rol64(v1, 17); v1 ^= v2; v2 = rol64(v2, 32); \ - } while (0) +#define SIPROUND SIPHASH_PERMUTATION(v0, v1, v2, v3) #define PREAMBLE(len) \ - u64 v0 = 0x736f6d6570736575ULL; \ - u64 v1 = 0x646f72616e646f6dULL; \ - u64 v2 = 0x6c7967656e657261ULL; \ - u64 v3 = 0x7465646279746573ULL; \ + u64 v0 = SIPHASH_CONST_0; \ + u64 v1 = SIPHASH_CONST_1; \ + u64 v2 = SIPHASH_CONST_2; \ + u64 v3 = SIPHASH_CONST_3; \ u64 b = ((u64)(len)) << 56; \ v3 ^= key->key[1]; \ v2 ^= key->key[0]; \ @@ -389,19 +383,13 @@ u32 hsiphash_4u32(const u32 first, const u32 second, const u32 third, } EXPORT_SYMBOL(hsiphash_4u32); #else -#define HSIPROUND \ - do { \ - v0 += v1; v1 = rol32(v1, 5); v1 ^= v0; v0 = rol32(v0, 16); \ - v2 += v3; v3 = rol32(v3, 8); v3 ^= v2; \ - v0 += v3; v3 = rol32(v3, 7); v3 ^= v0; \ - v2 += v1; v1 = rol32(v1, 13); v1 ^= v2; v2 = rol32(v2, 16); \ - } while (0) +#define HSIPROUND HSIPHASH_PERMUTATION(v0, v1, v2, v3) #define HPREAMBLE(len) \ - u32 v0 = 0; \ - u32 v1 = 0; \ - u32 v2 = 0x6c796765U; \ - u32 v3 = 0x74656462U; \ + u32 v0 = HSIPHASH_CONST_0; \ + u32 v1 = HSIPHASH_CONST_1; \ + u32 v2 = HSIPHASH_CONST_2; \ + u32 v3 = HSIPHASH_CONST_3; \ u32 b = ((u32)(len)) << 24; \ v3 ^= key->key[1]; \ v2 ^= key->key[0]; \ From 0baeec0effc73bf104befc09562ae19ed6fddc2d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Sun, 8 May 2022 13:20:30 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0584/1091] random: use symbolic constants for crng_init states commit e3d2c5e79a999aa4e7d6f0127e16d3da5a4ff70d upstream. crng_init represents a state machine, with three states, and various rules for transitions. For the longest time, we've been managing these with "0", "1", and "2", and expecting people to figure it out. To make the code more obvious, replace these with proper enum values representing the transition, and then redocument what each of these states mean. Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Cc: Joe Perches Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index f23e0b49d78b..43ba0d0d4bb9 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -70,16 +70,16 @@ *********************************************************************/ /* - * crng_init = 0 --> Uninitialized - * 1 --> Initialized - * 2 --> Initialized from input_pool - * * crng_init is protected by base_crng->lock, and only increases - * its value (from 0->1->2). + * its value (from empty->early->ready). */ -static int crng_init = 0; -#define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init > 1)) -/* Various types of waiters for crng_init->2 transition. */ +static enum { + CRNG_EMPTY = 0, /* Little to no entropy collected */ + CRNG_EARLY = 1, /* At least POOL_EARLY_BITS collected */ + CRNG_READY = 2 /* Fully initialized with POOL_READY_BITS collected */ +} crng_init = CRNG_EMPTY; +#define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init >= CRNG_READY)) +/* Various types of waiters for crng_init->CRNG_READY transition. */ static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_init_wait); static struct fasync_struct *fasync; static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(random_ready_chain_lock); @@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(void) WRITE_ONCE(base_crng.generation, next_gen); WRITE_ONCE(base_crng.birth, jiffies); if (!crng_ready()) { - crng_init = 2; + crng_init = CRNG_READY; finalize_init = true; } spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags); @@ -376,7 +376,7 @@ static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)], * For the fast path, we check whether we're ready, unlocked first, and * then re-check once locked later. In the case where we're really not * ready, we do fast key erasure with the base_crng directly, extracting - * when crng_init==0. + * when crng_init is CRNG_EMPTY. */ if (!crng_ready()) { bool ready; @@ -384,7 +384,7 @@ static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)], spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags); ready = crng_ready(); if (!ready) { - if (crng_init == 0) + if (crng_init == CRNG_EMPTY) extract_entropy(base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key)); crng_fast_key_erasure(base_crng.key, chacha_state, random_data, random_data_len); @@ -735,8 +735,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch); enum { POOL_BITS = BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE * 8, - POOL_INIT_BITS = POOL_BITS, /* No point in settling for less. */ - POOL_FAST_INIT_BITS = POOL_INIT_BITS / 2 + POOL_READY_BITS = POOL_BITS, /* When crng_init->CRNG_READY */ + POOL_EARLY_BITS = POOL_READY_BITS / 2 /* When crng_init->CRNG_EARLY */ }; static struct { @@ -831,13 +831,13 @@ static void credit_init_bits(size_t nbits) init_bits = min_t(unsigned int, POOL_BITS, orig + add); } while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.init_bits, orig, init_bits) != orig); - if (!crng_ready() && init_bits >= POOL_INIT_BITS) + if (!crng_ready() && init_bits >= POOL_READY_BITS) crng_reseed(); - else if (unlikely(crng_init == 0 && init_bits >= POOL_FAST_INIT_BITS)) { + else if (unlikely(crng_init == CRNG_EMPTY && init_bits >= POOL_EARLY_BITS)) { spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags); - if (crng_init == 0) { + if (crng_init == CRNG_EMPTY) { extract_entropy(base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key)); - crng_init = 1; + crng_init = CRNG_EARLY; } spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags); } @@ -1512,7 +1512,7 @@ const struct file_operations urandom_fops = { * * - write_wakeup_threshold - the amount of entropy in the input pool * below which write polls to /dev/random will unblock, requesting - * more entropy, tied to the POOL_INIT_BITS constant. It is writable + * more entropy, tied to the POOL_READY_BITS constant. It is writable * to avoid breaking old userspaces, but writing to it does not * change any behavior of the RNG. * @@ -1527,7 +1527,7 @@ const struct file_operations urandom_fops = { #include static int sysctl_random_min_urandom_seed = CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL / HZ; -static int sysctl_random_write_wakeup_bits = POOL_INIT_BITS; +static int sysctl_random_write_wakeup_bits = POOL_READY_BITS; static int sysctl_poolsize = POOL_BITS; static u8 sysctl_bootid[UUID_SIZE]; From 0747ad152fa19dfdf92515ea57bd162ab0b608dc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Mon, 9 May 2022 13:40:55 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0585/1091] random: avoid initializing twice in credit race commit fed7ef061686cc813b1f3d8d0edc6c35b4d3537b upstream. Since all changes of crng_init now go through credit_init_bits(), we can fix a long standing race in which two concurrent callers of credit_init_bits() have the new bit count >= some threshold, but are doing so with crng_init as a lower threshold, checked outside of a lock, resulting in crng_reseed() or similar being called twice. In order to fix this, we can use the original cmpxchg value of the bit count, and only change crng_init when the bit count transitions from below a threshold to meeting the threshold. Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 43ba0d0d4bb9..44a6de29ed7b 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -818,7 +818,7 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes) static void credit_init_bits(size_t nbits) { - unsigned int init_bits, orig, add; + unsigned int new, orig, add; unsigned long flags; if (crng_ready() || !nbits) @@ -828,12 +828,12 @@ static void credit_init_bits(size_t nbits) do { orig = READ_ONCE(input_pool.init_bits); - init_bits = min_t(unsigned int, POOL_BITS, orig + add); - } while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.init_bits, orig, init_bits) != orig); + new = min_t(unsigned int, POOL_BITS, orig + add); + } while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.init_bits, orig, new) != orig); - if (!crng_ready() && init_bits >= POOL_READY_BITS) + if (orig < POOL_READY_BITS && new >= POOL_READY_BITS) crng_reseed(); - else if (unlikely(crng_init == CRNG_EMPTY && init_bits >= POOL_EARLY_BITS)) { + else if (orig < POOL_EARLY_BITS && new >= POOL_EARLY_BITS) { spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags); if (crng_init == CRNG_EMPTY) { extract_entropy(base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key)); From c5373bd6e4fba84c8ebe71eb204c9790f1348033 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Mon, 9 May 2022 13:53:24 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0586/1091] random: move initialization out of reseeding hot path commit 68c9c8b192c6dae9be6278e98ee44029d5da2d31 upstream. Initialization happens once -- by way of credit_init_bits() -- and then it never happens again. Therefore, it doesn't need to be in crng_reseed(), which is a hot path that is called multiple times. It also doesn't make sense to have there, as initialization activity is better associated with initialization routines. After the prior commit, crng_reseed() now won't be called by multiple concurrent callers, which means that we can safely move the "finialize_init" logic into crng_init_bits() unconditionally. Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++++----------------------- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 44a6de29ed7b..ea27a347f9f3 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -264,7 +264,6 @@ static void crng_reseed(void) unsigned long flags; unsigned long next_gen; u8 key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE]; - bool finalize_init = false; extract_entropy(key, sizeof(key)); @@ -281,28 +280,10 @@ static void crng_reseed(void) ++next_gen; WRITE_ONCE(base_crng.generation, next_gen); WRITE_ONCE(base_crng.birth, jiffies); - if (!crng_ready()) { + if (!crng_ready()) crng_init = CRNG_READY; - finalize_init = true; - } spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags); memzero_explicit(key, sizeof(key)); - if (finalize_init) { - process_random_ready_list(); - wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait); - kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN); - pr_notice("crng init done\n"); - if (unseeded_warning.missed) { - pr_notice("%d get_random_xx warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n", - unseeded_warning.missed); - unseeded_warning.missed = 0; - } - if (urandom_warning.missed) { - pr_notice("%d urandom warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n", - urandom_warning.missed); - urandom_warning.missed = 0; - } - } } /* @@ -831,10 +812,25 @@ static void credit_init_bits(size_t nbits) new = min_t(unsigned int, POOL_BITS, orig + add); } while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.init_bits, orig, new) != orig); - if (orig < POOL_READY_BITS && new >= POOL_READY_BITS) - crng_reseed(); - else if (orig < POOL_EARLY_BITS && new >= POOL_EARLY_BITS) { + if (orig < POOL_READY_BITS && new >= POOL_READY_BITS) { + crng_reseed(); /* Sets crng_init to CRNG_READY under base_crng.lock. */ + process_random_ready_list(); + wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait); + kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN); + pr_notice("crng init done\n"); + if (unseeded_warning.missed) { + pr_notice("%d get_random_xx warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n", + unseeded_warning.missed); + unseeded_warning.missed = 0; + } + if (urandom_warning.missed) { + pr_notice("%d urandom warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n", + urandom_warning.missed); + urandom_warning.missed = 0; + } + } else if (orig < POOL_EARLY_BITS && new >= POOL_EARLY_BITS) { spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags); + /* Check if crng_init is CRNG_EMPTY, to avoid race with crng_reseed(). */ if (crng_init == CRNG_EMPTY) { extract_entropy(base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key)); crng_init = CRNG_EARLY; From 3266fba20661c2139f17ce81892f576cc98307e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Mon, 9 May 2022 16:13:18 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0587/1091] random: remove ratelimiting for in-kernel unseeded randomness commit cc1e127bfa95b5fb2f9307e7168bf8b2b45b4c5e upstream. The CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM debug option controls whether the kernel warns about all unseeded randomness or just the first instance. There's some complicated rate limiting and comparison to the previous caller, such that even with CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM enabled, developers still don't see all the messages or even an accurate count of how many were missed. This is the result of basically parallel mechanisms aimed at accomplishing more or less the same thing, added at different points in random.c history, which sort of compete with the first-instance-only limiting we have now. It turns out, however, that nobody cares about the first unseeded randomness instance of in-kernel users. The same first user has been there for ages now, and nobody is doing anything about it. It isn't even clear that anybody _can_ do anything about it. Most places that can do something about it have switched over to using get_random_bytes_wait() or wait_for_random_bytes(), which is the right thing to do, but there is still much code that needs randomness sometimes during init, and as a geeneral rule, if you're not using one of the _wait functions or the readiness notifier callback, you're bound to be doing it wrong just based on that fact alone. So warning about this same first user that can't easily change is simply not an effective mechanism for anything at all. Users can't do anything about it, as the Kconfig text points out -- the problem isn't in userspace code -- and kernel developers don't or more often can't react to it. Instead, show the warning for all instances when CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM is set, so that developers can debug things need be, or if it isn't set, don't show a warning at all. At the same time, CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM now implies setting random.ratelimit_disable=1 on by default, since if you care about one you probably care about the other too. And we can clean up usage around the related urandom_warning ratelimiter as well (whose behavior isn't changing), so that it properly counts missed messages after the 10 message threshold is reached. Cc: Theodore Ts'o Cc: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 61 +++++++++++++------------------------------ lib/Kconfig.debug | 3 +-- 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index ea27a347f9f3..a35d7799555b 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -86,11 +86,10 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(random_ready_chain_lock); static RAW_NOTIFIER_HEAD(random_ready_chain); /* Control how we warn userspace. */ -static struct ratelimit_state unseeded_warning = - RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT("warn_unseeded_randomness", HZ, 3); static struct ratelimit_state urandom_warning = RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT("warn_urandom_randomness", HZ, 3); -static int ratelimit_disable __read_mostly; +static int ratelimit_disable __read_mostly = + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM); module_param_named(ratelimit_disable, ratelimit_disable, int, 0644); MODULE_PARM_DESC(ratelimit_disable, "Disable random ratelimit suppression"); @@ -183,27 +182,15 @@ static void process_random_ready_list(void) spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_chain_lock, flags); } -#define warn_unseeded_randomness(previous) \ - _warn_unseeded_randomness(__func__, (void *)_RET_IP_, (previous)) +#define warn_unseeded_randomness() \ + _warn_unseeded_randomness(__func__, (void *)_RET_IP_) -static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(const char *func_name, void *caller, void **previous) +static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(const char *func_name, void *caller) { -#ifdef CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM - const bool print_once = false; -#else - static bool print_once __read_mostly; -#endif - - if (print_once || crng_ready() || - (previous && (caller == READ_ONCE(*previous)))) + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM) || crng_ready()) return; - WRITE_ONCE(*previous, caller); -#ifndef CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM - print_once = true; -#endif - if (__ratelimit(&unseeded_warning)) - printk_deferred(KERN_NOTICE "random: %s called from %pS with crng_init=%d\n", - func_name, caller, crng_init); + printk_deferred(KERN_NOTICE "random: %s called from %pS with crng_init=%d\n", + func_name, caller, crng_init); } @@ -454,9 +441,7 @@ static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes) */ void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes) { - static void *previous; - - warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous); + warn_unseeded_randomness(); _get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes); @@ -550,10 +535,9 @@ u64 get_random_u64(void) u64 ret; unsigned long flags; struct batched_entropy *batch; - static void *previous; unsigned long next_gen; - warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous); + warn_unseeded_randomness(); if (!crng_ready()) { _get_random_bytes(&ret, sizeof(ret)); @@ -588,10 +572,9 @@ u32 get_random_u32(void) u32 ret; unsigned long flags; struct batched_entropy *batch; - static void *previous; unsigned long next_gen; - warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous); + warn_unseeded_randomness(); if (!crng_ready()) { _get_random_bytes(&ret, sizeof(ret)); @@ -818,16 +801,9 @@ static void credit_init_bits(size_t nbits) wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait); kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN); pr_notice("crng init done\n"); - if (unseeded_warning.missed) { - pr_notice("%d get_random_xx warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n", - unseeded_warning.missed); - unseeded_warning.missed = 0; - } - if (urandom_warning.missed) { + if (urandom_warning.missed) pr_notice("%d urandom warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n", urandom_warning.missed); - urandom_warning.missed = 0; - } } else if (orig < POOL_EARLY_BITS && new >= POOL_EARLY_BITS) { spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags); /* Check if crng_init is CRNG_EMPTY, to avoid race with crng_reseed(). */ @@ -940,10 +916,6 @@ int __init rand_initialize(void) else if (arch_init && trust_cpu) credit_init_bits(BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE * 8); - if (ratelimit_disable) { - urandom_warning.interval = 0; - unseeded_warning.interval = 0; - } return 0; } @@ -1389,11 +1361,14 @@ static ssize_t urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, { static int maxwarn = 10; - if (!crng_ready() && maxwarn > 0) { - maxwarn--; - if (__ratelimit(&urandom_warning)) + if (!crng_ready()) { + if (!ratelimit_disable && maxwarn <= 0) + ++urandom_warning.missed; + else if (ratelimit_disable || __ratelimit(&urandom_warning)) { + --maxwarn; pr_notice("%s: uninitialized urandom read (%zd bytes read)\n", current->comm, nbytes); + } } return get_random_bytes_user(buf, nbytes); diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.debug b/lib/Kconfig.debug index a846f03901db..dd7044aa1a12 100644 --- a/lib/Kconfig.debug +++ b/lib/Kconfig.debug @@ -1292,8 +1292,7 @@ config WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM so architecture maintainers really need to do what they can to get the CRNG seeded sooner after the system is booted. However, since users cannot do anything actionable to - address this, by default the kernel will issue only a single - warning for the first use of unseeded randomness. + address this, by default this option is disabled. Say Y here if you want to receive warnings for all uses of unseeded randomness. This will be of use primarily for From 736a22645d9826133dabf8e6ee78cb195e1aeb42 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Tue, 10 May 2022 15:20:42 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0588/1091] random: use proper jiffies comparison macro commit 8a5b8a4a4ceb353b4dd5bafd09e2b15751bcdb51 upstream. This expands to exactly the same code that it replaces, but makes things consistent by using the same macro for jiffy comparisons throughout. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index a35d7799555b..36a03e6180e8 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -324,7 +324,7 @@ static bool crng_has_old_seed(void) interval = max_t(unsigned int, CRNG_RESEED_START_INTERVAL, (unsigned int)uptime / 2 * HZ); } - return time_after(jiffies, READ_ONCE(base_crng.birth) + interval); + return time_is_before_jiffies(READ_ONCE(base_crng.birth) + interval); } /* From ac48f7bee198ca77f65d9905865100757fb024a1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Thu, 5 May 2022 02:20:22 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0589/1091] random: handle latent entropy and command line from random_init() commit 2f14062bb14b0fcfcc21e6dc7d5b5c0d25966164 upstream. Currently, start_kernel() adds latent entropy and the command line to the entropy bool *after* the RNG has been initialized, deferring when it's actually used by things like stack canaries until the next time the pool is seeded. This surely is not intended. Rather than splitting up which entropy gets added where and when between start_kernel() and random_init(), just do everything in random_init(), which should eliminate these kinds of bugs in the future. While we're at it, rename the awkwardly titled "rand_initialize()" to the more standard "random_init()" nomenclature. Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 13 ++++++++----- include/linux/random.h | 22 ++++++++++------------ init/main.c | 10 +++------- 3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 36a03e6180e8..6000992e7923 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -883,12 +883,13 @@ early_param("random.trust_bootloader", parse_trust_bootloader); /* * The first collection of entropy occurs at system boot while interrupts - * are still turned off. Here we push in RDSEED, a timestamp, and utsname(). - * Depending on the above configuration knob, RDSEED may be considered - * sufficient for initialization. Note that much earlier setup may already - * have pushed entropy into the input pool by the time we get here. + * are still turned off. Here we push in latent entropy, RDSEED, a timestamp, + * utsname(), and the command line. Depending on the above configuration knob, + * RDSEED may be considered sufficient for initialization. Note that much + * earlier setup may already have pushed entropy into the input pool by the + * time we get here. */ -int __init rand_initialize(void) +int __init random_init(const char *command_line) { size_t i; ktime_t now = ktime_get_real(); @@ -910,6 +911,8 @@ int __init rand_initialize(void) } _mix_pool_bytes(&now, sizeof(now)); _mix_pool_bytes(utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname()))); + _mix_pool_bytes(command_line, strlen(command_line)); + add_latent_entropy(); if (crng_ready()) crng_reseed(); diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h index d4abda9e2348..588e31dc10af 100644 --- a/include/linux/random.h +++ b/include/linux/random.h @@ -14,26 +14,24 @@ struct notifier_block; extern void add_device_randomness(const void *, size_t); extern void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *, size_t); - -#if defined(LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN) && !defined(__CHECKER__) -static inline void add_latent_entropy(void) -{ - add_device_randomness((const void *)&latent_entropy, - sizeof(latent_entropy)); -} -#else -static inline void add_latent_entropy(void) {} -#endif - extern void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, unsigned int value) __latent_entropy; extern void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) __latent_entropy; extern void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count, size_t entropy); +#if defined(LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN) && !defined(__CHECKER__) +static inline void add_latent_entropy(void) +{ + add_device_randomness((const void *)&latent_entropy, sizeof(latent_entropy)); +} +#else +static inline void add_latent_entropy(void) {} +#endif + extern void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes); extern int wait_for_random_bytes(void); -extern int __init rand_initialize(void); +extern int __init random_init(const char *command_line); extern bool rng_is_initialized(void); extern int register_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb); extern int unregister_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb); diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c index 51b1a88438ff..a17a111d9336 100644 --- a/init/main.c +++ b/init/main.c @@ -685,15 +685,11 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init start_kernel(void) /* * For best initial stack canary entropy, prepare it after: * - setup_arch() for any UEFI RNG entropy and boot cmdline access - * - timekeeping_init() for ktime entropy used in rand_initialize() + * - timekeeping_init() for ktime entropy used in random_init() * - time_init() for making random_get_entropy() work on some platforms - * - rand_initialize() to get any arch-specific entropy like RDRAND - * - add_latent_entropy() to get any latent entropy - * - adding command line entropy + * - random_init() to initialize the RNG from from early entropy sources */ - rand_initialize(); - add_latent_entropy(); - add_device_randomness(command_line, strlen(command_line)); + random_init(command_line); boot_init_stack_canary(); perf_event_init(); From 087a14b9cf9b3ece6a07ca9515adc7cf741d06d4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Thu, 12 May 2022 15:32:26 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0590/1091] random: credit architectural init the exact amount commit 12e45a2a6308105469968951e6d563e8f4fea187 upstream. RDRAND and RDSEED can fail sometimes, which is fine. We currently initialize the RNG with 512 bits of RDRAND/RDSEED. We only need 256 bits of those to succeed in order to initialize the RNG. Instead of the current "all or nothing" approach, actually credit these contributions the amount that is actually contributed. Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 6000992e7923..ed93bdc69ab7 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -891,9 +891,8 @@ early_param("random.trust_bootloader", parse_trust_bootloader); */ int __init random_init(const char *command_line) { - size_t i; ktime_t now = ktime_get_real(); - bool arch_init = true; + unsigned int i, arch_bytes; unsigned long rv; #if defined(LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN) @@ -901,11 +900,12 @@ int __init random_init(const char *command_line) _mix_pool_bytes(compiletime_seed, sizeof(compiletime_seed)); #endif - for (i = 0; i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; i += sizeof(rv)) { + for (i = 0, arch_bytes = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; + i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; i += sizeof(rv)) { if (!arch_get_random_seed_long_early(&rv) && !arch_get_random_long_early(&rv)) { rv = random_get_entropy(); - arch_init = false; + arch_bytes -= sizeof(rv); } _mix_pool_bytes(&rv, sizeof(rv)); } @@ -916,8 +916,8 @@ int __init random_init(const char *command_line) if (crng_ready()) crng_reseed(); - else if (arch_init && trust_cpu) - credit_init_bits(BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE * 8); + else if (trust_cpu) + credit_init_bits(arch_bytes * 8); return 0; } From d8b4296417ea01bdd80a678f0ba5da9f28de9ac2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Tue, 3 May 2022 15:30:45 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0591/1091] random: use static branch for crng_ready() commit f5bda35fba615ace70a656d4700423fa6c9bebee upstream. Since crng_ready() is only false briefly during initialization and then forever after becomes true, we don't need to evaluate it after, making it a prime candidate for a static branch. One complication, however, is that it changes state in a particular call to credit_init_bits(), which might be made from atomic context, which means we must kick off a workqueue to change the static key. Further complicating things, credit_init_bits() may be called sufficiently early on in system initialization such that system_wq is NULL. Fortunately, there exists the nice function execute_in_process_context(), which will immediately execute the function if !in_interrupt(), and otherwise defer it to a workqueue. During early init, before workqueues are available, in_interrupt() is always false, because interrupts haven't even been enabled yet, which means the function in that case executes immediately. Later on, after workqueues are available, in_interrupt() might be true, but in that case, the work is queued in system_wq and all goes well. Cc: Theodore Ts'o Cc: Sultan Alsawaf Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 16 ++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index ed93bdc69ab7..979f99507263 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -77,8 +77,9 @@ static enum { CRNG_EMPTY = 0, /* Little to no entropy collected */ CRNG_EARLY = 1, /* At least POOL_EARLY_BITS collected */ CRNG_READY = 2 /* Fully initialized with POOL_READY_BITS collected */ -} crng_init = CRNG_EMPTY; -#define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init >= CRNG_READY)) +} crng_init __read_mostly = CRNG_EMPTY; +static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(crng_is_ready); +#define crng_ready() (static_branch_likely(&crng_is_ready) || crng_init >= CRNG_READY) /* Various types of waiters for crng_init->CRNG_READY transition. */ static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_init_wait); static struct fasync_struct *fasync; @@ -108,6 +109,11 @@ bool rng_is_initialized(void) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(rng_is_initialized); +static void crng_set_ready(struct work_struct *work) +{ + static_branch_enable(&crng_is_ready); +} + /* Used by wait_for_random_bytes(), and considered an entropy collector, below. */ static void try_to_generate_entropy(void); @@ -267,7 +273,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(void) ++next_gen; WRITE_ONCE(base_crng.generation, next_gen); WRITE_ONCE(base_crng.birth, jiffies); - if (!crng_ready()) + if (!static_branch_likely(&crng_is_ready)) crng_init = CRNG_READY; spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags); memzero_explicit(key, sizeof(key)); @@ -782,6 +788,7 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes) static void credit_init_bits(size_t nbits) { + static struct execute_work set_ready; unsigned int new, orig, add; unsigned long flags; @@ -797,6 +804,7 @@ static void credit_init_bits(size_t nbits) if (orig < POOL_READY_BITS && new >= POOL_READY_BITS) { crng_reseed(); /* Sets crng_init to CRNG_READY under base_crng.lock. */ + execute_in_process_context(crng_set_ready, &set_ready); process_random_ready_list(); wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait); kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN); @@ -1306,7 +1314,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count, unsigned int, if (count > INT_MAX) count = INT_MAX; - if (!(flags & GRND_INSECURE) && !crng_ready()) { + if (!crng_ready() && !(flags & GRND_INSECURE)) { int ret; if (flags & GRND_NONBLOCK) From d05948dc23e686f3bcc7e689b1038484fe68a224 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Fri, 13 May 2022 12:29:38 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0592/1091] random: remove extern from functions in header commit 7782cfeca7d420e8bb707613d4cfb0f7ff29bb3a upstream. Accoriding to the kernel style guide, having `extern` on functions in headers is old school and deprecated, and doesn't add anything. So remove them from random.h, and tidy up the file a little bit too. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/linux/random.h | 71 +++++++++++++++++------------------------- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h index 588e31dc10af..0c140a0847a2 100644 --- a/include/linux/random.h +++ b/include/linux/random.h @@ -12,13 +12,12 @@ struct notifier_block; -extern void add_device_randomness(const void *, size_t); -extern void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *, size_t); -extern void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, - unsigned int value) __latent_entropy; -extern void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) __latent_entropy; -extern void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count, - size_t entropy); +void add_device_randomness(const void *, size_t); +void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *, size_t); +void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, + unsigned int value) __latent_entropy; +void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) __latent_entropy; +void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count, size_t entropy); #if defined(LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN) && !defined(__CHECKER__) static inline void add_latent_entropy(void) @@ -26,21 +25,11 @@ static inline void add_latent_entropy(void) add_device_randomness((const void *)&latent_entropy, sizeof(latent_entropy)); } #else -static inline void add_latent_entropy(void) {} -#endif - -extern void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes); -extern int wait_for_random_bytes(void); -extern int __init random_init(const char *command_line); -extern bool rng_is_initialized(void); -extern int register_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb); -extern int unregister_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb); -extern size_t __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, size_t nbytes); - -#ifndef MODULE -extern const struct file_operations random_fops, urandom_fops; +static inline void add_latent_entropy(void) { } #endif +void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes); +size_t __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, size_t nbytes); u32 get_random_u32(void); u64 get_random_u64(void); static inline unsigned int get_random_int(void) @@ -72,11 +61,17 @@ static inline unsigned long get_random_long(void) static inline unsigned long get_random_canary(void) { - unsigned long val = get_random_long(); - - return val & CANARY_MASK; + return get_random_long() & CANARY_MASK; } +unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range); + +int __init random_init(const char *command_line); +bool rng_is_initialized(void); +int wait_for_random_bytes(void); +int register_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb); +int unregister_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb); + /* Calls wait_for_random_bytes() and then calls get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes). * Returns the result of the call to wait_for_random_bytes. */ static inline int get_random_bytes_wait(void *buf, size_t nbytes) @@ -100,8 +95,6 @@ declare_get_random_var_wait(int) declare_get_random_var_wait(long) #undef declare_get_random_var -unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range); - /* * This is designed to be standalone for just prandom * users, but for now we include it from @@ -112,22 +105,10 @@ unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range); #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM # include #else -static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v) -{ - return false; -} -static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_int(unsigned int *v) -{ - return false; -} -static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v) -{ - return false; -} -static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v) -{ - return false; -} +static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v) { return false; } +static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_int(unsigned int *v) { return false; } +static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v) { return false; } +static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v) { return false; } #endif /* @@ -151,8 +132,12 @@ static inline bool __init arch_get_random_long_early(unsigned long *v) #endif #ifdef CONFIG_SMP -extern int random_prepare_cpu(unsigned int cpu); -extern int random_online_cpu(unsigned int cpu); +int random_prepare_cpu(unsigned int cpu); +int random_online_cpu(unsigned int cpu); +#endif + +#ifndef MODULE +extern const struct file_operations random_fops, urandom_fops; #endif #endif /* _LINUX_RANDOM_H */ From 70fce7f105bb9ce550cf41a4ada476b51a3281ad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Fri, 13 May 2022 12:32:23 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0593/1091] random: use proper return types on get_random_{int,long}_wait() commit 7c3a8a1db5e03d02cc0abb3357a84b8b326dfac3 upstream. Before these were returning signed values, but the API is intended to be used with unsigned values. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/linux/random.h | 14 +++++++------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h index 0c140a0847a2..0416b393ca4d 100644 --- a/include/linux/random.h +++ b/include/linux/random.h @@ -81,18 +81,18 @@ static inline int get_random_bytes_wait(void *buf, size_t nbytes) return ret; } -#define declare_get_random_var_wait(var) \ - static inline int get_random_ ## var ## _wait(var *out) { \ +#define declare_get_random_var_wait(name, ret_type) \ + static inline int get_random_ ## name ## _wait(ret_type *out) { \ int ret = wait_for_random_bytes(); \ if (unlikely(ret)) \ return ret; \ - *out = get_random_ ## var(); \ + *out = get_random_ ## name(); \ return 0; \ } -declare_get_random_var_wait(u32) -declare_get_random_var_wait(u64) -declare_get_random_var_wait(int) -declare_get_random_var_wait(long) +declare_get_random_var_wait(u32, u32) +declare_get_random_var_wait(u64, u32) +declare_get_random_var_wait(int, unsigned int) +declare_get_random_var_wait(long, unsigned long) #undef declare_get_random_var /* From d3bf98d61fb68e96cf0903d4316e1339c5c37d73 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Fri, 13 May 2022 13:18:46 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0594/1091] random: make consistent use of buf and len commit a19402634c435a4eae226df53c141cdbb9922e7b upstream. The current code was a mix of "nbytes", "count", "size", "buffer", "in", and so forth. Instead, let's clean this up by naming input parameters "buf" (or "ubuf") and "len", so that you always understand that you're reading this variety of function argument. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 195 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- include/linux/random.h | 10 +-- 2 files changed, 100 insertions(+), 105 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 979f99507263..bbce1f6242d8 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(const char *func_name, void *caller) * * There are a few exported interfaces for use by other drivers: * - * void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes) + * void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t len) * u32 get_random_u32() * u64 get_random_u64() * unsigned int get_random_int() @@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct crng, crngs) = { }; /* Used by crng_reseed() and crng_make_state() to extract a new seed from the input pool. */ -static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes); +static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t len); /* This extracts a new crng key from the input pool. */ static void crng_reseed(void) @@ -403,24 +403,24 @@ static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)], local_irq_restore(flags); } -static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes) +static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t len) { u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)]; u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]; - size_t len; + size_t first_block_len; - if (!nbytes) + if (!len) return; - len = min_t(size_t, 32, nbytes); - crng_make_state(chacha_state, buf, len); - nbytes -= len; - buf += len; + first_block_len = min_t(size_t, 32, len); + crng_make_state(chacha_state, buf, first_block_len); + len -= first_block_len; + buf += first_block_len; - while (nbytes) { - if (nbytes < CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE) { + while (len) { + if (len < CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE) { chacha20_block(chacha_state, tmp); - memcpy(buf, tmp, nbytes); + memcpy(buf, tmp, len); memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); break; } @@ -428,7 +428,7 @@ static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes) chacha20_block(chacha_state, buf); if (unlikely(chacha_state[12] == 0)) ++chacha_state[13]; - nbytes -= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE; + len -= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE; buf += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE; } @@ -445,20 +445,20 @@ static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes) * wait_for_random_bytes() should be called and return 0 at least once * at any point prior. */ -void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes) +void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t len) { warn_unseeded_randomness(); - _get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes); + _get_random_bytes(buf, len); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes); -static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes) +static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(void __user *ubuf, size_t len) { - size_t len, left, ret = 0; + size_t block_len, left, ret = 0; u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)]; u8 output[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]; - if (!nbytes) + if (!len) return 0; /* @@ -472,8 +472,8 @@ static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes) * use chacha_state after, so we can simply return those bytes to * the user directly. */ - if (nbytes <= CHACHA_KEY_SIZE) { - ret = nbytes - copy_to_user(buf, &chacha_state[4], nbytes); + if (len <= CHACHA_KEY_SIZE) { + ret = len - copy_to_user(ubuf, &chacha_state[4], len); goto out_zero_chacha; } @@ -482,17 +482,17 @@ static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes) if (unlikely(chacha_state[12] == 0)) ++chacha_state[13]; - len = min_t(size_t, nbytes, CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE); - left = copy_to_user(buf, output, len); + block_len = min_t(size_t, len, CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE); + left = copy_to_user(ubuf, output, block_len); if (left) { - ret += len - left; + ret += block_len - left; break; } - buf += len; - ret += len; - nbytes -= len; - if (!nbytes) + ubuf += block_len; + ret += block_len; + len -= block_len; + if (!len) break; BUILD_BUG_ON(PAGE_SIZE % CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE != 0); @@ -663,24 +663,24 @@ unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range) * use. Use get_random_bytes() instead. It returns the number of * bytes filled in. */ -size_t __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, size_t nbytes) +size_t __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, size_t len) { - size_t left = nbytes; + size_t left = len; u8 *p = buf; while (left) { unsigned long v; - size_t chunk = min_t(size_t, left, sizeof(unsigned long)); + size_t block_len = min_t(size_t, left, sizeof(unsigned long)); if (!arch_get_random_long(&v)) break; - memcpy(p, &v, chunk); - p += chunk; - left -= chunk; + memcpy(p, &v, block_len); + p += block_len; + left -= block_len; } - return nbytes - left; + return len - left; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch); @@ -691,15 +691,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch); * * Callers may add entropy via: * - * static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, size_t nbytes) + * static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *buf, size_t len) * * After which, if added entropy should be credited: * - * static void credit_init_bits(size_t nbits) + * static void credit_init_bits(size_t bits) * * Finally, extract entropy via: * - * static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes) + * static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t len) * **********************************************************************/ @@ -721,9 +721,9 @@ static struct { .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(input_pool.lock), }; -static void _mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, size_t nbytes) +static void _mix_pool_bytes(const void *buf, size_t len) { - blake2s_update(&input_pool.hash, in, nbytes); + blake2s_update(&input_pool.hash, buf, len); } /* @@ -731,12 +731,12 @@ static void _mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, size_t nbytes) * update the initialization bit counter; the caller should call * credit_init_bits if this is appropriate. */ -static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, size_t nbytes) +static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *buf, size_t len) { unsigned long flags; spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags); - _mix_pool_bytes(in, nbytes); + _mix_pool_bytes(buf, len); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags); } @@ -744,7 +744,7 @@ static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, size_t nbytes) * This is an HKDF-like construction for using the hashed collected entropy * as a PRF key, that's then expanded block-by-block. */ -static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes) +static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t len) { unsigned long flags; u8 seed[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE], next_key[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE]; @@ -773,12 +773,12 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes) spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags); memzero_explicit(next_key, sizeof(next_key)); - while (nbytes) { - i = min_t(size_t, nbytes, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE); + while (len) { + i = min_t(size_t, len, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE); /* output = HASHPRF(seed, RDSEED || ++counter) */ ++block.counter; blake2s(buf, (u8 *)&block, seed, i, sizeof(block), sizeof(seed)); - nbytes -= i; + len -= i; buf += i; } @@ -786,16 +786,16 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes) memzero_explicit(&block, sizeof(block)); } -static void credit_init_bits(size_t nbits) +static void credit_init_bits(size_t bits) { static struct execute_work set_ready; unsigned int new, orig, add; unsigned long flags; - if (crng_ready() || !nbits) + if (crng_ready() || !bits) return; - add = min_t(size_t, nbits, POOL_BITS); + add = min_t(size_t, bits, POOL_BITS); do { orig = READ_ONCE(input_pool.init_bits); @@ -831,13 +831,11 @@ static void credit_init_bits(size_t nbits) * The following exported functions are used for pushing entropy into * the above entropy accumulation routines: * - * void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size); - * void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count, - * size_t entropy); - * void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size); + * void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len); + * void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len, size_t entropy); + * void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len); * void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq); - * void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, - * unsigned int value); + * void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, unsigned int value); * void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk); * * add_device_randomness() adds data to the input pool that @@ -901,7 +899,7 @@ int __init random_init(const char *command_line) { ktime_t now = ktime_get_real(); unsigned int i, arch_bytes; - unsigned long rv; + unsigned long entropy; #if defined(LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN) static const u8 compiletime_seed[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE] __initconst __latent_entropy; @@ -909,13 +907,13 @@ int __init random_init(const char *command_line) #endif for (i = 0, arch_bytes = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; - i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; i += sizeof(rv)) { - if (!arch_get_random_seed_long_early(&rv) && - !arch_get_random_long_early(&rv)) { - rv = random_get_entropy(); - arch_bytes -= sizeof(rv); + i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; i += sizeof(entropy)) { + if (!arch_get_random_seed_long_early(&entropy) && + !arch_get_random_long_early(&entropy)) { + entropy = random_get_entropy(); + arch_bytes -= sizeof(entropy); } - _mix_pool_bytes(&rv, sizeof(rv)); + _mix_pool_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy)); } _mix_pool_bytes(&now, sizeof(now)); _mix_pool_bytes(utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname()))); @@ -938,14 +936,14 @@ int __init random_init(const char *command_line) * the entropy pool having similar initial state across largely * identical devices. */ -void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size) +void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len) { unsigned long entropy = random_get_entropy(); unsigned long flags; spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags); _mix_pool_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy)); - _mix_pool_bytes(buf, size); + _mix_pool_bytes(buf, len); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_device_randomness); @@ -955,10 +953,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_device_randomness); * Those devices may produce endless random bits and will be throttled * when our pool is full. */ -void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count, - size_t entropy) +void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len, size_t entropy) { - mix_pool_bytes(buffer, count); + mix_pool_bytes(buf, len); credit_init_bits(entropy); /* @@ -974,11 +971,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_hwgenerator_randomness); * Handle random seed passed by bootloader, and credit it if * CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is set. */ -void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size) +void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len) { - mix_pool_bytes(buf, size); + mix_pool_bytes(buf, len); if (trust_bootloader) - credit_init_bits(size * 8); + credit_init_bits(len * 8); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_bootloader_randomness); @@ -1178,8 +1175,7 @@ static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned int nu credit_init_bits(bits); } -void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, - unsigned int value) +void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, unsigned int value) { static unsigned char last_value; static struct timer_rand_state input_timer_state = { INITIAL_JIFFIES }; @@ -1298,8 +1294,7 @@ static void try_to_generate_entropy(void) * **********************************************************************/ -SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count, unsigned int, - flags) +SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, ubuf, size_t, len, unsigned int, flags) { if (flags & ~(GRND_NONBLOCK | GRND_RANDOM | GRND_INSECURE)) return -EINVAL; @@ -1311,8 +1306,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count, unsigned int, if ((flags & (GRND_INSECURE | GRND_RANDOM)) == (GRND_INSECURE | GRND_RANDOM)) return -EINVAL; - if (count > INT_MAX) - count = INT_MAX; + if (len > INT_MAX) + len = INT_MAX; if (!crng_ready() && !(flags & GRND_INSECURE)) { int ret; @@ -1323,7 +1318,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count, unsigned int, if (unlikely(ret)) return ret; } - return get_random_bytes_user(buf, count); + return get_random_bytes_user(ubuf, len); } static __poll_t random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait) @@ -1332,21 +1327,21 @@ static __poll_t random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait) return crng_ready() ? EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM : EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM; } -static int write_pool(const char __user *ubuf, size_t count) +static int write_pool(const char __user *ubuf, size_t len) { - size_t len; + size_t block_len; int ret = 0; u8 block[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE]; - while (count) { - len = min(count, sizeof(block)); - if (copy_from_user(block, ubuf, len)) { + while (len) { + block_len = min(len, sizeof(block)); + if (copy_from_user(block, ubuf, block_len)) { ret = -EFAULT; goto out; } - count -= len; - ubuf += len; - mix_pool_bytes(block, len); + len -= block_len; + ubuf += block_len; + mix_pool_bytes(block, block_len); cond_resched(); } @@ -1355,20 +1350,20 @@ out: return ret; } -static ssize_t random_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer, - size_t count, loff_t *ppos) +static ssize_t random_write(struct file *file, const char __user *ubuf, + size_t len, loff_t *ppos) { int ret; - ret = write_pool(buffer, count); + ret = write_pool(ubuf, len); if (ret) return ret; - return (ssize_t)count; + return (ssize_t)len; } -static ssize_t urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, - loff_t *ppos) +static ssize_t urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *ubuf, + size_t len, loff_t *ppos) { static int maxwarn = 10; @@ -1378,22 +1373,22 @@ static ssize_t urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, else if (ratelimit_disable || __ratelimit(&urandom_warning)) { --maxwarn; pr_notice("%s: uninitialized urandom read (%zd bytes read)\n", - current->comm, nbytes); + current->comm, len); } } - return get_random_bytes_user(buf, nbytes); + return get_random_bytes_user(ubuf, len); } -static ssize_t random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, - loff_t *ppos) +static ssize_t random_read(struct file *file, char __user *ubuf, + size_t len, loff_t *ppos) { int ret; ret = wait_for_random_bytes(); if (ret != 0) return ret; - return get_random_bytes_user(buf, nbytes); + return get_random_bytes_user(ubuf, len); } static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) @@ -1518,8 +1513,8 @@ static u8 sysctl_bootid[UUID_SIZE]; * UUID. The difference is in whether table->data is NULL; if it is, * then a new UUID is generated and returned to the user. */ -static int proc_do_uuid(struct ctl_table *table, int write, - void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) +static int proc_do_uuid(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void __user *buf, + size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) { u8 tmp_uuid[UUID_SIZE], *uuid; char uuid_string[UUID_STRING_LEN + 1]; @@ -1545,14 +1540,14 @@ static int proc_do_uuid(struct ctl_table *table, int write, } snprintf(uuid_string, sizeof(uuid_string), "%pU", uuid); - return proc_dostring(&fake_table, 0, buffer, lenp, ppos); + return proc_dostring(&fake_table, 0, buf, lenp, ppos); } /* The same as proc_dointvec, but writes don't change anything. */ -static int proc_do_rointvec(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void __user *buffer, +static int proc_do_rointvec(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void __user *buf, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) { - return write ? 0 : proc_dointvec(table, 0, buffer, lenp, ppos); + return write ? 0 : proc_dointvec(table, 0, buf, lenp, ppos); } extern struct ctl_table random_table[]; diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h index 0416b393ca4d..d6ef6cf4346a 100644 --- a/include/linux/random.h +++ b/include/linux/random.h @@ -12,12 +12,12 @@ struct notifier_block; -void add_device_randomness(const void *, size_t); -void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *, size_t); +void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len); +void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len); void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, unsigned int value) __latent_entropy; void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) __latent_entropy; -void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count, size_t entropy); +void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len, size_t entropy); #if defined(LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN) && !defined(__CHECKER__) static inline void add_latent_entropy(void) @@ -28,8 +28,8 @@ static inline void add_latent_entropy(void) static inline void add_latent_entropy(void) { } #endif -void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes); -size_t __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, size_t nbytes); +void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t len); +size_t __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, size_t len); u32 get_random_u32(void); u64 get_random_u64(void); static inline unsigned int get_random_int(void) From ceaf1feefe6ea8122c9cf2244ab9f373db298ec7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Fri, 13 May 2022 16:17:12 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0595/1091] random: move initialization functions out of hot pages commit 560181c27b582557d633ecb608110075433383af upstream. Much of random.c is devoted to initializing the rng and accounting for when a sufficient amount of entropy has been added. In a perfect world, this would all happen during init, and so we could mark these functions as __init. But in reality, this isn't the case: sometimes the rng only finishes initializing some seconds after system init is finished. For this reason, at the moment, a whole host of functions that are only used relatively close to system init and then never again are intermixed with functions that are used in hot code all the time. This creates more cache misses than necessary. In order to pack the hot code closer together, this commit moves the initialization functions that can't be marked as __init into .text.unlikely by way of the __cold attribute. Of particular note is moving credit_init_bits() into a macro wrapper that inlines the crng_ready() static branch check. This avoids a function call to a nop+ret, and most notably prevents extra entropy arithmetic from being computed in mix_interrupt_randomness(). Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++---------------------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index bbce1f6242d8..8f3c41e7fec0 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ bool rng_is_initialized(void) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(rng_is_initialized); -static void crng_set_ready(struct work_struct *work) +static void __cold crng_set_ready(struct work_struct *work) { static_branch_enable(&crng_is_ready); } @@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_random_bytes); * returns: 0 if callback is successfully added * -EALREADY if pool is already initialised (callback not called) */ -int register_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb) +int __cold register_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb) { unsigned long flags; int ret = -EALREADY; @@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(register_random_ready_notifier); /* * Delete a previously registered readiness callback function. */ -int unregister_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb) +int __cold unregister_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb) { unsigned long flags; int ret; @@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ int unregister_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_random_ready_notifier); -static void process_random_ready_list(void) +static void __cold process_random_ready_list(void) { unsigned long flags; @@ -189,15 +189,9 @@ static void process_random_ready_list(void) } #define warn_unseeded_randomness() \ - _warn_unseeded_randomness(__func__, (void *)_RET_IP_) - -static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(const char *func_name, void *caller) -{ - if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM) || crng_ready()) - return; - printk_deferred(KERN_NOTICE "random: %s called from %pS with crng_init=%d\n", - func_name, caller, crng_init); -} + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM) && !crng_ready()) \ + printk_deferred(KERN_NOTICE "random: %s called from %pS with crng_init=%d\n", \ + __func__, (void *)_RET_IP_, crng_init) /********************************************************************* @@ -611,7 +605,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u32); * This function is called when the CPU is coming up, with entry * CPUHP_RANDOM_PREPARE, which comes before CPUHP_WORKQUEUE_PREP. */ -int random_prepare_cpu(unsigned int cpu) +int __cold random_prepare_cpu(unsigned int cpu) { /* * When the cpu comes back online, immediately invalidate both @@ -786,13 +780,15 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t len) memzero_explicit(&block, sizeof(block)); } -static void credit_init_bits(size_t bits) +#define credit_init_bits(bits) if (!crng_ready()) _credit_init_bits(bits) + +static void __cold _credit_init_bits(size_t bits) { static struct execute_work set_ready; unsigned int new, orig, add; unsigned long flags; - if (crng_ready() || !bits) + if (!bits) return; add = min_t(size_t, bits, POOL_BITS); @@ -971,7 +967,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_hwgenerator_randomness); * Handle random seed passed by bootloader, and credit it if * CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is set. */ -void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len) +void __cold add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len) { mix_pool_bytes(buf, len); if (trust_bootloader) @@ -1017,7 +1013,7 @@ static void fast_mix(unsigned long s[4], unsigned long v1, unsigned long v2) * This function is called when the CPU has just come online, with * entry CPUHP_AP_RANDOM_ONLINE, just after CPUHP_AP_WORKQUEUE_ONLINE. */ -int random_online_cpu(unsigned int cpu) +int __cold random_online_cpu(unsigned int cpu) { /* * During CPU shutdown and before CPU onlining, add_interrupt_ @@ -1172,7 +1168,7 @@ static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned int nu if (in_irq()) this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness)->count += max(1u, bits * 64) - 1; else - credit_init_bits(bits); + _credit_init_bits(bits); } void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, unsigned int value) @@ -1200,7 +1196,7 @@ void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_disk_randomness); -void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk) +void __cold rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk) { struct timer_rand_state *state; @@ -1229,7 +1225,7 @@ void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk) * * So the re-arming always happens in the entropy loop itself. */ -static void entropy_timer(struct timer_list *t) +static void __cold entropy_timer(struct timer_list *t) { credit_init_bits(1); } @@ -1238,7 +1234,7 @@ static void entropy_timer(struct timer_list *t) * If we have an actual cycle counter, see if we can * generate enough entropy with timing noise */ -static void try_to_generate_entropy(void) +static void __cold try_to_generate_entropy(void) { struct { unsigned long entropy; From 1aeedbe02b5c730a6fbc2370f6bc110c2d47f6a8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Sat, 14 May 2022 13:59:30 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0596/1091] random: move randomize_page() into mm where it belongs commit 5ad7dd882e45d7fe432c32e896e2aaa0b21746ea upstream. randomize_page is an mm function. It is documented like one. It contains the history of one. It has the naming convention of one. It looks just like another very similar function in mm, randomize_stack_top(). And it has always been maintained and updated by mm people. There is no need for it to be in random.c. In the "which shape does not look like the other ones" test, pointing to randomize_page() is correct. So move randomize_page() into mm/util.c, right next to the similar randomize_stack_top() function. This commit contains no actual code changes. Cc: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 32 -------------------------------- include/linux/mm.h | 1 + include/linux/random.h | 2 -- mm/util.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 8f3c41e7fec0..6c1c856a0f56 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -619,38 +619,6 @@ int __cold random_prepare_cpu(unsigned int cpu) } #endif -/** - * randomize_page - Generate a random, page aligned address - * @start: The smallest acceptable address the caller will take. - * @range: The size of the area, starting at @start, within which the - * random address must fall. - * - * If @start + @range would overflow, @range is capped. - * - * NOTE: Historical use of randomize_range, which this replaces, presumed that - * @start was already page aligned. We now align it regardless. - * - * Return: A page aligned address within [start, start + range). On error, - * @start is returned. - */ -unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range) -{ - if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(start)) { - range -= PAGE_ALIGN(start) - start; - start = PAGE_ALIGN(start); - } - - if (start > ULONG_MAX - range) - range = ULONG_MAX - start; - - range >>= PAGE_SHIFT; - - if (range == 0) - return start; - - return start + (get_random_long() % range << PAGE_SHIFT); -} - /* * This function will use the architecture-specific hardware random * number generator if it is available. It is not recommended for diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h index a7d626b4cad1..c125fea49752 100644 --- a/include/linux/mm.h +++ b/include/linux/mm.h @@ -2354,6 +2354,7 @@ extern int install_special_mapping(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long flags, struct page **pages); unsigned long randomize_stack_top(unsigned long stack_top); +unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range); extern unsigned long get_unmapped_area(struct file *, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long); diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h index d6ef6cf4346a..917470c4490a 100644 --- a/include/linux/random.h +++ b/include/linux/random.h @@ -64,8 +64,6 @@ static inline unsigned long get_random_canary(void) return get_random_long() & CANARY_MASK; } -unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range); - int __init random_init(const char *command_line); bool rng_is_initialized(void); int wait_for_random_bytes(void); diff --git a/mm/util.c b/mm/util.c index ab358c64bbd3..04ebc76588aa 100644 --- a/mm/util.c +++ b/mm/util.c @@ -320,6 +320,38 @@ unsigned long randomize_stack_top(unsigned long stack_top) #endif } +/** + * randomize_page - Generate a random, page aligned address + * @start: The smallest acceptable address the caller will take. + * @range: The size of the area, starting at @start, within which the + * random address must fall. + * + * If @start + @range would overflow, @range is capped. + * + * NOTE: Historical use of randomize_range, which this replaces, presumed that + * @start was already page aligned. We now align it regardless. + * + * Return: A page aligned address within [start, start + range). On error, + * @start is returned. + */ +unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range) +{ + if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(start)) { + range -= PAGE_ALIGN(start) - start; + start = PAGE_ALIGN(start); + } + + if (start > ULONG_MAX - range) + range = ULONG_MAX - start; + + range >>= PAGE_SHIFT; + + if (range == 0) + return start; + + return start + (get_random_long() % range << PAGE_SHIFT); +} + #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_WANT_DEFAULT_TOPDOWN_MMAP_LAYOUT unsigned long arch_randomize_brk(struct mm_struct *mm) { From c23188facd10e72a36de66fabd1da3b97d8622c5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Sun, 15 May 2022 00:22:05 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0597/1091] random: unify batched entropy implementations commit 3092adcef3ffd2ef59634998297ca8358461ebce upstream. There are currently two separate batched entropy implementations, for u32 and u64, with nearly identical code, with the goal of avoiding unaligned memory accesses and letting the buffers be used more efficiently. Having to maintain these two functions independently is a bit of a hassle though, considering that they always need to be kept in sync. This commit factors them out into a type-generic macro, so that the expansion produces the same code as before, such that diffing the assembly shows no differences. This will also make it easier in the future to add u16 and u8 batches. This was initially tested using an always_inline function and letting gcc constant fold the type size in, but the code gen was less efficient, and in general it was more verbose and harder to follow. So this patch goes with the boring macro solution, similar to what's already done for the _wait functions in random.h. Cc: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 140 ++++++++++++++++-------------------------- 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+), 88 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 6c1c856a0f56..615ba72f50ef 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -509,96 +509,60 @@ out_zero_chacha: * provided by this function is okay, the function wait_for_random_bytes() * should be called and return 0 at least once at any point prior. */ -struct batched_entropy { - union { - /* - * We make this 1.5x a ChaCha block, so that we get the - * remaining 32 bytes from fast key erasure, plus one full - * block from the detached ChaCha state. We can increase - * the size of this later if needed so long as we keep the - * formula of (integer_blocks + 0.5) * CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE. - */ - u64 entropy_u64[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 3 / (2 * sizeof(u64))]; - u32 entropy_u32[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 3 / (2 * sizeof(u32))]; - }; - unsigned long generation; - unsigned int position; -}; +#define DEFINE_BATCHED_ENTROPY(type) \ +struct batch_ ##type { \ + /* \ + * We make this 1.5x a ChaCha block, so that we get the \ + * remaining 32 bytes from fast key erasure, plus one full \ + * block from the detached ChaCha state. We can increase \ + * the size of this later if needed so long as we keep the \ + * formula of (integer_blocks + 0.5) * CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE. \ + */ \ + type entropy[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 3 / (2 * sizeof(type))]; \ + unsigned long generation; \ + unsigned int position; \ +}; \ + \ +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batch_ ##type, batched_entropy_ ##type) = { \ + .position = UINT_MAX \ +}; \ + \ +type get_random_ ##type(void) \ +{ \ + type ret; \ + unsigned long flags; \ + struct batch_ ##type *batch; \ + unsigned long next_gen; \ + \ + warn_unseeded_randomness(); \ + \ + if (!crng_ready()) { \ + _get_random_bytes(&ret, sizeof(ret)); \ + return ret; \ + } \ + \ + local_irq_save(flags); \ + batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_##type); \ + \ + next_gen = READ_ONCE(base_crng.generation); \ + if (batch->position >= ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy) || \ + next_gen != batch->generation) { \ + _get_random_bytes(batch->entropy, sizeof(batch->entropy)); \ + batch->position = 0; \ + batch->generation = next_gen; \ + } \ + \ + ret = batch->entropy[batch->position]; \ + batch->entropy[batch->position] = 0; \ + ++batch->position; \ + local_irq_restore(flags); \ + return ret; \ +} \ +EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_ ##type); -static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u64) = { - .position = UINT_MAX -}; - -u64 get_random_u64(void) -{ - u64 ret; - unsigned long flags; - struct batched_entropy *batch; - unsigned long next_gen; - - warn_unseeded_randomness(); - - if (!crng_ready()) { - _get_random_bytes(&ret, sizeof(ret)); - return ret; - } - - local_irq_save(flags); - batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u64); - - next_gen = READ_ONCE(base_crng.generation); - if (batch->position >= ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u64) || - next_gen != batch->generation) { - _get_random_bytes(batch->entropy_u64, sizeof(batch->entropy_u64)); - batch->position = 0; - batch->generation = next_gen; - } - - ret = batch->entropy_u64[batch->position]; - batch->entropy_u64[batch->position] = 0; - ++batch->position; - local_irq_restore(flags); - return ret; -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u64); - -static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u32) = { - .position = UINT_MAX -}; - -u32 get_random_u32(void) -{ - u32 ret; - unsigned long flags; - struct batched_entropy *batch; - unsigned long next_gen; - - warn_unseeded_randomness(); - - if (!crng_ready()) { - _get_random_bytes(&ret, sizeof(ret)); - return ret; - } - - local_irq_save(flags); - batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u32); - - next_gen = READ_ONCE(base_crng.generation); - if (batch->position >= ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u32) || - next_gen != batch->generation) { - _get_random_bytes(batch->entropy_u32, sizeof(batch->entropy_u32)); - batch->position = 0; - batch->generation = next_gen; - } - - ret = batch->entropy_u32[batch->position]; - batch->entropy_u32[batch->position] = 0; - ++batch->position; - local_irq_restore(flags); - return ret; -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u32); +DEFINE_BATCHED_ENTROPY(u64) +DEFINE_BATCHED_ENTROPY(u32) #ifdef CONFIG_SMP /* From 43e62db84a9942aa2f37f3d881d4cd8d333f91c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jens Axboe Date: Thu, 19 May 2022 17:31:36 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 0598/1091] random: convert to using fops->read_iter() commit 1b388e7765f2eaa137cf5d92b47ef5925ad83ced upstream. This is a pre-requisite to wiring up splice() again for the random and urandom drivers. It also allows us to remove the INT_MAX check in getrandom(), because import_single_range() applies capping internally. Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe [Jason: rewrote get_random_bytes_user() to simplify and also incorporate additional suggestions from Al.] Cc: Al Viro Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++----------------------- 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 615ba72f50ef..c800790eb116 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -446,13 +447,13 @@ void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t len) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes); -static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(void __user *ubuf, size_t len) +static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(struct iov_iter *iter) { - size_t block_len, left, ret = 0; u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)]; - u8 output[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]; + u8 block[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]; + size_t ret = 0, copied; - if (!len) + if (unlikely(!iov_iter_count(iter))) return 0; /* @@ -466,30 +467,22 @@ static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(void __user *ubuf, size_t len) * use chacha_state after, so we can simply return those bytes to * the user directly. */ - if (len <= CHACHA_KEY_SIZE) { - ret = len - copy_to_user(ubuf, &chacha_state[4], len); + if (iov_iter_count(iter) <= CHACHA_KEY_SIZE) { + ret = copy_to_iter(&chacha_state[4], CHACHA_KEY_SIZE, iter); goto out_zero_chacha; } for (;;) { - chacha20_block(chacha_state, output); + chacha20_block(chacha_state, block); if (unlikely(chacha_state[12] == 0)) ++chacha_state[13]; - block_len = min_t(size_t, len, CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE); - left = copy_to_user(ubuf, output, block_len); - if (left) { - ret += block_len - left; - break; - } - - ubuf += block_len; - ret += block_len; - len -= block_len; - if (!len) + copied = copy_to_iter(block, sizeof(block), iter); + ret += copied; + if (!iov_iter_count(iter) || copied != sizeof(block)) break; - BUILD_BUG_ON(PAGE_SIZE % CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE != 0); + BUILD_BUG_ON(PAGE_SIZE % sizeof(block) != 0); if (ret % PAGE_SIZE == 0) { if (signal_pending(current)) break; @@ -497,7 +490,7 @@ static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(void __user *ubuf, size_t len) } } - memzero_explicit(output, sizeof(output)); + memzero_explicit(block, sizeof(block)); out_zero_chacha: memzero_explicit(chacha_state, sizeof(chacha_state)); return ret ? ret : -EFAULT; @@ -1224,6 +1217,10 @@ static void __cold try_to_generate_entropy(void) SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, ubuf, size_t, len, unsigned int, flags) { + struct iov_iter iter; + struct iovec iov; + int ret; + if (flags & ~(GRND_NONBLOCK | GRND_RANDOM | GRND_INSECURE)) return -EINVAL; @@ -1234,19 +1231,18 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, ubuf, size_t, len, unsigned int, flags if ((flags & (GRND_INSECURE | GRND_RANDOM)) == (GRND_INSECURE | GRND_RANDOM)) return -EINVAL; - if (len > INT_MAX) - len = INT_MAX; - if (!crng_ready() && !(flags & GRND_INSECURE)) { - int ret; - if (flags & GRND_NONBLOCK) return -EAGAIN; ret = wait_for_random_bytes(); if (unlikely(ret)) return ret; } - return get_random_bytes_user(ubuf, len); + + ret = import_single_range(READ, ubuf, len, &iov, &iter); + if (unlikely(ret)) + return ret; + return get_random_bytes_user(&iter); } static __poll_t random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait) @@ -1290,8 +1286,7 @@ static ssize_t random_write(struct file *file, const char __user *ubuf, return (ssize_t)len; } -static ssize_t urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *ubuf, - size_t len, loff_t *ppos) +static ssize_t urandom_read_iter(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct iov_iter *iter) { static int maxwarn = 10; @@ -1300,23 +1295,22 @@ static ssize_t urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *ubuf, ++urandom_warning.missed; else if (ratelimit_disable || __ratelimit(&urandom_warning)) { --maxwarn; - pr_notice("%s: uninitialized urandom read (%zd bytes read)\n", - current->comm, len); + pr_notice("%s: uninitialized urandom read (%zu bytes read)\n", + current->comm, iov_iter_count(iter)); } } - return get_random_bytes_user(ubuf, len); + return get_random_bytes_user(iter); } -static ssize_t random_read(struct file *file, char __user *ubuf, - size_t len, loff_t *ppos) +static ssize_t random_read_iter(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct iov_iter *iter) { int ret; ret = wait_for_random_bytes(); if (ret != 0) return ret; - return get_random_bytes_user(ubuf, len); + return get_random_bytes_user(iter); } static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) @@ -1378,7 +1372,7 @@ static int random_fasync(int fd, struct file *filp, int on) } const struct file_operations random_fops = { - .read = random_read, + .read_iter = random_read_iter, .write = random_write, .poll = random_poll, .unlocked_ioctl = random_ioctl, @@ -1388,7 +1382,7 @@ const struct file_operations random_fops = { }; const struct file_operations urandom_fops = { - .read = urandom_read, + .read_iter = urandom_read_iter, .write = random_write, .unlocked_ioctl = random_ioctl, .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl, From 35db2a073118eb163dc1f99af570600355479967 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jens Axboe Date: Thu, 19 May 2022 17:43:15 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 0599/1091] random: convert to using fops->write_iter() commit 22b0a222af4df8ee9bb8e07013ab44da9511b047 upstream. Now that the read side has been converted to fix a regression with splice, convert the write side as well to have some symmetry in the interface used (and help deprecate ->write()). Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe [Jason: cleaned up random_ioctl a bit, require full writes in RNDADDENTROPY since it's crediting entropy, simplify control flow of write_pool(), and incorporate suggestions from Al.] Cc: Al Viro Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index c800790eb116..a51d0d6ca264 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -1251,39 +1251,31 @@ static __poll_t random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait) return crng_ready() ? EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM : EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM; } -static int write_pool(const char __user *ubuf, size_t len) +static ssize_t write_pool(struct iov_iter *iter) { - size_t block_len; - int ret = 0; u8 block[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE]; + ssize_t ret = 0; + size_t copied; - while (len) { - block_len = min(len, sizeof(block)); - if (copy_from_user(block, ubuf, block_len)) { - ret = -EFAULT; - goto out; - } - len -= block_len; - ubuf += block_len; - mix_pool_bytes(block, block_len); + if (unlikely(!iov_iter_count(iter))) + return 0; + + for (;;) { + copied = copy_from_iter(block, sizeof(block), iter); + ret += copied; + mix_pool_bytes(block, copied); + if (!iov_iter_count(iter) || copied != sizeof(block)) + break; cond_resched(); } -out: memzero_explicit(block, sizeof(block)); - return ret; + return ret ? ret : -EFAULT; } -static ssize_t random_write(struct file *file, const char __user *ubuf, - size_t len, loff_t *ppos) +static ssize_t random_write_iter(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct iov_iter *iter) { - int ret; - - ret = write_pool(ubuf, len); - if (ret) - return ret; - - return (ssize_t)len; + return write_pool(iter); } static ssize_t urandom_read_iter(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct iov_iter *iter) @@ -1315,9 +1307,8 @@ static ssize_t random_read_iter(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct iov_iter *iter) static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) { - int size, ent_count; int __user *p = (int __user *)arg; - int retval; + int ent_count; switch (cmd) { case RNDGETENTCNT: @@ -1334,20 +1325,32 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) return -EINVAL; credit_init_bits(ent_count); return 0; - case RNDADDENTROPY: + case RNDADDENTROPY: { + struct iov_iter iter; + struct iovec iov; + ssize_t ret; + int len; + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; if (get_user(ent_count, p++)) return -EFAULT; if (ent_count < 0) return -EINVAL; - if (get_user(size, p++)) + if (get_user(len, p++)) + return -EFAULT; + ret = import_single_range(WRITE, p, len, &iov, &iter); + if (unlikely(ret)) + return ret; + ret = write_pool(&iter); + if (unlikely(ret < 0)) + return ret; + /* Since we're crediting, enforce that it was all written into the pool. */ + if (unlikely(ret != len)) return -EFAULT; - retval = write_pool((const char __user *)p, size); - if (retval < 0) - return retval; credit_init_bits(ent_count); return 0; + } case RNDZAPENTCNT: case RNDCLEARPOOL: /* No longer has any effect. */ @@ -1373,7 +1376,7 @@ static int random_fasync(int fd, struct file *filp, int on) const struct file_operations random_fops = { .read_iter = random_read_iter, - .write = random_write, + .write_iter = random_write_iter, .poll = random_poll, .unlocked_ioctl = random_ioctl, .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl, @@ -1383,7 +1386,7 @@ const struct file_operations random_fops = { const struct file_operations urandom_fops = { .read_iter = urandom_read_iter, - .write = random_write, + .write_iter = random_write_iter, .unlocked_ioctl = random_ioctl, .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl, .fasync = random_fasync, From 2177cef53ec97dd51d7e8b70d5ada2650fa988f1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jens Axboe Date: Thu, 19 May 2022 17:31:37 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 0600/1091] random: wire up fops->splice_{read,write}_iter() commit 79025e727a846be6fd215ae9cdb654368ac3f9a6 upstream. Now that random/urandom is using {read,write}_iter, we can wire it up to using the generic splice handlers. Fixes: 36e2c7421f02 ("fs: don't allow splice read/write without explicit ops") Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe [Jason: added the splice_write path. Note that sendfile() and such still does not work for read, though it does for write, because of a file type restriction in splice_direct_to_actor(), which I'll address separately.] Cc: Al Viro Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index a51d0d6ca264..cebe167edae5 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -1382,6 +1382,8 @@ const struct file_operations random_fops = { .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl, .fasync = random_fasync, .llseek = noop_llseek, + .splice_read = generic_file_splice_read, + .splice_write = iter_file_splice_write, }; const struct file_operations urandom_fops = { @@ -1391,6 +1393,8 @@ const struct file_operations urandom_fops = { .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl, .fasync = random_fasync, .llseek = noop_llseek, + .splice_read = generic_file_splice_read, + .splice_write = iter_file_splice_write, }; From 3faf33a85650de98505af8e658679f6af9f4c48e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Sun, 22 May 2022 22:25:41 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0601/1091] random: check for signals after page of pool writes commit 1ce6c8d68f8ac587f54d0a271ac594d3d51f3efb upstream. get_random_bytes_user() checks for signals after producing a PAGE_SIZE worth of output, just like /dev/zero does. write_pool() is doing basically the same work (actually, slightly more expensive), and so should stop to check for signals in the same way. Let's also name it write_pool_user() to match get_random_bytes_user(), so this won't be misused in the future. Before this patch, massive writes to /dev/urandom would tie up the process for an extremely long time and make it unterminatable. After, it can be successfully interrupted. The following test program can be used to see this works as intended: #include #include #include #include static unsigned char x[~0U]; static void handle(int) { } int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { pid_t pid = getpid(), child; int fd; signal(SIGUSR1, handle); if (!(child = fork())) { for (;;) kill(pid, SIGUSR1); } fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_WRONLY); pause(); printf("interrupted after writing %zd bytes\n", write(fd, x, sizeof(x))); close(fd); kill(child, SIGTERM); return 0; } Result before: "interrupted after writing 2147479552 bytes" Result after: "interrupted after writing 4096 bytes" Cc: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 14 ++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index cebe167edae5..5a79cfe23174 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -1251,7 +1251,7 @@ static __poll_t random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait) return crng_ready() ? EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM : EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM; } -static ssize_t write_pool(struct iov_iter *iter) +static ssize_t write_pool_user(struct iov_iter *iter) { u8 block[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE]; ssize_t ret = 0; @@ -1266,7 +1266,13 @@ static ssize_t write_pool(struct iov_iter *iter) mix_pool_bytes(block, copied); if (!iov_iter_count(iter) || copied != sizeof(block)) break; - cond_resched(); + + BUILD_BUG_ON(PAGE_SIZE % sizeof(block) != 0); + if (ret % PAGE_SIZE == 0) { + if (signal_pending(current)) + break; + cond_resched(); + } } memzero_explicit(block, sizeof(block)); @@ -1275,7 +1281,7 @@ static ssize_t write_pool(struct iov_iter *iter) static ssize_t random_write_iter(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct iov_iter *iter) { - return write_pool(iter); + return write_pool_user(iter); } static ssize_t urandom_read_iter(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct iov_iter *iter) @@ -1342,7 +1348,7 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) ret = import_single_range(WRITE, p, len, &iov, &iter); if (unlikely(ret)) return ret; - ret = write_pool(&iter); + ret = write_pool_user(&iter); if (unlikely(ret < 0)) return ret; /* Since we're crediting, enforce that it was all written into the pool. */ From 61f87ea3f957298b05dc62e3722da0e3d4232c5b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Tue, 7 Jun 2022 10:40:05 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0602/1091] Revert "random: use static branch for crng_ready()" This reverts upstream commit f5bda35fba615ace70a656d4700423fa6c9bebee from stable. It's not essential and will take some time during 5.19 to work out properly. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 12 ++---------- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 5a79cfe23174..bbfce902cc67 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -79,8 +79,7 @@ static enum { CRNG_EARLY = 1, /* At least POOL_EARLY_BITS collected */ CRNG_READY = 2 /* Fully initialized with POOL_READY_BITS collected */ } crng_init __read_mostly = CRNG_EMPTY; -static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(crng_is_ready); -#define crng_ready() (static_branch_likely(&crng_is_ready) || crng_init >= CRNG_READY) +#define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init >= CRNG_READY)) /* Various types of waiters for crng_init->CRNG_READY transition. */ static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_init_wait); static struct fasync_struct *fasync; @@ -110,11 +109,6 @@ bool rng_is_initialized(void) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(rng_is_initialized); -static void __cold crng_set_ready(struct work_struct *work) -{ - static_branch_enable(&crng_is_ready); -} - /* Used by wait_for_random_bytes(), and considered an entropy collector, below. */ static void try_to_generate_entropy(void); @@ -268,7 +262,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(void) ++next_gen; WRITE_ONCE(base_crng.generation, next_gen); WRITE_ONCE(base_crng.birth, jiffies); - if (!static_branch_likely(&crng_is_ready)) + if (!crng_ready()) crng_init = CRNG_READY; spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags); memzero_explicit(key, sizeof(key)); @@ -709,7 +703,6 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t len) static void __cold _credit_init_bits(size_t bits) { - static struct execute_work set_ready; unsigned int new, orig, add; unsigned long flags; @@ -725,7 +718,6 @@ static void __cold _credit_init_bits(size_t bits) if (orig < POOL_READY_BITS && new >= POOL_READY_BITS) { crng_reseed(); /* Sets crng_init to CRNG_READY under base_crng.lock. */ - execute_in_process_context(crng_set_ready, &set_ready); process_random_ready_list(); wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait); kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN); From 98e574a734142f241cbe1ba625e1225d609f62fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Stephan=20M=C3=BCller?= Date: Fri, 17 Apr 2020 21:34:03 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0603/1091] crypto: drbg - always seeded with SP800-90B compliant noise source commit 97f2650e504033376e8813691cb6eccf73151676 upstream. As the Jitter RNG provides an SP800-90B compliant noise source, use this noise source always for the (re)seeding of the DRBG. To make sure the DRBG is always properly seeded, the reseed threshold is reduced to 1<<20 generate operations. The Jitter RNG may report health test failures. Such health test failures are treated as transient as follows. The DRBG will not reseed from the Jitter RNG (but from get_random_bytes) in case of a health test failure. Though, it produces the requested random number. The Jitter RNG has a failure counter where at most 1024 consecutive resets due to a health test failure are considered as a transient error. If more consecutive resets are required, the Jitter RNG will return a permanent error which is returned to the caller by the DRBG. With this approach, the worst case reseed threshold is significantly lower than mandated by SP800-90A in order to seed with an SP800-90B noise source: the DRBG has a reseed threshold of 2^20 * 1024 = 2^30 generate requests. Yet, in case of a transient Jitter RNG health test failure, the DRBG is seeded with the data obtained from get_random_bytes. However, if the Jitter RNG fails during the initial seeding operation even due to a health test error, the DRBG will send an error to the caller because at that time, the DRBG has received no seed that is SP800-90B compliant. Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- crypto/drbg.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++------- include/crypto/drbg.h | 6 +----- 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/drbg.c b/crypto/drbg.c index 7c8d9ac99b55..74f20fbded64 100644 --- a/crypto/drbg.c +++ b/crypto/drbg.c @@ -1087,10 +1087,6 @@ static void drbg_async_seed(struct work_struct *work) if (ret) goto unlock; - /* If nonblocking pool is initialized, deactivate Jitter RNG */ - crypto_free_rng(drbg->jent); - drbg->jent = NULL; - /* Set seeded to false so that if __drbg_seed fails the * next generate call will trigger a reseed. */ @@ -1168,7 +1164,23 @@ static int drbg_seed(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct drbg_string *pers, entropylen); if (ret) { pr_devel("DRBG: jent failed with %d\n", ret); - goto out; + + /* + * Do not treat the transient failure of the + * Jitter RNG as an error that needs to be + * reported. The combined number of the + * maximum reseed threshold times the maximum + * number of Jitter RNG transient errors is + * less than the reseed threshold required by + * SP800-90A allowing us to treat the + * transient errors as such. + * + * However, we mandate that at least the first + * seeding operation must succeed with the + * Jitter RNG. + */ + if (!reseed || ret != -EAGAIN) + goto out; } drbg_string_fill(&data1, entropy, entropylen * 2); @@ -1495,6 +1507,8 @@ static int drbg_prepare_hrng(struct drbg_state *drbg) if (list_empty(&drbg->test_data.list)) return 0; + drbg->jent = crypto_alloc_rng("jitterentropy_rng", 0, 0); + INIT_WORK(&drbg->seed_work, drbg_async_seed); drbg->random_ready.notifier_call = drbg_schedule_async_seed; @@ -1513,8 +1527,6 @@ static int drbg_prepare_hrng(struct drbg_state *drbg) return err; } - drbg->jent = crypto_alloc_rng("jitterentropy_rng", 0, 0); - /* * Require frequent reseeds until the seed source is fully * initialized. diff --git a/include/crypto/drbg.h b/include/crypto/drbg.h index 97b386c1fcc9..88e4d145f7cd 100644 --- a/include/crypto/drbg.h +++ b/include/crypto/drbg.h @@ -184,11 +184,7 @@ static inline size_t drbg_max_addtl(struct drbg_state *drbg) static inline size_t drbg_max_requests(struct drbg_state *drbg) { /* SP800-90A requires 2**48 maximum requests before reseeding */ -#if (__BITS_PER_LONG == 32) - return SIZE_MAX; -#else - return (1UL<<48); -#endif + return (1<<20); } /* From 1b93b302e94221486a067054a4a8888b95f89b29 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nicolai Stange Date: Thu, 2 Jun 2022 22:22:29 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0604/1091] crypto: drbg - prepare for more fine-grained tracking of seeding state MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit ce8ce31b2c5c8b18667784b8c515650c65d57b4e upstream. There are two different randomness sources the DRBGs are getting seeded from, namely the jitterentropy source (if enabled) and get_random_bytes(). At initial DRBG seeding time during boot, the latter might not have collected sufficient entropy for seeding itself yet and thus, the DRBG implementation schedules a reseed work from a random_ready_callback once that has happened. This is particularly important for the !->pr DRBG instances, for which (almost) no further reseeds are getting triggered during their lifetime. Because collecting data from the jitterentropy source is a rather expensive operation, the aforementioned asynchronously scheduled reseed work restricts itself to get_random_bytes() only. That is, it in some sense amends the initial DRBG seed derived from jitterentropy output at full (estimated) entropy with fresh randomness obtained from get_random_bytes() once that has been seeded with sufficient entropy itself. With the advent of rng_is_initialized(), there is no real need for doing the reseed operation from an asynchronously scheduled work anymore and a subsequent patch will make it synchronous by moving it next to related logic already present in drbg_generate(). However, for tracking whether a full reseed including the jitterentropy source is required or a "partial" reseed involving only get_random_bytes() would be sufficient already, the boolean struct drbg_state's ->seeded member must become a tristate value. Prepare for this by introducing the new enum drbg_seed_state and change struct drbg_state's ->seeded member's type from bool to that type. For facilitating review, enum drbg_seed_state is made to only contain two members corresponding to the former ->seeded values of false and true resp. at this point: DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED and DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL. A third one for tracking the intermediate state of "seeded from jitterentropy only" will be introduced with a subsequent patch. There is no change in behaviour at this point. Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange Reviewed-by: Stephan Müller Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- crypto/drbg.c | 19 ++++++++++--------- include/crypto/drbg.h | 7 ++++++- 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/drbg.c b/crypto/drbg.c index 74f20fbded64..0c0204c2bb58 100644 --- a/crypto/drbg.c +++ b/crypto/drbg.c @@ -1042,7 +1042,7 @@ static inline int __drbg_seed(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct list_head *seed, if (ret) return ret; - drbg->seeded = true; + drbg->seeded = DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL; /* 10.1.1.2 / 10.1.1.3 step 5 */ drbg->reseed_ctr = 1; @@ -1087,14 +1087,14 @@ static void drbg_async_seed(struct work_struct *work) if (ret) goto unlock; - /* Set seeded to false so that if __drbg_seed fails the - * next generate call will trigger a reseed. + /* Reset ->seeded so that if __drbg_seed fails the next + * generate call will trigger a reseed. */ - drbg->seeded = false; + drbg->seeded = DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED; __drbg_seed(drbg, &seedlist, true); - if (drbg->seeded) + if (drbg->seeded == DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL) drbg->reseed_threshold = drbg_max_requests(drbg); unlock: @@ -1385,13 +1385,14 @@ static int drbg_generate(struct drbg_state *drbg, * here. The spec is a bit convoluted here, we make it simpler. */ if (drbg->reseed_threshold < drbg->reseed_ctr) - drbg->seeded = false; + drbg->seeded = DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED; - if (drbg->pr || !drbg->seeded) { + if (drbg->pr || drbg->seeded == DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED) { pr_devel("DRBG: reseeding before generation (prediction " "resistance: %s, state %s)\n", drbg->pr ? "true" : "false", - drbg->seeded ? "seeded" : "unseeded"); + (drbg->seeded == DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL ? + "seeded" : "unseeded")); /* 9.3.1 steps 7.1 through 7.3 */ len = drbg_seed(drbg, addtl, true); if (len) @@ -1576,7 +1577,7 @@ static int drbg_instantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct drbg_string *pers, if (!drbg->core) { drbg->core = &drbg_cores[coreref]; drbg->pr = pr; - drbg->seeded = false; + drbg->seeded = DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED; drbg->reseed_threshold = drbg_max_requests(drbg); ret = drbg_alloc_state(drbg); diff --git a/include/crypto/drbg.h b/include/crypto/drbg.h index 88e4d145f7cd..2db72121d568 100644 --- a/include/crypto/drbg.h +++ b/include/crypto/drbg.h @@ -105,6 +105,11 @@ struct drbg_test_data { struct drbg_string *testentropy; /* TEST PARAMETER: test entropy */ }; +enum drbg_seed_state { + DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED, + DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL, +}; + struct drbg_state { struct mutex drbg_mutex; /* lock around DRBG */ unsigned char *V; /* internal state 10.1.1.1 1a) */ @@ -127,7 +132,7 @@ struct drbg_state { struct crypto_wait ctr_wait; /* CTR mode async wait obj */ struct scatterlist sg_in, sg_out; /* CTR mode SGLs */ - bool seeded; /* DRBG fully seeded? */ + enum drbg_seed_state seeded; /* DRBG fully seeded? */ bool pr; /* Prediction resistance enabled? */ bool fips_primed; /* Continuous test primed? */ unsigned char *prev; /* FIPS 140-2 continuous test value */ From babba4bf53a60682ac94a4c739983d8a75ffe3dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nicolai Stange Date: Thu, 2 Jun 2022 22:22:30 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0605/1091] crypto: drbg - track whether DRBG was seeded with !rng_is_initialized() MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 2bcd25443868aa8863779a6ebc6c9319633025d2 upstream. Currently, the DRBG implementation schedules asynchronous works from random_ready_callbacks for reseeding the DRBG instances with output from get_random_bytes() once the latter has sufficient entropy available. However, as the get_random_bytes() initialization state can get queried by means of rng_is_initialized() now, there is no real need for this asynchronous reseeding logic anymore and it's better to keep things simple by doing it synchronously when needed instead, i.e. from drbg_generate() once rng_is_initialized() has flipped to true. Of course, for this to work, drbg_generate() would need some means by which it can tell whether or not rng_is_initialized() has flipped to true since the last seeding from get_random_bytes(). Or equivalently, whether or not the last seed from get_random_bytes() has happened when rng_is_initialized() was still evaluating to false. As it currently stands, enum drbg_seed_state allows for the representation of two different DRBG seeding states: DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED and DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL. The former makes drbg_generate() to invoke a full reseeding operation involving both, the rather expensive jitterentropy as well as the get_random_bytes() randomness sources. The DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL state on the other hand implies that no reseeding at all is required for a !->pr DRBG variant. Introduce the new DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL state to enum drbg_seed_state for representing the condition that a DRBG was being seeded when rng_is_initialized() had still been false. In particular, this new state implies that - the given DRBG instance has been fully seeded from the jitterentropy source (if enabled) - and drbg_generate() is supposed to reseed from get_random_bytes() *only* once rng_is_initialized() turns to true. Up to now, the __drbg_seed() helper used to set the given DRBG instance's ->seeded state to constant DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL. Introduce a new argument allowing for the specification of the to be written ->seeded value instead. Make the first of its two callers, drbg_seed(), determine the appropriate value based on rng_is_initialized(). The remaining caller, drbg_async_seed(), is known to get invoked only once rng_is_initialized() is true, hence let it pass constant DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL for the new argument to __drbg_seed(). There is no change in behaviour, except for that the pr_devel() in drbg_generate() would now report "unseeded" for ->pr DRBG instances which had last been seeded when rng_is_initialized() was still evaluating to false. Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange Reviewed-by: Stephan Müller Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- crypto/drbg.c | 12 ++++++++---- include/crypto/drbg.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/drbg.c b/crypto/drbg.c index 0c0204c2bb58..c8dd056de386 100644 --- a/crypto/drbg.c +++ b/crypto/drbg.c @@ -1035,14 +1035,14 @@ static const struct drbg_state_ops drbg_hash_ops = { ******************************************************************/ static inline int __drbg_seed(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct list_head *seed, - int reseed) + int reseed, enum drbg_seed_state new_seed_state) { int ret = drbg->d_ops->update(drbg, seed, reseed); if (ret) return ret; - drbg->seeded = DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL; + drbg->seeded = new_seed_state; /* 10.1.1.2 / 10.1.1.3 step 5 */ drbg->reseed_ctr = 1; @@ -1092,7 +1092,7 @@ static void drbg_async_seed(struct work_struct *work) */ drbg->seeded = DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED; - __drbg_seed(drbg, &seedlist, true); + __drbg_seed(drbg, &seedlist, true, DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL); if (drbg->seeded == DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL) drbg->reseed_threshold = drbg_max_requests(drbg); @@ -1122,6 +1122,7 @@ static int drbg_seed(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct drbg_string *pers, unsigned int entropylen = drbg_sec_strength(drbg->core->flags); struct drbg_string data1; LIST_HEAD(seedlist); + enum drbg_seed_state new_seed_state = DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL; /* 9.1 / 9.2 / 9.3.1 step 3 */ if (pers && pers->len > (drbg_max_addtl(drbg))) { @@ -1149,6 +1150,9 @@ static int drbg_seed(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct drbg_string *pers, BUG_ON((entropylen * 2) > sizeof(entropy)); /* Get seed from in-kernel /dev/urandom */ + if (!rng_is_initialized()) + new_seed_state = DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL; + ret = drbg_get_random_bytes(drbg, entropy, entropylen); if (ret) goto out; @@ -1205,7 +1209,7 @@ static int drbg_seed(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct drbg_string *pers, memset(drbg->C, 0, drbg_statelen(drbg)); } - ret = __drbg_seed(drbg, &seedlist, reseed); + ret = __drbg_seed(drbg, &seedlist, reseed, new_seed_state); out: memzero_explicit(entropy, entropylen * 2); diff --git a/include/crypto/drbg.h b/include/crypto/drbg.h index 2db72121d568..01caab5e65de 100644 --- a/include/crypto/drbg.h +++ b/include/crypto/drbg.h @@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ struct drbg_test_data { enum drbg_seed_state { DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED, + DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL, /* Seeded with !rng_is_initialized() */ DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL, }; From f284afc3a9ca60f06306ad18554a1c434f093e99 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nicolai Stange Date: Thu, 2 Jun 2022 22:22:31 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0606/1091] crypto: drbg - move dynamic ->reseed_threshold adjustments to __drbg_seed() MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 262d83a4290c331cd4f617a457408bdb82fbb738 upstream. Since commit 42ea507fae1a ("crypto: drbg - reseed often if seedsource is degraded"), the maximum seed lifetime represented by ->reseed_threshold gets temporarily lowered if the get_random_bytes() source cannot provide sufficient entropy yet, as is common during boot, and restored back to the original value again once that has changed. More specifically, if the add_random_ready_callback() invoked from drbg_prepare_hrng() in the course of DRBG instantiation does not return -EALREADY, that is, if get_random_bytes() has not been fully initialized at this point yet, drbg_prepare_hrng() will lower ->reseed_threshold to a value of 50. The drbg_async_seed() scheduled from said random_ready_callback will eventually restore the original value. A future patch will replace the random_ready_callback based notification mechanism and thus, there will be no add_random_ready_callback() return value anymore which could get compared to -EALREADY. However, there's __drbg_seed() which gets invoked in the course of both, the DRBG instantiation as well as the eventual reseeding from get_random_bytes() in aforementioned drbg_async_seed(), if any. Moreover, it knows about the get_random_bytes() initialization state by the time the seed data had been obtained from it: the new_seed_state argument introduced with the previous patch would get set to DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL in case get_random_bytes() had not been fully initialized yet and to DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL otherwise. Thus, __drbg_seed() provides a convenient alternative for managing that ->reseed_threshold lowering and restoring at a central place. Move all ->reseed_threshold adjustment code from drbg_prepare_hrng() and drbg_async_seed() respectively to __drbg_seed(). Make __drbg_seed() lower the ->reseed_threshold to 50 in case its new_seed_state argument equals DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL and let it restore the original value otherwise. There is no change in behaviour. Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange Reviewed-by: Stephan Müller Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- crypto/drbg.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/drbg.c b/crypto/drbg.c index c8dd056de386..28871b0896ea 100644 --- a/crypto/drbg.c +++ b/crypto/drbg.c @@ -1046,6 +1046,27 @@ static inline int __drbg_seed(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct list_head *seed, /* 10.1.1.2 / 10.1.1.3 step 5 */ drbg->reseed_ctr = 1; + switch (drbg->seeded) { + case DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED: + /* Impossible, but handle it to silence compiler warnings. */ + fallthrough; + case DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL: + /* + * Require frequent reseeds until the seed source is + * fully initialized. + */ + drbg->reseed_threshold = 50; + break; + + case DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL: + /* + * Seed source has become fully initialized, frequent + * reseeds no longer required. + */ + drbg->reseed_threshold = drbg_max_requests(drbg); + break; + } + return ret; } @@ -1094,9 +1115,6 @@ static void drbg_async_seed(struct work_struct *work) __drbg_seed(drbg, &seedlist, true, DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL); - if (drbg->seeded == DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL) - drbg->reseed_threshold = drbg_max_requests(drbg); - unlock: mutex_unlock(&drbg->drbg_mutex); @@ -1532,12 +1550,6 @@ static int drbg_prepare_hrng(struct drbg_state *drbg) return err; } - /* - * Require frequent reseeds until the seed source is fully - * initialized. - */ - drbg->reseed_threshold = 50; - return err; } From e9eb0c4741a70e8f361452f675b6acc07cef20b8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Stephan=20M=C3=BCller?= Date: Sun, 7 Jun 2020 15:20:26 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0607/1091] crypto: drbg - always try to free Jitter RNG instance commit 819966c06b759022e9932f328284314d9272b9f3 upstream. The Jitter RNG is unconditionally allocated as a seed source follwoing the patch 97f2650e5040. Thus, the instance must always be deallocated. Reported-by: syzbot+2e635807decef724a1fa@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 97f2650e5040 ("crypto: drbg - always seeded with SP800-90B ...") Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- crypto/drbg.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/drbg.c b/crypto/drbg.c index 28871b0896ea..b2b256a1c52e 100644 --- a/crypto/drbg.c +++ b/crypto/drbg.c @@ -1647,10 +1647,12 @@ static int drbg_uninstantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg) if (drbg->random_ready.notifier_call) { unregister_random_ready_notifier(&drbg->random_ready); cancel_work_sync(&drbg->seed_work); - crypto_free_rng(drbg->jent); - drbg->jent = NULL; } + if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(drbg->jent)) + crypto_free_rng(drbg->jent); + drbg->jent = NULL; + if (drbg->d_ops) drbg->d_ops->crypto_fini(drbg); drbg_dealloc_state(drbg); From 072cd87d12a8ba472a6b95e66cf5b0c8f642f658 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nicolai Stange Date: Thu, 2 Jun 2022 22:22:32 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0608/1091] crypto: drbg - make reseeding from get_random_bytes() synchronous commit 074bcd4000e0d812bc253f86fedc40f81ed59ccc upstream. get_random_bytes() usually hasn't full entropy available by the time DRBG instances are first getting seeded from it during boot. Thus, the DRBG implementation registers random_ready_callbacks which would in turn schedule some work for reseeding the DRBGs once get_random_bytes() has sufficient entropy available. For reference, the relevant history around handling DRBG (re)seeding in the context of a not yet fully seeded get_random_bytes() is: commit 16b369a91d0d ("random: Blocking API for accessing nonblocking_pool") commit 4c7879907edd ("crypto: drbg - add async seeding operation") commit 205a525c3342 ("random: Add callback API for random pool readiness") commit 57225e679788 ("crypto: drbg - Use callback API for random readiness") commit c2719503f5e1 ("random: Remove kernel blocking API") However, some time later, the initialization state of get_random_bytes() has been made queryable via rng_is_initialized() introduced with commit 9a47249d444d ("random: Make crng state queryable"). This primitive now allows for streamlining the DRBG reseeding from get_random_bytes() by replacing that aforementioned asynchronous work scheduling from random_ready_callbacks with some simpler, synchronous code in drbg_generate() next to the related logic already present therein. Apart from improving overall code readability, this change will also enable DRBG users to rely on wait_for_random_bytes() for ensuring that the initial seeding has completed, if desired. The previous patches already laid the grounds by making drbg_seed() to record at each DRBG instance whether it was being seeded at a time when rng_is_initialized() still had been false as indicated by ->seeded == DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL. All that remains to be done now is to make drbg_generate() check for this condition, determine whether rng_is_initialized() has flipped to true in the meanwhile and invoke a reseed from get_random_bytes() if so. Make this move: - rename the former drbg_async_seed() work handler, i.e. the one in charge of reseeding a DRBG instance from get_random_bytes(), to "drbg_seed_from_random()", - change its signature as appropriate, i.e. make it take a struct drbg_state rather than a work_struct and change its return type from "void" to "int" in order to allow for passing error information from e.g. its __drbg_seed() invocation onwards to callers, - make drbg_generate() invoke this drbg_seed_from_random() once it encounters a DRBG instance with ->seeded == DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL by the time rng_is_initialized() has flipped to true and - prune everything related to the former, random_ready_callback based mechanism. As drbg_seed_from_random() is now getting invoked from drbg_generate() with the ->drbg_mutex being held, it must not attempt to recursively grab it once again. Remove the corresponding mutex operations from what is now drbg_seed_from_random(). Furthermore, as drbg_seed_from_random() can now report errors directly to its caller, there's no need for it to temporarily switch the DRBG's ->seeded state to DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED so that a failure of the subsequently invoked __drbg_seed() will get signaled to drbg_generate(). Don't do it then. Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu [Jason: for stable, undid the modifications for the backport of 5acd3548.] Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- crypto/drbg.c | 61 ++++++++----------------------------------- drivers/char/random.c | 2 -- include/crypto/drbg.h | 2 -- 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/drbg.c b/crypto/drbg.c index b2b256a1c52e..9329d9dcc210 100644 --- a/crypto/drbg.c +++ b/crypto/drbg.c @@ -1086,12 +1086,10 @@ static inline int drbg_get_random_bytes(struct drbg_state *drbg, return 0; } -static void drbg_async_seed(struct work_struct *work) +static int drbg_seed_from_random(struct drbg_state *drbg) { struct drbg_string data; LIST_HEAD(seedlist); - struct drbg_state *drbg = container_of(work, struct drbg_state, - seed_work); unsigned int entropylen = drbg_sec_strength(drbg->core->flags); unsigned char entropy[32]; int ret; @@ -1102,23 +1100,15 @@ static void drbg_async_seed(struct work_struct *work) drbg_string_fill(&data, entropy, entropylen); list_add_tail(&data.list, &seedlist); - mutex_lock(&drbg->drbg_mutex); - ret = drbg_get_random_bytes(drbg, entropy, entropylen); if (ret) - goto unlock; + goto out; - /* Reset ->seeded so that if __drbg_seed fails the next - * generate call will trigger a reseed. - */ - drbg->seeded = DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED; - - __drbg_seed(drbg, &seedlist, true, DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL); - -unlock: - mutex_unlock(&drbg->drbg_mutex); + ret = __drbg_seed(drbg, &seedlist, true, DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL); +out: memzero_explicit(entropy, entropylen); + return ret; } /* @@ -1421,6 +1411,11 @@ static int drbg_generate(struct drbg_state *drbg, goto err; /* 9.3.1 step 7.4 */ addtl = NULL; + } else if (rng_is_initialized() && + drbg->seeded == DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL) { + len = drbg_seed_from_random(drbg); + if (len) + goto err; } if (addtl && 0 < addtl->len) @@ -1513,44 +1508,15 @@ static int drbg_generate_long(struct drbg_state *drbg, return 0; } -static int drbg_schedule_async_seed(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long action, void *data) -{ - struct drbg_state *drbg = container_of(nb, struct drbg_state, - random_ready); - - schedule_work(&drbg->seed_work); - return 0; -} - static int drbg_prepare_hrng(struct drbg_state *drbg) { - int err; - /* We do not need an HRNG in test mode. */ if (list_empty(&drbg->test_data.list)) return 0; drbg->jent = crypto_alloc_rng("jitterentropy_rng", 0, 0); - INIT_WORK(&drbg->seed_work, drbg_async_seed); - - drbg->random_ready.notifier_call = drbg_schedule_async_seed; - err = register_random_ready_notifier(&drbg->random_ready); - - switch (err) { - case 0: - break; - - case -EALREADY: - err = 0; - /* fall through */ - - default: - drbg->random_ready.notifier_call = NULL; - return err; - } - - return err; + return 0; } /* @@ -1644,11 +1610,6 @@ free_everything: */ static int drbg_uninstantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg) { - if (drbg->random_ready.notifier_call) { - unregister_random_ready_notifier(&drbg->random_ready); - cancel_work_sync(&drbg->seed_work); - } - if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(drbg->jent)) crypto_free_rng(drbg->jent); drbg->jent = NULL; diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index bbfce902cc67..420d78eee6c5 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -157,7 +157,6 @@ int __cold register_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb) spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_chain_lock, flags); return ret; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(register_random_ready_notifier); /* * Delete a previously registered readiness callback function. @@ -172,7 +171,6 @@ int __cold unregister_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb) spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_chain_lock, flags); return ret; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_random_ready_notifier); static void __cold process_random_ready_list(void) { diff --git a/include/crypto/drbg.h b/include/crypto/drbg.h index 01caab5e65de..a6c3b8e7deb6 100644 --- a/include/crypto/drbg.h +++ b/include/crypto/drbg.h @@ -137,12 +137,10 @@ struct drbg_state { bool pr; /* Prediction resistance enabled? */ bool fips_primed; /* Continuous test primed? */ unsigned char *prev; /* FIPS 140-2 continuous test value */ - struct work_struct seed_work; /* asynchronous seeding support */ struct crypto_rng *jent; const struct drbg_state_ops *d_ops; const struct drbg_core *core; struct drbg_string test_data; - struct notifier_block random_ready; }; static inline __u8 drbg_statelen(struct drbg_state *drbg) From f96250197b436c5290fc26950e3db63fa8fc8ed4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Tue, 7 Jun 2022 09:44:07 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0609/1091] random: avoid checking crng_ready() twice in random_init() commit 9b29b6b20376ab64e1b043df6301d8a92378e631 upstream. The current flow expands to: if (crng_ready()) ... else if (...) if (!crng_ready()) ... The second crng_ready() call is redundant, but can't so easily be optimized out by the compiler. This commit simplifies that to: if (crng_ready() ... else if (...) ... Fixes: 560181c27b58 ("random: move initialization functions out of hot pages") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 420d78eee6c5..9972259809db 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -834,7 +834,7 @@ int __init random_init(const char *command_line) if (crng_ready()) crng_reseed(); else if (trust_cpu) - credit_init_bits(arch_bytes * 8); + _credit_init_bits(arch_bytes * 8); return 0; } From c0bf6bfce70a9b5e0fc58c41df524fa007f3dac0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Tue, 7 Jun 2022 17:00:16 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0610/1091] random: mark bootloader randomness code as __init commit 39e0f991a62ed5efabd20711a7b6e7da92603170 upstream. add_bootloader_randomness() and the variables it touches are only used during __init and not after, so mark these as __init. At the same time, unexport this, since it's only called by other __init code that's built-in. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 428826f5358c ("fdt: add support for rng-seed") Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 7 +++---- include/linux/random.h | 2 +- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 9972259809db..d09e78e6f24b 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -785,8 +785,8 @@ static void __cold _credit_init_bits(size_t bits) * **********************************************************************/ -static bool trust_cpu __ro_after_init = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU); -static bool trust_bootloader __ro_after_init = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER); +static bool trust_cpu __initdata = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU); +static bool trust_bootloader __initdata = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER); static int __init parse_trust_cpu(char *arg) { return kstrtobool(arg, &trust_cpu); @@ -882,13 +882,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_hwgenerator_randomness); * Handle random seed passed by bootloader, and credit it if * CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is set. */ -void __cold add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len) +void __init add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len) { mix_pool_bytes(buf, len); if (trust_bootloader) credit_init_bits(len * 8); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_bootloader_randomness); struct fast_pool { struct work_struct mix; diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h index 917470c4490a..3feafab498ad 100644 --- a/include/linux/random.h +++ b/include/linux/random.h @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ struct notifier_block; void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len); -void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len); +void __init add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len); void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, unsigned int value) __latent_entropy; void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) __latent_entropy; From 5624055c8f4b5abcce23e019f90b4867ebc59519 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Tue, 7 Jun 2022 17:04:38 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0611/1091] random: account for arch randomness in bits commit 77fc95f8c0dc9e1f8e620ec14d2fb65028fb7adc upstream. Rather than accounting in bytes and multiplying (shifting), we can just account in bits and avoid the shift. The main motivation for this is there are other patches in flux that expand this code a bit, and avoiding the duplication of "* 8" everywhere makes things a bit clearer. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 12e45a2a6308 ("random: credit architectural init the exact amount") Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index d09e78e6f24b..82f9ee440406 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -809,7 +809,7 @@ early_param("random.trust_bootloader", parse_trust_bootloader); int __init random_init(const char *command_line) { ktime_t now = ktime_get_real(); - unsigned int i, arch_bytes; + unsigned int i, arch_bits; unsigned long entropy; #if defined(LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN) @@ -817,12 +817,12 @@ int __init random_init(const char *command_line) _mix_pool_bytes(compiletime_seed, sizeof(compiletime_seed)); #endif - for (i = 0, arch_bytes = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; + for (i = 0, arch_bits = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE * 8; i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; i += sizeof(entropy)) { if (!arch_get_random_seed_long_early(&entropy) && !arch_get_random_long_early(&entropy)) { entropy = random_get_entropy(); - arch_bytes -= sizeof(entropy); + arch_bits -= sizeof(entropy) * 8; } _mix_pool_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy)); } @@ -834,7 +834,7 @@ int __init random_init(const char *command_line) if (crng_ready()) crng_reseed(); else if (trust_cpu) - _credit_init_bits(arch_bytes * 8); + _credit_init_bits(arch_bits); return 0; } From 348831a9e8aa311e6fb09ce8748b8ed29e73cf05 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: He Ying Date: Thu, 20 Jan 2022 20:44:18 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 0612/1091] powerpc/kasan: Silence KASAN warnings in __get_wchan() [ Upstream commit a1b29ba2f2c171b9bea73be993bfdf0a62d37d15 ] The following KASAN warning was reported in our kernel. BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in get_wchan+0x188/0x250 Read of size 4 at addr d216f958 by task ps/14437 CPU: 3 PID: 14437 Comm: ps Tainted: G O 5.10.0 #1 Call Trace: [daa63858] [c0654348] dump_stack+0x9c/0xe4 (unreliable) [daa63888] [c035cf0c] print_address_description.constprop.3+0x8c/0x570 [daa63908] [c035d6bc] kasan_report+0x1ac/0x218 [daa63948] [c00496e8] get_wchan+0x188/0x250 [daa63978] [c0461ec8] do_task_stat+0xce8/0xe60 [daa63b98] [c0455ac8] proc_single_show+0x98/0x170 [daa63bc8] [c03cab8c] seq_read_iter+0x1ec/0x900 [daa63c38] [c03cb47c] seq_read+0x1dc/0x290 [daa63d68] [c037fc94] vfs_read+0x164/0x510 [daa63ea8] [c03808e4] ksys_read+0x144/0x1d0 [daa63f38] [c005b1dc] ret_from_syscall+0x0/0x38 --- interrupt: c00 at 0x8fa8f4 LR = 0x8fa8cc The buggy address belongs to the page: page:98ebcdd2 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:00000000 index:0x2 pfn:0x1216f flags: 0x0() raw: 00000000 00000000 01010122 00000000 00000002 00000000 ffffffff 00000000 raw: 00000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: d216f800: 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 d216f880: f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 >d216f900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 ^ d216f980: f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 d216fa00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 After looking into this issue, I find the buggy address belongs to the task stack region. It seems KASAN has something wrong. I look into the code of __get_wchan in x86 architecture and find the same issue has been resolved by the commit f7d27c35ddff ("x86/mm, kasan: Silence KASAN warnings in get_wchan()"). The solution could be applied to powerpc architecture too. As Andrey Ryabinin said, get_wchan() is racy by design, it may access volatile stack of running task, thus it may access redzone in a stack frame and cause KASAN to warn about this. Use READ_ONCE_NOCHECK() to silence these warnings. Reported-by: Wanming Hu Signed-off-by: He Ying Signed-off-by: Chen Jingwen Reviewed-by: Kees Cook Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220121014418.155675-1-heying24@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c index c94bba9142e7..832663f21422 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c @@ -2001,12 +2001,12 @@ static unsigned long __get_wchan(struct task_struct *p) return 0; do { - sp = *(unsigned long *)sp; + sp = READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(*(unsigned long *)sp); if (!validate_sp(sp, p, STACK_FRAME_OVERHEAD) || p->state == TASK_RUNNING) return 0; if (count > 0) { - ip = ((unsigned long *)sp)[STACK_FRAME_LR_SAVE]; + ip = READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(((unsigned long *)sp)[STACK_FRAME_LR_SAVE]); if (!in_sched_functions(ip)) return ip; } From a45e19fd6ed89ef6a19bbc026e7dd9faec880e53 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hui Wang Date: Mon, 30 May 2022 12:01:50 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0613/1091] ASoC: nau8822: Add operation for internal PLL off and on [ Upstream commit aeca8a3295022bcec46697f16e098140423d8463 ] We tried to enable the audio on an imx6sx EVB with the codec nau8822, after setting the internal PLL fractional parameters, the audio still couldn't work and the there was no sdma irq at all. After checking with the section "8.1.1 Phase Locked Loop (PLL) Design Example" of "NAU88C22 Datasheet Rev 0.6", we found we need to turn off the PLL before programming fractional parameters and turn on the PLL after programming. After this change, the audio driver could record and play sound and the sdma's irq is triggered when playing or recording. Cc: David Lin Cc: John Hsu Cc: Seven Li Signed-off-by: Hui Wang Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220530040151.95221-2-hui.wang@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- sound/soc/codecs/nau8822.c | 4 ++++ sound/soc/codecs/nau8822.h | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/nau8822.c b/sound/soc/codecs/nau8822.c index 78db3bd0b3bc..cd163978792e 100644 --- a/sound/soc/codecs/nau8822.c +++ b/sound/soc/codecs/nau8822.c @@ -740,6 +740,8 @@ static int nau8822_set_pll(struct snd_soc_dai *dai, int pll_id, int source, pll_param->pll_int, pll_param->pll_frac, pll_param->mclk_scaler, pll_param->pre_factor); + snd_soc_component_update_bits(component, + NAU8822_REG_POWER_MANAGEMENT_1, NAU8822_PLL_EN_MASK, NAU8822_PLL_OFF); snd_soc_component_update_bits(component, NAU8822_REG_PLL_N, NAU8822_PLLMCLK_DIV2 | NAU8822_PLLN_MASK, (pll_param->pre_factor ? NAU8822_PLLMCLK_DIV2 : 0) | @@ -757,6 +759,8 @@ static int nau8822_set_pll(struct snd_soc_dai *dai, int pll_id, int source, pll_param->mclk_scaler << NAU8822_MCLKSEL_SFT); snd_soc_component_update_bits(component, NAU8822_REG_CLOCKING, NAU8822_CLKM_MASK, NAU8822_CLKM_PLL); + snd_soc_component_update_bits(component, + NAU8822_REG_POWER_MANAGEMENT_1, NAU8822_PLL_EN_MASK, NAU8822_PLL_ON); return 0; } diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/nau8822.h b/sound/soc/codecs/nau8822.h index 489191ff187e..b45d42c15de6 100644 --- a/sound/soc/codecs/nau8822.h +++ b/sound/soc/codecs/nau8822.h @@ -90,6 +90,9 @@ #define NAU8822_REFIMP_3K 0x3 #define NAU8822_IOBUF_EN (0x1 << 2) #define NAU8822_ABIAS_EN (0x1 << 3) +#define NAU8822_PLL_EN_MASK (0x1 << 5) +#define NAU8822_PLL_ON (0x1 << 5) +#define NAU8822_PLL_OFF (0x0 << 5) /* NAU8822_REG_AUDIO_INTERFACE (0x4) */ #define NAU8822_AIFMT_MASK (0x3 << 3) From cd8c1e6c01f1b76ad56b0b16ac5e1b42aa5bbffb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Rob Clark Date: Wed, 1 Jun 2022 07:51:16 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0614/1091] dma-debug: make things less spammy under memory pressure [ Upstream commit e19f8fa6ce1ca9b8b934ba7d2e8f34c95abc6e60 ] Limit the error msg to avoid flooding the console. If you have a lot of threads hitting this at once, they could have already gotten passed the dma_debug_disabled() check before they get to the point of allocation failure, resulting in quite a lot of this error message spamming the log. Use pr_err_once() to limit that. Signed-off-by: Rob Clark Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- kernel/dma/debug.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/dma/debug.c b/kernel/dma/debug.c index 1c133f610f59..9a4837b68e18 100644 --- a/kernel/dma/debug.c +++ b/kernel/dma/debug.c @@ -616,7 +616,7 @@ static void add_dma_entry(struct dma_debug_entry *entry) rc = active_cacheline_insert(entry); if (rc == -ENOMEM) { - pr_err("cacheline tracking ENOMEM, dma-debug disabled\n"); + pr_err_once("cacheline tracking ENOMEM, dma-debug disabled\n"); global_disable = true; } From b00f63dba5b89d7b3640ce03b46eddac72bd331c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Charles Keepax Date: Thu, 2 Jun 2022 17:21:14 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0615/1091] ASoC: cs42l52: Fix TLV scales for mixer controls [ Upstream commit 8bf5aabf524eec61013e506f764a0b2652dc5665 ] The datasheet specifies the range of the mixer volumes as between -51.5dB and 12dB with a 0.5dB step. Update the TLVs for this. Signed-off-by: Charles Keepax Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220602162119.3393857-2-ckeepax@opensource.cirrus.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- sound/soc/codecs/cs42l52.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/cs42l52.c b/sound/soc/codecs/cs42l52.c index 2ea4cba3be2a..0daa3b4c68ca 100644 --- a/sound/soc/codecs/cs42l52.c +++ b/sound/soc/codecs/cs42l52.c @@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ static DECLARE_TLV_DB_SCALE(mic_tlv, 1600, 100, 0); static DECLARE_TLV_DB_SCALE(pga_tlv, -600, 50, 0); -static DECLARE_TLV_DB_SCALE(mix_tlv, -50, 50, 0); +static DECLARE_TLV_DB_SCALE(mix_tlv, -5150, 50, 0); static DECLARE_TLV_DB_SCALE(beep_tlv, -56, 200, 0); @@ -364,7 +364,7 @@ static const struct snd_kcontrol_new cs42l52_snd_controls[] = { CS42L52_ADCB_VOL, 0, 0xA0, 0x78, ipd_tlv), SOC_DOUBLE_R_SX_TLV("ADC Mixer Volume", CS42L52_ADCA_MIXER_VOL, CS42L52_ADCB_MIXER_VOL, - 0, 0x19, 0x7F, ipd_tlv), + 0, 0x19, 0x7F, mix_tlv), SOC_DOUBLE("ADC Switch", CS42L52_ADC_MISC_CTL, 0, 1, 1, 0), From 675b6a49cf70c4b2f84c73f7166f01217859a3a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Charles Keepax Date: Thu, 2 Jun 2022 17:21:15 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0616/1091] ASoC: cs35l36: Update digital volume TLV [ Upstream commit 5005a2345825eb8346546d99bfe669f73111b5c5 ] The digital volume TLV specifies the step as 0.25dB but the actual step of the control is 0.125dB. Update the TLV to correct this. Signed-off-by: Charles Keepax Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220602162119.3393857-3-ckeepax@opensource.cirrus.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- sound/soc/codecs/cs35l36.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/cs35l36.c b/sound/soc/codecs/cs35l36.c index e9b5f76f27a8..aa32b8c26578 100644 --- a/sound/soc/codecs/cs35l36.c +++ b/sound/soc/codecs/cs35l36.c @@ -444,7 +444,8 @@ static bool cs35l36_volatile_reg(struct device *dev, unsigned int reg) } } -static DECLARE_TLV_DB_SCALE(dig_vol_tlv, -10200, 25, 0); +static const DECLARE_TLV_DB_RANGE(dig_vol_tlv, 0, 912, + TLV_DB_MINMAX_ITEM(-10200, 1200)); static DECLARE_TLV_DB_SCALE(amp_gain_tlv, 0, 1, 1); static const char * const cs35l36_pcm_sftramp_text[] = { From 385a031c56a98aa118818a06f0b826ea47ff56fc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Charles Keepax Date: Thu, 2 Jun 2022 17:21:16 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0617/1091] ASoC: cs53l30: Correct number of volume levels on SX controls [ Upstream commit 7fbd6dd68127927e844912a16741016d432a0737 ] This driver specified the maximum value rather than the number of volume levels on the SX controls, this is incorrect, so correct them. Reported-by: David Rhodes Signed-off-by: Charles Keepax Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220602162119.3393857-4-ckeepax@opensource.cirrus.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- sound/soc/codecs/cs53l30.c | 16 ++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/cs53l30.c b/sound/soc/codecs/cs53l30.c index ed22361b35c1..a5a383b92305 100644 --- a/sound/soc/codecs/cs53l30.c +++ b/sound/soc/codecs/cs53l30.c @@ -347,22 +347,22 @@ static const struct snd_kcontrol_new cs53l30_snd_controls[] = { SOC_ENUM("ADC2 NG Delay", adc2_ng_delay_enum), SOC_SINGLE_SX_TLV("ADC1A PGA Volume", - CS53L30_ADC1A_AFE_CTL, 0, 0x34, 0x18, pga_tlv), + CS53L30_ADC1A_AFE_CTL, 0, 0x34, 0x24, pga_tlv), SOC_SINGLE_SX_TLV("ADC1B PGA Volume", - CS53L30_ADC1B_AFE_CTL, 0, 0x34, 0x18, pga_tlv), + CS53L30_ADC1B_AFE_CTL, 0, 0x34, 0x24, pga_tlv), SOC_SINGLE_SX_TLV("ADC2A PGA Volume", - CS53L30_ADC2A_AFE_CTL, 0, 0x34, 0x18, pga_tlv), + CS53L30_ADC2A_AFE_CTL, 0, 0x34, 0x24, pga_tlv), SOC_SINGLE_SX_TLV("ADC2B PGA Volume", - CS53L30_ADC2B_AFE_CTL, 0, 0x34, 0x18, pga_tlv), + CS53L30_ADC2B_AFE_CTL, 0, 0x34, 0x24, pga_tlv), SOC_SINGLE_SX_TLV("ADC1A Digital Volume", - CS53L30_ADC1A_DIG_VOL, 0, 0xA0, 0x0C, dig_tlv), + CS53L30_ADC1A_DIG_VOL, 0, 0xA0, 0x6C, dig_tlv), SOC_SINGLE_SX_TLV("ADC1B Digital Volume", - CS53L30_ADC1B_DIG_VOL, 0, 0xA0, 0x0C, dig_tlv), + CS53L30_ADC1B_DIG_VOL, 0, 0xA0, 0x6C, dig_tlv), SOC_SINGLE_SX_TLV("ADC2A Digital Volume", - CS53L30_ADC2A_DIG_VOL, 0, 0xA0, 0x0C, dig_tlv), + CS53L30_ADC2A_DIG_VOL, 0, 0xA0, 0x6C, dig_tlv), SOC_SINGLE_SX_TLV("ADC2B Digital Volume", - CS53L30_ADC2B_DIG_VOL, 0, 0xA0, 0x0C, dig_tlv), + CS53L30_ADC2B_DIG_VOL, 0, 0xA0, 0x6C, dig_tlv), }; static const struct snd_soc_dapm_widget cs53l30_dapm_widgets[] = { From 6d180913b3ab8d786205bc2ade8876e935c7837f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Charles Keepax Date: Thu, 2 Jun 2022 17:21:17 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0618/1091] ASoC: cs42l52: Correct TLV for Bypass Volume [ Upstream commit 91e90c712fade0b69cdff7cc6512f6099bd18ae5 ] The Bypass Volume is accidentally using a -6dB minimum TLV rather than the correct -60dB minimum. Add a new TLV to correct this. Signed-off-by: Charles Keepax Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220602162119.3393857-5-ckeepax@opensource.cirrus.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- sound/soc/codecs/cs42l52.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/cs42l52.c b/sound/soc/codecs/cs42l52.c index 0daa3b4c68ca..6c054b357205 100644 --- a/sound/soc/codecs/cs42l52.c +++ b/sound/soc/codecs/cs42l52.c @@ -137,6 +137,8 @@ static DECLARE_TLV_DB_SCALE(mic_tlv, 1600, 100, 0); static DECLARE_TLV_DB_SCALE(pga_tlv, -600, 50, 0); +static DECLARE_TLV_DB_SCALE(pass_tlv, -6000, 50, 0); + static DECLARE_TLV_DB_SCALE(mix_tlv, -5150, 50, 0); static DECLARE_TLV_DB_SCALE(beep_tlv, -56, 200, 0); @@ -351,7 +353,7 @@ static const struct snd_kcontrol_new cs42l52_snd_controls[] = { CS42L52_SPKB_VOL, 0, 0x40, 0xC0, hl_tlv), SOC_DOUBLE_R_SX_TLV("Bypass Volume", CS42L52_PASSTHRUA_VOL, - CS42L52_PASSTHRUB_VOL, 0, 0x88, 0x90, pga_tlv), + CS42L52_PASSTHRUB_VOL, 0, 0x88, 0x90, pass_tlv), SOC_DOUBLE("Bypass Mute", CS42L52_MISC_CTL, 4, 5, 1, 0), From 052cd621acbf1ea643856bfe5022af56777bc0ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Charles Keepax Date: Thu, 2 Jun 2022 17:21:18 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0619/1091] ASoC: cs42l56: Correct typo in minimum level for SX volume controls [ Upstream commit a8928ada9b96944cadd8b65d191e33199fd38782 ] A couple of the SX volume controls specify 0x84 as the lowest volume value, however the correct value from the datasheet is 0x44. The datasheet don't include spaces in the value it displays as binary so this was almost certainly just a typo reading 1000100. Signed-off-by: Charles Keepax Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220602162119.3393857-6-ckeepax@opensource.cirrus.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- sound/soc/codecs/cs42l56.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/cs42l56.c b/sound/soc/codecs/cs42l56.c index 51d7a87ab4c3..8be7d83f0ce9 100644 --- a/sound/soc/codecs/cs42l56.c +++ b/sound/soc/codecs/cs42l56.c @@ -391,9 +391,9 @@ static const struct snd_kcontrol_new cs42l56_snd_controls[] = { SOC_DOUBLE("ADC Boost Switch", CS42L56_GAIN_BIAS_CTL, 3, 2, 1, 1), SOC_DOUBLE_R_SX_TLV("Headphone Volume", CS42L56_HPA_VOLUME, - CS42L56_HPB_VOLUME, 0, 0x84, 0x48, hl_tlv), + CS42L56_HPB_VOLUME, 0, 0x44, 0x48, hl_tlv), SOC_DOUBLE_R_SX_TLV("LineOut Volume", CS42L56_LOA_VOLUME, - CS42L56_LOB_VOLUME, 0, 0x84, 0x48, hl_tlv), + CS42L56_LOB_VOLUME, 0, 0x44, 0x48, hl_tlv), SOC_SINGLE_TLV("Bass Shelving Volume", CS42L56_TONE_CTL, 0, 0x00, 1, tone_tlv), From 253334f84c81bc6a43af489f108c0bddad989eef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sergey Shtylyov Date: Sat, 21 May 2022 23:34:10 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 0620/1091] ata: libata-core: fix NULL pointer deref in ata_host_alloc_pinfo() [ Upstream commit bf476fe22aa1851bab4728e0c49025a6a0bea307 ] In an unlikely (and probably wrong?) case that the 'ppi' parameter of ata_host_alloc_pinfo() points to an array starting with a NULL pointer, there's going to be a kernel oops as the 'pi' local variable won't get reassigned from the initial value of NULL. Initialize 'pi' instead to '&ata_dummy_port_info' to fix the possible kernel oops for good... Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with the SVACE static analysis tool. Signed-off-by: Sergey Shtylyov Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/ata/libata-core.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/ata/libata-core.c b/drivers/ata/libata-core.c index af8a1bac9345..fc37e075f3e1 100644 --- a/drivers/ata/libata-core.c +++ b/drivers/ata/libata-core.c @@ -6235,7 +6235,7 @@ struct ata_host *ata_host_alloc_pinfo(struct device *dev, const struct ata_port_info * const * ppi, int n_ports) { - const struct ata_port_info *pi; + const struct ata_port_info *pi = &ata_dummy_port_info; struct ata_host *host; int i, j; @@ -6243,7 +6243,7 @@ struct ata_host *ata_host_alloc_pinfo(struct device *dev, if (!host) return NULL; - for (i = 0, j = 0, pi = NULL; i < host->n_ports; i++) { + for (i = 0, j = 0; i < host->n_ports; i++) { struct ata_port *ap = host->ports[i]; if (ppi[j]) From a81f5a7f7a2095fed22e379c72f03987be7edb6d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Adam Ford Date: Thu, 26 May 2022 13:21:28 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 0621/1091] ASoC: wm8962: Fix suspend while playing music [ Upstream commit d1f5272c0f7d2e53c6f2480f46725442776f5f78 ] If the audio CODEC is playing sound when the system is suspended, it can be left in a state which throws the following error: wm8962 3-001a: ASoC: error at soc_component_read_no_lock on wm8962.3-001a: -16 Once this error has occurred, the audio will not work again until rebooted. Fix this by configuring SET_SYSTEM_SLEEP_PM_OPS. Signed-off-by: Adam Ford Acked-by: Charles Keepax Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220526182129.538472-1-aford173@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- sound/soc/codecs/wm8962.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/wm8962.c b/sound/soc/codecs/wm8962.c index d9d59f45833f..ebaee468057b 100644 --- a/sound/soc/codecs/wm8962.c +++ b/sound/soc/codecs/wm8962.c @@ -3854,6 +3854,7 @@ static int wm8962_runtime_suspend(struct device *dev) #endif static const struct dev_pm_ops wm8962_pm = { + SET_SYSTEM_SLEEP_PM_OPS(pm_runtime_force_suspend, pm_runtime_force_resume) SET_RUNTIME_PM_OPS(wm8962_runtime_suspend, wm8962_runtime_resume, NULL) }; From bc046649c5d6a66f5ba0a129e6c2354e835ce1ef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mark Brown Date: Fri, 3 Jun 2022 14:39:37 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0622/1091] ASoC: es8328: Fix event generation for deemphasis control [ Upstream commit 8259610c2ec01c5cbfb61882ae176aabacac9c19 ] Currently the put() method for the deemphasis control returns 0 when a new value is written to the control even if the value changed, meaning events are not generated. Fix this, skip the work of updating the value when it is unchanged and then return 1 after having done so. Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220603123937.4013603-1-broonie@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- sound/soc/codecs/es8328.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/es8328.c b/sound/soc/codecs/es8328.c index fdf64c29f563..4117ab6e9b6f 100644 --- a/sound/soc/codecs/es8328.c +++ b/sound/soc/codecs/es8328.c @@ -161,13 +161,16 @@ static int es8328_put_deemph(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, if (deemph > 1) return -EINVAL; + if (es8328->deemph == deemph) + return 0; + ret = es8328_set_deemph(component); if (ret < 0) return ret; es8328->deemph = deemph; - return 0; + return 1; } From 9e3a0d3fc71c62000a6889b9bbf0e22c354b4324 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mark Brown Date: Fri, 3 Jun 2022 13:50:03 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0623/1091] ASoC: wm_adsp: Fix event generation for wm_adsp_fw_put() [ Upstream commit 2abdf9f80019e8244d3806ed0e1c9f725e50b452 ] Currently wm_adsp_fw_put() returns 0 rather than 1 when updating the value of the control, meaning that no event is generated to userspace. Fix this by setting the default return value to 1, the code already exits early with a return value of 0 if the value is unchanged. Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Reviewed-by: Richard Fitzgerald Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220603115003.3865834-1-broonie@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- sound/soc/codecs/wm_adsp.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/wm_adsp.c b/sound/soc/codecs/wm_adsp.c index 13672928da99..aedfa6b2895b 100644 --- a/sound/soc/codecs/wm_adsp.c +++ b/sound/soc/codecs/wm_adsp.c @@ -791,7 +791,7 @@ int wm_adsp_fw_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, struct snd_soc_component *component = snd_soc_kcontrol_component(kcontrol); struct soc_enum *e = (struct soc_enum *)kcontrol->private_value; struct wm_adsp *dsp = snd_soc_component_get_drvdata(component); - int ret = 0; + int ret = 1; if (ucontrol->value.enumerated.item[0] == dsp[e->shift_l].fw) return 0; From 001de3d8ce823e73e95c455e3c4642c2108b9fdb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wentao Wang Date: Thu, 2 Jun 2022 08:57:00 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0624/1091] scsi: vmw_pvscsi: Expand vcpuHint to 16 bits [ Upstream commit cf71d59c2eceadfcde0fb52e237990a0909880d7 ] vcpuHint has been expanded to 16 bit on host to enable routing to more CPUs. Guest side should align with the change. This change has been tested with hosts with 8-bit and 16-bit vcpuHint, on both platforms host side can get correct value. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/EF35F4D5-5DCC-42C5-BCC4-29DF1729B24C@vmware.com Signed-off-by: Wentao Wang Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.h | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.h b/drivers/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.h index 75966d3f326e..d87c12324c03 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.h +++ b/drivers/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.h @@ -333,8 +333,8 @@ struct PVSCSIRingReqDesc { u8 tag; u8 bus; u8 target; - u8 vcpuHint; - u8 unused[59]; + u16 vcpuHint; + u8 unused[58]; } __packed; /* From 1f1be79189fd1a00f26eaf4cfccf4a23fcf3aaae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: James Smart Date: Fri, 3 Jun 2022 10:43:26 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0625/1091] scsi: lpfc: Fix port stuck in bypassed state after LIP in PT2PT topology [ Upstream commit 336d63615466b4c06b9401c987813fd19bdde39b ] After issuing a LIP, a specific target vendor does not ACC the FLOGI that lpfc sends. However, it does send its own FLOGI that lpfc ACCs. The target then establishes the port IDs by sending a PLOGI. lpfc PLOGI_ACCs and starts the RPI registration for DID 0x000001. The target then sends a LOGO to the fabric DID. lpfc is currently treating the LOGO from the fabric DID as a link down and cleans up all the ndlps. The ndlp for DID 0x000001 is put back into NPR and discovery stops, leaving the port in stuck in bypassed mode. Change lpfc behavior such that if a LOGO is received for the fabric DID in PT2PT topology skip the lpfc_linkdown_port() routine and just move the fabric DID back to NPR. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220603174329.63777-7-jsmart2021@gmail.com Co-developed-by: Justin Tee Signed-off-by: Justin Tee Signed-off-by: James Smart Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_nportdisc.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_nportdisc.c b/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_nportdisc.c index df2f7c3d7f84..e6a94f550a57 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_nportdisc.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_nportdisc.c @@ -842,7 +842,8 @@ lpfc_rcv_logo(struct lpfc_vport *vport, struct lpfc_nodelist *ndlp, else lpfc_els_rsp_acc(vport, ELS_CMD_ACC, cmdiocb, ndlp, NULL); if (ndlp->nlp_DID == Fabric_DID) { - if (vport->port_state <= LPFC_FDISC) + if (vport->port_state <= LPFC_FDISC || + vport->fc_flag & FC_PT2PT) goto out; lpfc_linkdown_port(vport); spin_lock_irq(shost->host_lock); From fe0855944a641a1d011b5245f37668d3b8d31716 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: James Smart Date: Fri, 3 Jun 2022 10:43:28 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0626/1091] scsi: lpfc: Allow reduced polling rate for nvme_admin_async_event cmd completion [ Upstream commit 2e7e9c0c1ec05f18d320ecc8a31eec59d2af1af9 ] NVMe Asynchronous Event Request commands have no command timeout value per specifications. Set WQE option to allow a reduced FLUSH polling rate for I/O error detection specifically for nvme_admin_async_event commands. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220603174329.63777-9-jsmart2021@gmail.com Co-developed-by: Justin Tee Signed-off-by: Justin Tee Signed-off-by: James Smart Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_hw4.h | 3 +++ drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_nvme.c | 11 +++++++++-- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_hw4.h b/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_hw4.h index b8a772f80d6c..cbea3e0c1a7d 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_hw4.h +++ b/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_hw4.h @@ -4249,6 +4249,9 @@ struct wqe_common { #define wqe_sup_SHIFT 6 #define wqe_sup_MASK 0x00000001 #define wqe_sup_WORD word11 +#define wqe_ffrq_SHIFT 6 +#define wqe_ffrq_MASK 0x00000001 +#define wqe_ffrq_WORD word11 #define wqe_wqec_SHIFT 7 #define wqe_wqec_MASK 0x00000001 #define wqe_wqec_WORD word11 diff --git a/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_nvme.c b/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_nvme.c index 5a86a1ee0de3..193c1a81cac0 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_nvme.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_nvme.c @@ -1202,7 +1202,8 @@ lpfc_nvme_prep_io_cmd(struct lpfc_vport *vport, { struct lpfc_hba *phba = vport->phba; struct nvmefc_fcp_req *nCmd = lpfc_ncmd->nvmeCmd; - struct lpfc_iocbq *pwqeq = &(lpfc_ncmd->cur_iocbq); + struct nvme_common_command *sqe; + struct lpfc_iocbq *pwqeq = &lpfc_ncmd->cur_iocbq; union lpfc_wqe128 *wqe = &pwqeq->wqe; uint32_t req_len; @@ -1258,8 +1259,14 @@ lpfc_nvme_prep_io_cmd(struct lpfc_vport *vport, cstat->control_requests++; } - if (pnode->nlp_nvme_info & NLP_NVME_NSLER) + if (pnode->nlp_nvme_info & NLP_NVME_NSLER) { bf_set(wqe_erp, &wqe->generic.wqe_com, 1); + sqe = &((struct nvme_fc_cmd_iu *) + nCmd->cmdaddr)->sqe.common; + if (sqe->opcode == nvme_admin_async_event) + bf_set(wqe_ffrq, &wqe->generic.wqe_com, 1); + } + /* * Finish initializing those WQE fields that are independent * of the nvme_cmnd request_buffer From c48119223618c518edaf0095063509b524ea42d0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chengguang Xu Date: Sun, 29 May 2022 23:34:53 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0627/1091] scsi: ipr: Fix missing/incorrect resource cleanup in error case [ Upstream commit d64c491911322af1dcada98e5b9ee0d87e8c8fee ] Fix missing resource cleanup (when '(--i) == 0') for error case in ipr_alloc_mem() and skip incorrect resource cleanup (when '(--i) == 0') for error case in ipr_request_other_msi_irqs() because variable i started from 1. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220529153456.4183738-4-cgxu519@mykernel.net Reviewed-by: Dan Carpenter Acked-by: Brian King Signed-off-by: Chengguang Xu Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/scsi/ipr.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/ipr.c b/drivers/scsi/ipr.c index 7a57b61f0340..a163fd9331b3 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/ipr.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/ipr.c @@ -9772,7 +9772,7 @@ static int ipr_alloc_mem(struct ipr_ioa_cfg *ioa_cfg) GFP_KERNEL); if (!ioa_cfg->hrrq[i].host_rrq) { - while (--i > 0) + while (--i >= 0) dma_free_coherent(&pdev->dev, sizeof(u32) * ioa_cfg->hrrq[i].size, ioa_cfg->hrrq[i].host_rrq, @@ -10045,7 +10045,7 @@ static int ipr_request_other_msi_irqs(struct ipr_ioa_cfg *ioa_cfg, ioa_cfg->vectors_info[i].desc, &ioa_cfg->hrrq[i]); if (rc) { - while (--i >= 0) + while (--i > 0) free_irq(pci_irq_vector(pdev, i), &ioa_cfg->hrrq[i]); return rc; From ff882404dff70628e199943079d11e7f5c13dbed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chengguang Xu Date: Sun, 29 May 2022 23:34:55 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0628/1091] scsi: pmcraid: Fix missing resource cleanup in error case [ Upstream commit ec1e8adcbdf661c57c395bca342945f4f815add7 ] Fix missing resource cleanup (when '(--i) == 0') for error case in pmcraid_register_interrupt_handler(). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220529153456.4183738-6-cgxu519@mykernel.net Reviewed-by: Dan Carpenter Signed-off-by: Chengguang Xu Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/scsi/pmcraid.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/pmcraid.c b/drivers/scsi/pmcraid.c index 398d2af60832..f95a970db8fd 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/pmcraid.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/pmcraid.c @@ -4532,7 +4532,7 @@ pmcraid_register_interrupt_handler(struct pmcraid_instance *pinstance) return 0; out_unwind: - while (--i > 0) + while (--i >= 0) free_irq(pci_irq_vector(pdev, i), &pinstance->hrrq_vector[i]); pci_free_irq_vectors(pdev); return rc; From aacb264d54c412063d5b3e6bcbddc778569e137c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: huangwenhui Date: Wed, 8 Jun 2022 16:23:57 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0629/1091] ALSA: hda/realtek - Add HW8326 support [ Upstream commit 527f4643e03c298c1e3321cfa27866b1374a55e1 ] Added the support of new Huawei codec HW8326. The HW8326 is developed by Huawei with Realtek's IP Core, and it's compatible with ALC256. Signed-off-by: huangwenhui Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220608082357.26898-1-huangwenhuia@uniontech.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- sound/hda/hdac_device.c | 1 + sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+) diff --git a/sound/hda/hdac_device.c b/sound/hda/hdac_device.c index b84e12f4f804..489f996d86bc 100644 --- a/sound/hda/hdac_device.c +++ b/sound/hda/hdac_device.c @@ -656,6 +656,7 @@ static struct hda_vendor_id hda_vendor_ids[] = { { 0x14f1, "Conexant" }, { 0x17e8, "Chrontel" }, { 0x1854, "LG" }, + { 0x19e5, "Huawei" }, { 0x1aec, "Wolfson Microelectronics" }, { 0x1af4, "QEMU" }, { 0x434d, "C-Media" }, diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c index 8a221866ab01..9f55ee76861a 100644 --- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c +++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c @@ -382,6 +382,7 @@ static void alc_fill_eapd_coef(struct hda_codec *codec) case 0x10ec0245: case 0x10ec0255: case 0x10ec0256: + case 0x19e58326: case 0x10ec0257: case 0x10ec0282: case 0x10ec0283: @@ -519,6 +520,7 @@ static void alc_shutup_pins(struct hda_codec *codec) switch (codec->core.vendor_id) { case 0x10ec0236: case 0x10ec0256: + case 0x19e58326: case 0x10ec0283: case 0x10ec0286: case 0x10ec0288: @@ -3194,6 +3196,7 @@ static void alc_disable_headset_jack_key(struct hda_codec *codec) case 0x10ec0230: case 0x10ec0236: case 0x10ec0256: + case 0x19e58326: alc_write_coef_idx(codec, 0x48, 0x0); alc_update_coef_idx(codec, 0x49, 0x0045, 0x0); break; @@ -3222,6 +3225,7 @@ static void alc_enable_headset_jack_key(struct hda_codec *codec) case 0x10ec0230: case 0x10ec0236: case 0x10ec0256: + case 0x19e58326: alc_write_coef_idx(codec, 0x48, 0xd011); alc_update_coef_idx(codec, 0x49, 0x007f, 0x0045); break; @@ -4684,6 +4688,7 @@ static void alc_headset_mode_unplugged(struct hda_codec *codec) case 0x10ec0230: case 0x10ec0236: case 0x10ec0256: + case 0x19e58326: alc_process_coef_fw(codec, coef0256); break; case 0x10ec0234: @@ -4799,6 +4804,7 @@ static void alc_headset_mode_mic_in(struct hda_codec *codec, hda_nid_t hp_pin, case 0x10ec0230: case 0x10ec0236: case 0x10ec0256: + case 0x19e58326: alc_write_coef_idx(codec, 0x45, 0xc489); snd_hda_set_pin_ctl_cache(codec, hp_pin, 0); alc_process_coef_fw(codec, coef0256); @@ -4949,6 +4955,7 @@ static void alc_headset_mode_default(struct hda_codec *codec) case 0x10ec0230: case 0x10ec0236: case 0x10ec0256: + case 0x19e58326: alc_write_coef_idx(codec, 0x1b, 0x0e4b); alc_write_coef_idx(codec, 0x45, 0xc089); msleep(50); @@ -5048,6 +5055,7 @@ static void alc_headset_mode_ctia(struct hda_codec *codec) case 0x10ec0230: case 0x10ec0236: case 0x10ec0256: + case 0x19e58326: alc_process_coef_fw(codec, coef0256); break; case 0x10ec0234: @@ -5162,6 +5170,7 @@ static void alc_headset_mode_omtp(struct hda_codec *codec) case 0x10ec0230: case 0x10ec0236: case 0x10ec0256: + case 0x19e58326: alc_process_coef_fw(codec, coef0256); break; case 0x10ec0234: @@ -5258,6 +5267,7 @@ static void alc_determine_headset_type(struct hda_codec *codec) case 0x10ec0230: case 0x10ec0236: case 0x10ec0256: + case 0x19e58326: alc_write_coef_idx(codec, 0x1b, 0x0e4b); alc_write_coef_idx(codec, 0x06, 0x6104); alc_write_coefex_idx(codec, 0x57, 0x3, 0x09a3); @@ -5552,6 +5562,7 @@ static void alc255_set_default_jack_type(struct hda_codec *codec) case 0x10ec0230: case 0x10ec0236: case 0x10ec0256: + case 0x19e58326: alc_process_coef_fw(codec, alc256fw); break; } @@ -6155,6 +6166,7 @@ static void alc_combo_jack_hp_jd_restart(struct hda_codec *codec) case 0x10ec0236: case 0x10ec0255: case 0x10ec0256: + case 0x19e58326: alc_update_coef_idx(codec, 0x1b, 0x8000, 1 << 15); /* Reset HP JD */ alc_update_coef_idx(codec, 0x1b, 0x8000, 0 << 15); break; @@ -9160,6 +9172,7 @@ static int patch_alc269(struct hda_codec *codec) case 0x10ec0230: case 0x10ec0236: case 0x10ec0256: + case 0x19e58326: spec->codec_variant = ALC269_TYPE_ALC256; spec->shutup = alc256_shutup; spec->init_hook = alc256_init; @@ -10602,6 +10615,7 @@ static const struct hda_device_id snd_hda_id_realtek[] = { HDA_CODEC_ENTRY(0x10ec0b00, "ALCS1200A", patch_alc882), HDA_CODEC_ENTRY(0x10ec1168, "ALC1220", patch_alc882), HDA_CODEC_ENTRY(0x10ec1220, "ALC1220", patch_alc882), + HDA_CODEC_ENTRY(0x19e58326, "HW8326", patch_alc269), {} /* terminator */ }; MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(hdaudio, snd_hda_id_realtek); From 786428a1dec2a551fac319d101c550f932ea6988 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: chengkaitao Date: Thu, 2 Jun 2022 08:55:42 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0630/1091] virtio-mmio: fix missing put_device() when vm_cmdline_parent registration failed [ Upstream commit a58a7f97ba11391d2d0d408e0b24f38d86ae748e ] The reference must be released when device_register(&vm_cmdline_parent) failed. Add the corresponding 'put_device()' in the error handling path. Signed-off-by: chengkaitao Message-Id: <20220602005542.16489-1-chengkaitao@didiglobal.com> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin Acked-by: Jason Wang Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/virtio/virtio_mmio.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/virtio/virtio_mmio.c b/drivers/virtio/virtio_mmio.c index e09edb5c5e06..74547323aa83 100644 --- a/drivers/virtio/virtio_mmio.c +++ b/drivers/virtio/virtio_mmio.c @@ -669,6 +669,7 @@ static int vm_cmdline_set(const char *device, if (!vm_cmdline_parent_registered) { err = device_register(&vm_cmdline_parent); if (err) { + put_device(&vm_cmdline_parent); pr_err("Failed to register parent device!\n"); return err; } From 6b4d8b44e7163a77fe942f5b80e1651c1b78c537 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xiaohui Zhang Date: Tue, 7 Jun 2022 16:32:30 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0631/1091] nfc: nfcmrvl: Fix memory leak in nfcmrvl_play_deferred [ Upstream commit 8a4d480702b71184fabcf379b80bf7539716752e ] Similar to the handling of play_deferred in commit 19cfe912c37b ("Bluetooth: btusb: Fix memory leak in play_deferred"), we thought a patch might be needed here as well. Currently usb_submit_urb is called directly to submit deferred tx urbs after unanchor them. So the usb_giveback_urb_bh would failed to unref it in usb_unanchor_urb and cause memory leak. Put those urbs in tx_anchor to avoid the leak, and also fix the error handling. Signed-off-by: Xiaohui Zhang Acked-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220607083230.6182-1-xiaohuizhang@ruc.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/nfc/nfcmrvl/usb.c | 16 ++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/nfc/nfcmrvl/usb.c b/drivers/nfc/nfcmrvl/usb.c index 888e298f610b..f26986eb53f1 100644 --- a/drivers/nfc/nfcmrvl/usb.c +++ b/drivers/nfc/nfcmrvl/usb.c @@ -401,13 +401,25 @@ static void nfcmrvl_play_deferred(struct nfcmrvl_usb_drv_data *drv_data) int err; while ((urb = usb_get_from_anchor(&drv_data->deferred))) { + usb_anchor_urb(urb, &drv_data->tx_anchor); + err = usb_submit_urb(urb, GFP_ATOMIC); - if (err) + if (err) { + kfree(urb->setup_packet); + usb_unanchor_urb(urb); + usb_free_urb(urb); break; + } drv_data->tx_in_flight++; + usb_free_urb(urb); + } + + /* Cleanup the rest deferred urbs. */ + while ((urb = usb_get_from_anchor(&drv_data->deferred))) { + kfree(urb->setup_packet); + usb_free_urb(urb); } - usb_scuttle_anchored_urbs(&drv_data->deferred); } static int nfcmrvl_resume(struct usb_interface *intf) From 2f42389d270f2304c8855b0b63498a5a4d0c053d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wang Yufen Date: Tue, 7 Jun 2022 20:00:28 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0632/1091] ipv6: Fix signed integer overflow in l2tp_ip6_sendmsg [ Upstream commit f638a84afef3dfe10554c51820c16e39a278c915 ] When len >= INT_MAX - transhdrlen, ulen = len + transhdrlen will be overflow. To fix, we can follow what udpv6 does and subtract the transhdrlen from the max. Signed-off-by: Wang Yufen Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220607120028.845916-2-wangyufen@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c index 0fa694bd3f6a..23e9ce985ed6 100644 --- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c +++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c @@ -515,14 +515,15 @@ static int l2tp_ip6_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len) struct ipcm6_cookie ipc6; int addr_len = msg->msg_namelen; int transhdrlen = 4; /* zero session-id */ - int ulen = len + transhdrlen; + int ulen; int err; /* Rough check on arithmetic overflow, better check is made in ip6_append_data(). */ - if (len > INT_MAX) + if (len > INT_MAX - transhdrlen) return -EMSGSIZE; + ulen = len + transhdrlen; /* Mirror BSD error message compatibility */ if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_OOB) From 9e4cab02b7ec6c430577adf1a6434c5c19183d8e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chen Lin Date: Wed, 8 Jun 2022 20:46:53 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0633/1091] net: ethernet: mtk_eth_soc: fix misuse of mem alloc interface netdev[napi]_alloc_frag [ Upstream commit 2f2c0d2919a14002760f89f4e02960c735a316d2 ] When rx_flag == MTK_RX_FLAGS_HWLRO, rx_data_len = MTK_MAX_LRO_RX_LENGTH(4096 * 3) > PAGE_SIZE. netdev_alloc_frag is for alloction of page fragment only. Reference to other drivers and Documentation/vm/page_frags.rst Branch to use __get_free_pages when ring->frag_size > PAGE_SIZE. Signed-off-by: Chen Lin Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1654692413-2598-1-git-send-email-chen45464546@163.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/mediatek/mtk_eth_soc.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mediatek/mtk_eth_soc.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mediatek/mtk_eth_soc.c index 5dce4cd60f58..f9139150a8a2 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mediatek/mtk_eth_soc.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mediatek/mtk_eth_soc.c @@ -802,6 +802,17 @@ static inline void mtk_rx_get_desc(struct mtk_rx_dma *rxd, rxd->rxd4 = READ_ONCE(dma_rxd->rxd4); } +static void *mtk_max_lro_buf_alloc(gfp_t gfp_mask) +{ + unsigned int size = mtk_max_frag_size(MTK_MAX_LRO_RX_LENGTH); + unsigned long data; + + data = __get_free_pages(gfp_mask | __GFP_COMP | __GFP_NOWARN, + get_order(size)); + + return (void *)data; +} + /* the qdma core needs scratch memory to be setup */ static int mtk_init_fq_dma(struct mtk_eth *eth) { @@ -1299,7 +1310,10 @@ static int mtk_poll_rx(struct napi_struct *napi, int budget, goto release_desc; /* alloc new buffer */ - new_data = napi_alloc_frag(ring->frag_size); + if (ring->frag_size <= PAGE_SIZE) + new_data = napi_alloc_frag(ring->frag_size); + else + new_data = mtk_max_lro_buf_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC); if (unlikely(!new_data)) { netdev->stats.rx_dropped++; goto release_desc; @@ -1696,7 +1710,10 @@ static int mtk_rx_alloc(struct mtk_eth *eth, int ring_no, int rx_flag) return -ENOMEM; for (i = 0; i < rx_dma_size; i++) { - ring->data[i] = netdev_alloc_frag(ring->frag_size); + if (ring->frag_size <= PAGE_SIZE) + ring->data[i] = netdev_alloc_frag(ring->frag_size); + else + ring->data[i] = mtk_max_lro_buf_alloc(GFP_KERNEL); if (!ring->data[i]) return -ENOMEM; } From e32fe87afcfebf6f9e43c0a15af2556d31948512 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Mon, 13 Jun 2022 22:07:01 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 0634/1091] random: credit cpu and bootloader seeds by default [ Upstream commit 846bb97e131d7938847963cca00657c995b1fce1 ] This commit changes the default Kconfig values of RANDOM_TRUST_CPU and RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER to be Y by default. It does not change any existing configs or change any kernel behavior. The reason for this is several fold. As background, I recently had an email thread with the kernel maintainers of Fedora/RHEL, Debian, Ubuntu, Gentoo, Arch, NixOS, Alpine, SUSE, and Void as recipients. I noted that some distros trust RDRAND, some trust EFI, and some trust both, and I asked why or why not. There wasn't really much of a "debate" but rather an interesting discussion of what the historical reasons have been for this, and it came up that some distros just missed the introduction of the bootloader Kconfig knob, while another didn't want to enable it until there was a boot time switch to turn it off for more concerned users (which has since been added). The result of the rather uneventful discussion is that every major Linux distro enables these two options by default. While I didn't have really too strong of an opinion going into this thread -- and I mostly wanted to learn what the distros' thinking was one way or another -- ultimately I think their choice was a decent enough one for a default option (which can be disabled at boot time). I'll try to summarize the pros and cons: Pros: - The RNG machinery gets initialized super quickly, and there's no messing around with subsequent blocking behavior. - The bootloader mechanism is used by kexec in order for the prior kernel to initialize the RNG of the next kernel, which increases the entropy available to early boot daemons of the next kernel. - Previous objections related to backdoors centered around Dual_EC_DRBG-like kleptographic systems, in which observing some amount of the output stream enables an adversary holding the right key to determine the entire output stream. This used to be a partially justified concern, because RDRAND output was mixed into the output stream in varying ways, some of which may have lacked pre-image resistance (e.g. XOR or an LFSR). But this is no longer the case. Now, all usage of RDRAND and bootloader seeds go through a cryptographic hash function. This means that the CPU would have to compute a hash pre-image, which is not considered to be feasible (otherwise the hash function would be terribly broken). - More generally, if the CPU is backdoored, the RNG is probably not the realistic vector of choice for an attacker. - These CPU or bootloader seeds are far from being the only source of entropy. Rather, there is generally a pretty huge amount of entropy, not all of which is credited, especially on CPUs that support instructions like RDRAND. In other words, assuming RDRAND outputs all zeros, an attacker would *still* have to accurately model every single other entropy source also in use. - The RNG now reseeds itself quite rapidly during boot, starting at 2 seconds, then 4, then 8, then 16, and so forth, so that other sources of entropy get used without much delay. - Paranoid users can set random.trust_{cpu,bootloader}=no in the kernel command line, and paranoid system builders can set the Kconfig options to N, so there's no reduction or restriction of optionality. - It's a practical default. - All the distros have it set this way. Microsoft and Apple trust it too. Bandwagon. Cons: - RDRAND *could* still be backdoored with something like a fixed key or limited space serial number seed or another indexable scheme like that. (However, it's hard to imagine threat models where the CPU is backdoored like this, yet people are still okay making *any* computations with it or connecting it to networks, etc.) - RDRAND *could* be defective, rather than backdoored, and produce garbage that is in one way or another insufficient for crypto. - Suggesting a *reduction* in paranoia, as this commit effectively does, may cause some to question my personal integrity as a "security person". - Bootloader seeds and RDRAND are generally very difficult if not all together impossible to audit. Keep in mind that this doesn't actually change any behavior. This is just a change in the default Kconfig value. The distros already are shipping kernels that set things this way. Ard made an additional argument in [1]: We're at the mercy of firmware and micro-architecture anyway, given that we are also relying on it to ensure that every instruction in the kernel's executable image has been faithfully copied to memory, and that the CPU implements those instructions as documented. So I don't think firmware or ISA bugs related to RNGs deserve special treatment - if they are broken, we should quirk around them like we usually do. So enabling these by default is a step in the right direction IMHO. In [2], Phil pointed out that having this disabled masked a bug that CI otherwise would have caught: A clean 5.15.45 boots cleanly, whereas a downstream kernel shows the static key warning (but it does go on to boot). The significant difference is that our defconfigs set CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER=y defining that on top of multi_v7_defconfig demonstrates the issue on a clean 5.15.45. Conversely, not setting that option in a downstream kernel build avoids the warning [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAMj1kXGi+ieviFjXv9zQBSaGyyzeGW_VpMpTLJK8PJb2QHEQ-w@mail.gmail.com/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/c47c42e3-1d56-5859-a6ad-976a1a3381c6@raspberrypi.com/ Cc: Theodore Ts'o Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/char/Kconfig | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/Kconfig b/drivers/char/Kconfig index 0a811d5f5e00..85e97550a9a6 100644 --- a/drivers/char/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/char/Kconfig @@ -535,29 +535,41 @@ config ADI and SSM (Silicon Secured Memory). Intended consumers of this driver include crash and makedumpfile. -endmenu - config RANDOM_TRUST_CPU - bool "Trust the CPU manufacturer to initialize Linux's CRNG" - depends on X86 || S390 || PPC - default n + bool "Initialize RNG using CPU RNG instructions" + default y + depends on ARCH_RANDOM help - Assume that CPU manufacturer (e.g., Intel or AMD for RDSEED or - RDRAND, IBM for the S390 and Power PC architectures) is trustworthy - for the purposes of initializing Linux's CRNG. Since this is not - something that can be independently audited, this amounts to trusting - that CPU manufacturer (perhaps with the insistence or mandate - of a Nation State's intelligence or law enforcement agencies) - has not installed a hidden back door to compromise the CPU's - random number generation facilities. This can also be configured - at boot with "random.trust_cpu=on/off". + Initialize the RNG using random numbers supplied by the CPU's + RNG instructions (e.g. RDRAND), if supported and available. These + random numbers are never used directly, but are rather hashed into + the main input pool, and this happens regardless of whether or not + this option is enabled. Instead, this option controls whether the + they are credited and hence can initialize the RNG. Additionally, + other sources of randomness are always used, regardless of this + setting. Enabling this implies trusting that the CPU can supply high + quality and non-backdoored random numbers. + + Say Y here unless you have reason to mistrust your CPU or believe + its RNG facilities may be faulty. This may also be configured at + boot time with "random.trust_cpu=on/off". config RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER - bool "Trust the bootloader to initialize Linux's CRNG" + bool "Initialize RNG using bootloader-supplied seed" + default y help - Some bootloaders can provide entropy to increase the kernel's initial - device randomness. Say Y here to assume the entropy provided by the - booloader is trustworthy so it will be added to the kernel's entropy - pool. Otherwise, say N here so it will be regarded as device input that - only mixes the entropy pool. This can also be configured at boot with - "random.trust_bootloader=on/off". + Initialize the RNG using a seed supplied by the bootloader or boot + environment (e.g. EFI or a bootloader-generated device tree). This + seed is not used directly, but is rather hashed into the main input + pool, and this happens regardless of whether or not this option is + enabled. Instead, this option controls whether the seed is credited + and hence can initialize the RNG. Additionally, other sources of + randomness are always used, regardless of this setting. Enabling + this implies trusting that the bootloader can supply high quality and + non-backdoored seeds. + + Say Y here unless you have reason to mistrust your bootloader or + believe its RNG facilities may be faulty. This may also be configured + at boot time with "random.trust_bootloader=on/off". + +endmenu From 11c870c0b532feaf740f2cb2c6b8a1d7970b0da4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Trond Myklebust Date: Tue, 31 May 2022 11:03:06 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 0635/1091] pNFS: Don't keep retrying if the server replied NFS4ERR_LAYOUTUNAVAILABLE [ Upstream commit fe44fb23d6ccde4c914c44ef74ab8d9d9ba02bea ] If the server tells us that a pNFS layout is not available for a specific file, then we should not keep pounding it with further layoutget requests. Fixes: 183d9e7b112a ("pnfs: rework LAYOUTGET retry handling") Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/nfs/pnfs.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/nfs/pnfs.c b/fs/nfs/pnfs.c index 2fe48982fbb4..3b19fa74b062 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/pnfs.c +++ b/fs/nfs/pnfs.c @@ -2111,6 +2111,12 @@ lookup_again: case -ERECALLCONFLICT: case -EAGAIN: break; + case -ENODATA: + /* The server returned NFS4ERR_LAYOUTUNAVAILABLE */ + pnfs_layout_set_fail_bit( + lo, pnfs_iomode_to_fail_bit(iomode)); + lseg = NULL; + goto out_put_layout_hdr; default: if (!nfs_error_is_fatal(PTR_ERR(lseg))) { pnfs_layout_clear_fail_bit(lo, pnfs_iomode_to_fail_bit(iomode)); From cff3a7ce6e81418b6e8bac941779bbf5d342d626 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Masahiro Yamada Date: Mon, 6 Jun 2022 14:02:38 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 0636/1091] clocksource: hyper-v: unexport __init-annotated hv_init_clocksource() [ Upstream commit 245b993d8f6c4e25f19191edfbd8080b645e12b1 ] EXPORT_SYMBOL and __init is a bad combination because the .init.text section is freed up after the initialization. Hence, modules cannot use symbols annotated __init. The access to a freed symbol may end up with kernel panic. modpost used to detect it, but it has been broken for a decade. Recently, I fixed modpost so it started to warn it again, then this showed up in linux-next builds. There are two ways to fix it: - Remove __init - Remove EXPORT_SYMBOL I chose the latter for this case because the only in-tree call-site, arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c is never compiled as modular. (CONFIG_HYPERVISOR_GUEST is boolean) Fixes: dd2cb348613b ("clocksource/drivers: Continue making Hyper-V clocksource ISA agnostic") Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220606050238.4162200-1-masahiroy@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Wei Liu Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/clocksource/hyperv_timer.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/clocksource/hyperv_timer.c b/drivers/clocksource/hyperv_timer.c index 36933e2b3b0d..80b4b8fee54d 100644 --- a/drivers/clocksource/hyperv_timer.c +++ b/drivers/clocksource/hyperv_timer.c @@ -325,4 +325,3 @@ void __init hv_init_clocksource(void) hv_sched_clock_offset = hyperv_cs->read(hyperv_cs); hv_setup_sched_clock(read_hv_sched_clock_msr); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hv_init_clocksource); From 43f65970eeb2787897c04fc0dff5b2b9c223a786 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Grzegorz Szczurek Date: Fri, 29 Apr 2022 14:27:08 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0637/1091] i40e: Fix adding ADQ filter to TC0 [ Upstream commit c3238d36c3a2be0a29a9d848d6c51e1b14be6692 ] Procedure of configure tc flower filters erroneously allows to create filters on TC0 where unfiltered packets are also directed by default. Issue was caused by insufficient checks of hw_tc parameter specifying the hardware traffic class to pass matching packets to. Fix checking hw_tc parameter which blocks creation of filters on TC0. Fixes: 2f4b411a3d67 ("i40e: Enable cloud filters via tc-flower") Signed-off-by: Grzegorz Szczurek Signed-off-by: Jedrzej Jagielski Tested-by: Bharathi Sreenivas Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c index 7f4aa2239786..05442bbc218c 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c @@ -8108,6 +8108,11 @@ static int i40e_configure_clsflower(struct i40e_vsi *vsi, return -EOPNOTSUPP; } + if (!tc) { + dev_err(&pf->pdev->dev, "Unable to add filter because of invalid destination"); + return -EINVAL; + } + if (test_bit(__I40E_RESET_RECOVERY_PENDING, pf->state) || test_bit(__I40E_RESET_INTR_RECEIVED, pf->state)) return -EBUSY; From 4b94408e1617134358ce2dada6ed696de4c3d364 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Grzegorz Szczurek Date: Fri, 29 Apr 2022 14:40:23 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0638/1091] i40e: Fix calculating the number of queue pairs [ Upstream commit 0bb050670ac90a167ecfa3f9590f92966c9a3677 ] If ADQ is enabled for a VF, then actual number of queue pair is a number of currently available traffic classes for this VF. Without this change the configuration of the Rx/Tx queues fails with error. Fixes: d29e0d233e0d ("i40e: missing input validation on VF message handling by the PF") Signed-off-by: Grzegorz Szczurek Signed-off-by: Jedrzej Jagielski Tested-by: Bharathi Sreenivas Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_virtchnl_pf.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_virtchnl_pf.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_virtchnl_pf.c index 4962e6193eec..4080fdacca4c 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_virtchnl_pf.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_virtchnl_pf.c @@ -2149,7 +2149,7 @@ static int i40e_vc_config_queues_msg(struct i40e_vf *vf, u8 *msg) } if (vf->adq_enabled) { - for (i = 0; i < I40E_MAX_VF_VSI; i++) + for (i = 0; i < vf->num_tc; i++) num_qps_all += vf->ch[i].num_qps; if (num_qps_all != qci->num_queue_pairs) { aq_ret = I40E_ERR_PARAM; From ff6e03fe84bc917bb0c907d02de668c2fe101712 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Aleksandr Loktionov Date: Thu, 19 May 2022 16:01:45 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0639/1091] i40e: Fix call trace in setup_tx_descriptors [ Upstream commit fd5855e6b1358e816710afee68a1d2bc685176ca ] After PF reset and ethtool -t there was call trace in dmesg sometimes leading to panic. When there was some time, around 5 seconds, between reset and test there were no errors. Problem was that pf reset calls i40e_vsi_close in prep_for_reset and ethtool -t calls i40e_vsi_close in diag_test. If there was not enough time between those commands the second i40e_vsi_close starts before previous i40e_vsi_close was done which leads to crash. Add check to diag_test if pf is in reset and don't start offline tests if it is true. Add netif_info("testing failed") into unhappy path of i40e_diag_test() Fixes: e17bc411aea8 ("i40e: Disable offline diagnostics if VFs are enabled") Fixes: 510efb2682b3 ("i40e: Fix ethtool offline diagnostic with netqueues") Signed-off-by: Michal Jaron Signed-off-by: Aleksandr Loktionov Tested-by: Gurucharan (A Contingent worker at Intel) Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- .../net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_ethtool.c | 25 +++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_ethtool.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_ethtool.c index 2cc4f63b1e91..689deecb4e1a 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_ethtool.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_ethtool.c @@ -2578,15 +2578,16 @@ static void i40e_diag_test(struct net_device *netdev, set_bit(__I40E_TESTING, pf->state); + if (test_bit(__I40E_RESET_RECOVERY_PENDING, pf->state) || + test_bit(__I40E_RESET_INTR_RECEIVED, pf->state)) { + dev_warn(&pf->pdev->dev, + "Cannot start offline testing when PF is in reset state.\n"); + goto skip_ol_tests; + } + if (i40e_active_vfs(pf) || i40e_active_vmdqs(pf)) { dev_warn(&pf->pdev->dev, "Please take active VFs and Netqueues offline and restart the adapter before running NIC diagnostics\n"); - data[I40E_ETH_TEST_REG] = 1; - data[I40E_ETH_TEST_EEPROM] = 1; - data[I40E_ETH_TEST_INTR] = 1; - data[I40E_ETH_TEST_LINK] = 1; - eth_test->flags |= ETH_TEST_FL_FAILED; - clear_bit(__I40E_TESTING, pf->state); goto skip_ol_tests; } @@ -2633,9 +2634,17 @@ static void i40e_diag_test(struct net_device *netdev, data[I40E_ETH_TEST_INTR] = 0; } -skip_ol_tests: - netif_info(pf, drv, netdev, "testing finished\n"); + return; + +skip_ol_tests: + data[I40E_ETH_TEST_REG] = 1; + data[I40E_ETH_TEST_EEPROM] = 1; + data[I40E_ETH_TEST_INTR] = 1; + data[I40E_ETH_TEST_LINK] = 1; + eth_test->flags |= ETH_TEST_FL_FAILED; + clear_bit(__I40E_TESTING, pf->state); + netif_info(pf, drv, netdev, "testing failed\n"); } static void i40e_get_wol(struct net_device *netdev, From f7183c76d500324b8b5bd0af5e663cfa57b7b836 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vincent Whitchurch Date: Thu, 9 Jun 2022 16:17:04 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0640/1091] tty: goldfish: Fix free_irq() on remove [ Upstream commit 499e13aac6c762e1e828172b0f0f5275651d6512 ] Pass the correct dev_id to free_irq() to fix this splat when the driver is unbound: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 30 at kernel/irq/manage.c:1895 free_irq Trying to free already-free IRQ 65 Call Trace: warn_slowpath_fmt free_irq goldfish_tty_remove platform_remove device_remove device_release_driver_internal device_driver_detach unbind_store drv_attr_store ... Fixes: 465893e18878e119 ("tty: goldfish: support platform_device with id -1") Signed-off-by: Vincent Whitchurch Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220609141704.1080024-1-vincent.whitchurch@axis.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/tty/goldfish.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/tty/goldfish.c b/drivers/tty/goldfish.c index abc84d84f638..9180ca5e4dcd 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/goldfish.c +++ b/drivers/tty/goldfish.c @@ -428,7 +428,7 @@ static int goldfish_tty_remove(struct platform_device *pdev) tty_unregister_device(goldfish_tty_driver, qtty->console.index); iounmap(qtty->base); qtty->base = NULL; - free_irq(qtty->irq, pdev); + free_irq(qtty->irq, qtty); tty_port_destroy(&qtty->port); goldfish_tty_current_line_count--; if (goldfish_tty_current_line_count == 0) From c03304dc4234a2b0acf670bca4371d076260c456 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miaoqian Lin Date: Wed, 1 Jun 2022 16:30:26 +0400 Subject: [PATCH 0641/1091] misc: atmel-ssc: Fix IRQ check in ssc_probe [ Upstream commit 1c245358ce0b13669f6d1625f7a4e05c41f28980 ] platform_get_irq() returns negative error number instead 0 on failure. And the doc of platform_get_irq() provides a usage example: int irq = platform_get_irq(pdev, 0); if (irq < 0) return irq; Fix the check of return value to catch errors correctly. Fixes: eb1f2930609b ("Driver for the Atmel on-chip SSC on AT32AP and AT91") Reviewed-by: Claudiu Beznea Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220601123026.7119-1-linmq006@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/misc/atmel-ssc.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/misc/atmel-ssc.c b/drivers/misc/atmel-ssc.c index d6cd5537126c..69f9b0336410 100644 --- a/drivers/misc/atmel-ssc.c +++ b/drivers/misc/atmel-ssc.c @@ -232,9 +232,9 @@ static int ssc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) clk_disable_unprepare(ssc->clk); ssc->irq = platform_get_irq(pdev, 0); - if (!ssc->irq) { + if (ssc->irq < 0) { dev_dbg(&pdev->dev, "could not get irq\n"); - return -ENXIO; + return ssc->irq; } mutex_lock(&user_lock); From c19cdd72b3ec4b532478e8f07fbb91717568c230 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Petr Machata Date: Mon, 13 Jun 2022 15:50:17 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 0642/1091] mlxsw: spectrum_cnt: Reorder counter pools [ Upstream commit 4b7a632ac4e7101ceefee8484d5c2ca505d347b3 ] Both RIF and ACL flow counters use a 24-bit SW-managed counter address to communicate which counter they want to bind. In a number of Spectrum FW releases, binding a RIF counter is broken and slices the counter index to 16 bits. As a result, on Spectrum-2 and above, no more than about 410 RIF counters can be effectively used. This translates to 205 netdevices for which L3 HW stats can be enabled. (This does not happen on Spectrum-1, because there are fewer counters available overall and the counter index never exceeds 16 bits.) Binding counters to ACLs does not have this issue. Therefore reorder the counter allocation scheme so that RIF counters come first and therefore get lower indices that are below the 16-bit barrier. Fixes: 98e60dce4da1 ("Merge branch 'mlxsw-Introduce-initial-Spectrum-2-support'") Reported-by: Maksym Yaremchuk Signed-off-by: Petr Machata Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220613125017.2018162-1-idosch@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_cnt.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_cnt.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_cnt.h index 81465e267b10..b7eb3674e285 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_cnt.h +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_cnt.h @@ -7,8 +7,8 @@ #include "spectrum.h" enum mlxsw_sp_counter_sub_pool_id { - MLXSW_SP_COUNTER_SUB_POOL_FLOW, MLXSW_SP_COUNTER_SUB_POOL_RIF, + MLXSW_SP_COUNTER_SUB_POOL_FLOW, }; int mlxsw_sp_counter_alloc(struct mlxsw_sp *mlxsw_sp, From 0e21311ba4596d90c7941391954a44a49420cd8e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christophe JAILLET Date: Mon, 13 Jun 2022 22:53:50 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0643/1091] net: bgmac: Fix an erroneous kfree() in bgmac_remove() [ Upstream commit d7dd6eccfbc95ac47a12396f84e7e1b361db654b ] 'bgmac' is part of a managed resource allocated with bgmac_alloc(). It should not be freed explicitly. Remove the erroneous kfree() from the .remove() function. Fixes: 34a5102c3235 ("net: bgmac: allocate struct bgmac just once & don't copy it") Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/a026153108dd21239036a032b95c25b5cece253b.1655153616.git.christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bgmac-bcma.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bgmac-bcma.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bgmac-bcma.c index 34d18302b1a3..2d52754afc33 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bgmac-bcma.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bgmac-bcma.c @@ -323,7 +323,6 @@ static void bgmac_remove(struct bcma_device *core) bcma_mdio_mii_unregister(bgmac->mii_bus); bgmac_enet_remove(bgmac); bcma_set_drvdata(core, NULL); - kfree(bgmac); } static struct bcma_driver bgmac_bcma_driver = { From fb775ee3cfff14d3e7f5139ec6f3ce1ced762912 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mark Rutland Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 09:09:42 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0644/1091] arm64: ftrace: fix branch range checks [ Upstream commit 3eefdf9d1e406f3da47470b2854347009ffcb6fa ] The branch range checks in ftrace_make_call() and ftrace_make_nop() are incorrect, erroneously permitting a forwards branch of 128M and erroneously rejecting a backwards branch of 128M. This is because both functions calculate the offset backwards, calculating the offset *from* the target *to* the branch, rather than the other way around as the later comparisons expect. If an out-of-range branch were erroeously permitted, this would later be rejected by aarch64_insn_gen_branch_imm() as branch_imm_common() checks the bounds correctly, resulting in warnings and the placement of a BRK instruction. Note that this can only happen for a forwards branch of exactly 128M, and so the caller would need to be exactly 128M bytes below the relevant ftrace trampoline. If an in-range branch were erroeously rejected, then: * For modules when CONFIG_ARM64_MODULE_PLTS=y, this would result in the use of a PLT entry, which is benign. Note that this is the common case, as this is selected by CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE (and therefore RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL), which distributions typically seelct. This is also selected by CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_843419. * For modules when CONFIG_ARM64_MODULE_PLTS=n, this would result in internal ftrace failures. * For core kernel text, this would result in internal ftrace failues. Note that for this to happen, the kernel text would need to be at least 128M bytes in size, and typical configurations are smaller tha this. Fix this by calculating the offset *from* the branch *to* the target in both functions. Fixes: f8af0b364e24 ("arm64: ftrace: don't validate branch via PLT in ftrace_make_nop()") Fixes: e71a4e1bebaf ("arm64: ftrace: add support for far branches to dynamic ftrace") Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland Cc: Ard Biesheuvel Cc: Will Deacon Tested-by: "Ivan T. Ivanov" Reviewed-by: Chengming Zhou Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220614080944.1349146-2-mark.rutland@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/arm64/kernel/ftrace.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/ftrace.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/ftrace.c index 822718eafdb4..d4a4be02d309 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/ftrace.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/ftrace.c @@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ int ftrace_make_call(struct dyn_ftrace *rec, unsigned long addr) { unsigned long pc = rec->ip; u32 old, new; - long offset = (long)pc - (long)addr; + long offset = (long)addr - (long)pc; if (offset < -SZ_128M || offset >= SZ_128M) { #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_MODULE_PLTS @@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ int ftrace_make_nop(struct module *mod, struct dyn_ftrace *rec, unsigned long pc = rec->ip; bool validate = true; u32 old = 0, new; - long offset = (long)pc - (long)addr; + long offset = (long)addr - (long)pc; if (offset < -SZ_128M || offset >= SZ_128M) { #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_MODULE_PLTS From 1b34d6a93832e3f974f15adf56d7a9a6b597cb58 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Masahiro Yamada Date: Sun, 12 Jun 2022 02:22:30 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 0645/1091] certs/blacklist_hashes.c: fix const confusion in certs blacklist MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit 6a1c3767d82ed8233de1263aa7da81595e176087 ] This file fails to compile as follows: CC certs/blacklist_hashes.o certs/blacklist_hashes.c:4:1: error: ignoring attribute ‘section (".init.data")’ because it conflicts with previous ‘section (".init.rodata")’ [-Werror=attributes] 4 | const char __initdata *const blacklist_hashes[] = { | ^~~~~ In file included from certs/blacklist_hashes.c:2: certs/blacklist.h:5:38: note: previous declaration here 5 | extern const char __initconst *const blacklist_hashes[]; | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Apply the same fix as commit 2be04df5668d ("certs/blacklist_nohashes.c: fix const confusion in certs blacklist"). Fixes: 734114f8782f ("KEYS: Add a system blacklist keyring") Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Reviewed-by: Mickaël Salaün Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- certs/blacklist_hashes.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/certs/blacklist_hashes.c b/certs/blacklist_hashes.c index 344892337be0..d5961aa3d338 100644 --- a/certs/blacklist_hashes.c +++ b/certs/blacklist_hashes.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 #include "blacklist.h" -const char __initdata *const blacklist_hashes[] = { +const char __initconst *const blacklist_hashes[] = { #include CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST , NULL }; From 4695bafabf5ba661dc9ccb0a78e596ee7bb01259 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Poimboeuf Date: Wed, 1 Jun 2022 17:42:22 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0646/1091] faddr2line: Fix overlapping text section failures, the sequel [ Upstream commit dcea997beed694cbd8705100ca1a6eb0d886de69 ] If a function lives in a section other than .text, but .text also exists in the object, faddr2line may wrongly assume .text. This can result in comically wrong output. For example: $ scripts/faddr2line vmlinux.o enter_from_user_mode+0x1c enter_from_user_mode+0x1c/0x30: find_next_bit at /home/jpoimboe/git/linux/./include/linux/find.h:40 (inlined by) perf_clear_dirty_counters at /home/jpoimboe/git/linux/arch/x86/events/core.c:2504 Fix it by passing the section name to addr2line, unless the object file is vmlinux, in which case the symbol table uses absolute addresses. Fixes: 1d1a0e7c5100 ("scripts/faddr2line: Fix overlapping text section failures") Reported-by: Peter Zijlstra Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/7d25bc1408bd3a750ac26e60d2f2815a5f4a8363.1654130536.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- scripts/faddr2line | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/scripts/faddr2line b/scripts/faddr2line index 0e6268d59883..94ed98dd899f 100755 --- a/scripts/faddr2line +++ b/scripts/faddr2line @@ -95,17 +95,25 @@ __faddr2line() { local print_warnings=$4 local sym_name=${func_addr%+*} - local offset=${func_addr#*+} - offset=${offset%/*} + local func_offset=${func_addr#*+} + func_offset=${func_offset%/*} local user_size= + local file_type + local is_vmlinux=0 [[ $func_addr =~ "/" ]] && user_size=${func_addr#*/} - if [[ -z $sym_name ]] || [[ -z $offset ]] || [[ $sym_name = $func_addr ]]; then + if [[ -z $sym_name ]] || [[ -z $func_offset ]] || [[ $sym_name = $func_addr ]]; then warn "bad func+offset $func_addr" DONE=1 return fi + # vmlinux uses absolute addresses in the section table rather than + # section offsets. + local file_type=$(${READELF} --file-header $objfile | + ${AWK} '$1 == "Type:" { print $2; exit }') + [[ $file_type = "EXEC" ]] && is_vmlinux=1 + # Go through each of the object's symbols which match the func name. # In rare cases there might be duplicates, in which case we print all # matches. @@ -114,9 +122,11 @@ __faddr2line() { local sym_addr=0x${fields[1]} local sym_elf_size=${fields[2]} local sym_sec=${fields[6]} + local sec_size + local sec_name # Get the section size: - local sec_size=$(${READELF} --section-headers --wide $objfile | + sec_size=$(${READELF} --section-headers --wide $objfile | sed 's/\[ /\[/' | ${AWK} -v sec=$sym_sec '$1 == "[" sec "]" { print "0x" $6; exit }') @@ -126,6 +136,17 @@ __faddr2line() { return fi + # Get the section name: + sec_name=$(${READELF} --section-headers --wide $objfile | + sed 's/\[ /\[/' | + ${AWK} -v sec=$sym_sec '$1 == "[" sec "]" { print $2; exit }') + + if [[ -z $sec_name ]]; then + warn "bad section name: section: $sym_sec" + DONE=1 + return + fi + # Calculate the symbol size. # # Unfortunately we can't use the ELF size, because kallsyms @@ -174,10 +195,10 @@ __faddr2line() { sym_size=0x$(printf %x $sym_size) - # Calculate the section address from user-supplied offset: - local addr=$(($sym_addr + $offset)) + # Calculate the address from user-supplied offset: + local addr=$(($sym_addr + $func_offset)) if [[ -z $addr ]] || [[ $addr = 0 ]]; then - warn "bad address: $sym_addr + $offset" + warn "bad address: $sym_addr + $func_offset" DONE=1 return fi @@ -191,9 +212,9 @@ __faddr2line() { fi # Make sure the provided offset is within the symbol's range: - if [[ $offset -gt $sym_size ]]; then + if [[ $func_offset -gt $sym_size ]]; then [[ $print_warnings = 1 ]] && - echo "skipping $sym_name address at $addr due to size mismatch ($offset > $sym_size)" + echo "skipping $sym_name address at $addr due to size mismatch ($func_offset > $sym_size)" continue fi @@ -202,11 +223,13 @@ __faddr2line() { [[ $FIRST = 0 ]] && echo FIRST=0 - echo "$sym_name+$offset/$sym_size:" + echo "$sym_name+$func_offset/$sym_size:" # Pass section address to addr2line and strip absolute paths # from the output: - local output=$(${ADDR2LINE} -fpie $objfile $addr | sed "s; $dir_prefix\(\./\)*; ;") + local args="--functions --pretty-print --inlines --exe=$objfile" + [[ $is_vmlinux = 0 ]] && args="$args --section=$sec_name" + local output=$(${ADDR2LINE} $args $addr | sed "s; $dir_prefix\(\./\)*; ;") [[ -z $output ]] && continue # Default output (non --list): From 56526c3883fc7a1f5898b1d40a02c8b8685a5d92 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miaoqian Lin Date: Wed, 1 Jun 2022 12:09:25 +0400 Subject: [PATCH 0647/1091] irqchip/gic/realview: Fix refcount leak in realview_gic_of_init [ Upstream commit f4b98e314888cc51486421bcf6d52852452ea48b ] of_find_matching_node_and_match() returns a node pointer with refcount incremented, we should use of_node_put() on it when not need anymore. Add missing of_node_put() to avoid refcount leak. Fixes: 82b0a434b436 ("irqchip/gic/realview: Support more RealView DCC variants") Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220601080930.31005-2-linmq006@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-realview.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-realview.c b/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-realview.c index b4c1924f0255..38fab02ffe9d 100644 --- a/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-realview.c +++ b/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-realview.c @@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ realview_gic_of_init(struct device_node *node, struct device_node *parent) /* The PB11MPCore GIC needs to be configured in the syscon */ map = syscon_node_to_regmap(np); + of_node_put(np); if (!IS_ERR(map)) { /* new irq mode with no DCC */ regmap_write(map, REALVIEW_SYS_LOCK_OFFSET, From 58e67c81e229351027d28c610638378606e33a08 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miaoqian Lin Date: Wed, 1 Jun 2022 12:09:28 +0400 Subject: [PATCH 0648/1091] irqchip/gic-v3: Fix error handling in gic_populate_ppi_partitions [ Upstream commit ec8401a429ffee34ccf38cebf3443f8d5ae6cb0d ] of_get_child_by_name() returns a node pointer with refcount incremented, we should use of_node_put() on it when not need anymore. When kcalloc fails, it missing of_node_put() and results in refcount leak. Fix this by goto out_put_node label. Fixes: 52085d3f2028 ("irqchip/gic-v3: Dynamically allocate PPI partition descriptors") Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220601080930.31005-5-linmq006@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c b/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c index f589ca2480a1..8ce4a2925e92 100644 --- a/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c +++ b/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c @@ -1616,7 +1616,7 @@ static void __init gic_populate_ppi_partitions(struct device_node *gic_node) gic_data.ppi_descs = kcalloc(gic_data.ppi_nr, sizeof(*gic_data.ppi_descs), GFP_KERNEL); if (!gic_data.ppi_descs) - return; + goto out_put_node; nr_parts = of_get_child_count(parts_node); From 8d884c08eeb83142a7173cb46bcff0434ec42cf1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miaoqian Lin Date: Wed, 1 Jun 2022 12:09:29 +0400 Subject: [PATCH 0649/1091] irqchip/gic-v3: Fix refcount leak in gic_populate_ppi_partitions [ Upstream commit fa1ad9d4cc47ca2470cd904ad4519f05d7e43a2b ] of_find_node_by_phandle() returns a node pointer with refcount incremented, we should use of_node_put() on it when not need anymore. Add missing of_node_put() to avoid refcount leak. Fixes: e3825ba1af3a ("irqchip/gic-v3: Add support for partitioned PPIs") Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220601080930.31005-6-linmq006@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c b/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c index 8ce4a2925e92..77a130c03223 100644 --- a/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c +++ b/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c @@ -1657,12 +1657,15 @@ static void __init gic_populate_ppi_partitions(struct device_node *gic_node) continue; cpu = of_cpu_node_to_id(cpu_node); - if (WARN_ON(cpu < 0)) + if (WARN_ON(cpu < 0)) { + of_node_put(cpu_node); continue; + } pr_cont("%pOF[%d] ", cpu_node, cpu); cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, &part->mask); + of_node_put(cpu_node); } pr_cont("}\n"); From bf833c48488136060c94d05919eae23db0204957 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Serge Semin Date: Fri, 10 Jun 2022 10:42:33 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 0650/1091] i2c: designware: Use standard optional ref clock implementation [ Upstream commit 27071b5cbca59d8e8f8750c199a6cbf8c9799963 ] Even though the DW I2C controller reference clock source is requested by the method devm_clk_get() with non-optional clock requirement the way the clock handler is used afterwards has a pure optional clock semantic (though in some circumstances we can get a warning about the clock missing printed in the system console). There is no point in reimplementing that functionality seeing the kernel clock framework already supports the optional interface from scratch. Thus let's convert the platform driver to using it. Note by providing this commit we get to fix two problems. The first one was introduced in commit c62ebb3d5f0d ("i2c: designware: Add support for an interface clock"). It causes not having the interface clock (pclk) enabled/disabled in case if the reference clock isn't provided. The second problem was first introduced in commit b33af11de236 ("i2c: designware: Do not require clock when SSCN and FFCN are provided"). Since that modification the deferred probe procedure has been unsupported in case if the interface clock isn't ready. Fixes: c62ebb3d5f0d ("i2c: designware: Add support for an interface clock") Fixes: b33af11de236 ("i2c: designware: Do not require clock when SSCN and FFCN are provided") Signed-off-by: Serge Semin Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko Acked-by: Jarkko Nikula Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-designware-common.c | 3 --- drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-designware-platdrv.c | 13 +++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-designware-common.c b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-designware-common.c index 2de7452fcd6d..c9036675bd77 100644 --- a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-designware-common.c +++ b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-designware-common.c @@ -253,9 +253,6 @@ int i2c_dw_prepare_clk(struct dw_i2c_dev *dev, bool prepare) { int ret; - if (IS_ERR(dev->clk)) - return PTR_ERR(dev->clk); - if (prepare) { /* Optional interface clock */ ret = clk_prepare_enable(dev->pclk); diff --git a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-designware-platdrv.c b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-designware-platdrv.c index 0c55c54372d7..75313c80f132 100644 --- a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-designware-platdrv.c +++ b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-designware-platdrv.c @@ -349,8 +349,17 @@ static int dw_i2c_plat_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) goto exit_reset; } - dev->clk = devm_clk_get(&pdev->dev, NULL); - if (!i2c_dw_prepare_clk(dev, true)) { + dev->clk = devm_clk_get_optional(&pdev->dev, NULL); + if (IS_ERR(dev->clk)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(dev->clk); + goto exit_reset; + } + + ret = i2c_dw_prepare_clk(dev, true); + if (ret) + goto exit_reset; + + if (dev->clk) { u64 clk_khz; dev->get_clk_rate_khz = i2c_dw_get_clk_rate_khz; From d0c3730f2763770842e7ffe55ddb251b0132c91d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ian Abbott Date: Tue, 7 Jun 2022 18:18:19 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0651/1091] comedi: vmk80xx: fix expression for tx buffer size commit 242439f7e279d86b3f73b5de724bc67b2f8aeb07 upstream. The expression for setting the size of the allocated bulk TX buffer (`devpriv->usb_tx_buf`) is calling `usb_endpoint_maxp(devpriv->ep_rx)`, which is using the wrong endpoint (should be `devpriv->ep_tx`). Fix it. Fixes: a23461c47482 ("comedi: vmk80xx: fix transfer-buffer overflow") Cc: Johan Hovold Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9+ Reviewed-by: Johan Hovold Signed-off-by: Ian Abbott Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220607171819.4121-1-abbotti@mev.co.uk Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/vmk80xx.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/vmk80xx.c b/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/vmk80xx.c index 7769eadfaf61..ccc65cfc519f 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/vmk80xx.c +++ b/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/vmk80xx.c @@ -685,7 +685,7 @@ static int vmk80xx_alloc_usb_buffers(struct comedi_device *dev) if (!devpriv->usb_rx_buf) return -ENOMEM; - size = max(usb_endpoint_maxp(devpriv->ep_rx), MIN_BUF_SIZE); + size = max(usb_endpoint_maxp(devpriv->ep_tx), MIN_BUF_SIZE); devpriv->usb_tx_buf = kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); if (!devpriv->usb_tx_buf) return -ENOMEM; From 31363b2b868e42b6a68a73b085171c0c12149759 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Slark Xiao Date: Wed, 1 Jun 2022 11:47:40 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0652/1091] USB: serial: option: add support for Cinterion MV31 with new baseline commit 158f7585bfcea4aae0ad4128d032a80fec550df1 upstream. Adding support for Cinterion device MV31 with Qualcomm new baseline. Use different PIDs to separate it from previous base line products. All interfaces settings keep same as previous. Below is test evidence: T: Bus=03 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=00 Cnt=01 Dev#= 6 Spd=480 MxCh= 0 D: Ver= 2.10 Cls=ef(misc ) Sub=02 Prot=01 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1 P: Vendor=1e2d ProdID=00b8 Rev=04.14 S: Manufacturer=Cinterion S: Product=Cinterion PID 0x00B8 USB Mobile Broadband S: SerialNumber=90418e79 C: #Ifs= 6 Cfg#= 1 Atr=a0 MxPwr=500mA I: If#=0x0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=02(commc) Sub=0e Prot=00 Driver=cdc_mbim I: If#=0x1 Alt= 1 #EPs= 2 Cls=0a(data ) Sub=00 Prot=02 Driver=cdc_mbim I: If#=0x2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=40 Driver=option I: If#=0x3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=(none) I: If#=0x4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=60 Driver=option I: If#=0x5 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=30 Driver=option T: Bus=03 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=00 Cnt=01 Dev#= 7 Spd=480 MxCh= 0 D: Ver= 2.10 Cls=ef(misc ) Sub=02 Prot=01 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1 P: Vendor=1e2d ProdID=00b9 Rev=04.14 S: Manufacturer=Cinterion S: Product=Cinterion PID 0x00B9 USB Mobile Broadband S: SerialNumber=90418e79 C: #Ifs= 4 Cfg#= 1 Atr=a0 MxPwr=500mA I: If#=0x0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=50 Driver=qmi_wwan I: If#=0x1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=40 Driver=option I: If#=0x2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=60 Driver=option I: If#=0x3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=30 Driver=option For PID 00b8, interface 3 is GNSS port which don't use serial driver. Signed-off-by: Slark Xiao Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220601034740.5438-1-slark_xiao@163.com [ johan: rename defines using a "2" infix ] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/serial/option.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/option.c b/drivers/usb/serial/option.c index 62f79fd5257b..ec4fdb814091 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/serial/option.c +++ b/drivers/usb/serial/option.c @@ -432,6 +432,8 @@ static void option_instat_callback(struct urb *urb); #define CINTERION_PRODUCT_CLS8 0x00b0 #define CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV31_MBIM 0x00b3 #define CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV31_RMNET 0x00b7 +#define CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV31_2_MBIM 0x00b8 +#define CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV31_2_RMNET 0x00b9 #define CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV32_WA 0x00f1 #define CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV32_WB 0x00f2 @@ -1979,6 +1981,10 @@ static const struct usb_device_id option_ids[] = { .driver_info = RSVD(3)}, { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(CINTERION_VENDOR_ID, CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV31_RMNET, 0xff), .driver_info = RSVD(0)}, + { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(CINTERION_VENDOR_ID, CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV31_2_MBIM, 0xff), + .driver_info = RSVD(3)}, + { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(CINTERION_VENDOR_ID, CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV31_2_RMNET, 0xff), + .driver_info = RSVD(0)}, { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(CINTERION_VENDOR_ID, CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV32_WA, 0xff), .driver_info = RSVD(3)}, { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(CINTERION_VENDOR_ID, CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV32_WB, 0xff), From 940653b51c33210066bf1debdac0d5702a9f7ebc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Robert Eckelmann Date: Sat, 21 May 2022 23:08:08 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 0653/1091] USB: serial: io_ti: add Agilent E5805A support commit 908e698f2149c3d6a67d9ae15c75545a3f392559 upstream. Add support for Agilent E5805A (rebranded ION Edgeport/4) to io_ti. Signed-off-by: Robert Eckelmann Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220521230808.30931eca@octoberrain Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/serial/io_ti.c | 2 ++ drivers/usb/serial/io_usbvend.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/io_ti.c b/drivers/usb/serial/io_ti.c index c327d4cf7928..03bcab3b9bd0 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/serial/io_ti.c +++ b/drivers/usb/serial/io_ti.c @@ -168,6 +168,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id edgeport_2port_id_table[] = { { USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ION, ION_DEVICE_ID_TI_EDGEPORT_8S) }, { USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ION, ION_DEVICE_ID_TI_EDGEPORT_416) }, { USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ION, ION_DEVICE_ID_TI_EDGEPORT_416B) }, + { USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ION, ION_DEVICE_ID_E5805A) }, { } }; @@ -206,6 +207,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id id_table_combined[] = { { USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ION, ION_DEVICE_ID_TI_EDGEPORT_8S) }, { USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ION, ION_DEVICE_ID_TI_EDGEPORT_416) }, { USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ION, ION_DEVICE_ID_TI_EDGEPORT_416B) }, + { USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ION, ION_DEVICE_ID_E5805A) }, { } }; diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/io_usbvend.h b/drivers/usb/serial/io_usbvend.h index c38e87ac5ea9..7ca5ca49adff 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/serial/io_usbvend.h +++ b/drivers/usb/serial/io_usbvend.h @@ -212,6 +212,7 @@ // // Definitions for other product IDs #define ION_DEVICE_ID_MT4X56USB 0x1403 // OEM device +#define ION_DEVICE_ID_E5805A 0x1A01 // OEM device (rebranded Edgeport/4) #define GENERATION_ID_FROM_USB_PRODUCT_ID(ProductId) \ From 6506aff2dc2f7059aa3d45ee2e8639b25e87090f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miaoqian Lin Date: Mon, 30 May 2022 12:54:12 +0400 Subject: [PATCH 0654/1091] usb: dwc2: Fix memory leak in dwc2_hcd_init commit 3755278f078460b021cd0384562977bf2039a57a upstream. usb_create_hcd will alloc memory for hcd, and we should call usb_put_hcd to free it when platform_get_resource() fails to prevent memory leak. goto error2 label instead error1 to fix this. Fixes: 856e6e8e0f93 ("usb: dwc2: check return value after calling platform_get_resource()") Cc: stable Acked-by: Minas Harutyunyan Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220530085413.44068-1-linmq006@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/dwc2/hcd.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/dwc2/hcd.c b/drivers/usb/dwc2/hcd.c index 78329d0e9af0..a412ef67af18 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/dwc2/hcd.c +++ b/drivers/usb/dwc2/hcd.c @@ -5076,7 +5076,7 @@ int dwc2_hcd_init(struct dwc2_hsotg *hsotg) res = platform_get_resource(pdev, IORESOURCE_MEM, 0); if (!res) { retval = -EINVAL; - goto error1; + goto error2; } hcd->rsrc_start = res->start; hcd->rsrc_len = resource_size(res); From b75bddfcc18170ce8e3fb695a76ec2dec4ce0ea5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miaoqian Lin Date: Fri, 3 Jun 2022 18:02:44 +0400 Subject: [PATCH 0655/1091] usb: gadget: lpc32xx_udc: Fix refcount leak in lpc32xx_udc_probe commit 4757c9ade34178b351580133771f510b5ffcf9c8 upstream. of_parse_phandle() returns a node pointer with refcount incremented, we should use of_node_put() on it when not need anymore. Add missing of_node_put() to avoid refcount leak. of_node_put() will check NULL pointer. Fixes: 24a28e428351 ("USB: gadget driver for LPC32xx") Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220603140246.64529-1-linmq006@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/gadget/udc/lpc32xx_udc.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/lpc32xx_udc.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/lpc32xx_udc.c index 6d2f1f98f13d..f71f61bcfe1e 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/lpc32xx_udc.c +++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/lpc32xx_udc.c @@ -3027,6 +3027,7 @@ static int lpc32xx_udc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) } udc->isp1301_i2c_client = isp1301_get_client(isp1301_node); + of_node_put(isp1301_node); if (!udc->isp1301_i2c_client) { return -EPROBE_DEFER; } From 64d2df6480036ea28633fc545521fb6b24725b43 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Ilpo=20J=C3=A4rvinen?= Date: Fri, 20 May 2022 13:35:41 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 0656/1091] serial: 8250: Store to lsr_save_flags after lsr read MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit be03b0651ffd8bab69dfd574c6818b446c0753ce upstream. Not all LSR register flags are preserved across reads. Therefore, LSR readers must store the non-preserved bits into lsr_save_flags. This fix was initially mixed into feature commit f6f586102add ("serial: 8250: Handle UART without interrupt on TEMT using em485"). However, that feature change had a flaw and it was reverted to make room for simpler approach providing the same feature. The embedded fix got reverted with the feature change. Re-add the lsr_save_flags fix and properly mark it's a fix. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/1d6c31d-d194-9e6a-ddf9-5f29af829f3@linux.intel.com/T/#m1737eef986bd20cf19593e344cebd7b0244945fc Fixes: e490c9144cfa ("tty: Add software emulated RS485 support for 8250") Cc: stable Acked-by: Uwe Kleine-König Signed-off-by: Uwe Kleine-König Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/f4d774be-1437-a550-8334-19d8722ab98c@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c b/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c index c1891c55897a..cb975228726e 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c +++ b/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c @@ -1476,6 +1476,8 @@ static inline void __stop_tx(struct uart_8250_port *p) if (em485) { unsigned char lsr = serial_in(p, UART_LSR); + p->lsr_saved_flags |= lsr & LSR_SAVE_FLAGS; + /* * To provide required timeing and allow FIFO transfer, * __stop_tx_rs485() must be called only when both FIFO and From ae460312875159285cef5bf3dc654593f404a1ef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mikulas Patocka Date: Thu, 16 Jun 2022 13:28:57 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 0657/1091] dm mirror log: round up region bitmap size to BITS_PER_LONG commit 85e123c27d5cbc22cfdc01de1e2ca1d9003a02d0 upstream. The code in dm-log rounds up bitset_size to 32 bits. It then uses find_next_zero_bit_le on the allocated region. find_next_zero_bit_le accesses the bitmap using unsigned long pointers. So, on 64-bit architectures, it may access 4 bytes beyond the allocated size. Fix this bug by rounding up bitset_size to BITS_PER_LONG. This bug was found by running the lvm2 testsuite with kasan. Fixes: 29121bd0b00e ("[PATCH] dm mirror log: bitset_size fix") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/md/dm-log.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-log.c b/drivers/md/dm-log.c index 33e71ea6cc14..8b15f53cbdd9 100644 --- a/drivers/md/dm-log.c +++ b/drivers/md/dm-log.c @@ -415,8 +415,7 @@ static int create_log_context(struct dm_dirty_log *log, struct dm_target *ti, /* * Work out how many "unsigned long"s we need to hold the bitset. */ - bitset_size = dm_round_up(region_count, - sizeof(*lc->clean_bits) << BYTE_SHIFT); + bitset_size = dm_round_up(region_count, BITS_PER_LONG); bitset_size >>= BYTE_SHIFT; lc->bitset_uint32_count = bitset_size / sizeof(*lc->clean_bits); From a6b31616e5afe1d3972cb0682a373e50597faf5c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Baokun Li Date: Sat, 28 May 2022 19:00:15 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0658/1091] ext4: fix bug_on ext4_mb_use_inode_pa commit a08f789d2ab5242c07e716baf9a835725046be89 upstream. Hulk Robot reported a BUG_ON: ================================================================== kernel BUG at fs/ext4/mballoc.c:3211! [...] RIP: 0010:ext4_mb_mark_diskspace_used.cold+0x85/0x136f [...] Call Trace: ext4_mb_new_blocks+0x9df/0x5d30 ext4_ext_map_blocks+0x1803/0x4d80 ext4_map_blocks+0x3a4/0x1a10 ext4_writepages+0x126d/0x2c30 do_writepages+0x7f/0x1b0 __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x285/0x3b0 file_write_and_wait_range+0xb1/0x140 ext4_sync_file+0x1aa/0xca0 vfs_fsync_range+0xfb/0x260 do_fsync+0x48/0xa0 [...] ================================================================== Above issue may happen as follows: ------------------------------------- do_fsync vfs_fsync_range ext4_sync_file file_write_and_wait_range __filemap_fdatawrite_range do_writepages ext4_writepages mpage_map_and_submit_extent mpage_map_one_extent ext4_map_blocks ext4_mb_new_blocks ext4_mb_normalize_request >>> start + size <= ac->ac_o_ex.fe_logical ext4_mb_regular_allocator ext4_mb_simple_scan_group ext4_mb_use_best_found ext4_mb_new_preallocation ext4_mb_new_inode_pa ext4_mb_use_inode_pa >>> set ac->ac_b_ex.fe_len <= 0 ext4_mb_mark_diskspace_used >>> BUG_ON(ac->ac_b_ex.fe_len <= 0); we can easily reproduce this problem with the following commands: `fallocate -l100M disk` `mkfs.ext4 -b 1024 -g 256 disk` `mount disk /mnt` `fsstress -d /mnt -l 0 -n 1000 -p 1` The size must be smaller than or equal to EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP. Therefore, "start + size <= ac->ac_o_ex.fe_logical" may occur when the size is truncated. So start should be the start position of the group where ac_o_ex.fe_logical is located after alignment. In addition, when the value of fe_logical or EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP is very large, the value calculated by start_off is more accurate. Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: cd648b8a8fd5 ("ext4: trim allocation requests to group size") Reported-by: Hulk Robot Signed-off-by: Baokun Li Reviewed-by: Ritesh Harjani Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220528110017.354175-2-libaokun1@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/ext4/mballoc.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/ext4/mballoc.c b/fs/ext4/mballoc.c index 0307702d114d..3c3166ba4364 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/mballoc.c +++ b/fs/ext4/mballoc.c @@ -3172,6 +3172,15 @@ ext4_mb_normalize_request(struct ext4_allocation_context *ac, size = size >> bsbits; start = start_off >> bsbits; + /* + * For tiny groups (smaller than 8MB) the chosen allocation + * alignment may be larger than group size. Make sure the + * alignment does not move allocation to a different group which + * makes mballoc fail assertions later. + */ + start = max(start, rounddown(ac->ac_o_ex.fe_logical, + (ext4_lblk_t)EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(ac->ac_sb))); + /* don't cover already allocated blocks in selected range */ if (ar->pleft && start <= ar->lleft) { size -= ar->lleft + 1 - start; From 4ca0d2f1e04e63aafea00445ddbc85878e3a5725 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ding Xiang Date: Mon, 30 May 2022 18:00:47 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0659/1091] ext4: make variable "count" signed commit bc75a6eb856cb1507fa907bf6c1eda91b3fef52f upstream. Since dx_make_map() may return -EFSCORRUPTED now, so change "count" to be a signed integer so we can correctly check for an error code returned by dx_make_map(). Fixes: 46c116b920eb ("ext4: verify dir block before splitting it") Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ding Xiang Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220530100047.537598-1-dingxiang@cmss.chinamobile.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/ext4/namei.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/namei.c b/fs/ext4/namei.c index b01059bb562c..d151892db8b0 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/namei.c +++ b/fs/ext4/namei.c @@ -1836,7 +1836,8 @@ static struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *do_split(handle_t *handle, struct inode *dir, struct dx_hash_info *hinfo) { unsigned blocksize = dir->i_sb->s_blocksize; - unsigned count, continued; + unsigned continued; + int count; struct buffer_head *bh2; ext4_lblk_t newblock; u32 hash2; From fba54289176702a7caac0b64738406775817f451 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zhang Yi Date: Wed, 1 Jun 2022 17:27:17 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0660/1091] ext4: add reserved GDT blocks check commit b55c3cd102a6f48b90e61c44f7f3dda8c290c694 upstream. We capture a NULL pointer issue when resizing a corrupt ext4 image which is freshly clear resize_inode feature (not run e2fsck). It could be simply reproduced by following steps. The problem is because of the resize_inode feature was cleared, and it will convert the filesystem to meta_bg mode in ext4_resize_fs(), but the es->s_reserved_gdt_blocks was not reduced to zero, so could we mistakenly call reserve_backup_gdb() and passing an uninitialized resize_inode to it when adding new group descriptors. mkfs.ext4 /dev/sda 3G tune2fs -O ^resize_inode /dev/sda #forget to run requested e2fsck mount /dev/sda /mnt resize2fs /dev/sda 8G ======== BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000028 CPU: 19 PID: 3243 Comm: resize2fs Not tainted 5.18.0-rc7-00001-gfde086c5ebfd #748 ... RIP: 0010:ext4_flex_group_add+0xe08/0x2570 ... Call Trace: ext4_resize_fs+0xbec/0x1660 __ext4_ioctl+0x1749/0x24e0 ext4_ioctl+0x12/0x20 __x64_sys_ioctl+0xa6/0x110 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7f2dd739617b ======== The fix is simple, add a check in ext4_resize_begin() to make sure that the es->s_reserved_gdt_blocks is zero when the resize_inode feature is disabled. Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi Reviewed-by: Ritesh Harjani Reviewed-by: Jan Kara Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220601092717.763694-1-yi.zhang@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/ext4/resize.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/ext4/resize.c b/fs/ext4/resize.c index b7f20196439a..6410c1e098d3 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/resize.c +++ b/fs/ext4/resize.c @@ -52,6 +52,16 @@ int ext4_resize_begin(struct super_block *sb) if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) return -EPERM; + /* + * If the reserved GDT blocks is non-zero, the resize_inode feature + * should always be set. + */ + if (EXT4_SB(sb)->s_es->s_reserved_gdt_blocks && + !ext4_has_feature_resize_inode(sb)) { + ext4_error(sb, "resize_inode disabled but reserved GDT blocks non-zero"); + return -EFSCORRUPTED; + } + /* * If we are not using the primary superblock/GDT copy don't resize, * because the user tools have no way of handling this. Probably a From 119e0268cc1ce0efa29ddf6c155d32d34435260d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeremy Szu Date: Tue, 16 Mar 2021 15:46:24 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0661/1091] ALSA: hda/realtek: fix mute/micmute LEDs for HP 440 G8 commit e7d66cf799390166e90f9a5715f2eede4fe06d51 upstream. The HP EliteBook 840 G8 Notebook PC is using ALC236 codec which is using 0x02 to control mute LED and 0x01 to control micmute LED. Therefore, add a quirk to make it works. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Szu Cc: Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210316074626.79895-1-jeremy.szu@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai [sudip: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c index 9f55ee76861a..4a68c587e9b3 100644 --- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c +++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c @@ -4296,6 +4296,12 @@ static void alc_fixup_hp_gpio_led(struct hda_codec *codec, } } +static void alc236_fixup_hp_gpio_led(struct hda_codec *codec, + const struct hda_fixup *fix, int action) +{ + alc_fixup_hp_gpio_led(codec, action, 0x02, 0x01); +} + static void alc269_fixup_hp_gpio_led(struct hda_codec *codec, const struct hda_fixup *fix, int action) { @@ -6477,6 +6483,7 @@ enum { ALC294_FIXUP_ASUS_GU502_VERBS, ALC285_FIXUP_HP_GPIO_LED, ALC285_FIXUP_HP_MUTE_LED, + ALC236_FIXUP_HP_GPIO_LED, ALC236_FIXUP_HP_MUTE_LED, ALC298_FIXUP_SAMSUNG_HEADPHONE_VERY_QUIET, ALC256_FIXUP_SAMSUNG_HEADPHONE_VERY_QUIET, @@ -7753,6 +7760,10 @@ static const struct hda_fixup alc269_fixups[] = { .type = HDA_FIXUP_FUNC, .v.func = alc285_fixup_hp_mute_led, }, + [ALC236_FIXUP_HP_GPIO_LED] = { + .type = HDA_FIXUP_FUNC, + .v.func = alc236_fixup_hp_gpio_led, + }, [ALC236_FIXUP_HP_MUTE_LED] = { .type = HDA_FIXUP_FUNC, .v.func = alc236_fixup_hp_mute_led, @@ -8174,6 +8185,7 @@ static const struct snd_pci_quirk alc269_fixup_tbl[] = { SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x8760, "HP", ALC285_FIXUP_HP_MUTE_LED), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x877a, "HP", ALC285_FIXUP_HP_MUTE_LED), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x877d, "HP", ALC236_FIXUP_HP_MUTE_LED), + SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x87e5, "HP ProBook 440 G8 Notebook PC", ALC236_FIXUP_HP_GPIO_LED), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1043, 0x103e, "ASUS X540SA", ALC256_FIXUP_ASUS_MIC), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1043, 0x103f, "ASUS TX300", ALC282_FIXUP_ASUS_TX300), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1043, 0x106d, "Asus K53BE", ALC269_FIXUP_LIMIT_INT_MIC_BOOST), From 80e4d8a274515b50a7738cc913e99ffced2c27c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andy Chi Date: Fri, 13 May 2022 20:16:45 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0662/1091] ALSA: hda/realtek: fix right sounds and mute/micmute LEDs for HP machine commit 024a7ad9eb4df626ca8c77fef4f67fd0ebd559d2 upstream. The HP EliteBook 630 is using ALC236 codec which used 0x02 to control mute LED and 0x01 to control micmute LED. Therefore, add a quirk to make it works. Signed-off-by: Andy Chi Cc: Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220513121648.28584-1-andy.chi@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai [sudip: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c index 4a68c587e9b3..8c37de779346 100644 --- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c +++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c @@ -8186,6 +8186,7 @@ static const struct snd_pci_quirk alc269_fixup_tbl[] = { SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x877a, "HP", ALC285_FIXUP_HP_MUTE_LED), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x877d, "HP", ALC236_FIXUP_HP_MUTE_LED), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x87e5, "HP ProBook 440 G8 Notebook PC", ALC236_FIXUP_HP_GPIO_LED), + SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x89aa, "HP EliteBook 630 G9", ALC236_FIXUP_HP_GPIO_LED), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1043, 0x103e, "ASUS X540SA", ALC256_FIXUP_ASUS_MIC), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1043, 0x103f, "ASUS TX300", ALC282_FIXUP_ASUS_TX300), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1043, 0x106d, "Asus K53BE", ALC269_FIXUP_LIMIT_INT_MIC_BOOST), From 13fbdea1184ba0ae5f105db48db83daa1a4ec268 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Murilo Opsfelder Araujo Date: Thu, 14 Apr 2022 23:30:02 -0300 Subject: [PATCH 0663/1091] virtio-pci: Remove wrong address verification in vp_del_vqs() MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 7e415282b41bf0d15c6e0fe268f822d9b083f2f7 upstream. GCC 12 enhanced -Waddress when comparing array address to null [0], which warns: drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c: In function ‘vp_del_vqs’: drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c:257:29: warning: the comparison will always evaluate as ‘true’ for the pointer operand in ‘vp_dev->msix_affinity_masks + (sizetype)((long unsigned int)i * 256)’ must not be NULL [-Waddress] 257 | if (vp_dev->msix_affinity_masks[i]) | ^~~~~~ In fact, the verification is comparing the result of a pointer arithmetic, the address "msix_affinity_masks + i", which will always evaluate to true. Under the hood, free_cpumask_var() calls kfree(), which is safe to pass NULL, not requiring non-null verification. So remove the verification to make compiler happy (happy compiler, happy life). [0] https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=102103 Signed-off-by: Murilo Opsfelder Araujo Message-Id: <20220415023002.49805-1-muriloo@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin Acked-by: Christophe de Dinechin Cc: Sudip Mukherjee Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c b/drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c index b35bb2d57f62..1e890ef17687 100644 --- a/drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c +++ b/drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c @@ -254,8 +254,7 @@ void vp_del_vqs(struct virtio_device *vdev) if (vp_dev->msix_affinity_masks) { for (i = 0; i < vp_dev->msix_vectors; i++) - if (vp_dev->msix_affinity_masks[i]) - free_cpumask_var(vp_dev->msix_affinity_masks[i]); + free_cpumask_var(vp_dev->msix_affinity_masks[i]); } if (vp_dev->msix_enabled) { From b47319b4aa216f332223a7089f80952f85f9600a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Davide Caratti Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2022 18:56:08 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0664/1091] net/sched: act_police: more accurate MTU policing commit 4ddc844eb81da59bfb816d8d52089aba4e59e269 upstream. in current Linux, MTU policing does not take into account that packets at the TC ingress have the L2 header pulled. Thus, the same TC police action (with the same value of tcfp_mtu) behaves differently for ingress/egress. In addition, the full GSO size is compared to tcfp_mtu: as a consequence, the policer drops GSO packets even when individual segments have the L2 + L3 + L4 + payload length below the configured valued of tcfp_mtu. Improve the accuracy of MTU policing as follows: - account for mac_len for non-GSO packets at TC ingress. - compare MTU threshold with the segmented size for GSO packets. Also, add a kselftest that verifies the correct behavior. Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti Reviewed-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner Signed-off-by: David S. Miller [dcaratti: fix conflicts due to lack of the following commits: - commit 2ffe0395288a ("net/sched: act_police: add support for packet-per-second policing") - commit afe231d32eb5 ("selftests: forwarding: Add tc-police tests") - commit 53b61f29367d ("selftests: forwarding: Add tc-police tests for packets per second")] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/876d597a0ff55f6ba786f73c5a9fd9eb8d597a03.1644514748.git.dcaratti@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/sched/act_police.c | 16 +++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/sched/act_police.c b/net/sched/act_police.c index 8fd23a8b88a5..a7660b602237 100644 --- a/net/sched/act_police.c +++ b/net/sched/act_police.c @@ -213,6 +213,20 @@ release_idr: return err; } +static bool tcf_police_mtu_check(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 limit) +{ + u32 len; + + if (skb_is_gso(skb)) + return skb_gso_validate_mac_len(skb, limit); + + len = qdisc_pkt_len(skb); + if (skb_at_tc_ingress(skb)) + len += skb->mac_len; + + return len <= limit; +} + static int tcf_police_act(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct tc_action *a, struct tcf_result *res) { @@ -235,7 +249,7 @@ static int tcf_police_act(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct tc_action *a, goto inc_overlimits; } - if (qdisc_pkt_len(skb) <= p->tcfp_mtu) { + if (tcf_police_mtu_check(skb, p->tcfp_mtu)) { if (!p->rate_present) { ret = p->tcfp_result; goto end; From 6bb3c77c74f5de28c78c74ef23af4c63e06e881e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ilya Maximets Date: Tue, 7 Jun 2022 00:11:40 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0665/1091] net: openvswitch: fix misuse of the cached connection on tuple changes commit 2061ecfdf2350994e5b61c43e50e98a7a70e95ee upstream. If packet headers changed, the cached nfct is no longer relevant for the packet and attempt to re-use it leads to the incorrect packet classification. This issue is causing broken connectivity in OpenStack deployments with OVS/OVN due to hairpin traffic being unexpectedly dropped. The setup has datapath flows with several conntrack actions and tuple changes between them: actions:ct(commit,zone=8,mark=0/0x1,nat(src)), set(eth(src=00:00:00:00:00:01,dst=00:00:00:00:00:06)), set(ipv4(src=172.18.2.10,dst=192.168.100.6,ttl=62)), ct(zone=8),recirc(0x4) After the first ct() action the packet headers are almost fully re-written. The next ct() tries to re-use the existing nfct entry and marks the packet as invalid, so it gets dropped later in the pipeline. Clearing the cached conntrack entry whenever packet tuple is changed to avoid the issue. The flow key should not be cleared though, because we should still be able to match on the ct_state if the recirculation happens after the tuple change but before the next ct() action. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 7f8a436eaa2c ("openvswitch: Add conntrack action") Reported-by: Frode Nordahl Link: https://mail.openvswitch.org/pipermail/ovs-discuss/2022-May/051829.html Link: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/ovn/+bug/1967856 Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220606221140.488984-1-i.maximets@ovn.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski [Backport to 5.10: minor rebase in ovs_ct_clear function. This version also applicable to and tested on 5.4 and 4.19.] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/openvswitch/actions.c | 6 ++++++ net/openvswitch/conntrack.c | 3 ++- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/openvswitch/actions.c b/net/openvswitch/actions.c index ae40593daf21..9e8a5c4862d0 100644 --- a/net/openvswitch/actions.c +++ b/net/openvswitch/actions.c @@ -377,6 +377,7 @@ static void set_ip_addr(struct sk_buff *skb, struct iphdr *nh, update_ip_l4_checksum(skb, nh, *addr, new_addr); csum_replace4(&nh->check, *addr, new_addr); skb_clear_hash(skb); + ovs_ct_clear(skb, NULL); *addr = new_addr; } @@ -424,6 +425,7 @@ static void set_ipv6_addr(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 l4_proto, update_ipv6_checksum(skb, l4_proto, addr, new_addr); skb_clear_hash(skb); + ovs_ct_clear(skb, NULL); memcpy(addr, new_addr, sizeof(__be32[4])); } @@ -664,6 +666,7 @@ static int set_nsh(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sw_flow_key *flow_key, static void set_tp_port(struct sk_buff *skb, __be16 *port, __be16 new_port, __sum16 *check) { + ovs_ct_clear(skb, NULL); inet_proto_csum_replace2(check, skb, *port, new_port, false); *port = new_port; } @@ -703,6 +706,7 @@ static int set_udp(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sw_flow_key *flow_key, uh->dest = dst; flow_key->tp.src = src; flow_key->tp.dst = dst; + ovs_ct_clear(skb, NULL); } skb_clear_hash(skb); @@ -765,6 +769,8 @@ static int set_sctp(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sw_flow_key *flow_key, sh->checksum = old_csum ^ old_correct_csum ^ new_csum; skb_clear_hash(skb); + ovs_ct_clear(skb, NULL); + flow_key->tp.src = sh->source; flow_key->tp.dst = sh->dest; diff --git a/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c b/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c index 816036b9c223..78448b6888dd 100644 --- a/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c +++ b/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c @@ -1319,7 +1319,8 @@ int ovs_ct_clear(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sw_flow_key *key) if (skb_nfct(skb)) { nf_conntrack_put(skb_nfct(skb)); nf_ct_set(skb, NULL, IP_CT_UNTRACKED); - ovs_ct_fill_key(skb, key); + if (key) + ovs_ct_fill_key(skb, key); } return 0; From ef6f9ce0a79aa23b10fc5f3b3cab3814a25aac40 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ilya Maximets Date: Mon, 4 Apr 2022 17:43:45 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0666/1091] net: openvswitch: fix leak of nested actions MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 1f30fb9166d4f15a1aa19449b9da871fe0ed4796 upstream. While parsing user-provided actions, openvswitch module may dynamically allocate memory and store pointers in the internal copy of the actions. So this memory has to be freed while destroying the actions. Currently there are only two such actions: ct() and set(). However, there are many actions that can hold nested lists of actions and ovs_nla_free_flow_actions() just jumps over them leaking the memory. For example, removal of the flow with the following actions will lead to a leak of the memory allocated by nf_ct_tmpl_alloc(): actions:clone(ct(commit),0) Non-freed set() action may also leak the 'dst' structure for the tunnel info including device references. Under certain conditions with a high rate of flow rotation that may cause significant memory leak problem (2MB per second in reporter's case). The problem is also hard to mitigate, because the user doesn't have direct control over the datapath flows generated by OVS. Fix that by iterating over all the nested actions and freeing everything that needs to be freed recursively. New build time assertion should protect us from this problem if new actions will be added in the future. Unfortunately, openvswitch module doesn't use NLA_F_NESTED, so all attributes has to be explicitly checked. sample() and clone() actions are mixing extra attributes into the user-provided action list. That prevents some code generalization too. Fixes: 34ae932a4036 ("openvswitch: Make tunnel set action attach a metadata dst") Link: https://mail.openvswitch.org/pipermail/ovs-dev/2022-March/392922.html Reported-by: Stéphane Graber Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets Acked-by: Aaron Conole Signed-off-by: David S. Miller [Backport for 5.4: Removed handling of OVS_ACTION_ATTR_DEC_TTL as it doesn't exist in this version. BUILD_BUG_ON condition adjusted accordingly.] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/openvswitch/flow_netlink.c | 80 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 75 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/openvswitch/flow_netlink.c b/net/openvswitch/flow_netlink.c index 8461de79f67b..67125939d7ee 100644 --- a/net/openvswitch/flow_netlink.c +++ b/net/openvswitch/flow_netlink.c @@ -2266,6 +2266,51 @@ static struct sw_flow_actions *nla_alloc_flow_actions(int size) return sfa; } +static void ovs_nla_free_nested_actions(const struct nlattr *actions, int len); + +static void ovs_nla_free_check_pkt_len_action(const struct nlattr *action) +{ + const struct nlattr *a; + int rem; + + nla_for_each_nested(a, action, rem) { + switch (nla_type(a)) { + case OVS_CHECK_PKT_LEN_ATTR_ACTIONS_IF_LESS_EQUAL: + case OVS_CHECK_PKT_LEN_ATTR_ACTIONS_IF_GREATER: + ovs_nla_free_nested_actions(nla_data(a), nla_len(a)); + break; + } + } +} + +static void ovs_nla_free_clone_action(const struct nlattr *action) +{ + const struct nlattr *a = nla_data(action); + int rem = nla_len(action); + + switch (nla_type(a)) { + case OVS_CLONE_ATTR_EXEC: + /* The real list of actions follows this attribute. */ + a = nla_next(a, &rem); + ovs_nla_free_nested_actions(a, rem); + break; + } +} + +static void ovs_nla_free_sample_action(const struct nlattr *action) +{ + const struct nlattr *a = nla_data(action); + int rem = nla_len(action); + + switch (nla_type(a)) { + case OVS_SAMPLE_ATTR_ARG: + /* The real list of actions follows this attribute. */ + a = nla_next(a, &rem); + ovs_nla_free_nested_actions(a, rem); + break; + } +} + static void ovs_nla_free_set_action(const struct nlattr *a) { const struct nlattr *ovs_key = nla_data(a); @@ -2279,25 +2324,50 @@ static void ovs_nla_free_set_action(const struct nlattr *a) } } -void ovs_nla_free_flow_actions(struct sw_flow_actions *sf_acts) +static void ovs_nla_free_nested_actions(const struct nlattr *actions, int len) { const struct nlattr *a; int rem; - if (!sf_acts) + /* Whenever new actions are added, the need to update this + * function should be considered. + */ + BUILD_BUG_ON(OVS_ACTION_ATTR_MAX != 21); + + if (!actions) return; - nla_for_each_attr(a, sf_acts->actions, sf_acts->actions_len, rem) { + nla_for_each_attr(a, actions, len, rem) { switch (nla_type(a)) { - case OVS_ACTION_ATTR_SET: - ovs_nla_free_set_action(a); + case OVS_ACTION_ATTR_CHECK_PKT_LEN: + ovs_nla_free_check_pkt_len_action(a); break; + + case OVS_ACTION_ATTR_CLONE: + ovs_nla_free_clone_action(a); + break; + case OVS_ACTION_ATTR_CT: ovs_ct_free_action(a); break; + + case OVS_ACTION_ATTR_SAMPLE: + ovs_nla_free_sample_action(a); + break; + + case OVS_ACTION_ATTR_SET: + ovs_nla_free_set_action(a); + break; } } +} +void ovs_nla_free_flow_actions(struct sw_flow_actions *sf_acts) +{ + if (!sf_acts) + return; + + ovs_nla_free_nested_actions(sf_acts->actions, sf_acts->actions_len); kfree(sf_acts); } From 490a02cd8205d20c174e0aa53058244d2d52ccfe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jean-Philippe Brucker Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2020 14:49:01 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0667/1091] arm64: kprobes: Use BRK instead of single-step when executing instructions out-of-line commit 7ee31a3aa8f490c6507bc4294df6b70bed1c593e upstream. Commit 36dadef23fcc ("kprobes: Init kprobes in early_initcall") enabled using kprobes from early_initcall. Unfortunately at this point the hardware debug infrastructure is not operational. The OS lock may still be locked, and the hardware watchpoints may have unknown values when kprobe enables debug monitors to single-step instructions. Rather than using hardware single-step, append a BRK instruction after the instruction to be executed out-of-line. Fixes: 36dadef23fcc ("kprobes: Init kprobes in early_initcall") Suggested-by: Will Deacon Signed-off-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201103134900.337243-1-jean-philippe@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Will Deacon Signed-off-by: Mark-PK Tsai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm64/include/asm/brk-imm.h | 2 + arch/arm64/include/asm/debug-monitors.h | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/kprobes.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/kernel/probes/kprobes.c | 71 +++++++++---------------- 4 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/brk-imm.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/brk-imm.h index e3d47b52161d..ec7720dbe2c8 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/brk-imm.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/brk-imm.h @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ * #imm16 values used for BRK instruction generation * 0x004: for installing kprobes * 0x005: for installing uprobes + * 0x006: for kprobe software single-step * Allowed values for kgdb are 0x400 - 0x7ff * 0x100: for triggering a fault on purpose (reserved) * 0x400: for dynamic BRK instruction @@ -19,6 +20,7 @@ */ #define KPROBES_BRK_IMM 0x004 #define UPROBES_BRK_IMM 0x005 +#define KPROBES_BRK_SS_IMM 0x006 #define FAULT_BRK_IMM 0x100 #define KGDB_DYN_DBG_BRK_IMM 0x400 #define KGDB_COMPILED_DBG_BRK_IMM 0x401 diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/debug-monitors.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/debug-monitors.h index d825e3585e28..0253691c4b3a 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/debug-monitors.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/debug-monitors.h @@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ /* kprobes BRK opcodes with ESR encoding */ #define BRK64_OPCODE_KPROBES (AARCH64_BREAK_MON | (KPROBES_BRK_IMM << 5)) +#define BRK64_OPCODE_KPROBES_SS (AARCH64_BREAK_MON | (KPROBES_BRK_SS_IMM << 5)) /* uprobes BRK opcodes with ESR encoding */ #define BRK64_OPCODE_UPROBES (AARCH64_BREAK_MON | (UPROBES_BRK_IMM << 5)) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kprobes.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kprobes.h index 97e511d645a2..8699ce30f587 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kprobes.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kprobes.h @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ #include #define __ARCH_WANT_KPROBES_INSN_SLOT -#define MAX_INSN_SIZE 1 +#define MAX_INSN_SIZE 2 #define flush_insn_slot(p) do { } while (0) #define kretprobe_blacklist_size 0 diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/probes/kprobes.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/probes/kprobes.c index c4452827419b..b41ed2f907b0 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/probes/kprobes.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/probes/kprobes.c @@ -36,25 +36,16 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct kprobe_ctlblk, kprobe_ctlblk); static void __kprobes post_kprobe_handler(struct kprobe_ctlblk *, struct pt_regs *); -static int __kprobes patch_text(kprobe_opcode_t *addr, u32 opcode) -{ - void *addrs[1]; - u32 insns[1]; - - addrs[0] = addr; - insns[0] = opcode; - - return aarch64_insn_patch_text(addrs, insns, 1); -} - static void __kprobes arch_prepare_ss_slot(struct kprobe *p) { - /* prepare insn slot */ - patch_text(p->ainsn.api.insn, p->opcode); + kprobe_opcode_t *addr = p->ainsn.api.insn; + void *addrs[] = {addr, addr + 1}; + u32 insns[] = {p->opcode, BRK64_OPCODE_KPROBES_SS}; - flush_icache_range((uintptr_t) (p->ainsn.api.insn), - (uintptr_t) (p->ainsn.api.insn) + - MAX_INSN_SIZE * sizeof(kprobe_opcode_t)); + /* prepare insn slot */ + aarch64_insn_patch_text(addrs, insns, 2); + + flush_icache_range((uintptr_t)addr, (uintptr_t)(addr + MAX_INSN_SIZE)); /* * Needs restoring of return address after stepping xol. @@ -134,13 +125,18 @@ void *alloc_insn_page(void) /* arm kprobe: install breakpoint in text */ void __kprobes arch_arm_kprobe(struct kprobe *p) { - patch_text(p->addr, BRK64_OPCODE_KPROBES); + void *addr = p->addr; + u32 insn = BRK64_OPCODE_KPROBES; + + aarch64_insn_patch_text(&addr, &insn, 1); } /* disarm kprobe: remove breakpoint from text */ void __kprobes arch_disarm_kprobe(struct kprobe *p) { - patch_text(p->addr, p->opcode); + void *addr = p->addr; + + aarch64_insn_patch_text(&addr, &p->opcode, 1); } void __kprobes arch_remove_kprobe(struct kprobe *p) @@ -169,20 +165,15 @@ static void __kprobes set_current_kprobe(struct kprobe *p) } /* - * Interrupts need to be disabled before single-step mode is set, and not - * reenabled until after single-step mode ends. - * Without disabling interrupt on local CPU, there is a chance of - * interrupt occurrence in the period of exception return and start of - * out-of-line single-step, that result in wrongly single stepping - * into the interrupt handler. + * Mask all of DAIF while executing the instruction out-of-line, to keep things + * simple and avoid nesting exceptions. Interrupts do have to be disabled since + * the kprobe state is per-CPU and doesn't get migrated. */ static void __kprobes kprobes_save_local_irqflag(struct kprobe_ctlblk *kcb, struct pt_regs *regs) { kcb->saved_irqflag = regs->pstate & DAIF_MASK; - regs->pstate |= PSR_I_BIT; - /* Unmask PSTATE.D for enabling software step exceptions. */ - regs->pstate &= ~PSR_D_BIT; + regs->pstate |= DAIF_MASK; } static void __kprobes kprobes_restore_local_irqflag(struct kprobe_ctlblk *kcb, @@ -225,10 +216,7 @@ static void __kprobes setup_singlestep(struct kprobe *p, slot = (unsigned long)p->ainsn.api.insn; set_ss_context(kcb, slot); /* mark pending ss */ - - /* IRQs and single stepping do not mix well. */ kprobes_save_local_irqflag(kcb, regs); - kernel_enable_single_step(regs); instruction_pointer_set(regs, slot); } else { /* insn simulation */ @@ -279,12 +267,8 @@ post_kprobe_handler(struct kprobe_ctlblk *kcb, struct pt_regs *regs) } /* call post handler */ kcb->kprobe_status = KPROBE_HIT_SSDONE; - if (cur->post_handler) { - /* post_handler can hit breakpoint and single step - * again, so we enable D-flag for recursive exception. - */ + if (cur->post_handler) cur->post_handler(cur, regs, 0); - } reset_current_kprobe(); } @@ -308,8 +292,6 @@ int __kprobes kprobe_fault_handler(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int fsr) if (!instruction_pointer(regs)) BUG(); - kernel_disable_single_step(); - if (kcb->kprobe_status == KPROBE_REENTER) restore_previous_kprobe(kcb); else @@ -371,10 +353,6 @@ static void __kprobes kprobe_handler(struct pt_regs *regs) * pre-handler and it returned non-zero, it will * modify the execution path and no need to single * stepping. Let's just reset current kprobe and exit. - * - * pre_handler can hit a breakpoint and can step thru - * before return, keep PSTATE D-flag enabled until - * pre_handler return back. */ if (!p->pre_handler || !p->pre_handler(p, regs)) { setup_singlestep(p, regs, kcb, 0); @@ -405,7 +383,7 @@ kprobe_ss_hit(struct kprobe_ctlblk *kcb, unsigned long addr) } static int __kprobes -kprobe_single_step_handler(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int esr) +kprobe_breakpoint_ss_handler(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int esr) { struct kprobe_ctlblk *kcb = get_kprobe_ctlblk(); int retval; @@ -415,16 +393,15 @@ kprobe_single_step_handler(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int esr) if (retval == DBG_HOOK_HANDLED) { kprobes_restore_local_irqflag(kcb, regs); - kernel_disable_single_step(); - post_kprobe_handler(kcb, regs); } return retval; } -static struct step_hook kprobes_step_hook = { - .fn = kprobe_single_step_handler, +static struct break_hook kprobes_break_ss_hook = { + .imm = KPROBES_BRK_SS_IMM, + .fn = kprobe_breakpoint_ss_handler, }; static int __kprobes @@ -568,7 +545,7 @@ int __kprobes arch_trampoline_kprobe(struct kprobe *p) int __init arch_init_kprobes(void) { register_kernel_break_hook(&kprobes_break_hook); - register_kernel_step_hook(&kprobes_step_hook); + register_kernel_break_hook(&kprobes_break_ss_hook); return 0; } From 2464a1c0de5390d668b2a286b4a6ba2365d8bd2d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Randy Dunlap Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2020 17:39:51 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 0668/1091] RISC-V: fix barrier() use in commit 30aca1bacb398dec6c1ed5eeca33f355bd7b6203 upstream. riscv's uses barrier() so it should include Fixes this build error: CC [M] drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_main.o In file included from ./include/vdso/processor.h:10, from ./arch/riscv/include/asm/processor.h:11, from ./include/linux/prefetch.h:15, from drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_main.c:14: ./arch/riscv/include/asm/vdso/processor.h: In function 'cpu_relax': ./arch/riscv/include/asm/vdso/processor.h:14:2: error: implicit declaration of function 'barrier' [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration] 14 | barrier(); This happens with a total of 5 networking drivers -- they all use . rv64 allmodconfig now builds cleanly after this patch. Fixes fallout from: 815f0ddb346c ("include/linux/compiler*.h: make compiler-*.h mutually exclusive") Fixes: ad5d1122b82f ("riscv: use vDSO common flow to reduce the latency of the time-related functions") Reported-by: Andreas Schwab Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap Acked-by: Arvind Sankar Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt [sudip: change in old path] Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/riscv/include/asm/processor.h | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/processor.h index f539149d04c2..8c5b11a640dd 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/processor.h +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/processor.h @@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ +#include + struct task_struct; struct pt_regs; From 1a48a41f14222177365fd3cf2049705f39281eaa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Olof Johansson Date: Mon, 16 Dec 2019 20:06:31 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 0669/1091] riscv: Less inefficient gcc tishift helpers (and export their symbols) commit fc585d4a5cf614727f64d86550b794bcad29d5c3 upstream. The existing __lshrti3 was really inefficient, and the other two helpers are also needed to compile some modules. Add the missing versions, and export all of the symbols like arm64 already does. This code is based on the assembly generated by libgcc builds. This fixes a build break triggered by ubsan: riscv64-unknown-linux-gnu-ld: lib/ubsan.o: in function `.L2': ubsan.c:(.text.unlikely+0x38): undefined reference to `__ashlti3' riscv64-unknown-linux-gnu-ld: ubsan.c:(.text.unlikely+0x42): undefined reference to `__ashrti3' Signed-off-by: Olof Johansson [paul.walmsley@sifive.com: use SYM_FUNC_{START,END} instead of ENTRY/ENDPROC; note libgcc origin] Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/riscv/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h | 4 ++ arch/riscv/lib/tishift.S | 75 +++++++++++++++++++------ 2 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h index c9fecd120d18..8ae9708a8eee 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h @@ -4,4 +4,8 @@ #include #include +long long __lshrti3(long long a, int b); +long long __ashrti3(long long a, int b); +long long __ashlti3(long long a, int b); + #endif /* _ASM_RISCV_PROTOTYPES_H */ diff --git a/arch/riscv/lib/tishift.S b/arch/riscv/lib/tishift.S index 15f9d54c7db6..ef90075c4b0a 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/lib/tishift.S +++ b/arch/riscv/lib/tishift.S @@ -4,34 +4,73 @@ */ #include +#include -ENTRY(__lshrti3) +SYM_FUNC_START(__lshrti3) beqz a2, .L1 li a5,64 sub a5,a5,a2 - addi sp,sp,-16 sext.w a4,a5 blez a5, .L2 sext.w a2,a2 - sll a4,a1,a4 srl a0,a0,a2 - srl a1,a1,a2 + sll a4,a1,a4 + srl a2,a1,a2 or a0,a0,a4 - sd a1,8(sp) - sd a0,0(sp) - ld a0,0(sp) - ld a1,8(sp) - addi sp,sp,16 - ret + mv a1,a2 .L1: ret .L2: - negw a4,a4 - srl a1,a1,a4 - sd a1,0(sp) - sd zero,8(sp) - ld a0,0(sp) - ld a1,8(sp) - addi sp,sp,16 + negw a0,a4 + li a2,0 + srl a0,a1,a0 + mv a1,a2 ret -ENDPROC(__lshrti3) +SYM_FUNC_END(__lshrti3) +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__lshrti3) + +SYM_FUNC_START(__ashrti3) + beqz a2, .L3 + li a5,64 + sub a5,a5,a2 + sext.w a4,a5 + blez a5, .L4 + sext.w a2,a2 + srl a0,a0,a2 + sll a4,a1,a4 + sra a2,a1,a2 + or a0,a0,a4 + mv a1,a2 +.L3: + ret +.L4: + negw a0,a4 + srai a2,a1,0x3f + sra a0,a1,a0 + mv a1,a2 + ret +SYM_FUNC_END(__ashrti3) +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ashrti3) + +SYM_FUNC_START(__ashlti3) + beqz a2, .L5 + li a5,64 + sub a5,a5,a2 + sext.w a4,a5 + blez a5, .L6 + sext.w a2,a2 + sll a1,a1,a2 + srl a4,a0,a4 + sll a2,a0,a2 + or a1,a1,a4 + mv a0,a2 +.L5: + ret +.L6: + negw a1,a4 + li a2,0 + sll a1,a0,a1 + mv a0,a2 + ret +SYM_FUNC_END(__ashlti3) +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ashlti3) From ab8dff4b716ea338131b91b679573845a0c4a02b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexey Kardashevskiy Date: Tue, 21 Dec 2021 16:59:03 +1100 Subject: [PATCH 0670/1091] powerpc/mm: Switch obsolete dssall to .long commit d51f86cfd8e378d4907958db77da3074f6dce3ba upstream. The dssall ("Data Stream Stop All") instruction is obsolete altogether with other Data Cache Instructions since ISA 2.03 (year 2006). LLVM IAS does not support it but PPC970 seems to be using it. This switches dssall to .long as there is no much point in fixing LLVM. Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211221055904.555763-6-aik@ozlabs.ru [sudip: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/powerpc/include/asm/ppc-opcode.h | 2 ++ arch/powerpc/kernel/idle_6xx.S | 2 +- arch/powerpc/kernel/l2cr_6xx.S | 6 +++--- arch/powerpc/kernel/swsusp_32.S | 2 +- arch/powerpc/kernel/swsusp_asm64.S | 2 +- arch/powerpc/mm/mmu_context.c | 2 +- arch/powerpc/platforms/powermac/cache.S | 4 ++-- 7 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/ppc-opcode.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/ppc-opcode.h index c1df75edde44..a9af63bd430f 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/ppc-opcode.h +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/ppc-opcode.h @@ -204,6 +204,7 @@ #define PPC_INST_ICBT 0x7c00002c #define PPC_INST_ICSWX 0x7c00032d #define PPC_INST_ICSWEPX 0x7c00076d +#define PPC_INST_DSSALL 0x7e00066c #define PPC_INST_ISEL 0x7c00001e #define PPC_INST_ISEL_MASK 0xfc00003e #define PPC_INST_LDARX 0x7c0000a8 @@ -439,6 +440,7 @@ __PPC_RA(a) | __PPC_RB(b)) #define PPC_DCBZL(a, b) stringify_in_c(.long PPC_INST_DCBZL | \ __PPC_RA(a) | __PPC_RB(b)) +#define PPC_DSSALL stringify_in_c(.long PPC_INST_DSSALL) #define PPC_LQARX(t, a, b, eh) stringify_in_c(.long PPC_INST_LQARX | \ ___PPC_RT(t) | ___PPC_RA(a) | \ ___PPC_RB(b) | __PPC_EH(eh)) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/idle_6xx.S b/arch/powerpc/kernel/idle_6xx.S index 0ffdd18b9f26..acb8215c5a01 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/idle_6xx.S +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/idle_6xx.S @@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ BEGIN_FTR_SECTION END_FTR_SECTION_IFCLR(CPU_FTR_NO_DPM) mtspr SPRN_HID0,r4 BEGIN_FTR_SECTION - DSSALL + PPC_DSSALL sync END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_ALTIVEC) lwz r8,TI_LOCAL_FLAGS(r2) /* set napping bit */ diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/l2cr_6xx.S b/arch/powerpc/kernel/l2cr_6xx.S index 2020d255585f..7684f644e93e 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/l2cr_6xx.S +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/l2cr_6xx.S @@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_IFCLR(CPU_FTR_L2CR) /* Stop DST streams */ BEGIN_FTR_SECTION - DSSALL + PPC_DSSALL sync END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_ALTIVEC) @@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_IFCLR(CPU_FTR_L3CR) isync /* Stop DST streams */ - DSSALL + PPC_DSSALL sync /* Get the current enable bit of the L3CR into r4 */ @@ -402,7 +402,7 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_L3CR) _GLOBAL(__flush_disable_L1) /* Stop pending alitvec streams and memory accesses */ BEGIN_FTR_SECTION - DSSALL + PPC_DSSALL END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_ALTIVEC) sync diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/swsusp_32.S b/arch/powerpc/kernel/swsusp_32.S index cbdf86228eaa..54c44aea338c 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/swsusp_32.S +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/swsusp_32.S @@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ _GLOBAL(swsusp_arch_resume) #ifdef CONFIG_ALTIVEC /* Stop pending alitvec streams and memory accesses */ BEGIN_FTR_SECTION - DSSALL + PPC_DSSALL END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_ALTIVEC) #endif sync diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/swsusp_asm64.S b/arch/powerpc/kernel/swsusp_asm64.S index 6d3189830dd3..068a268a8013 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/swsusp_asm64.S +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/swsusp_asm64.S @@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ END_FW_FTR_SECTION_IFCLR(FW_FEATURE_LPAR) _GLOBAL(swsusp_arch_resume) /* Stop pending alitvec streams and memory accesses */ BEGIN_FTR_SECTION - DSSALL + PPC_DSSALL END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_ALTIVEC) sync diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/mmu_context.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/mmu_context.c index 18f20da0d348..64290d343b55 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/mm/mmu_context.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/mmu_context.c @@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next, * context */ if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_ALTIVEC)) - asm volatile ("dssall"); + asm volatile (PPC_DSSALL); if (new_on_cpu) radix_kvm_prefetch_workaround(next); diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powermac/cache.S b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powermac/cache.S index da69e0fcb4f1..9b85b030cbeb 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powermac/cache.S +++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powermac/cache.S @@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ flush_disable_75x: /* Stop DST streams */ BEGIN_FTR_SECTION - DSSALL + PPC_DSSALL sync END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_ALTIVEC) @@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ flush_disable_745x: isync /* Stop prefetch streams */ - DSSALL + PPC_DSSALL sync /* Disable L2 prefetching */ From f0c280af0ec7c79cf043594974206d87c3c46524 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Wed, 22 Jun 2022 14:11:24 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0671/1091] Linux 5.4.200 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220620124737.799371052@linuxfoundation.org Tested-by: Florian Fainelli Tested-by: Guenter Roeck Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing Tested-by: Sudip Mukherjee Tested-by: Jon Hunter Tested-by: Hulk Robot Tested-by: Shuah Khan Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Makefile | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index a8d2f2a1c052..32da9117e9d7 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 VERSION = 5 PATCHLEVEL = 4 -SUBLEVEL = 199 +SUBLEVEL = 200 EXTRAVERSION = NAME = Kleptomaniac Octopus From 864659cb5f4d3239434c76fcd1368d2dc0d2a8fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Tue, 21 Jun 2022 19:49:52 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0672/1091] Revert "ALSA: jack: Access input_dev under mutex" This reverts commit f68bed124c7699e23ffb4ce4fcc84671e9193cde which is commit 1b6a6fc5280e97559287b61eade2d4b363e836f2 upstream. It breaks the kernel abi and is not relevant for Android systems. Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Change-Id: I18399bc9d5e48a84f513302e2eabff255e9a931a --- include/sound/jack.h | 1 - sound/core/jack.c | 34 +++++++--------------------------- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/sound/jack.h b/include/sound/jack.h index 78f3619f3de9..9eb2b5ec1ec4 100644 --- a/include/sound/jack.h +++ b/include/sound/jack.h @@ -62,7 +62,6 @@ struct snd_jack { const char *id; #ifdef CONFIG_SND_JACK_INPUT_DEV struct input_dev *input_dev; - struct mutex input_dev_lock; int registered; int type; char name[100]; diff --git a/sound/core/jack.c b/sound/core/jack.c index e7ac82d46821..b00ae6f39f05 100644 --- a/sound/core/jack.c +++ b/sound/core/jack.c @@ -34,11 +34,8 @@ static int snd_jack_dev_disconnect(struct snd_device *device) #ifdef CONFIG_SND_JACK_INPUT_DEV struct snd_jack *jack = device->device_data; - mutex_lock(&jack->input_dev_lock); - if (!jack->input_dev) { - mutex_unlock(&jack->input_dev_lock); + if (!jack->input_dev) return 0; - } /* If the input device is registered with the input subsystem * then we need to use a different deallocator. */ @@ -47,7 +44,6 @@ static int snd_jack_dev_disconnect(struct snd_device *device) else input_free_device(jack->input_dev); jack->input_dev = NULL; - mutex_unlock(&jack->input_dev_lock); #endif /* CONFIG_SND_JACK_INPUT_DEV */ return 0; } @@ -86,11 +82,8 @@ static int snd_jack_dev_register(struct snd_device *device) snprintf(jack->name, sizeof(jack->name), "%s %s", card->shortname, jack->id); - mutex_lock(&jack->input_dev_lock); - if (!jack->input_dev) { - mutex_unlock(&jack->input_dev_lock); + if (!jack->input_dev) return 0; - } jack->input_dev->name = jack->name; @@ -115,7 +108,6 @@ static int snd_jack_dev_register(struct snd_device *device) if (err == 0) jack->registered = 1; - mutex_unlock(&jack->input_dev_lock); return err; } #endif /* CONFIG_SND_JACK_INPUT_DEV */ @@ -236,11 +228,9 @@ int snd_jack_new(struct snd_card *card, const char *id, int type, return -ENOMEM; } -#ifdef CONFIG_SND_JACK_INPUT_DEV - mutex_init(&jack->input_dev_lock); - - /* don't create input device for phantom jack */ + /* don't creat input device for phantom jack */ if (!phantom_jack) { +#ifdef CONFIG_SND_JACK_INPUT_DEV int i; jack->input_dev = input_allocate_device(); @@ -258,8 +248,8 @@ int snd_jack_new(struct snd_card *card, const char *id, int type, input_set_capability(jack->input_dev, EV_SW, jack_switch_types[i]); - } #endif /* CONFIG_SND_JACK_INPUT_DEV */ + } err = snd_device_new(card, SNDRV_DEV_JACK, jack, &ops); if (err < 0) @@ -299,14 +289,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(snd_jack_new); void snd_jack_set_parent(struct snd_jack *jack, struct device *parent) { WARN_ON(jack->registered); - mutex_lock(&jack->input_dev_lock); - if (!jack->input_dev) { - mutex_unlock(&jack->input_dev_lock); + if (!jack->input_dev) return; - } jack->input_dev->dev.parent = parent; - mutex_unlock(&jack->input_dev_lock); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(snd_jack_set_parent); @@ -354,8 +340,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(snd_jack_set_key); /** * snd_jack_report - Report the current status of a jack - * Note: This function uses mutexes and should be called from a - * context which can sleep (such as a workqueue). * * @jack: The jack to report status for * @status: The current status of the jack @@ -375,11 +359,8 @@ void snd_jack_report(struct snd_jack *jack, int status) status & jack_kctl->mask_bits); #ifdef CONFIG_SND_JACK_INPUT_DEV - mutex_lock(&jack->input_dev_lock); - if (!jack->input_dev) { - mutex_unlock(&jack->input_dev_lock); + if (!jack->input_dev) return; - } for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(jack->key); i++) { int testbit = SND_JACK_BTN_0 >> i; @@ -398,7 +379,6 @@ void snd_jack_report(struct snd_jack *jack, int status) } input_sync(jack->input_dev); - mutex_unlock(&jack->input_dev_lock); #endif /* CONFIG_SND_JACK_INPUT_DEV */ } EXPORT_SYMBOL(snd_jack_report); From 829ffaa71cda424f2823245b1448d701fdc7f117 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Tue, 21 Jun 2022 20:51:43 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0673/1091] Revert "drm: fix EDID struct for old ARM OABI format" This reverts commit ebede9aadfa3a387e5b014b6535bcb4af16d2e82 which is commit 47f15561b69e226bfc034e94ff6dbec51a4662af upstream. This is not relevant for the specific Android ARM64 systems, and it causes a CRC issue when present, so revert it. Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Change-Id: If766583203be987e5623598aa0bbd30934d5ccf7 --- include/drm/drm_edid.h | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/drm/drm_edid.h b/include/drm/drm_edid.h index f40a97417b68..b9719418c3d2 100644 --- a/include/drm/drm_edid.h +++ b/include/drm/drm_edid.h @@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ struct detailed_data_monitor_range { u8 supported_scalings; u8 preferred_refresh; } __attribute__((packed)) cvt; - } __attribute__((packed)) formula; + } formula; } __attribute__((packed)); struct detailed_data_wpindex { @@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ struct detailed_non_pixel { struct detailed_data_wpindex color; struct std_timing timings[6]; struct cvt_timing cvt[4]; - } __attribute__((packed)) data; + } data; } __attribute__((packed)); #define EDID_DETAIL_EST_TIMINGS 0xf7 @@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ struct detailed_timing { union { struct detailed_pixel_timing pixel_data; struct detailed_non_pixel other_data; - } __attribute__((packed)) data; + } data; } __attribute__((packed)); #define DRM_EDID_INPUT_SERRATION_VSYNC (1 << 0) From bba1b765b99b1e79d46b536d9eca8d29b433da2c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Wed, 22 Jun 2022 16:58:18 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0674/1091] Revert "mailbox: forward the hrtimer if not queued and under a lock" This reverts commit 6d8b9f574bcac0694fb0476e8e478be2f2362e7c which is commit bca1a1004615efe141fd78f360ecc48c60bc4ad5 upstream. It breaks the kernel api and isn't anything that is relevant for Android systems as it was already fixed in Android in a different way, so it can be reverted. Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Change-Id: I49bf9cf61438dbd002eaf89dc0c1ce514fd66e17 --- drivers/mailbox/mailbox.c | 19 ++++++------------- include/linux/mailbox_controller.h | 1 - 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/mailbox/mailbox.c b/drivers/mailbox/mailbox.c index 4229b9b5da98..3e7d4b20ab34 100644 --- a/drivers/mailbox/mailbox.c +++ b/drivers/mailbox/mailbox.c @@ -82,11 +82,11 @@ static void msg_submit(struct mbox_chan *chan) exit: spin_unlock_irqrestore(&chan->lock, flags); + /* kick start the timer immediately to avoid delays */ if (!err && (chan->txdone_method & TXDONE_BY_POLL)) { - /* kick start the timer immediately to avoid delays */ - spin_lock_irqsave(&chan->mbox->poll_hrt_lock, flags); - hrtimer_start(&chan->mbox->poll_hrt, 0, HRTIMER_MODE_REL); - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&chan->mbox->poll_hrt_lock, flags); + /* but only if not already active */ + if (!hrtimer_active(&chan->mbox->poll_hrt)) + hrtimer_start(&chan->mbox->poll_hrt, 0, HRTIMER_MODE_REL); } } @@ -120,26 +120,20 @@ static enum hrtimer_restart txdone_hrtimer(struct hrtimer *hrtimer) container_of(hrtimer, struct mbox_controller, poll_hrt); bool txdone, resched = false; int i; - unsigned long flags; for (i = 0; i < mbox->num_chans; i++) { struct mbox_chan *chan = &mbox->chans[i]; if (chan->active_req && chan->cl) { + resched = true; txdone = chan->mbox->ops->last_tx_done(chan); if (txdone) tx_tick(chan, 0); - else - resched = true; } } if (resched) { - spin_lock_irqsave(&mbox->poll_hrt_lock, flags); - if (!hrtimer_is_queued(hrtimer)) - hrtimer_forward_now(hrtimer, ms_to_ktime(mbox->txpoll_period)); - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&mbox->poll_hrt_lock, flags); - + hrtimer_forward_now(hrtimer, ms_to_ktime(mbox->txpoll_period)); return HRTIMER_RESTART; } return HRTIMER_NORESTART; @@ -506,7 +500,6 @@ int mbox_controller_register(struct mbox_controller *mbox) hrtimer_init(&mbox->poll_hrt, CLOCK_MONOTONIC, HRTIMER_MODE_REL); mbox->poll_hrt.function = txdone_hrtimer; - spin_lock_init(&mbox->poll_hrt_lock); } for (i = 0; i < mbox->num_chans; i++) { diff --git a/include/linux/mailbox_controller.h b/include/linux/mailbox_controller.h index 6fee33cb52f5..36d6ce673503 100644 --- a/include/linux/mailbox_controller.h +++ b/include/linux/mailbox_controller.h @@ -83,7 +83,6 @@ struct mbox_controller { const struct of_phandle_args *sp); /* Internal to API */ struct hrtimer poll_hrt; - spinlock_t poll_hrt_lock; struct list_head node; }; From c566c065e850f4e5e1226015451d47534d21b818 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Thu, 23 Jun 2022 15:14:02 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0675/1091] ANDROID: change function signatures for some random functions. In 5.4.200 the functions add_device_randomness() and get_random_bytes() want from: void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int len); -> void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t len); void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int len); -> void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len); As these functions are part of the GKI abi to be preserved, move them back. As these are just lengths of the buffer, all is fine with the size, they should never overflow. Bug: 161946584 Fixes: b530684129b2 ("random: make more consistent use of integer types") Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Change-Id: I5430259958b9a904e6e8b950e11526332c919c0c --- drivers/char/random.c | 4 ++-- include/linux/random.h | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 82f9ee440406..ede8dc0dfa0c 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t len) * wait_for_random_bytes() should be called and return 0 at least once * at any point prior. */ -void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t len) +void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int len) { warn_unseeded_randomness(); _get_random_bytes(buf, len); @@ -847,7 +847,7 @@ int __init random_init(const char *command_line) * the entropy pool having similar initial state across largely * identical devices. */ -void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len) +void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int len) { unsigned long entropy = random_get_entropy(); unsigned long flags; diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h index 3feafab498ad..72f1100a5a32 100644 --- a/include/linux/random.h +++ b/include/linux/random.h @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ struct notifier_block; -void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len); +void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int len); void __init add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len); void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, unsigned int value) __latent_entropy; @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ static inline void add_latent_entropy(void) static inline void add_latent_entropy(void) { } #endif -void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t len); +void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int len); size_t __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, size_t len); u32 get_random_u32(void); u64 get_random_u64(void); From 467eb53acd35d3fd43342b4bbcd0912981aa8fea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Thu, 23 Jun 2022 15:17:14 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0676/1091] ANDROID: cpu/hotplug: avoid breaking Android ABI by fusing cpuhp steps We can't add more values to the cpuhp_state enum, lest we break some vendor module. So instead break out existing steps into helper functions which call both steps. Fortunately none of these steps return anything other than 0, so we don't need to worry about rollback. Bug: 161946584 Fixes: 62cd795e465a ("random: clear fast pool, crng, and batches in cpuhp bring up") Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Change-Id: Icaa61291207d799bab741be7bab2b636cda09422 --- include/linux/cpuhotplug.h | 2 -- kernel/cpu.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++------------ 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/cpuhotplug.h b/include/linux/cpuhotplug.h index 43e2b1f9c982..2d55cee638fc 100644 --- a/include/linux/cpuhotplug.h +++ b/include/linux/cpuhotplug.h @@ -60,7 +60,6 @@ enum cpuhp_state { CPUHP_LUSTRE_CFS_DEAD, CPUHP_AP_ARM_CACHE_B15_RAC_DEAD, CPUHP_PADATA_DEAD, - CPUHP_RANDOM_PREPARE, CPUHP_WORKQUEUE_PREP, CPUHP_POWER_NUMA_PREPARE, CPUHP_HRTIMERS_PREPARE, @@ -177,7 +176,6 @@ enum cpuhp_state { CPUHP_AP_PERF_POWERPC_TRACE_IMC_ONLINE, CPUHP_AP_WATCHDOG_ONLINE, CPUHP_AP_WORKQUEUE_ONLINE, - CPUHP_AP_RANDOM_ONLINE, CPUHP_AP_RCUTREE_ONLINE, CPUHP_AP_BASE_CACHEINFO_ONLINE, CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN, diff --git a/kernel/cpu.c b/kernel/cpu.c index 4ff158a6b246..e37aad5d45b7 100644 --- a/kernel/cpu.c +++ b/kernel/cpu.c @@ -1446,6 +1446,20 @@ core_initcall(cpu_hotplug_pm_sync_init); int __boot_cpu_id; +/* Horrific hacks because we can't add more to cpuhp_hp_states. */ +static int random_and_perf_prepare_fusion(unsigned int cpu) +{ + perf_event_init_cpu(cpu); + random_prepare_cpu(cpu); + return 0; +} +static int random_and_workqueue_online_fusion(unsigned int cpu) +{ + workqueue_online_cpu(cpu); + random_online_cpu(cpu); + return 0; +} + #endif /* CONFIG_SMP */ /* Boot processor state steps */ @@ -1464,14 +1478,9 @@ static struct cpuhp_step cpuhp_hp_states[] = { }, [CPUHP_PERF_PREPARE] = { .name = "perf:prepare", - .startup.single = perf_event_init_cpu, + .startup.single = random_and_perf_prepare_fusion, .teardown.single = perf_event_exit_cpu, }, - [CPUHP_RANDOM_PREPARE] = { - .name = "random:prepare", - .startup.single = random_prepare_cpu, - .teardown.single = NULL, - }, [CPUHP_WORKQUEUE_PREP] = { .name = "workqueue:prepare", .startup.single = workqueue_prepare_cpu, @@ -1585,14 +1594,9 @@ static struct cpuhp_step cpuhp_hp_states[] = { }, [CPUHP_AP_WORKQUEUE_ONLINE] = { .name = "workqueue:online", - .startup.single = workqueue_online_cpu, + .startup.single = random_and_workqueue_online_fusion, .teardown.single = workqueue_offline_cpu, }, - [CPUHP_AP_RANDOM_ONLINE] = { - .name = "random:online", - .startup.single = random_online_cpu, - .teardown.single = NULL, - }, [CPUHP_AP_RCUTREE_ONLINE] = { .name = "RCU/tree:online", .startup.single = rcutree_online_cpu, From 91b58da1b3232f89f1084ded2e8c9596bce11bd9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Rosenberg Date: Wed, 22 Jun 2022 17:36:51 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0677/1091] Revert "ANDROID: ext4: Optimize match for casefolded encrypted dirs" This reverts commit 954d16b089d175848669949bc0f501686042a6a8. Replacing with upstream version Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg Change-Id: I3a349e3e6e5101806ba1564d4a2d84796f8b16a3 --- fs/ext4/ext4.h | 17 ++++++++-------- fs/ext4/namei.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------- 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/ext4.h b/fs/ext4/ext4.h index e62ab839d165..94a353a617e7 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/ext4.h +++ b/fs/ext4/ext4.h @@ -2406,9 +2406,9 @@ extern unsigned ext4_free_clusters_after_init(struct super_block *sb, ext4_fsblk_t ext4_inode_to_goal_block(struct inode *); #ifdef CONFIG_UNICODE -extern int ext4_fname_setup_ci_filename(struct inode *dir, +extern void ext4_fname_setup_ci_filename(struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *iname, - struct ext4_filename *fname); + struct fscrypt_str *fname); #endif #ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION @@ -2439,9 +2439,9 @@ static inline int ext4_fname_setup_filename(struct inode *dir, ext4_fname_from_fscrypt_name(fname, &name); #ifdef CONFIG_UNICODE - err = ext4_fname_setup_ci_filename(dir, iname, fname); + ext4_fname_setup_ci_filename(dir, iname, &fname->cf_name); #endif - return err; + return 0; } static inline int ext4_fname_prepare_lookup(struct inode *dir, @@ -2458,9 +2458,9 @@ static inline int ext4_fname_prepare_lookup(struct inode *dir, ext4_fname_from_fscrypt_name(fname, &name); #ifdef CONFIG_UNICODE - err = ext4_fname_setup_ci_filename(dir, &dentry->d_name, fname); + ext4_fname_setup_ci_filename(dir, &dentry->d_name, &fname->cf_name); #endif - return err; + return 0; } static inline void ext4_fname_free_filename(struct ext4_filename *fname) @@ -2485,16 +2485,15 @@ static inline int ext4_fname_setup_filename(struct inode *dir, int lookup, struct ext4_filename *fname) { - int err = 0; fname->usr_fname = iname; fname->disk_name.name = (unsigned char *) iname->name; fname->disk_name.len = iname->len; #ifdef CONFIG_UNICODE - err = ext4_fname_setup_ci_filename(dir, iname, fname); + ext4_fname_setup_ci_filename(dir, iname, &fname->cf_name); #endif - return err; + return 0; } static inline int ext4_fname_prepare_lookup(struct inode *dir, diff --git a/fs/ext4/namei.c b/fs/ext4/namei.c index 7b7f1e40c1e9..95d3d38b145d 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/namei.c +++ b/fs/ext4/namei.c @@ -799,9 +799,7 @@ dx_probe(struct ext4_filename *fname, struct inode *dir, if (hinfo->hash_version <= DX_HASH_TEA) hinfo->hash_version += EXT4_SB(dir->i_sb)->s_hash_unsigned; hinfo->seed = EXT4_SB(dir->i_sb)->s_hash_seed; - /* hash is already computed for encrypted casefolded directory */ - if (fname && fname_name(fname) && - !(IS_ENCRYPTED(dir) && IS_CASEFOLDED(dir))) + if (fname && fname_name(fname)) ext4fs_dirhash(dir, fname_name(fname), fname_len(fname), hinfo); hash = hinfo->hash; @@ -1383,21 +1381,19 @@ out: return ret; } -int ext4_fname_setup_ci_filename(struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *iname, - struct ext4_filename *name) +void ext4_fname_setup_ci_filename(struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *iname, + struct fscrypt_str *cf_name) { - struct fscrypt_str *cf_name = &name->cf_name; - struct dx_hash_info *hinfo = &name->hinfo; int len; if (!needs_casefold(dir)) { cf_name->name = NULL; - return 0; + return; } cf_name->name = kmalloc(EXT4_NAME_LEN, GFP_NOFS); if (!cf_name->name) - return -ENOMEM; + return; len = utf8_casefold(dir->i_sb->s_encoding, iname, cf_name->name, @@ -1405,18 +1401,10 @@ int ext4_fname_setup_ci_filename(struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *iname, if (len <= 0) { kfree(cf_name->name); cf_name->name = NULL; + return; } cf_name->len = (unsigned) len; - if (!IS_ENCRYPTED(dir)) - return 0; - hinfo->hash_version = DX_HASH_SIPHASH; - hinfo->seed = NULL; - if (cf_name->name) - ext4fs_dirhash(dir, cf_name->name, cf_name->len, hinfo); - else - ext4fs_dirhash(dir, iname->name, iname->len, hinfo); - return 0; } #endif @@ -1446,12 +1434,16 @@ static bool ext4_match(struct inode *parent, struct qstr cf = {.name = fname->cf_name.name, .len = fname->cf_name.len}; if (IS_ENCRYPTED(parent)) { - if (fname->hinfo.hash != EXT4_DIRENT_HASH(de) || - fname->hinfo.minor_hash != - EXT4_DIRENT_MINOR_HASH(de)) { + struct dx_hash_info hinfo; + hinfo.hash_version = DX_HASH_SIPHASH; + hinfo.seed = NULL; + ext4fs_dirhash(parent, fname->cf_name.name, + fname_len(fname), &hinfo); + if (hinfo.hash != EXT4_DIRENT_HASH(de) || + hinfo.minor_hash != + EXT4_DIRENT_MINOR_HASH(de)) return 0; - } } return !ext4_ci_compare(parent, &cf, de->name, de->name_len, true); @@ -2086,11 +2078,15 @@ void ext4_insert_dentry(struct inode *dir, de->name_len = fname_len(fname); memcpy(de->name, fname_name(fname), fname_len(fname)); if (ext4_hash_in_dirent(dir)) { - struct dx_hash_info *hinfo = &fname->hinfo; + struct dx_hash_info hinfo; - EXT4_DIRENT_HASHES(de)->hash = cpu_to_le32(hinfo->hash); + hinfo.hash_version = DX_HASH_SIPHASH; + hinfo.seed = NULL; + ext4fs_dirhash(dir, fname_usr_name(fname), + fname_len(fname), &hinfo); + EXT4_DIRENT_HASHES(de)->hash = cpu_to_le32(hinfo.hash); EXT4_DIRENT_HASHES(de)->minor_hash = - cpu_to_le32(hinfo->minor_hash); + cpu_to_le32(hinfo.minor_hash); } } @@ -2241,9 +2237,10 @@ static int make_indexed_dir(handle_t *handle, struct ext4_filename *fname, if (fname->hinfo.hash_version <= DX_HASH_TEA) fname->hinfo.hash_version += EXT4_SB(dir->i_sb)->s_hash_unsigned; fname->hinfo.seed = EXT4_SB(dir->i_sb)->s_hash_seed; - - /* casefolded encrypted hashes are computed on fname setup */ - if (!ext4_hash_in_dirent(dir)) + if (ext4_hash_in_dirent(dir)) + ext4fs_dirhash(dir, fname_usr_name(fname), + fname_len(fname), &fname->hinfo); + else ext4fs_dirhash(dir, fname_name(fname), fname_len(fname), &fname->hinfo); From 8515bb68eedccf906e1368bc90de087cb7774ae6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Rosenberg Date: Wed, 22 Jun 2022 17:58:38 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0678/1091] Revert "ANDROID: ext4: Handle casefolding with encryption" This reverts commit 268041d71e8b87d5db75dfe6a12a6cdfdbd0c9a0. Replacing with upstream version Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg Change-Id: Icedfb2bada2722e8325abd3962403d61f6ffd885 --- Documentation/filesystems/ext4/directory.rst | 27 -- fs/ext4/dir.c | 51 +-- fs/ext4/ext4.h | 62 +--- fs/ext4/hash.c | 24 +- fs/ext4/ialloc.c | 5 +- fs/ext4/inline.c | 41 ++- fs/ext4/namei.c | 310 ++++++------------- fs/ext4/super.c | 6 + 8 files changed, 151 insertions(+), 375 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/ext4/directory.rst b/Documentation/filesystems/ext4/directory.rst index 55f618b37144..073940cc64ed 100644 --- a/Documentation/filesystems/ext4/directory.rst +++ b/Documentation/filesystems/ext4/directory.rst @@ -121,31 +121,6 @@ The directory file type is one of the following values: * - 0x7 - Symbolic link. -To support directories that are both encrypted and casefolded directories, we -must also include hash information in the directory entry. We append -``ext4_extended_dir_entry_2`` to ``ext4_dir_entry_2`` except for the entries -for dot and dotdot, which are kept the same. The structure follows immediately -after ``name`` and is included in the size listed by ``rec_len`` If a directory -entry uses this extension, it may be up to 271 bytes. - -.. list-table:: - :widths: 8 8 24 40 - :header-rows: 1 - - * - Offset - - Size - - Name - - Description - * - 0x0 - - \_\_le32 - - hash - - The hash of the directory name - * - 0x4 - - \_\_le32 - - minor\_hash - - The minor hash of the directory name - - In order to add checksums to these classic directory blocks, a phony ``struct ext4_dir_entry`` is placed at the end of each leaf block to hold the checksum. The directory entry is 12 bytes long. The inode @@ -347,8 +322,6 @@ The directory hash is one of the following values: - Half MD4, unsigned. * - 0x5 - Tea, unsigned. - * - 0x6 - - Siphash. Interior nodes of an htree are recorded as ``struct dx_node``, which is also the full length of a data block: diff --git a/fs/ext4/dir.c b/fs/ext4/dir.c index 7eeaf5566e1a..b86705e4ce7b 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/dir.c +++ b/fs/ext4/dir.c @@ -30,8 +30,6 @@ #include "ext4.h" #include "xattr.h" -#define DOTDOT_OFFSET 12 - static int ext4_dx_readdir(struct file *, struct dir_context *); /** @@ -57,19 +55,6 @@ static int is_dx_dir(struct inode *inode) return 0; } -static bool is_fake_entry(struct inode *dir, ext4_lblk_t lblk, - unsigned int offset, unsigned int blocksize) -{ - /* Entries in the first block before this value refer to . or .. */ - if (lblk == 0 && offset <= DOTDOT_OFFSET) - return true; - /* Check if this is likely the csum entry */ - if (ext4_has_metadata_csum(dir->i_sb) && offset % blocksize == - blocksize - sizeof(struct ext4_dir_entry_tail)) - return true; - return false; -} - /* * Return 0 if the directory entry is OK, and 1 if there is a problem * @@ -82,30 +67,25 @@ int __ext4_check_dir_entry(const char *function, unsigned int line, struct inode *dir, struct file *filp, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de, struct buffer_head *bh, char *buf, int size, - ext4_lblk_t lblk, unsigned int offset) { const char *error_msg = NULL; const int rlen = ext4_rec_len_from_disk(de->rec_len, dir->i_sb->s_blocksize); - const int next_offset = ((char *) de - buf) + rlen; - unsigned int blocksize = dir->i_sb->s_blocksize; - bool fake = is_fake_entry(dir, lblk, offset, blocksize); - bool next_fake = is_fake_entry(dir, lblk, next_offset, blocksize); - if (unlikely(rlen < ext4_dir_rec_len(1, fake ? NULL : dir))) + if (unlikely(rlen < EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(1))) error_msg = "rec_len is smaller than minimal"; else if (unlikely(rlen % 4 != 0)) error_msg = "rec_len % 4 != 0"; - else if (unlikely(rlen < ext4_dir_rec_len(de->name_len, - fake ? NULL : dir))) + else if (unlikely(rlen < EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(de->name_len))) error_msg = "rec_len is too small for name_len"; else if (unlikely(((char *) de - buf) + rlen > size)) error_msg = "directory entry overrun"; - else if (unlikely(next_offset > size - ext4_dir_rec_len(1, - next_fake ? NULL : dir) && - next_offset != size)) + else if (unlikely(((char *) de - buf) + rlen > + size - EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(1) && + ((char *) de - buf) + rlen != size)) { error_msg = "directory entry too close to block end"; + } else if (unlikely(le32_to_cpu(de->inode) > le32_to_cpu(EXT4_SB(dir->i_sb)->s_es->s_inodes_count))) error_msg = "inode out of bounds"; @@ -115,15 +95,15 @@ int __ext4_check_dir_entry(const char *function, unsigned int line, if (filp) ext4_error_file(filp, function, line, bh->b_blocknr, "bad entry in directory: %s - offset=%u, " - "inode=%u, rec_len=%d, lblk=%d, size=%d fake=%d", + "inode=%u, rec_len=%d, name_len=%d, size=%d", error_msg, offset, le32_to_cpu(de->inode), - rlen, lblk, size, fake); + rlen, de->name_len, size); else ext4_error_inode(dir, function, line, bh->b_blocknr, "bad entry in directory: %s - offset=%u, " - "inode=%u, rec_len=%d, lblk=%d, size=%d fake=%d", + "inode=%u, rec_len=%d, name_len=%d, size=%d", error_msg, offset, le32_to_cpu(de->inode), - rlen, lblk, size, fake); + rlen, de->name_len, size); return 1; } @@ -247,8 +227,7 @@ static int ext4_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) * failure will be detected in the * dirent test below. */ if (ext4_rec_len_from_disk(de->rec_len, - sb->s_blocksize) < ext4_dir_rec_len(1, - inode)) + sb->s_blocksize) < EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(1)) break; i += ext4_rec_len_from_disk(de->rec_len, sb->s_blocksize); @@ -264,7 +243,7 @@ static int ext4_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) (bh->b_data + offset); if (ext4_check_dir_entry(inode, file, de, bh, bh->b_data, bh->b_size, - map.m_lblk, offset)) { + offset)) { /* * On error, skip to the next block */ @@ -289,9 +268,7 @@ static int ext4_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) /* Directory is encrypted */ err = fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr(inode, - EXT4_DIRENT_HASH(de), - EXT4_DIRENT_MINOR_HASH(de), - &de_name, &fstr); + 0, 0, &de_name, &fstr); de_name = fstr; fstr.len = save_len; if (err) @@ -668,7 +645,7 @@ int ext4_check_all_de(struct inode *dir, struct buffer_head *bh, void *buf, top = buf + buf_size; while ((char *) de < top) { if (ext4_check_dir_entry(dir, NULL, de, bh, - buf, buf_size, 0, offset)) + buf, buf_size, offset)) return -EFSCORRUPTED; rlen = ext4_rec_len_from_disk(de->rec_len, buf_size); de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *)((char *)de + rlen); diff --git a/fs/ext4/ext4.h b/fs/ext4/ext4.h index 94a353a617e7..3eca81622fbf 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/ext4.h +++ b/fs/ext4/ext4.h @@ -1971,17 +1971,6 @@ struct ext4_dir_entry { char name[EXT4_NAME_LEN]; /* File name */ }; - -/* - * Encrypted Casefolded entries require saving the hash on disk. This structure - * followed ext4_dir_entry_2's name[name_len] at the next 4 byte aligned - * boundary. - */ -struct ext4_dir_entry_hash { - __le32 hash; - __le32 minor_hash; -}; - /* * The new version of the directory entry. Since EXT4 structures are * stored in intel byte order, and the name_len field could never be @@ -1996,22 +1985,6 @@ struct ext4_dir_entry_2 { char name[EXT4_NAME_LEN]; /* File name */ }; -/* - * Access the hashes at the end of ext4_dir_entry_2 - */ -#define EXT4_DIRENT_HASHES(entry) \ - ((struct ext4_dir_entry_hash *) \ - (((void *)(entry)) + \ - ((8 + (entry)->name_len + EXT4_DIR_ROUND) & ~EXT4_DIR_ROUND))) -#define EXT4_DIRENT_HASH(entry) le32_to_cpu(EXT4_DIRENT_HASHES(de)->hash) -#define EXT4_DIRENT_MINOR_HASH(entry) \ - le32_to_cpu(EXT4_DIRENT_HASHES(de)->minor_hash) - -static inline bool ext4_hash_in_dirent(const struct inode *inode) -{ - return IS_CASEFOLDED(inode) && IS_ENCRYPTED(inode); -} - /* * This is a bogus directory entry at the end of each leaf block that * records checksums. @@ -2053,24 +2026,10 @@ struct ext4_dir_entry_tail { */ #define EXT4_DIR_PAD 4 #define EXT4_DIR_ROUND (EXT4_DIR_PAD - 1) +#define EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(name_len) (((name_len) + 8 + EXT4_DIR_ROUND) & \ + ~EXT4_DIR_ROUND) #define EXT4_MAX_REC_LEN ((1<<16)-1) -/* - * The rec_len is dependent on the type of directory. Directories that are - * casefolded and encrypted need to store the hash as well, so we add room for - * ext4_extended_dir_entry_2. For all entries related to '.' or '..' you should - * pass NULL for dir, as those entries do not use the extra fields. - */ -static inline unsigned int ext4_dir_rec_len(__u8 name_len, - const struct inode *dir) -{ - int rec_len = (name_len + 8 + EXT4_DIR_ROUND); - - if (dir && ext4_hash_in_dirent(dir)) - rec_len += sizeof(struct ext4_dir_entry_hash); - return (rec_len & ~EXT4_DIR_ROUND); -} - /* * If we ever get support for fs block sizes > page_size, we'll need * to remove the #if statements in the next two functions... @@ -2127,7 +2086,6 @@ static inline __le16 ext4_rec_len_to_disk(unsigned len, unsigned blocksize) #define DX_HASH_LEGACY_UNSIGNED 3 #define DX_HASH_HALF_MD4_UNSIGNED 4 #define DX_HASH_TEA_UNSIGNED 5 -#define DX_HASH_SIPHASH 6 static inline u32 ext4_chksum(struct ext4_sb_info *sbi, u32 crc, const void *address, unsigned int length) @@ -2182,7 +2140,6 @@ struct ext4_filename { }; #define fname_name(p) ((p)->disk_name.name) -#define fname_usr_name(p) ((p)->usr_fname->name) #define fname_len(p) ((p)->disk_name.len) /* @@ -2517,22 +2474,21 @@ extern int __ext4_check_dir_entry(const char *, unsigned int, struct inode *, struct file *, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *, struct buffer_head *, char *, int, - ext4_lblk_t, unsigned int); -#define ext4_check_dir_entry(dir, filp, de, bh, buf, size, lblk, offset) \ + unsigned int); +#define ext4_check_dir_entry(dir, filp, de, bh, buf, size, offset) \ unlikely(__ext4_check_dir_entry(__func__, __LINE__, (dir), (filp), \ - (de), (bh), (buf), (size), (lblk), (offset))) + (de), (bh), (buf), (size), (offset))) extern int ext4_htree_store_dirent(struct file *dir_file, __u32 hash, __u32 minor_hash, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *dirent, struct fscrypt_str *ent_name); extern void ext4_htree_free_dir_info(struct dir_private_info *p); extern int ext4_find_dest_de(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode, - ext4_lblk_t lblk, struct buffer_head *bh, void *buf, int buf_size, struct ext4_filename *fname, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 **dest_de); -void ext4_insert_dentry(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode, +void ext4_insert_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de, int buf_size, struct ext4_filename *fname); @@ -2717,12 +2673,11 @@ extern int ext4_search_dir(struct buffer_head *bh, int buf_size, struct inode *dir, struct ext4_filename *fname, - ext4_lblk_t lblk, unsigned int offset, + unsigned int offset, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 **res_dir); extern int ext4_generic_delete_entry(handle_t *handle, struct inode *dir, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de_del, - ext4_lblk_t lblk, struct buffer_head *bh, void *entry_buf, int buf_size, @@ -3257,6 +3212,9 @@ extern void ext4_initialize_dirent_tail(struct buffer_head *bh, unsigned int blocksize); extern int ext4_handle_dirty_dirblock(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, struct buffer_head *bh); +extern int ext4_ci_compare(const struct inode *parent, + const struct qstr *fname, + const struct qstr *entry, bool quick); #define S_SHIFT 12 static const unsigned char ext4_type_by_mode[(S_IFMT >> S_SHIFT) + 1] = { diff --git a/fs/ext4/hash.c b/fs/ext4/hash.c index 035b57b93673..143b0073b3f4 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/hash.c +++ b/fs/ext4/hash.c @@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ static void str2hashbuf_unsigned(const char *msg, int len, __u32 *buf, int num) * represented, and whether or not the returned hash is 32 bits or 64 * bits. 32 bit hashes will return 0 for the minor hash. */ -static int __ext4fs_dirhash(const struct inode *dir, const char *name, int len, +static int __ext4fs_dirhash(const char *name, int len, struct dx_hash_info *hinfo) { __u32 hash; @@ -259,22 +259,6 @@ static int __ext4fs_dirhash(const struct inode *dir, const char *name, int len, hash = buf[0]; minor_hash = buf[1]; break; - case DX_HASH_SIPHASH: - { - struct qstr qname = QSTR_INIT(name, len); - __u64 combined_hash; - - if (fscrypt_has_encryption_key(dir)) { - combined_hash = fscrypt_fname_siphash(dir, &qname); - } else { - ext4_warning_inode(dir, "Siphash requires key"); - return -1; - } - - hash = (__u32)(combined_hash >> 32); - minor_hash = (__u32)combined_hash; - break; - } default: hinfo->hash = 0; return -1; @@ -296,7 +280,7 @@ int ext4fs_dirhash(const struct inode *dir, const char *name, int len, unsigned char *buff; struct qstr qstr = {.name = name, .len = len }; - if (len && needs_casefold(dir) && um) { + if (len && IS_CASEFOLDED(dir) && um) { buff = kzalloc(sizeof(char) * PATH_MAX, GFP_KERNEL); if (!buff) return -ENOMEM; @@ -307,12 +291,12 @@ int ext4fs_dirhash(const struct inode *dir, const char *name, int len, goto opaque_seq; } - r = __ext4fs_dirhash(dir, buff, dlen, hinfo); + r = __ext4fs_dirhash(buff, dlen, hinfo); kfree(buff); return r; } opaque_seq: #endif - return __ext4fs_dirhash(dir, name, len, hinfo); + return __ext4fs_dirhash(name, len, hinfo); } diff --git a/fs/ext4/ialloc.c b/fs/ext4/ialloc.c index e6487c0c5078..83846cc81485 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/ialloc.c +++ b/fs/ext4/ialloc.c @@ -450,10 +450,7 @@ static int find_group_orlov(struct super_block *sb, struct inode *parent, int ret = -1; if (qstr) { - if (ext4_hash_in_dirent(parent)) - hinfo.hash_version = DX_HASH_SIPHASH; - else - hinfo.hash_version = DX_HASH_HALF_MD4; + hinfo.hash_version = DX_HASH_HALF_MD4; hinfo.seed = sbi->s_hash_seed; ext4fs_dirhash(parent, qstr->name, qstr->len, &hinfo); grp = hinfo.hash; diff --git a/fs/ext4/inline.c b/fs/ext4/inline.c index 48958edecf01..6eb45b580f97 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/inline.c +++ b/fs/ext4/inline.c @@ -1011,7 +1011,7 @@ void ext4_show_inline_dir(struct inode *dir, struct buffer_head *bh, offset, de_len, de->name_len, de->name, de->name_len, le32_to_cpu(de->inode)); if (ext4_check_dir_entry(dir, NULL, de, bh, - inline_start, inline_size, 0, offset)) + inline_start, inline_size, offset)) BUG(); offset += de_len; @@ -1037,7 +1037,7 @@ static int ext4_add_dirent_to_inline(handle_t *handle, int err; struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de; - err = ext4_find_dest_de(dir, inode, 0, iloc->bh, inline_start, + err = ext4_find_dest_de(dir, inode, iloc->bh, inline_start, inline_size, fname, &de); if (err) return err; @@ -1046,7 +1046,7 @@ static int ext4_add_dirent_to_inline(handle_t *handle, err = ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle, iloc->bh); if (err) return err; - ext4_insert_dentry(dir, inode, de, inline_size, fname); + ext4_insert_dentry(inode, de, inline_size, fname); ext4_show_inline_dir(dir, iloc->bh, inline_start, inline_size); @@ -1115,7 +1115,7 @@ static int ext4_update_inline_dir(handle_t *handle, struct inode *dir, int old_size = EXT4_I(dir)->i_inline_size - EXT4_MIN_INLINE_DATA_SIZE; int new_size = get_max_inline_xattr_value_size(dir, iloc); - if (new_size - old_size <= ext4_dir_rec_len(1, NULL)) + if (new_size - old_size <= EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(1)) return -ENOSPC; ret = ext4_update_inline_data(handle, dir, @@ -1401,8 +1401,8 @@ int ext4_inlinedir_to_tree(struct file *dir_file, fake.name_len = 1; strcpy(fake.name, "."); fake.rec_len = ext4_rec_len_to_disk( - ext4_dir_rec_len(fake.name_len, NULL), - inline_size); + EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(fake.name_len), + inline_size); ext4_set_de_type(inode->i_sb, &fake, S_IFDIR); de = &fake; pos = EXT4_INLINE_DOTDOT_OFFSET; @@ -1411,8 +1411,8 @@ int ext4_inlinedir_to_tree(struct file *dir_file, fake.name_len = 2; strcpy(fake.name, ".."); fake.rec_len = ext4_rec_len_to_disk( - ext4_dir_rec_len(fake.name_len, NULL), - inline_size); + EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(fake.name_len), + inline_size); ext4_set_de_type(inode->i_sb, &fake, S_IFDIR); de = &fake; pos = EXT4_INLINE_DOTDOT_SIZE; @@ -1421,18 +1421,13 @@ int ext4_inlinedir_to_tree(struct file *dir_file, pos += ext4_rec_len_from_disk(de->rec_len, inline_size); if (ext4_check_dir_entry(inode, dir_file, de, iloc.bh, dir_buf, - inline_size, block, pos)) { + inline_size, pos)) { ret = count; goto out; } } - if (ext4_hash_in_dirent(dir)) { - hinfo->hash = EXT4_DIRENT_HASH(de); - hinfo->minor_hash = EXT4_DIRENT_MINOR_HASH(de); - } else { - ext4fs_dirhash(dir, de->name, de->name_len, hinfo); - } + ext4fs_dirhash(dir, de->name, de->name_len, hinfo); if ((hinfo->hash < start_hash) || ((hinfo->hash == start_hash) && (hinfo->minor_hash < start_minor_hash))) @@ -1514,8 +1509,8 @@ int ext4_read_inline_dir(struct file *file, * So we will use extra_offset and extra_size to indicate them * during the inline dir iteration. */ - dotdot_offset = ext4_dir_rec_len(1, NULL); - dotdot_size = dotdot_offset + ext4_dir_rec_len(2, NULL); + dotdot_offset = EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(1); + dotdot_size = dotdot_offset + EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(2); extra_offset = dotdot_size - EXT4_INLINE_DOTDOT_SIZE; extra_size = extra_offset + inline_size; @@ -1550,7 +1545,7 @@ int ext4_read_inline_dir(struct file *file, * failure will be detected in the * dirent test below. */ if (ext4_rec_len_from_disk(de->rec_len, extra_size) - < ext4_dir_rec_len(1, NULL)) + < EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(1)) break; i += ext4_rec_len_from_disk(de->rec_len, extra_size); @@ -1578,7 +1573,7 @@ int ext4_read_inline_dir(struct file *file, de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) (dir_buf + ctx->pos - extra_offset); if (ext4_check_dir_entry(inode, file, de, iloc.bh, dir_buf, - extra_size, 0, ctx->pos)) + extra_size, ctx->pos)) goto out; if (le32_to_cpu(de->inode)) { if (!dir_emit(ctx, de->name, de->name_len, @@ -1670,7 +1665,7 @@ struct buffer_head *ext4_find_inline_entry(struct inode *dir, EXT4_INLINE_DOTDOT_SIZE; inline_size = EXT4_MIN_INLINE_DATA_SIZE - EXT4_INLINE_DOTDOT_SIZE; ret = ext4_search_dir(iloc.bh, inline_start, inline_size, - dir, fname, 0, 0, res_dir); + dir, fname, 0, res_dir); if (ret == 1) goto out_find; if (ret < 0) @@ -1683,7 +1678,7 @@ struct buffer_head *ext4_find_inline_entry(struct inode *dir, inline_size = ext4_get_inline_size(dir) - EXT4_MIN_INLINE_DATA_SIZE; ret = ext4_search_dir(iloc.bh, inline_start, inline_size, - dir, fname, 0, 0, res_dir); + dir, fname, 0, res_dir); if (ret == 1) goto out_find; @@ -1732,7 +1727,7 @@ int ext4_delete_inline_entry(handle_t *handle, if (err) goto out; - err = ext4_generic_delete_entry(handle, dir, de_del, 0, bh, + err = ext4_generic_delete_entry(handle, dir, de_del, bh, inline_start, inline_size, 0); if (err) goto out; @@ -1816,7 +1811,7 @@ bool empty_inline_dir(struct inode *dir, int *has_inline_data) &inline_pos, &inline_size); if (ext4_check_dir_entry(dir, NULL, de, iloc.bh, inline_pos, - inline_size, 0, offset)) { + inline_size, offset)) { ext4_warning(dir->i_sb, "bad inline directory (dir #%lu) - " "inode %u, rec_len %u, name_len %d" diff --git a/fs/ext4/namei.c b/fs/ext4/namei.c index 95d3d38b145d..9538a3c328f4 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/namei.c +++ b/fs/ext4/namei.c @@ -277,11 +277,9 @@ static int dx_make_map(struct inode *dir, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de, unsigned blocksize, struct dx_hash_info *hinfo, struct dx_map_entry map[]); static void dx_sort_map(struct dx_map_entry *map, unsigned count); -static struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *dx_move_dirents(struct inode *dir, char *from, - char *to, struct dx_map_entry *offsets, - int count, unsigned int blocksize); -static struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *dx_pack_dirents(struct inode *dir, char *base, - unsigned int blocksize); +static struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *dx_move_dirents(char *from, char *to, + struct dx_map_entry *offsets, int count, unsigned blocksize); +static struct ext4_dir_entry_2* dx_pack_dirents(char *base, unsigned blocksize); static void dx_insert_block(struct dx_frame *frame, u32 hash, ext4_lblk_t block); static int ext4_htree_next_block(struct inode *dir, __u32 hash, @@ -290,7 +288,7 @@ static int ext4_htree_next_block(struct inode *dir, __u32 hash, __u32 *start_hash); static struct buffer_head * ext4_dx_find_entry(struct inode *dir, struct ext4_filename *fname, - struct ext4_dir_entry_2 **res_dir, ext4_lblk_t *lblk); + struct ext4_dir_entry_2 **res_dir); static int ext4_dx_add_entry(handle_t *handle, struct ext4_filename *fname, struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode); @@ -573,9 +571,8 @@ static inline void dx_set_limit(struct dx_entry *entries, unsigned value) static inline unsigned dx_root_limit(struct inode *dir, unsigned infosize) { - unsigned int entry_space = dir->i_sb->s_blocksize - - ext4_dir_rec_len(1, NULL) - - ext4_dir_rec_len(2, NULL) - infosize; + unsigned entry_space = dir->i_sb->s_blocksize - EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(1) - + EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(2) - infosize; if (ext4_has_metadata_csum(dir->i_sb)) entry_space -= sizeof(struct dx_tail); @@ -584,8 +581,7 @@ static inline unsigned dx_root_limit(struct inode *dir, unsigned infosize) static inline unsigned dx_node_limit(struct inode *dir) { - unsigned int entry_space = dir->i_sb->s_blocksize - - ext4_dir_rec_len(0, dir); + unsigned entry_space = dir->i_sb->s_blocksize - EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(0); if (ext4_has_metadata_csum(dir->i_sb)) entry_space -= sizeof(struct dx_tail); @@ -681,10 +677,7 @@ static struct stats dx_show_leaf(struct inode *dir, name = fname_crypto_str.name; len = fname_crypto_str.len; } - if (IS_CASEFOLDED(dir)) - h.hash = EXT4_DIRENT_HASH(de); - else - ext4fs_dirhash(dir, de->name, + ext4fs_dirhash(dir, de->name, de->name_len, &h); printk("%*.s:(E)%x.%u ", len, name, h.hash, (unsigned) ((char *) de @@ -700,7 +693,7 @@ static struct stats dx_show_leaf(struct inode *dir, (unsigned) ((char *) de - base)); #endif } - space += ext4_dir_rec_len(de->name_len, dir); + space += EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(de->name_len); names++; } de = ext4_next_entry(de, size); @@ -774,25 +767,11 @@ dx_probe(struct ext4_filename *fname, struct inode *dir, root = (struct dx_root *) frame->bh->b_data; if (root->info.hash_version != DX_HASH_TEA && root->info.hash_version != DX_HASH_HALF_MD4 && - root->info.hash_version != DX_HASH_LEGACY && - root->info.hash_version != DX_HASH_SIPHASH) { + root->info.hash_version != DX_HASH_LEGACY) { ext4_warning_inode(dir, "Unrecognised inode hash code %u", root->info.hash_version); goto fail; } - if (ext4_hash_in_dirent(dir)) { - if (root->info.hash_version != DX_HASH_SIPHASH) { - ext4_warning_inode(dir, - "Hash in dirent, but hash is not SIPHASH"); - goto fail; - } - } else { - if (root->info.hash_version == DX_HASH_SIPHASH) { - ext4_warning_inode(dir, - "Hash code is SIPHASH, but hash not in dirent"); - goto fail; - } - } if (fname) hinfo = &fname->hinfo; hinfo->hash_version = root->info.hash_version; @@ -1028,7 +1007,6 @@ static int htree_dirblock_to_tree(struct file *dir_file, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de, *top; int err = 0, count = 0; struct fscrypt_str fname_crypto_str = FSTR_INIT(NULL, 0), tmp_str; - int csum = ext4_has_metadata_csum(dir->i_sb); dxtrace(printk(KERN_INFO "In htree dirblock_to_tree: block %lu\n", (unsigned long)block)); @@ -1037,11 +1015,9 @@ static int htree_dirblock_to_tree(struct file *dir_file, return PTR_ERR(bh); de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) bh->b_data; - /* csum entries are not larger in the casefolded encrypted case */ top = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) ((char *) de + dir->i_sb->s_blocksize - - ext4_dir_rec_len(0, - csum ? NULL : dir)); + EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(0)); #ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION /* Check if the directory is encrypted */ if (IS_ENCRYPTED(dir)) { @@ -1060,23 +1036,13 @@ static int htree_dirblock_to_tree(struct file *dir_file, #endif for (; de < top; de = ext4_next_entry(de, dir->i_sb->s_blocksize)) { if (ext4_check_dir_entry(dir, NULL, de, bh, - bh->b_data, bh->b_size, block, + bh->b_data, bh->b_size, (block<i_sb)) + ((char *)de - bh->b_data))) { /* silently ignore the rest of the block */ break; } - if (ext4_hash_in_dirent(dir)) { - if (de->name_len && de->inode) { - hinfo->hash = EXT4_DIRENT_HASH(de); - hinfo->minor_hash = EXT4_DIRENT_MINOR_HASH(de); - } else { - hinfo->hash = 0; - hinfo->minor_hash = 0; - } - } else { - ext4fs_dirhash(dir, de->name, de->name_len, hinfo); - } + ext4fs_dirhash(dir, de->name, de->name_len, hinfo); if ((hinfo->hash < start_hash) || ((hinfo->hash == start_hash) && (hinfo->minor_hash < start_minor_hash))) @@ -1147,11 +1113,7 @@ int ext4_htree_fill_tree(struct file *dir_file, __u32 start_hash, start_hash, start_minor_hash)); dir = file_inode(dir_file); if (!(ext4_test_inode_flag(dir, EXT4_INODE_INDEX))) { - if (ext4_hash_in_dirent(dir)) - hinfo.hash_version = DX_HASH_SIPHASH; - else - hinfo.hash_version = - EXT4_SB(dir->i_sb)->s_def_hash_version; + hinfo.hash_version = EXT4_SB(dir->i_sb)->s_def_hash_version; if (hinfo.hash_version <= DX_HASH_TEA) hinfo.hash_version += EXT4_SB(dir->i_sb)->s_hash_unsigned; @@ -1244,12 +1206,11 @@ errout: static inline int search_dirblock(struct buffer_head *bh, struct inode *dir, struct ext4_filename *fname, - ext4_lblk_t lblk, unsigned int offset, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 **res_dir) { return ext4_search_dir(bh, bh->b_data, dir->i_sb->s_blocksize, dir, - fname, lblk, offset, res_dir); + fname, offset, res_dir); } /* @@ -1270,10 +1231,7 @@ static int dx_make_map(struct inode *dir, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de, while ((char *) de < base + blocksize) { if (de->name_len && de->inode) { - if (ext4_hash_in_dirent(dir)) - h.hash = EXT4_DIRENT_HASH(de); - else - ext4fs_dirhash(dir, de->name, de->name_len, &h); + ext4fs_dirhash(dir, de->name, de->name_len, &h); map_tail--; map_tail->hash = h.hash; map_tail->offs = ((char *) de - base)>>2; @@ -1337,47 +1295,31 @@ static void dx_insert_block(struct dx_frame *frame, u32 hash, ext4_lblk_t block) * Returns: 0 if the directory entry matches, more than 0 if it * doesn't match or less than zero on error. */ -static int ext4_ci_compare(const struct inode *parent, const struct qstr *name, - u8 *de_name, size_t de_name_len, bool quick) +int ext4_ci_compare(const struct inode *parent, const struct qstr *name, + const struct qstr *entry, bool quick) { const struct super_block *sb = parent->i_sb; const struct unicode_map *um = sb->s_encoding; - struct fscrypt_str decrypted_name = FSTR_INIT(NULL, de_name_len); - struct qstr entry = QSTR_INIT(de_name, de_name_len); int ret; - if (IS_ENCRYPTED(parent)) { - const struct fscrypt_str encrypted_name = - FSTR_INIT(de_name, de_name_len); - - decrypted_name.name = kmalloc(de_name_len, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!decrypted_name.name) - return -ENOMEM; - ret = fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr(parent, 0, 0, &encrypted_name, - &decrypted_name); - if (ret < 0) - goto out; - entry.name = decrypted_name.name; - entry.len = decrypted_name.len; - } - if (quick) - ret = utf8_strncasecmp_folded(um, name, &entry); + ret = utf8_strncasecmp_folded(um, name, entry); else - ret = utf8_strncasecmp(um, name, &entry); + ret = utf8_strncasecmp(um, name, entry); + if (ret < 0) { /* Handle invalid character sequence as either an error * or as an opaque byte sequence. */ if (sb_has_enc_strict_mode(sb)) - ret = -EINVAL; - else if (name->len != entry.len) - ret = 1; - else - ret = !!memcmp(name->name, entry.name, entry.len); + return -EINVAL; + + if (name->len != entry->len) + return 1; + + return !!memcmp(name->name, entry->name, name->len); } -out: - kfree(decrypted_name.name); + return ret; } @@ -1413,11 +1355,14 @@ void ext4_fname_setup_ci_filename(struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *iname, * * Return: %true if the directory entry matches, otherwise %false. */ -static bool ext4_match(struct inode *parent, +static inline bool ext4_match(const struct inode *parent, const struct ext4_filename *fname, - struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de) + const struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de) { struct fscrypt_name f; +#ifdef CONFIG_UNICODE + const struct qstr entry = {.name = de->name, .len = de->name_len}; +#endif if (!de->inode) return false; @@ -1433,23 +1378,10 @@ static bool ext4_match(struct inode *parent, if (fname->cf_name.name) { struct qstr cf = {.name = fname->cf_name.name, .len = fname->cf_name.len}; - if (IS_ENCRYPTED(parent)) { - struct dx_hash_info hinfo; - - hinfo.hash_version = DX_HASH_SIPHASH; - hinfo.seed = NULL; - ext4fs_dirhash(parent, fname->cf_name.name, - fname_len(fname), &hinfo); - if (hinfo.hash != EXT4_DIRENT_HASH(de) || - hinfo.minor_hash != - EXT4_DIRENT_MINOR_HASH(de)) - return 0; - } - return !ext4_ci_compare(parent, &cf, de->name, - de->name_len, true); + return !ext4_ci_compare(parent, &cf, &entry, true); } - return !ext4_ci_compare(parent, fname->usr_fname, de->name, - de->name_len, false); + return !ext4_ci_compare(parent, fname->usr_fname, &entry, + false); } #endif @@ -1461,8 +1393,7 @@ static bool ext4_match(struct inode *parent, */ int ext4_search_dir(struct buffer_head *bh, char *search_buf, int buf_size, struct inode *dir, struct ext4_filename *fname, - ext4_lblk_t lblk, unsigned int offset, - struct ext4_dir_entry_2 **res_dir) + unsigned int offset, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 **res_dir) { struct ext4_dir_entry_2 * de; char * dlimit; @@ -1478,7 +1409,7 @@ int ext4_search_dir(struct buffer_head *bh, char *search_buf, int buf_size, /* found a match - just to be sure, do * a full check */ if (ext4_check_dir_entry(dir, NULL, de, bh, search_buf, - buf_size, lblk, offset)) + buf_size, offset)) return -1; *res_dir = de; return 1; @@ -1524,7 +1455,7 @@ static int is_dx_internal_node(struct inode *dir, ext4_lblk_t block, static struct buffer_head *__ext4_find_entry(struct inode *dir, struct ext4_filename *fname, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 **res_dir, - int *inlined, ext4_lblk_t *lblk) + int *inlined) { struct super_block *sb; struct buffer_head *bh_use[NAMEI_RA_SIZE]; @@ -1548,8 +1479,6 @@ static struct buffer_head *__ext4_find_entry(struct inode *dir, int has_inline_data = 1; ret = ext4_find_inline_entry(dir, fname, res_dir, &has_inline_data); - if (lblk) - *lblk = 0; if (has_inline_data) { if (inlined) *inlined = 1; @@ -1568,7 +1497,7 @@ static struct buffer_head *__ext4_find_entry(struct inode *dir, goto restart; } if (is_dx(dir)) { - ret = ext4_dx_find_entry(dir, fname, res_dir, lblk); + ret = ext4_dx_find_entry(dir, fname, res_dir); /* * On success, or if the error was file not found, * return. Otherwise, fall back to doing a search the @@ -1632,11 +1561,9 @@ restart: goto cleanup_and_exit; } set_buffer_verified(bh); - i = search_dirblock(bh, dir, fname, block, + i = search_dirblock(bh, dir, fname, block << EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(sb), res_dir); if (i == 1) { - if (lblk) - *lblk = block; EXT4_I(dir)->i_dir_start_lookup = block; ret = bh; goto cleanup_and_exit; @@ -1671,7 +1598,7 @@ cleanup_and_exit: static struct buffer_head *ext4_find_entry(struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *d_name, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 **res_dir, - int *inlined, ext4_lblk_t *lblk) + int *inlined) { int err; struct ext4_filename fname; @@ -1683,7 +1610,7 @@ static struct buffer_head *ext4_find_entry(struct inode *dir, if (err) return ERR_PTR(err); - bh = __ext4_find_entry(dir, &fname, res_dir, inlined, lblk); + bh = __ext4_find_entry(dir, &fname, res_dir, inlined); ext4_fname_free_filename(&fname); return bh; @@ -1704,7 +1631,7 @@ static struct buffer_head *ext4_lookup_entry(struct inode *dir, if (err) return ERR_PTR(err); - bh = __ext4_find_entry(dir, &fname, res_dir, NULL, NULL); + bh = __ext4_find_entry(dir, &fname, res_dir, NULL); ext4_fname_free_filename(&fname); return bh; @@ -1712,7 +1639,7 @@ static struct buffer_head *ext4_lookup_entry(struct inode *dir, static struct buffer_head * ext4_dx_find_entry(struct inode *dir, struct ext4_filename *fname, - struct ext4_dir_entry_2 **res_dir, ext4_lblk_t *lblk) + struct ext4_dir_entry_2 **res_dir) { struct super_block * sb = dir->i_sb; struct dx_frame frames[EXT4_HTREE_LEVEL], *frame; @@ -1728,13 +1655,11 @@ static struct buffer_head * ext4_dx_find_entry(struct inode *dir, return (struct buffer_head *) frame; do { block = dx_get_block(frame->at); - if (lblk) - *lblk = block; bh = ext4_read_dirblock(dir, block, DIRENT_HTREE); if (IS_ERR(bh)) goto errout; - retval = search_dirblock(bh, dir, fname, block, + retval = search_dirblock(bh, dir, fname, block << EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(sb), res_dir); if (retval == 1) @@ -1829,7 +1754,7 @@ struct dentry *ext4_get_parent(struct dentry *child) struct ext4_dir_entry_2 * de; struct buffer_head *bh; - bh = ext4_find_entry(d_inode(child), &dotdot, &de, NULL, NULL); + bh = ext4_find_entry(d_inode(child), &dotdot, &de, NULL); if (IS_ERR(bh)) return ERR_CAST(bh); if (!bh) @@ -1851,8 +1776,7 @@ struct dentry *ext4_get_parent(struct dentry *child) * Returns pointer to last entry moved. */ static struct ext4_dir_entry_2 * -dx_move_dirents(struct inode *dir, char *from, char *to, - struct dx_map_entry *map, int count, +dx_move_dirents(char *from, char *to, struct dx_map_entry *map, int count, unsigned blocksize) { unsigned rec_len = 0; @@ -1860,8 +1784,7 @@ dx_move_dirents(struct inode *dir, char *from, char *to, while (count--) { struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) (from + (map->offs<<2)); - rec_len = ext4_dir_rec_len(de->name_len, dir); - + rec_len = EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(de->name_len); memcpy (to, de, rec_len); ((struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) to)->rec_len = ext4_rec_len_to_disk(rec_len, blocksize); @@ -1876,8 +1799,7 @@ dx_move_dirents(struct inode *dir, char *from, char *to, * Compact each dir entry in the range to the minimal rec_len. * Returns pointer to last entry in range. */ -static struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *dx_pack_dirents(struct inode *dir, char *base, - unsigned int blocksize) +static struct ext4_dir_entry_2* dx_pack_dirents(char *base, unsigned blocksize) { struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *next, *to, *prev, *de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) base; unsigned rec_len = 0; @@ -1886,7 +1808,7 @@ static struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *dx_pack_dirents(struct inode *dir, char *base, while ((char*)de < base + blocksize) { next = ext4_next_entry(de, blocksize); if (de->inode && de->name_len) { - rec_len = ext4_dir_rec_len(de->name_len, dir); + rec_len = EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(de->name_len); if (de > to) memmove(to, de, rec_len); to->rec_len = ext4_rec_len_to_disk(rec_len, blocksize); @@ -1904,13 +1826,14 @@ static struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *dx_pack_dirents(struct inode *dir, char *base, * Returns pointer to de in block into which the new entry will be inserted. */ static struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *do_split(handle_t *handle, struct inode *dir, - struct buffer_head **bh, struct dx_frame *frame, - struct dx_hash_info *hinfo, ext4_lblk_t *newblock) + struct buffer_head **bh,struct dx_frame *frame, + struct dx_hash_info *hinfo) { unsigned blocksize = dir->i_sb->s_blocksize; unsigned continued; int count; struct buffer_head *bh2; + ext4_lblk_t newblock; u32 hash2; struct dx_map_entry *map; char *data1 = (*bh)->b_data, *data2; @@ -1922,7 +1845,7 @@ static struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *do_split(handle_t *handle, struct inode *dir, if (ext4_has_metadata_csum(dir->i_sb)) csum_size = sizeof(struct ext4_dir_entry_tail); - bh2 = ext4_append(handle, dir, newblock); + bh2 = ext4_append(handle, dir, &newblock); if (IS_ERR(bh2)) { brelse(*bh); *bh = NULL; @@ -1976,9 +1899,9 @@ static struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *do_split(handle_t *handle, struct inode *dir, hash2, split, count-split)); /* Fancy dance to stay within two buffers */ - de2 = dx_move_dirents(dir, data1, data2, map + split, count - split, + de2 = dx_move_dirents(data1, data2, map + split, count - split, blocksize); - de = dx_pack_dirents(dir, data1, blocksize); + de = dx_pack_dirents(data1, blocksize); de->rec_len = ext4_rec_len_to_disk(data1 + (blocksize - csum_size) - (char *) de, blocksize); @@ -2000,7 +1923,7 @@ static struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *do_split(handle_t *handle, struct inode *dir, swap(*bh, bh2); de = de2; } - dx_insert_block(frame, hash2 + continued, *newblock); + dx_insert_block(frame, hash2 + continued, newblock); err = ext4_handle_dirty_dirblock(handle, dir, bh2); if (err) goto journal_error; @@ -2020,14 +1943,13 @@ journal_error: } int ext4_find_dest_de(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode, - ext4_lblk_t lblk, struct buffer_head *bh, void *buf, int buf_size, struct ext4_filename *fname, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 **dest_de) { struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de; - unsigned short reclen = ext4_dir_rec_len(fname_len(fname), dir); + unsigned short reclen = EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(fname_len(fname)); int nlen, rlen; unsigned int offset = 0; char *top; @@ -2036,11 +1958,11 @@ int ext4_find_dest_de(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode, top = buf + buf_size - reclen; while ((char *) de <= top) { if (ext4_check_dir_entry(dir, NULL, de, bh, - buf, buf_size, lblk, offset)) + buf, buf_size, offset)) return -EFSCORRUPTED; if (ext4_match(dir, fname, de)) return -EEXIST; - nlen = ext4_dir_rec_len(de->name_len, dir); + nlen = EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(de->name_len); rlen = ext4_rec_len_from_disk(de->rec_len, buf_size); if ((de->inode ? rlen - nlen : rlen) >= reclen) break; @@ -2054,8 +1976,7 @@ int ext4_find_dest_de(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode, return 0; } -void ext4_insert_dentry(struct inode *dir, - struct inode *inode, +void ext4_insert_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de, int buf_size, struct ext4_filename *fname) @@ -2063,7 +1984,7 @@ void ext4_insert_dentry(struct inode *dir, int nlen, rlen; - nlen = ext4_dir_rec_len(de->name_len, dir); + nlen = EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(de->name_len); rlen = ext4_rec_len_from_disk(de->rec_len, buf_size); if (de->inode) { struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de1 = @@ -2077,17 +1998,6 @@ void ext4_insert_dentry(struct inode *dir, ext4_set_de_type(inode->i_sb, de, inode->i_mode); de->name_len = fname_len(fname); memcpy(de->name, fname_name(fname), fname_len(fname)); - if (ext4_hash_in_dirent(dir)) { - struct dx_hash_info hinfo; - - hinfo.hash_version = DX_HASH_SIPHASH; - hinfo.seed = NULL; - ext4fs_dirhash(dir, fname_usr_name(fname), - fname_len(fname), &hinfo); - EXT4_DIRENT_HASHES(de)->hash = cpu_to_le32(hinfo.hash); - EXT4_DIRENT_HASHES(de)->minor_hash = - cpu_to_le32(hinfo.minor_hash); - } } /* @@ -2101,7 +2011,6 @@ void ext4_insert_dentry(struct inode *dir, static int add_dirent_to_buf(handle_t *handle, struct ext4_filename *fname, struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de, - ext4_lblk_t blk, struct buffer_head *bh) { unsigned int blocksize = dir->i_sb->s_blocksize; @@ -2112,7 +2021,7 @@ static int add_dirent_to_buf(handle_t *handle, struct ext4_filename *fname, csum_size = sizeof(struct ext4_dir_entry_tail); if (!de) { - err = ext4_find_dest_de(dir, inode, blk, bh, bh->b_data, + err = ext4_find_dest_de(dir, inode, bh, bh->b_data, blocksize - csum_size, fname, &de); if (err) return err; @@ -2125,7 +2034,7 @@ static int add_dirent_to_buf(handle_t *handle, struct ext4_filename *fname, } /* By now the buffer is marked for journaling */ - ext4_insert_dentry(dir, inode, de, blocksize, fname); + ext4_insert_dentry(inode, de, blocksize, fname); /* * XXX shouldn't update any times until successful @@ -2217,16 +2126,11 @@ static int make_indexed_dir(handle_t *handle, struct ext4_filename *fname, /* Initialize the root; the dot dirents already exist */ de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) (&root->dotdot); - de->rec_len = ext4_rec_len_to_disk( - blocksize - ext4_dir_rec_len(2, NULL), blocksize); + de->rec_len = ext4_rec_len_to_disk(blocksize - EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(2), + blocksize); memset (&root->info, 0, sizeof(root->info)); root->info.info_length = sizeof(root->info); - if (ext4_hash_in_dirent(dir)) - root->info.hash_version = DX_HASH_SIPHASH; - else - root->info.hash_version = - EXT4_SB(dir->i_sb)->s_def_hash_version; - + root->info.hash_version = EXT4_SB(dir->i_sb)->s_def_hash_version; entries = root->entries; dx_set_block(entries, 1); dx_set_count(entries, 1); @@ -2237,12 +2141,7 @@ static int make_indexed_dir(handle_t *handle, struct ext4_filename *fname, if (fname->hinfo.hash_version <= DX_HASH_TEA) fname->hinfo.hash_version += EXT4_SB(dir->i_sb)->s_hash_unsigned; fname->hinfo.seed = EXT4_SB(dir->i_sb)->s_hash_seed; - if (ext4_hash_in_dirent(dir)) - ext4fs_dirhash(dir, fname_usr_name(fname), - fname_len(fname), &fname->hinfo); - else - ext4fs_dirhash(dir, fname_name(fname), - fname_len(fname), &fname->hinfo); + ext4fs_dirhash(dir, fname_name(fname), fname_len(fname), &fname->hinfo); memset(frames, 0, sizeof(frames)); frame = frames; @@ -2257,13 +2156,13 @@ static int make_indexed_dir(handle_t *handle, struct ext4_filename *fname, if (retval) goto out_frames; - de = do_split(handle, dir, &bh2, frame, &fname->hinfo, &block); + de = do_split(handle,dir, &bh2, frame, &fname->hinfo); if (IS_ERR(de)) { retval = PTR_ERR(de); goto out_frames; } - retval = add_dirent_to_buf(handle, fname, dir, inode, de, block, bh2); + retval = add_dirent_to_buf(handle, fname, dir, inode, de, bh2); out_frames: /* * Even if the block split failed, we have to properly write @@ -2361,7 +2260,7 @@ static int ext4_add_entry(handle_t *handle, struct dentry *dentry, goto out; } retval = add_dirent_to_buf(handle, &fname, dir, inode, - NULL, block, bh); + NULL, bh); if (retval != -ENOSPC) goto out; @@ -2388,7 +2287,7 @@ add_to_new_block: if (csum_size) ext4_initialize_dirent_tail(bh, blocksize); - retval = add_dirent_to_buf(handle, &fname, dir, inode, de, block, bh); + retval = add_dirent_to_buf(handle, &fname, dir, inode, de, bh); out: ext4_fname_free_filename(&fname); brelse(bh); @@ -2410,7 +2309,6 @@ static int ext4_dx_add_entry(handle_t *handle, struct ext4_filename *fname, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de; int restart; int err; - ext4_lblk_t lblk; again: restart = 0; @@ -2419,8 +2317,7 @@ again: return PTR_ERR(frame); entries = frame->entries; at = frame->at; - lblk = dx_get_block(frame->at); - bh = ext4_read_dirblock(dir, lblk, DIRENT_HTREE); + bh = ext4_read_dirblock(dir, dx_get_block(frame->at), DIRENT_HTREE); if (IS_ERR(bh)) { err = PTR_ERR(bh); bh = NULL; @@ -2432,7 +2329,7 @@ again: if (err) goto journal_error; - err = add_dirent_to_buf(handle, fname, dir, inode, NULL, lblk, bh); + err = add_dirent_to_buf(handle, fname, dir, inode, NULL, bh); if (err != -ENOSPC) goto cleanup; @@ -2551,12 +2448,12 @@ again: goto journal_error; } } - de = do_split(handle, dir, &bh, frame, &fname->hinfo, &lblk); + de = do_split(handle, dir, &bh, frame, &fname->hinfo); if (IS_ERR(de)) { err = PTR_ERR(de); goto cleanup; } - err = add_dirent_to_buf(handle, fname, dir, inode, de, lblk, bh); + err = add_dirent_to_buf(handle, fname, dir, inode, de, bh); goto cleanup; journal_error: @@ -2579,7 +2476,6 @@ cleanup: int ext4_generic_delete_entry(handle_t *handle, struct inode *dir, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de_del, - ext4_lblk_t lblk, struct buffer_head *bh, void *entry_buf, int buf_size, @@ -2594,7 +2490,7 @@ int ext4_generic_delete_entry(handle_t *handle, de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *)entry_buf; while (i < buf_size - csum_size) { if (ext4_check_dir_entry(dir, NULL, de, bh, - entry_buf, buf_size, lblk, i)) + entry_buf, buf_size, i)) return -EFSCORRUPTED; if (de == de_del) { if (pde) @@ -2619,7 +2515,6 @@ int ext4_generic_delete_entry(handle_t *handle, static int ext4_delete_entry(handle_t *handle, struct inode *dir, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de_del, - ext4_lblk_t lblk, struct buffer_head *bh) { int err, csum_size = 0; @@ -2640,7 +2535,7 @@ static int ext4_delete_entry(handle_t *handle, if (unlikely(err)) goto out; - err = ext4_generic_delete_entry(handle, dir, de_del, lblk, + err = ext4_generic_delete_entry(handle, dir, de_del, bh, bh->b_data, dir->i_sb->s_blocksize, csum_size); if (err) @@ -2823,7 +2718,7 @@ struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *ext4_init_dot_dotdot(struct inode *inode, { de->inode = cpu_to_le32(inode->i_ino); de->name_len = 1; - de->rec_len = ext4_rec_len_to_disk(ext4_dir_rec_len(de->name_len, NULL), + de->rec_len = ext4_rec_len_to_disk(EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(de->name_len), blocksize); strcpy(de->name, "."); ext4_set_de_type(inode->i_sb, de, S_IFDIR); @@ -2833,12 +2728,11 @@ struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *ext4_init_dot_dotdot(struct inode *inode, de->name_len = 2; if (!dotdot_real_len) de->rec_len = ext4_rec_len_to_disk(blocksize - - (csum_size + ext4_dir_rec_len(1, NULL)), + (csum_size + EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(1)), blocksize); else de->rec_len = ext4_rec_len_to_disk( - ext4_dir_rec_len(de->name_len, NULL), - blocksize); + EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(de->name_len), blocksize); strcpy(de->name, ".."); ext4_set_de_type(inode->i_sb, de, S_IFDIR); @@ -2963,8 +2857,7 @@ bool ext4_empty_dir(struct inode *inode) } sb = inode->i_sb; - if (inode->i_size < ext4_dir_rec_len(1, NULL) + - ext4_dir_rec_len(2, NULL)) { + if (inode->i_size < EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(1) + EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(2)) { EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "invalid size"); return true; } @@ -2976,7 +2869,7 @@ bool ext4_empty_dir(struct inode *inode) return true; de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) bh->b_data; - if (ext4_check_dir_entry(inode, NULL, de, bh, bh->b_data, bh->b_size, 0, + if (ext4_check_dir_entry(inode, NULL, de, bh, bh->b_data, bh->b_size, 0) || le32_to_cpu(de->inode) != inode->i_ino || strcmp(".", de->name)) { ext4_warning_inode(inode, "directory missing '.'"); @@ -2985,7 +2878,7 @@ bool ext4_empty_dir(struct inode *inode) } offset = ext4_rec_len_from_disk(de->rec_len, sb->s_blocksize); de = ext4_next_entry(de, sb->s_blocksize); - if (ext4_check_dir_entry(inode, NULL, de, bh, bh->b_data, bh->b_size, 0, + if (ext4_check_dir_entry(inode, NULL, de, bh, bh->b_data, bh->b_size, offset) || le32_to_cpu(de->inode) == 0 || strcmp("..", de->name)) { ext4_warning_inode(inode, "directory missing '..'"); @@ -3009,7 +2902,7 @@ bool ext4_empty_dir(struct inode *inode) de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) (bh->b_data + (offset & (sb->s_blocksize - 1))); if (ext4_check_dir_entry(inode, NULL, de, bh, - bh->b_data, bh->b_size, 0, offset)) { + bh->b_data, bh->b_size, offset)) { offset = (offset | (sb->s_blocksize - 1)) + 1; continue; } @@ -3204,8 +3097,6 @@ static int ext4_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) struct buffer_head *bh; struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de; handle_t *handle = NULL; - ext4_lblk_t lblk; - if (unlikely(ext4_forced_shutdown(EXT4_SB(dir->i_sb)))) return -EIO; @@ -3220,7 +3111,7 @@ static int ext4_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) return retval; retval = -ENOENT; - bh = ext4_find_entry(dir, &dentry->d_name, &de, NULL, &lblk); + bh = ext4_find_entry(dir, &dentry->d_name, &de, NULL); if (IS_ERR(bh)) return PTR_ERR(bh); if (!bh) @@ -3247,7 +3138,7 @@ static int ext4_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) if (IS_DIRSYNC(dir)) ext4_handle_sync(handle); - retval = ext4_delete_entry(handle, dir, de, lblk, bh); + retval = ext4_delete_entry(handle, dir, de, bh); if (retval) goto end_rmdir; if (!EXT4_DIR_LINK_EMPTY(inode)) @@ -3293,7 +3184,6 @@ static int ext4_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) struct buffer_head *bh; struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de; handle_t *handle = NULL; - ext4_lblk_t lblk; if (unlikely(ext4_forced_shutdown(EXT4_SB(dir->i_sb)))) return -EIO; @@ -3309,7 +3199,7 @@ static int ext4_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) return retval; retval = -ENOENT; - bh = ext4_find_entry(dir, &dentry->d_name, &de, NULL, &lblk); + bh = ext4_find_entry(dir, &dentry->d_name, &de, NULL); if (IS_ERR(bh)) return PTR_ERR(bh); if (!bh) @@ -3332,7 +3222,7 @@ static int ext4_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) if (IS_DIRSYNC(dir)) ext4_handle_sync(handle); - retval = ext4_delete_entry(handle, dir, de, lblk, bh); + retval = ext4_delete_entry(handle, dir, de, bh); if (retval) goto end_unlink; dir->i_ctime = dir->i_mtime = current_time(dir); @@ -3594,7 +3484,6 @@ struct ext4_renament { int dir_nlink_delta; /* entry for "dentry" */ - ext4_lblk_t lblk; struct buffer_head *bh; struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de; int inlined; @@ -3685,7 +3574,7 @@ static void ext4_resetent(handle_t *handle, struct ext4_renament *ent, * so the old->de may no longer valid and need to find it again * before reset old inode info. */ - old.bh = ext4_find_entry(old.dir, &old.dentry->d_name, &old.de, NULL, NULL); + old.bh = ext4_find_entry(old.dir, &old.dentry->d_name, &old.de, NULL); if (IS_ERR(old.bh)) retval = PTR_ERR(old.bh); if (!old.bh) @@ -3705,13 +3594,12 @@ static int ext4_find_delete_entry(handle_t *handle, struct inode *dir, int retval = -ENOENT; struct buffer_head *bh; struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de; - ext4_lblk_t lblk; - bh = ext4_find_entry(dir, d_name, &de, NULL, &lblk); + bh = ext4_find_entry(dir, d_name, &de, NULL); if (IS_ERR(bh)) return PTR_ERR(bh); if (bh) { - retval = ext4_delete_entry(handle, dir, de, lblk, bh); + retval = ext4_delete_entry(handle, dir, de, bh); brelse(bh); } return retval; @@ -3735,8 +3623,7 @@ static void ext4_rename_delete(handle_t *handle, struct ext4_renament *ent, retval = ext4_find_delete_entry(handle, ent->dir, &ent->dentry->d_name); } else { - retval = ext4_delete_entry(handle, ent->dir, ent->de, - ent->lblk, ent->bh); + retval = ext4_delete_entry(handle, ent->dir, ent->de, ent->bh); if (retval == -ENOENT) { retval = ext4_find_delete_entry(handle, ent->dir, &ent->dentry->d_name); @@ -3849,8 +3736,7 @@ static int ext4_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, return retval; } - old.bh = ext4_find_entry(old.dir, &old.dentry->d_name, &old.de, NULL, - &old.lblk); + old.bh = ext4_find_entry(old.dir, &old.dentry->d_name, &old.de, NULL); if (IS_ERR(old.bh)) return PTR_ERR(old.bh); /* @@ -3864,7 +3750,7 @@ static int ext4_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, goto release_bh; new.bh = ext4_find_entry(new.dir, &new.dentry->d_name, - &new.de, &new.inlined, NULL); + &new.de, &new.inlined); if (IS_ERR(new.bh)) { retval = PTR_ERR(new.bh); new.bh = NULL; @@ -4048,7 +3934,7 @@ static int ext4_cross_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, return retval; old.bh = ext4_find_entry(old.dir, &old.dentry->d_name, - &old.de, &old.inlined, NULL); + &old.de, &old.inlined); if (IS_ERR(old.bh)) return PTR_ERR(old.bh); /* @@ -4062,7 +3948,7 @@ static int ext4_cross_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, goto end_rename; new.bh = ext4_find_entry(new.dir, &new.dentry->d_name, - &new.de, &new.inlined, NULL); + &new.de, &new.inlined); if (IS_ERR(new.bh)) { retval = PTR_ERR(new.bh); new.bh = NULL; diff --git a/fs/ext4/super.c b/fs/ext4/super.c index 3d7656c65bfa..f5e87c9e5f50 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/super.c +++ b/fs/ext4/super.c @@ -3972,6 +3972,12 @@ static int ext4_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) struct unicode_map *encoding; __u16 encoding_flags; + if (ext4_has_feature_encrypt(sb)) { + ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, + "Can't mount with encoding and encryption"); + goto failed_mount; + } + if (ext4_sb_read_encoding(es, &encoding_info, &encoding_flags)) { ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, From ce3b26019c9e6cfd114294b6f7e2108942554f74 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Rosenberg Date: Fri, 19 Mar 2021 07:34:13 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0679/1091] BACKPORT: ext4: handle casefolding with encryption [ Upstream commit 471fbbea7ff7061b2d6474665cb5a2ceb4fd6500 ] This adds support for encryption with casefolding. Since the name on disk is case preserving, and also encrypted, we can no longer just recompute the hash on the fly. Additionally, to avoid leaking extra information from the hash of the unencrypted name, we use siphash via an fscrypt v2 policy. The hash is stored at the end of the directory entry for all entries inside of an encrypted and casefolded directory apart from those that deal with '.' and '..'. This way, the change is backwards compatible with existing ext4 filesystems. [ Changed to advertise this feature via the file: /sys/fs/ext4/features/encrypted_casefold -- TYT ] Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210319073414.1381041-2-drosen@google.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Change-Id: I61653ddb324bae4bad77ccd49384159103b499f5 --- Documentation/filesystems/ext4/directory.rst | 27 +++ fs/ext4/dir.c | 42 ++-- fs/ext4/ext4.h | 56 +++++- fs/ext4/hash.c | 25 ++- fs/ext4/inline.c | 25 ++- fs/ext4/namei.c | 200 ++++++++++++++----- fs/ext4/super.c | 6 - fs/ext4/sysfs.c | 2 + 8 files changed, 290 insertions(+), 93 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/ext4/directory.rst b/Documentation/filesystems/ext4/directory.rst index 073940cc64ed..55f618b37144 100644 --- a/Documentation/filesystems/ext4/directory.rst +++ b/Documentation/filesystems/ext4/directory.rst @@ -121,6 +121,31 @@ The directory file type is one of the following values: * - 0x7 - Symbolic link. +To support directories that are both encrypted and casefolded directories, we +must also include hash information in the directory entry. We append +``ext4_extended_dir_entry_2`` to ``ext4_dir_entry_2`` except for the entries +for dot and dotdot, which are kept the same. The structure follows immediately +after ``name`` and is included in the size listed by ``rec_len`` If a directory +entry uses this extension, it may be up to 271 bytes. + +.. list-table:: + :widths: 8 8 24 40 + :header-rows: 1 + + * - Offset + - Size + - Name + - Description + * - 0x0 + - \_\_le32 + - hash + - The hash of the directory name + * - 0x4 + - \_\_le32 + - minor\_hash + - The minor hash of the directory name + + In order to add checksums to these classic directory blocks, a phony ``struct ext4_dir_entry`` is placed at the end of each leaf block to hold the checksum. The directory entry is 12 bytes long. The inode @@ -322,6 +347,8 @@ The directory hash is one of the following values: - Half MD4, unsigned. * - 0x5 - Tea, unsigned. + * - 0x6 + - Siphash. Interior nodes of an htree are recorded as ``struct dx_node``, which is also the full length of a data block: diff --git a/fs/ext4/dir.c b/fs/ext4/dir.c index b86705e4ce7b..67099e5886fb 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/dir.c +++ b/fs/ext4/dir.c @@ -55,6 +55,18 @@ static int is_dx_dir(struct inode *inode) return 0; } +static bool is_fake_dir_entry(struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de) +{ + /* Check if . or .. , or skip if namelen is 0 */ + if ((de->name_len > 0) && (de->name_len <= 2) && (de->name[0] == '.') && + (de->name[1] == '.' || de->name[1] == '\0')) + return true; + /* Check if this is a csum entry */ + if (de->file_type == EXT4_FT_DIR_CSUM) + return true; + return false; +} + /* * Return 0 if the directory entry is OK, and 1 if there is a problem * @@ -72,20 +84,23 @@ int __ext4_check_dir_entry(const char *function, unsigned int line, const char *error_msg = NULL; const int rlen = ext4_rec_len_from_disk(de->rec_len, dir->i_sb->s_blocksize); + const int next_offset = ((char *) de - buf) + rlen; + bool fake = is_fake_dir_entry(de); + bool has_csum = ext4_has_metadata_csum(dir->i_sb); - if (unlikely(rlen < EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(1))) + if (unlikely(rlen < ext4_dir_rec_len(1, fake ? NULL : dir))) error_msg = "rec_len is smaller than minimal"; else if (unlikely(rlen % 4 != 0)) error_msg = "rec_len % 4 != 0"; - else if (unlikely(rlen < EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(de->name_len))) + else if (unlikely(rlen < ext4_dir_rec_len(de->name_len, + fake ? NULL : dir))) error_msg = "rec_len is too small for name_len"; else if (unlikely(((char *) de - buf) + rlen > size)) error_msg = "directory entry overrun"; - else if (unlikely(((char *) de - buf) + rlen > - size - EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(1) && - ((char *) de - buf) + rlen != size)) { + else if (unlikely(next_offset > size - ext4_dir_rec_len(1, + has_csum ? NULL : dir) && + next_offset != size)) error_msg = "directory entry too close to block end"; - } else if (unlikely(le32_to_cpu(de->inode) > le32_to_cpu(EXT4_SB(dir->i_sb)->s_es->s_inodes_count))) error_msg = "inode out of bounds"; @@ -95,15 +110,15 @@ int __ext4_check_dir_entry(const char *function, unsigned int line, if (filp) ext4_error_file(filp, function, line, bh->b_blocknr, "bad entry in directory: %s - offset=%u, " - "inode=%u, rec_len=%d, name_len=%d, size=%d", + "inode=%u, rec_len=%d, size=%d fake=%d", error_msg, offset, le32_to_cpu(de->inode), - rlen, de->name_len, size); + rlen, size, fake); else ext4_error_inode(dir, function, line, bh->b_blocknr, "bad entry in directory: %s - offset=%u, " - "inode=%u, rec_len=%d, name_len=%d, size=%d", + "inode=%u, rec_len=%d, size=%d fake=%d", error_msg, offset, le32_to_cpu(de->inode), - rlen, de->name_len, size); + rlen, size, fake); return 1; } @@ -227,7 +242,8 @@ static int ext4_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) * failure will be detected in the * dirent test below. */ if (ext4_rec_len_from_disk(de->rec_len, - sb->s_blocksize) < EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(1)) + sb->s_blocksize) < ext4_dir_rec_len(1, + inode)) break; i += ext4_rec_len_from_disk(de->rec_len, sb->s_blocksize); @@ -268,7 +284,9 @@ static int ext4_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) /* Directory is encrypted */ err = fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr(inode, - 0, 0, &de_name, &fstr); + EXT4_DIRENT_HASH(de), + EXT4_DIRENT_MINOR_HASH(de), + &de_name, &fstr); de_name = fstr; fstr.len = save_len; if (err) diff --git a/fs/ext4/ext4.h b/fs/ext4/ext4.h index 3eca81622fbf..004982cbaabf 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/ext4.h +++ b/fs/ext4/ext4.h @@ -1971,6 +1971,17 @@ struct ext4_dir_entry { char name[EXT4_NAME_LEN]; /* File name */ }; + +/* + * Encrypted Casefolded entries require saving the hash on disk. This structure + * followed ext4_dir_entry_2's name[name_len] at the next 4 byte aligned + * boundary. + */ +struct ext4_dir_entry_hash { + __le32 hash; + __le32 minor_hash; +}; + /* * The new version of the directory entry. Since EXT4 structures are * stored in intel byte order, and the name_len field could never be @@ -1985,6 +1996,22 @@ struct ext4_dir_entry_2 { char name[EXT4_NAME_LEN]; /* File name */ }; +/* + * Access the hashes at the end of ext4_dir_entry_2 + */ +#define EXT4_DIRENT_HASHES(entry) \ + ((struct ext4_dir_entry_hash *) \ + (((void *)(entry)) + \ + ((8 + (entry)->name_len + EXT4_DIR_ROUND) & ~EXT4_DIR_ROUND))) +#define EXT4_DIRENT_HASH(entry) le32_to_cpu(EXT4_DIRENT_HASHES(de)->hash) +#define EXT4_DIRENT_MINOR_HASH(entry) \ + le32_to_cpu(EXT4_DIRENT_HASHES(de)->minor_hash) + +static inline bool ext4_hash_in_dirent(const struct inode *inode) +{ + return IS_CASEFOLDED(inode) && IS_ENCRYPTED(inode); +} + /* * This is a bogus directory entry at the end of each leaf block that * records checksums. @@ -2026,10 +2053,24 @@ struct ext4_dir_entry_tail { */ #define EXT4_DIR_PAD 4 #define EXT4_DIR_ROUND (EXT4_DIR_PAD - 1) -#define EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(name_len) (((name_len) + 8 + EXT4_DIR_ROUND) & \ - ~EXT4_DIR_ROUND) #define EXT4_MAX_REC_LEN ((1<<16)-1) +/* + * The rec_len is dependent on the type of directory. Directories that are + * casefolded and encrypted need to store the hash as well, so we add room for + * ext4_extended_dir_entry_2. For all entries related to '.' or '..' you should + * pass NULL for dir, as those entries do not use the extra fields. + */ +static inline unsigned int ext4_dir_rec_len(__u8 name_len, + const struct inode *dir) +{ + int rec_len = (name_len + 8 + EXT4_DIR_ROUND); + + if (dir && ext4_hash_in_dirent(dir)) + rec_len += sizeof(struct ext4_dir_entry_hash); + return (rec_len & ~EXT4_DIR_ROUND); +} + /* * If we ever get support for fs block sizes > page_size, we'll need * to remove the #if statements in the next two functions... @@ -2086,6 +2127,7 @@ static inline __le16 ext4_rec_len_to_disk(unsigned len, unsigned blocksize) #define DX_HASH_LEGACY_UNSIGNED 3 #define DX_HASH_HALF_MD4_UNSIGNED 4 #define DX_HASH_TEA_UNSIGNED 5 +#define DX_HASH_SIPHASH 6 static inline u32 ext4_chksum(struct ext4_sb_info *sbi, u32 crc, const void *address, unsigned int length) @@ -2140,6 +2182,7 @@ struct ext4_filename { }; #define fname_name(p) ((p)->disk_name.name) +#define fname_usr_name(p) ((p)->usr_fname->name) #define fname_len(p) ((p)->disk_name.len) /* @@ -2475,9 +2518,9 @@ extern int __ext4_check_dir_entry(const char *, unsigned int, struct inode *, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *, struct buffer_head *, char *, int, unsigned int); -#define ext4_check_dir_entry(dir, filp, de, bh, buf, size, offset) \ +#define ext4_check_dir_entry(dir, filp, de, bh, buf, size, offset) \ unlikely(__ext4_check_dir_entry(__func__, __LINE__, (dir), (filp), \ - (de), (bh), (buf), (size), (offset))) + (de), (bh), (buf), (size), (offset))) extern int ext4_htree_store_dirent(struct file *dir_file, __u32 hash, __u32 minor_hash, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *dirent, @@ -2488,7 +2531,7 @@ extern int ext4_find_dest_de(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode, void *buf, int buf_size, struct ext4_filename *fname, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 **dest_de); -void ext4_insert_dentry(struct inode *inode, +void ext4_insert_dentry(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de, int buf_size, struct ext4_filename *fname); @@ -3212,9 +3255,6 @@ extern void ext4_initialize_dirent_tail(struct buffer_head *bh, unsigned int blocksize); extern int ext4_handle_dirty_dirblock(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, struct buffer_head *bh); -extern int ext4_ci_compare(const struct inode *parent, - const struct qstr *fname, - const struct qstr *entry, bool quick); #define S_SHIFT 12 static const unsigned char ext4_type_by_mode[(S_IFMT >> S_SHIFT) + 1] = { diff --git a/fs/ext4/hash.c b/fs/ext4/hash.c index 143b0073b3f4..8aff1e3d7380 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/hash.c +++ b/fs/ext4/hash.c @@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ static void str2hashbuf_unsigned(const char *msg, int len, __u32 *buf, int num) * represented, and whether or not the returned hash is 32 bits or 64 * bits. 32 bit hashes will return 0 for the minor hash. */ -static int __ext4fs_dirhash(const char *name, int len, +static int __ext4fs_dirhash(const struct inode *dir, const char *name, int len, struct dx_hash_info *hinfo) { __u32 hash; @@ -259,6 +259,22 @@ static int __ext4fs_dirhash(const char *name, int len, hash = buf[0]; minor_hash = buf[1]; break; + case DX_HASH_SIPHASH: + { + struct qstr qname = QSTR_INIT(name, len); + __u64 combined_hash; + + if (fscrypt_has_encryption_key(dir)) { + combined_hash = fscrypt_fname_siphash(dir, &qname); + } else { + ext4_warning_inode(dir, "Siphash requires key"); + return -1; + } + + hash = (__u32)(combined_hash >> 32); + minor_hash = (__u32)combined_hash; + break; + } default: hinfo->hash = 0; return -1; @@ -280,7 +296,8 @@ int ext4fs_dirhash(const struct inode *dir, const char *name, int len, unsigned char *buff; struct qstr qstr = {.name = name, .len = len }; - if (len && IS_CASEFOLDED(dir) && um) { + if (len && IS_CASEFOLDED(dir) && um && + (!IS_ENCRYPTED(dir) || fscrypt_has_encryption_key(dir))) { buff = kzalloc(sizeof(char) * PATH_MAX, GFP_KERNEL); if (!buff) return -ENOMEM; @@ -291,12 +308,12 @@ int ext4fs_dirhash(const struct inode *dir, const char *name, int len, goto opaque_seq; } - r = __ext4fs_dirhash(buff, dlen, hinfo); + r = __ext4fs_dirhash(dir, buff, dlen, hinfo); kfree(buff); return r; } opaque_seq: #endif - return __ext4fs_dirhash(name, len, hinfo); + return __ext4fs_dirhash(dir, name, len, hinfo); } diff --git a/fs/ext4/inline.c b/fs/ext4/inline.c index 6eb45b580f97..96a47b1b1255 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/inline.c +++ b/fs/ext4/inline.c @@ -1046,7 +1046,7 @@ static int ext4_add_dirent_to_inline(handle_t *handle, err = ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle, iloc->bh); if (err) return err; - ext4_insert_dentry(inode, de, inline_size, fname); + ext4_insert_dentry(dir, inode, de, inline_size, fname); ext4_show_inline_dir(dir, iloc->bh, inline_start, inline_size); @@ -1115,7 +1115,7 @@ static int ext4_update_inline_dir(handle_t *handle, struct inode *dir, int old_size = EXT4_I(dir)->i_inline_size - EXT4_MIN_INLINE_DATA_SIZE; int new_size = get_max_inline_xattr_value_size(dir, iloc); - if (new_size - old_size <= EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(1)) + if (new_size - old_size <= ext4_dir_rec_len(1, NULL)) return -ENOSPC; ret = ext4_update_inline_data(handle, dir, @@ -1401,8 +1401,8 @@ int ext4_inlinedir_to_tree(struct file *dir_file, fake.name_len = 1; strcpy(fake.name, "."); fake.rec_len = ext4_rec_len_to_disk( - EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(fake.name_len), - inline_size); + ext4_dir_rec_len(fake.name_len, NULL), + inline_size); ext4_set_de_type(inode->i_sb, &fake, S_IFDIR); de = &fake; pos = EXT4_INLINE_DOTDOT_OFFSET; @@ -1411,8 +1411,8 @@ int ext4_inlinedir_to_tree(struct file *dir_file, fake.name_len = 2; strcpy(fake.name, ".."); fake.rec_len = ext4_rec_len_to_disk( - EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(fake.name_len), - inline_size); + ext4_dir_rec_len(fake.name_len, NULL), + inline_size); ext4_set_de_type(inode->i_sb, &fake, S_IFDIR); de = &fake; pos = EXT4_INLINE_DOTDOT_SIZE; @@ -1427,7 +1427,12 @@ int ext4_inlinedir_to_tree(struct file *dir_file, } } - ext4fs_dirhash(dir, de->name, de->name_len, hinfo); + if (ext4_hash_in_dirent(dir)) { + hinfo->hash = EXT4_DIRENT_HASH(de); + hinfo->minor_hash = EXT4_DIRENT_MINOR_HASH(de); + } else { + ext4fs_dirhash(dir, de->name, de->name_len, hinfo); + } if ((hinfo->hash < start_hash) || ((hinfo->hash == start_hash) && (hinfo->minor_hash < start_minor_hash))) @@ -1509,8 +1514,8 @@ int ext4_read_inline_dir(struct file *file, * So we will use extra_offset and extra_size to indicate them * during the inline dir iteration. */ - dotdot_offset = EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(1); - dotdot_size = dotdot_offset + EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(2); + dotdot_offset = ext4_dir_rec_len(1, NULL); + dotdot_size = dotdot_offset + ext4_dir_rec_len(2, NULL); extra_offset = dotdot_size - EXT4_INLINE_DOTDOT_SIZE; extra_size = extra_offset + inline_size; @@ -1545,7 +1550,7 @@ int ext4_read_inline_dir(struct file *file, * failure will be detected in the * dirent test below. */ if (ext4_rec_len_from_disk(de->rec_len, extra_size) - < EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(1)) + < ext4_dir_rec_len(1, NULL)) break; i += ext4_rec_len_from_disk(de->rec_len, extra_size); diff --git a/fs/ext4/namei.c b/fs/ext4/namei.c index 9538a3c328f4..cb80da2cbb25 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/namei.c +++ b/fs/ext4/namei.c @@ -277,9 +277,11 @@ static int dx_make_map(struct inode *dir, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de, unsigned blocksize, struct dx_hash_info *hinfo, struct dx_map_entry map[]); static void dx_sort_map(struct dx_map_entry *map, unsigned count); -static struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *dx_move_dirents(char *from, char *to, - struct dx_map_entry *offsets, int count, unsigned blocksize); -static struct ext4_dir_entry_2* dx_pack_dirents(char *base, unsigned blocksize); +static struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *dx_move_dirents(struct inode *dir, char *from, + char *to, struct dx_map_entry *offsets, + int count, unsigned int blocksize); +static struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *dx_pack_dirents(struct inode *dir, char *base, + unsigned int blocksize); static void dx_insert_block(struct dx_frame *frame, u32 hash, ext4_lblk_t block); static int ext4_htree_next_block(struct inode *dir, __u32 hash, @@ -571,8 +573,9 @@ static inline void dx_set_limit(struct dx_entry *entries, unsigned value) static inline unsigned dx_root_limit(struct inode *dir, unsigned infosize) { - unsigned entry_space = dir->i_sb->s_blocksize - EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(1) - - EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(2) - infosize; + unsigned int entry_space = dir->i_sb->s_blocksize - + ext4_dir_rec_len(1, NULL) - + ext4_dir_rec_len(2, NULL) - infosize; if (ext4_has_metadata_csum(dir->i_sb)) entry_space -= sizeof(struct dx_tail); @@ -581,7 +584,8 @@ static inline unsigned dx_root_limit(struct inode *dir, unsigned infosize) static inline unsigned dx_node_limit(struct inode *dir) { - unsigned entry_space = dir->i_sb->s_blocksize - EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(0); + unsigned int entry_space = dir->i_sb->s_blocksize - + ext4_dir_rec_len(0, dir); if (ext4_has_metadata_csum(dir->i_sb)) entry_space -= sizeof(struct dx_tail); @@ -677,7 +681,10 @@ static struct stats dx_show_leaf(struct inode *dir, name = fname_crypto_str.name; len = fname_crypto_str.len; } - ext4fs_dirhash(dir, de->name, + if (IS_CASEFOLDED(dir)) + h.hash = EXT4_DIRENT_HASH(de); + else + ext4fs_dirhash(dir, de->name, de->name_len, &h); printk("%*.s:(E)%x.%u ", len, name, h.hash, (unsigned) ((char *) de @@ -693,7 +700,7 @@ static struct stats dx_show_leaf(struct inode *dir, (unsigned) ((char *) de - base)); #endif } - space += EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(de->name_len); + space += ext4_dir_rec_len(de->name_len, dir); names++; } de = ext4_next_entry(de, size); @@ -767,11 +774,25 @@ dx_probe(struct ext4_filename *fname, struct inode *dir, root = (struct dx_root *) frame->bh->b_data; if (root->info.hash_version != DX_HASH_TEA && root->info.hash_version != DX_HASH_HALF_MD4 && - root->info.hash_version != DX_HASH_LEGACY) { + root->info.hash_version != DX_HASH_LEGACY && + root->info.hash_version != DX_HASH_SIPHASH) { ext4_warning_inode(dir, "Unrecognised inode hash code %u", root->info.hash_version); goto fail; } + if (ext4_hash_in_dirent(dir)) { + if (root->info.hash_version != DX_HASH_SIPHASH) { + ext4_warning_inode(dir, + "Hash in dirent, but hash is not SIPHASH"); + goto fail; + } + } else { + if (root->info.hash_version == DX_HASH_SIPHASH) { + ext4_warning_inode(dir, + "Hash code is SIPHASH, but hash not in dirent"); + goto fail; + } + } if (fname) hinfo = &fname->hinfo; hinfo->hash_version = root->info.hash_version; @@ -1007,6 +1028,7 @@ static int htree_dirblock_to_tree(struct file *dir_file, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de, *top; int err = 0, count = 0; struct fscrypt_str fname_crypto_str = FSTR_INIT(NULL, 0), tmp_str; + int csum = ext4_has_metadata_csum(dir->i_sb); dxtrace(printk(KERN_INFO "In htree dirblock_to_tree: block %lu\n", (unsigned long)block)); @@ -1015,9 +1037,11 @@ static int htree_dirblock_to_tree(struct file *dir_file, return PTR_ERR(bh); de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) bh->b_data; + /* csum entries are not larger in the casefolded encrypted case */ top = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) ((char *) de + dir->i_sb->s_blocksize - - EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(0)); + ext4_dir_rec_len(0, + csum ? NULL : dir)); #ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION /* Check if the directory is encrypted */ if (IS_ENCRYPTED(dir)) { @@ -1042,7 +1066,17 @@ static int htree_dirblock_to_tree(struct file *dir_file, /* silently ignore the rest of the block */ break; } - ext4fs_dirhash(dir, de->name, de->name_len, hinfo); + if (ext4_hash_in_dirent(dir)) { + if (de->name_len && de->inode) { + hinfo->hash = EXT4_DIRENT_HASH(de); + hinfo->minor_hash = EXT4_DIRENT_MINOR_HASH(de); + } else { + hinfo->hash = 0; + hinfo->minor_hash = 0; + } + } else { + ext4fs_dirhash(dir, de->name, de->name_len, hinfo); + } if ((hinfo->hash < start_hash) || ((hinfo->hash == start_hash) && (hinfo->minor_hash < start_minor_hash))) @@ -1113,7 +1147,11 @@ int ext4_htree_fill_tree(struct file *dir_file, __u32 start_hash, start_hash, start_minor_hash)); dir = file_inode(dir_file); if (!(ext4_test_inode_flag(dir, EXT4_INODE_INDEX))) { - hinfo.hash_version = EXT4_SB(dir->i_sb)->s_def_hash_version; + if (ext4_hash_in_dirent(dir)) + hinfo.hash_version = DX_HASH_SIPHASH; + else + hinfo.hash_version = + EXT4_SB(dir->i_sb)->s_def_hash_version; if (hinfo.hash_version <= DX_HASH_TEA) hinfo.hash_version += EXT4_SB(dir->i_sb)->s_hash_unsigned; @@ -1231,7 +1269,10 @@ static int dx_make_map(struct inode *dir, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de, while ((char *) de < base + blocksize) { if (de->name_len && de->inode) { - ext4fs_dirhash(dir, de->name, de->name_len, &h); + if (ext4_hash_in_dirent(dir)) + h.hash = EXT4_DIRENT_HASH(de); + else + ext4fs_dirhash(dir, de->name, de->name_len, &h); map_tail--; map_tail->hash = h.hash; map_tail->offs = ((char *) de - base)>>2; @@ -1295,31 +1336,47 @@ static void dx_insert_block(struct dx_frame *frame, u32 hash, ext4_lblk_t block) * Returns: 0 if the directory entry matches, more than 0 if it * doesn't match or less than zero on error. */ -int ext4_ci_compare(const struct inode *parent, const struct qstr *name, - const struct qstr *entry, bool quick) +static int ext4_ci_compare(const struct inode *parent, const struct qstr *name, + u8 *de_name, size_t de_name_len, bool quick) { const struct super_block *sb = parent->i_sb; const struct unicode_map *um = sb->s_encoding; + struct fscrypt_str decrypted_name = FSTR_INIT(NULL, de_name_len); + struct qstr entry = QSTR_INIT(de_name, de_name_len); int ret; - if (quick) - ret = utf8_strncasecmp_folded(um, name, entry); - else - ret = utf8_strncasecmp(um, name, entry); + if (IS_ENCRYPTED(parent)) { + const struct fscrypt_str encrypted_name = + FSTR_INIT(de_name, de_name_len); + decrypted_name.name = kmalloc(de_name_len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!decrypted_name.name) + return -ENOMEM; + ret = fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr(parent, 0, 0, &encrypted_name, + &decrypted_name); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + entry.name = decrypted_name.name; + entry.len = decrypted_name.len; + } + + if (quick) + ret = utf8_strncasecmp_folded(um, name, &entry); + else + ret = utf8_strncasecmp(um, name, &entry); if (ret < 0) { /* Handle invalid character sequence as either an error * or as an opaque byte sequence. */ if (sb_has_enc_strict_mode(sb)) - return -EINVAL; - - if (name->len != entry->len) - return 1; - - return !!memcmp(name->name, entry->name, name->len); + ret = -EINVAL; + else if (name->len != entry.len) + ret = 1; + else + ret = !!memcmp(name->name, entry.name, entry.len); } - +out: + kfree(decrypted_name.name); return ret; } @@ -1355,14 +1412,11 @@ void ext4_fname_setup_ci_filename(struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *iname, * * Return: %true if the directory entry matches, otherwise %false. */ -static inline bool ext4_match(const struct inode *parent, +static bool ext4_match(struct inode *parent, const struct ext4_filename *fname, - const struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de) + struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de) { struct fscrypt_name f; -#ifdef CONFIG_UNICODE - const struct qstr entry = {.name = de->name, .len = de->name_len}; -#endif if (!de->inode) return false; @@ -1378,10 +1432,23 @@ static inline bool ext4_match(const struct inode *parent, if (fname->cf_name.name) { struct qstr cf = {.name = fname->cf_name.name, .len = fname->cf_name.len}; - return !ext4_ci_compare(parent, &cf, &entry, true); + if (IS_ENCRYPTED(parent)) { + struct dx_hash_info hinfo; + + hinfo.hash_version = DX_HASH_SIPHASH; + hinfo.seed = NULL; + ext4fs_dirhash(parent, fname->cf_name.name, + fname_len(fname), &hinfo); + if (hinfo.hash != EXT4_DIRENT_HASH(de) || + hinfo.minor_hash != + EXT4_DIRENT_MINOR_HASH(de)) + return 0; + } + return !ext4_ci_compare(parent, &cf, de->name, + de->name_len, true); } - return !ext4_ci_compare(parent, fname->usr_fname, &entry, - false); + return !ext4_ci_compare(parent, fname->usr_fname, de->name, + de->name_len, false); } #endif @@ -1776,7 +1843,8 @@ struct dentry *ext4_get_parent(struct dentry *child) * Returns pointer to last entry moved. */ static struct ext4_dir_entry_2 * -dx_move_dirents(char *from, char *to, struct dx_map_entry *map, int count, +dx_move_dirents(struct inode *dir, char *from, char *to, + struct dx_map_entry *map, int count, unsigned blocksize) { unsigned rec_len = 0; @@ -1784,7 +1852,8 @@ dx_move_dirents(char *from, char *to, struct dx_map_entry *map, int count, while (count--) { struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) (from + (map->offs<<2)); - rec_len = EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(de->name_len); + rec_len = ext4_dir_rec_len(de->name_len, dir); + memcpy (to, de, rec_len); ((struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) to)->rec_len = ext4_rec_len_to_disk(rec_len, blocksize); @@ -1799,7 +1868,8 @@ dx_move_dirents(char *from, char *to, struct dx_map_entry *map, int count, * Compact each dir entry in the range to the minimal rec_len. * Returns pointer to last entry in range. */ -static struct ext4_dir_entry_2* dx_pack_dirents(char *base, unsigned blocksize) +static struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *dx_pack_dirents(struct inode *dir, char *base, + unsigned int blocksize) { struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *next, *to, *prev, *de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) base; unsigned rec_len = 0; @@ -1808,7 +1878,7 @@ static struct ext4_dir_entry_2* dx_pack_dirents(char *base, unsigned blocksize) while ((char*)de < base + blocksize) { next = ext4_next_entry(de, blocksize); if (de->inode && de->name_len) { - rec_len = EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(de->name_len); + rec_len = ext4_dir_rec_len(de->name_len, dir); if (de > to) memmove(to, de, rec_len); to->rec_len = ext4_rec_len_to_disk(rec_len, blocksize); @@ -1899,9 +1969,9 @@ static struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *do_split(handle_t *handle, struct inode *dir, hash2, split, count-split)); /* Fancy dance to stay within two buffers */ - de2 = dx_move_dirents(data1, data2, map + split, count - split, + de2 = dx_move_dirents(dir, data1, data2, map + split, count - split, blocksize); - de = dx_pack_dirents(data1, blocksize); + de = dx_pack_dirents(dir, data1, blocksize); de->rec_len = ext4_rec_len_to_disk(data1 + (blocksize - csum_size) - (char *) de, blocksize); @@ -1949,7 +2019,7 @@ int ext4_find_dest_de(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 **dest_de) { struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de; - unsigned short reclen = EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(fname_len(fname)); + unsigned short reclen = ext4_dir_rec_len(fname_len(fname), dir); int nlen, rlen; unsigned int offset = 0; char *top; @@ -1962,7 +2032,7 @@ int ext4_find_dest_de(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode, return -EFSCORRUPTED; if (ext4_match(dir, fname, de)) return -EEXIST; - nlen = EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(de->name_len); + nlen = ext4_dir_rec_len(de->name_len, dir); rlen = ext4_rec_len_from_disk(de->rec_len, buf_size); if ((de->inode ? rlen - nlen : rlen) >= reclen) break; @@ -1976,7 +2046,8 @@ int ext4_find_dest_de(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode, return 0; } -void ext4_insert_dentry(struct inode *inode, +void ext4_insert_dentry(struct inode *dir, + struct inode *inode, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de, int buf_size, struct ext4_filename *fname) @@ -1984,7 +2055,7 @@ void ext4_insert_dentry(struct inode *inode, int nlen, rlen; - nlen = EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(de->name_len); + nlen = ext4_dir_rec_len(de->name_len, dir); rlen = ext4_rec_len_from_disk(de->rec_len, buf_size); if (de->inode) { struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de1 = @@ -1998,6 +2069,17 @@ void ext4_insert_dentry(struct inode *inode, ext4_set_de_type(inode->i_sb, de, inode->i_mode); de->name_len = fname_len(fname); memcpy(de->name, fname_name(fname), fname_len(fname)); + if (ext4_hash_in_dirent(dir)) { + struct dx_hash_info hinfo; + + hinfo.hash_version = DX_HASH_SIPHASH; + hinfo.seed = NULL; + ext4fs_dirhash(dir, fname_usr_name(fname), + fname_len(fname), &hinfo); + EXT4_DIRENT_HASHES(de)->hash = cpu_to_le32(hinfo.hash); + EXT4_DIRENT_HASHES(de)->minor_hash = + cpu_to_le32(hinfo.minor_hash); + } } /* @@ -2034,7 +2116,7 @@ static int add_dirent_to_buf(handle_t *handle, struct ext4_filename *fname, } /* By now the buffer is marked for journaling */ - ext4_insert_dentry(inode, de, blocksize, fname); + ext4_insert_dentry(dir, inode, de, blocksize, fname); /* * XXX shouldn't update any times until successful @@ -2126,11 +2208,16 @@ static int make_indexed_dir(handle_t *handle, struct ext4_filename *fname, /* Initialize the root; the dot dirents already exist */ de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) (&root->dotdot); - de->rec_len = ext4_rec_len_to_disk(blocksize - EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(2), - blocksize); + de->rec_len = ext4_rec_len_to_disk( + blocksize - ext4_dir_rec_len(2, NULL), blocksize); memset (&root->info, 0, sizeof(root->info)); root->info.info_length = sizeof(root->info); - root->info.hash_version = EXT4_SB(dir->i_sb)->s_def_hash_version; + if (ext4_hash_in_dirent(dir)) + root->info.hash_version = DX_HASH_SIPHASH; + else + root->info.hash_version = + EXT4_SB(dir->i_sb)->s_def_hash_version; + entries = root->entries; dx_set_block(entries, 1); dx_set_count(entries, 1); @@ -2141,7 +2228,12 @@ static int make_indexed_dir(handle_t *handle, struct ext4_filename *fname, if (fname->hinfo.hash_version <= DX_HASH_TEA) fname->hinfo.hash_version += EXT4_SB(dir->i_sb)->s_hash_unsigned; fname->hinfo.seed = EXT4_SB(dir->i_sb)->s_hash_seed; - ext4fs_dirhash(dir, fname_name(fname), fname_len(fname), &fname->hinfo); + if (ext4_hash_in_dirent(dir)) + ext4fs_dirhash(dir, fname_usr_name(fname), + fname_len(fname), &fname->hinfo); + else + ext4fs_dirhash(dir, fname_name(fname), + fname_len(fname), &fname->hinfo); memset(frames, 0, sizeof(frames)); frame = frames; @@ -2718,7 +2810,7 @@ struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *ext4_init_dot_dotdot(struct inode *inode, { de->inode = cpu_to_le32(inode->i_ino); de->name_len = 1; - de->rec_len = ext4_rec_len_to_disk(EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(de->name_len), + de->rec_len = ext4_rec_len_to_disk(ext4_dir_rec_len(de->name_len, NULL), blocksize); strcpy(de->name, "."); ext4_set_de_type(inode->i_sb, de, S_IFDIR); @@ -2728,11 +2820,12 @@ struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *ext4_init_dot_dotdot(struct inode *inode, de->name_len = 2; if (!dotdot_real_len) de->rec_len = ext4_rec_len_to_disk(blocksize - - (csum_size + EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(1)), + (csum_size + ext4_dir_rec_len(1, NULL)), blocksize); else de->rec_len = ext4_rec_len_to_disk( - EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(de->name_len), blocksize); + ext4_dir_rec_len(de->name_len, NULL), + blocksize); strcpy(de->name, ".."); ext4_set_de_type(inode->i_sb, de, S_IFDIR); @@ -2857,7 +2950,8 @@ bool ext4_empty_dir(struct inode *inode) } sb = inode->i_sb; - if (inode->i_size < EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(1) + EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(2)) { + if (inode->i_size < ext4_dir_rec_len(1, NULL) + + ext4_dir_rec_len(2, NULL)) { EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "invalid size"); return true; } diff --git a/fs/ext4/super.c b/fs/ext4/super.c index f5e87c9e5f50..3d7656c65bfa 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/super.c +++ b/fs/ext4/super.c @@ -3972,12 +3972,6 @@ static int ext4_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) struct unicode_map *encoding; __u16 encoding_flags; - if (ext4_has_feature_encrypt(sb)) { - ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, - "Can't mount with encoding and encryption"); - goto failed_mount; - } - if (ext4_sb_read_encoding(es, &encoding_info, &encoding_flags)) { ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, diff --git a/fs/ext4/sysfs.c b/fs/ext4/sysfs.c index 477c79d147f3..abff1784ce27 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/sysfs.c +++ b/fs/ext4/sysfs.c @@ -250,6 +250,7 @@ EXT4_ATTR_FEATURE(casefold); EXT4_ATTR_FEATURE(verity); #endif EXT4_ATTR_FEATURE(metadata_csum_seed); +EXT4_ATTR_FEATURE(encrypted_casefold); static struct attribute *ext4_feat_attrs[] = { ATTR_LIST(lazy_itable_init), @@ -266,6 +267,7 @@ static struct attribute *ext4_feat_attrs[] = { ATTR_LIST(verity), #endif ATTR_LIST(metadata_csum_seed), + ATTR_LIST(encrypted_casefold), NULL, }; ATTRIBUTE_GROUPS(ext4_feat); From 7f4133a55e201a09af0855b65202c0b09f7688be Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Rosenberg Date: Fri, 19 Mar 2021 07:34:14 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0680/1091] BACKPORT: ext4: optimize match for casefolded encrypted dirs [ Upstream commit 1ae98e295fa2577fb5e492200c58d10230e00e99 ] Matching names with casefolded encrypting directories requires decrypting entries to confirm case since we are case preserving. We can avoid needing to decrypt if our hash values don't match. Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210319073414.1381041-3-drosen@google.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Change-Id: Ic74307e53dc59ec47575f33c56e291ccd137520d --- fs/ext4/ext4.h | 17 ++++++++-------- fs/ext4/namei.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------- 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/ext4.h b/fs/ext4/ext4.h index 004982cbaabf..36466976f0b2 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/ext4.h +++ b/fs/ext4/ext4.h @@ -2406,9 +2406,9 @@ extern unsigned ext4_free_clusters_after_init(struct super_block *sb, ext4_fsblk_t ext4_inode_to_goal_block(struct inode *); #ifdef CONFIG_UNICODE -extern void ext4_fname_setup_ci_filename(struct inode *dir, +extern int ext4_fname_setup_ci_filename(struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *iname, - struct fscrypt_str *fname); + struct ext4_filename *fname); #endif #ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION @@ -2439,9 +2439,9 @@ static inline int ext4_fname_setup_filename(struct inode *dir, ext4_fname_from_fscrypt_name(fname, &name); #ifdef CONFIG_UNICODE - ext4_fname_setup_ci_filename(dir, iname, &fname->cf_name); + err = ext4_fname_setup_ci_filename(dir, iname, fname); #endif - return 0; + return err; } static inline int ext4_fname_prepare_lookup(struct inode *dir, @@ -2458,9 +2458,9 @@ static inline int ext4_fname_prepare_lookup(struct inode *dir, ext4_fname_from_fscrypt_name(fname, &name); #ifdef CONFIG_UNICODE - ext4_fname_setup_ci_filename(dir, &dentry->d_name, &fname->cf_name); + err = ext4_fname_setup_ci_filename(dir, &dentry->d_name, fname); #endif - return 0; + return err; } static inline void ext4_fname_free_filename(struct ext4_filename *fname) @@ -2485,15 +2485,16 @@ static inline int ext4_fname_setup_filename(struct inode *dir, int lookup, struct ext4_filename *fname) { + int err = 0; fname->usr_fname = iname; fname->disk_name.name = (unsigned char *) iname->name; fname->disk_name.len = iname->len; #ifdef CONFIG_UNICODE - ext4_fname_setup_ci_filename(dir, iname, &fname->cf_name); + err = ext4_fname_setup_ci_filename(dir, iname, fname); #endif - return 0; + return err; } static inline int ext4_fname_prepare_lookup(struct inode *dir, diff --git a/fs/ext4/namei.c b/fs/ext4/namei.c index cb80da2cbb25..3e5072b4afb3 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/namei.c +++ b/fs/ext4/namei.c @@ -799,7 +799,9 @@ dx_probe(struct ext4_filename *fname, struct inode *dir, if (hinfo->hash_version <= DX_HASH_TEA) hinfo->hash_version += EXT4_SB(dir->i_sb)->s_hash_unsigned; hinfo->seed = EXT4_SB(dir->i_sb)->s_hash_seed; - if (fname && fname_name(fname)) + /* hash is already computed for encrypted casefolded directory */ + if (fname && fname_name(fname) && + !(IS_ENCRYPTED(dir) && IS_CASEFOLDED(dir))) ext4fs_dirhash(dir, fname_name(fname), fname_len(fname), hinfo); hash = hinfo->hash; @@ -1380,19 +1382,21 @@ out: return ret; } -void ext4_fname_setup_ci_filename(struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *iname, - struct fscrypt_str *cf_name) +int ext4_fname_setup_ci_filename(struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *iname, + struct ext4_filename *name) { + struct fscrypt_str *cf_name = &name->cf_name; + struct dx_hash_info *hinfo = &name->hinfo; int len; if (!needs_casefold(dir)) { cf_name->name = NULL; - return; + return 0; } cf_name->name = kmalloc(EXT4_NAME_LEN, GFP_NOFS); if (!cf_name->name) - return; + return -ENOMEM; len = utf8_casefold(dir->i_sb->s_encoding, iname, cf_name->name, @@ -1400,10 +1404,18 @@ void ext4_fname_setup_ci_filename(struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *iname, if (len <= 0) { kfree(cf_name->name); cf_name->name = NULL; - return; } cf_name->len = (unsigned) len; + if (!IS_ENCRYPTED(dir)) + return 0; + hinfo->hash_version = DX_HASH_SIPHASH; + hinfo->seed = NULL; + if (cf_name->name) + ext4fs_dirhash(dir, cf_name->name, cf_name->len, hinfo); + else + ext4fs_dirhash(dir, iname->name, iname->len, hinfo); + return 0; } #endif @@ -1433,16 +1445,12 @@ static bool ext4_match(struct inode *parent, struct qstr cf = {.name = fname->cf_name.name, .len = fname->cf_name.len}; if (IS_ENCRYPTED(parent)) { - struct dx_hash_info hinfo; + if (fname->hinfo.hash != EXT4_DIRENT_HASH(de) || + fname->hinfo.minor_hash != + EXT4_DIRENT_MINOR_HASH(de)) { - hinfo.hash_version = DX_HASH_SIPHASH; - hinfo.seed = NULL; - ext4fs_dirhash(parent, fname->cf_name.name, - fname_len(fname), &hinfo); - if (hinfo.hash != EXT4_DIRENT_HASH(de) || - hinfo.minor_hash != - EXT4_DIRENT_MINOR_HASH(de)) return 0; + } } return !ext4_ci_compare(parent, &cf, de->name, de->name_len, true); @@ -2070,15 +2078,11 @@ void ext4_insert_dentry(struct inode *dir, de->name_len = fname_len(fname); memcpy(de->name, fname_name(fname), fname_len(fname)); if (ext4_hash_in_dirent(dir)) { - struct dx_hash_info hinfo; + struct dx_hash_info *hinfo = &fname->hinfo; - hinfo.hash_version = DX_HASH_SIPHASH; - hinfo.seed = NULL; - ext4fs_dirhash(dir, fname_usr_name(fname), - fname_len(fname), &hinfo); - EXT4_DIRENT_HASHES(de)->hash = cpu_to_le32(hinfo.hash); + EXT4_DIRENT_HASHES(de)->hash = cpu_to_le32(hinfo->hash); EXT4_DIRENT_HASHES(de)->minor_hash = - cpu_to_le32(hinfo.minor_hash); + cpu_to_le32(hinfo->minor_hash); } } @@ -2228,10 +2232,9 @@ static int make_indexed_dir(handle_t *handle, struct ext4_filename *fname, if (fname->hinfo.hash_version <= DX_HASH_TEA) fname->hinfo.hash_version += EXT4_SB(dir->i_sb)->s_hash_unsigned; fname->hinfo.seed = EXT4_SB(dir->i_sb)->s_hash_seed; - if (ext4_hash_in_dirent(dir)) - ext4fs_dirhash(dir, fname_usr_name(fname), - fname_len(fname), &fname->hinfo); - else + + /* casefolded encrypted hashes are computed on fname setup */ + if (!ext4_hash_in_dirent(dir)) ext4fs_dirhash(dir, fname_name(fname), fname_len(fname), &fname->hinfo); From 4adf82828478dea8c1a3fff5fb730a68f29f3291 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Rosenberg Date: Sat, 22 May 2021 00:41:32 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0681/1091] BACKPORT: ext4: fix no-key deletion for encrypt+casefold [ Upstream commit 63e7f1289389c8dff3c766f01ac1cc1c874b2ba5 ] commit 471fbbea7ff7 ("ext4: handle casefolding with encryption") is missing a few checks for the encryption key which are needed to support deleting enrypted casefolded files when the key is not present. This bug made it impossible to delete encrypted+casefolded directories without the encryption key, due to errors like: W : EXT4-fs warning (device vdc): __ext4fs_dirhash:270: inode #49202: comm Binder:378_4: Siphash requires key Repro steps in kvm-xfstests test appliance: mkfs.ext4 -F -E encoding=utf8 -O encrypt /dev/vdc mount /vdc mkdir /vdc/dir chattr +F /vdc/dir keyid=$(head -c 64 /dev/zero | xfs_io -c add_enckey /vdc | awk '{print $NF}') xfs_io -c "set_encpolicy $keyid" /vdc/dir for i in `seq 1 100`; do mkdir /vdc/dir/$i done xfs_io -c "rm_enckey $keyid" /vdc rm -rf /vdc/dir # fails with the bug Fixes: 471fbbea7ff7 ("ext4: handle casefolding with encryption") Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210522004132.2142563-1-drosen@google.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Change-Id: Idbf9a46ebac38df02603c13206b41459762d2b8b --- fs/ext4/namei.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/namei.c b/fs/ext4/namei.c index 3e5072b4afb3..6a2d730ec746 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/namei.c +++ b/fs/ext4/namei.c @@ -1389,7 +1389,8 @@ int ext4_fname_setup_ci_filename(struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *iname, struct dx_hash_info *hinfo = &name->hinfo; int len; - if (!needs_casefold(dir)) { + if (!IS_CASEFOLDED(dir) || !dir->i_sb->s_encoding || + (IS_ENCRYPTED(dir) && !fscrypt_has_encryption_key(dir))) { cf_name->name = NULL; return 0; } @@ -1440,7 +1441,8 @@ static bool ext4_match(struct inode *parent, #endif #ifdef CONFIG_UNICODE - if (needs_casefold(parent)) { + if (parent->i_sb->s_encoding && IS_CASEFOLDED(parent) && + (!IS_ENCRYPTED(parent) || fscrypt_has_encryption_key(parent))) { if (fname->cf_name.name) { struct qstr cf = {.name = fname->cf_name.name, .len = fname->cf_name.len}; From 24ee3133e7cd374d533768bdd7563ac6490fd216 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Rosenberg Date: Thu, 3 Jun 2021 09:48:49 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0682/1091] BACKPORT: ext4: Only advertise encrypted_casefold when encryption and unicode are enabled [ Upstream commit e71f99f2dfb45f4e7203a0732e85f71ef1d04dab ] Encrypted casefolding is only supported when both encryption and casefolding are both enabled in the config. Fixes: 471fbbea7ff7 ("ext4: handle casefolding with encryption") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.13+ Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210603094849.314342-1-drosen@google.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Change-Id: I4655b3aab60006ea03fb3454a0a833634546373b --- fs/ext4/sysfs.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/ext4/sysfs.c b/fs/ext4/sysfs.c index abff1784ce27..4508e8b7c8d7 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/sysfs.c +++ b/fs/ext4/sysfs.c @@ -250,7 +250,9 @@ EXT4_ATTR_FEATURE(casefold); EXT4_ATTR_FEATURE(verity); #endif EXT4_ATTR_FEATURE(metadata_csum_seed); +#if defined(CONFIG_UNICODE) && defined(CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION) EXT4_ATTR_FEATURE(encrypted_casefold); +#endif static struct attribute *ext4_feat_attrs[] = { ATTR_LIST(lazy_itable_init), @@ -267,7 +269,9 @@ static struct attribute *ext4_feat_attrs[] = { ATTR_LIST(verity), #endif ATTR_LIST(metadata_csum_seed), +#if defined(CONFIG_UNICODE) && defined(CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION) ATTR_LIST(encrypted_casefold), +#endif NULL, }; ATTRIBUTE_GROUPS(ext4_feat); From 1765fa52678138928a5d3a8d90aa836d258b776f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ye Bin Date: Thu, 14 Apr 2022 10:52:23 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0683/1091] UPSTREAM: ext4: fix use-after-free in ext4_rename_dir_prepare commit 0be698ecbe4471fcad80e81ec6a05001421041b3 upstream. We got issue as follows: EXT4-fs (loop0): mounted filesystem without journal. Opts: ,errors=continue ext4_get_first_dir_block: bh->b_data=0xffff88810bee6000 len=34478 ext4_get_first_dir_block: *parent_de=0xffff88810beee6ae bh->b_data=0xffff88810bee6000 ext4_rename_dir_prepare: [1] parent_de=0xffff88810beee6ae ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ext4_rename_dir_prepare+0x152/0x220 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88810beee6ae by task rep/1895 CPU: 13 PID: 1895 Comm: rep Not tainted 5.10.0+ #241 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xbe/0xf9 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1e/0x220 kasan_report.cold+0x37/0x7f ext4_rename_dir_prepare+0x152/0x220 ext4_rename+0xf44/0x1ad0 ext4_rename2+0x11c/0x170 vfs_rename+0xa84/0x1440 do_renameat2+0x683/0x8f0 __x64_sys_renameat+0x53/0x60 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x7f45a6fc41c9 RSP: 002b:00007ffc5a470218 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000108 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f45a6fc41c9 RDX: 0000000000000005 RSI: 0000000020000180 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 00007ffc5a470240 R08: 00007ffc5a470160 R09: 0000000020000080 R10: 00000000200001c0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400bb0 R13: 00007ffc5a470320 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 The buggy address belongs to the page: page:00000000440015ce refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x1 pfn:0x10beee flags: 0x200000000000000() raw: 0200000000000000 ffffea00043ff4c8 ffffea0004325608 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88810beee580: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ffff88810beee600: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff >ffff88810beee680: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ^ ffff88810beee700: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ffff88810beee780: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ================================================================== Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint ext4_rename_dir_prepare: [2] parent_de->inode=3537895424 ext4_rename_dir_prepare: [3] dir=0xffff888124170140 ext4_rename_dir_prepare: [4] ino=2 ext4_rename_dir_prepare: ent->dir->i_ino=2 parent=-757071872 Reason is first directory entry which 'rec_len' is 34478, then will get illegal parent entry. Now, we do not check directory entry after read directory block in 'ext4_get_first_dir_block'. To solve this issue, check directory entry in 'ext4_get_first_dir_block'. [ Trigger an ext4_error() instead of just warning if the directory is missing a '.' or '..' entry. Also make sure we return an error code if the file system is corrupted. -TYT ] Signed-off-by: Ye Bin Reviewed-by: Jan Kara Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220414025223.4113128-1-yebin10@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman (cherry picked from commit eaecf7ebfd5dd09038a80b14be46b844f54cfc5c) Change-Id: Ibdaf266e6444efd9cd8465cb5a7614d437e82ce2 --- fs/ext4/namei.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/namei.c b/fs/ext4/namei.c index 6a2d730ec746..a31d8da1acea 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/namei.c +++ b/fs/ext4/namei.c @@ -3557,6 +3557,9 @@ static struct buffer_head *ext4_get_first_dir_block(handle_t *handle, struct buffer_head *bh; if (!ext4_has_inline_data(inode)) { + struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de; + unsigned int offset; + /* The first directory block must not be a hole, so * treat it as DIRENT_HTREE */ @@ -3565,9 +3568,30 @@ static struct buffer_head *ext4_get_first_dir_block(handle_t *handle, *retval = PTR_ERR(bh); return NULL; } - *parent_de = ext4_next_entry( - (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *)bh->b_data, - inode->i_sb->s_blocksize); + + de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) bh->b_data; + if (ext4_check_dir_entry(inode, NULL, de, bh, bh->b_data, + bh->b_size, 0) || + le32_to_cpu(de->inode) != inode->i_ino || + strcmp(".", de->name)) { + EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "directory missing '.'"); + brelse(bh); + *retval = -EFSCORRUPTED; + return NULL; + } + offset = ext4_rec_len_from_disk(de->rec_len, + inode->i_sb->s_blocksize); + de = ext4_next_entry(de, inode->i_sb->s_blocksize); + if (ext4_check_dir_entry(inode, NULL, de, bh, bh->b_data, + bh->b_size, offset) || + le32_to_cpu(de->inode) == 0 || strcmp("..", de->name)) { + EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "directory missing '..'"); + brelse(bh); + *retval = -EFSCORRUPTED; + return NULL; + } + *parent_de = de; + return bh; } From 1dd92ce7e8406507c839685bbe511672c0123f7b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jan Kara Date: Wed, 18 May 2022 11:33:28 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0684/1091] UPSTREAM: ext4: verify dir block before splitting it commit 46c116b920ebec58031f0a78c5ea9599b0d2a371 upstream. Before splitting a directory block verify its directory entries are sane so that the splitting code does not access memory it should not. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jan Kara Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220518093332.13986-1-jack@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman (cherry picked from commit 17034d45ec443fb0e3c0e7297f9cd10f70446064) Change-Id: Iaaecaddd868150834b0cdef0f0889a39c2226e41 --- fs/ext4/namei.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/namei.c b/fs/ext4/namei.c index a31d8da1acea..20c3d7bdac2e 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/namei.c +++ b/fs/ext4/namei.c @@ -273,9 +273,9 @@ static struct dx_frame *dx_probe(struct ext4_filename *fname, struct dx_hash_info *hinfo, struct dx_frame *frame); static void dx_release(struct dx_frame *frames); -static int dx_make_map(struct inode *dir, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de, - unsigned blocksize, struct dx_hash_info *hinfo, - struct dx_map_entry map[]); +static int dx_make_map(struct inode *dir, struct buffer_head *bh, + struct dx_hash_info *hinfo, + struct dx_map_entry *map_tail); static void dx_sort_map(struct dx_map_entry *map, unsigned count); static struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *dx_move_dirents(struct inode *dir, char *from, char *to, struct dx_map_entry *offsets, @@ -1261,15 +1261,23 @@ static inline int search_dirblock(struct buffer_head *bh, * Create map of hash values, offsets, and sizes, stored at end of block. * Returns number of entries mapped. */ -static int dx_make_map(struct inode *dir, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de, - unsigned blocksize, struct dx_hash_info *hinfo, +static int dx_make_map(struct inode *dir, struct buffer_head *bh, + struct dx_hash_info *hinfo, struct dx_map_entry *map_tail) { int count = 0; - char *base = (char *) de; + struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *)bh->b_data; + unsigned int buflen = bh->b_size; + char *base = bh->b_data; struct dx_hash_info h = *hinfo; - while ((char *) de < base + blocksize) { + if (ext4_has_metadata_csum(dir->i_sb)) + buflen -= sizeof(struct ext4_dir_entry_tail); + + while ((char *) de < base + buflen) { + if (ext4_check_dir_entry(dir, NULL, de, bh, base, buflen, + ((char *)de) - base)) + return -EFSCORRUPTED; if (de->name_len && de->inode) { if (ext4_hash_in_dirent(dir)) h.hash = EXT4_DIRENT_HASH(de); @@ -1282,8 +1290,7 @@ static int dx_make_map(struct inode *dir, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de, count++; cond_resched(); } - /* XXX: do we need to check rec_len == 0 case? -Chris */ - de = ext4_next_entry(de, blocksize); + de = ext4_next_entry(de, dir->i_sb->s_blocksize); } return count; } @@ -1946,8 +1953,11 @@ static struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *do_split(handle_t *handle, struct inode *dir, /* create map in the end of data2 block */ map = (struct dx_map_entry *) (data2 + blocksize); - count = dx_make_map(dir, (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) data1, - blocksize, hinfo, map); + count = dx_make_map(dir, *bh, hinfo, map); + if (count < 0) { + err = count; + goto journal_error; + } map -= count; dx_sort_map(map, count); /* Ensure that neither split block is over half full */ From 4143503b486afa8cac2a2c0550fd240593a08834 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christian Borntraeger Date: Mon, 30 May 2022 11:27:06 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0685/1091] s390/mm: use non-quiescing sske for KVM switch to keyed guest commit 3ae11dbcfac906a8c3a480e98660a823130dc16a upstream. The switch to a keyed guest does not require a classic sske as the other guest CPUs are not accessing the key before the switch is complete. By using the NQ SSKE things are faster especially with multiple guests. Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger Suggested-by: Janis Schoetterl-Glausch Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220530092706.11637-3-borntraeger@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/s390/mm/pgtable.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/s390/mm/pgtable.c b/arch/s390/mm/pgtable.c index 4438c00acb65..28ca07360e97 100644 --- a/arch/s390/mm/pgtable.c +++ b/arch/s390/mm/pgtable.c @@ -716,7 +716,7 @@ void ptep_zap_key(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr, pte_t *ptep) pgste_val(pgste) |= PGSTE_GR_BIT | PGSTE_GC_BIT; ptev = pte_val(*ptep); if (!(ptev & _PAGE_INVALID) && (ptev & _PAGE_WRITE)) - page_set_storage_key(ptev & PAGE_MASK, PAGE_DEFAULT_KEY, 1); + page_set_storage_key(ptev & PAGE_MASK, PAGE_DEFAULT_KEY, 0); pgste_set_unlock(ptep, pgste); preempt_enable(); } From 2577d67a9a8aa5ee5e3963379f63e427a916de08 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mike Snitzer Date: Tue, 21 Jun 2022 12:35:04 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 0686/1091] dm: remove special-casing of bio-based immutable singleton target on NVMe Commit 9c37de297f6590937f95a28bec1b7ac68a38618f upstream. There is no benefit to DM special-casing NVMe. Remove all code used to establish DM_TYPE_NVME_BIO_BASED. Also, remove 3 'struct mapped_device *md' variables in __map_bio() which masked the same variable that is available within __map_bio()'s scope. Tested-by: Guenter Roeck Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/md/dm-table.c | 32 +-------------- drivers/md/dm.c | 73 ++++------------------------------- include/linux/device-mapper.h | 1 - 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 97 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-table.c b/drivers/md/dm-table.c index 06b382304d92..81bc36a43b32 100644 --- a/drivers/md/dm-table.c +++ b/drivers/md/dm-table.c @@ -872,8 +872,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(dm_consume_args); static bool __table_type_bio_based(enum dm_queue_mode table_type) { return (table_type == DM_TYPE_BIO_BASED || - table_type == DM_TYPE_DAX_BIO_BASED || - table_type == DM_TYPE_NVME_BIO_BASED); + table_type == DM_TYPE_DAX_BIO_BASED); } static bool __table_type_request_based(enum dm_queue_mode table_type) @@ -929,8 +928,6 @@ bool dm_table_supports_dax(struct dm_table *t, return true; } -static bool dm_table_does_not_support_partial_completion(struct dm_table *t); - static int device_is_rq_stackable(struct dm_target *ti, struct dm_dev *dev, sector_t start, sector_t len, void *data) { @@ -960,7 +957,6 @@ static int dm_table_determine_type(struct dm_table *t) goto verify_bio_based; } BUG_ON(t->type == DM_TYPE_DAX_BIO_BASED); - BUG_ON(t->type == DM_TYPE_NVME_BIO_BASED); goto verify_rq_based; } @@ -999,15 +995,6 @@ verify_bio_based: if (dm_table_supports_dax(t, device_not_dax_capable, &page_size) || (list_empty(devices) && live_md_type == DM_TYPE_DAX_BIO_BASED)) { t->type = DM_TYPE_DAX_BIO_BASED; - } else { - /* Check if upgrading to NVMe bio-based is valid or required */ - tgt = dm_table_get_immutable_target(t); - if (tgt && !tgt->max_io_len && dm_table_does_not_support_partial_completion(t)) { - t->type = DM_TYPE_NVME_BIO_BASED; - goto verify_rq_based; /* must be stacked directly on NVMe (blk-mq) */ - } else if (list_empty(devices) && live_md_type == DM_TYPE_NVME_BIO_BASED) { - t->type = DM_TYPE_NVME_BIO_BASED; - } } return 0; } @@ -1024,8 +1011,7 @@ verify_rq_based: * (e.g. request completion process for partial completion.) */ if (t->num_targets > 1) { - DMERR("%s DM doesn't support multiple targets", - t->type == DM_TYPE_NVME_BIO_BASED ? "nvme bio-based" : "request-based"); + DMERR("request-based DM doesn't support multiple targets"); return -EINVAL; } @@ -1714,20 +1700,6 @@ static int device_is_not_random(struct dm_target *ti, struct dm_dev *dev, return q && !blk_queue_add_random(q); } -static int device_is_partial_completion(struct dm_target *ti, struct dm_dev *dev, - sector_t start, sector_t len, void *data) -{ - char b[BDEVNAME_SIZE]; - - /* For now, NVMe devices are the only devices of this class */ - return (strncmp(bdevname(dev->bdev, b), "nvme", 4) != 0); -} - -static bool dm_table_does_not_support_partial_completion(struct dm_table *t) -{ - return !dm_table_any_dev_attr(t, device_is_partial_completion, NULL); -} - static int device_not_write_same_capable(struct dm_target *ti, struct dm_dev *dev, sector_t start, sector_t len, void *data) { diff --git a/drivers/md/dm.c b/drivers/md/dm.c index 37b8bb4d80f0..77e28f77c59f 100644 --- a/drivers/md/dm.c +++ b/drivers/md/dm.c @@ -1000,7 +1000,7 @@ static void clone_endio(struct bio *bio) struct mapped_device *md = tio->io->md; dm_endio_fn endio = tio->ti->type->end_io; - if (unlikely(error == BLK_STS_TARGET) && md->type != DM_TYPE_NVME_BIO_BASED) { + if (unlikely(error == BLK_STS_TARGET)) { if (bio_op(bio) == REQ_OP_DISCARD && !bio->bi_disk->queue->limits.max_discard_sectors) disable_discard(md); @@ -1325,7 +1325,6 @@ static blk_qc_t __map_bio(struct dm_target_io *tio) sector = clone->bi_iter.bi_sector; if (unlikely(swap_bios_limit(ti, clone))) { - struct mapped_device *md = io->md; int latch = get_swap_bios(); if (unlikely(latch != md->swap_bios)) __set_swap_bios_limit(md, latch); @@ -1340,24 +1339,17 @@ static blk_qc_t __map_bio(struct dm_target_io *tio) /* the bio has been remapped so dispatch it */ trace_block_bio_remap(clone->bi_disk->queue, clone, bio_dev(io->orig_bio), sector); - if (md->type == DM_TYPE_NVME_BIO_BASED) - ret = direct_make_request(clone); - else - ret = generic_make_request(clone); + ret = generic_make_request(clone); break; case DM_MAPIO_KILL: - if (unlikely(swap_bios_limit(ti, clone))) { - struct mapped_device *md = io->md; + if (unlikely(swap_bios_limit(ti, clone))) up(&md->swap_bios_semaphore); - } free_tio(tio); dec_pending(io, BLK_STS_IOERR); break; case DM_MAPIO_REQUEUE: - if (unlikely(swap_bios_limit(ti, clone))) { - struct mapped_device *md = io->md; + if (unlikely(swap_bios_limit(ti, clone))) up(&md->swap_bios_semaphore); - } free_tio(tio); dec_pending(io, BLK_STS_DM_REQUEUE); break; @@ -1732,51 +1724,6 @@ static blk_qc_t __split_and_process_bio(struct mapped_device *md, return ret; } -/* - * Optimized variant of __split_and_process_bio that leverages the - * fact that targets that use it do _not_ have a need to split bios. - */ -static blk_qc_t __process_bio(struct mapped_device *md, struct dm_table *map, - struct bio *bio, struct dm_target *ti) -{ - struct clone_info ci; - blk_qc_t ret = BLK_QC_T_NONE; - int error = 0; - - init_clone_info(&ci, md, map, bio); - - if (bio->bi_opf & REQ_PREFLUSH) { - struct bio flush_bio; - - /* - * Use an on-stack bio for this, it's safe since we don't - * need to reference it after submit. It's just used as - * the basis for the clone(s). - */ - bio_init(&flush_bio, NULL, 0); - flush_bio.bi_opf = REQ_OP_WRITE | REQ_PREFLUSH | REQ_SYNC; - ci.bio = &flush_bio; - ci.sector_count = 0; - error = __send_empty_flush(&ci); - bio_uninit(ci.bio); - /* dec_pending submits any data associated with flush */ - } else { - struct dm_target_io *tio; - - ci.bio = bio; - ci.sector_count = bio_sectors(bio); - if (__process_abnormal_io(&ci, ti, &error)) - goto out; - - tio = alloc_tio(&ci, ti, 0, GFP_NOIO); - ret = __clone_and_map_simple_bio(&ci, tio, NULL); - } -out: - /* drop the extra reference count */ - dec_pending(ci.io, errno_to_blk_status(error)); - return ret; -} - static blk_qc_t dm_process_bio(struct mapped_device *md, struct dm_table *map, struct bio *bio) { @@ -1807,8 +1754,6 @@ static blk_qc_t dm_process_bio(struct mapped_device *md, /* regular IO is split by __split_and_process_bio */ } - if (dm_get_md_type(md) == DM_TYPE_NVME_BIO_BASED) - return __process_bio(md, map, bio, ti); return __split_and_process_bio(md, map, bio); } @@ -2200,12 +2145,10 @@ static struct dm_table *__bind(struct mapped_device *md, struct dm_table *t, if (request_based) dm_stop_queue(q); - if (request_based || md->type == DM_TYPE_NVME_BIO_BASED) { + if (request_based) { /* - * Leverage the fact that request-based DM targets and - * NVMe bio based targets are immutable singletons - * - used to optimize both dm_request_fn and dm_mq_queue_rq; - * and __process_bio. + * Leverage the fact that request-based DM targets are + * immutable singletons - used to optimize dm_mq_queue_rq. */ md->immutable_target = dm_table_get_immutable_target(t); } @@ -2334,7 +2277,6 @@ int dm_setup_md_queue(struct mapped_device *md, struct dm_table *t) break; case DM_TYPE_BIO_BASED: case DM_TYPE_DAX_BIO_BASED: - case DM_TYPE_NVME_BIO_BASED: dm_init_congested_fn(md); break; case DM_TYPE_NONE: @@ -3070,7 +3012,6 @@ struct dm_md_mempools *dm_alloc_md_mempools(struct mapped_device *md, enum dm_qu switch (type) { case DM_TYPE_BIO_BASED: case DM_TYPE_DAX_BIO_BASED: - case DM_TYPE_NVME_BIO_BASED: pool_size = max(dm_get_reserved_bio_based_ios(), min_pool_size); front_pad = roundup(per_io_data_size, __alignof__(struct dm_target_io)) + offsetof(struct dm_target_io, clone); io_front_pad = roundup(front_pad, __alignof__(struct dm_io)) + offsetof(struct dm_io, tio); diff --git a/include/linux/device-mapper.h b/include/linux/device-mapper.h index a53d7d2c2d95..60631f3abddb 100644 --- a/include/linux/device-mapper.h +++ b/include/linux/device-mapper.h @@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ enum dm_queue_mode { DM_TYPE_BIO_BASED = 1, DM_TYPE_REQUEST_BASED = 2, DM_TYPE_DAX_BIO_BASED = 3, - DM_TYPE_NVME_BIO_BASED = 4, }; typedef enum { STATUSTYPE_INFO, STATUSTYPE_TABLE } status_type_t; From bdcbf2602febf5cf19065d4fa091873b1f482779 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Marian Postevca Date: Fri, 3 Jun 2022 18:34:59 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 0687/1091] usb: gadget: u_ether: fix regression in setting fixed MAC address commit b337af3a4d6147000b7ca6b3438bf5c820849b37 upstream. In systemd systems setting a fixed MAC address through the "dev_addr" module argument fails systematically. When checking the MAC address after the interface is created it always has the same but different MAC address to the one supplied as argument. This is partially caused by systemd which by default will set an internally generated permanent MAC address for interfaces that are marked as having a randomly generated address. Commit 890d5b40908bfd1a ("usb: gadget: u_ether: fix race in setting MAC address in setup phase") didn't take into account the fact that the interface must be marked as having a set MAC address when it's set as module argument. Fixed by marking the interface with NET_ADDR_SET when the "dev_addr" module argument is supplied. Fixes: 890d5b40908bfd1a ("usb: gadget: u_ether: fix race in setting MAC address in setup phase") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marian Postevca Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220603153459.32722-1-posteuca@mutex.one Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.c | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.c index 271bd08f4a25..3f053b11e2ce 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.c +++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.c @@ -772,9 +772,13 @@ struct eth_dev *gether_setup_name(struct usb_gadget *g, dev->qmult = qmult; snprintf(net->name, sizeof(net->name), "%s%%d", netname); - if (get_ether_addr(dev_addr, net->dev_addr)) + if (get_ether_addr(dev_addr, net->dev_addr)) { + net->addr_assign_type = NET_ADDR_RANDOM; dev_warn(&g->dev, "using random %s ethernet address\n", "self"); + } else { + net->addr_assign_type = NET_ADDR_SET; + } if (get_ether_addr(host_addr, dev->host_mac)) dev_warn(&g->dev, "using random %s ethernet address\n", "host"); @@ -831,6 +835,9 @@ struct net_device *gether_setup_name_default(const char *netname) INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->tx_reqs); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->rx_reqs); + /* by default we always have a random MAC address */ + net->addr_assign_type = NET_ADDR_RANDOM; + skb_queue_head_init(&dev->rx_frames); /* network device setup */ @@ -868,7 +875,6 @@ int gether_register_netdev(struct net_device *net) g = dev->gadget; memcpy(net->dev_addr, dev->dev_mac, ETH_ALEN); - net->addr_assign_type = NET_ADDR_RANDOM; status = register_netdev(net); if (status < 0) { @@ -908,6 +914,7 @@ int gether_set_dev_addr(struct net_device *net, const char *dev_addr) if (get_ether_addr(dev_addr, new_addr)) return -EINVAL; memcpy(dev->dev_mac, new_addr, ETH_ALEN); + net->addr_assign_type = NET_ADDR_SET; return 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(gether_set_dev_addr); From 95921a3bab76872e8b5c6ba07903cbdbcc352cc6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Tue, 9 Feb 2021 11:20:28 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 0688/1091] tcp: add some entropy in __inet_hash_connect() commit c579bd1b4021c42ae247108f1e6f73dd3f08600c upstream. Even when implementing RFC 6056 3.3.4 (Algorithm 4: Double-Hash Port Selection Algorithm), a patient attacker could still be able to collect enough state from an otherwise idle host. Idea of this patch is to inject some noise, in the cases __inet_hash_connect() found a candidate in the first attempt. This noise should not significantly reduce the collision avoidance, and should be zero if connection table is already well used. Note that this is not implementing RFC 6056 3.3.5 because we think Algorithm 5 could hurt typical workloads. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Cc: David Dworken Cc: Willem de Bruijn Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Cc: Ben Hutchings Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c index 959f4f0c8546..ba1aa49b91ed 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c +++ b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c @@ -782,6 +782,11 @@ next_port: return -EADDRNOTAVAIL; ok: + /* If our first attempt found a candidate, skip next candidate + * in 1/16 of cases to add some noise. + */ + if (!i && !(prandom_u32() % 16)) + i = 2; WRITE_ONCE(table_perturb[index], READ_ONCE(table_perturb[index]) + i + 2); /* Head lock still held and bh's disabled */ From 53c5de3092ade55f82ed4f5373d8a8ca115df818 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Willy Tarreau Date: Mon, 2 May 2022 10:46:09 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0689/1091] tcp: use different parts of the port_offset for index and offset commit 9e9b70ae923baf2b5e8a0ea4fd0c8451801ac526 upstream. Amit Klein suggests that we use different parts of port_offset for the table's index and the port offset so that there is no direct relation between them. Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld Cc: Moshe Kol Cc: Yossi Gilad Cc: Amit Klein Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Cc: Ben Hutchings Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c index ba1aa49b91ed..df3eec00fbc1 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c +++ b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c @@ -726,7 +726,7 @@ int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row, net_get_random_once(table_perturb, sizeof(table_perturb)); index = hash_32(port_offset, INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT); - offset = READ_ONCE(table_perturb[index]) + port_offset; + offset = READ_ONCE(table_perturb[index]) + (port_offset >> 32); offset %= remaining; /* In first pass we try ports of @low parity. From 7c0a777b7dbdcd39eb45996afe6df7770f7926ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Willy Tarreau Date: Mon, 2 May 2022 10:46:11 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0690/1091] tcp: add small random increments to the source port commit ca7af0402550f9a0b3316d5f1c30904e42ed257d upstream. Here we're randomly adding between 0 and 7 random increments to the selected source port in order to add some noise in the source port selection that will make the next port less predictable. With the default port range of 32768-60999 this means a worst case reuse scenario of 14116/8=1764 connections between two consecutive uses of the same port, with an average of 14116/4.5=3137. This code was stressed at more than 800000 connections per second to a fixed target with all connections closed by the client using RSTs (worst condition) and only 2 connections failed among 13 billion, despite the hash being reseeded every 10 seconds, indicating a perfectly safe situation. Cc: Moshe Kol Cc: Yossi Gilad Cc: Amit Klein Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Cc: Ben Hutchings Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c index df3eec00fbc1..e88746ed74bf 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c +++ b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c @@ -782,11 +782,12 @@ next_port: return -EADDRNOTAVAIL; ok: - /* If our first attempt found a candidate, skip next candidate - * in 1/16 of cases to add some noise. + /* Here we want to add a little bit of randomness to the next source + * port that will be chosen. We use a max() with a random here so that + * on low contention the randomness is maximal and on high contention + * it may be inexistent. */ - if (!i && !(prandom_u32() % 16)) - i = 2; + i = max_t(int, i, (prandom_u32() & 7) * 2); WRITE_ONCE(table_perturb[index], READ_ONCE(table_perturb[index]) + i + 2); /* Head lock still held and bh's disabled */ From 77d29f3b18c466a6b88bdfceccec3085961a7d0e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Willy Tarreau Date: Mon, 2 May 2022 10:46:12 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0691/1091] tcp: dynamically allocate the perturb table used by source ports commit e9261476184be1abd486c9434164b2acbe0ed6c2 upstream. We'll need to further increase the size of this table and it's likely that at some point its size will not be suitable anymore for a static table. Let's allocate it on boot from inet_hashinfo2_init(), which is called from tcp_init(). Cc: Moshe Kol Cc: Yossi Gilad Cc: Amit Klein Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Cc: Ben Hutchings Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c | 12 ++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c index e88746ed74bf..8c958f5ac870 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c +++ b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c @@ -680,7 +680,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(inet_unhash); * privacy, this only consumes 1 KB of kernel memory. */ #define INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT 8 -static u32 table_perturb[1 << INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT]; +#define INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SIZE (1 << INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT) +static u32 *table_perturb; int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row, struct sock *sk, u64 port_offset, @@ -723,7 +724,8 @@ int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row, if (likely(remaining > 1)) remaining &= ~1U; - net_get_random_once(table_perturb, sizeof(table_perturb)); + net_get_random_once(table_perturb, + INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SIZE * sizeof(*table_perturb)); index = hash_32(port_offset, INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT); offset = READ_ONCE(table_perturb[index]) + (port_offset >> 32); @@ -861,6 +863,12 @@ void __init inet_hashinfo2_init(struct inet_hashinfo *h, const char *name, low_limit, high_limit); init_hashinfo_lhash2(h); + + /* this one is used for source ports of outgoing connections */ + table_perturb = kmalloc_array(INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SIZE, + sizeof(*table_perturb), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!table_perturb) + panic("TCP: failed to alloc table_perturb"); } int inet_hashinfo2_init_mod(struct inet_hashinfo *h) From c26e1addf15763ae404f4bbf131719a724e768ab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Willy Tarreau Date: Mon, 2 May 2022 10:46:13 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0692/1091] tcp: increase source port perturb table to 2^16 commit 4c2c8f03a5ab7cb04ec64724d7d176d00bcc91e5 upstream. Moshe Kol, Amit Klein, and Yossi Gilad reported being able to accurately identify a client by forcing it to emit only 40 times more connections than there are entries in the table_perturb[] table. The previous two improvements consisting in resalting the secret every 10s and adding randomness to each port selection only slightly improved the situation, and the current value of 2^8 was too small as it's not very difficult to make a client emit 10k connections in less than 10 seconds. Thus we're increasing the perturb table from 2^8 to 2^16 so that the same precision now requires 2.6M connections, which is more difficult in this time frame and harder to hide as a background activity. The impact is that the table now uses 256 kB instead of 1 kB, which could mostly affect devices making frequent outgoing connections. However such components usually target a small set of destinations (load balancers, database clients, perf assessment tools), and in practice only a few entries will be visited, like before. A live test at 1 million connections per second showed no performance difference from the previous value. Reported-by: Moshe Kol Reported-by: Yossi Gilad Reported-by: Amit Klein Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Cc: Ben Hutchings Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c index 8c958f5ac870..ffee136ed8c7 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c +++ b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c @@ -675,11 +675,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(inet_unhash); * Note that we use 32bit integers (vs RFC 'short integers') * because 2^16 is not a multiple of num_ephemeral and this * property might be used by clever attacker. - * RFC claims using TABLE_LENGTH=10 buckets gives an improvement, - * we use 256 instead to really give more isolation and - * privacy, this only consumes 1 KB of kernel memory. + * RFC claims using TABLE_LENGTH=10 buckets gives an improvement, though + * attacks were since demonstrated, thus we use 65536 instead to really + * give more isolation and privacy, at the expense of 256kB of kernel + * memory. */ -#define INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT 8 +#define INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT 16 #define INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SIZE (1 << INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT) static u32 *table_perturb; From 2e1591c27b954f1f60ef8ce5d214e8fee1b4d304 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Willy Tarreau Date: Mon, 2 May 2022 10:46:14 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0693/1091] tcp: drop the hash_32() part from the index calculation commit e8161345ddbb66e449abde10d2fdce93f867eba9 upstream. In commit 190cc82489f4 ("tcp: change source port randomizarion at connect() time"), the table_perturb[] array was introduced and an index was taken from the port_offset via hash_32(). But it turns out that hash_32() performs a multiplication while the input here comes from the output of SipHash in secure_seq, that is well distributed enough to avoid the need for yet another hash. Suggested-by: Amit Klein Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Cc: Ben Hutchings Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c index ffee136ed8c7..d9bee15e36a5 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c +++ b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c @@ -727,7 +727,7 @@ int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row, net_get_random_once(table_perturb, INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SIZE * sizeof(*table_perturb)); - index = hash_32(port_offset, INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT); + index = port_offset & (INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SIZE - 1); offset = READ_ONCE(table_perturb[index]) + (port_offset >> 32); offset %= remaining; From 7b9c3bfbad2510478ac29221d2c40a09184ce6a1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Will Deacon Date: Fri, 10 Jun 2022 16:12:27 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0694/1091] arm64: mm: Don't invalidate FROM_DEVICE buffers at start of DMA transfer commit c50f11c6196f45c92ca48b16a5071615d4ae0572 upstream. Invalidating the buffer memory in arch_sync_dma_for_device() for FROM_DEVICE transfers When using the streaming DMA API to map a buffer prior to inbound non-coherent DMA (i.e. DMA_FROM_DEVICE), we invalidate any dirty CPU cachelines so that they will not be written back during the transfer and corrupt the buffer contents written by the DMA. This, however, poses two potential problems: (1) If the DMA transfer does not write to every byte in the buffer, then the unwritten bytes will contain stale data once the transfer has completed. (2) If the buffer has a virtual alias in userspace, then stale data may be visible via this alias during the period between performing the cache invalidation and the DMA writes landing in memory. Address both of these issues by cleaning (aka writing-back) the dirty lines in arch_sync_dma_for_device(DMA_FROM_DEVICE) instead of discarding them using invalidation. Cc: Ard Biesheuvel Cc: Christoph Hellwig Cc: Robin Murphy Cc: Russell King Cc: Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220606152150.GA31568@willie-the-truck Signed-off-by: Will Deacon Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220610151228.4562-2-will@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm64/mm/cache.S | 2 -- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/cache.S b/arch/arm64/mm/cache.S index db767b072601..7b054c67acd8 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/mm/cache.S +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/cache.S @@ -228,8 +228,6 @@ ENDPIPROC(__dma_flush_area) * - dir - DMA direction */ ENTRY(__dma_map_area) - cmp w2, #DMA_FROM_DEVICE - b.eq __dma_inv_area b __dma_clean_area ENDPIPROC(__dma_map_area) From 3994d2ee55e28a08a4af4ef2ad5ced8d194d8b78 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Thu, 23 Jun 2022 18:19:35 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0695/1091] Revert "hwmon: Make chip parameter for with_info API mandatory" This reverts commit 1ec0bc72f5dab3ab367ae5230cf6f212d805a225 which is commit ddaefa209c4ac791c1262e97c9b2d0440c8ef1d5 upstream. It should not have been applied to the stable trees. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220622154454.GA1864037@roeck-us.net Reported-by: Julian Haller Reported-by: Guenter Roeck Cc: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Documentation/hwmon/hwmon-kernel-api.rst | 2 +- drivers/hwmon/hwmon.c | 16 +++++++++------- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/hwmon/hwmon-kernel-api.rst b/Documentation/hwmon/hwmon-kernel-api.rst index 23f27fe78e37..c41eb6108103 100644 --- a/Documentation/hwmon/hwmon-kernel-api.rst +++ b/Documentation/hwmon/hwmon-kernel-api.rst @@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ hwmon_device_register_with_info is the most comprehensive and preferred means to register a hardware monitoring device. It creates the standard sysfs attributes in the hardware monitoring core, letting the driver focus on reading from and writing to the chip instead of having to bother with sysfs attributes. -The parent device parameter as well as the chip parameter must not be NULL. Its +The parent device parameter cannot be NULL with non-NULL chip info. Its parameters are described in more detail below. devm_hwmon_device_register_with_info is similar to diff --git a/drivers/hwmon/hwmon.c b/drivers/hwmon/hwmon.c index c73b93b9bb87..a2175394cd25 100644 --- a/drivers/hwmon/hwmon.c +++ b/drivers/hwmon/hwmon.c @@ -715,12 +715,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hwmon_device_register_with_groups); /** * hwmon_device_register_with_info - register w/ hwmon - * @dev: the parent device (mandatory) - * @name: hwmon name attribute (mandatory) - * @drvdata: driver data to attach to created device (optional) - * @chip: pointer to hwmon chip information (mandatory) + * @dev: the parent device + * @name: hwmon name attribute + * @drvdata: driver data to attach to created device + * @chip: pointer to hwmon chip information * @extra_groups: pointer to list of additional non-standard attribute groups - * (optional) * * hwmon_device_unregister() must be called when the device is no * longer needed. @@ -733,10 +732,13 @@ hwmon_device_register_with_info(struct device *dev, const char *name, const struct hwmon_chip_info *chip, const struct attribute_group **extra_groups) { - if (!dev || !name || !chip) + if (!name) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); - if (!chip->ops || !chip->ops->is_visible || !chip->info) + if (chip && (!chip->ops || !chip->ops->is_visible || !chip->info)) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + if (chip && !dev) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); return __hwmon_device_register(dev, name, drvdata, chip, extra_groups); From 23db944f754e99abf814a79a2273b0191d35e4ff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Sat, 25 Jun 2022 12:44:36 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0696/1091] Linux 5.4.201 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220623164321.195163701@linuxfoundation.org Tested-by: Florian Fainelli Tested-by: Shuah Khan Tested-by: Hulk Robot Tested-by: Jon Hunter Tested-by: Sudip Mukherjee Tested-by: Guenter Roeck Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Makefile | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index 32da9117e9d7..75be5870cc55 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 VERSION = 5 PATCHLEVEL = 4 -SUBLEVEL = 200 +SUBLEVEL = 201 EXTRAVERSION = NAME = Kleptomaniac Octopus From c87e851b23e5cb2ba90a3049ef38340ed7d5746f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jiri Slaby Date: Tue, 5 Jan 2021 13:02:35 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0697/1091] vt: drop old FONT ioctls commit ff2047fb755d4415ec3c70ac799889371151796d upstream. Drop support for these ioctls: * PIO_FONT, PIO_FONTX * GIO_FONT, GIO_FONTX * PIO_FONTRESET As was demonstrated by commit 90bfdeef83f1 (tty: make FONTX ioctl use the tty pointer they were actually passed), these ioctls are not used from userspace, as: 1) they used to be broken (set up font on current console, not the open one) and racy (before the commit above) 2) KDFONTOP ioctl is used for years instead Note that PIO_FONTRESET is defunct on most systems as VGA_CONSOLE is set on them for ages. That turns on BROKEN_GRAPHICS_PROGRAMS which makes PIO_FONTRESET just return an error. We are removing KD_FONT_FLAG_OLD here as it was used only by these removed ioctls. kd.h header exists both in kernel and uapi headers, so we can remove the kernel one completely. Everyone includeing kd.h will now automatically get the uapi one. There are now unused definitions of the ioctl numbers and "struct consolefontdesc" in kd.h, but as it is a uapi header, I am not touching these. Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210105120239.28031-8-jslaby@suse.cz Cc: guodaxing Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/tty/vt/vt.c | 39 +--------- drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c | 147 -------------------------------------- include/linux/kd.h | 8 --- 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 191 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 include/linux/kd.h diff --git a/drivers/tty/vt/vt.c b/drivers/tty/vt/vt.c index d1ab8561e258..c3df1660cb5c 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/vt/vt.c +++ b/drivers/tty/vt/vt.c @@ -4541,16 +4541,8 @@ static int con_font_get(struct vc_data *vc, struct console_font_op *op) if (op->data && font.charcount > op->charcount) rc = -ENOSPC; - if (!(op->flags & KD_FONT_FLAG_OLD)) { - if (font.width > op->width || font.height > op->height) - rc = -ENOSPC; - } else { - if (font.width != 8) - rc = -EIO; - else if ((op->height && font.height > op->height) || - font.height > 32) - rc = -ENOSPC; - } + if (font.width > op->width || font.height > op->height) + rc = -ENOSPC; if (rc) goto out; @@ -4578,7 +4570,7 @@ static int con_font_set(struct vc_data *vc, struct console_font_op *op) return -EINVAL; if (op->charcount > 512) return -EINVAL; - if (op->width <= 0 || op->width > 32 || op->height > 32) + if (op->width <= 0 || op->width > 32 || !op->height || op->height > 32) return -EINVAL; size = (op->width+7)/8 * 32 * op->charcount; if (size > max_font_size) @@ -4588,31 +4580,6 @@ static int con_font_set(struct vc_data *vc, struct console_font_op *op) if (IS_ERR(font.data)) return PTR_ERR(font.data); - if (!op->height) { /* Need to guess font height [compat] */ - int h, i; - u8 *charmap = font.data; - - /* - * If from KDFONTOP ioctl, don't allow things which can be done - * in userland,so that we can get rid of this soon - */ - if (!(op->flags & KD_FONT_FLAG_OLD)) { - kfree(font.data); - return -EINVAL; - } - - for (h = 32; h > 0; h--) - for (i = 0; i < op->charcount; i++) - if (charmap[32*i+h-1]) - goto nonzero; - - kfree(font.data); - return -EINVAL; - - nonzero: - op->height = h; - } - font.charcount = op->charcount; font.width = op->width; font.height = op->height; diff --git a/drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c b/drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c index 312857168dad..f623b3859e98 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c +++ b/drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c @@ -241,48 +241,6 @@ int vt_waitactive(int n) #define GPLAST 0x3df #define GPNUM (GPLAST - GPFIRST + 1) - - -static inline int -do_fontx_ioctl(struct vc_data *vc, int cmd, struct consolefontdesc __user *user_cfd, int perm, struct console_font_op *op) -{ - struct consolefontdesc cfdarg; - int i; - - if (copy_from_user(&cfdarg, user_cfd, sizeof(struct consolefontdesc))) - return -EFAULT; - - switch (cmd) { - case PIO_FONTX: - if (!perm) - return -EPERM; - op->op = KD_FONT_OP_SET; - op->flags = KD_FONT_FLAG_OLD; - op->width = 8; - op->height = cfdarg.charheight; - op->charcount = cfdarg.charcount; - op->data = cfdarg.chardata; - return con_font_op(vc, op); - - case GIO_FONTX: - op->op = KD_FONT_OP_GET; - op->flags = KD_FONT_FLAG_OLD; - op->width = 8; - op->height = cfdarg.charheight; - op->charcount = cfdarg.charcount; - op->data = cfdarg.chardata; - i = con_font_op(vc, op); - if (i) - return i; - cfdarg.charheight = op->height; - cfdarg.charcount = op->charcount; - if (copy_to_user(user_cfd, &cfdarg, sizeof(struct consolefontdesc))) - return -EFAULT; - return 0; - } - return -EINVAL; -} - static inline int do_unimap_ioctl(int cmd, struct unimapdesc __user *user_ud, int perm, struct vc_data *vc) { @@ -919,30 +877,6 @@ int vt_ioctl(struct tty_struct *tty, break; } - case PIO_FONT: { - if (!perm) - return -EPERM; - op.op = KD_FONT_OP_SET; - op.flags = KD_FONT_FLAG_OLD | KD_FONT_FLAG_DONT_RECALC; /* Compatibility */ - op.width = 8; - op.height = 0; - op.charcount = 256; - op.data = up; - ret = con_font_op(vc, &op); - break; - } - - case GIO_FONT: { - op.op = KD_FONT_OP_GET; - op.flags = KD_FONT_FLAG_OLD; - op.width = 8; - op.height = 32; - op.charcount = 256; - op.data = up; - ret = con_font_op(vc, &op); - break; - } - case PIO_CMAP: if (!perm) ret = -EPERM; @@ -954,36 +888,6 @@ int vt_ioctl(struct tty_struct *tty, ret = con_get_cmap(up); break; - case PIO_FONTX: - case GIO_FONTX: - ret = do_fontx_ioctl(vc, cmd, up, perm, &op); - break; - - case PIO_FONTRESET: - { - if (!perm) - return -EPERM; - -#ifdef BROKEN_GRAPHICS_PROGRAMS - /* With BROKEN_GRAPHICS_PROGRAMS defined, the default - font is not saved. */ - ret = -ENOSYS; - break; -#else - { - op.op = KD_FONT_OP_SET_DEFAULT; - op.data = NULL; - ret = con_font_op(vc, &op); - if (ret) - break; - console_lock(); - con_set_default_unimap(vc); - console_unlock(); - break; - } -#endif - } - case KDFONTOP: { if (copy_from_user(&op, up, sizeof(op))) { ret = -EFAULT; @@ -1097,54 +1001,6 @@ void vc_SAK(struct work_struct *work) #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT -struct compat_consolefontdesc { - unsigned short charcount; /* characters in font (256 or 512) */ - unsigned short charheight; /* scan lines per character (1-32) */ - compat_caddr_t chardata; /* font data in expanded form */ -}; - -static inline int -compat_fontx_ioctl(struct vc_data *vc, int cmd, - struct compat_consolefontdesc __user *user_cfd, - int perm, struct console_font_op *op) -{ - struct compat_consolefontdesc cfdarg; - int i; - - if (copy_from_user(&cfdarg, user_cfd, sizeof(struct compat_consolefontdesc))) - return -EFAULT; - - switch (cmd) { - case PIO_FONTX: - if (!perm) - return -EPERM; - op->op = KD_FONT_OP_SET; - op->flags = KD_FONT_FLAG_OLD; - op->width = 8; - op->height = cfdarg.charheight; - op->charcount = cfdarg.charcount; - op->data = compat_ptr(cfdarg.chardata); - return con_font_op(vc, op); - - case GIO_FONTX: - op->op = KD_FONT_OP_GET; - op->flags = KD_FONT_FLAG_OLD; - op->width = 8; - op->height = cfdarg.charheight; - op->charcount = cfdarg.charcount; - op->data = compat_ptr(cfdarg.chardata); - i = con_font_op(vc, op); - if (i) - return i; - cfdarg.charheight = op->height; - cfdarg.charcount = op->charcount; - if (copy_to_user(user_cfd, &cfdarg, sizeof(struct compat_consolefontdesc))) - return -EFAULT; - return 0; - } - return -EINVAL; -} - struct compat_console_font_op { compat_uint_t op; /* operation code KD_FONT_OP_* */ compat_uint_t flags; /* KD_FONT_FLAG_* */ @@ -1221,9 +1077,6 @@ long vt_compat_ioctl(struct tty_struct *tty, /* * these need special handlers for incompatible data structures */ - case PIO_FONTX: - case GIO_FONTX: - return compat_fontx_ioctl(vc, cmd, up, perm, &op); case KDFONTOP: return compat_kdfontop_ioctl(up, perm, &op, vc); diff --git a/include/linux/kd.h b/include/linux/kd.h deleted file mode 100644 index b130a18f860f..000000000000 --- a/include/linux/kd.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,8 +0,0 @@ -/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ -#ifndef _LINUX_KD_H -#define _LINUX_KD_H - -#include - -#define KD_FONT_FLAG_OLD 0x80000000 /* Invoked via old interface [compat] */ -#endif /* _LINUX_KD_H */ From 1df5178fdebe4e80c3c9d6b8ccabaf6fae9ea78b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Thu, 16 Jun 2022 02:03:12 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0698/1091] random: schedule mix_interrupt_randomness() less often commit 534d2eaf1970274150596fdd2bf552721e65d6b2 upstream. It used to be that mix_interrupt_randomness() would credit 1 bit each time it ran, and so add_interrupt_randomness() would schedule mix() to run every 64 interrupts, a fairly arbitrary number, but nonetheless considered to be a decent enough conservative estimate. Since e3e33fc2ea7f ("random: do not use input pool from hard IRQs"), mix() is now able to credit multiple bits, depending on the number of calls to add(). This was done for reasons separate from this commit, but it has the nice side effect of enabling this patch to schedule mix() less often. Currently the rules are: a) Credit 1 bit for every 64 calls to add(). b) Schedule mix() once a second that add() is called. c) Schedule mix() once every 64 calls to add(). Rules (a) and (c) no longer need to be coupled. It's still important to have _some_ value in (c), so that we don't "over-saturate" the fast pool, but the once per second we get from rule (b) is a plenty enough baseline. So, by increasing the 64 in rule (c) to something larger, we avoid calling queue_work_on() as frequently during irq storms. This commit changes that 64 in rule (c) to be 1024, which means we schedule mix() 16 times less often. And it does *not* need to change the 64 in rule (a). Fixes: 58340f8e952b ("random: defer fast pool mixing to worker") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Dominik Brodowski Acked-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 82f9ee440406..ca5212fbe97f 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -996,7 +996,7 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) if (new_count & MIX_INFLIGHT) return; - if (new_count < 64 && !time_is_before_jiffies(fast_pool->last + HZ)) + if (new_count < 1024 && !time_is_before_jiffies(fast_pool->last + HZ)) return; if (unlikely(!fast_pool->mix.func)) From eca9b5e36e249d9ff27d9c99019b9ccdaa4a0abb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Takashi Iwai Date: Mon, 20 Jun 2022 12:40:08 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0699/1091] ALSA: hda/via: Fix missing beep setup commit c7807b27d510e5aa53c8a120cfc02c33c24ebb5f upstream. Like the previous fix for Conexant codec, the beep_nid has to be set up before calling snd_hda_gen_parse_auto_config(); otherwise it'd miss the path setup. Fix the call order for addressing the missing beep setup. Fixes: 0e8f9862493a ("ALSA: hda/via - Simplify control management") Cc: Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216152 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220620104008.1994-2-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/pci/hda/patch_via.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/patch_via.c b/sound/pci/hda/patch_via.c index a5c1a2c4eae4..3edb4e25797d 100644 --- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_via.c +++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_via.c @@ -520,11 +520,11 @@ static int via_parse_auto_config(struct hda_codec *codec) if (err < 0) return err; - err = snd_hda_gen_parse_auto_config(codec, &spec->gen.autocfg); + err = auto_parse_beep(codec); if (err < 0) return err; - err = auto_parse_beep(codec); + err = snd_hda_gen_parse_auto_config(codec, &spec->gen.autocfg); if (err < 0) return err; From cf81f367cf81f4d72a479c7056a20bdab9b73acb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Takashi Iwai Date: Mon, 20 Jun 2022 12:40:07 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0700/1091] ALSA: hda/conexant: Fix missing beep setup commit 5faa0bc69102f3a4c605581564c367be5eb94dfa upstream. Currently the Conexant codec driver sets up the beep NID after calling snd_hda_gen_parse_auto_config(). It turned out that this results in the insufficient setup for the beep control, as the generic parser handles the fake path in snd_hda_gen_parse_auto_config() only if the beep_nid is set up beforehand. For dealing with the beep widget properly, call cx_auto_parse_beep() before snd_hda_gen_parse_auto_config() call. Fixes: 51e19ca5f755 ("ALSA: hda/conexant - Clean up beep code") Cc: Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216152 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220620104008.1994-1-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/pci/hda/patch_conexant.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/patch_conexant.c b/sound/pci/hda/patch_conexant.c index c0b6881b0672..b81b0a1bada5 100644 --- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_conexant.c +++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_conexant.c @@ -1048,11 +1048,11 @@ static int patch_conexant_auto(struct hda_codec *codec) if (err < 0) goto error; - err = snd_hda_gen_parse_auto_config(codec, &spec->gen.autocfg); + err = cx_auto_parse_beep(codec); if (err < 0) goto error; - err = cx_auto_parse_beep(codec); + err = snd_hda_gen_parse_auto_config(codec, &spec->gen.autocfg); if (err < 0) goto error; From 5fbad99e76c0e7af8a2ab2378bdb621615210f8d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kailang Yang Date: Mon, 13 Jun 2022 14:57:19 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0701/1091] ALSA: hda/realtek - ALC897 headset MIC no sound commit fe6900bd8156467365bd5b976df64928fdebfeb0 upstream. There is not have Headset Mic verb table in BIOS default. So, it will have recording issue from headset MIC. Add the verb table value without jack detect. It will turn on Headset Mic. Signed-off-by: Kailang Yang Cc: Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/719133a27d8844a890002cb817001dfa@realtek.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c index 8c37de779346..58d636bfac05 100644 --- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c +++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c @@ -9805,6 +9805,7 @@ enum { ALC668_FIXUP_MIC_DET_COEF, ALC897_FIXUP_LENOVO_HEADSET_MIC, ALC897_FIXUP_HEADSET_MIC_PIN, + ALC897_FIXUP_HP_HSMIC_VERB, }; static const struct hda_fixup alc662_fixups[] = { @@ -10224,6 +10225,13 @@ static const struct hda_fixup alc662_fixups[] = { .chained = true, .chain_id = ALC897_FIXUP_LENOVO_HEADSET_MIC }, + [ALC897_FIXUP_HP_HSMIC_VERB] = { + .type = HDA_FIXUP_PINS, + .v.pins = (const struct hda_pintbl[]) { + { 0x19, 0x01a1913c }, /* use as headset mic, without its own jack detect */ + { } + }, + }, }; static const struct snd_pci_quirk alc662_fixup_tbl[] = { @@ -10249,6 +10257,7 @@ static const struct snd_pci_quirk alc662_fixup_tbl[] = { SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1028, 0x0698, "Dell", ALC668_FIXUP_DELL_MIC_NO_PRESENCE), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1028, 0x069f, "Dell", ALC668_FIXUP_DELL_MIC_NO_PRESENCE), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x1632, "HP RP5800", ALC662_FIXUP_HP_RP5800), + SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x8719, "HP", ALC897_FIXUP_HP_HSMIC_VERB), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x873e, "HP", ALC671_FIXUP_HP_HEADSET_MIC2), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x885f, "HP 288 Pro G8", ALC671_FIXUP_HP_HEADSET_MIC2), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1043, 0x1080, "Asus UX501VW", ALC668_FIXUP_HEADSET_MODE), From 6fda65dabd3e5658ad0a94fcc00021c1b9ba4ba6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tim Crawford Date: Fri, 17 Jun 2022 07:30:28 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 0702/1091] ALSA: hda/realtek: Add quirk for Clevo PD70PNT commit d49951219b0249d3eff49e4f02e0de82357bc8a0 upstream. Fixes speaker output and headset detection on Clevo PD70PNT. Signed-off-by: Tim Crawford Cc: Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220617133028.50568-1-tcrawford@system76.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c index 58d636bfac05..804fc0d331b4 100644 --- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c +++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c @@ -2585,6 +2585,7 @@ static const struct snd_pci_quirk alc882_fixup_tbl[] = { SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1558, 0x67e1, "Clevo PB71[DE][CDF]", ALC1220_FIXUP_CLEVO_PB51ED_PINS), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1558, 0x67e5, "Clevo PC70D[PRS](?:-D|-G)?", ALC1220_FIXUP_CLEVO_PB51ED_PINS), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1558, 0x67f1, "Clevo PC70H[PRS]", ALC1220_FIXUP_CLEVO_PB51ED_PINS), + SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1558, 0x67f5, "Clevo PD70PN[NRT]", ALC1220_FIXUP_CLEVO_PB51ED_PINS), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1558, 0x70d1, "Clevo PC70[ER][CDF]", ALC1220_FIXUP_CLEVO_PB51ED_PINS), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1558, 0x7714, "Clevo X170SM", ALC1220_FIXUP_CLEVO_PB51ED_PINS), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1558, 0x7715, "Clevo X170KM-G", ALC1220_FIXUP_CLEVO_PB51ED), From af28f602df7449f88b0cda05aacc7533fb64f641 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Rosemarie O'Riorden Date: Tue, 21 Jun 2022 16:48:45 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 0703/1091] net: openvswitch: fix parsing of nw_proto for IPv6 fragments commit 12378a5a75e33f34f8586706eb61cca9e6d4690c upstream. When a packet enters the OVS datapath and does not match any existing flows installed in the kernel flow cache, the packet will be sent to userspace to be parsed, and a new flow will be created. The kernel and OVS rely on each other to parse packet fields in the same way so that packets will be handled properly. As per the design document linked below, OVS expects all later IPv6 fragments to have nw_proto=44 in the flow key, so they can be correctly matched on OpenFlow rules. OpenFlow controllers create pipelines based on this design. This behavior was changed by the commit in the Fixes tag so that nw_proto equals the next_header field of the last extension header. However, there is no counterpart for this change in OVS userspace, meaning that this field is parsed differently between OVS and the kernel. This is a problem because OVS creates actions based on what is parsed in userspace, but the kernel-provided flow key is used as a match criteria, as described in Documentation/networking/openvswitch.rst. This leads to issues such as packets incorrectly matching on a flow and thus the wrong list of actions being applied to the packet. Such changes in packet parsing cannot be implemented without breaking the userspace. The offending commit is partially reverted to restore the expected behavior. The change technically made sense and there is a good reason that it was implemented, but it does not comply with the original design of OVS. If in the future someone wants to implement such a change, then it must be user-configurable and disabled by default to preserve backwards compatibility with existing OVS versions. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: fa642f08839b ("openvswitch: Derive IP protocol number for IPv6 later frags") Link: https://docs.openvswitch.org/en/latest/topics/design/#fragments Signed-off-by: Rosemarie O'Riorden Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220621204845.9721-1-roriorden@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/openvswitch/flow.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/openvswitch/flow.c b/net/openvswitch/flow.c index 38147e6a20f5..989175ce81d4 100644 --- a/net/openvswitch/flow.c +++ b/net/openvswitch/flow.c @@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ static int parse_ipv6hdr(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sw_flow_key *key) if (flags & IP6_FH_F_FRAG) { if (frag_off) { key->ip.frag = OVS_FRAG_TYPE_LATER; - key->ip.proto = nexthdr; + key->ip.proto = NEXTHDR_FRAGMENT; return 0; } key->ip.frag = OVS_FRAG_TYPE_FIRST; From c8d37e6ca180d88493e204c4fc2633e7998556ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chevron Li Date: Thu, 2 Jun 2022 06:25:43 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0704/1091] mmc: sdhci-pci-o2micro: Fix card detect by dealing with debouncing commit e591fcf6b4e39335c9b128b17738fcd2fdd278ae upstream. The result from ->get_cd() may be incorrect as the card detect debouncing isn't managed correctly. Let's fix it. Signed-off-by: Chevron Li Fixes: 7d44061704dd ("mmc: sdhci-pci-o2micro: Fix O2 Host data read/write DLL Lock phase shift issue") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220602132543.596-1-chevron.li@bayhubtech.com [Ulf: Updated the commit message] Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-pci-o2micro.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-pci-o2micro.c b/drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-pci-o2micro.c index 41a2394313dd..3170c19683c4 100644 --- a/drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-pci-o2micro.c +++ b/drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-pci-o2micro.c @@ -145,6 +145,8 @@ static int sdhci_o2_get_cd(struct mmc_host *mmc) if (!(sdhci_readw(host, O2_PLL_DLL_WDT_CONTROL1) & O2_PLL_LOCK_STATUS)) sdhci_o2_enable_internal_clock(host); + else + sdhci_o2_wait_card_detect_stable(host); return !!(sdhci_readl(host, SDHCI_PRESENT_STATE) & SDHCI_CARD_PRESENT); } From 71c76f56b97c15d367f0855bbf2127029bdabecc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sascha Hauer Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 10:31:38 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0705/1091] mtd: rawnand: gpmi: Fix setting busy timeout setting commit 06781a5026350cde699d2d10c9914a25c1524f45 upstream. The DEVICE_BUSY_TIMEOUT value is described in the Reference Manual as: | Timeout waiting for NAND Ready/Busy or ATA IRQ. Used in WAIT_FOR_READY | mode. This value is the number of GPMI_CLK cycles multiplied by 4096. So instead of multiplying the value in cycles with 4096, we have to divide it by that value. Use DIV_ROUND_UP to make sure we are on the safe side, especially when the calculated value in cycles is smaller than 4096 as typically the case. This bug likely never triggered because any timeout != 0 usually will do. In my case the busy timeout in cycles was originally calculated as 2408, which multiplied with 4096 is 0x968000. The lower 16 bits were taken for the 16 bit wide register field, so the register value was 0x8000. With 2970bf5a32f0 ("mtd: rawnand: gpmi: fix controller timings setting") however the value in cycles became 2384, which multiplied with 4096 is 0x950000. The lower 16 bit are 0x0 now resulting in an intermediate timeout when reading from NAND. Fixes: b1206122069aa ("mtd: rawnand: gpmi: use core timings instead of an empirical derivation") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sascha Hauer Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mtd/20220614083138.3455683-1-s.hauer@pengutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/mtd/nand/raw/gpmi-nand/gpmi-nand.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/mtd/nand/raw/gpmi-nand/gpmi-nand.c b/drivers/mtd/nand/raw/gpmi-nand/gpmi-nand.c index 02218c3b548f..41f7dd58bdcf 100644 --- a/drivers/mtd/nand/raw/gpmi-nand/gpmi-nand.c +++ b/drivers/mtd/nand/raw/gpmi-nand/gpmi-nand.c @@ -682,7 +682,7 @@ static void gpmi_nfc_compute_timings(struct gpmi_nand_data *this, hw->timing0 = BF_GPMI_TIMING0_ADDRESS_SETUP(addr_setup_cycles) | BF_GPMI_TIMING0_DATA_HOLD(data_hold_cycles) | BF_GPMI_TIMING0_DATA_SETUP(data_setup_cycles); - hw->timing1 = BF_GPMI_TIMING1_BUSY_TIMEOUT(busy_timeout_cycles * 4096); + hw->timing1 = BF_GPMI_TIMING1_BUSY_TIMEOUT(DIV_ROUND_UP(busy_timeout_cycles, 4096)); /* * Derive NFC ideal delay from {3}: From 0e75acbe1b7683026cdbcd1a95107ba42eb3cfbb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Edward Wu Date: Fri, 17 Jun 2022 11:32:20 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0706/1091] ata: libata: add qc->flags in ata_qc_complete_template tracepoint commit 540a92bfe6dab7310b9df2e488ba247d784d0163 upstream. Add flags value to check the result of ata completion Fixes: 255c03d15a29 ("libata: Add tracepoints") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Edward Wu Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/trace/events/libata.h | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/include/trace/events/libata.h b/include/trace/events/libata.h index ab69434e2329..72e785a903b6 100644 --- a/include/trace/events/libata.h +++ b/include/trace/events/libata.h @@ -249,6 +249,7 @@ DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(ata_qc_complete_template, __entry->hob_feature = qc->result_tf.hob_feature; __entry->nsect = qc->result_tf.nsect; __entry->hob_nsect = qc->result_tf.hob_nsect; + __entry->flags = qc->flags; ), TP_printk("ata_port=%u ata_dev=%u tag=%d flags=%s status=%s " \ From 1f350f3cf0c135c479a79899ee96c1cda8b669bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nikos Tsironis Date: Tue, 21 Jun 2022 15:24:03 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 0707/1091] dm era: commit metadata in postsuspend after worker stops commit 9ae6e8b1c9bbf6874163d1243e393137313762b7 upstream. During postsuspend dm-era does the following: 1. Archives the current era 2. Commits the metadata, as part of the RPC call for archiving the current era 3. Stops the worker Until the worker stops, it might write to the metadata again. Moreover, these writes are not flushed to disk immediately, but are cached by the dm-bufio client, which writes them back asynchronously. As a result, the committed metadata of a suspended dm-era device might not be consistent with the in-core metadata. In some cases, this can result in the corruption of the on-disk metadata. Suppose the following sequence of events: 1. Load a new table, e.g. a snapshot-origin table, to a device with a dm-era table 2. Suspend the device 3. dm-era commits its metadata, but the worker does a few more metadata writes until it stops, as part of digesting an archived writeset 4. These writes are cached by the dm-bufio client 5. Load the dm-era table to another device. 6. The new instance of the dm-era target loads the committed, on-disk metadata, which don't include the extra writes done by the worker after the metadata commit. 7. Resume the new device 8. The new dm-era target instance starts using the metadata 9. Resume the original device 10. The destructor of the old dm-era target instance is called and destroys the dm-bufio client, which results in flushing the cached writes to disk 11. These writes might overwrite the writes done by the new dm-era instance, hence corrupting its metadata. Fix this by committing the metadata after the worker stops running. stop_worker uses flush_workqueue to flush the current work. However, the work item may re-queue itself and flush_workqueue doesn't wait for re-queued works to finish. This could result in the worker changing the metadata after they have been committed, or writing to the metadata concurrently with the commit in the postsuspend thread. Use drain_workqueue instead, which waits until the work and all re-queued works finish. Fixes: eec40579d8487 ("dm: add era target") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.15+ Signed-off-by: Nikos Tsironis Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/md/dm-era-target.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-era-target.c b/drivers/md/dm-era-target.c index 6b0b3a13ab4a..418f590b99b8 100644 --- a/drivers/md/dm-era-target.c +++ b/drivers/md/dm-era-target.c @@ -1397,7 +1397,7 @@ static void start_worker(struct era *era) static void stop_worker(struct era *era) { atomic_set(&era->suspended, 1); - flush_workqueue(era->wq); + drain_workqueue(era->wq); } /*---------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -1581,6 +1581,12 @@ static void era_postsuspend(struct dm_target *ti) } stop_worker(era); + + r = metadata_commit(era->md); + if (r) { + DMERR("%s: metadata_commit failed", __func__); + /* FIXME: fail mode */ + } } static int era_preresume(struct dm_target *ti) From 06a24ddba93aa0ceabf05cd91f679ba5d20d4cbd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mikulas Patocka Date: Thu, 23 Jun 2022 14:53:25 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 0708/1091] dm mirror log: clear log bits up to BITS_PER_LONG boundary commit 90736eb3232d208ee048493f371075e4272e0944 upstream. Commit 85e123c27d5c ("dm mirror log: round up region bitmap size to BITS_PER_LONG") introduced a regression on 64-bit architectures in the lvm testsuite tests: lvcreate-mirror, mirror-names and vgsplit-operation. If the device is shrunk, we need to clear log bits beyond the end of the device. The code clears bits up to a 32-bit boundary and then calculates lc->sync_count by summing set bits up to a 64-bit boundary (the commit changed that; previously, this boundary was 32-bit too). So, it was using some non-zeroed bits in the calculation and this caused misbehavior. Fix this regression by clearing bits up to BITS_PER_LONG boundary. Fixes: 85e123c27d5c ("dm mirror log: round up region bitmap size to BITS_PER_LONG") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Benjamin Marzinski Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/md/dm-log.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-log.c b/drivers/md/dm-log.c index 8b15f53cbdd9..fe3a9473f338 100644 --- a/drivers/md/dm-log.c +++ b/drivers/md/dm-log.c @@ -615,7 +615,7 @@ static int disk_resume(struct dm_dirty_log *log) log_clear_bit(lc, lc->clean_bits, i); /* clear any old bits -- device has shrunk */ - for (i = lc->region_count; i % (sizeof(*lc->clean_bits) << BYTE_SHIFT); i++) + for (i = lc->region_count; i % BITS_PER_LONG; i++) log_clear_bit(lc, lc->clean_bits, i); /* copy clean across to sync */ From ae183969bd66d0e05a7a7f3803859345d561f291 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Thu, 16 Jun 2022 15:00:51 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0709/1091] random: quiet urandom warning ratelimit suppression message commit c01d4d0a82b71857be7449380338bc53dde2da92 upstream. random.c ratelimits how much it warns about uninitialized urandom reads using __ratelimit(). When the RNG is finally initialized, it prints the number of missed messages due to ratelimiting. It has been this way since that functionality was introduced back in 2018. Recently, cc1e127bfa95 ("random: remove ratelimiting for in-kernel unseeded randomness") put a bit more stress on the urandom ratelimiting, which teased out a bug in the implementation. Specifically, when under pressure, __ratelimit() will print its own message and reset the count back to 0, making the final message at the end less useful. Secondly, it does so as a pr_warn(), which apparently is undesirable for people's CI. Fortunately, __ratelimit() has the RATELIMIT_MSG_ON_RELEASE flag exactly for this purpose, so we set the flag. Fixes: 4e00b339e264 ("random: rate limit unseeded randomness warnings") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Jon Hunter Reported-by: Ron Economos Tested-by: Ron Economos Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 2 +- include/linux/ratelimit.h | 12 ++++++++---- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index ca5212fbe97f..b86bee9284fa 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ static RAW_NOTIFIER_HEAD(random_ready_chain); /* Control how we warn userspace. */ static struct ratelimit_state urandom_warning = - RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT("warn_urandom_randomness", HZ, 3); + RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT_FLAGS("urandom_warning", HZ, 3, RATELIMIT_MSG_ON_RELEASE); static int ratelimit_disable __read_mostly = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM); module_param_named(ratelimit_disable, ratelimit_disable, int, 0644); diff --git a/include/linux/ratelimit.h b/include/linux/ratelimit.h index 8ddf79e9207a..1df12e8dde6f 100644 --- a/include/linux/ratelimit.h +++ b/include/linux/ratelimit.h @@ -23,12 +23,16 @@ struct ratelimit_state { unsigned long flags; }; -#define RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT(name, interval_init, burst_init) { \ - .lock = __RAW_SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(name.lock), \ - .interval = interval_init, \ - .burst = burst_init, \ +#define RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT_FLAGS(name, interval_init, burst_init, flags_init) { \ + .lock = __RAW_SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(name.lock), \ + .interval = interval_init, \ + .burst = burst_init, \ + .flags = flags_init, \ } +#define RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT(name, interval_init, burst_init) \ + RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT_FLAGS(name, interval_init, burst_init, 0) + #define RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT_DISABLED \ RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT(ratelimit_state, 0, DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_BURST) From 613c849d73df60b54fd1542fd9cb6cd667925ba3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Carlo Lobrano Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 09:56:23 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0710/1091] USB: serial: option: add Telit LE910Cx 0x1250 composition commit 342fc0c3b345525da21112bd0478a0dc741598ea upstream. Add support for the following Telit LE910Cx composition: 0x1250: rmnet, tty, tty, tty, tty Reviewed-by: Daniele Palmas Signed-off-by: Carlo Lobrano Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220614075623.2392607-1-c.lobrano@gmail.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/serial/option.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/option.c b/drivers/usb/serial/option.c index ec4fdb814091..cd7d08e50d70 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/serial/option.c +++ b/drivers/usb/serial/option.c @@ -1279,6 +1279,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id option_ids[] = { .driver_info = NCTRL(0) | RSVD(1) | RSVD(2) }, { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, 0x1231, 0xff), /* Telit LE910Cx (RNDIS) */ .driver_info = NCTRL(2) | RSVD(3) }, + { USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, 0x1250, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00) }, /* Telit LE910Cx (rmnet) */ { USB_DEVICE(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, 0x1260), .driver_info = NCTRL(0) | RSVD(1) | RSVD(2) }, { USB_DEVICE(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, 0x1261), From ea7b23eadebca52f149395686646741809138407 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yonglin Tan Date: Tue, 21 Jun 2022 20:37:53 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0711/1091] USB: serial: option: add Quectel EM05-G modem commit 33b29dbb39bcbd0a96e440646396bbf670b914fa upstream. The EM05-G modem has 2 USB configurations that are configurable via the AT command AT+QCFG="usbnet",[ 0 | 2 ] which make the modem enumerate with the following interfaces, respectively: "RMNET" : AT + DIAG + NMEA + Modem + QMI "MBIM" : MBIM + AT + DIAG + NMEA + Modem The detailed description of the USB configuration for each mode as follows: RMNET Mode -------------- T: Bus=01 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=00 Cnt=01 Dev#= 21 Spd=480 MxCh= 0 D: Ver= 2.00 Cls=ef(misc ) Sub=02 Prot=01 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1 P: Vendor=2c7c ProdID=030a Rev= 3.18 S: Manufacturer=Quectel S: Product=Quectel EM05-G C:* #Ifs= 5 Cfg#= 1 Atr=a0 MxPwr=500mA I:* If#= 3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option E: Ad=81(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=01(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms I:* If#= 4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option E: Ad=83(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 10 Ivl=32ms E: Ad=82(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=02(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms I:* If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option E: Ad=85(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 10 Ivl=32ms E: Ad=84(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=03(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms I:* If#= 5 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option E: Ad=87(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 10 Ivl=32ms E: Ad=86(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=04(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms I:* If#= 6 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=(none) E: Ad=89(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 8 Ivl=32ms E: Ad=88(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=05(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms MBIM Mode -------------- T: Bus=01 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=00 Cnt=01 Dev#= 16 Spd=480 MxCh= 0 D: Ver= 2.00 Cls=ef(misc ) Sub=02 Prot=01 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1 P: Vendor=2c7c ProdID=030a Rev= 3.18 S: Manufacturer=Quectel S: Product=Quectel EM05-G C:* #Ifs= 6 Cfg#= 1 Atr=a0 MxPwr=500mA A: FirstIf#= 0 IfCount= 2 Cls=02(comm.) Sub=0e Prot=00 I:* If#= 3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option E: Ad=81(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=01(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms I:* If#= 4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option E: Ad=83(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 10 Ivl=32ms E: Ad=82(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=02(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms I:* If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option E: Ad=85(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 10 Ivl=32ms E: Ad=84(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=03(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms I:* If#= 5 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option E: Ad=87(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 10 Ivl=32ms E: Ad=86(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=04(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms I:* If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=02(comm.) Sub=0e Prot=00 Driver=cdc_mbim E: Ad=89(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 64 Ivl=32ms I: If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 0 Cls=0a(data ) Sub=00 Prot=02 Driver=cdc_mbim I:* If#= 1 Alt= 1 #EPs= 2 Cls=0a(data ) Sub=00 Prot=02 Driver=cdc_mbim E: Ad=88(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=05(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms Signed-off-by: Yonglin Tan Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/serial/option.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/option.c b/drivers/usb/serial/option.c index cd7d08e50d70..2f8c04d2d7e6 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/serial/option.c +++ b/drivers/usb/serial/option.c @@ -252,6 +252,7 @@ static void option_instat_callback(struct urb *urb); #define QUECTEL_PRODUCT_EG95 0x0195 #define QUECTEL_PRODUCT_BG96 0x0296 #define QUECTEL_PRODUCT_EP06 0x0306 +#define QUECTEL_PRODUCT_EM05G 0x030a #define QUECTEL_PRODUCT_EM12 0x0512 #define QUECTEL_PRODUCT_RM500Q 0x0800 #define QUECTEL_PRODUCT_EC200S_CN 0x6002 @@ -1134,6 +1135,8 @@ static const struct usb_device_id option_ids[] = { { USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(QUECTEL_VENDOR_ID, QUECTEL_PRODUCT_EP06, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff), .driver_info = RSVD(1) | RSVD(2) | RSVD(3) | RSVD(4) | NUMEP2 }, { USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(QUECTEL_VENDOR_ID, QUECTEL_PRODUCT_EP06, 0xff, 0, 0) }, + { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(QUECTEL_VENDOR_ID, QUECTEL_PRODUCT_EM05G, 0xff), + .driver_info = RSVD(6) | ZLP }, { USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(QUECTEL_VENDOR_ID, QUECTEL_PRODUCT_EM12, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff), .driver_info = RSVD(1) | RSVD(2) | RSVD(3) | RSVD(4) | NUMEP2 }, { USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(QUECTEL_VENDOR_ID, QUECTEL_PRODUCT_EM12, 0xff, 0, 0) }, From f074ab2539887d051717b1495cffdd277ca9394c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Macpaul Lin Date: Thu, 23 Jun 2022 16:56:44 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0712/1091] USB: serial: option: add Quectel RM500K module support commit 15b694e96c31807d8515aacfa687a1e8a4fbbadc upstream. Add usb product id of the Quectel RM500K module. RM500K provides 2 mandatory interfaces to Linux host after enumeration. - /dev/ttyUSB5: this is a serial interface for control path. User needs to write AT commands to this device node to query status, set APN, set PIN code, and enable/disable the data connection to 5G network. - ethX: this is the data path provided as a RNDIS devices. After the data connection has been established, Linux host can access 5G data network via this interface. "RNDIS": RNDIS + ADB + AT (/dev/ttyUSB5) + MODEM COMs usb-devices output for 0x7001: T: Bus=05 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=00 Cnt=01 Dev#= 3 Spd=480 MxCh= 0 D: Ver= 2.10 Cls=ef(misc ) Sub=02 Prot=01 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1 P: Vendor=2c7c ProdID=7001 Rev=00.01 S: Manufacturer=MediaTek Inc. S: Product=USB DATA CARD S: SerialNumber=869206050009672 C: #Ifs=10 Cfg#= 1 Atr=a0 MxPwr=500mA I: If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=02(commc) Sub=02 Prot=ff Driver=rndis_host E: Ad=82(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 64 Ivl=125us I: If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=0a(data ) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=rndis_host E: Ad=01(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=81(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms I: If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option E: Ad=02(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=83(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms I: If#= 3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option E: Ad=03(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=84(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms I: If#= 4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option E: Ad=04(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=85(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms I: If#= 5 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=42 Prot=01 Driver=(none) E: Ad=05(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=86(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms I: If#= 6 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option E: Ad=06(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=87(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms I: If#= 7 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option E: Ad=07(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=88(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms I: If#= 8 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option E: Ad=08(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=89(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms I: If#= 9 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option E: Ad=09(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=8a(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms Co-developed-by: Ballon Shi Signed-off-by: Ballon Shi Signed-off-by: Macpaul Lin Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/serial/option.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/option.c b/drivers/usb/serial/option.c index 2f8c04d2d7e6..2317ed357d8e 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/serial/option.c +++ b/drivers/usb/serial/option.c @@ -257,6 +257,7 @@ static void option_instat_callback(struct urb *urb); #define QUECTEL_PRODUCT_RM500Q 0x0800 #define QUECTEL_PRODUCT_EC200S_CN 0x6002 #define QUECTEL_PRODUCT_EC200T 0x6026 +#define QUECTEL_PRODUCT_RM500K 0x7001 #define CMOTECH_VENDOR_ID 0x16d8 #define CMOTECH_PRODUCT_6001 0x6001 @@ -1150,6 +1151,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id option_ids[] = { .driver_info = ZLP }, { USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(QUECTEL_VENDOR_ID, QUECTEL_PRODUCT_EC200S_CN, 0xff, 0, 0) }, { USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(QUECTEL_VENDOR_ID, QUECTEL_PRODUCT_EC200T, 0xff, 0, 0) }, + { USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(QUECTEL_VENDOR_ID, QUECTEL_PRODUCT_RM500K, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00) }, { USB_DEVICE(CMOTECH_VENDOR_ID, CMOTECH_PRODUCT_6001) }, { USB_DEVICE(CMOTECH_VENDOR_ID, CMOTECH_PRODUCT_CMU_300) }, From 8ffe2e50e9678c8373027492035f094b130437f1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jon Maxwell Date: Wed, 15 Jun 2022 11:15:40 +1000 Subject: [PATCH 0713/1091] bpf: Fix request_sock leak in sk lookup helpers [ Upstream commit 3046a827316c0e55fc563b4fb78c93b9ca5c7c37 ] A customer reported a request_socket leak in a Calico cloud environment. We found that a BPF program was doing a socket lookup with takes a refcnt on the socket and that it was finding the request_socket but returning the parent LISTEN socket via sk_to_full_sk() without decrementing the child request socket 1st, resulting in request_sock slab object leak. This patch retains the existing behaviour of returning full socks to the caller but it also decrements the child request_socket if one is present before doing so to prevent the leak. Thanks to Curtis Taylor for all the help in diagnosing and testing this. And thanks to Antoine Tenart for the reproducer and patch input. v2 of this patch contains, refactor as per Daniel Borkmann's suggestions to validate RCU flags on the listen socket so that it balances with bpf_sk_release() and update comments as per Martin KaFai Lau's suggestion. One small change to Daniels suggestion, put "sk = sk2" under "if (sk2 != sk)" to avoid an extra instruction. Fixes: f7355a6c0497 ("bpf: Check sk_fullsock() before returning from bpf_sk_lookup()") Fixes: edbf8c01de5a ("bpf: add skc_lookup_tcp helper") Co-developed-by: Antoine Tenart Signed-off-by: Antoine Tenart Signed-off-by: Jon Maxwell Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Tested-by: Curtis Taylor Cc: Martin KaFai Lau Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/56d6f898-bde0-bb25-3427-12a330b29fb8@iogearbox.net Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220615011540.813025-1-jmaxwell37@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/core/filter.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c index b0df4ddbe30c..eba96343c7af 100644 --- a/net/core/filter.c +++ b/net/core/filter.c @@ -5313,10 +5313,21 @@ __bpf_sk_lookup(struct sk_buff *skb, struct bpf_sock_tuple *tuple, u32 len, ifindex, proto, netns_id, flags); if (sk) { - sk = sk_to_full_sk(sk); - if (!sk_fullsock(sk)) { + struct sock *sk2 = sk_to_full_sk(sk); + + /* sk_to_full_sk() may return (sk)->rsk_listener, so make sure the original sk + * sock refcnt is decremented to prevent a request_sock leak. + */ + if (!sk_fullsock(sk2)) + sk2 = NULL; + if (sk2 != sk) { sock_gen_put(sk); - return NULL; + /* Ensure there is no need to bump sk2 refcnt */ + if (unlikely(sk2 && !sock_flag(sk2, SOCK_RCU_FREE))) { + WARN_ONCE(1, "Found non-RCU, unreferenced socket!"); + return NULL; + } + sk = sk2; } } @@ -5350,10 +5361,21 @@ bpf_sk_lookup(struct sk_buff *skb, struct bpf_sock_tuple *tuple, u32 len, flags); if (sk) { - sk = sk_to_full_sk(sk); - if (!sk_fullsock(sk)) { + struct sock *sk2 = sk_to_full_sk(sk); + + /* sk_to_full_sk() may return (sk)->rsk_listener, so make sure the original sk + * sock refcnt is decremented to prevent a request_sock leak. + */ + if (!sk_fullsock(sk2)) + sk2 = NULL; + if (sk2 != sk) { sock_gen_put(sk); - return NULL; + /* Ensure there is no need to bump sk2 refcnt */ + if (unlikely(sk2 && !sock_flag(sk2, SOCK_RCU_FREE))) { + WARN_ONCE(1, "Found non-RCU, unreferenced socket!"); + return NULL; + } + sk = sk2; } } From 104a59b74577cfb4be0964452573f39bc1b9d998 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Claudiu Manoil Date: Fri, 10 Jun 2022 11:40:37 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 0714/1091] phy: aquantia: Fix AN when higher speeds than 1G are not advertised [ Upstream commit 9b7fd1670a94a57d974795acebde843a5c1a354e ] Even when the eth port is resticted to work with speeds not higher than 1G, and so the eth driver is requesting the phy (via phylink) to advertise up to 1000BASET support, the aquantia phy device is still advertising for 2.5G and 5G speeds. Clear these advertising defaults when requested. Cc: Ondrej Spacek Fixes: 09c4c57f7bc41 ("net: phy: aquantia: add support for auto-negotiation configuration") Signed-off-by: Claudiu Manoil Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220610084037.7625-1-claudiu.manoil@nxp.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/phy/aquantia_main.c | 15 ++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/phy/aquantia_main.c b/drivers/net/phy/aquantia_main.c index 975789d9349d..75d8351ee250 100644 --- a/drivers/net/phy/aquantia_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/phy/aquantia_main.c @@ -34,6 +34,8 @@ #define MDIO_AN_VEND_PROV 0xc400 #define MDIO_AN_VEND_PROV_1000BASET_FULL BIT(15) #define MDIO_AN_VEND_PROV_1000BASET_HALF BIT(14) +#define MDIO_AN_VEND_PROV_5000BASET_FULL BIT(11) +#define MDIO_AN_VEND_PROV_2500BASET_FULL BIT(10) #define MDIO_AN_VEND_PROV_DOWNSHIFT_EN BIT(4) #define MDIO_AN_VEND_PROV_DOWNSHIFT_MASK GENMASK(3, 0) #define MDIO_AN_VEND_PROV_DOWNSHIFT_DFLT 4 @@ -230,9 +232,20 @@ static int aqr_config_aneg(struct phy_device *phydev) phydev->advertising)) reg |= MDIO_AN_VEND_PROV_1000BASET_HALF; + /* Handle the case when the 2.5G and 5G speeds are not advertised */ + if (linkmode_test_bit(ETHTOOL_LINK_MODE_2500baseT_Full_BIT, + phydev->advertising)) + reg |= MDIO_AN_VEND_PROV_2500BASET_FULL; + + if (linkmode_test_bit(ETHTOOL_LINK_MODE_5000baseT_Full_BIT, + phydev->advertising)) + reg |= MDIO_AN_VEND_PROV_5000BASET_FULL; + ret = phy_modify_mmd_changed(phydev, MDIO_MMD_AN, MDIO_AN_VEND_PROV, MDIO_AN_VEND_PROV_1000BASET_HALF | - MDIO_AN_VEND_PROV_1000BASET_FULL, reg); + MDIO_AN_VEND_PROV_1000BASET_FULL | + MDIO_AN_VEND_PROV_2500BASET_FULL | + MDIO_AN_VEND_PROV_5000BASET_FULL, reg); if (ret < 0) return ret; if (ret > 0) From 47d31b97bf47853093afe325986d3415c0c271b5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jay Vosburgh Date: Thu, 16 Jun 2022 12:32:40 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0715/1091] bonding: ARP monitor spams NETDEV_NOTIFY_PEERS notifiers [ Upstream commit 7a9214f3d88cfdb099f3896e102a306b316d8707 ] The bonding ARP monitor fails to decrement send_peer_notif, the number of peer notifications (gratuitous ARP or ND) to be sent. This results in a continuous series of notifications. Correct this by decrementing the counter for each notification. Reported-by: Jonathan Toppins Signed-off-by: Jay Vosburgh Fixes: b0929915e035 ("bonding: Fix RTNL: assertion failed at net/core/rtnetlink.c for ab arp monitor") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/b2fd4147-8f50-bebd-963a-1a3e8d1d9715@redhat.com/ Tested-by: Jonathan Toppins Reviewed-by: Jonathan Toppins Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/9400.1655407960@famine Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c index d6ecd03b6045..246bcbd650b4 100644 --- a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c @@ -3071,9 +3071,11 @@ re_arm: if (!rtnl_trylock()) return; - if (should_notify_peers) + if (should_notify_peers) { + bond->send_peer_notif--; call_netdevice_notifiers(NETDEV_NOTIFY_PEERS, bond->dev); + } if (should_notify_rtnl) { bond_slave_state_notify(bond); bond_slave_link_notify(bond); From f1f9c2a5a3d98b2f14ac73e360d8c54b991d2f9d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peilin Ye Date: Thu, 16 Jun 2022 16:43:36 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0716/1091] net/sched: sch_netem: Fix arithmetic in netem_dump() for 32-bit platforms [ Upstream commit a2b1a5d40bd12b44322c2ccd40bb0ec1699708b6 ] As reported by Yuming, currently tc always show a latency of UINT_MAX for netem Qdisc's on 32-bit platforms: $ tc qdisc add dev dummy0 root netem latency 100ms $ tc qdisc show dev dummy0 qdisc netem 8001: root refcnt 2 limit 1000 delay 275s 275s ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Let us take a closer look at netem_dump(): qopt.latency = min_t(psched_tdiff_t, PSCHED_NS2TICKS(q->latency, UINT_MAX); qopt.latency is __u32, psched_tdiff_t is signed long, (psched_tdiff_t)(UINT_MAX) is negative for 32-bit platforms, so qopt.latency is always UINT_MAX. Fix it by using psched_time_t (u64) instead. Note: confusingly, users have two ways to specify 'latency': 1. normally, via '__u32 latency' in struct tc_netem_qopt; 2. via the TCA_NETEM_LATENCY64 attribute, which is s64. For the second case, theoretically 'latency' could be negative. This patch ignores that corner case, since it is broken (i.e. assigning a negative s64 to __u32) anyways, and should be handled separately. Thanks Ted Lin for the analysis [1] . [1] https://github.com/raspberrypi/linux/issues/3512 Reported-by: Yuming Chen Fixes: 112f9cb65643 ("netem: convert to qdisc_watchdog_schedule_ns") Reviewed-by: Cong Wang Signed-off-by: Peilin Ye Acked-by: Stephen Hemminger Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220616234336.2443-1-yepeilin.cs@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/sched/sch_netem.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/sched/sch_netem.c b/net/sched/sch_netem.c index f4101a920d1f..1802f134aa40 100644 --- a/net/sched/sch_netem.c +++ b/net/sched/sch_netem.c @@ -1146,9 +1146,9 @@ static int netem_dump(struct Qdisc *sch, struct sk_buff *skb) struct tc_netem_rate rate; struct tc_netem_slot slot; - qopt.latency = min_t(psched_tdiff_t, PSCHED_NS2TICKS(q->latency), + qopt.latency = min_t(psched_time_t, PSCHED_NS2TICKS(q->latency), UINT_MAX); - qopt.jitter = min_t(psched_tdiff_t, PSCHED_NS2TICKS(q->jitter), + qopt.jitter = min_t(psched_time_t, PSCHED_NS2TICKS(q->jitter), UINT_MAX); qopt.limit = q->limit; qopt.loss = q->loss; From d1592d3e362cc59b29f15019707b16c695d70ca3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miaoqian Lin Date: Tue, 7 Jun 2022 15:08:38 +0400 Subject: [PATCH 0717/1091] drm/msm/mdp4: Fix refcount leak in mdp4_modeset_init_intf [ Upstream commit b9cc4598607cb7f7eae5c75fc1e3209cd52ff5e0 ] of_graph_get_remote_node() returns remote device node pointer with refcount incremented, we should use of_node_put() on it when not need anymore. Add missing of_node_put() to avoid refcount leak. Fixes: 86418f90a4c1 ("drm: convert drivers to use of_graph_get_remote_node") Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin Reviewed-by: Dmitry Baryshkov Reviewed-by: Stephen Boyd Reviewed-by: Abhinav Kumar Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/488473/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220607110841.53889-1-linmq006@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Rob Clark Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/mdp4/mdp4_kms.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/mdp4/mdp4_kms.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/mdp4/mdp4_kms.c index 4f0c6d58e06f..f0a5767b69f5 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/mdp4/mdp4_kms.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/mdp4/mdp4_kms.c @@ -245,6 +245,7 @@ static int mdp4_modeset_init_intf(struct mdp4_kms *mdp4_kms, encoder = mdp4_lcdc_encoder_init(dev, panel_node); if (IS_ERR(encoder)) { DRM_DEV_ERROR(dev->dev, "failed to construct LCDC encoder\n"); + of_node_put(panel_node); return PTR_ERR(encoder); } @@ -254,6 +255,7 @@ static int mdp4_modeset_init_intf(struct mdp4_kms *mdp4_kms, connector = mdp4_lvds_connector_init(dev, panel_node, encoder); if (IS_ERR(connector)) { DRM_DEV_ERROR(dev->dev, "failed to initialize LVDS connector\n"); + of_node_put(panel_node); return PTR_ERR(connector); } From 02da602bc2f353dccd9e489a604490034ded941e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Mon, 20 Jun 2022 01:35:06 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0718/1091] erspan: do not assume transport header is always set [ Upstream commit 301bd140ed0b24f0da660874c7e8a47dad8c8222 ] Rewrite tests in ip6erspan_tunnel_xmit() and erspan_fb_xmit() to not assume transport header is set. syzbot reported: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1350 at include/linux/skbuff.h:2911 skb_transport_header include/linux/skbuff.h:2911 [inline] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1350 at include/linux/skbuff.h:2911 ip6erspan_tunnel_xmit+0x15af/0x2eb0 net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c:963 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 1350 Comm: aoe_tx0 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc2-syzkaller-00160-g274295c6e53f #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:skb_transport_header include/linux/skbuff.h:2911 [inline] RIP: 0010:ip6erspan_tunnel_xmit+0x15af/0x2eb0 net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c:963 Code: 0f 47 f0 40 88 b5 7f fe ff ff e8 8c 16 4b f9 89 de bf ff ff ff ff e8 a0 12 4b f9 66 83 fb ff 0f 85 1d f1 ff ff e8 71 16 4b f9 <0f> 0b e9 43 f0 ff ff e8 65 16 4b f9 48 8d 85 30 ff ff ff ba 60 00 RSP: 0018:ffffc90005daf910 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 000000000000ffff RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff88801f032100 RSI: ffffffff882e8d3f RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: ffffc90005dafab8 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 000000000000ffff R10: 000000000000ffff R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888024f21d40 R13: 000000000000a288 R14: 00000000000000b0 R15: ffff888025a2e000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88802c800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000001b2e425000 CR3: 000000006d099000 CR4: 0000000000152ef0 Call Trace: __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4805 [inline] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4819 [inline] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3588 [inline] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x188/0x880 net/core/dev.c:3604 sch_direct_xmit+0x19f/0xbe0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:342 __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3815 [inline] __dev_queue_xmit+0x14a1/0x3900 net/core/dev.c:4219 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:2994 [inline] tx+0x6a/0xc0 drivers/block/aoe/aoenet.c:63 kthread+0x1e7/0x3b0 drivers/block/aoe/aoecmd.c:1229 kthread+0x2e9/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:376 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:302 Fixes: d5db21a3e697 ("erspan: auto detect truncated ipv6 packets.") Reported-by: syzbot Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Cc: William Tu Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/ipv4/ip_gre.c | 15 ++++++++++----- net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c | 15 ++++++++++----- 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_gre.c b/net/ipv4/ip_gre.c index 614410a6db44..52dbffb7bc2f 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/ip_gre.c +++ b/net/ipv4/ip_gre.c @@ -497,7 +497,6 @@ static void erspan_fb_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev) int tunnel_hlen; int version; int nhoff; - int thoff; tun_info = skb_tunnel_info(skb); if (unlikely(!tun_info || !(tun_info->mode & IP_TUNNEL_INFO_TX) || @@ -531,10 +530,16 @@ static void erspan_fb_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev) (ntohs(ip_hdr(skb)->tot_len) > skb->len - nhoff)) truncate = true; - thoff = skb_transport_header(skb) - skb_mac_header(skb); - if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6) && - (ntohs(ipv6_hdr(skb)->payload_len) > skb->len - thoff)) - truncate = true; + if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) { + int thoff; + + if (skb_transport_header_was_set(skb)) + thoff = skb_transport_header(skb) - skb_mac_header(skb); + else + thoff = nhoff + sizeof(struct ipv6hdr); + if (ntohs(ipv6_hdr(skb)->payload_len) > skb->len - thoff) + truncate = true; + } if (version == 1) { erspan_build_header(skb, ntohl(tunnel_id_to_key32(key->tun_id)), diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c index e550db28aabb..4a6396d574a0 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c @@ -927,7 +927,6 @@ static netdev_tx_t ip6erspan_tunnel_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, __be16 proto; __u32 mtu; int nhoff; - int thoff; if (!pskb_inet_may_pull(skb)) goto tx_err; @@ -948,10 +947,16 @@ static netdev_tx_t ip6erspan_tunnel_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, (ntohs(ip_hdr(skb)->tot_len) > skb->len - nhoff)) truncate = true; - thoff = skb_transport_header(skb) - skb_mac_header(skb); - if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6) && - (ntohs(ipv6_hdr(skb)->payload_len) > skb->len - thoff)) - truncate = true; + if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) { + int thoff; + + if (skb_transport_header_was_set(skb)) + thoff = skb_transport_header(skb) - skb_mac_header(skb); + else + thoff = nhoff + sizeof(struct ipv6hdr); + if (ntohs(ipv6_hdr(skb)->payload_len) > skb->len - thoff) + truncate = true; + } if (skb_cow_head(skb, dev->needed_headroom ?: t->hlen)) goto tx_err; From 05c6c36c79311d9a00a79f88647f83a7cf009624 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ziyang Xuan Date: Mon, 20 Jun 2022 12:35:08 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0719/1091] net/tls: fix tls_sk_proto_close executed repeatedly [ Upstream commit 69135c572d1f84261a6de2a1268513a7e71753e2 ] After setting the sock ktls, update ctx->sk_proto to sock->sk_prot by tls_update(), so now ctx->sk_proto->close is tls_sk_proto_close(). When close the sock, tls_sk_proto_close() is called for sock->sk_prot->close is tls_sk_proto_close(). But ctx->sk_proto->close() will be executed later in tls_sk_proto_close(). Thus tls_sk_proto_close() executed repeatedly occurred. That will trigger the following bug. ================================================================= KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000010-0x0000000000000017] RIP: 0010:tls_sk_proto_close+0xd8/0xaf0 net/tls/tls_main.c:306 Call Trace: tls_sk_proto_close+0x356/0xaf0 net/tls/tls_main.c:329 inet_release+0x12e/0x280 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:428 __sock_release+0xcd/0x280 net/socket.c:650 sock_close+0x18/0x20 net/socket.c:1365 Updating a proto which is same with sock->sk_prot is incorrect. Add proto and sock->sk_prot equality check at the head of tls_update() to fix it. Fixes: 95fa145479fb ("bpf: sockmap/tls, close can race with map free") Reported-by: syzbot+29c3c12f3214b85ad081@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/tls/tls_main.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/tls/tls_main.c b/net/tls/tls_main.c index 7aba4ee77aba..df9177d96f7f 100644 --- a/net/tls/tls_main.c +++ b/net/tls/tls_main.c @@ -803,6 +803,9 @@ static void tls_update(struct sock *sk, struct proto *p, { struct tls_context *ctx; + if (sk->sk_prot == p) + return; + ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); if (likely(ctx)) { ctx->sk_write_space = write_space; From c7bdaad9cbfe17c83e4f56c7bb7a2d87d944f0fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gerd Hoffmann Date: Mon, 20 Jun 2022 09:15:47 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0720/1091] udmabuf: add back sanity check [ Upstream commit 05b252cccb2e5c3f56119d25de684b4f810ba40a ] Check vm_fault->pgoff before using it. When we removed the warning, we also removed the check. Fixes: 7b26e4e2119d ("udmabuf: drop WARN_ON() check.") Reported-by: zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/dma-buf/udmabuf.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/dma-buf/udmabuf.c b/drivers/dma-buf/udmabuf.c index e553c6a937f6..c6e9b7bd7618 100644 --- a/drivers/dma-buf/udmabuf.c +++ b/drivers/dma-buf/udmabuf.c @@ -24,8 +24,11 @@ static vm_fault_t udmabuf_vm_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) { struct vm_area_struct *vma = vmf->vma; struct udmabuf *ubuf = vma->vm_private_data; + pgoff_t pgoff = vmf->pgoff; - vmf->page = ubuf->pages[vmf->pgoff]; + if (pgoff >= ubuf->pagecount) + return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS; + vmf->page = ubuf->pages[pgoff]; get_page(vmf->page); return 0; } From 788c954f194c6b32ade948c7bf4748dc7470771a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Julien Grall Date: Fri, 17 Jun 2022 11:30:37 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0721/1091] x86/xen: Remove undefined behavior in setup_features() [ Upstream commit ecb6237fa397b7b810d798ad19322eca466dbab1 ] 1 << 31 is undefined. So switch to 1U << 31. Fixes: 5ead97c84fa7 ("xen: Core Xen implementation") Signed-off-by: Julien Grall Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220617103037.57828-1-julien@xen.org Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/xen/features.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/xen/features.c b/drivers/xen/features.c index 25c053b09605..2c306de228db 100644 --- a/drivers/xen/features.c +++ b/drivers/xen/features.c @@ -29,6 +29,6 @@ void xen_setup_features(void) if (HYPERVISOR_xen_version(XENVER_get_features, &fi) < 0) break; for (j = 0; j < 32; j++) - xen_features[i * 32 + j] = !!(fi.submap & 1< Date: Fri, 10 Jun 2022 19:14:20 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0722/1091] MIPS: Remove repetitive increase irq_err_count [ Upstream commit c81aba8fde2aee4f5778ebab3a1d51bd2ef48e4c ] commit 979934da9e7a ("[PATCH] mips: update IRQ handling for vr41xx") added a function irq_dispatch, and it'll increase irq_err_count when the get_irq callback returns a negative value, but increase irq_err_count in get_irq was not removed. And also, modpost complains once gpio-vr41xx drivers become modules. ERROR: modpost: "irq_err_count" [drivers/gpio/gpio-vr41xx.ko] undefined! So it would be a good idea to remove repetitive increase irq_err_count in get_irq callback. Fixes: 27fdd325dace ("MIPS: Update VR41xx GPIO driver to use gpiolib") Fixes: 979934da9e7a ("[PATCH] mips: update IRQ handling for vr41xx") Reported-by: k2ci Signed-off-by: huhai Signed-off-by: Genjian Zhang Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/mips/vr41xx/common/icu.c | 2 -- drivers/gpio/gpio-vr41xx.c | 2 -- 2 files changed, 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/mips/vr41xx/common/icu.c b/arch/mips/vr41xx/common/icu.c index 7b7f25b4b057..9240bcdbe74e 100644 --- a/arch/mips/vr41xx/common/icu.c +++ b/arch/mips/vr41xx/common/icu.c @@ -640,8 +640,6 @@ static int icu_get_irq(unsigned int irq) printk(KERN_ERR "spurious ICU interrupt: %04x,%04x\n", pend1, pend2); - atomic_inc(&irq_err_count); - return -1; } diff --git a/drivers/gpio/gpio-vr41xx.c b/drivers/gpio/gpio-vr41xx.c index 98cd715ccc33..8d09b619c166 100644 --- a/drivers/gpio/gpio-vr41xx.c +++ b/drivers/gpio/gpio-vr41xx.c @@ -217,8 +217,6 @@ static int giu_get_irq(unsigned int irq) printk(KERN_ERR "spurious GIU interrupt: %04x(%04x),%04x(%04x)\n", maskl, pendl, maskh, pendh); - atomic_inc(&irq_err_count); - return -EINVAL; } From e3a232e5767051483ffad4cef7d0a89d292a192b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Howells Date: Tue, 21 Jun 2022 15:59:57 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0723/1091] afs: Fix dynamic root getattr [ Upstream commit cb78d1b5efffe4cf97e16766329dd7358aed3deb ] The recent patch to make afs_getattr consult the server didn't account for the pseudo-inodes employed by the dynamic root-type afs superblock not having a volume or a server to access, and thus an oops occurs if such a directory is stat'd. Fix this by checking to see if the vnode->volume pointer actually points anywhere before following it in afs_getattr(). This can be tested by stat'ing a directory in /afs. It may be sufficient just to do "ls /afs" and the oops looks something like: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000020 ... RIP: 0010:afs_getattr+0x8b/0x14b ... Call Trace: vfs_statx+0x79/0xf5 vfs_fstatat+0x49/0x62 Fixes: 2aeb8c86d499 ("afs: Fix afs_getattr() to refetch file status if callback break occurred") Reported-by: Marc Dionne Signed-off-by: David Howells Reviewed-by: Marc Dionne Tested-by: Marc Dionne cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/165408450783.1031787.7941404776393751186.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/afs/inode.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/afs/inode.c b/fs/afs/inode.c index 90eac3ec01cb..622363af4c1b 100644 --- a/fs/afs/inode.c +++ b/fs/afs/inode.c @@ -739,7 +739,8 @@ int afs_getattr(const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat, _enter("{ ino=%lu v=%u }", inode->i_ino, inode->i_generation); - if (!(query_flags & AT_STATX_DONT_SYNC) && + if (vnode->volume && + !(query_flags & AT_STATX_DONT_SYNC) && !test_bit(AFS_VNODE_CB_PROMISED, &vnode->flags)) { key = afs_request_key(vnode->volume->cell); if (IS_ERR(key)) From 844168a5dabf7453c9f2cb08f18564d4cdb8009f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Anatolii Gerasymenko Date: Mon, 20 Jun 2022 09:47:05 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0724/1091] ice: ethtool: advertise 1000M speeds properly [ Upstream commit c3d184c83ff4b80167e34edfc3d21df424bf27ff ] In current implementation ice_update_phy_type enables all link modes for selected speed. This approach doesn't work for 1000M speeds, because both copper (1000baseT) and optical (1000baseX) standards cannot be enabled at once. Fix this, by adding the function `ice_set_phy_type_from_speed()` for 1000M speeds. Fixes: 48cb27f2fd18 ("ice: Implement handlers for ethtool PHY/link operations") Signed-off-by: Anatolii Gerasymenko Tested-by: Gurucharan (A Contingent worker at Intel) Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_ethtool.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_ethtool.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_ethtool.c index fc9ff985a62b..b297a3ca22fc 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_ethtool.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_ethtool.c @@ -2337,6 +2337,42 @@ ice_setup_autoneg(struct ice_port_info *p, struct ethtool_link_ksettings *ks, return err; } +/** + * ice_set_phy_type_from_speed - set phy_types based on speeds + * and advertised modes + * @ks: ethtool link ksettings struct + * @phy_type_low: pointer to the lower part of phy_type + * @phy_type_high: pointer to the higher part of phy_type + * @adv_link_speed: targeted link speeds bitmap + */ +static void +ice_set_phy_type_from_speed(const struct ethtool_link_ksettings *ks, + u64 *phy_type_low, u64 *phy_type_high, + u16 adv_link_speed) +{ + /* Handle 1000M speed in a special way because ice_update_phy_type + * enables all link modes, but having mixed copper and optical + * standards is not supported. + */ + adv_link_speed &= ~ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_1000MB; + + if (ethtool_link_ksettings_test_link_mode(ks, advertising, + 1000baseT_Full)) + *phy_type_low |= ICE_PHY_TYPE_LOW_1000BASE_T | + ICE_PHY_TYPE_LOW_1G_SGMII; + + if (ethtool_link_ksettings_test_link_mode(ks, advertising, + 1000baseKX_Full)) + *phy_type_low |= ICE_PHY_TYPE_LOW_1000BASE_KX; + + if (ethtool_link_ksettings_test_link_mode(ks, advertising, + 1000baseX_Full)) + *phy_type_low |= ICE_PHY_TYPE_LOW_1000BASE_SX | + ICE_PHY_TYPE_LOW_1000BASE_LX; + + ice_update_phy_type(phy_type_low, phy_type_high, adv_link_speed); +} + /** * ice_set_link_ksettings - Set Speed and Duplex * @netdev: network interface device structure @@ -2472,7 +2508,8 @@ ice_set_link_ksettings(struct net_device *netdev, adv_link_speed = curr_link_speed; /* Convert the advertise link speeds to their corresponded PHY_TYPE */ - ice_update_phy_type(&phy_type_low, &phy_type_high, adv_link_speed); + ice_set_phy_type_from_speed(ks, &phy_type_low, &phy_type_high, + adv_link_speed); if (!autoneg_changed && adv_link_speed == curr_link_speed) { netdev_info(netdev, "Nothing changed, exiting without setting anything.\n"); From a5ed066bc2461659acbbbaf788a5c327d666e81d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Aidan MacDonald Date: Mon, 20 Jun 2022 21:05:56 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0725/1091] regmap-irq: Fix a bug in regmap_irq_enable() for type_in_mask chips [ Upstream commit 485037ae9a095491beb7f893c909a76cc4f9d1e7 ] When enabling a type_in_mask irq, the type_buf contents must be AND'd with the mask of the IRQ we're enabling to avoid enabling other IRQs by accident, which can happen if several type_in_mask irqs share a mask register. Fixes: bc998a730367 ("regmap: irq: handle HW using separate rising/falling edge interrupts") Signed-off-by: Aidan MacDonald Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220620200644.1961936-2-aidanmacdonald.0x0@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/base/regmap/regmap-irq.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/base/regmap/regmap-irq.c b/drivers/base/regmap/regmap-irq.c index 3d64c9331a82..3c1e554df4eb 100644 --- a/drivers/base/regmap/regmap-irq.c +++ b/drivers/base/regmap/regmap-irq.c @@ -214,6 +214,7 @@ static void regmap_irq_enable(struct irq_data *data) struct regmap_irq_chip_data *d = irq_data_get_irq_chip_data(data); struct regmap *map = d->map; const struct regmap_irq *irq_data = irq_to_regmap_irq(d, data->hwirq); + unsigned int reg = irq_data->reg_offset / map->reg_stride; unsigned int mask, type; type = irq_data->type.type_falling_val | irq_data->type.type_rising_val; @@ -230,14 +231,14 @@ static void regmap_irq_enable(struct irq_data *data) * at the corresponding offset in regmap_irq_set_type(). */ if (d->chip->type_in_mask && type) - mask = d->type_buf[irq_data->reg_offset / map->reg_stride]; + mask = d->type_buf[reg] & irq_data->mask; else mask = irq_data->mask; if (d->chip->clear_on_unmask) d->clear_status = true; - d->mask_buf[irq_data->reg_offset / map->reg_stride] &= ~mask; + d->mask_buf[reg] &= ~mask; } static void regmap_irq_disable(struct irq_data *data) From 28a78414f21edac0d7386ebf10b6eeccb46218b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kai-Heng Feng Date: Tue, 21 Jun 2022 15:10:56 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0726/1091] igb: Make DMA faster when CPU is active on the PCIe link [ Upstream commit 4e0effd9007ea0be31f7488611eb3824b4541554 ] Intel I210 on some Intel Alder Lake platforms can only achieve ~750Mbps Tx speed via iperf. The RR2DCDELAY shows around 0x2xxx DMA delay, which will be significantly lower when 1) ASPM is disabled or 2) SoC package c-state stays above PC3. When the RR2DCDELAY is around 0x1xxx the Tx speed can reach to ~950Mbps. According to the I210 datasheet "8.26.1 PCIe Misc. Register - PCIEMISC", "DMA Idle Indication" doesn't seem to tie to DMA coalesce anymore, so set it to 1b for "DMA is considered idle when there is no Rx or Tx AND when there are no TLPs indicating that CPU is active detected on the PCIe link (such as the host executes CSR or Configuration register read or write operation)" and performing Tx should also fall under "active CPU on PCIe link" case. In addition to that, commit b6e0c419f040 ("igb: Move DMA Coalescing init code to separate function.") seems to wrongly changed from enabling E1000_PCIEMISC_LX_DECISION to disabling it, also fix that. Fixes: b6e0c419f040 ("igb: Move DMA Coalescing init code to separate function.") Signed-off-by: Kai-Heng Feng Tested-by: Gurucharan (A Contingent worker at Intel) Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220621221056.604304-1-anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c | 12 +++++------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c index 26c8d09ad4dd..8734dfd001bb 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c @@ -9404,11 +9404,10 @@ static void igb_init_dmac(struct igb_adapter *adapter, u32 pba) struct e1000_hw *hw = &adapter->hw; u32 dmac_thr; u16 hwm; + u32 reg; if (hw->mac.type > e1000_82580) { if (adapter->flags & IGB_FLAG_DMAC) { - u32 reg; - /* force threshold to 0. */ wr32(E1000_DMCTXTH, 0); @@ -9441,7 +9440,6 @@ static void igb_init_dmac(struct igb_adapter *adapter, u32 pba) /* Disable BMC-to-OS Watchdog Enable */ if (hw->mac.type != e1000_i354) reg &= ~E1000_DMACR_DC_BMC2OSW_EN; - wr32(E1000_DMACR, reg); /* no lower threshold to disable @@ -9458,12 +9456,12 @@ static void igb_init_dmac(struct igb_adapter *adapter, u32 pba) */ wr32(E1000_DMCTXTH, (IGB_MIN_TXPBSIZE - (IGB_TX_BUF_4096 + adapter->max_frame_size)) >> 6); + } - /* make low power state decision controlled - * by DMA coal - */ + if (hw->mac.type >= e1000_i210 || + (adapter->flags & IGB_FLAG_DMAC)) { reg = rd32(E1000_PCIEMISC); - reg &= ~E1000_PCIEMISC_LX_DECISION; + reg |= E1000_PCIEMISC_LX_DECISION; wr32(E1000_PCIEMISC, reg); } /* endif adapter->dmac is not disabled */ } else if (hw->mac.type == e1000_82580) { From 8c7a32b7c15555beddc5810c3334d9cefff061bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stephan Gerhold Date: Tue, 21 Jun 2022 13:48:44 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0727/1091] virtio_net: fix xdp_rxq_info bug after suspend/resume [ Upstream commit 8af52fe9fd3bf5e7478da99193c0632276e1dfce ] The following sequence currently causes a driver bug warning when using virtio_net: # ip link set eth0 up # echo mem > /sys/power/state (or e.g. # rtcwake -s 10 -m mem) # ip link set eth0 down Missing register, driver bug WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 375 at net/core/xdp.c:138 xdp_rxq_info_unreg+0x58/0x60 Call trace: xdp_rxq_info_unreg+0x58/0x60 virtnet_close+0x58/0xac __dev_close_many+0xac/0x140 __dev_change_flags+0xd8/0x210 dev_change_flags+0x24/0x64 do_setlink+0x230/0xdd0 ... This happens because virtnet_freeze() frees the receive_queue completely (including struct xdp_rxq_info) but does not call xdp_rxq_info_unreg(). Similarly, virtnet_restore() sets up the receive_queue again but does not call xdp_rxq_info_reg(). Actually, parts of virtnet_freeze_down() and virtnet_restore_up() are almost identical to virtnet_close() and virtnet_open(): only the calls to xdp_rxq_info_(un)reg() are missing. This means that we can fix this easily and avoid such problems in the future by just calling virtnet_close()/open() from the freeze/restore handlers. Aside from adding the missing xdp_rxq_info calls the only difference is that the refill work is only cancelled if netif_running(). However, this should not make any functional difference since the refill work should only be active if the network interface is actually up. Fixes: 754b8a21a96d ("virtio_net: setup xdp_rxq_info") Signed-off-by: Stephan Gerhold Acked-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer Acked-by: Jason Wang Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220621114845.3650258-1-stephan.gerhold@kernkonzept.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/virtio_net.c | 25 ++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/virtio_net.c b/drivers/net/virtio_net.c index 37c2cecd1e50..f4c03518d7d2 100644 --- a/drivers/net/virtio_net.c +++ b/drivers/net/virtio_net.c @@ -2393,7 +2393,6 @@ static const struct ethtool_ops virtnet_ethtool_ops = { static void virtnet_freeze_down(struct virtio_device *vdev) { struct virtnet_info *vi = vdev->priv; - int i; /* Make sure no work handler is accessing the device */ flush_work(&vi->config_work); @@ -2401,14 +2400,8 @@ static void virtnet_freeze_down(struct virtio_device *vdev) netif_tx_lock_bh(vi->dev); netif_device_detach(vi->dev); netif_tx_unlock_bh(vi->dev); - cancel_delayed_work_sync(&vi->refill); - - if (netif_running(vi->dev)) { - for (i = 0; i < vi->max_queue_pairs; i++) { - napi_disable(&vi->rq[i].napi); - virtnet_napi_tx_disable(&vi->sq[i].napi); - } - } + if (netif_running(vi->dev)) + virtnet_close(vi->dev); } static int init_vqs(struct virtnet_info *vi); @@ -2416,7 +2409,7 @@ static int init_vqs(struct virtnet_info *vi); static int virtnet_restore_up(struct virtio_device *vdev) { struct virtnet_info *vi = vdev->priv; - int err, i; + int err; err = init_vqs(vi); if (err) @@ -2425,15 +2418,9 @@ static int virtnet_restore_up(struct virtio_device *vdev) virtio_device_ready(vdev); if (netif_running(vi->dev)) { - for (i = 0; i < vi->curr_queue_pairs; i++) - if (!try_fill_recv(vi, &vi->rq[i], GFP_KERNEL)) - schedule_delayed_work(&vi->refill, 0); - - for (i = 0; i < vi->max_queue_pairs; i++) { - virtnet_napi_enable(vi->rq[i].vq, &vi->rq[i].napi); - virtnet_napi_tx_enable(vi, vi->sq[i].vq, - &vi->sq[i].napi); - } + err = virtnet_open(vi->dev); + if (err) + return err; } netif_tx_lock_bh(vi->dev); From bb18ad00c0b77acff2d6d5d5dda10e233e9a48d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jakub Kicinski Date: Mon, 20 Jun 2022 12:13:52 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0728/1091] Revert "net/tls: fix tls_sk_proto_close executed repeatedly" [ Upstream commit 1b205d948fbb06a7613d87dcea0ff5fd8a08ed91 ] This reverts commit 69135c572d1f84261a6de2a1268513a7e71753e2. This commit was just papering over the issue, ULP should not get ->update() called with its own sk_prot. Each ULP would need to add this check. Fixes: 69135c572d1f ("net/tls: fix tls_sk_proto_close executed repeatedly") Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Reviewed-by: John Fastabend Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220620191353.1184629-1-kuba@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/tls/tls_main.c | 3 --- 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/tls/tls_main.c b/net/tls/tls_main.c index df9177d96f7f..7aba4ee77aba 100644 --- a/net/tls/tls_main.c +++ b/net/tls/tls_main.c @@ -803,9 +803,6 @@ static void tls_update(struct sock *sk, struct proto *p, { struct tls_context *ctx; - if (sk->sk_prot == p) - return; - ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); if (likely(ctx)) { ctx->sk_write_space = write_space; From 4837d1c81223fc89dd005e4136da670fa43744c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dan Carpenter Date: Thu, 23 Jun 2022 11:29:48 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 0729/1091] gpio: winbond: Fix error code in winbond_gpio_get() [ Upstream commit 9ca766eaea2e87b8b773bff04ee56c055cb76d4e ] This error path returns 1, but it should instead propagate the negative error code from winbond_sio_enter(). Fixes: a0d65009411c ("gpio: winbond: Add driver") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/gpio/gpio-winbond.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpio/gpio-winbond.c b/drivers/gpio/gpio-winbond.c index 7f8f5b02e31d..4b61d975cc0e 100644 --- a/drivers/gpio/gpio-winbond.c +++ b/drivers/gpio/gpio-winbond.c @@ -385,12 +385,13 @@ static int winbond_gpio_get(struct gpio_chip *gc, unsigned int offset) unsigned long *base = gpiochip_get_data(gc); const struct winbond_gpio_info *info; bool val; + int ret; winbond_gpio_get_info(&offset, &info); - val = winbond_sio_enter(*base); - if (val) - return val; + ret = winbond_sio_enter(*base); + if (ret) + return ret; winbond_sio_select_logical(*base, info->dev); From 741b6c8363c2c5cad2ad53928a1d650d767ebbcc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thomas Richter Date: Fri, 10 Jun 2022 15:19:00 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0730/1091] s390/cpumf: Handle events cycles and instructions identical [ Upstream commit be857b7f77d130dbbd47c91fc35198b040f35865 ] Events CPU_CYCLES and INSTRUCTIONS can be submitted with two different perf_event attribute::type values: - PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE: when invoked via perf tool predefined events name cycles or cpu-cycles or instructions. - pmu->type: when invoked via perf tool event name cpu_cf/CPU_CYLCES/ or cpu_cf/INSTRUCTIONS/. This invocation also selects the PMU to which the event belongs. Handle both type of invocations identical for events CPU_CYLCES and INSTRUCTIONS. They address the same hardware. The result is different when event modifier exclude_kernel is also set. Invocation with event modifier for user space event counting fails. Output before: # perf stat -e cpum_cf/cpu_cycles/u -- true Performance counter stats for 'true': cpum_cf/cpu_cycles/u 0.000761033 seconds time elapsed 0.000076000 seconds user 0.000725000 seconds sys # Output after: # perf stat -e cpum_cf/cpu_cycles/u -- true Performance counter stats for 'true': 349,613 cpum_cf/cpu_cycles/u 0.000844143 seconds time elapsed 0.000079000 seconds user 0.000800000 seconds sys # Fixes: 6a82e23f45fe ("s390/cpumf: Adjust registration of s390 PMU device drivers") Signed-off-by: Thomas Richter Acked-by: Sumanth Korikkar [agordeev@linux.ibm.com corrected commit ID of Fixes commit] Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/s390/kernel/perf_cpum_cf.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/perf_cpum_cf.c b/arch/s390/kernel/perf_cpum_cf.c index 0eb1d1cc53a8..dddb32e53db8 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kernel/perf_cpum_cf.c +++ b/arch/s390/kernel/perf_cpum_cf.c @@ -292,6 +292,26 @@ static int __hw_perf_event_init(struct perf_event *event, unsigned int type) return err; } +/* Events CPU_CYLCES and INSTRUCTIONS can be submitted with two different + * attribute::type values: + * - PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE: + * - pmu->type: + * Handle both type of invocations identical. They address the same hardware. + * The result is different when event modifiers exclude_kernel and/or + * exclude_user are also set. + */ +static int cpumf_pmu_event_type(struct perf_event *event) +{ + u64 ev = event->attr.config; + + if (cpumf_generic_events_basic[PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES] == ev || + cpumf_generic_events_basic[PERF_COUNT_HW_INSTRUCTIONS] == ev || + cpumf_generic_events_user[PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES] == ev || + cpumf_generic_events_user[PERF_COUNT_HW_INSTRUCTIONS] == ev) + return PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE; + return PERF_TYPE_RAW; +} + static int cpumf_pmu_event_init(struct perf_event *event) { unsigned int type = event->attr.type; @@ -301,7 +321,7 @@ static int cpumf_pmu_event_init(struct perf_event *event) err = __hw_perf_event_init(event, type); else if (event->pmu->type == type) /* Registered as unknown PMU */ - err = __hw_perf_event_init(event, PERF_TYPE_RAW); + err = __hw_perf_event_init(event, cpumf_pmu_event_type(event)); else return -ENOENT; From d62d1c606db036a5e8d5cef7df086f1c0b28f45d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Baruch Siach Date: Mon, 30 May 2022 11:50:26 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 0731/1091] iio: adc: vf610: fix conversion mode sysfs node name [ Upstream commit f1a633b15cd5371a2a83f02c513984e51132dd68 ] The documentation missed the "in_" prefix for this IIO_SHARED_BY_DIR entry. Fixes: bf04c1a367e3 ("iio: adc: vf610: implement configurable conversion modes") Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach Acked-by: Haibo Chen Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/560dc93fafe5ef7e9a409885fd20b6beac3973d8.1653900626.git.baruch@tkos.co.il Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-iio-vf610 | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-iio-vf610 b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-iio-vf610 index 308a6756d3bf..491ead804488 100644 --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-iio-vf610 +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-iio-vf610 @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -What: /sys/bus/iio/devices/iio:deviceX/conversion_mode +What: /sys/bus/iio/devices/iio:deviceX/in_conversion_mode KernelVersion: 4.2 Contact: linux-iio@vger.kernel.org Description: From 47e41b4dabbf4d0a64dd24117f8f0189ce8f3af7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mathias Nyman Date: Thu, 23 Jun 2022 14:19:43 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 0732/1091] xhci: turn off port power in shutdown commit 83810f84ecf11dfc5a9414a8b762c3501b328185 upstream. If ports are not turned off in shutdown then runtime suspended self-powered USB devices may survive in U3 link state over S5. During subsequent boot, if firmware sends an IPC command to program the port in DISCONNECT state, it will time out, causing significant delay in the boot time. Turning off roothub port power is also recommended in xhci specification 4.19.4 "Port Power" in the additional note. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220623111945.1557702-3-mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/host/xhci-hub.c | 2 +- drivers/usb/host/xhci.c | 15 +++++++++++++-- drivers/usb/host/xhci.h | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-hub.c b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-hub.c index dd46c15c4853..9c066d1c512b 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-hub.c +++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-hub.c @@ -566,7 +566,7 @@ struct xhci_hub *xhci_get_rhub(struct usb_hcd *hcd) * It will release and re-aquire the lock while calling ACPI * method. */ -static void xhci_set_port_power(struct xhci_hcd *xhci, struct usb_hcd *hcd, +void xhci_set_port_power(struct xhci_hcd *xhci, struct usb_hcd *hcd, u16 index, bool on, unsigned long *flags) { struct xhci_hub *rhub; diff --git a/drivers/usb/host/xhci.c b/drivers/usb/host/xhci.c index 2f59d447411b..9fe35bb67731 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci.c +++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci.c @@ -775,6 +775,8 @@ static void xhci_stop(struct usb_hcd *hcd) void xhci_shutdown(struct usb_hcd *hcd) { struct xhci_hcd *xhci = hcd_to_xhci(hcd); + unsigned long flags; + int i; if (xhci->quirks & XHCI_SPURIOUS_REBOOT) usb_disable_xhci_ports(to_pci_dev(hcd->self.sysdev)); @@ -790,12 +792,21 @@ void xhci_shutdown(struct usb_hcd *hcd) del_timer_sync(&xhci->shared_hcd->rh_timer); } - spin_lock_irq(&xhci->lock); + spin_lock_irqsave(&xhci->lock, flags); xhci_halt(xhci); + + /* Power off USB2 ports*/ + for (i = 0; i < xhci->usb2_rhub.num_ports; i++) + xhci_set_port_power(xhci, xhci->main_hcd, i, false, &flags); + + /* Power off USB3 ports*/ + for (i = 0; i < xhci->usb3_rhub.num_ports; i++) + xhci_set_port_power(xhci, xhci->shared_hcd, i, false, &flags); + /* Workaround for spurious wakeups at shutdown with HSW */ if (xhci->quirks & XHCI_SPURIOUS_WAKEUP) xhci_reset(xhci, XHCI_RESET_SHORT_USEC); - spin_unlock_irq(&xhci->lock); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&xhci->lock, flags); xhci_cleanup_msix(xhci); diff --git a/drivers/usb/host/xhci.h b/drivers/usb/host/xhci.h index 4b05d767e08f..a9031f494984 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci.h +++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci.h @@ -2155,6 +2155,8 @@ int xhci_hub_control(struct usb_hcd *hcd, u16 typeReq, u16 wValue, u16 wIndex, int xhci_hub_status_data(struct usb_hcd *hcd, char *buf); int xhci_find_raw_port_number(struct usb_hcd *hcd, int port1); struct xhci_hub *xhci_get_rhub(struct usb_hcd *hcd); +void xhci_set_port_power(struct xhci_hcd *xhci, struct usb_hcd *hcd, u16 index, + bool on, unsigned long *flags); void xhci_hc_died(struct xhci_hcd *xhci); From 2333db14d875919b523c6741c2adc019cc78e845 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xu Yang Date: Thu, 23 Jun 2022 11:02:42 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0733/1091] usb: chipidea: udc: check request status before setting device address commit b24346a240b36cfc4df194d145463874985aa29b upstream. The complete() function may be called even though request is not completed. In this case, it's necessary to check request status so as not to set device address wrongly. Fixes: 10775eb17bee ("usb: chipidea: udc: update gadget states according to ch9") cc: Signed-off-by: Xu Yang Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220623030242.41796-1-xu.yang_2@nxp.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/chipidea/udc.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/chipidea/udc.c b/drivers/usb/chipidea/udc.c index 8f18e7b6cadf..21c299c85505 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/chipidea/udc.c +++ b/drivers/usb/chipidea/udc.c @@ -921,6 +921,9 @@ isr_setup_status_complete(struct usb_ep *ep, struct usb_request *req) struct ci_hdrc *ci = req->context; unsigned long flags; + if (req->status < 0) + return; + if (ci->setaddr) { hw_usb_set_address(ci, ci->address); ci->setaddr = false; From 8ea16a64aafc3045d52952030ac900054bc94c72 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dmitry Rokosov Date: Tue, 24 May 2022 18:14:45 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0734/1091] iio:chemical:ccs811: rearrange iio trigger get and register commit d710359c0b445e8c03e24f19ae2fb79ce7282260 upstream. IIO trigger interface function iio_trigger_get() should be called after iio_trigger_register() (or its devm analogue) strictly, because of iio_trigger_get() acquires module refcnt based on the trigger->owner pointer, which is initialized inside iio_trigger_register() to THIS_MODULE. If this call order is wrong, the next iio_trigger_put() (from sysfs callback or "delete module" path) will dereference "default" module refcnt, which is incorrect behaviour. Fixes: f1f065d7ac30 ("iio: chemical: ccs811: Add support for data ready trigger") Signed-off-by: Dmitry Rokosov Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220524181150.9240-5-ddrokosov@sberdevices.ru Cc: Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iio/chemical/ccs811.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iio/chemical/ccs811.c b/drivers/iio/chemical/ccs811.c index 7bf4e9a16a6a..a2ee6bbda7f4 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/chemical/ccs811.c +++ b/drivers/iio/chemical/ccs811.c @@ -418,11 +418,11 @@ static int ccs811_probe(struct i2c_client *client, data->drdy_trig->dev.parent = &client->dev; data->drdy_trig->ops = &ccs811_trigger_ops; iio_trigger_set_drvdata(data->drdy_trig, indio_dev); - indio_dev->trig = data->drdy_trig; - iio_trigger_get(indio_dev->trig); ret = iio_trigger_register(data->drdy_trig); if (ret) goto err_poweroff; + + indio_dev->trig = iio_trigger_get(data->drdy_trig); } ret = iio_triggered_buffer_setup(indio_dev, NULL, From 23c158caa0327425e3aa5fb16b6b0b34ce917c8d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dmitry Rokosov Date: Tue, 24 May 2022 18:14:39 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0735/1091] iio:accel:bma180: rearrange iio trigger get and register commit e5f3205b04d7f95a2ef43bce4b454a7f264d6923 upstream. IIO trigger interface function iio_trigger_get() should be called after iio_trigger_register() (or its devm analogue) strictly, because of iio_trigger_get() acquires module refcnt based on the trigger->owner pointer, which is initialized inside iio_trigger_register() to THIS_MODULE. If this call order is wrong, the next iio_trigger_put() (from sysfs callback or "delete module" path) will dereference "default" module refcnt, which is incorrect behaviour. Fixes: 0668a4e4d297 ("iio: accel: bma180: Fix indio_dev->trig assignment") Signed-off-by: Dmitry Rokosov Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220524181150.9240-2-ddrokosov@sberdevices.ru Cc: Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iio/accel/bma180.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/iio/accel/bma180.c b/drivers/iio/accel/bma180.c index acf1cc2bee07..014788ea493a 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/accel/bma180.c +++ b/drivers/iio/accel/bma180.c @@ -793,11 +793,12 @@ static int bma180_probe(struct i2c_client *client, data->trig->dev.parent = &client->dev; data->trig->ops = &bma180_trigger_ops; iio_trigger_set_drvdata(data->trig, indio_dev); - indio_dev->trig = iio_trigger_get(data->trig); ret = iio_trigger_register(data->trig); if (ret) goto err_trigger_free; + + indio_dev->trig = iio_trigger_get(data->trig); } ret = iio_triggered_buffer_setup(indio_dev, NULL, From a391bced840437f9161ed09a4851f80a4212aa42 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dmitry Rokosov Date: Tue, 24 May 2022 18:14:43 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0736/1091] iio:accel:mxc4005: rearrange iio trigger get and register commit 9354c224c9b4f55847a0de3e968cba2ebf15af3b upstream. IIO trigger interface function iio_trigger_get() should be called after iio_trigger_register() (or its devm analogue) strictly, because of iio_trigger_get() acquires module refcnt based on the trigger->owner pointer, which is initialized inside iio_trigger_register() to THIS_MODULE. If this call order is wrong, the next iio_trigger_put() (from sysfs callback or "delete module" path) will dereference "default" module refcnt, which is incorrect behaviour. Fixes: 47196620c82f ("iio: mxc4005: add data ready trigger for mxc4005") Signed-off-by: Dmitry Rokosov Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220524181150.9240-4-ddrokosov@sberdevices.ru Cc: Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iio/accel/mxc4005.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iio/accel/mxc4005.c b/drivers/iio/accel/mxc4005.c index d81b02642a0b..110b7ea76ef2 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/accel/mxc4005.c +++ b/drivers/iio/accel/mxc4005.c @@ -462,8 +462,6 @@ static int mxc4005_probe(struct i2c_client *client, data->dready_trig->dev.parent = &client->dev; data->dready_trig->ops = &mxc4005_trigger_ops; iio_trigger_set_drvdata(data->dready_trig, indio_dev); - indio_dev->trig = data->dready_trig; - iio_trigger_get(indio_dev->trig); ret = devm_iio_trigger_register(&client->dev, data->dready_trig); if (ret) { @@ -471,6 +469,8 @@ static int mxc4005_probe(struct i2c_client *client, "failed to register trigger\n"); return ret; } + + indio_dev->trig = iio_trigger_get(data->dready_trig); } return devm_iio_device_register(&client->dev, indio_dev); From 1ad6d668543d4a9d68e6284d658e878c26afbab5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Haibo Chen Date: Wed, 15 Jun 2022 19:31:58 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0737/1091] iio: accel: mma8452: ignore the return value of reset operation commit bf745142cc0a3e1723f9207fb0c073c88464b7b4 upstream. On fxls8471, after set the reset bit, the device will reset immediately, will not give ACK. So ignore the return value of this reset operation, let the following code logic to check whether the reset operation works. Signed-off-by: Haibo Chen Fixes: ecabae713196 ("iio: mma8452: Initialise before activating") Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1655292718-14287-1-git-send-email-haibo.chen@nxp.com Cc: Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iio/accel/mma8452.c | 10 +++++++--- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iio/accel/mma8452.c b/drivers/iio/accel/mma8452.c index eaaee6f2a978..74942bfc676a 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/accel/mma8452.c +++ b/drivers/iio/accel/mma8452.c @@ -1489,10 +1489,14 @@ static int mma8452_reset(struct i2c_client *client) int i; int ret; - ret = i2c_smbus_write_byte_data(client, MMA8452_CTRL_REG2, + /* + * Find on fxls8471, after config reset bit, it reset immediately, + * and will not give ACK, so here do not check the return value. + * The following code will read the reset register, and check whether + * this reset works. + */ + i2c_smbus_write_byte_data(client, MMA8452_CTRL_REG2, MMA8452_CTRL_REG2_RST); - if (ret < 0) - return ret; for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) { usleep_range(100, 200); From 6d2e68d02171898ae47813c1581c26293dea4954 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zheyu Ma Date: Tue, 10 May 2022 17:24:31 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0738/1091] iio: gyro: mpu3050: Fix the error handling in mpu3050_power_up() commit b2f5ad97645e1deb5ca9bcb7090084b92cae35d2 upstream. The driver should disable regulators when fails at regmap_update_bits(). Signed-off-by: Zheyu Ma Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij Cc: Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220510092431.1711284-1-zheyuma97@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iio/gyro/mpu3050-core.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/iio/gyro/mpu3050-core.c b/drivers/iio/gyro/mpu3050-core.c index 75db410b5054..0f5de4afe33f 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/gyro/mpu3050-core.c +++ b/drivers/iio/gyro/mpu3050-core.c @@ -874,6 +874,7 @@ static int mpu3050_power_up(struct mpu3050 *mpu3050) ret = regmap_update_bits(mpu3050->map, MPU3050_PWR_MGM, MPU3050_PWR_MGM_SLEEP, 0); if (ret) { + regulator_bulk_disable(ARRAY_SIZE(mpu3050->regs), mpu3050->regs); dev_err(mpu3050->dev, "error setting power mode\n"); return ret; } From 5e39397d60dacc7f5d81d442c1c958eaaaf31128 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vincent Whitchurch Date: Thu, 19 May 2022 11:19:25 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0739/1091] iio: trigger: sysfs: fix use-after-free on remove commit 78601726d4a59a291acc5a52da1d3a0a6831e4e8 upstream. Ensure that the irq_work has completed before the trigger is freed. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in irq_work_run_list Read of size 8 at addr 0000000064702248 by task python3/25 Call Trace: irq_work_run_list irq_work_tick update_process_times tick_sched_handle tick_sched_timer __hrtimer_run_queues hrtimer_interrupt Allocated by task 25: kmem_cache_alloc_trace iio_sysfs_trig_add dev_attr_store sysfs_kf_write kernfs_fop_write_iter new_sync_write vfs_write ksys_write sys_write Freed by task 25: kfree iio_sysfs_trig_remove dev_attr_store sysfs_kf_write kernfs_fop_write_iter new_sync_write vfs_write ksys_write sys_write ================================================================== Fixes: f38bc926d022 ("staging:iio:sysfs-trigger: Use irq_work to properly active trigger") Signed-off-by: Vincent Whitchurch Reviewed-by: Lars-Peter Clausen Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220519091925.1053897-1-vincent.whitchurch@axis.com Cc: Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iio/trigger/iio-trig-sysfs.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/iio/trigger/iio-trig-sysfs.c b/drivers/iio/trigger/iio-trig-sysfs.c index e09e58072872..2277d6336ac0 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/trigger/iio-trig-sysfs.c +++ b/drivers/iio/trigger/iio-trig-sysfs.c @@ -196,6 +196,7 @@ static int iio_sysfs_trigger_remove(int id) } iio_trigger_unregister(t->trig); + irq_work_sync(&t->work); iio_trigger_free(t->trig); list_del(&t->l); From 11c7ea38be91025ca741b365e18e40523f04ce6f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Olivier Moysan Date: Thu, 9 Jun 2022 11:52:34 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0740/1091] iio: adc: stm32: fix maximum clock rate for stm32mp15x commit 990539486e7e311fb5dab1bf4d85d1a8973ae644 upstream. Change maximum STM32 ADC input clock rate to 36MHz, as specified in STM32MP15x datasheets. Fixes: d58c67d1d851 ("iio: adc: stm32-adc: add support for STM32MP1") Signed-off-by: Olivier Moysan Reviewed-by: Fabrice Gasnier Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220609095234.375925-1-olivier.moysan@foss.st.com Cc: Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iio/adc/stm32-adc-core.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/iio/adc/stm32-adc-core.c b/drivers/iio/adc/stm32-adc-core.c index 14d6a537289c..0ecec5a15fbf 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/adc/stm32-adc-core.c +++ b/drivers/iio/adc/stm32-adc-core.c @@ -815,7 +815,7 @@ static const struct stm32_adc_priv_cfg stm32h7_adc_priv_cfg = { static const struct stm32_adc_priv_cfg stm32mp1_adc_priv_cfg = { .regs = &stm32h7_adc_common_regs, .clk_sel = stm32h7_adc_clk_sel, - .max_clk_rate_hz = 40000000, + .max_clk_rate_hz = 36000000, .has_syscfg = HAS_VBOOSTER | HAS_ANASWVDD, .num_irqs = 2, }; From f0fc7cdf5f19e33396323a7b300d317460e86c89 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hans de Goede Date: Fri, 6 May 2022 11:50:40 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0741/1091] iio: adc: axp288: Override TS pin bias current for some models MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 048058399f19d43cf21de9f5d36cd8144337d004 upstream. Since commit 9bcf15f75cac ("iio: adc: axp288: Fix TS-pin handling") we preserve the bias current set by the firmware at boot. This fixes issues we were seeing on various models. Some models like the Nuvision Solo 10 Draw tablet actually need the old hardcoded 80ųA bias current for battery temperature monitoring to work properly. Add a quirk entry for the Nuvision Solo 10 Draw to the DMI quirk table to restore setting the bias current to 80ųA on this model. Fixes: 9bcf15f75cac ("iio: adc: axp288: Fix TS-pin handling") BugLink: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=215882 Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506095040.21008-1-hdegoede@redhat.com Cc: Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iio/adc/axp288_adc.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/iio/adc/axp288_adc.c b/drivers/iio/adc/axp288_adc.c index 8ea2aed6d6f5..99ceaa09ef39 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/adc/axp288_adc.c +++ b/drivers/iio/adc/axp288_adc.c @@ -196,6 +196,14 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id axp288_adc_ts_bias_override[] = { }, .driver_data = (void *)(uintptr_t)AXP288_ADC_TS_BIAS_80UA, }, + { + /* Nuvision Solo 10 Draw */ + .matches = { + DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "TMAX"), + DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "TM101W610L"), + }, + .driver_data = (void *)(uintptr_t)AXP288_ADC_TS_BIAS_80UA, + }, {} }; From a52972ee706b438302eb0350e61f378eb191e3d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Liang He Date: Fri, 17 Jun 2022 19:53:23 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0742/1091] xtensa: xtfpga: Fix refcount leak bug in setup commit 173940b3ae40114d4179c251a98ee039dc9cd5b3 upstream. In machine_setup(), of_find_compatible_node() will return a node pointer with refcount incremented. We should use of_node_put() when it is not used anymore. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Liang He Message-Id: <20220617115323.4046905-1-windhl@126.com> Signed-off-by: Max Filippov Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/xtensa/platforms/xtfpga/setup.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/xtensa/platforms/xtfpga/setup.c b/arch/xtensa/platforms/xtfpga/setup.c index 4edccb4d4a5f..340479a328dc 100644 --- a/arch/xtensa/platforms/xtfpga/setup.c +++ b/arch/xtensa/platforms/xtfpga/setup.c @@ -148,6 +148,7 @@ static int __init machine_setup(void) if ((eth = of_find_compatible_node(eth, NULL, "opencores,ethoc"))) update_local_mac(eth); + of_node_put(eth); return 0; } arch_initcall(machine_setup); From e5234a9d64a976abd134a14710dcd5188158a7c5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Liang He Date: Fri, 17 Jun 2022 20:44:32 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0743/1091] xtensa: Fix refcount leak bug in time.c commit a0117dc956429f2ede17b323046e1968d1849150 upstream. In calibrate_ccount(), of_find_compatible_node() will return a node pointer with refcount incremented. We should use of_node_put() when it is not used anymore. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Liang He Message-Id: <20220617124432.4049006-1-windhl@126.com> Signed-off-by: Max Filippov Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/xtensa/kernel/time.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/xtensa/kernel/time.c b/arch/xtensa/kernel/time.c index 69db8c93c1f9..9b87a9b98727 100644 --- a/arch/xtensa/kernel/time.c +++ b/arch/xtensa/kernel/time.c @@ -160,6 +160,7 @@ static void __init calibrate_ccount(void) cpu = of_find_compatible_node(NULL, NULL, "cdns,xtensa-cpu"); if (cpu) { clk = of_clk_get(cpu, 0); + of_node_put(cpu); if (!IS_ERR(clk)) { ccount_freq = clk_get_rate(clk); return; From e0701f150b28753a0d56dbd23e1d7e5c851c66be Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Helge Deller Date: Sun, 26 Jun 2022 11:50:43 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0744/1091] parisc: Enable ARCH_HAS_STRICT_MODULE_RWX commit 0a1355db36718178becd2bfe728a023933d73123 upstream. Fix a boot crash on a c8000 machine as reported by Dave. Basically it changes patch_map() to return an alias mapping to the to-be-patched code in order to prevent writing to write-protected memory. Signed-off-by: Helge Deller Suggested-by: John David Anglin Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.2+ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/e8ec39e8-25f8-e6b4-b7ed-4cb23efc756e@bell.net/ Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/parisc/Kconfig | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/parisc/Kconfig b/arch/parisc/Kconfig index 0c29d6cb2c8d..c97c01c75566 100644 --- a/arch/parisc/Kconfig +++ b/arch/parisc/Kconfig @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ config PARISC select ARCH_WANT_FRAME_POINTERS select ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE select ARCH_HAS_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX + select ARCH_HAS_STRICT_MODULE_RWX select ARCH_HAS_UBSAN_SANITIZE_ALL select ARCH_NO_SG_CHAIN select ARCH_SUPPORTS_MEMORY_FAILURE From b6232979320a4c5b493a2f9b93144e5c240d7315 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Naveen N. Rao" Date: Thu, 9 Jun 2022 16:03:28 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 0745/1091] powerpc: Enable execve syscall exit tracepoint commit ec6d0dde71d760aa60316f8d1c9a1b0d99213529 upstream. On execve[at], we are zero'ing out most of the thread register state including gpr[0], which contains the syscall number. Due to this, we fail to trigger the syscall exit tracepoint properly. Fix this by retaining gpr[0] in the thread register state. Before this patch: # tail /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace cat-123 [000] ..... 61.449351: sys_execve(filename: 7fffa6b23448, argv: 7fffa6b233e0, envp: 7fffa6b233f8) cat-124 [000] ..... 62.428481: sys_execve(filename: 7fffa6b23448, argv: 7fffa6b233e0, envp: 7fffa6b233f8) echo-125 [000] ..... 65.813702: sys_execve(filename: 7fffa6b23378, argv: 7fffa6b233a0, envp: 7fffa6b233b0) echo-125 [000] ..... 65.822214: sys_execveat(fd: 0, filename: 1009ac48, argv: 7ffff65d0c98, envp: 7ffff65d0ca8, flags: 0) After this patch: # tail /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace cat-127 [000] ..... 100.416262: sys_execve(filename: 7fffa41b3448, argv: 7fffa41b33e0, envp: 7fffa41b33f8) cat-127 [000] ..... 100.418203: sys_execve -> 0x0 echo-128 [000] ..... 103.873968: sys_execve(filename: 7fffa41b3378, argv: 7fffa41b33a0, envp: 7fffa41b33b0) echo-128 [000] ..... 103.875102: sys_execve -> 0x0 echo-128 [000] ..... 103.882097: sys_execveat(fd: 0, filename: 1009ac48, argv: 7fffd10d2148, envp: 7fffd10d2158, flags: 0) echo-128 [000] ..... 103.883225: sys_execveat -> 0x0 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Naveen N. Rao Tested-by: Sumit Dubey2 Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220609103328.41306-1-naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c index 832663f21422..cf87573e6e78 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c @@ -1719,7 +1719,7 @@ void start_thread(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long start, unsigned long sp) tm_reclaim_current(0); #endif - memset(regs->gpr, 0, sizeof(regs->gpr)); + memset(®s->gpr[1], 0, sizeof(regs->gpr) - sizeof(regs->gpr[0])); regs->ctr = 0; regs->link = 0; regs->xer = 0; From 97808c781721617c10b9a30e9022f639b21934cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrew Donnellan Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:49:52 +1000 Subject: [PATCH 0746/1091] powerpc/rtas: Allow ibm,platform-dump RTAS call with null buffer address commit 7bc08056a6dabc3a1442216daf527edf61ac24b6 upstream. Add a special case to block_rtas_call() to allow the ibm,platform-dump RTAS call through the RTAS filter if the buffer address is 0. According to PAPR, ibm,platform-dump is called with a null buffer address to notify the platform firmware that processing of a particular dump is finished. Without this, on a pseries machine with CONFIG_PPC_RTAS_FILTER enabled, an application such as rtas_errd that is attempting to retrieve a dump will encounter an error at the end of the retrieval process. Fixes: bd59380c5ba4 ("powerpc/rtas: Restrict RTAS requests from userspace") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Sathvika Vasireddy Signed-off-by: Andrew Donnellan Reviewed-by: Tyrel Datwyler Reviewed-by: Nathan Lynch Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220614134952.156010-1-ajd@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c | 11 ++++++++++- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c index 9392661ac8a8..35e246e39705 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c @@ -988,7 +988,7 @@ static struct rtas_filter rtas_filters[] __ro_after_init = { { "get-time-of-day", -1, -1, -1, -1, -1 }, { "ibm,get-vpd", -1, 0, -1, 1, 2 }, { "ibm,lpar-perftools", -1, 2, 3, -1, -1 }, - { "ibm,platform-dump", -1, 4, 5, -1, -1 }, + { "ibm,platform-dump", -1, 4, 5, -1, -1 }, /* Special cased */ { "ibm,read-slot-reset-state", -1, -1, -1, -1, -1 }, { "ibm,scan-log-dump", -1, 0, 1, -1, -1 }, { "ibm,set-dynamic-indicator", -1, 2, -1, -1, -1 }, @@ -1035,6 +1035,15 @@ static bool block_rtas_call(int token, int nargs, size = 1; end = base + size - 1; + + /* + * Special case for ibm,platform-dump - NULL buffer + * address is used to indicate end of dump processing + */ + if (!strcmp(f->name, "ibm,platform-dump") && + base == 0) + return false; + if (!in_rmo_buf(base, end)) goto err; } From 93e6137d2a5b0d1385e98bf507100d8ac050e533 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Tue, 21 Jun 2022 16:08:49 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0747/1091] powerpc/powernv: wire up rng during setup_arch commit f3eac426657d985b97c92fa5f7ae1d43f04721f3 upstream. The platform's RNG must be available before random_init() in order to be useful for initial seeding, which in turn means that it needs to be called from setup_arch(), rather than from an init call. Complicating things, however, is that POWER8 systems need some per-cpu state and kmalloc, which isn't available at this stage. So we split things up into an early phase and a later opportunistic phase. This commit also removes some noisy log messages that don't add much. Fixes: a4da0d50b2a0 ("powerpc: Implement arch_get_random_long/int() for powernv") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+ Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Reviewed-by: Christophe Leroy [mpe: Add of_node_put(), use pnv naming, minor change log editing] Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220621140849.127227-1-Jason@zx2c4.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/powernv.h | 2 + arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/rng.c | 52 ++++++++++++++++-------- arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/setup.c | 2 + 3 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/powernv.h b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/powernv.h index 1aa51c4fa904..4825e4cf4410 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/powernv.h +++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/powernv.h @@ -35,4 +35,6 @@ ssize_t memcons_copy(struct memcons *mc, char *to, loff_t pos, size_t count); u32 memcons_get_size(struct memcons *mc); struct memcons *memcons_init(struct device_node *node, const char *mc_prop_name); +void pnv_rng_init(void); + #endif /* _POWERNV_H */ diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/rng.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/rng.c index 1c31863a9be6..eba4142998b0 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/rng.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/rng.c @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include "powernv.h" #define DARN_ERR 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFul @@ -28,7 +29,6 @@ struct powernv_rng { static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct powernv_rng *, powernv_rng); - int powernv_hwrng_present(void) { struct powernv_rng *rng; @@ -98,9 +98,6 @@ static int initialise_darn(void) return 0; } } - - pr_warn("Unable to use DARN for get_random_seed()\n"); - return -EIO; } @@ -163,32 +160,55 @@ static __init int rng_create(struct device_node *dn) rng_init_per_cpu(rng, dn); - pr_info_once("Registering arch random hook.\n"); - ppc_md.get_random_seed = powernv_get_random_long; return 0; } -static __init int rng_init(void) +static int __init pnv_get_random_long_early(unsigned long *v) { struct device_node *dn; - int rc; + + if (!slab_is_available()) + return 0; + + if (cmpxchg(&ppc_md.get_random_seed, pnv_get_random_long_early, + NULL) != pnv_get_random_long_early) + return 0; for_each_compatible_node(dn, NULL, "ibm,power-rng") { - rc = rng_create(dn); - if (rc) { - pr_err("Failed creating rng for %pOF (%d).\n", - dn, rc); + if (rng_create(dn)) continue; - } - /* Create devices for hwrng driver */ of_platform_device_create(dn, NULL, NULL); } - initialise_darn(); + if (!ppc_md.get_random_seed) + return 0; + return ppc_md.get_random_seed(v); +} +void __init pnv_rng_init(void) +{ + struct device_node *dn; + + /* Prefer darn over the rest. */ + if (!initialise_darn()) + return; + + dn = of_find_compatible_node(NULL, NULL, "ibm,power-rng"); + if (dn) + ppc_md.get_random_seed = pnv_get_random_long_early; + + of_node_put(dn); +} + +static int __init pnv_rng_late_init(void) +{ + unsigned long v; + /* In case it wasn't called during init for some other reason. */ + if (ppc_md.get_random_seed == pnv_get_random_long_early) + pnv_get_random_long_early(&v); return 0; } -machine_subsys_initcall(powernv, rng_init); +machine_subsys_initcall(powernv, pnv_rng_late_init); diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/setup.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/setup.c index 1b7b0d0c3ebd..d9e26614d7ed 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/setup.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/setup.c @@ -168,6 +168,8 @@ static void __init pnv_setup_arch(void) powersave_nap = 1; /* XXX PMCS */ + + pnv_rng_init(); } static void __init pnv_init(void) From 615907ccc4216f28e133b2275113655f8943fe74 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lucas Stach Date: Wed, 11 May 2022 18:08:23 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0748/1091] ARM: dts: imx6qdl: correct PU regulator ramp delay commit 93a8ba2a619816d631bd69e9ce2172b4d7a481b8 upstream. Contrary to what was believed at the time, the ramp delay of 150us is not plenty for the PU LDO with the default step time of 512 pulses of the 24MHz clock. Measurements have shown that after enabling the LDO the voltage on VDDPU_CAP jumps to ~750mV in the first step and after that the regulator executes the normal ramp up as defined by the step size control. This means it takes the regulator between 360us and 370us to ramp up to the nominal 1.15V voltage for this power domain. With the old setting of the ramp delay the power up of the PU GPC domain would happen in the middle of the regulator ramp with the voltage being at around 900mV. Apparently this was enough for most units to properly power up the peripherals in the domain and execute the reset. Some units however, fail to power up properly, especially when the chip is at a low temperature. In that case any access to the GPU registers would yield an incorrect result with no way to recover from this situation. Change the ramp delay to 380us to cover the measured ramp up time with a bit of additional slack. Fixes: 40130d327f72 ("ARM: dts: imx6qdl: Allow disabling the PU regulator, add a enable ramp delay") Signed-off-by: Lucas Stach Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6qdl.dtsi | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6qdl.dtsi b/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6qdl.dtsi index bc488df31511..e9955ef12e02 100644 --- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6qdl.dtsi +++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6qdl.dtsi @@ -766,7 +766,7 @@ regulator-name = "vddpu"; regulator-min-microvolt = <725000>; regulator-max-microvolt = <1450000>; - regulator-enable-ramp-delay = <150>; + regulator-enable-ramp-delay = <380>; anatop-reg-offset = <0x140>; anatop-vol-bit-shift = <9>; anatop-vol-bit-width = <5>; From f9b77a52937582a5b99a5a07e4ef1e2f48f87347 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miaoqian Lin Date: Mon, 23 May 2022 18:55:13 +0400 Subject: [PATCH 0749/1091] ARM: exynos: Fix refcount leak in exynos_map_pmu commit c4c79525042a4a7df96b73477feaf232fe44ae81 upstream. of_find_matching_node() returns a node pointer with refcount incremented, we should use of_node_put() on it when not need anymore. Add missing of_node_put() to avoid refcount leak. of_node_put() checks null pointer. Fixes: fce9e5bb2526 ("ARM: EXYNOS: Add support for mapping PMU base address via DT") Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220523145513.12341-1-linmq006@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm/mach-exynos/exynos.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-exynos/exynos.c b/arch/arm/mach-exynos/exynos.c index f226d4f57bf4..9025067ef6f5 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mach-exynos/exynos.c +++ b/arch/arm/mach-exynos/exynos.c @@ -136,6 +136,7 @@ static void exynos_map_pmu(void) np = of_find_matching_node(NULL, exynos_dt_pmu_match); if (np) pmu_base_addr = of_iomap(np, 0); + of_node_put(np); } static void __init exynos_init_irq(void) From 734a4d15142bb4c8ecad2d8ec70d7564e78ae34d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miaoqian Lin Date: Thu, 26 May 2022 11:53:22 +0400 Subject: [PATCH 0750/1091] soc: bcm: brcmstb: pm: pm-arm: Fix refcount leak in brcmstb_pm_probe commit 37d838de369b07b596c19ff3662bf0293fdb09ee upstream. of_find_matching_node() returns a node pointer with refcount incremented, we should use of_node_put() on it when not need anymore. Add missing of_node_put() to avoid refcount leak. In brcmstb_init_sram, it pass dn to of_address_to_resource(), of_address_to_resource() will call of_find_device_by_node() to take reference, so we should release the reference returned by of_find_matching_node(). Fixes: 0b741b8234c8 ("soc: bcm: brcmstb: Add support for S2/S3/S5 suspend states (ARM)") Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/soc/bcm/brcmstb/pm/pm-arm.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/soc/bcm/brcmstb/pm/pm-arm.c b/drivers/soc/bcm/brcmstb/pm/pm-arm.c index b1062334e608..c6ec7d95bcfc 100644 --- a/drivers/soc/bcm/brcmstb/pm/pm-arm.c +++ b/drivers/soc/bcm/brcmstb/pm/pm-arm.c @@ -780,6 +780,7 @@ static int brcmstb_pm_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) } ret = brcmstb_init_sram(dn); + of_node_put(dn); if (ret) { pr_err("error setting up SRAM for PM\n"); return ret; From 29ca9c4efacccdc15104a8d4bf10b5183fc92840 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miaoqian Lin Date: Wed, 1 Jun 2022 13:05:48 +0400 Subject: [PATCH 0751/1091] ARM: Fix refcount leak in axxia_boot_secondary commit 7c7ff68daa93d8c4cdea482da4f2429c0398fcde upstream. of_find_compatible_node() returns a node pointer with refcount incremented, we should use of_node_put() on it when done. Add missing of_node_put() to avoid refcount leak. Fixes: 1d22924e1c4e ("ARM: Add platform support for LSI AXM55xx SoC") Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220601090548.47616-1-linmq006@gmail.com' Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm/mach-axxia/platsmp.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-axxia/platsmp.c b/arch/arm/mach-axxia/platsmp.c index 512943eae30a..2e203626eda5 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mach-axxia/platsmp.c +++ b/arch/arm/mach-axxia/platsmp.c @@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ static int axxia_boot_secondary(unsigned int cpu, struct task_struct *idle) return -ENOENT; syscon = of_iomap(syscon_np, 0); + of_node_put(syscon_np); if (!syscon) return -ENOMEM; From d1359e4129ad43e43972a28838b87291c51de23d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miaoqian Lin Date: Sun, 5 Jun 2022 11:58:41 +0400 Subject: [PATCH 0752/1091] ARM: cns3xxx: Fix refcount leak in cns3xxx_init commit 1ba904b6b16e08de5aed7c1349838d9cd0d178c5 upstream. of_find_compatible_node() returns a node pointer with refcount incremented, we should use of_node_put() on it when done. Add missing of_node_put() to avoid refcount leak. Fixes: 415f59142d9d ("ARM: cns3xxx: initial DT support") Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin Acked-by: Krzysztof Halasa Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm/mach-cns3xxx/core.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-cns3xxx/core.c b/arch/arm/mach-cns3xxx/core.c index 1d61a7701c11..d7e63f57b426 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mach-cns3xxx/core.c +++ b/arch/arm/mach-cns3xxx/core.c @@ -376,6 +376,7 @@ static void __init cns3xxx_init(void) /* De-Asscer SATA Reset */ cns3xxx_pwr_soft_rst(CNS3XXX_PWR_SOFTWARE_RST(SATA)); } + of_node_put(dn); dn = of_find_compatible_node(NULL, NULL, "cavium,cns3420-sdhci"); if (of_device_is_available(dn)) { @@ -389,6 +390,7 @@ static void __init cns3xxx_init(void) cns3xxx_pwr_clk_en(CNS3XXX_PWR_CLK_EN(SDIO)); cns3xxx_pwr_soft_rst(CNS3XXX_PWR_SOFTWARE_RST(SDIO)); } + of_node_put(dn); pm_power_off = cns3xxx_power_off; From 80f0038d757eb5d129a712188258db01b747fab0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Masahiro Yamada Date: Sat, 11 Jun 2022 03:32:30 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 0753/1091] modpost: fix section mismatch check for exported init/exit sections commit 28438794aba47a27e922857d27b31b74e8559143 upstream. Since commit f02e8a6596b7 ("module: Sort exported symbols"), EXPORT_SYMBOL* is placed in the individual section ___ksymtab(_gpl)+ (3 leading underscores instead of 2). Since then, modpost cannot detect the bad combination of EXPORT_SYMBOL and __init/__exit. Fix the .fromsec field. Fixes: f02e8a6596b7 ("module: Sort exported symbols") Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- scripts/mod/modpost.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/scripts/mod/modpost.c b/scripts/mod/modpost.c index 59011ddf8bb8..e5aeaf72dcdb 100644 --- a/scripts/mod/modpost.c +++ b/scripts/mod/modpost.c @@ -1131,7 +1131,7 @@ static const struct sectioncheck sectioncheck[] = { }, /* Do not export init/exit functions or data */ { - .fromsec = { "__ksymtab*", NULL }, + .fromsec = { "___ksymtab*", NULL }, .bad_tosec = { INIT_SECTIONS, EXIT_SECTIONS, NULL }, .mismatch = EXPORT_TO_INIT_EXIT, .symbol_white_list = { DEFAULT_SYMBOL_WHITE_LIST, NULL }, From 2a81e813141ea5d26ff1edb4241033e14bb507fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Mon, 20 Jun 2022 11:03:48 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0754/1091] random: update comment from copy_to_user() -> copy_to_iter() commit 63b8ea5e4f1a87dea4d3114293fc8e96a8f193d7 upstream. This comment wasn't updated when we moved from read() to read_iter(), so this patch makes the trivial fix. Fixes: 1b388e7765f2 ("random: convert to using fops->read_iter()") Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index b86bee9284fa..1ef94d112521 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -450,7 +450,7 @@ static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(struct iov_iter *iter) /* * Immediately overwrite the ChaCha key at index 4 with random - * bytes, in case userspace causes copy_to_user() below to sleep + * bytes, in case userspace causes copy_to_iter() below to sleep * forever, so that we still retain forward secrecy in that case. */ crng_make_state(chacha_state, (u8 *)&chacha_state[4], CHACHA_KEY_SIZE); From ece98389028789f76a08eab82aac38749818aa21 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Masahiro Yamada Date: Fri, 24 Jun 2022 04:11:47 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 0755/1091] kbuild: link vmlinux only once for CONFIG_TRIM_UNUSED_KSYMS (2nd attempt) commit 53632ba87d9f302a8d97a11ec2f4f4eec7bb75ea upstream. If CONFIG_TRIM_UNUSED_KSYMS is enabled and the kernel is built from a pristine state, the vmlinux is linked twice. Commit 3fdc7d3fe4c0 ("kbuild: link vmlinux only once for CONFIG_TRIM_UNUSED_KSYMS") explains why this happens, but it did not fix the issue at all. Now I realized I had applied a wrong patch. In v1 patch [1], the autoksyms_recursive target correctly recurses to "$(MAKE) -f $(srctree)/Makefile autoksyms_recursive". In v2 patch [2], I accidentally dropped the diff line, and it recurses to "$(MAKE) -f $(srctree)/Makefile vmlinux". Restore the code I intended in v1. [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-kbuild/1521045861-22418-8-git-send-email-yamada.masahiro@socionext.com/ [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-kbuild/1521166725-24157-8-git-send-email-yamada.masahiro@socionext.com/ Fixes: 3fdc7d3fe4c0 ("kbuild: link vmlinux only once for CONFIG_TRIM_UNUSED_KSYMS") Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada Tested-by: Sami Tolvanen Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Makefile | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index 75be5870cc55..ae9156f804e5 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -1073,7 +1073,7 @@ PHONY += autoksyms_recursive ifdef CONFIG_TRIM_UNUSED_KSYMS autoksyms_recursive: descend modules.order $(Q)$(CONFIG_SHELL) $(srctree)/scripts/adjust_autoksyms.sh \ - "$(MAKE) -f $(srctree)/Makefile vmlinux" + "$(MAKE) -f $(srctree)/Makefile autoksyms_recursive" endif # For the kernel to actually contain only the needed exported symbols, From ceda71d49f6b397b2046c7e387ec16cf5adf4d0c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Sat, 11 Jun 2022 17:10:15 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0756/1091] powerpc/pseries: wire up rng during setup_arch() commit e561e472a3d441753bd012333b057f48fef1045b upstream. The platform's RNG must be available before random_init() in order to be useful for initial seeding, which in turn means that it needs to be called from setup_arch(), rather than from an init call. Fortunately, each platform already has a setup_arch function pointer, which means it's easy to wire this up. This commit also removes some noisy log messages that don't add much. Fixes: a489043f4626 ("powerpc/pseries: Implement arch_get_random_long() based on H_RANDOM") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+ Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Reviewed-by: Christophe Leroy Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220611151015.548325-4-Jason@zx2c4.com Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/pseries.h | 2 ++ arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/rng.c | 11 +++-------- arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/pseries.h b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/pseries.h index 13fa370a87e4..5fd56230b01c 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/pseries.h +++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/pseries.h @@ -114,4 +114,6 @@ int dlpar_workqueue_init(void); void pseries_setup_rfi_flush(void); void pseries_lpar_read_hblkrm_characteristics(void); +void pseries_rng_init(void); + #endif /* _PSERIES_PSERIES_H */ diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/rng.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/rng.c index 6268545947b8..6ddfdeaace9e 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/rng.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/rng.c @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include "pseries.h" static int pseries_get_random_long(unsigned long *v) @@ -24,19 +25,13 @@ static int pseries_get_random_long(unsigned long *v) return 0; } -static __init int rng_init(void) +void __init pseries_rng_init(void) { struct device_node *dn; dn = of_find_compatible_node(NULL, NULL, "ibm,random"); if (!dn) - return -ENODEV; - - pr_info("Registering arch random hook.\n"); - + return; ppc_md.get_random_seed = pseries_get_random_long; - of_node_put(dn); - return 0; } -machine_subsys_initcall(pseries, rng_init); diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c index 16b744646ea9..d5abb25865e3 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c @@ -792,6 +792,8 @@ static void __init pSeries_setup_arch(void) if (swiotlb_force == SWIOTLB_FORCE) ppc_swiotlb_enable = 1; + + pseries_rng_init(); } static void pseries_panic(char *str) From 9ef3ad40a81ff6b8b65ed870588b230f38812f2a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Wed, 29 Jun 2022 08:58:50 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0757/1091] Linux 5.4.202 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220627111927.641837068@linuxfoundation.org Tested-by: Jon Hunter Tested-by: Florian Fainelli Tested-by: Shuah Khan Tested-by: Guenter Roeck Tested-by: Sudip Mukherjee Tested-by: Hulk Robot Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Makefile | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index ae9156f804e5..021878dc23f9 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 VERSION = 5 PATCHLEVEL = 4 -SUBLEVEL = 201 +SUBLEVEL = 202 EXTRAVERSION = NAME = Kleptomaniac Octopus From 77e2ad0918505ed954dc7d2080e1d451addf8053 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christoph Hellwig Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2021 13:13:23 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0758/1091] drm: remove drm_fb_helper_modinit commit bf22c9ec39da90ce866d5f625d616f28bc733dc1 upstream. drm_fb_helper_modinit has a lot of boilerplate for what is not very simple functionality. Just open code it in the only caller using IS_ENABLED and IS_MODULE, and skip the find_module check as a request_module is harmless if the module is already loaded (and not other caller has this find_module check either). Acked-by: Daniel Vetter Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/gpu/drm/drm_crtc_helper_internal.h | 10 ---------- drivers/gpu/drm/drm_fb_helper.c | 21 -------------------- drivers/gpu/drm/drm_kms_helper_common.c | 23 +++++++++++----------- 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_crtc_helper_internal.h b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_crtc_helper_internal.h index b5ac1581e623..d595697d3d7e 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_crtc_helper_internal.h +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_crtc_helper_internal.h @@ -32,16 +32,6 @@ #include #include -/* drm_fb_helper.c */ -#ifdef CONFIG_DRM_FBDEV_EMULATION -int drm_fb_helper_modinit(void); -#else -static inline int drm_fb_helper_modinit(void) -{ - return 0; -} -#endif - /* drm_dp_aux_dev.c */ #ifdef CONFIG_DRM_DP_AUX_CHARDEV int drm_dp_aux_dev_init(void); diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_fb_helper.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_fb_helper.c index 02ffde5fd722..4ae68bf04892 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_fb_helper.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_fb_helper.c @@ -2415,24 +2415,3 @@ int drm_fbdev_generic_setup(struct drm_device *dev, unsigned int preferred_bpp) return 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(drm_fbdev_generic_setup); - -/* The Kconfig DRM_KMS_HELPER selects FRAMEBUFFER_CONSOLE (if !EXPERT) - * but the module doesn't depend on any fb console symbols. At least - * attempt to load fbcon to avoid leaving the system without a usable console. - */ -int __init drm_fb_helper_modinit(void) -{ -#if defined(CONFIG_FRAMEBUFFER_CONSOLE_MODULE) && !defined(CONFIG_EXPERT) - const char name[] = "fbcon"; - struct module *fbcon; - - mutex_lock(&module_mutex); - fbcon = find_module(name); - mutex_unlock(&module_mutex); - - if (!fbcon) - request_module_nowait(name); -#endif - return 0; -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(drm_fb_helper_modinit); diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_kms_helper_common.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_kms_helper_common.c index 221a8528c993..f933da1656eb 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_kms_helper_common.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_kms_helper_common.c @@ -64,19 +64,18 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(edid_firmware, static int __init drm_kms_helper_init(void) { - int ret; + /* + * The Kconfig DRM_KMS_HELPER selects FRAMEBUFFER_CONSOLE (if !EXPERT) + * but the module doesn't depend on any fb console symbols. At least + * attempt to load fbcon to avoid leaving the system without a usable + * console. + */ + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DRM_FBDEV_EMULATION) && + IS_MODULE(CONFIG_FRAMEBUFFER_CONSOLE) && + !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EXPERT)) + request_module_nowait("fbcon"); - /* Call init functions from specific kms helpers here */ - ret = drm_fb_helper_modinit(); - if (ret < 0) - goto out; - - ret = drm_dp_aux_dev_init(); - if (ret < 0) - goto out; - -out: - return ret; + return drm_dp_aux_dev_init(); } static void __exit drm_kms_helper_exit(void) From ab3ed204a146aed80ca815bfccd207e191a875b2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Naveen N. Rao" Date: Mon, 16 May 2022 12:44:22 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 0759/1091] powerpc/ftrace: Remove ftrace init tramp once kernel init is complete commit 84ade0a6655bee803d176525ef457175cbf4df22 upstream. Stop using the ftrace trampoline for init section once kernel init is complete. Fixes: 67361cf8071286 ("powerpc/ftrace: Handle large kernel configs") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.20+ Signed-off-by: Naveen N. Rao Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220516071422.463738-1-naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/powerpc/include/asm/ftrace.h | 5 ++++- arch/powerpc/kernel/trace/ftrace.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- arch/powerpc/mm/mem.c | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/ftrace.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/ftrace.h index f54a08a2cd70..017336f2b086 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/ftrace.h +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/ftrace.h @@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ static inline bool arch_syscall_match_sym_name(const char *sym, const char *name #endif /* PPC64_ELF_ABI_v1 */ #endif /* CONFIG_FTRACE_SYSCALLS */ -#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64 +#if defined(CONFIG_PPC64) && defined(CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER) #include static inline void this_cpu_disable_ftrace(void) @@ -108,9 +108,12 @@ static inline void this_cpu_enable_ftrace(void) { get_paca()->ftrace_enabled = 1; } + +void ftrace_free_init_tramp(void); #else /* CONFIG_PPC64 */ static inline void this_cpu_disable_ftrace(void) { } static inline void this_cpu_enable_ftrace(void) { } +static inline void ftrace_free_init_tramp(void) { } #endif /* CONFIG_PPC64 */ #endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */ diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/trace/ftrace.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/trace/ftrace.c index 7ea0ca044b65..d816e714f2f4 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/trace/ftrace.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/trace/ftrace.c @@ -328,9 +328,7 @@ static int setup_mcount_compiler_tramp(unsigned long tramp) /* Is this a known long jump tramp? */ for (i = 0; i < NUM_FTRACE_TRAMPS; i++) - if (!ftrace_tramps[i]) - break; - else if (ftrace_tramps[i] == tramp) + if (ftrace_tramps[i] == tramp) return 0; /* Is this a known plt tramp? */ @@ -868,6 +866,17 @@ void arch_ftrace_update_code(int command) extern unsigned int ftrace_tramp_text[], ftrace_tramp_init[]; +void ftrace_free_init_tramp(void) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < NUM_FTRACE_TRAMPS && ftrace_tramps[i]; i++) + if (ftrace_tramps[i] == (unsigned long)ftrace_tramp_init) { + ftrace_tramps[i] = 0; + return; + } +} + int __init ftrace_dyn_arch_init(void) { int i; diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/mem.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/mem.c index c48705c726ac..d427f70556ea 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/mm/mem.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/mem.c @@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include @@ -346,6 +347,7 @@ void free_initmem(void) mark_initmem_nx(); init_mem_is_free = true; free_initmem_default(POISON_FREE_INITMEM); + ftrace_free_init_tramp(); } /** From 223d551a668145c674e1f0b80cd6d81151c30b28 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Naveen N. Rao" Date: Thu, 19 May 2022 14:42:37 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 0760/1091] kexec_file: drop weak attribute from arch_kexec_apply_relocations[_add] commit 3e35142ef99fe6b4fe5d834ad43ee13cca10a2dc upstream. Since commit d1bcae833b32f1 ("ELF: Don't generate unused section symbols") [1], binutils (v2.36+) started dropping section symbols that it thought were unused. This isn't an issue in general, but with kexec_file.c, gcc is placing kexec_arch_apply_relocations[_add] into a separate .text.unlikely section and the section symbol ".text.unlikely" is being dropped. Due to this, recordmcount is unable to find a non-weak symbol in .text.unlikely to generate a relocation record against. Address this by dropping the weak attribute from these functions. Instead, follow the existing pattern of having architectures #define the name of the function they want to override in their headers. [1] https://sourceware.org/git/?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=commit;h=d1bcae833b32f1 [akpm@linux-foundation.org: arch/s390/include/asm/kexec.h needs linux/module.h] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220519091237.676736-1-naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman Signed-off-by: Naveen N. Rao Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/s390/include/asm/kexec.h | 10 ++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h | 9 +++++++ include/linux/kexec.h | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ kernel/kexec_file.c | 34 -------------------------- 4 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/kexec.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/kexec.h index 7f3c9ac34bd8..63098df81c9f 100644 --- a/arch/s390/include/asm/kexec.h +++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/kexec.h @@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ #ifndef _S390_KEXEC_H #define _S390_KEXEC_H +#include + #include #include #include @@ -83,4 +85,12 @@ struct kimage_arch { extern const struct kexec_file_ops s390_kexec_image_ops; extern const struct kexec_file_ops s390_kexec_elf_ops; +#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE +struct purgatory_info; +int arch_kexec_apply_relocations_add(struct purgatory_info *pi, + Elf_Shdr *section, + const Elf_Shdr *relsec, + const Elf_Shdr *symtab); +#define arch_kexec_apply_relocations_add arch_kexec_apply_relocations_add +#endif #endif /*_S390_KEXEC_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h index 5e7d6b46de97..367da081f7d9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -201,6 +202,14 @@ extern int arch_kexec_post_alloc_pages(void *vaddr, unsigned int pages, extern void arch_kexec_pre_free_pages(void *vaddr, unsigned int pages); #define arch_kexec_pre_free_pages arch_kexec_pre_free_pages +#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE +struct purgatory_info; +int arch_kexec_apply_relocations_add(struct purgatory_info *pi, + Elf_Shdr *section, + const Elf_Shdr *relsec, + const Elf_Shdr *symtab); +#define arch_kexec_apply_relocations_add arch_kexec_apply_relocations_add +#endif #endif typedef void crash_vmclear_fn(void); diff --git a/include/linux/kexec.h b/include/linux/kexec.h index a1cffce3de8c..64f23bab6255 100644 --- a/include/linux/kexec.h +++ b/include/linux/kexec.h @@ -186,14 +186,6 @@ void *kexec_purgatory_get_symbol_addr(struct kimage *image, const char *name); int __weak arch_kexec_kernel_image_probe(struct kimage *image, void *buf, unsigned long buf_len); void * __weak arch_kexec_kernel_image_load(struct kimage *image); -int __weak arch_kexec_apply_relocations_add(struct purgatory_info *pi, - Elf_Shdr *section, - const Elf_Shdr *relsec, - const Elf_Shdr *symtab); -int __weak arch_kexec_apply_relocations(struct purgatory_info *pi, - Elf_Shdr *section, - const Elf_Shdr *relsec, - const Elf_Shdr *symtab); extern int kexec_add_buffer(struct kexec_buf *kbuf); int kexec_locate_mem_hole(struct kexec_buf *kbuf); @@ -216,6 +208,44 @@ extern int crash_exclude_mem_range(struct crash_mem *mem, unsigned long long mend); extern int crash_prepare_elf64_headers(struct crash_mem *mem, int kernel_map, void **addr, unsigned long *sz); + +#ifndef arch_kexec_apply_relocations_add +/* + * arch_kexec_apply_relocations_add - apply relocations of type RELA + * @pi: Purgatory to be relocated. + * @section: Section relocations applying to. + * @relsec: Section containing RELAs. + * @symtab: Corresponding symtab. + * + * Return: 0 on success, negative errno on error. + */ +static inline int +arch_kexec_apply_relocations_add(struct purgatory_info *pi, Elf_Shdr *section, + const Elf_Shdr *relsec, const Elf_Shdr *symtab) +{ + pr_err("RELA relocation unsupported.\n"); + return -ENOEXEC; +} +#endif + +#ifndef arch_kexec_apply_relocations +/* + * arch_kexec_apply_relocations - apply relocations of type REL + * @pi: Purgatory to be relocated. + * @section: Section relocations applying to. + * @relsec: Section containing RELs. + * @symtab: Corresponding symtab. + * + * Return: 0 on success, negative errno on error. + */ +static inline int +arch_kexec_apply_relocations(struct purgatory_info *pi, Elf_Shdr *section, + const Elf_Shdr *relsec, const Elf_Shdr *symtab) +{ + pr_err("REL relocation unsupported.\n"); + return -ENOEXEC; +} +#endif #endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE */ #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_ELF diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c index b17998fa03f1..5b58149bcd90 100644 --- a/kernel/kexec_file.c +++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c @@ -107,40 +107,6 @@ int __weak arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig(struct kimage *image, void *buf, } #endif -/* - * arch_kexec_apply_relocations_add - apply relocations of type RELA - * @pi: Purgatory to be relocated. - * @section: Section relocations applying to. - * @relsec: Section containing RELAs. - * @symtab: Corresponding symtab. - * - * Return: 0 on success, negative errno on error. - */ -int __weak -arch_kexec_apply_relocations_add(struct purgatory_info *pi, Elf_Shdr *section, - const Elf_Shdr *relsec, const Elf_Shdr *symtab) -{ - pr_err("RELA relocation unsupported.\n"); - return -ENOEXEC; -} - -/* - * arch_kexec_apply_relocations - apply relocations of type REL - * @pi: Purgatory to be relocated. - * @section: Section relocations applying to. - * @relsec: Section containing RELs. - * @symtab: Corresponding symtab. - * - * Return: 0 on success, negative errno on error. - */ -int __weak -arch_kexec_apply_relocations(struct purgatory_info *pi, Elf_Shdr *section, - const Elf_Shdr *relsec, const Elf_Shdr *symtab) -{ - pr_err("REL relocation unsupported.\n"); - return -ENOEXEC; -} - /* * Free up memory used by kernel, initrd, and command line. This is temporary * memory allocation which is not needed any more after these buffers have From 2bfb0d43a47c19a15e92c44ed009cdeeeaf04907 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vladimir Oltean Date: Tue, 28 Jun 2022 20:20:16 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 0761/1091] net: mscc: ocelot: allow unregistered IP multicast flooding Flooding of unregistered IP multicast has been broken (both to other switch ports and to the CPU) since the ocelot driver introduction, and up until commit 4cf35a2b627a ("net: mscc: ocelot: fix broken IP multicast flooding"), a bug fix for commit 421741ea5672 ("net: mscc: ocelot: offload bridge port flags to device") from v5.12. The driver used to set PGID_MCIPV4 and PGID_MCIPV6 to the empty port mask (0), which made unregistered IPv4/IPv6 multicast go nowhere, and without ever modifying that port mask at runtime. The expectation is that such packets are treated as broadcast, and flooded according to the forwarding domain (to the CPU if the port is standalone, or to the CPU and other bridged ports, if under a bridge). Since the aforementioned commit, the limitation has been lifted by responding to SWITCHDEV_ATTR_ID_PORT_BRIDGE_FLAGS events emitted by the bridge. As for host flooding, DSA synthesizes another call to ocelot_port_bridge_flags() on the NPI port which ensures that the CPU gets the unregistered multicast traffic it might need, for example for smcroute to work between standalone ports. But between v4.18 and v5.12, IP multicast flooding has remained unfixed. Delete the inexplicable premature optimization of clearing PGID_MCIPV4 and PGID_MCIPV6 as part of the init sequence, and allow unregistered IP multicast to be flooded freely according to the forwarding domain established by PGID_SRC, by explicitly programming PGID_MCIPV4 and PGID_MCIPV6 towards all physical ports plus the CPU port module. Fixes: a556c76adc05 ("net: mscc: Add initial Ocelot switch support") Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/ethernet/mscc/ocelot.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mscc/ocelot.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mscc/ocelot.c index bf7832b34a00..acddb3aa53de 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mscc/ocelot.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mscc/ocelot.c @@ -2153,8 +2153,12 @@ int ocelot_init(struct ocelot *ocelot) ocelot_write_rix(ocelot, ANA_PGID_PGID_PGID(GENMASK(ocelot->num_phys_ports, 0)), ANA_PGID_PGID, PGID_MC); - ocelot_write_rix(ocelot, 0, ANA_PGID_PGID, PGID_MCIPV4); - ocelot_write_rix(ocelot, 0, ANA_PGID_PGID, PGID_MCIPV6); + ocelot_write_rix(ocelot, + ANA_PGID_PGID_PGID(GENMASK(ocelot->num_phys_ports, 0)), + ANA_PGID_PGID, PGID_MCIPV4); + ocelot_write_rix(ocelot, + ANA_PGID_PGID_PGID(GENMASK(ocelot->num_phys_ports, 0)), + ANA_PGID_PGID, PGID_MCIPV6); /* CPU port Injection/Extraction configuration */ ocelot_write_rix(ocelot, QSYS_SWITCH_PORT_MODE_INGRESS_DROP_MODE | From 472671eec98a9ca2995c34cf9d29873863180047 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefan Agner Date: Wed, 29 Jun 2022 11:02:17 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0762/1091] ARM: 8989/1: use .fpu assembler directives instead of assembler arguments commit a6c30873ee4a5cc0549c1973668156381ab2c1c4 upstream Explicit FPU selection has been introduced in commit 1a6be26d5b1a ("[ARM] Enable VFP to be built when non-VFP capable CPUs are selected") to make use of assembler mnemonics for VFP instructions. However, clang currently does not support passing assembler flags like this and errors out with: clang-10: error: the clang compiler does not support '-Wa,-mfpu=softvfp+vfp' Make use of the .fpu assembler directives to select the floating point hardware selectively. Also use the new unified assembler language mnemonics. This allows to build these procedures with Clang. Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/762 Signed-off-by: Stefan Agner Signed-off-by: Russell King Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm/vfp/Makefile | 2 -- arch/arm/vfp/vfphw.S | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++---------- 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/vfp/Makefile b/arch/arm/vfp/Makefile index 9975b63ac3b0..749901a72d6d 100644 --- a/arch/arm/vfp/Makefile +++ b/arch/arm/vfp/Makefile @@ -8,6 +8,4 @@ # ccflags-y := -DDEBUG # asflags-y := -DDEBUG -KBUILD_AFLAGS :=$(KBUILD_AFLAGS:-msoft-float=-Wa,-mfpu=softvfp+vfp -mfloat-abi=soft) - obj-y += vfpmodule.o entry.o vfphw.o vfpsingle.o vfpdouble.o diff --git a/arch/arm/vfp/vfphw.S b/arch/arm/vfp/vfphw.S index b530db8f2c6c..772c6a3b1f72 100644 --- a/arch/arm/vfp/vfphw.S +++ b/arch/arm/vfp/vfphw.S @@ -253,11 +253,14 @@ vfp_current_hw_state_address: ENTRY(vfp_get_float) tbl_branch r0, r3, #3 + .fpu vfpv2 .irp dr,0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15 -1: mrc p10, 0, r0, c\dr, c0, 0 @ fmrs r0, s0 +1: vmov r0, s\dr ret lr .org 1b + 8 -1: mrc p10, 0, r0, c\dr, c0, 4 @ fmrs r0, s1 + .endr + .irp dr,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31 +1: vmov r0, s\dr ret lr .org 1b + 8 .endr @@ -265,11 +268,14 @@ ENDPROC(vfp_get_float) ENTRY(vfp_put_float) tbl_branch r1, r3, #3 + .fpu vfpv2 .irp dr,0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15 -1: mcr p10, 0, r0, c\dr, c0, 0 @ fmsr r0, s0 +1: vmov s\dr, r0 ret lr .org 1b + 8 -1: mcr p10, 0, r0, c\dr, c0, 4 @ fmsr r0, s1 + .endr + .irp dr,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31 +1: vmov s\dr, r0 ret lr .org 1b + 8 .endr @@ -277,15 +283,17 @@ ENDPROC(vfp_put_float) ENTRY(vfp_get_double) tbl_branch r0, r3, #3 + .fpu vfpv2 .irp dr,0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15 -1: fmrrd r0, r1, d\dr +1: vmov r0, r1, d\dr ret lr .org 1b + 8 .endr #ifdef CONFIG_VFPv3 @ d16 - d31 registers - .irp dr,0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15 -1: mrrc p11, 3, r0, r1, c\dr @ fmrrd r0, r1, d\dr + .fpu vfpv3 + .irp dr,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31 +1: vmov r0, r1, d\dr ret lr .org 1b + 8 .endr @@ -299,15 +307,17 @@ ENDPROC(vfp_get_double) ENTRY(vfp_put_double) tbl_branch r2, r3, #3 + .fpu vfpv2 .irp dr,0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15 -1: fmdrr d\dr, r0, r1 +1: vmov d\dr, r0, r1 ret lr .org 1b + 8 .endr #ifdef CONFIG_VFPv3 + .fpu vfpv3 @ d16 - d31 registers - .irp dr,0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15 -1: mcrr p11, 3, r0, r1, c\dr @ fmdrr r0, r1, d\dr + .irp dr,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31 +1: vmov d\dr, r0, r1 ret lr .org 1b + 8 .endr From 0a43679016f051fd78ab0355f9af6f6f4468149f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefan Agner Date: Wed, 29 Jun 2022 11:02:18 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0763/1091] ARM: 8990/1: use VFP assembler mnemonics in register load/store macros commit ee440336e5ef977c397afdb72cbf9c6b8effc8ea upstream The integrated assembler of Clang 10 and earlier do not allow to access the VFP registers through the coprocessor load/store instructions: :4:6: error: invalid operand for instruction LDC p11, cr0, [r10],#32*4 @ FLDMIAD r10!, {d0-d15} ^ This has been addressed with Clang 11 [0]. However, to support earlier versions of Clang and for better readability use of VFP assembler mnemonics still is preferred. Replace the coprocessor load/store instructions with explicit assembler mnemonics to accessing the floating point coprocessor registers. Use assembler directives to select the appropriate FPU version. This allows to build these macros with GNU assembler as well as with Clang's built-in assembler. [0] https://reviews.llvm.org/D59733 Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/905 Signed-off-by: Stefan Agner Signed-off-by: Russell King Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm/include/asm/vfpmacros.h | 19 +++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/vfpmacros.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/vfpmacros.h index 628c336e8e3b..947ee5395e1f 100644 --- a/arch/arm/include/asm/vfpmacros.h +++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/vfpmacros.h @@ -19,23 +19,25 @@ @ read all the working registers back into the VFP .macro VFPFLDMIA, base, tmp + .fpu vfpv2 #if __LINUX_ARM_ARCH__ < 6 - LDC p11, cr0, [\base],#33*4 @ FLDMIAX \base!, {d0-d15} + fldmiax \base!, {d0-d15} #else - LDC p11, cr0, [\base],#32*4 @ FLDMIAD \base!, {d0-d15} + vldmia \base!, {d0-d15} #endif #ifdef CONFIG_VFPv3 + .fpu vfpv3 #if __LINUX_ARM_ARCH__ <= 6 ldr \tmp, =elf_hwcap @ may not have MVFR regs ldr \tmp, [\tmp, #0] tst \tmp, #HWCAP_VFPD32 - ldclne p11, cr0, [\base],#32*4 @ FLDMIAD \base!, {d16-d31} + vldmiane \base!, {d16-d31} addeq \base, \base, #32*4 @ step over unused register space #else VFPFMRX \tmp, MVFR0 @ Media and VFP Feature Register 0 and \tmp, \tmp, #MVFR0_A_SIMD_MASK @ A_SIMD field cmp \tmp, #2 @ 32 x 64bit registers? - ldcleq p11, cr0, [\base],#32*4 @ FLDMIAD \base!, {d16-d31} + vldmiaeq \base!, {d16-d31} addne \base, \base, #32*4 @ step over unused register space #endif #endif @@ -44,22 +46,23 @@ @ write all the working registers out of the VFP .macro VFPFSTMIA, base, tmp #if __LINUX_ARM_ARCH__ < 6 - STC p11, cr0, [\base],#33*4 @ FSTMIAX \base!, {d0-d15} + fstmiax \base!, {d0-d15} #else - STC p11, cr0, [\base],#32*4 @ FSTMIAD \base!, {d0-d15} + vstmia \base!, {d0-d15} #endif #ifdef CONFIG_VFPv3 + .fpu vfpv3 #if __LINUX_ARM_ARCH__ <= 6 ldr \tmp, =elf_hwcap @ may not have MVFR regs ldr \tmp, [\tmp, #0] tst \tmp, #HWCAP_VFPD32 - stclne p11, cr0, [\base],#32*4 @ FSTMIAD \base!, {d16-d31} + vstmiane \base!, {d16-d31} addeq \base, \base, #32*4 @ step over unused register space #else VFPFMRX \tmp, MVFR0 @ Media and VFP Feature Register 0 and \tmp, \tmp, #MVFR0_A_SIMD_MASK @ A_SIMD field cmp \tmp, #2 @ 32 x 64bit registers? - stcleq p11, cr0, [\base],#32*4 @ FSTMIAD \base!, {d16-d31} + vstmiaeq \base!, {d16-d31} addne \base, \base, #32*4 @ step over unused register space #endif #endif From e120403c0e7c6177c549de76b5d35818100c0f2d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jian Cai Date: Wed, 29 Jun 2022 11:02:19 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0764/1091] ARM: 8971/1: replace the sole use of a symbol with its definition commit a780e485b5768e78aef087502499714901b68cc4 upstream ALT_UP_B macro sets symbol up_b_offset via .equ to an expression involving another symbol. The macro gets expanded twice when arch/arm/kernel/sleep.S is assembled, creating a scenario where up_b_offset is set to another expression involving symbols while its current value is based on symbols. LLVM integrated assembler does not allow such cases, and based on the documentation of binutils, "Values that are based on expressions involving other symbols are allowed, but some targets may restrict this to only being done once per assembly", so it may be better to avoid such cases as it is not clearly stated which targets should support or disallow them. The fix in this case is simple, as up_b_offset has only one use, so we can replace the use with the definition and get rid of up_b_offset. Link:https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/920 Reviewed-by: Stefan Agner Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers Signed-off-by: Jian Cai Signed-off-by: Russell King Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h index 6b3e64e19fb6..70e1c23feedb 100644 --- a/arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h +++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h @@ -279,10 +279,9 @@ .endif ;\ .popsection #define ALT_UP_B(label) \ - .equ up_b_offset, label - 9998b ;\ .pushsection ".alt.smp.init", "a" ;\ .long 9998b ;\ - W(b) . + up_b_offset ;\ + W(b) . + (label - 9998b) ;\ .popsection #else #define ALT_SMP(instr...) From 5e6f800332862f9a8f6cfdda7e6e8f1be394ddb2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ard Biesheuvel Date: Wed, 29 Jun 2022 11:02:20 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0765/1091] crypto: arm/sha256-neon - avoid ADRL pseudo instruction commit 54781938ec342cadbe2d76669ef8d3294d909974 upstream The ADRL pseudo instruction is not an architectural construct, but a convenience macro that was supported by the ARM proprietary assembler and adopted by binutils GAS as well, but only when assembling in 32-bit ARM mode. Therefore, it can only be used in assembler code that is known to assemble in ARM mode only, but as it turns out, the Clang assembler does not implement ADRL at all, and so it is better to get rid of it entirely. So replace the ADRL instruction with a ADR instruction that refers to a nearer symbol, and apply the delta explicitly using an additional instruction. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel Tested-by: Nick Desaulniers Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm/crypto/sha256-armv4.pl | 4 ++-- arch/arm/crypto/sha256-core.S_shipped | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/crypto/sha256-armv4.pl b/arch/arm/crypto/sha256-armv4.pl index a03cf4dfb781..d927483985c2 100644 --- a/arch/arm/crypto/sha256-armv4.pl +++ b/arch/arm/crypto/sha256-armv4.pl @@ -175,7 +175,6 @@ $code=<<___; #else .syntax unified # ifdef __thumb2__ -# define adrl adr .thumb # else .code 32 @@ -471,7 +470,8 @@ sha256_block_data_order_neon: stmdb sp!,{r4-r12,lr} sub $H,sp,#16*4+16 - adrl $Ktbl,K256 + adr $Ktbl,.Lsha256_block_data_order + sub $Ktbl,$Ktbl,#.Lsha256_block_data_order-K256 bic $H,$H,#15 @ align for 128-bit stores mov $t2,sp mov sp,$H @ alloca diff --git a/arch/arm/crypto/sha256-core.S_shipped b/arch/arm/crypto/sha256-core.S_shipped index 054aae0edfce..9deb515f3c9f 100644 --- a/arch/arm/crypto/sha256-core.S_shipped +++ b/arch/arm/crypto/sha256-core.S_shipped @@ -56,7 +56,6 @@ #else .syntax unified # ifdef __thumb2__ -# define adrl adr .thumb # else .code 32 @@ -1885,7 +1884,8 @@ sha256_block_data_order_neon: stmdb sp!,{r4-r12,lr} sub r11,sp,#16*4+16 - adrl r14,K256 + adr r14,.Lsha256_block_data_order + sub r14,r14,#.Lsha256_block_data_order-K256 bic r11,r11,#15 @ align for 128-bit stores mov r12,sp mov sp,r11 @ alloca From 54e6ecd5b7caade849b695954d68a66511ccbae3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ard Biesheuvel Date: Wed, 29 Jun 2022 11:02:21 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0766/1091] crypto: arm/sha512-neon - avoid ADRL pseudo instruction commit 0f5e8323777bfc1c1d2cba71242db6a361de03b6 upstream The ADRL pseudo instruction is not an architectural construct, but a convenience macro that was supported by the ARM proprietary assembler and adopted by binutils GAS as well, but only when assembling in 32-bit ARM mode. Therefore, it can only be used in assembler code that is known to assemble in ARM mode only, but as it turns out, the Clang assembler does not implement ADRL at all, and so it is better to get rid of it entirely. So replace the ADRL instruction with a ADR instruction that refers to a nearer symbol, and apply the delta explicitly using an additional instruction. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel Tested-by: Nick Desaulniers Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm/crypto/sha512-armv4.pl | 4 ++-- arch/arm/crypto/sha512-core.S_shipped | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/crypto/sha512-armv4.pl b/arch/arm/crypto/sha512-armv4.pl index 788c17b56ecc..2a0bdf7dd87c 100644 --- a/arch/arm/crypto/sha512-armv4.pl +++ b/arch/arm/crypto/sha512-armv4.pl @@ -212,7 +212,6 @@ $code=<<___; #else .syntax unified # ifdef __thumb2__ -# define adrl adr .thumb # else .code 32 @@ -602,7 +601,8 @@ sha512_block_data_order_neon: dmb @ errata #451034 on early Cortex A8 add $len,$inp,$len,lsl#7 @ len to point at the end of inp VFP_ABI_PUSH - adrl $Ktbl,K512 + adr $Ktbl,.Lsha512_block_data_order + sub $Ktbl,$Ktbl,.Lsha512_block_data_order-K512 vldmia $ctx,{$A-$H} @ load context .Loop_neon: ___ diff --git a/arch/arm/crypto/sha512-core.S_shipped b/arch/arm/crypto/sha512-core.S_shipped index 710ea309769e..cf5a7a70ff00 100644 --- a/arch/arm/crypto/sha512-core.S_shipped +++ b/arch/arm/crypto/sha512-core.S_shipped @@ -79,7 +79,6 @@ #else .syntax unified # ifdef __thumb2__ -# define adrl adr .thumb # else .code 32 @@ -543,7 +542,8 @@ sha512_block_data_order_neon: dmb @ errata #451034 on early Cortex A8 add r2,r1,r2,lsl#7 @ len to point at the end of inp VFP_ABI_PUSH - adrl r3,K512 + adr r3,.Lsha512_block_data_order + sub r3,r3,.Lsha512_block_data_order-K512 vldmia r0,{d16-d23} @ load context .Loop_neon: vshr.u64 d24,d20,#14 @ 0 From 02c200fdba463209a3b7650ec285a758319c968b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nick Desaulniers Date: Wed, 29 Jun 2022 11:02:22 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0767/1091] ARM: 8933/1: replace Sun/Solaris style flag on section directive commit 790756c7e0229dedc83bf058ac69633045b1000e upstream It looks like a section directive was using "Solaris style" to declare the section flags. Replace this with the GNU style so that Clang's integrated assembler can assemble this directive. The modified instances were identified via: $ ag \.section | grep # Link: https://ftp.gnu.org/old-gnu/Manuals/gas-2.9.1/html_chapter/as_7.html#SEC119 Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/744 Link: https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=43759 Link: https://reviews.llvm.org/D69296 Acked-by: Nicolas Pitre Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel Reviewed-by: Stefan Agner Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers Suggested-by: Fangrui Song Suggested-by: Jian Cai Suggested-by: Peter Smith Signed-off-by: Russell King Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm/boot/bootp/init.S | 2 +- arch/arm/boot/compressed/big-endian.S | 2 +- arch/arm/boot/compressed/head.S | 2 +- arch/arm/boot/compressed/piggy.S | 2 +- arch/arm/mm/proc-arm1020.S | 2 +- arch/arm/mm/proc-arm1020e.S | 2 +- arch/arm/mm/proc-arm1022.S | 2 +- arch/arm/mm/proc-arm1026.S | 2 +- arch/arm/mm/proc-arm720.S | 2 +- arch/arm/mm/proc-arm740.S | 2 +- arch/arm/mm/proc-arm7tdmi.S | 2 +- arch/arm/mm/proc-arm920.S | 2 +- arch/arm/mm/proc-arm922.S | 2 +- arch/arm/mm/proc-arm925.S | 2 +- arch/arm/mm/proc-arm926.S | 2 +- arch/arm/mm/proc-arm940.S | 2 +- arch/arm/mm/proc-arm946.S | 2 +- arch/arm/mm/proc-arm9tdmi.S | 2 +- arch/arm/mm/proc-fa526.S | 2 +- arch/arm/mm/proc-feroceon.S | 2 +- arch/arm/mm/proc-mohawk.S | 2 +- arch/arm/mm/proc-sa110.S | 2 +- arch/arm/mm/proc-sa1100.S | 2 +- arch/arm/mm/proc-v6.S | 2 +- arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S | 2 +- arch/arm/mm/proc-v7m.S | 4 ++-- arch/arm/mm/proc-xsc3.S | 2 +- arch/arm/mm/proc-xscale.S | 2 +- 28 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/bootp/init.S b/arch/arm/boot/bootp/init.S index 5c476bd2b4ce..b562da2f7040 100644 --- a/arch/arm/boot/bootp/init.S +++ b/arch/arm/boot/bootp/init.S @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ * size immediately following the kernel, we could build this into * a binary blob, and concatenate the zImage using the cat command. */ - .section .start,#alloc,#execinstr + .section .start, "ax" .type _start, #function .globl _start diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/compressed/big-endian.S b/arch/arm/boot/compressed/big-endian.S index 88e2a88d324b..0e092c36da2f 100644 --- a/arch/arm/boot/compressed/big-endian.S +++ b/arch/arm/boot/compressed/big-endian.S @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * Author: Nicolas Pitre */ - .section ".start", #alloc, #execinstr + .section ".start", "ax" mrc p15, 0, r0, c1, c0, 0 @ read control reg orr r0, r0, #(1 << 7) @ enable big endian mode diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/compressed/head.S b/arch/arm/boot/compressed/head.S index 0a2410adc25b..cdaf94027d3b 100644 --- a/arch/arm/boot/compressed/head.S +++ b/arch/arm/boot/compressed/head.S @@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ #endif .endm - .section ".start", #alloc, #execinstr + .section ".start", "ax" /* * sort out different calling conventions */ diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/compressed/piggy.S b/arch/arm/boot/compressed/piggy.S index 0284f84dcf38..27577644ee72 100644 --- a/arch/arm/boot/compressed/piggy.S +++ b/arch/arm/boot/compressed/piggy.S @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ - .section .piggydata,#alloc + .section .piggydata, "a" .globl input_data input_data: .incbin "arch/arm/boot/compressed/piggy_data" diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm1020.S b/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm1020.S index 4fa5371bc662..2785da387c91 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm1020.S +++ b/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm1020.S @@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ cpu_arm1020_name: .align - .section ".proc.info.init", #alloc + .section ".proc.info.init", "a" .type __arm1020_proc_info,#object __arm1020_proc_info: diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm1020e.S b/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm1020e.S index 5d8a8339e09a..e9ea237ed785 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm1020e.S +++ b/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm1020e.S @@ -449,7 +449,7 @@ arm1020e_crval: .align - .section ".proc.info.init", #alloc + .section ".proc.info.init", "a" .type __arm1020e_proc_info,#object __arm1020e_proc_info: diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm1022.S b/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm1022.S index b3dd95c345e4..920c279e7879 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm1022.S +++ b/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm1022.S @@ -443,7 +443,7 @@ arm1022_crval: .align - .section ".proc.info.init", #alloc + .section ".proc.info.init", "a" .type __arm1022_proc_info,#object __arm1022_proc_info: diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm1026.S b/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm1026.S index ac5afde12f35..10e21012380b 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm1026.S +++ b/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm1026.S @@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ arm1026_crval: string cpu_arm1026_name, "ARM1026EJ-S" .align - .section ".proc.info.init", #alloc + .section ".proc.info.init", "a" .type __arm1026_proc_info,#object __arm1026_proc_info: diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm720.S b/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm720.S index c99d24363f32..39361e196d61 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm720.S +++ b/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm720.S @@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ arm720_crval: * See for a definition of this structure. */ - .section ".proc.info.init", #alloc + .section ".proc.info.init", "a" .macro arm720_proc_info name:req, cpu_val:req, cpu_mask:req, cpu_name:req, cpu_flush:req .type __\name\()_proc_info,#object diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm740.S b/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm740.S index 1b4a3838393f..1a94bbf6e53f 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm740.S +++ b/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm740.S @@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ __arm740_setup: .align - .section ".proc.info.init", #alloc + .section ".proc.info.init", "a" .type __arm740_proc_info,#object __arm740_proc_info: .long 0x41807400 diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm7tdmi.S b/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm7tdmi.S index 17a4687065c7..52b66cf0259e 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm7tdmi.S +++ b/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm7tdmi.S @@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ __arm7tdmi_setup: .align - .section ".proc.info.init", #alloc + .section ".proc.info.init", "a" .macro arm7tdmi_proc_info name:req, cpu_val:req, cpu_mask:req, cpu_name:req, \ extra_hwcaps=0 diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm920.S b/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm920.S index 298c76b47749..31ac8acc34dc 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm920.S +++ b/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm920.S @@ -434,7 +434,7 @@ arm920_crval: .align - .section ".proc.info.init", #alloc + .section ".proc.info.init", "a" .type __arm920_proc_info,#object __arm920_proc_info: diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm922.S b/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm922.S index 824be3a0bc23..ca2c7ca8af21 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm922.S +++ b/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm922.S @@ -412,7 +412,7 @@ arm922_crval: .align - .section ".proc.info.init", #alloc + .section ".proc.info.init", "a" .type __arm922_proc_info,#object __arm922_proc_info: diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm925.S b/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm925.S index d40cff8f102c..a381a0c9f109 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm925.S +++ b/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm925.S @@ -477,7 +477,7 @@ arm925_crval: .align - .section ".proc.info.init", #alloc + .section ".proc.info.init", "a" .macro arm925_proc_info name:req, cpu_val:req, cpu_mask:req, cpu_name:req, cache .type __\name\()_proc_info,#object diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm926.S b/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm926.S index f3cd08f353f0..3188ab2bac61 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm926.S +++ b/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm926.S @@ -460,7 +460,7 @@ arm926_crval: .align - .section ".proc.info.init", #alloc + .section ".proc.info.init", "a" .type __arm926_proc_info,#object __arm926_proc_info: diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm940.S b/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm940.S index 1c26d991386d..4b8a00220cc9 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm940.S +++ b/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm940.S @@ -340,7 +340,7 @@ __arm940_setup: .align - .section ".proc.info.init", #alloc + .section ".proc.info.init", "a" .type __arm940_proc_info,#object __arm940_proc_info: diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm946.S b/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm946.S index 2dc1c75a4fd4..555becf9c758 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm946.S +++ b/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm946.S @@ -395,7 +395,7 @@ __arm946_setup: .align - .section ".proc.info.init", #alloc + .section ".proc.info.init", "a" .type __arm946_proc_info,#object __arm946_proc_info: .long 0x41009460 diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm9tdmi.S b/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm9tdmi.S index 913c06e590af..ef517530130b 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm9tdmi.S +++ b/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm9tdmi.S @@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ __arm9tdmi_setup: .align - .section ".proc.info.init", #alloc + .section ".proc.info.init", "a" .macro arm9tdmi_proc_info name:req, cpu_val:req, cpu_mask:req, cpu_name:req .type __\name\()_proc_info, #object diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/proc-fa526.S b/arch/arm/mm/proc-fa526.S index 8120b6f4dbb8..dddf833fe000 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mm/proc-fa526.S +++ b/arch/arm/mm/proc-fa526.S @@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ fa526_cr1_set: .align - .section ".proc.info.init", #alloc + .section ".proc.info.init", "a" .type __fa526_proc_info,#object __fa526_proc_info: diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/proc-feroceon.S b/arch/arm/mm/proc-feroceon.S index bb6dc34d42a3..b12b76bc8d30 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mm/proc-feroceon.S +++ b/arch/arm/mm/proc-feroceon.S @@ -571,7 +571,7 @@ feroceon_crval: .align - .section ".proc.info.init", #alloc + .section ".proc.info.init", "a" .macro feroceon_proc_info name:req, cpu_val:req, cpu_mask:req, cpu_name:req, cache:req .type __\name\()_proc_info,#object diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/proc-mohawk.S b/arch/arm/mm/proc-mohawk.S index f08308578885..d47d6c5cee63 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mm/proc-mohawk.S +++ b/arch/arm/mm/proc-mohawk.S @@ -416,7 +416,7 @@ mohawk_crval: .align - .section ".proc.info.init", #alloc + .section ".proc.info.init", "a" .type __88sv331x_proc_info,#object __88sv331x_proc_info: diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/proc-sa110.S b/arch/arm/mm/proc-sa110.S index d5bc5d702563..baba503ba816 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mm/proc-sa110.S +++ b/arch/arm/mm/proc-sa110.S @@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ sa110_crval: .align - .section ".proc.info.init", #alloc + .section ".proc.info.init", "a" .type __sa110_proc_info,#object __sa110_proc_info: diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/proc-sa1100.S b/arch/arm/mm/proc-sa1100.S index be7b611c76c7..75ebacc8e4e5 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mm/proc-sa1100.S +++ b/arch/arm/mm/proc-sa1100.S @@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ sa1100_crval: .align - .section ".proc.info.init", #alloc + .section ".proc.info.init", "a" .macro sa1100_proc_info name:req, cpu_val:req, cpu_mask:req, cpu_name:req .type __\name\()_proc_info,#object diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/proc-v6.S b/arch/arm/mm/proc-v6.S index c1c85eb3484f..1dd0d5ca27da 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mm/proc-v6.S +++ b/arch/arm/mm/proc-v6.S @@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ v6_crval: string cpu_elf_name, "v6" .align - .section ".proc.info.init", #alloc + .section ".proc.info.init", "a" /* * Match any ARMv6 processor core. diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S b/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S index c4e8006a1a8c..48e0ef6f0dcc 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S +++ b/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S @@ -644,7 +644,7 @@ __v7_setup_stack: string cpu_elf_name, "v7" .align - .section ".proc.info.init", #alloc + .section ".proc.info.init", "a" /* * Standard v7 proc info content diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7m.S b/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7m.S index 1a49d503eafc..84459c1d31b8 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7m.S +++ b/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7m.S @@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ ENTRY(cpu_cm7_proc_fin) ret lr ENDPROC(cpu_cm7_proc_fin) - .section ".init.text", #alloc, #execinstr + .section ".init.text", "ax" __v7m_cm7_setup: mov r8, #(V7M_SCB_CCR_DC | V7M_SCB_CCR_IC| V7M_SCB_CCR_BP) @@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ ENDPROC(__v7m_setup) string cpu_elf_name "v7m" string cpu_v7m_name "ARMv7-M" - .section ".proc.info.init", #alloc + .section ".proc.info.init", "a" .macro __v7m_proc name, initfunc, cache_fns = nop_cache_fns, hwcaps = 0, proc_fns = v7m_processor_functions .long 0 /* proc_info_list.__cpu_mm_mmu_flags */ diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/proc-xsc3.S b/arch/arm/mm/proc-xsc3.S index 1ac0fbbe9f12..42eaecc43cfe 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mm/proc-xsc3.S +++ b/arch/arm/mm/proc-xsc3.S @@ -496,7 +496,7 @@ xsc3_crval: .align - .section ".proc.info.init", #alloc + .section ".proc.info.init", "a" .macro xsc3_proc_info name:req, cpu_val:req, cpu_mask:req .type __\name\()_proc_info,#object diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/proc-xscale.S b/arch/arm/mm/proc-xscale.S index bdb2b7749b03..18ac5a1f8922 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mm/proc-xscale.S +++ b/arch/arm/mm/proc-xscale.S @@ -610,7 +610,7 @@ xscale_crval: .align - .section ".proc.info.init", #alloc + .section ".proc.info.init", "a" .macro xscale_proc_info name:req, cpu_val:req, cpu_mask:req, cpu_name:req, cache .type __\name\()_proc_info,#object From 3657432a75e3db3d6d9ec69bba486ca6ae0bf651 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefan Agner Date: Wed, 29 Jun 2022 11:02:23 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0768/1091] ARM: 8929/1: use APSR_nzcv instead of r15 as mrc operand commit 9f1984c6ae30e2a379751339ce3375a21099b5d4 upstream LLVM's integrated assembler does not accept r15 as mrc operand. arch/arm/boot/compressed/head.S:1267:16: error: operand must be a register in range [r0, r14] or apsr_nzcv 1: mrc p15, 0, r15, c7, c14, 3 @ test,clean,invalidate D cache ^ Use APSR_nzcv instead of r15. The GNU assembler supports this syntax since binutils 2.21 [0]. [0] https://sourceware.org/git/gitweb.cgi?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=commit;h=db472d6ff0f438a21b357249a9b48e4b74498076 Signed-off-by: Stefan Agner Signed-off-by: Russell King Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm/boot/compressed/head.S | 2 +- arch/arm/mm/proc-arm1026.S | 4 ++-- arch/arm/mm/proc-arm926.S | 4 ++-- 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/compressed/head.S b/arch/arm/boot/compressed/head.S index cdaf94027d3b..17f87f4c74f5 100644 --- a/arch/arm/boot/compressed/head.S +++ b/arch/arm/boot/compressed/head.S @@ -1274,7 +1274,7 @@ iflush: __armv5tej_mmu_cache_flush: tst r4, #1 movne pc, lr -1: mrc p15, 0, r15, c7, c14, 3 @ test,clean,invalidate D cache +1: mrc p15, 0, APSR_nzcv, c7, c14, 3 @ test,clean,invalidate D cache bne 1b mcr p15, 0, r0, c7, c5, 0 @ flush I cache mcr p15, 0, r0, c7, c10, 4 @ drain WB diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm1026.S b/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm1026.S index 10e21012380b..0bdf25a95b10 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm1026.S +++ b/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm1026.S @@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ ENTRY(arm1026_flush_kern_cache_all) mov ip, #0 __flush_whole_cache: #ifndef CONFIG_CPU_DCACHE_DISABLE -1: mrc p15, 0, r15, c7, c14, 3 @ test, clean, invalidate +1: mrc p15, 0, APSR_nzcv, c7, c14, 3 @ test, clean, invalidate bne 1b #endif tst r2, #VM_EXEC @@ -363,7 +363,7 @@ ENTRY(cpu_arm1026_switch_mm) #ifdef CONFIG_MMU mov r1, #0 #ifndef CONFIG_CPU_DCACHE_DISABLE -1: mrc p15, 0, r15, c7, c14, 3 @ test, clean, invalidate +1: mrc p15, 0, APSR_nzcv, c7, c14, 3 @ test, clean, invalidate bne 1b #endif #ifndef CONFIG_CPU_ICACHE_DISABLE diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm926.S b/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm926.S index 3188ab2bac61..1ba253c2bce1 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm926.S +++ b/arch/arm/mm/proc-arm926.S @@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ __flush_whole_cache: #ifdef CONFIG_CPU_DCACHE_WRITETHROUGH mcr p15, 0, ip, c7, c6, 0 @ invalidate D cache #else -1: mrc p15, 0, r15, c7, c14, 3 @ test,clean,invalidate +1: mrc p15, 0, APSR_nzcv, c7, c14, 3 @ test,clean,invalidate bne 1b #endif tst r2, #VM_EXEC @@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ ENTRY(cpu_arm926_switch_mm) mcr p15, 0, ip, c7, c6, 0 @ invalidate D cache #else @ && 'Clean & Invalidate whole DCache' -1: mrc p15, 0, r15, c7, c14, 3 @ test,clean,invalidate +1: mrc p15, 0, APSR_nzcv, c7, c14, 3 @ test,clean,invalidate bne 1b #endif mcr p15, 0, ip, c7, c5, 0 @ invalidate I cache From 9e00e5d195ed38bf577101100fa67bf02139623d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefan Agner Date: Wed, 29 Jun 2022 11:02:24 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0769/1091] ARM: OMAP2+: drop unnecessary adrl commit d85d5247885ef2e8192287b895c2e381fa931b0b upstream The adrl instruction has been introduced with commit dd31394779aa ("ARM: omap3: Thumb-2 compatibility for sleep34xx.S"), back when this assembly file was considerably longer. Today adr seems to have enough reach, even when inserting about 60 instructions between the use site and the label. Replace adrl with conventional adr instruction. This allows to build this file using Clang's integrated assembler (which does not support the adrl pseudo instruction). Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/430 Signed-off-by: Stefan Agner Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm/mach-omap2/sleep34xx.S | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-omap2/sleep34xx.S b/arch/arm/mach-omap2/sleep34xx.S index ac1324c6453b..c4e97d35c310 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mach-omap2/sleep34xx.S +++ b/arch/arm/mach-omap2/sleep34xx.S @@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ ENTRY(enable_omap3630_toggle_l2_on_restore) stmfd sp!, {lr} @ save registers on stack /* Setup so that we will disable and enable l2 */ mov r1, #0x1 - adrl r3, l2dis_3630_offset @ may be too distant for plain adr + adr r3, l2dis_3630_offset ldr r2, [r3] @ value for offset str r1, [r2, r3] @ write to l2dis_3630 ldmfd sp!, {pc} @ restore regs and return From 1b43c30cd5d555caa615d07a53bd8bb9c945fd73 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jian Cai Date: Wed, 29 Jun 2022 11:02:25 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0770/1091] ARM: 9029/1: Make iwmmxt.S support Clang's integrated assembler commit 3c9f5708b7aed6a963e2aefccbd1854802de163e upstream This patch replaces 6 IWMMXT instructions Clang's integrated assembler does not support in iwmmxt.S using macros, while making sure GNU assembler still emit the same instructions. This should be easier than providing full IWMMXT support in Clang. This is one of the last bits of kernel code that could be compiled but not assembled with clang. Once all of it works with IAS, we no longer need to special-case 32-bit Arm in Kbuild, or turn off CONFIG_IWMMXT when build-testing. "Intel Wireless MMX Technology - Developer Guide - August, 2002" should be referenced for the encoding schemes of these extensions. Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/975 Suggested-by: Nick Desaulniers Suggested-by: Ard Biesheuvel Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers Tested-by: Nick Desaulniers Signed-off-by: Jian Cai Signed-off-by: Russell King Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm/kernel/iwmmxt.S | 89 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- arch/arm/kernel/iwmmxt.h | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 92 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm/kernel/iwmmxt.h diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/iwmmxt.S b/arch/arm/kernel/iwmmxt.S index 0dcae787b004..d2b4ac06e4ed 100644 --- a/arch/arm/kernel/iwmmxt.S +++ b/arch/arm/kernel/iwmmxt.S @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include "iwmmxt.h" #if defined(CONFIG_CPU_PJ4) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_PJ4B) #define PJ4(code...) code @@ -113,33 +114,33 @@ concan_save: concan_dump: - wstrw wCSSF, [r1, #MMX_WCSSF] - wstrw wCASF, [r1, #MMX_WCASF] - wstrw wCGR0, [r1, #MMX_WCGR0] - wstrw wCGR1, [r1, #MMX_WCGR1] - wstrw wCGR2, [r1, #MMX_WCGR2] - wstrw wCGR3, [r1, #MMX_WCGR3] + wstrw wCSSF, r1, MMX_WCSSF + wstrw wCASF, r1, MMX_WCASF + wstrw wCGR0, r1, MMX_WCGR0 + wstrw wCGR1, r1, MMX_WCGR1 + wstrw wCGR2, r1, MMX_WCGR2 + wstrw wCGR3, r1, MMX_WCGR3 1: @ MUP? wRn tst r2, #0x2 beq 2f - wstrd wR0, [r1, #MMX_WR0] - wstrd wR1, [r1, #MMX_WR1] - wstrd wR2, [r1, #MMX_WR2] - wstrd wR3, [r1, #MMX_WR3] - wstrd wR4, [r1, #MMX_WR4] - wstrd wR5, [r1, #MMX_WR5] - wstrd wR6, [r1, #MMX_WR6] - wstrd wR7, [r1, #MMX_WR7] - wstrd wR8, [r1, #MMX_WR8] - wstrd wR9, [r1, #MMX_WR9] - wstrd wR10, [r1, #MMX_WR10] - wstrd wR11, [r1, #MMX_WR11] - wstrd wR12, [r1, #MMX_WR12] - wstrd wR13, [r1, #MMX_WR13] - wstrd wR14, [r1, #MMX_WR14] - wstrd wR15, [r1, #MMX_WR15] + wstrd wR0, r1, MMX_WR0 + wstrd wR1, r1, MMX_WR1 + wstrd wR2, r1, MMX_WR2 + wstrd wR3, r1, MMX_WR3 + wstrd wR4, r1, MMX_WR4 + wstrd wR5, r1, MMX_WR5 + wstrd wR6, r1, MMX_WR6 + wstrd wR7, r1, MMX_WR7 + wstrd wR8, r1, MMX_WR8 + wstrd wR9, r1, MMX_WR9 + wstrd wR10, r1, MMX_WR10 + wstrd wR11, r1, MMX_WR11 + wstrd wR12, r1, MMX_WR12 + wstrd wR13, r1, MMX_WR13 + wstrd wR14, r1, MMX_WR14 + wstrd wR15, r1, MMX_WR15 2: teq r0, #0 @ anything to load? reteq lr @ if not, return @@ -147,30 +148,30 @@ concan_dump: concan_load: @ Load wRn - wldrd wR0, [r0, #MMX_WR0] - wldrd wR1, [r0, #MMX_WR1] - wldrd wR2, [r0, #MMX_WR2] - wldrd wR3, [r0, #MMX_WR3] - wldrd wR4, [r0, #MMX_WR4] - wldrd wR5, [r0, #MMX_WR5] - wldrd wR6, [r0, #MMX_WR6] - wldrd wR7, [r0, #MMX_WR7] - wldrd wR8, [r0, #MMX_WR8] - wldrd wR9, [r0, #MMX_WR9] - wldrd wR10, [r0, #MMX_WR10] - wldrd wR11, [r0, #MMX_WR11] - wldrd wR12, [r0, #MMX_WR12] - wldrd wR13, [r0, #MMX_WR13] - wldrd wR14, [r0, #MMX_WR14] - wldrd wR15, [r0, #MMX_WR15] + wldrd wR0, r0, MMX_WR0 + wldrd wR1, r0, MMX_WR1 + wldrd wR2, r0, MMX_WR2 + wldrd wR3, r0, MMX_WR3 + wldrd wR4, r0, MMX_WR4 + wldrd wR5, r0, MMX_WR5 + wldrd wR6, r0, MMX_WR6 + wldrd wR7, r0, MMX_WR7 + wldrd wR8, r0, MMX_WR8 + wldrd wR9, r0, MMX_WR9 + wldrd wR10, r0, MMX_WR10 + wldrd wR11, r0, MMX_WR11 + wldrd wR12, r0, MMX_WR12 + wldrd wR13, r0, MMX_WR13 + wldrd wR14, r0, MMX_WR14 + wldrd wR15, r0, MMX_WR15 @ Load wCx - wldrw wCSSF, [r0, #MMX_WCSSF] - wldrw wCASF, [r0, #MMX_WCASF] - wldrw wCGR0, [r0, #MMX_WCGR0] - wldrw wCGR1, [r0, #MMX_WCGR1] - wldrw wCGR2, [r0, #MMX_WCGR2] - wldrw wCGR3, [r0, #MMX_WCGR3] + wldrw wCSSF, r0, MMX_WCSSF + wldrw wCASF, r0, MMX_WCASF + wldrw wCGR0, r0, MMX_WCGR0 + wldrw wCGR1, r0, MMX_WCGR1 + wldrw wCGR2, r0, MMX_WCGR2 + wldrw wCGR3, r0, MMX_WCGR3 @ clear CUP/MUP (only if r1 != 0) teq r1, #0 diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/iwmmxt.h b/arch/arm/kernel/iwmmxt.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..fb627286f5bb --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/arm/kernel/iwmmxt.h @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ + +#ifndef __IWMMXT_H__ +#define __IWMMXT_H__ + +.irp b, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 +.set .LwR\b, \b +.set .Lr\b, \b +.endr + +.set .LwCSSF, 0x2 +.set .LwCASF, 0x3 +.set .LwCGR0, 0x8 +.set .LwCGR1, 0x9 +.set .LwCGR2, 0xa +.set .LwCGR3, 0xb + +.macro wldrd, reg:req, base:req, offset:req +.inst 0xedd00100 | (.L\reg << 12) | (.L\base << 16) | (\offset >> 2) +.endm + +.macro wldrw, reg:req, base:req, offset:req +.inst 0xfd900100 | (.L\reg << 12) | (.L\base << 16) | (\offset >> 2) +.endm + +.macro wstrd, reg:req, base:req, offset:req +.inst 0xedc00100 | (.L\reg << 12) | (.L\base << 16) | (\offset >> 2) +.endm + +.macro wstrw, reg:req, base:req, offset:req +.inst 0xfd800100 | (.L\reg << 12) | (.L\base << 16) | (\offset >> 2) +.endm + +#ifdef __clang__ + +#define wCon c1 + +.macro tmrc, dest:req, control:req +mrc p1, 0, \dest, \control, c0, 0 +.endm + +.macro tmcr, control:req, src:req +mcr p1, 0, \src, \control, c0, 0 +.endm +#endif + +#endif From 3bf992f9d9a8469e4ded1826d84ed395e836ca43 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ard Biesheuvel Date: Wed, 29 Jun 2022 11:02:26 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0771/1091] crypto: arm - use Kconfig based compiler checks for crypto opcodes commit b4d0c0aad57ac3bd1b5141bac5ab1ab1d5e442b3 upstream Instead of allowing the Crypto Extensions algorithms to be selected when using a toolchain that does not support them, and complain about it at build time, use the information we have about the compiler to prevent them from being selected in the first place. Users that are stuck with a GCC version <4.8 are unlikely to care about these routines anyway, and it cleans up the Makefile considerably. While at it, add explicit 'armv8-a' CPU specifiers to the code that uses the 'crypto-neon-fp-armv8' FPU specifier so we don't regress Clang, which will complain about this in version 10 and later. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm/crypto/Kconfig | 14 +++++++------ arch/arm/crypto/Makefile | 32 ++++++----------------------- arch/arm/crypto/crct10dif-ce-core.S | 2 +- arch/arm/crypto/ghash-ce-core.S | 1 + arch/arm/crypto/sha1-ce-core.S | 1 + arch/arm/crypto/sha2-ce-core.S | 1 + 6 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/crypto/Kconfig b/arch/arm/crypto/Kconfig index 043b0b18bf7e..f747caea10ff 100644 --- a/arch/arm/crypto/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm/crypto/Kconfig @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ config CRYPTO_SHA1_ARM_NEON config CRYPTO_SHA1_ARM_CE tristate "SHA1 digest algorithm (ARM v8 Crypto Extensions)" - depends on KERNEL_MODE_NEON + depends on KERNEL_MODE_NEON && (CC_IS_CLANG || GCC_VERSION >= 40800) select CRYPTO_SHA1_ARM select CRYPTO_HASH help @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ config CRYPTO_SHA1_ARM_CE config CRYPTO_SHA2_ARM_CE tristate "SHA-224/256 digest algorithm (ARM v8 Crypto Extensions)" - depends on KERNEL_MODE_NEON + depends on KERNEL_MODE_NEON && (CC_IS_CLANG || GCC_VERSION >= 40800) select CRYPTO_SHA256_ARM select CRYPTO_HASH help @@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ config CRYPTO_AES_ARM_BS config CRYPTO_AES_ARM_CE tristate "Accelerated AES using ARMv8 Crypto Extensions" - depends on KERNEL_MODE_NEON + depends on KERNEL_MODE_NEON && (CC_IS_CLANG || GCC_VERSION >= 40800) select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER select CRYPTO_LIB_AES select CRYPTO_SIMD @@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ config CRYPTO_AES_ARM_CE config CRYPTO_GHASH_ARM_CE tristate "PMULL-accelerated GHASH using NEON/ARMv8 Crypto Extensions" - depends on KERNEL_MODE_NEON + depends on KERNEL_MODE_NEON && (CC_IS_CLANG || GCC_VERSION >= 40800) select CRYPTO_HASH select CRYPTO_CRYPTD select CRYPTO_GF128MUL @@ -118,12 +118,14 @@ config CRYPTO_GHASH_ARM_CE config CRYPTO_CRCT10DIF_ARM_CE tristate "CRCT10DIF digest algorithm using PMULL instructions" - depends on KERNEL_MODE_NEON && CRC_T10DIF + depends on KERNEL_MODE_NEON && (CC_IS_CLANG || GCC_VERSION >= 40800) + depends on CRC_T10DIF select CRYPTO_HASH config CRYPTO_CRC32_ARM_CE tristate "CRC32(C) digest algorithm using CRC and/or PMULL instructions" - depends on KERNEL_MODE_NEON && CRC32 + depends on KERNEL_MODE_NEON && (CC_IS_CLANG || GCC_VERSION >= 40800) + depends on CRC32 select CRYPTO_HASH config CRYPTO_CHACHA20_NEON diff --git a/arch/arm/crypto/Makefile b/arch/arm/crypto/Makefile index 4180f3a13512..c0d36771a693 100644 --- a/arch/arm/crypto/Makefile +++ b/arch/arm/crypto/Makefile @@ -12,32 +12,12 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA512_ARM) += sha512-arm.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CHACHA20_NEON) += chacha-neon.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_NHPOLY1305_NEON) += nhpoly1305-neon.o -ce-obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_AES_ARM_CE) += aes-arm-ce.o -ce-obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA1_ARM_CE) += sha1-arm-ce.o -ce-obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA2_ARM_CE) += sha2-arm-ce.o -ce-obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_GHASH_ARM_CE) += ghash-arm-ce.o -ce-obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CRCT10DIF_ARM_CE) += crct10dif-arm-ce.o -crc-obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CRC32_ARM_CE) += crc32-arm-ce.o - -ifneq ($(crc-obj-y)$(crc-obj-m),) -ifeq ($(call as-instr,.arch armv8-a\n.arch_extension crc,y,n),y) -ce-obj-y += $(crc-obj-y) -ce-obj-m += $(crc-obj-m) -else -$(warning These CRC Extensions modules need binutils 2.23 or higher) -$(warning $(crc-obj-y) $(crc-obj-m)) -endif -endif - -ifneq ($(ce-obj-y)$(ce-obj-m),) -ifeq ($(call as-instr,.fpu crypto-neon-fp-armv8,y,n),y) -obj-y += $(ce-obj-y) -obj-m += $(ce-obj-m) -else -$(warning These ARMv8 Crypto Extensions modules need binutils 2.23 or higher) -$(warning $(ce-obj-y) $(ce-obj-m)) -endif -endif +obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_AES_ARM_CE) += aes-arm-ce.o +obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA1_ARM_CE) += sha1-arm-ce.o +obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA2_ARM_CE) += sha2-arm-ce.o +obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_GHASH_ARM_CE) += ghash-arm-ce.o +obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CRCT10DIF_ARM_CE) += crct10dif-arm-ce.o +obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CRC32_ARM_CE) += crc32-arm-ce.o aes-arm-y := aes-cipher-core.o aes-cipher-glue.o aes-arm-bs-y := aes-neonbs-core.o aes-neonbs-glue.o diff --git a/arch/arm/crypto/crct10dif-ce-core.S b/arch/arm/crypto/crct10dif-ce-core.S index 86be258a803f..46c02c518a30 100644 --- a/arch/arm/crypto/crct10dif-ce-core.S +++ b/arch/arm/crypto/crct10dif-ce-core.S @@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ #endif .text - .arch armv7-a + .arch armv8-a .fpu crypto-neon-fp-armv8 init_crc .req r0 diff --git a/arch/arm/crypto/ghash-ce-core.S b/arch/arm/crypto/ghash-ce-core.S index c47fe81abcb0..534c9647726d 100644 --- a/arch/arm/crypto/ghash-ce-core.S +++ b/arch/arm/crypto/ghash-ce-core.S @@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ T3_H .req d17 .text + .arch armv8-a .fpu crypto-neon-fp-armv8 .macro __pmull_p64, rd, rn, rm, b1, b2, b3, b4 diff --git a/arch/arm/crypto/sha1-ce-core.S b/arch/arm/crypto/sha1-ce-core.S index 49a74a441aec..8a702e051738 100644 --- a/arch/arm/crypto/sha1-ce-core.S +++ b/arch/arm/crypto/sha1-ce-core.S @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #include .text + .arch armv8-a .fpu crypto-neon-fp-armv8 k0 .req q0 diff --git a/arch/arm/crypto/sha2-ce-core.S b/arch/arm/crypto/sha2-ce-core.S index 4ad517577e23..b6369d2440a1 100644 --- a/arch/arm/crypto/sha2-ce-core.S +++ b/arch/arm/crypto/sha2-ce-core.S @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #include .text + .arch armv8-a .fpu crypto-neon-fp-armv8 k0 .req q7 From 572cc34503d482172071c2ca2800fa79eb390289 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefan Agner Date: Wed, 29 Jun 2022 11:02:27 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0772/1091] crypto: arm/ghash-ce - define fpu before fpu registers are referenced commit 7548bf8c17d84607c106bd45d81834afd95a2edb upstream Building ARMv7 with Clang's integrated assembler leads to errors such as: arch/arm/crypto/ghash-ce-core.S:34:11: error: register name expected t3l .req d16 ^ Since no FPU has selected yet Clang considers d16 not a valid register. Moving the FPU directive on-top allows Clang to parse the registers and allows to successfully build this file with Clang's integrated assembler. Signed-off-by: Stefan Agner Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers Tested-by: Nick Desaulniers Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm/crypto/ghash-ce-core.S | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/crypto/ghash-ce-core.S b/arch/arm/crypto/ghash-ce-core.S index 534c9647726d..9f51e3fa4526 100644 --- a/arch/arm/crypto/ghash-ce-core.S +++ b/arch/arm/crypto/ghash-ce-core.S @@ -8,6 +8,9 @@ #include #include + .arch armv8-a + .fpu crypto-neon-fp-armv8 + SHASH .req q0 T1 .req q1 XL .req q2 @@ -88,8 +91,6 @@ T3_H .req d17 .text - .arch armv8-a - .fpu crypto-neon-fp-armv8 .macro __pmull_p64, rd, rn, rm, b1, b2, b3, b4 vmull.p64 \rd, \rn, \rm From 871cbc208bf0aded1946cd1e3eebec75799d31e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Sat, 2 Jul 2022 16:28:53 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0773/1091] Linux 5.4.203 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220630133230.936488203@linuxfoundation.org Tested-by: Jon Hunter Tested-by: Florian Fainelli Tested-by: Shuah Khan Tested-by: Guenter Roeck Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing Tested-by: Sudip Mukherjee Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Makefile | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index 021878dc23f9..86f518e49c33 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 VERSION = 5 PATCHLEVEL = 4 -SUBLEVEL = 202 +SUBLEVEL = 203 EXTRAVERSION = NAME = Kleptomaniac Octopus From 53fb996f27095174da27ad9076c76496561cbafd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nicolas Dichtel Date: Thu, 23 Jun 2022 14:00:15 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0774/1091] ipv6: take care of disable_policy when restoring routes commit 3b0dc529f56b5f2328244130683210be98f16f7f upstream. When routes corresponding to addresses are restored by fixup_permanent_addr(), the dst_nopolicy parameter was not set. The typical use case is a user that configures an address on a down interface and then put this interface up. Let's take care of this flag in addrconf_f6i_alloc(), so that every callers benefit ont it. CC: stable@kernel.org CC: David Forster Fixes: df789fe75206 ("ipv6: Provide ipv6 version of "disable_policy" sysctl") Reported-by: Siwar Zitouni Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel Reviewed-by: David Ahern Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220623120015.32640-1-nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/ipv6/addrconf.c | 4 ---- net/ipv6/route.c | 9 ++++++++- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c index e29553e4f4ee..a0123760fb2c 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c +++ b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c @@ -1102,10 +1102,6 @@ ipv6_add_addr(struct inet6_dev *idev, struct ifa6_config *cfg, goto out; } - if (net->ipv6.devconf_all->disable_policy || - idev->cnf.disable_policy) - f6i->dst_nopolicy = true; - neigh_parms_data_state_setall(idev->nd_parms); ifa->addr = *cfg->pfx; diff --git a/net/ipv6/route.c b/net/ipv6/route.c index 619d9dffa9e4..00732ee6bbd8 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/route.c +++ b/net/ipv6/route.c @@ -4483,8 +4483,15 @@ struct fib6_info *addrconf_f6i_alloc(struct net *net, } f6i = ip6_route_info_create(&cfg, gfp_flags, NULL); - if (!IS_ERR(f6i)) + if (!IS_ERR(f6i)) { f6i->dst_nocount = true; + + if (!anycast && + (net->ipv6.devconf_all->disable_policy || + idev->cnf.disable_policy)) + f6i->dst_nopolicy = true; + } + return f6i; } From d5e32f08e7f1a77718dc29d91ad59b07440c96b3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chris Ye Date: Tue, 31 May 2022 17:09:54 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0775/1091] nvdimm: Fix badblocks clear off-by-one error commit ef9102004a87cb3f8b26e000a095a261fc0467d3 upstream. nvdimm_clear_badblocks_region() validates badblock clearing requests against the span of the region, however it compares the inclusive badblock request range to the exclusive region range. Fix up the off-by-one error. Fixes: 23f498448362 ("libnvdimm: rework region badblocks clearing") Cc: Signed-off-by: Chris Ye Reviewed-by: Vishal Verma Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/165404219489.2445897.9792886413715690399.stgit@dwillia2-xfh Signed-off-by: Dan Williams Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/nvdimm/bus.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/nvdimm/bus.c b/drivers/nvdimm/bus.c index 5e5c6aafc070..56f189c3129a 100644 --- a/drivers/nvdimm/bus.c +++ b/drivers/nvdimm/bus.c @@ -187,8 +187,8 @@ static int nvdimm_clear_badblocks_region(struct device *dev, void *data) ndr_end = nd_region->ndr_start + nd_region->ndr_size - 1; /* make sure we are in the region */ - if (ctx->phys < nd_region->ndr_start - || (ctx->phys + ctx->cleared) > ndr_end) + if (ctx->phys < nd_region->ndr_start || + (ctx->phys + ctx->cleared - 1) > ndr_end) return 0; sector = (ctx->phys - nd_region->ndr_start) / 512; From 1ef2e87736a652bf8c1b0b129d96108ff27facf8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Liam Howlett Date: Fri, 24 Jun 2022 01:17:58 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0776/1091] powerpc/prom_init: Fix kernel config grep commit 6886da5f49e6d86aad76807a93f3eef5e4f01b10 upstream. When searching for config options, use the KCONFIG_CONFIG shell variable so that builds using non-standard config locations work. Fixes: 26deb04342e3 ("powerpc: prepare string/mem functions for KASAN") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.2+ Signed-off-by: Liam R. Howlett Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220624011745.4060795-1-Liam.Howlett@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/powerpc/kernel/prom_init_check.sh | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/prom_init_check.sh b/arch/powerpc/kernel/prom_init_check.sh index b183ab9c5107..dfa5f729f774 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/prom_init_check.sh +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/prom_init_check.sh @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ # If you really need to reference something from prom_init.o add # it to the list below: -grep "^CONFIG_KASAN=y$" .config >/dev/null +grep "^CONFIG_KASAN=y$" ${KCONFIG_CONFIG} >/dev/null if [ $? -eq 0 ] then MEM_FUNCS="__memcpy __memset" From b6125c5dc3d6ced92492d549cd151b55299bb4cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Naveen N. Rao" Date: Tue, 28 Jun 2022 00:41:19 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 0777/1091] powerpc/bpf: Fix use of user_pt_regs in uapi MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit b21bd5a4b130f8370861478d2880985daace5913 upstream. Trying to build a .c file that includes : $ cat test_bpf_headers.c #include throws the below error: /usr/include/linux/bpf_perf_event.h:14:28: error: field ‘regs’ has incomplete type 14 | bpf_user_pt_regs_t regs; | ^~~~ This is because we typedef bpf_user_pt_regs_t to 'struct user_pt_regs' in arch/powerpc/include/uaps/asm/bpf_perf_event.h, but 'struct user_pt_regs' is not exposed to userspace. Powerpc has both pt_regs and user_pt_regs structures. However, unlike arm64 and s390, we expose user_pt_regs to userspace as just 'pt_regs'. As such, we should typedef bpf_user_pt_regs_t to 'struct pt_regs' for userspace. Within the kernel though, we want to typedef bpf_user_pt_regs_t to 'struct user_pt_regs'. Remove arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/bpf_perf_event.h so that the uapi/asm-generic version of the header is exposed to userspace. Introduce arch/powerpc/include/asm/bpf_perf_event.h so that we can typedef bpf_user_pt_regs_t to 'struct user_pt_regs' for use within the kernel. Note that this was not showing up with the bpf selftest build since tools/include/uapi/asm/bpf_perf_event.h didn't include the powerpc variant. Fixes: a6460b03f945ee ("powerpc/bpf: Fix broken uapi for BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.20+ Signed-off-by: Naveen N. Rao [mpe: Use typical naming for header include guard] Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220627191119.142867-1-naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/powerpc/include/asm/bpf_perf_event.h | 9 +++++++++ arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/bpf_perf_event.h | 9 --------- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/include/asm/bpf_perf_event.h delete mode 100644 arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/bpf_perf_event.h diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/bpf_perf_event.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/bpf_perf_event.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e8a7b4ffb58c --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/bpf_perf_event.h @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef _ASM_POWERPC_BPF_PERF_EVENT_H +#define _ASM_POWERPC_BPF_PERF_EVENT_H + +#include + +typedef struct user_pt_regs bpf_user_pt_regs_t; + +#endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_BPF_PERF_EVENT_H */ diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/bpf_perf_event.h b/arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/bpf_perf_event.h deleted file mode 100644 index 5e1e648aeec4..000000000000 --- a/arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/bpf_perf_event.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,9 +0,0 @@ -/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */ -#ifndef _UAPI__ASM_BPF_PERF_EVENT_H__ -#define _UAPI__ASM_BPF_PERF_EVENT_H__ - -#include - -typedef struct user_pt_regs bpf_user_pt_regs_t; - -#endif /* _UAPI__ASM_BPF_PERF_EVENT_H__ */ From 90de15357504c8097ab29769dc6852e16281e9e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Heinz Mauelshagen Date: Tue, 28 Jun 2022 00:37:22 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0778/1091] dm raid: fix accesses beyond end of raid member array commit 332bd0778775d0cf105c4b9e03e460b590749916 upstream. On dm-raid table load (using raid_ctr), dm-raid allocates an array rs->devs[rs->raid_disks] for the raid device members. rs->raid_disks is defined by the number of raid metadata and image tupples passed into the target's constructor. In the case of RAID layout changes being requested, that number can be different from the current number of members for existing raid sets as defined in their superblocks. Example RAID layout changes include: - raid1 legs being added/removed - raid4/5/6/10 number of stripes changed (stripe reshaping) - takeover to higher raid level (e.g. raid5 -> raid6) When accessing array members, rs->raid_disks must be used in control loops instead of the potentially larger value in rs->md.raid_disks. Otherwise it will cause memory access beyond the end of the rs->devs array. Fix this by changing code that is prone to out-of-bounds access. Also fix validate_raid_redundancy() to validate all devices that are added. Also, use braces to help clean up raid_iterate_devices(). The out-of-bounds memory accesses was discovered using KASAN. This commit was verified to pass all LVM2 RAID tests (with KASAN enabled). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Heinz Mauelshagen Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/md/dm-raid.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-raid.c b/drivers/md/dm-raid.c index 5e73cc6ad0ce..42151c9fc6e5 100644 --- a/drivers/md/dm-raid.c +++ b/drivers/md/dm-raid.c @@ -998,12 +998,13 @@ static int validate_region_size(struct raid_set *rs, unsigned long region_size) static int validate_raid_redundancy(struct raid_set *rs) { unsigned int i, rebuild_cnt = 0; - unsigned int rebuilds_per_group = 0, copies; + unsigned int rebuilds_per_group = 0, copies, raid_disks; unsigned int group_size, last_group_start; - for (i = 0; i < rs->md.raid_disks; i++) - if (!test_bit(In_sync, &rs->dev[i].rdev.flags) || - !rs->dev[i].rdev.sb_page) + for (i = 0; i < rs->raid_disks; i++) + if (!test_bit(FirstUse, &rs->dev[i].rdev.flags) && + ((!test_bit(In_sync, &rs->dev[i].rdev.flags) || + !rs->dev[i].rdev.sb_page))) rebuild_cnt++; switch (rs->md.level) { @@ -1043,8 +1044,9 @@ static int validate_raid_redundancy(struct raid_set *rs) * A A B B C * C D D E E */ + raid_disks = min(rs->raid_disks, rs->md.raid_disks); if (__is_raid10_near(rs->md.new_layout)) { - for (i = 0; i < rs->md.raid_disks; i++) { + for (i = 0; i < raid_disks; i++) { if (!(i % copies)) rebuilds_per_group = 0; if ((!rs->dev[i].rdev.sb_page || @@ -1067,10 +1069,10 @@ static int validate_raid_redundancy(struct raid_set *rs) * results in the need to treat the last (potentially larger) * set differently. */ - group_size = (rs->md.raid_disks / copies); - last_group_start = (rs->md.raid_disks / group_size) - 1; + group_size = (raid_disks / copies); + last_group_start = (raid_disks / group_size) - 1; last_group_start *= group_size; - for (i = 0; i < rs->md.raid_disks; i++) { + for (i = 0; i < raid_disks; i++) { if (!(i % copies) && !(i > last_group_start)) rebuilds_per_group = 0; if ((!rs->dev[i].rdev.sb_page || @@ -1585,7 +1587,7 @@ static sector_t __rdev_sectors(struct raid_set *rs) { int i; - for (i = 0; i < rs->md.raid_disks; i++) { + for (i = 0; i < rs->raid_disks; i++) { struct md_rdev *rdev = &rs->dev[i].rdev; if (!test_bit(Journal, &rdev->flags) && @@ -3746,13 +3748,13 @@ static int raid_iterate_devices(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned int i; int r = 0; - for (i = 0; !r && i < rs->md.raid_disks; i++) - if (rs->dev[i].data_dev) - r = fn(ti, - rs->dev[i].data_dev, - 0, /* No offset on data devs */ - rs->md.dev_sectors, - data); + for (i = 0; !r && i < rs->raid_disks; i++) { + if (rs->dev[i].data_dev) { + r = fn(ti, rs->dev[i].data_dev, + 0, /* No offset on data devs */ + rs->md.dev_sectors, data); + } + } return r; } From f157bd9cf377a947fdb7035e69466b6ecdc17c17 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mikulas Patocka Date: Wed, 29 Jun 2022 13:40:57 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 0779/1091] dm raid: fix KASAN warning in raid5_add_disks commit 617b365872a247480e9dcd50a32c8d1806b21861 upstream. There's a KASAN warning in raid5_add_disk when running the LVM testsuite. The warning happens in the test lvconvert-raid-reshape-linear_to_raid6-single-type.sh. We fix the warning by verifying that rdev->saved_raid_disk is within limits. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/md/raid5.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/md/raid5.c b/drivers/md/raid5.c index c40327ad6ad5..474cf6abefea 100644 --- a/drivers/md/raid5.c +++ b/drivers/md/raid5.c @@ -7722,6 +7722,7 @@ static int raid5_add_disk(struct mddev *mddev, struct md_rdev *rdev) */ if (rdev->saved_raid_disk >= 0 && rdev->saved_raid_disk >= first && + rdev->saved_raid_disk <= last && conf->disks[rdev->saved_raid_disk].rdev == NULL) first = rdev->saved_raid_disk; From 13816057eaf2e9c7d203ee610d48d0f2b05f6540 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Sat, 11 Jun 2022 00:20:23 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0780/1091] s390/archrandom: simplify back to earlier design and initialize earlier commit e4f74400308cb8abde5fdc9cad609c2aba32110c upstream. s390x appears to present two RNG interfaces: - a "TRNG" that gathers entropy using some hardware function; and - a "DRBG" that takes in a seed and expands it. Previously, the TRNG was wired up to arch_get_random_{long,int}(), but it was observed that this was being called really frequently, resulting in high overhead. So it was changed to be wired up to arch_get_random_ seed_{long,int}(), which was a reasonable decision. Later on, the DRBG was then wired up to arch_get_random_{long,int}(), with a complicated buffer filling thread, to control overhead and rate. Fortunately, none of the performance issues matter much now. The RNG always attempts to use arch_get_random_seed_{long,int}() first, which means a complicated implementation of arch_get_random_{long,int}() isn't really valuable or useful to have around. And it's only used when reseeding, which means it won't hit the high throughput complications that were faced before. So this commit returns to an earlier design of just calling the TRNG in arch_get_random_seed_{long,int}(), and returning false in arch_get_ random_{long,int}(). Part of what makes the simplification possible is that the RNG now seeds itself using the TRNG at bootup. But this only works if the TRNG is detected early in boot, before random_init() is called. So this commit also causes that check to happen in setup_arch(). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Harald Freudenberger Cc: Ingo Franzki Cc: Juergen Christ Cc: Heiko Carstens Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220610222023.378448-1-Jason@zx2c4.com Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger Acked-by: Heiko Carstens Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/s390/crypto/arch_random.c | 111 +---------------------------- arch/s390/include/asm/archrandom.h | 21 +++--- arch/s390/kernel/setup.c | 5 ++ 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 119 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/arch_random.c b/arch/s390/crypto/arch_random.c index 4cbb4b6d85a8..1f2d40993c4d 100644 --- a/arch/s390/crypto/arch_random.c +++ b/arch/s390/crypto/arch_random.c @@ -2,126 +2,17 @@ /* * s390 arch random implementation. * - * Copyright IBM Corp. 2017, 2018 + * Copyright IBM Corp. 2017, 2020 * Author(s): Harald Freudenberger - * - * The s390_arch_random_generate() function may be called from random.c - * in interrupt context. So this implementation does the best to be very - * fast. There is a buffer of random data which is asynchronously checked - * and filled by a workqueue thread. - * If there are enough bytes in the buffer the s390_arch_random_generate() - * just delivers these bytes. Otherwise false is returned until the - * worker thread refills the buffer. - * The worker fills the rng buffer by pulling fresh entropy from the - * high quality (but slow) true hardware random generator. This entropy - * is then spread over the buffer with an pseudo random generator PRNG. - * As the arch_get_random_seed_long() fetches 8 bytes and the calling - * function add_interrupt_randomness() counts this as 1 bit entropy the - * distribution needs to make sure there is in fact 1 bit entropy contained - * in 8 bytes of the buffer. The current values pull 32 byte entropy - * and scatter this into a 2048 byte buffer. So 8 byte in the buffer - * will contain 1 bit of entropy. - * The worker thread is rescheduled based on the charge level of the - * buffer but at least with 500 ms delay to avoid too much CPU consumption. - * So the max. amount of rng data delivered via arch_get_random_seed is - * limited to 4k bytes per second. */ #include #include #include -#include #include -#include #include DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(s390_arch_random_available); atomic64_t s390_arch_random_counter = ATOMIC64_INIT(0); EXPORT_SYMBOL(s390_arch_random_counter); - -#define ARCH_REFILL_TICKS (HZ/2) -#define ARCH_PRNG_SEED_SIZE 32 -#define ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE 2048 - -static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(arch_rng_lock); -static u8 *arch_rng_buf; -static unsigned int arch_rng_buf_idx; - -static void arch_rng_refill_buffer(struct work_struct *); -static DECLARE_DELAYED_WORK(arch_rng_work, arch_rng_refill_buffer); - -bool s390_arch_random_generate(u8 *buf, unsigned int nbytes) -{ - /* max hunk is ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE */ - if (nbytes > ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE) - return false; - - /* lock rng buffer */ - if (!spin_trylock(&arch_rng_lock)) - return false; - - /* try to resolve the requested amount of bytes from the buffer */ - arch_rng_buf_idx -= nbytes; - if (arch_rng_buf_idx < ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE) { - memcpy(buf, arch_rng_buf + arch_rng_buf_idx, nbytes); - atomic64_add(nbytes, &s390_arch_random_counter); - spin_unlock(&arch_rng_lock); - return true; - } - - /* not enough bytes in rng buffer, refill is done asynchronously */ - spin_unlock(&arch_rng_lock); - - return false; -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(s390_arch_random_generate); - -static void arch_rng_refill_buffer(struct work_struct *unused) -{ - unsigned int delay = ARCH_REFILL_TICKS; - - spin_lock(&arch_rng_lock); - if (arch_rng_buf_idx > ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE) { - /* buffer is exhausted and needs refill */ - u8 seed[ARCH_PRNG_SEED_SIZE]; - u8 prng_wa[240]; - /* fetch ARCH_PRNG_SEED_SIZE bytes of entropy */ - cpacf_trng(NULL, 0, seed, sizeof(seed)); - /* blow this entropy up to ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE with PRNG */ - memset(prng_wa, 0, sizeof(prng_wa)); - cpacf_prno(CPACF_PRNO_SHA512_DRNG_SEED, - &prng_wa, NULL, 0, seed, sizeof(seed)); - cpacf_prno(CPACF_PRNO_SHA512_DRNG_GEN, - &prng_wa, arch_rng_buf, ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE, NULL, 0); - arch_rng_buf_idx = ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE; - } - delay += (ARCH_REFILL_TICKS * arch_rng_buf_idx) / ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE; - spin_unlock(&arch_rng_lock); - - /* kick next check */ - queue_delayed_work(system_long_wq, &arch_rng_work, delay); -} - -static int __init s390_arch_random_init(void) -{ - /* all the needed PRNO subfunctions available ? */ - if (cpacf_query_func(CPACF_PRNO, CPACF_PRNO_TRNG) && - cpacf_query_func(CPACF_PRNO, CPACF_PRNO_SHA512_DRNG_GEN)) { - - /* alloc arch random working buffer */ - arch_rng_buf = kmalloc(ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!arch_rng_buf) - return -ENOMEM; - - /* kick worker queue job to fill the random buffer */ - queue_delayed_work(system_long_wq, - &arch_rng_work, ARCH_REFILL_TICKS); - - /* enable arch random to the outside world */ - static_branch_enable(&s390_arch_random_available); - } - - return 0; -} -arch_initcall(s390_arch_random_init); diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/archrandom.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/archrandom.h index 9a6835137a16..2c6e1c6ecbe7 100644 --- a/arch/s390/include/asm/archrandom.h +++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/archrandom.h @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ /* * Kernel interface for the s390 arch_random_* functions * - * Copyright IBM Corp. 2017 + * Copyright IBM Corp. 2017, 2020 * * Author: Harald Freudenberger * @@ -15,34 +15,37 @@ #include #include +#include DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(s390_arch_random_available); extern atomic64_t s390_arch_random_counter; -bool s390_arch_random_generate(u8 *buf, unsigned int nbytes); - -static inline bool arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v) +static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v) { return false; } -static inline bool arch_get_random_int(unsigned int *v) +static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_int(unsigned int *v) { return false; } -static inline bool arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v) +static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v) { if (static_branch_likely(&s390_arch_random_available)) { - return s390_arch_random_generate((u8 *)v, sizeof(*v)); + cpacf_trng(NULL, 0, (u8 *)v, sizeof(*v)); + atomic64_add(sizeof(*v), &s390_arch_random_counter); + return true; } return false; } -static inline bool arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v) +static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v) { if (static_branch_likely(&s390_arch_random_available)) { - return s390_arch_random_generate((u8 *)v, sizeof(*v)); + cpacf_trng(NULL, 0, (u8 *)v, sizeof(*v)); + atomic64_add(sizeof(*v), &s390_arch_random_counter); + return true; } return false; } diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/setup.c b/arch/s390/kernel/setup.c index 9a0316a067a1..dbc2a718d232 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kernel/setup.c +++ b/arch/s390/kernel/setup.c @@ -1005,6 +1005,11 @@ static void __init setup_randomness(void) if (stsi(vmms, 3, 2, 2) == 0 && vmms->count) add_device_randomness(&vmms->vm, sizeof(vmms->vm[0]) * vmms->count); memblock_free((unsigned long) vmms, PAGE_SIZE); + +#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM + if (cpacf_query_func(CPACF_PRNO, CPACF_PRNO_TRNG)) + static_branch_enable(&s390_arch_random_available); +#endif } /* From 76a477d3983640a233c7b51b601fb29b33d14295 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chuck Lever Date: Thu, 30 Jun 2022 16:48:18 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 0781/1091] SUNRPC: Fix READ_PLUS crasher commit a23dd544debcda4ee4a549ec7de59e85c3c8345c upstream. Looks like there are still cases when "space_left - frag1bytes" can legitimately exceed PAGE_SIZE. Ensure that xdr->end always remains within the current encode buffer. Reported-by: Bruce Fields Reported-by: Zorro Lang Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216151 Fixes: 6c254bf3b637 ("SUNRPC: Fix the calculation of xdr->end in xdr_get_next_encode_buffer()") Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/sunrpc/xdr.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/sunrpc/xdr.c b/net/sunrpc/xdr.c index cb8740d15633..daa4165f1179 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/xdr.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/xdr.c @@ -608,7 +608,7 @@ static __be32 *xdr_get_next_encode_buffer(struct xdr_stream *xdr, */ xdr->p = (void *)p + frag2bytes; space_left = xdr->buf->buflen - xdr->buf->len; - if (space_left - nbytes >= PAGE_SIZE) + if (space_left - frag1bytes >= PAGE_SIZE) xdr->end = (void *)p + PAGE_SIZE; else xdr->end = (void *)p + space_left - frag1bytes; From bb91556d2af066f8ca2e7fd8e334d652e731ee29 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Duoming Zhou Date: Wed, 29 Jun 2022 08:26:40 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0782/1091] net: rose: fix UAF bugs caused by timer handler commit 9cc02ede696272c5271a401e4f27c262359bc2f6 upstream. There are UAF bugs in rose_heartbeat_expiry(), rose_timer_expiry() and rose_idletimer_expiry(). The root cause is that del_timer() could not stop the timer handler that is running and the refcount of sock is not managed properly. One of the UAF bugs is shown below: (thread 1) | (thread 2) | rose_bind | rose_connect | rose_start_heartbeat rose_release | (wait a time) case ROSE_STATE_0 | rose_destroy_socket | rose_heartbeat_expiry rose_stop_heartbeat | sock_put(sk) | ... sock_put(sk) // FREE | | bh_lock_sock(sk) // USE The sock is deallocated by sock_put() in rose_release() and then used by bh_lock_sock() in rose_heartbeat_expiry(). Although rose_destroy_socket() calls rose_stop_heartbeat(), it could not stop the timer that is running. The KASAN report triggered by POC is shown below: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in _raw_spin_lock+0x5a/0x110 Write of size 4 at addr ffff88800ae59098 by task swapper/3/0 ... Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0xbf/0xee print_address_description+0x7b/0x440 print_report+0x101/0x230 ? irq_work_single+0xbb/0x140 ? _raw_spin_lock+0x5a/0x110 kasan_report+0xed/0x120 ? _raw_spin_lock+0x5a/0x110 kasan_check_range+0x2bd/0x2e0 _raw_spin_lock+0x5a/0x110 rose_heartbeat_expiry+0x39/0x370 ? rose_start_heartbeat+0xb0/0xb0 call_timer_fn+0x2d/0x1c0 ? rose_start_heartbeat+0xb0/0xb0 expire_timers+0x1f3/0x320 __run_timers+0x3ff/0x4d0 run_timer_softirq+0x41/0x80 __do_softirq+0x233/0x544 irq_exit_rcu+0x41/0xa0 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x8c/0xb0 asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1b/0x20 RIP: 0010:default_idle+0xb/0x10 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000012fea0 EFLAGS: 00000202 RAX: 000000000000bcae RBX: ffff888006660f00 RCX: 000000000000bcae RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffff843a11c0 RDI: ffffffff843a1180 RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: dffffc0000000000 R09: ffffed100da36d46 R10: dfffe9100da36d47 R11: ffffffff83cf0950 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 1ffff11000ccc1e0 R14: ffffffff8542af28 R15: dffffc0000000000 ... Allocated by task 146: __kasan_kmalloc+0xc4/0xf0 sk_prot_alloc+0xdd/0x1a0 sk_alloc+0x2d/0x4e0 rose_create+0x7b/0x330 __sock_create+0x2dd/0x640 __sys_socket+0xc7/0x270 __x64_sys_socket+0x71/0x80 do_syscall_64+0x43/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 Freed by task 152: kasan_set_track+0x4c/0x70 kasan_set_free_info+0x1f/0x40 ____kasan_slab_free+0x124/0x190 kfree+0xd3/0x270 __sk_destruct+0x314/0x460 rose_release+0x2fa/0x3b0 sock_close+0xcb/0x230 __fput+0x2d9/0x650 task_work_run+0xd6/0x160 exit_to_user_mode_loop+0xc7/0xd0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x4e/0x80 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x20/0x40 do_syscall_64+0x4f/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 This patch adds refcount of sock when we use functions such as rose_start_heartbeat() and so on to start timer, and decreases the refcount of sock when timer is finished or deleted by functions such as rose_stop_heartbeat() and so on. As a result, the UAF bugs could be mitigated. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Duoming Zhou Tested-by: Duoming Zhou Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220629002640.5693-1-duoming@zju.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/rose/rose_timer.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/rose/rose_timer.c b/net/rose/rose_timer.c index b3138fc2e552..f06ddbed3fed 100644 --- a/net/rose/rose_timer.c +++ b/net/rose/rose_timer.c @@ -31,89 +31,89 @@ static void rose_idletimer_expiry(struct timer_list *); void rose_start_heartbeat(struct sock *sk) { - del_timer(&sk->sk_timer); + sk_stop_timer(sk, &sk->sk_timer); sk->sk_timer.function = rose_heartbeat_expiry; sk->sk_timer.expires = jiffies + 5 * HZ; - add_timer(&sk->sk_timer); + sk_reset_timer(sk, &sk->sk_timer, sk->sk_timer.expires); } void rose_start_t1timer(struct sock *sk) { struct rose_sock *rose = rose_sk(sk); - del_timer(&rose->timer); + sk_stop_timer(sk, &rose->timer); rose->timer.function = rose_timer_expiry; rose->timer.expires = jiffies + rose->t1; - add_timer(&rose->timer); + sk_reset_timer(sk, &rose->timer, rose->timer.expires); } void rose_start_t2timer(struct sock *sk) { struct rose_sock *rose = rose_sk(sk); - del_timer(&rose->timer); + sk_stop_timer(sk, &rose->timer); rose->timer.function = rose_timer_expiry; rose->timer.expires = jiffies + rose->t2; - add_timer(&rose->timer); + sk_reset_timer(sk, &rose->timer, rose->timer.expires); } void rose_start_t3timer(struct sock *sk) { struct rose_sock *rose = rose_sk(sk); - del_timer(&rose->timer); + sk_stop_timer(sk, &rose->timer); rose->timer.function = rose_timer_expiry; rose->timer.expires = jiffies + rose->t3; - add_timer(&rose->timer); + sk_reset_timer(sk, &rose->timer, rose->timer.expires); } void rose_start_hbtimer(struct sock *sk) { struct rose_sock *rose = rose_sk(sk); - del_timer(&rose->timer); + sk_stop_timer(sk, &rose->timer); rose->timer.function = rose_timer_expiry; rose->timer.expires = jiffies + rose->hb; - add_timer(&rose->timer); + sk_reset_timer(sk, &rose->timer, rose->timer.expires); } void rose_start_idletimer(struct sock *sk) { struct rose_sock *rose = rose_sk(sk); - del_timer(&rose->idletimer); + sk_stop_timer(sk, &rose->idletimer); if (rose->idle > 0) { rose->idletimer.function = rose_idletimer_expiry; rose->idletimer.expires = jiffies + rose->idle; - add_timer(&rose->idletimer); + sk_reset_timer(sk, &rose->idletimer, rose->idletimer.expires); } } void rose_stop_heartbeat(struct sock *sk) { - del_timer(&sk->sk_timer); + sk_stop_timer(sk, &sk->sk_timer); } void rose_stop_timer(struct sock *sk) { - del_timer(&rose_sk(sk)->timer); + sk_stop_timer(sk, &rose_sk(sk)->timer); } void rose_stop_idletimer(struct sock *sk) { - del_timer(&rose_sk(sk)->idletimer); + sk_stop_timer(sk, &rose_sk(sk)->idletimer); } static void rose_heartbeat_expiry(struct timer_list *t) @@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ static void rose_heartbeat_expiry(struct timer_list *t) (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN && sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD))) { bh_unlock_sock(sk); rose_destroy_socket(sk); + sock_put(sk); return; } break; @@ -152,6 +153,7 @@ static void rose_heartbeat_expiry(struct timer_list *t) rose_start_heartbeat(sk); bh_unlock_sock(sk); + sock_put(sk); } static void rose_timer_expiry(struct timer_list *t) @@ -181,6 +183,7 @@ static void rose_timer_expiry(struct timer_list *t) break; } bh_unlock_sock(sk); + sock_put(sk); } static void rose_idletimer_expiry(struct timer_list *t) @@ -205,4 +208,5 @@ static void rose_idletimer_expiry(struct timer_list *t) sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD); } bh_unlock_sock(sk); + sock_put(sk); } From 7f89bb5d710283e6505ff8003e628baf5a6de3a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jose Alonso Date: Tue, 28 Jun 2022 12:13:02 -0300 Subject: [PATCH 0783/1091] net: usb: ax88179_178a: Fix packet receiving commit f8ebb3ac881b17712e1d5967c97ab1806b16d3d6 upstream. This patch corrects packet receiving in ax88179_rx_fixup. - problem observed: ifconfig shows allways a lot of 'RX Errors' while packets are received normally. This occurs because ax88179_rx_fixup does not recognise properly the usb urb received. The packets are normally processed and at the end, the code exits with 'return 0', generating RX Errors. (pkt_cnt==-2 and ptk_hdr over field rx_hdr trying to identify another packet there) This is a usb urb received by "tcpdump -i usbmon2 -X" on a little-endian CPU: 0x0000: eeee f8e3 3b19 87a0 94de 80e3 daac 0800 ^ packet 1 start (pkt_len = 0x05ec) ^^^^ IP alignment pseudo header ^ ethernet packet start last byte ethernet packet v padding (8-bytes aligned) vvvv vvvv 0x05e0: c92d d444 1420 8a69 83dd 272f e82b 9811 0x05f0: eeee f8e3 3b19 87a0 94de 80e3 daac 0800 ... ^ packet 2 0x0be0: eeee f8e3 3b19 87a0 94de 80e3 daac 0800 ... 0x1130: 9d41 9171 8a38 0ec5 eeee f8e3 3b19 87a0 ... 0x1720: 8cfc 15ff 5e4c e85c eeee f8e3 3b19 87a0 ... 0x1d10: ecfa 2a3a 19ab c78c eeee f8e3 3b19 87a0 ... 0x2070: eeee f8e3 3b19 87a0 94de 80e3 daac 0800 ... ^ packet 7 0x2120: 7c88 4ca5 5c57 7dcc 0d34 7577 f778 7e0a 0x2130: f032 e093 7489 0740 3008 ec05 0000 0080 ====1==== ====2==== hdr_off ^ pkt_len = 0x05ec ^^^^ AX_RXHDR_*=0x00830 ^^^^ ^ pkt_len = 0 ^^^^ AX_RXHDR_DROP_ERR=0x80000000 ^^^^ ^ 0x2140: 3008 ec05 0000 0080 3008 5805 0000 0080 0x2150: 3008 ec05 0000 0080 3008 ec05 0000 0080 0x2160: 3008 5803 0000 0080 3008 c800 0000 0080 ===11==== ===12==== ===13==== ===14==== 0x2170: 0000 0000 0e00 3821 ^^^^ ^^^^ rx_hdr ^^^^ pkt_cnt=14 ^^^^ hdr_off=0x2138 ^^^^ ^^^^ padding The dump shows that pkt_cnt is the number of entrys in the per-packet metadata. It is "2 * packet count". Each packet have two entrys. The first have a valid value (pkt_len and AX_RXHDR_*) and the second have a dummy-header 0x80000000 (pkt_len=0 with AX_RXHDR_DROP_ERR). Why exists dummy-header for each packet?!? My guess is that this was done probably to align the entry for each packet to 64-bits and maintain compatibility with old firmware. There is also a padding (0x00000000) before the rx_hdr to align the end of rx_hdr to 64-bit. Note that packets have a alignment of 64-bits (8-bytes). This patch assumes that the dummy-header and the last padding are optional. So it preserves semantics and recognises the same valid packets as the current code. This patch was made using only the dumpfile information and tested with only one device: 0b95:1790 ASIX Electronics Corp. AX88179 Gigabit Ethernet Fixes: 57bc3d3ae8c1 ("net: usb: ax88179_178a: Fix out-of-bounds accesses in RX fixup") Fixes: e2ca90c276e1 ("ax88179_178a: ASIX AX88179_178A USB 3.0/2.0 to gigabit ethernet adapter driver") Signed-off-by: Jose Alonso Acked-by: Paolo Abeni Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/d6970bb04bf67598af4d316eaeb1792040b18cfd.camel@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/usb/ax88179_178a.c | 105 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 78 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/ax88179_178a.c b/drivers/net/usb/ax88179_178a.c index a06c3924e039..ea9c8361bf46 100644 --- a/drivers/net/usb/ax88179_178a.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/ax88179_178a.c @@ -1365,6 +1365,42 @@ static int ax88179_rx_fixup(struct usbnet *dev, struct sk_buff *skb) * are bundled into this buffer and where we can find an array of * per-packet metadata (which contains elements encoded into u16). */ + + /* SKB contents for current firmware: + * + * ... + * + * + * ... + * + * + * + * where: + * contains pkt_len bytes: + * 2 bytes of IP alignment pseudo header + * packet received + * contains 4 bytes: + * pkt_len and fields AX_RXHDR_* + * 0-7 bytes to terminate at + * 8 bytes boundary (64-bit). + * 4 bytes to make rx_hdr terminate at + * 8 bytes boundary (64-bit) + * contains 4 bytes: + * pkt_len=0 and AX_RXHDR_DROP_ERR + * contains 4 bytes: + * pkt_cnt and hdr_off (offset of + * ) + * + * pkt_cnt is number of entrys in the per-packet metadata. + * In current firmware there is 2 entrys per packet. + * The first points to the packet and the + * second is a dummy header. + * This was done probably to align fields in 64-bit and + * maintain compatibility with old firmware. + * This code assumes that and are + * optional. + */ + if (skb->len < 4) return 0; skb_trim(skb, skb->len - 4); @@ -1378,51 +1414,66 @@ static int ax88179_rx_fixup(struct usbnet *dev, struct sk_buff *skb) /* Make sure that the bounds of the metadata array are inside the SKB * (and in front of the counter at the end). */ - if (pkt_cnt * 2 + hdr_off > skb->len) + if (pkt_cnt * 4 + hdr_off > skb->len) return 0; pkt_hdr = (u32 *)(skb->data + hdr_off); /* Packets must not overlap the metadata array */ skb_trim(skb, hdr_off); - for (; ; pkt_cnt--, pkt_hdr++) { + for (; pkt_cnt > 0; pkt_cnt--, pkt_hdr++) { + u16 pkt_len_plus_padd; u16 pkt_len; le32_to_cpus(pkt_hdr); pkt_len = (*pkt_hdr >> 16) & 0x1fff; + pkt_len_plus_padd = (pkt_len + 7) & 0xfff8; - if (pkt_len > skb->len) + /* Skip dummy header used for alignment + */ + if (pkt_len == 0) + continue; + + if (pkt_len_plus_padd > skb->len) return 0; /* Check CRC or runt packet */ - if (((*pkt_hdr & (AX_RXHDR_CRC_ERR | AX_RXHDR_DROP_ERR)) == 0) && - pkt_len >= 2 + ETH_HLEN) { - bool last = (pkt_cnt == 0); - - if (last) { - ax_skb = skb; - } else { - ax_skb = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC); - if (!ax_skb) - return 0; - } - ax_skb->len = pkt_len; - /* Skip IP alignment pseudo header */ - skb_pull(ax_skb, 2); - skb_set_tail_pointer(ax_skb, ax_skb->len); - ax_skb->truesize = pkt_len + sizeof(struct sk_buff); - ax88179_rx_checksum(ax_skb, pkt_hdr); - - if (last) - return 1; - - usbnet_skb_return(dev, ax_skb); + if ((*pkt_hdr & (AX_RXHDR_CRC_ERR | AX_RXHDR_DROP_ERR)) || + pkt_len < 2 + ETH_HLEN) { + dev->net->stats.rx_errors++; + skb_pull(skb, pkt_len_plus_padd); + continue; } - /* Trim this packet away from the SKB */ - if (!skb_pull(skb, (pkt_len + 7) & 0xFFF8)) + /* last packet */ + if (pkt_len_plus_padd == skb->len) { + skb_trim(skb, pkt_len); + + /* Skip IP alignment pseudo header */ + skb_pull(skb, 2); + + skb->truesize = SKB_TRUESIZE(pkt_len_plus_padd); + ax88179_rx_checksum(skb, pkt_hdr); + return 1; + } + + ax_skb = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC); + if (!ax_skb) return 0; + skb_trim(ax_skb, pkt_len); + + /* Skip IP alignment pseudo header */ + skb_pull(ax_skb, 2); + + skb->truesize = pkt_len_plus_padd + + SKB_DATA_ALIGN(sizeof(struct sk_buff)); + ax88179_rx_checksum(ax_skb, pkt_hdr); + usbnet_skb_return(dev, ax_skb); + + skb_pull(skb, pkt_len_plus_padd); } + + return 0; } static struct sk_buff * From 1d877327da33d89164c5d74d7a86fcd5189b5891 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jason Wang Date: Fri, 17 Jun 2022 15:29:49 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0784/1091] virtio-net: fix race between ndo_open() and virtio_device_ready() commit 50c0ada627f56c92f5953a8bf9158b045ad026a1 upstream. We currently call virtio_device_ready() after netdev registration. Since ndo_open() can be called immediately after register_netdev, this means there exists a race between ndo_open() and virtio_device_ready(): the driver may start to use the device before DRIVER_OK which violates the spec. Fix this by switching to use register_netdevice() and protect the virtio_device_ready() with rtnl_lock() to make sure ndo_open() can only be called after virtio_device_ready(). Fixes: 4baf1e33d0842 ("virtio_net: enable VQs early") Signed-off-by: Jason Wang Message-Id: <20220617072949.30734-1-jasowang@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/virtio_net.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/virtio_net.c b/drivers/net/virtio_net.c index f4c03518d7d2..e14842fbe3d6 100644 --- a/drivers/net/virtio_net.c +++ b/drivers/net/virtio_net.c @@ -3219,14 +3219,20 @@ static int virtnet_probe(struct virtio_device *vdev) } } - err = register_netdev(dev); + /* serialize netdev register + virtio_device_ready() with ndo_open() */ + rtnl_lock(); + + err = register_netdevice(dev); if (err) { pr_debug("virtio_net: registering device failed\n"); + rtnl_unlock(); goto free_failover; } virtio_device_ready(vdev); + rtnl_unlock(); + err = virtnet_cpu_notif_add(vi); if (err) { pr_debug("virtio_net: registering cpu notifier failed\n"); From 22e75461014b421937ec927890e232fbb5dfb7d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dimitris Michailidis Date: Wed, 22 Jun 2022 17:02:34 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0785/1091] selftests/net: pass ipv6_args to udpgso_bench's IPv6 TCP test commit b968080808f7f28b89aa495b7402ba48eb17ee93 upstream. udpgso_bench.sh has been running its IPv6 TCP test with IPv4 arguments since its initial conmit. Looks like a typo. Fixes: 3a687bef148d ("selftests: udp gso benchmark") Cc: willemb@google.com Signed-off-by: Dimitris Michailidis Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220623000234.61774-1-dmichail@fungible.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- tools/testing/selftests/net/udpgso_bench.sh | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/udpgso_bench.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/net/udpgso_bench.sh index 80b5d352702e..dc932fd65363 100755 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/udpgso_bench.sh +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/udpgso_bench.sh @@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ run_all() { run_udp "${ipv4_args}" echo "ipv6" - run_tcp "${ipv4_args}" + run_tcp "${ipv6_args}" run_udp "${ipv6_args}" } From a8cf919022373c97a84fe596bbea544f909c485d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jakub Kicinski Date: Wed, 22 Jun 2022 21:20:39 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0786/1091] net: tun: unlink NAPI from device on destruction commit 3b9bc84d311104906d2b4995a9a02d7b7ddab2db upstream. Syzbot found a race between tun file and device destruction. NAPIs live in struct tun_file which can get destroyed before the netdev so we have to del them explicitly. The current code is missing deleting the NAPI if the queue was detached first. Fixes: 943170998b20 ("tun: enable NAPI for TUN/TAP driver") Reported-by: syzbot+b75c138e9286ac742647@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220623042039.2274708-1-kuba@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/tun.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/tun.c b/drivers/net/tun.c index d9993884a97d..0e2408c77748 100644 --- a/drivers/net/tun.c +++ b/drivers/net/tun.c @@ -783,6 +783,7 @@ static void tun_detach_all(struct net_device *dev) sock_put(&tfile->sk); } list_for_each_entry_safe(tfile, tmp, &tun->disabled, next) { + tun_napi_del(tfile); tun_enable_queue(tfile); tun_queue_purge(tfile); xdp_rxq_info_unreg(&tfile->xdp_rxq); From ea0519bc578d2d2bce210cc34f3b0463ff0dcac3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jakub Kicinski Date: Wed, 22 Jun 2022 21:21:05 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0787/1091] net: tun: stop NAPI when detaching queues commit a8fc8cb5692aebb9c6f7afd4265366d25dcd1d01 upstream. While looking at a syzbot report I noticed the NAPI only gets disabled before it's deleted. I think that user can detach the queue before destroying the device and the NAPI will never be stopped. Fixes: 943170998b20 ("tun: enable NAPI for TUN/TAP driver") Acked-by: Petar Penkov Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220623042105.2274812-1-kuba@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/tun.c | 11 ++++++++++- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/tun.c b/drivers/net/tun.c index 0e2408c77748..f1e110de8a32 100644 --- a/drivers/net/tun.c +++ b/drivers/net/tun.c @@ -327,6 +327,12 @@ static void tun_napi_init(struct tun_struct *tun, struct tun_file *tfile, } } +static void tun_napi_enable(struct tun_file *tfile) +{ + if (tfile->napi_enabled) + napi_enable(&tfile->napi); +} + static void tun_napi_disable(struct tun_file *tfile) { if (tfile->napi_enabled) @@ -709,8 +715,10 @@ static void __tun_detach(struct tun_file *tfile, bool clean) if (clean) { RCU_INIT_POINTER(tfile->tun, NULL); sock_put(&tfile->sk); - } else + } else { tun_disable_queue(tun, tfile); + tun_napi_disable(tfile); + } synchronize_net(); tun_flow_delete_by_queue(tun, tun->numqueues + 1); @@ -864,6 +872,7 @@ static int tun_attach(struct tun_struct *tun, struct file *file, if (tfile->detached) { tun_enable_queue(tfile); + tun_napi_enable(tfile); } else { sock_hold(&tfile->sk); tun_napi_init(tun, tfile, napi, napi_frags); From 85d7d672e896ada1e999d30b92f5658ac10f1b0f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kamal Heib Date: Wed, 25 May 2022 16:20:29 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 0788/1091] RDMA/qedr: Fix reporting QP timeout attribute MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 118f767413ada4eef7825fbd4af7c0866f883441 upstream. Make sure to save the passed QP timeout attribute when the QP gets modified, so when calling query QP the right value is reported and not the converted value that is required by the firmware. This issue was found while running the pyverbs tests. Fixes: cecbcddf6461 ("qedr: Add support for QP verbs") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220525132029.84813-1-kamalheib1@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Kamal Heib Acked-by: Michal Kalderon  Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/infiniband/hw/qedr/qedr.h | 1 + drivers/infiniband/hw/qedr/verbs.c | 4 +++- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/hw/qedr/qedr.h b/drivers/infiniband/hw/qedr/qedr.h index ed56df319d2d..f4b60a2d8aa9 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/qedr/qedr.h +++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/qedr/qedr.h @@ -416,6 +416,7 @@ struct qedr_qp { u32 sq_psn; u32 qkey; u32 dest_qp_num; + u8 timeout; /* Relevant to qps created from kernel space only (ULPs) */ u8 prev_wqe_size; diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/hw/qedr/verbs.c b/drivers/infiniband/hw/qedr/verbs.c index 717f17464764..798a96c2278e 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/qedr/verbs.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/qedr/verbs.c @@ -2259,6 +2259,8 @@ int qedr_modify_qp(struct ib_qp *ibqp, struct ib_qp_attr *attr, 1 << max_t(int, attr->timeout - 8, 0); else qp_params.ack_timeout = 0; + + qp->timeout = attr->timeout; } if (attr_mask & IB_QP_RETRY_CNT) { @@ -2418,7 +2420,7 @@ int qedr_query_qp(struct ib_qp *ibqp, rdma_ah_set_dgid_raw(&qp_attr->ah_attr, ¶ms.dgid.bytes[0]); rdma_ah_set_port_num(&qp_attr->ah_attr, 1); rdma_ah_set_sl(&qp_attr->ah_attr, 0); - qp_attr->timeout = params.timeout; + qp_attr->timeout = qp->timeout; qp_attr->rnr_retry = params.rnr_retry; qp_attr->retry_cnt = params.retry_cnt; qp_attr->min_rnr_timer = params.min_rnr_nak_timer; From 5af106f8e072aebd88b95e164a08fa320651a99a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tao Liu Date: Mon, 27 Jun 2022 22:00:04 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0789/1091] linux/dim: Fix divide by 0 in RDMA DIM commit 0fe3dbbefb74a8575f61d7801b08dbc50523d60d upstream. Fix a divide 0 error in rdma_dim_stats_compare() when prev->cpe_ratio == 0. CallTrace: Hardware name: H3C R4900 G3/RS33M2C9S, BIOS 2.00.37P21 03/12/2020 task: ffff880194b78000 task.stack: ffffc90006714000 RIP: 0010:backport_rdma_dim+0x10e/0x240 [mlx_compat] RSP: 0018:ffff880c10e83ec0 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000002710 RBX: ffff88096cd7f780 RCX: 0000000000000064 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 000000001d7c6c09 R13: ffff88096cd7f780 R14: ffff880b174fe800 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880c10e80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000a0965b00 CR3: 000000000200a003 CR4: 00000000007606e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: ib_poll_handler+0x43/0x80 [ib_core] irq_poll_softirq+0xae/0x110 __do_softirq+0xd1/0x28c irq_exit+0xde/0xf0 do_IRQ+0x54/0xe0 common_interrupt+0x8f/0x8f ? cpuidle_enter_state+0xd9/0x2a0 ? cpuidle_enter_state+0xc7/0x2a0 ? do_idle+0x170/0x1d0 ? cpu_startup_entry+0x6f/0x80 ? start_secondary+0x1b9/0x210 ? secondary_startup_64+0xa5/0xb0 Code: 0f 87 e1 00 00 00 8b 4c 24 14 44 8b 43 14 89 c8 4d 63 c8 44 29 c0 99 31 d0 29 d0 31 d2 48 98 48 8d 04 80 48 8d 04 80 48 c1 e0 02 <49> f7 f1 48 83 f8 0a 0f 86 c1 00 00 00 44 39 c1 7f 10 48 89 df RIP: backport_rdma_dim+0x10e/0x240 [mlx_compat] RSP: ffff880c10e83ec0 Fixes: f4915455dcf0 ("linux/dim: Implement RDMA adaptive moderation (DIM)") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220627140004.3099-1-thomas.liu@ucloud.cn Signed-off-by: Tao Liu Reviewed-by: Max Gurtovoy Acked-by: Leon Romanovsky Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/linux/dim.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/linux/dim.h b/include/linux/dim.h index 9fa4b3f88c39..2571da63877c 100644 --- a/include/linux/dim.h +++ b/include/linux/dim.h @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ * We consider 10% difference as significant. */ #define IS_SIGNIFICANT_DIFF(val, ref) \ - (((100UL * abs((val) - (ref))) / (ref)) > 10) + ((ref) && (((100UL * abs((val) - (ref))) / (ref)) > 10)) /** * Calculate the gap between two values. From 7a79f71f69314c49f17a70c28c41a715d11d1331 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oliver Neukum Date: Tue, 28 Jun 2022 11:35:17 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0790/1091] usbnet: fix memory allocation in helpers commit e65af5403e462ccd7dff6a045a886c64da598c2e upstream. usbnet provides some helper functions that are also used in the context of reset() operations. During a reset the other drivers on a device are unable to operate. As that can be block drivers, a driver for another interface cannot use paging in its memory allocations without risking a deadlock. Use GFP_NOIO in the helpers. Fixes: 877bd862f32b8 ("usbnet: introduce usbnet 3 command helpers") Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220628093517.7469-1-oneukum@suse.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c b/drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c index b8b9df82f51e..997936c3a30f 100644 --- a/drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c @@ -1987,7 +1987,7 @@ static int __usbnet_read_cmd(struct usbnet *dev, u8 cmd, u8 reqtype, cmd, reqtype, value, index, size); if (size) { - buf = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); + buf = kmalloc(size, GFP_NOIO); if (!buf) goto out; } @@ -2019,7 +2019,7 @@ static int __usbnet_write_cmd(struct usbnet *dev, u8 cmd, u8 reqtype, cmd, reqtype, value, index, size); if (data) { - buf = kmemdup(data, size, GFP_KERNEL); + buf = kmemdup(data, size, GFP_NOIO); if (!buf) goto out; } else { From 9204bc3e8722191932074d826db2fcd1d378f8aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: YueHaibing Date: Tue, 28 Jun 2022 11:31:34 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0791/1091] net: ipv6: unexport __init-annotated seg6_hmac_net_init() commit 53ad46169fe2996fe1b623ba6c9c4fa33847876f upstream. As of commit 5801f064e351 ("net: ipv6: unexport __init-annotated seg6_hmac_init()"), EXPORT_SYMBOL and __init is a bad combination because the .init.text section is freed up after the initialization. Hence, modules cannot use symbols annotated __init. The access to a freed symbol may end up with kernel panic. This remove the EXPORT_SYMBOL to fix modpost warning: WARNING: modpost: vmlinux.o(___ksymtab+seg6_hmac_net_init+0x0): Section mismatch in reference from the variable __ksymtab_seg6_hmac_net_init to the function .init.text:seg6_hmac_net_init() The symbol seg6_hmac_net_init is exported and annotated __init Fix this by removing the __init annotation of seg6_hmac_net_init or drop the export. Fixes: bf355b8d2c30 ("ipv6: sr: add core files for SR HMAC support") Reported-by: Hulk Robot Signed-off-by: YueHaibing Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220628033134.21088-1-yuehaibing@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/ipv6/seg6_hmac.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv6/seg6_hmac.c b/net/ipv6/seg6_hmac.c index a4cad71c4204..65394abf4736 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/seg6_hmac.c +++ b/net/ipv6/seg6_hmac.c @@ -410,7 +410,6 @@ int __net_init seg6_hmac_net_init(struct net *net) return 0; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(seg6_hmac_net_init); void seg6_hmac_exit(void) { From e1284ec4a6d76a2246b938f5bd64fb15a257c0a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jason Wang Date: Mon, 20 Jun 2022 13:11:14 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0792/1091] caif_virtio: fix race between virtio_device_ready() and ndo_open() commit 11a37eb66812ce6a06b79223ad530eb0e1d7294d upstream. We currently depend on probe() calling virtio_device_ready() - which happens after netdev registration. Since ndo_open() can be called immediately after register_netdev, this means there exists a race between ndo_open() and virtio_device_ready(): the driver may start to use the device (e.g. TX) before DRIVER_OK which violates the spec. Fix this by switching to use register_netdevice() and protect the virtio_device_ready() with rtnl_lock() to make sure ndo_open() can only be called after virtio_device_ready(). Fixes: 0d2e1a2926b18 ("caif_virtio: Introduce caif over virtio") Signed-off-by: Jason Wang Message-Id: <20220620051115.3142-3-jasowang@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/caif/caif_virtio.c | 10 +++++++++- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/caif/caif_virtio.c b/drivers/net/caif/caif_virtio.c index eb426822ad06..7f2c551e5d69 100644 --- a/drivers/net/caif/caif_virtio.c +++ b/drivers/net/caif/caif_virtio.c @@ -723,13 +723,21 @@ static int cfv_probe(struct virtio_device *vdev) /* Carrier is off until netdevice is opened */ netif_carrier_off(netdev); + /* serialize netdev register + virtio_device_ready() with ndo_open() */ + rtnl_lock(); + /* register Netdev */ - err = register_netdev(netdev); + err = register_netdevice(netdev); if (err) { + rtnl_unlock(); dev_err(&vdev->dev, "Unable to register netdev (%d)\n", err); goto err; } + virtio_device_ready(vdev); + + rtnl_unlock(); + debugfs_init(cfv); return 0; From bdecd912e99acfd61507f1720d3f4eed1b3418d8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miaoqian Lin Date: Thu, 26 May 2022 12:28:56 +0400 Subject: [PATCH 0793/1091] PM / devfreq: exynos-ppmu: Fix refcount leak in of_get_devfreq_events commit f44b799603a9b5d2e375b0b2d54dd0b791eddfc2 upstream. of_get_child_by_name() returns a node pointer with refcount incremented, we should use of_node_put() on it when done. This function only calls of_node_put() in normal path, missing it in error paths. Add missing of_node_put() to avoid refcount leak. Fixes: f262f28c1470 ("PM / devfreq: event: Add devfreq_event class") Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin Signed-off-by: Chanwoo Choi Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/devfreq/event/exynos-ppmu.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/devfreq/event/exynos-ppmu.c b/drivers/devfreq/event/exynos-ppmu.c index c4873bb791f8..94e1727d2999 100644 --- a/drivers/devfreq/event/exynos-ppmu.c +++ b/drivers/devfreq/event/exynos-ppmu.c @@ -514,15 +514,19 @@ static int of_get_devfreq_events(struct device_node *np, count = of_get_child_count(events_np); desc = devm_kcalloc(dev, count, sizeof(*desc), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!desc) + if (!desc) { + of_node_put(events_np); return -ENOMEM; + } info->num_events = count; of_id = of_match_device(exynos_ppmu_id_match, dev); if (of_id) info->ppmu_type = (enum exynos_ppmu_type)of_id->data; - else + else { + of_node_put(events_np); return -EINVAL; + } j = 0; for_each_child_of_node(events_np, node) { From 5b3a1c6bca3896941ca31c1a70dbc6b6b8b54c98 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Masahiro Yamada Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 02:09:00 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 0794/1091] s390: remove unneeded 'select BUILD_BIN2C' commit 25deecb21c18ee29e3be8ac6177b2a9504c33d2d upstream. Since commit 4c0f032d4963 ("s390/purgatory: Omit use of bin2c"), s390 builds the purgatory without using bin2c. Remove 'select BUILD_BIN2C' to avoid the unneeded build of bin2c. Fixes: 4c0f032d4963 ("s390/purgatory: Omit use of bin2c") Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220613170902.1775211-1-masahiroy@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/s390/Kconfig | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/s390/Kconfig b/arch/s390/Kconfig index 0023b78391f1..d7c7c7b80aed 100644 --- a/arch/s390/Kconfig +++ b/arch/s390/Kconfig @@ -541,7 +541,6 @@ config KEXEC config KEXEC_FILE bool "kexec file based system call" select KEXEC_CORE - select BUILD_BIN2C depends on CRYPTO depends on CRYPTO_SHA256 depends on CRYPTO_SHA256_S390 From 3b2ddeb89fe7d3b74b61bf1b74516263d35bc8ff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pablo Neira Ayuso Date: Tue, 21 Jun 2022 14:01:41 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0795/1091] netfilter: nft_dynset: restore set element counter when failing to update commit 05907f10e235680cc7fb196810e4ad3215d5e648 upstream. This patch fixes a race condition. nft_rhash_update() might fail for two reasons: - Element already exists in the hashtable. - Another packet won race to insert an entry in the hashtable. In both cases, new() has already bumped the counter via atomic_add_unless(), therefore, decrement the set element counter. Fixes: 22fe54d5fefc ("netfilter: nf_tables: add support for dynamic set updates") Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/netfilter/nft_set_hash.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_set_hash.c b/net/netfilter/nft_set_hash.c index 9de0eb20e954..e7eb56b4b89e 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_set_hash.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_set_hash.c @@ -142,6 +142,7 @@ static bool nft_rhash_update(struct nft_set *set, const u32 *key, /* Another cpu may race to insert the element with the same key */ if (prev) { nft_set_elem_destroy(set, he, true); + atomic_dec(&set->nelems); he = prev; } @@ -151,6 +152,7 @@ out: err2: nft_set_elem_destroy(set, he, true); + atomic_dec(&set->nelems); err1: return false; } From bb1dc7cc576ed23d6b10d56f64a30caa0f37575f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Victor Nogueira Date: Thu, 23 Jun 2022 11:07:41 -0300 Subject: [PATCH 0796/1091] net/sched: act_api: Notify user space if any actions were flushed before error commit 76b39b94382f9e0a639e1c70c3253de248cc4c83 upstream. If during an action flush operation one of the actions is still being referenced, the flush operation is aborted and the kernel returns to user space with an error. However, if the kernel was able to flush, for example, 3 actions and failed on the fourth, the kernel will not notify user space that it deleted 3 actions before failing. This patch fixes that behaviour by notifying user space of how many actions were deleted before flush failed and by setting extack with a message describing what happened. Fixes: 55334a5db5cd ("net_sched: act: refuse to remove bound action outside") Signed-off-by: Victor Nogueira Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/sched/act_api.c | 22 ++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/sched/act_api.c b/net/sched/act_api.c index ab277ee95032..db1c0139f99c 100644 --- a/net/sched/act_api.c +++ b/net/sched/act_api.c @@ -287,7 +287,8 @@ static int tcf_idr_release_unsafe(struct tc_action *p) } static int tcf_del_walker(struct tcf_idrinfo *idrinfo, struct sk_buff *skb, - const struct tc_action_ops *ops) + const struct tc_action_ops *ops, + struct netlink_ext_ack *extack) { struct nlattr *nest; int n_i = 0; @@ -303,20 +304,25 @@ static int tcf_del_walker(struct tcf_idrinfo *idrinfo, struct sk_buff *skb, if (nla_put_string(skb, TCA_KIND, ops->kind)) goto nla_put_failure; + ret = 0; mutex_lock(&idrinfo->lock); idr_for_each_entry_ul(idr, p, tmp, id) { if (IS_ERR(p)) continue; ret = tcf_idr_release_unsafe(p); - if (ret == ACT_P_DELETED) { + if (ret == ACT_P_DELETED) module_put(ops->owner); - n_i++; - } else if (ret < 0) { - mutex_unlock(&idrinfo->lock); - goto nla_put_failure; - } + else if (ret < 0) + break; + n_i++; } mutex_unlock(&idrinfo->lock); + if (ret < 0) { + if (n_i) + NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Unable to flush all TC actions"); + else + goto nla_put_failure; + } ret = nla_put_u32(skb, TCA_FCNT, n_i); if (ret) @@ -337,7 +343,7 @@ int tcf_generic_walker(struct tc_action_net *tn, struct sk_buff *skb, struct tcf_idrinfo *idrinfo = tn->idrinfo; if (type == RTM_DELACTION) { - return tcf_del_walker(idrinfo, skb, ops); + return tcf_del_walker(idrinfo, skb, ops, extack); } else if (type == RTM_GETACTION) { return tcf_dump_walker(idrinfo, skb, cb); } else { From 6fdef80e7eaa1aee297bfcbb4dd80ebc53ba5238 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Mon, 27 Jun 2022 10:28:13 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0797/1091] net: bonding: fix possible NULL deref in rlb code commit ab84db251c04d38b8dc7ee86e13d4050bedb1c88 upstream. syzbot has two reports involving the same root cause. bond_alb_initialize() must not set bond->alb_info.rlb_enabled if a memory allocation error is detected. Report 1: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000002: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000010-0x0000000000000017] CPU: 0 PID: 12276 Comm: kworker/u4:10 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc3-syzkaller-00132-g3b89b511ea0c #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Workqueue: netns cleanup_net RIP: 0010:rlb_clear_slave+0x10e/0x690 drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c:393 Code: 8e fc 83 fb ff 0f 84 74 02 00 00 e8 cc 2a 8e fc 48 8b 44 24 08 89 dd 48 c1 e5 06 4c 8d 34 28 49 8d 7e 14 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 0f b6 14 20 48 89 f8 83 e0 07 83 c0 03 38 d0 7c 08 84 d2 0f 85 RSP: 0018:ffffc90018a8f678 EFLAGS: 00010203 RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff88803375bb00 RSI: ffffffff84ec4ac4 RDI: 0000000000000014 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 00000000ffffffff R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: dffffc0000000000 R13: ffff8880ac889000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88815a668c80 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00005597077e10b0 CR3: 0000000026668000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: bond_alb_deinit_slave+0x43c/0x6b0 drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c:1663 __bond_release_one.cold+0x383/0xd53 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:2370 bond_slave_netdev_event drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:3778 [inline] bond_netdev_event+0x993/0xad0 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:3889 notifier_call_chain+0xb5/0x200 kernel/notifier.c:87 call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0xb5/0x130 net/core/dev.c:1945 call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:1983 [inline] call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:1997 [inline] unregister_netdevice_many+0x948/0x18b0 net/core/dev.c:10839 default_device_exit_batch+0x449/0x590 net/core/dev.c:11333 ops_exit_list+0x125/0x170 net/core/net_namespace.c:167 cleanup_net+0x4ea/0xb00 net/core/net_namespace.c:594 process_one_work+0x996/0x1610 kernel/workqueue.c:2289 worker_thread+0x665/0x1080 kernel/workqueue.c:2436 kthread+0x2e9/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:376 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:302 Report 2: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000006: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000030-0x0000000000000037] CPU: 1 PID: 5206 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 5.18.0-syzkaller-12108-g58f9d52ff689 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:rlb_req_update_slave_clients+0x109/0x2f0 drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c:502 Code: 5d 18 8f fc 41 80 3e 00 0f 85 a5 01 00 00 89 d8 48 c1 e0 06 49 03 84 24 68 01 00 00 48 8d 78 30 49 89 c7 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 2a 00 0f 85 98 01 00 00 4d 39 6f 30 75 83 e8 22 18 8f fc 49 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000300ee80 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffc90016c11000 RDX: 0000000000000006 RSI: ffffffff84eb6bf3 RDI: 0000000000000030 RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 00000000ffffffff R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888027c80c80 R13: ffff88807d7ff800 R14: ffffed1004f901bd R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f6f46c58700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000020010000 CR3: 00000000516cc000 CR4: 00000000003506e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: alb_fasten_mac_swap+0x886/0xa80 drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c:1070 bond_alb_handle_active_change+0x624/0x1050 drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c:1765 bond_change_active_slave+0xfa1/0x29b0 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:1173 bond_select_active_slave+0x23f/0xa50 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:1253 bond_enslave+0x3b34/0x53b0 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:2159 do_set_master+0x1c8/0x220 net/core/rtnetlink.c:2577 rtnl_newlink_create net/core/rtnetlink.c:3380 [inline] __rtnl_newlink+0x13ac/0x17e0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3580 rtnl_newlink+0x64/0xa0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3593 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x43a/0xc90 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6089 netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2501 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x543/0x7f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1345 netlink_sendmsg+0x917/0xe10 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1921 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:734 ____sys_sendmsg+0x6eb/0x810 net/socket.c:2492 ___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2546 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2575 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2584 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2582 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x132/0x220 net/socket.c:2582 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 RIP: 0033:0x7f6f45a89109 Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f6f46c58168 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f6f45b9c030 RCX: 00007f6f45a89109 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000080 RDI: 0000000000000006 RBP: 00007f6f45ae308d R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ffed99029af R14: 00007f6f46c58300 R15: 0000000000022000 Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: syzbot Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Cc: Jay Vosburgh Cc: Veaceslav Falico Cc: Andy Gospodarek Acked-by: Jay Vosburgh Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220627102813.126264-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c index a4af185fa466..8bee935c8f90 100644 --- a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c +++ b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c @@ -1276,12 +1276,12 @@ int bond_alb_initialize(struct bonding *bond, int rlb_enabled) return res; if (rlb_enabled) { - bond->alb_info.rlb_enabled = 1; res = rlb_initialize(bond); if (res) { tlb_deinitialize(bond); return res; } + bond->alb_info.rlb_enabled = 1; } else { bond->alb_info.rlb_enabled = 0; } From 893825289ba840afd86bfffcb6f7f363c73efff8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yevhen Orlov Date: Wed, 29 Jun 2022 04:29:14 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 0798/1091] net: bonding: fix use-after-free after 802.3ad slave unbind commit 050133e1aa2cb49bb17be847d48a4431598ef562 upstream. commit 0622cab0341c ("bonding: fix 802.3ad aggregator reselection"), resolve case, when there is several aggregation groups in the same bond. bond_3ad_unbind_slave will invalidate (clear) aggregator when __agg_active_ports return zero. So, ad_clear_agg can be executed even, when num_of_ports!=0. Than bond_3ad_unbind_slave can be executed again for, previously cleared aggregator. NOTE: at this time bond_3ad_unbind_slave will not update slave ports list, because lag_ports==NULL. So, here we got slave ports, pointing to freed aggregator memory. Fix with checking actual number of ports in group (as was before commit 0622cab0341c ("bonding: fix 802.3ad aggregator reselection") ), before ad_clear_agg(). The KASAN logs are as follows: [ 767.617392] ================================================================== [ 767.630776] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in bond_3ad_state_machine_handler+0x13dc/0x1470 [ 767.638764] Read of size 2 at addr ffff00011ba9d430 by task kworker/u8:7/767 [ 767.647361] CPU: 3 PID: 767 Comm: kworker/u8:7 Tainted: G O 5.15.11 #15 [ 767.655329] Hardware name: DNI AmazonGo1 A7040 board (DT) [ 767.660760] Workqueue: lacp_1 bond_3ad_state_machine_handler [ 767.666468] Call trace: [ 767.668930] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x2d0 [ 767.672625] show_stack+0x24/0x30 [ 767.675965] dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x84 [ 767.679659] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x74/0x2b8 [ 767.685451] kasan_report+0x1f0/0x260 [ 767.689148] __asan_load2+0x94/0xd0 [ 767.692667] bond_3ad_state_machine_handler+0x13dc/0x1470 Fixes: 0622cab0341c ("bonding: fix 802.3ad aggregator reselection") Co-developed-by: Maksym Glubokiy Signed-off-by: Maksym Glubokiy Signed-off-by: Yevhen Orlov Acked-by: Jay Vosburgh Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220629012914.361-1-yevhen.orlov@plvision.eu Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/bonding/bond_3ad.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_3ad.c b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_3ad.c index 41e58bd2e606..31ed7616e84e 100644 --- a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_3ad.c +++ b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_3ad.c @@ -2218,7 +2218,8 @@ void bond_3ad_unbind_slave(struct slave *slave) temp_aggregator->num_of_ports--; if (__agg_active_ports(temp_aggregator) == 0) { select_new_active_agg = temp_aggregator->is_active; - ad_clear_agg(temp_aggregator); + if (temp_aggregator->num_of_ports == 0) + ad_clear_agg(temp_aggregator); if (select_new_active_agg) { slave_info(bond->dev, slave->dev, "Removing an active aggregator\n"); /* select new active aggregator */ From 37287fd28fb01f0a37953ce3a7ebaa5b67706094 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Krzysztof Kozlowski Date: Mon, 27 Jun 2022 14:40:48 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0799/1091] nfc: nfcmrvl: Fix irq_of_parse_and_map() return value commit 5a478a653b4cca148d5c89832f007ec0809d7e6d upstream. The irq_of_parse_and_map() returns 0 on failure, not a negative ERRNO. Reported-by: Lv Ruyi Fixes: caf6e49bf6d0 ("NFC: nfcmrvl: add spi driver") Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220627124048.296253-1-krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/nfc/nfcmrvl/i2c.c | 6 +++--- drivers/nfc/nfcmrvl/spi.c | 6 +++--- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/nfc/nfcmrvl/i2c.c b/drivers/nfc/nfcmrvl/i2c.c index 0f22379887ca..919b4d2f5d8b 100644 --- a/drivers/nfc/nfcmrvl/i2c.c +++ b/drivers/nfc/nfcmrvl/i2c.c @@ -186,9 +186,9 @@ static int nfcmrvl_i2c_parse_dt(struct device_node *node, pdata->irq_polarity = IRQF_TRIGGER_RISING; ret = irq_of_parse_and_map(node, 0); - if (ret < 0) { - pr_err("Unable to get irq, error: %d\n", ret); - return ret; + if (!ret) { + pr_err("Unable to get irq\n"); + return -EINVAL; } pdata->irq = ret; diff --git a/drivers/nfc/nfcmrvl/spi.c b/drivers/nfc/nfcmrvl/spi.c index 8e0ddb434770..1f4120e3314b 100644 --- a/drivers/nfc/nfcmrvl/spi.c +++ b/drivers/nfc/nfcmrvl/spi.c @@ -129,9 +129,9 @@ static int nfcmrvl_spi_parse_dt(struct device_node *node, } ret = irq_of_parse_and_map(node, 0); - if (ret < 0) { - pr_err("Unable to get irq, error: %d\n", ret); - return ret; + if (!ret) { + pr_err("Unable to get irq\n"); + return -EINVAL; } pdata->irq = ret; From 8f968872ec34f95b1ce785d065515c429b264410 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michael Walle Date: Mon, 27 Jun 2022 19:06:42 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0800/1091] NFC: nxp-nci: Don't issue a zero length i2c_master_read() commit eddd95b9423946aaacb55cac6a9b2cea8ab944fc upstream. There are packets which doesn't have a payload. In that case, the second i2c_master_read() will have a zero length. But because the NFC controller doesn't have any data left, it will NACK the I2C read and -ENXIO will be returned. In case there is no payload, just skip the second i2c master read. Fixes: 6be88670fc59 ("NFC: nxp-nci_i2c: Add I2C support to NXP NCI driver") Signed-off-by: Michael Walle Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/nfc/nxp-nci/i2c.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/nfc/nxp-nci/i2c.c b/drivers/nfc/nxp-nci/i2c.c index 9f60e4dc5a90..3943a30053b3 100644 --- a/drivers/nfc/nxp-nci/i2c.c +++ b/drivers/nfc/nxp-nci/i2c.c @@ -162,6 +162,9 @@ static int nxp_nci_i2c_nci_read(struct nxp_nci_i2c_phy *phy, skb_put_data(*skb, (void *)&header, NCI_CTRL_HDR_SIZE); + if (!header.plen) + return 0; + r = i2c_master_recv(client, skb_put(*skb, header.plen), header.plen); if (r != header.plen) { nfc_err(&client->dev, From 5eac00ef2a11a0be77266f370151c903955991da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jakub Kicinski Date: Wed, 29 Jun 2022 11:19:10 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0801/1091] net: tun: avoid disabling NAPI twice commit ff1fa2081d173b01cebe2fbf0a2d0f1cee9ce4b5 upstream. Eric reports that syzbot made short work out of my speculative fix. Indeed when queue gets detached its tfile->tun remains, so we would try to stop NAPI twice with a detach(), close() sequence. Alternative fix would be to move tun_napi_disable() to tun_detach_all() and let the NAPI run after the queue has been detached. Fixes: a8fc8cb5692a ("net: tun: stop NAPI when detaching queues") Reported-by: syzbot Reported-by: Eric Dumazet Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220629181911.372047-1-kuba@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/tun.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/tun.c b/drivers/net/tun.c index f1e110de8a32..dd02fcc97277 100644 --- a/drivers/net/tun.c +++ b/drivers/net/tun.c @@ -696,7 +696,8 @@ static void __tun_detach(struct tun_file *tfile, bool clean) tun = rtnl_dereference(tfile->tun); if (tun && clean) { - tun_napi_disable(tfile); + if (!tfile->detached) + tun_napi_disable(tfile); tun_napi_del(tfile); } From ee25841221c17228cbd30262a90f3b03ad80cdf6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Demi Marie Obenour Date: Tue, 21 Jun 2022 22:27:26 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 0802/1091] xen/gntdev: Avoid blocking in unmap_grant_pages() commit dbe97cff7dd9f0f75c524afdd55ad46be3d15295 upstream. unmap_grant_pages() currently waits for the pages to no longer be used. In https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/7481, this lead to a deadlock against i915: i915 was waiting for gntdev's MMU notifier to finish, while gntdev was waiting for i915 to free its pages. I also believe this is responsible for various deadlocks I have experienced in the past. Avoid these problems by making unmap_grant_pages async. This requires making it return void, as any errors will not be available when the function returns. Fortunately, the only use of the return value is a WARN_ON(), which can be replaced by a WARN_ON when the error is detected. Additionally, a failed call will not prevent further calls from being made, but this is harmless. Because unmap_grant_pages is now async, the grant handle will be sent to INVALID_GRANT_HANDLE too late to prevent multiple unmaps of the same handle. Instead, a separate bool array is allocated for this purpose. This wastes memory, but stuffing this information in padding bytes is too fragile. Furthermore, it is necessary to grab a reference to the map before making the asynchronous call, and release the reference when the call returns. It is also necessary to guard against reentrancy in gntdev_map_put(), and to handle the case where userspace tries to map a mapping whose contents have not all been freed yet. Fixes: 745282256c75 ("xen/gntdev: safely unmap grants in case they are still in use") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Demi Marie Obenour Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220622022726.2538-1-demi@invisiblethingslab.com Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/xen/gntdev-common.h | 8 ++ drivers/xen/gntdev.c | 159 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 2 files changed, 116 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/xen/gntdev-common.h b/drivers/xen/gntdev-common.h index 2f8b949c3eeb..fab6f5a54d5b 100644 --- a/drivers/xen/gntdev-common.h +++ b/drivers/xen/gntdev-common.h @@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ #include #include #include +#include +#include struct gntdev_dmabuf_priv; @@ -61,6 +63,7 @@ struct gntdev_grant_map { struct gnttab_unmap_grant_ref *unmap_ops; struct gnttab_map_grant_ref *kmap_ops; struct gnttab_unmap_grant_ref *kunmap_ops; + bool *being_removed; struct page **pages; unsigned long pages_vm_start; @@ -78,6 +81,11 @@ struct gntdev_grant_map { /* Needed to avoid allocation in gnttab_dma_free_pages(). */ xen_pfn_t *frames; #endif + + /* Number of live grants */ + atomic_t live_grants; + /* Needed to avoid allocation in __unmap_grant_pages */ + struct gntab_unmap_queue_data unmap_data; }; struct gntdev_grant_map *gntdev_alloc_map(struct gntdev_priv *priv, int count, diff --git a/drivers/xen/gntdev.c b/drivers/xen/gntdev.c index e953ea34b3e4..f46479347765 100644 --- a/drivers/xen/gntdev.c +++ b/drivers/xen/gntdev.c @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -62,11 +63,12 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(limit, "Maximum number of grants that may be mapped by " static atomic_t pages_mapped = ATOMIC_INIT(0); +/* True in PV mode, false otherwise */ static int use_ptemod; #define populate_freeable_maps use_ptemod -static int unmap_grant_pages(struct gntdev_grant_map *map, - int offset, int pages); +static void unmap_grant_pages(struct gntdev_grant_map *map, + int offset, int pages); static struct miscdevice gntdev_miscdev; @@ -123,6 +125,7 @@ static void gntdev_free_map(struct gntdev_grant_map *map) kfree(map->unmap_ops); kfree(map->kmap_ops); kfree(map->kunmap_ops); + kfree(map->being_removed); kfree(map); } @@ -142,12 +145,15 @@ struct gntdev_grant_map *gntdev_alloc_map(struct gntdev_priv *priv, int count, add->kmap_ops = kcalloc(count, sizeof(add->kmap_ops[0]), GFP_KERNEL); add->kunmap_ops = kcalloc(count, sizeof(add->kunmap_ops[0]), GFP_KERNEL); add->pages = kcalloc(count, sizeof(add->pages[0]), GFP_KERNEL); + add->being_removed = + kcalloc(count, sizeof(add->being_removed[0]), GFP_KERNEL); if (NULL == add->grants || NULL == add->map_ops || NULL == add->unmap_ops || NULL == add->kmap_ops || NULL == add->kunmap_ops || - NULL == add->pages) + NULL == add->pages || + NULL == add->being_removed) goto err; #ifdef CONFIG_XEN_GRANT_DMA_ALLOC @@ -243,6 +249,35 @@ void gntdev_put_map(struct gntdev_priv *priv, struct gntdev_grant_map *map) return; atomic_sub(map->count, &pages_mapped); + if (map->pages && !use_ptemod) { + /* + * Increment the reference count. This ensures that the + * subsequent call to unmap_grant_pages() will not wind up + * re-entering itself. It *can* wind up calling + * gntdev_put_map() recursively, but such calls will be with a + * reference count greater than 1, so they will return before + * this code is reached. The recursion depth is thus limited to + * 1. Do NOT use refcount_inc() here, as it will detect that + * the reference count is zero and WARN(). + */ + refcount_set(&map->users, 1); + + /* + * Unmap the grants. This may or may not be asynchronous, so it + * is possible that the reference count is 1 on return, but it + * could also be greater than 1. + */ + unmap_grant_pages(map, 0, map->count); + + /* Check if the memory now needs to be freed */ + if (!refcount_dec_and_test(&map->users)) + return; + + /* + * All pages have been returned to the hypervisor, so free the + * map. + */ + } if (map->notify.flags & UNMAP_NOTIFY_SEND_EVENT) { notify_remote_via_evtchn(map->notify.event); @@ -298,6 +333,7 @@ static int set_grant_ptes_as_special(pte_t *pte, unsigned long addr, void *data) int gntdev_map_grant_pages(struct gntdev_grant_map *map) { + size_t alloced = 0; int i, err = 0; if (!use_ptemod) { @@ -346,87 +382,109 @@ int gntdev_map_grant_pages(struct gntdev_grant_map *map) map->pages, map->count); for (i = 0; i < map->count; i++) { - if (map->map_ops[i].status == GNTST_okay) + if (map->map_ops[i].status == GNTST_okay) { map->unmap_ops[i].handle = map->map_ops[i].handle; - else if (!err) + if (!use_ptemod) + alloced++; + } else if (!err) err = -EINVAL; if (map->flags & GNTMAP_device_map) map->unmap_ops[i].dev_bus_addr = map->map_ops[i].dev_bus_addr; if (use_ptemod) { - if (map->kmap_ops[i].status == GNTST_okay) + if (map->kmap_ops[i].status == GNTST_okay) { + if (map->map_ops[i].status == GNTST_okay) + alloced++; map->kunmap_ops[i].handle = map->kmap_ops[i].handle; - else if (!err) + } else if (!err) err = -EINVAL; } } + atomic_add(alloced, &map->live_grants); return err; } -static int __unmap_grant_pages(struct gntdev_grant_map *map, int offset, - int pages) +static void __unmap_grant_pages_done(int result, + struct gntab_unmap_queue_data *data) { - int i, err = 0; - struct gntab_unmap_queue_data unmap_data; + unsigned int i; + struct gntdev_grant_map *map = data->data; + unsigned int offset = data->unmap_ops - map->unmap_ops; - if (map->notify.flags & UNMAP_NOTIFY_CLEAR_BYTE) { - int pgno = (map->notify.addr >> PAGE_SHIFT); - if (pgno >= offset && pgno < offset + pages) { - /* No need for kmap, pages are in lowmem */ - uint8_t *tmp = pfn_to_kaddr(page_to_pfn(map->pages[pgno])); - tmp[map->notify.addr & (PAGE_SIZE-1)] = 0; - map->notify.flags &= ~UNMAP_NOTIFY_CLEAR_BYTE; - } - } - - unmap_data.unmap_ops = map->unmap_ops + offset; - unmap_data.kunmap_ops = use_ptemod ? map->kunmap_ops + offset : NULL; - unmap_data.pages = map->pages + offset; - unmap_data.count = pages; - - err = gnttab_unmap_refs_sync(&unmap_data); - if (err) - return err; - - for (i = 0; i < pages; i++) { - if (map->unmap_ops[offset+i].status) - err = -EINVAL; + for (i = 0; i < data->count; i++) { + WARN_ON(map->unmap_ops[offset+i].status); pr_debug("unmap handle=%d st=%d\n", map->unmap_ops[offset+i].handle, map->unmap_ops[offset+i].status); map->unmap_ops[offset+i].handle = -1; } - return err; + /* + * Decrease the live-grant counter. This must happen after the loop to + * prevent premature reuse of the grants by gnttab_mmap(). + */ + atomic_sub(data->count, &map->live_grants); + + /* Release reference taken by __unmap_grant_pages */ + gntdev_put_map(NULL, map); } -static int unmap_grant_pages(struct gntdev_grant_map *map, int offset, - int pages) +static void __unmap_grant_pages(struct gntdev_grant_map *map, int offset, + int pages) { - int range, err = 0; + if (map->notify.flags & UNMAP_NOTIFY_CLEAR_BYTE) { + int pgno = (map->notify.addr >> PAGE_SHIFT); + + if (pgno >= offset && pgno < offset + pages) { + /* No need for kmap, pages are in lowmem */ + uint8_t *tmp = pfn_to_kaddr(page_to_pfn(map->pages[pgno])); + + tmp[map->notify.addr & (PAGE_SIZE-1)] = 0; + map->notify.flags &= ~UNMAP_NOTIFY_CLEAR_BYTE; + } + } + + map->unmap_data.unmap_ops = map->unmap_ops + offset; + map->unmap_data.kunmap_ops = use_ptemod ? map->kunmap_ops + offset : NULL; + map->unmap_data.pages = map->pages + offset; + map->unmap_data.count = pages; + map->unmap_data.done = __unmap_grant_pages_done; + map->unmap_data.data = map; + refcount_inc(&map->users); /* to keep map alive during async call below */ + + gnttab_unmap_refs_async(&map->unmap_data); +} + +static void unmap_grant_pages(struct gntdev_grant_map *map, int offset, + int pages) +{ + int range; + + if (atomic_read(&map->live_grants) == 0) + return; /* Nothing to do */ pr_debug("unmap %d+%d [%d+%d]\n", map->index, map->count, offset, pages); /* It is possible the requested range will have a "hole" where we * already unmapped some of the grants. Only unmap valid ranges. */ - while (pages && !err) { - while (pages && map->unmap_ops[offset].handle == -1) { + while (pages) { + while (pages && map->being_removed[offset]) { offset++; pages--; } range = 0; while (range < pages) { - if (map->unmap_ops[offset+range].handle == -1) + if (map->being_removed[offset + range]) break; + map->being_removed[offset + range] = true; range++; } - err = __unmap_grant_pages(map, offset, range); + if (range) + __unmap_grant_pages(map, offset, range); offset += range; pages -= range; } - - return err; } /* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */ @@ -496,7 +554,6 @@ static int unmap_if_in_range(struct gntdev_grant_map *map, bool blockable) { unsigned long mstart, mend; - int err; if (!in_range(map, start, end)) return 0; @@ -510,10 +567,9 @@ static int unmap_if_in_range(struct gntdev_grant_map *map, map->index, map->count, map->vma->vm_start, map->vma->vm_end, start, end, mstart, mend); - err = unmap_grant_pages(map, + unmap_grant_pages(map, (mstart - map->vma->vm_start) >> PAGE_SHIFT, (mend - mstart) >> PAGE_SHIFT); - WARN_ON(err); return 0; } @@ -554,7 +610,6 @@ static void mn_release(struct mmu_notifier *mn, { struct gntdev_priv *priv = container_of(mn, struct gntdev_priv, mn); struct gntdev_grant_map *map; - int err; mutex_lock(&priv->lock); list_for_each_entry(map, &priv->maps, next) { @@ -563,8 +618,7 @@ static void mn_release(struct mmu_notifier *mn, pr_debug("map %d+%d (%lx %lx)\n", map->index, map->count, map->vma->vm_start, map->vma->vm_end); - err = unmap_grant_pages(map, /* offset */ 0, map->count); - WARN_ON(err); + unmap_grant_pages(map, /* offset */ 0, map->count); } list_for_each_entry(map, &priv->freeable_maps, next) { if (!map->vma) @@ -572,8 +626,7 @@ static void mn_release(struct mmu_notifier *mn, pr_debug("map %d+%d (%lx %lx)\n", map->index, map->count, map->vma->vm_start, map->vma->vm_end); - err = unmap_grant_pages(map, /* offset */ 0, map->count); - WARN_ON(err); + unmap_grant_pages(map, /* offset */ 0, map->count); } mutex_unlock(&priv->lock); } @@ -1102,6 +1155,10 @@ static int gntdev_mmap(struct file *flip, struct vm_area_struct *vma) goto unlock_out; } + if (atomic_read(&map->live_grants)) { + err = -EAGAIN; + goto unlock_out; + } refcount_inc(&map->users); vma->vm_ops = &gntdev_vmops; From ac9cd4f66a4de35aa65ccd4d0eb2a8b3e2164b0f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yang Yingliang Date: Fri, 1 Jul 2022 15:41:53 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0803/1091] hwmon: (ibmaem) don't call platform_device_del() if platform_device_add() fails [ Upstream commit d0e51022a025ca5350fafb8e413a6fe5d4baf833 ] If platform_device_add() fails, it no need to call platform_device_del(), split platform_device_unregister() into platform_device_del/put(), so platform_device_put() can be called separately. Fixes: 8808a793f052 ("ibmaem: new driver for power/energy/temp meters in IBM System X hardware") Reported-by: Hulk Robot Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220701074153.4021556-1-yangyingliang@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/hwmon/ibmaem.c | 12 ++++++++---- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/hwmon/ibmaem.c b/drivers/hwmon/ibmaem.c index d05ab713566d..00a4ffe01039 100644 --- a/drivers/hwmon/ibmaem.c +++ b/drivers/hwmon/ibmaem.c @@ -550,7 +550,7 @@ static int aem_init_aem1_inst(struct aem_ipmi_data *probe, u8 module_handle) res = platform_device_add(data->pdev); if (res) - goto ipmi_err; + goto dev_add_err; platform_set_drvdata(data->pdev, data); @@ -598,7 +598,9 @@ hwmon_reg_err: ipmi_destroy_user(data->ipmi.user); ipmi_err: platform_set_drvdata(data->pdev, NULL); - platform_device_unregister(data->pdev); + platform_device_del(data->pdev); +dev_add_err: + platform_device_put(data->pdev); dev_err: ida_simple_remove(&aem_ida, data->id); id_err: @@ -690,7 +692,7 @@ static int aem_init_aem2_inst(struct aem_ipmi_data *probe, res = platform_device_add(data->pdev); if (res) - goto ipmi_err; + goto dev_add_err; platform_set_drvdata(data->pdev, data); @@ -738,7 +740,9 @@ hwmon_reg_err: ipmi_destroy_user(data->ipmi.user); ipmi_err: platform_set_drvdata(data->pdev, NULL); - platform_device_unregister(data->pdev); + platform_device_del(data->pdev); +dev_add_err: + platform_device_put(data->pdev); dev_err: ida_simple_remove(&aem_ida, data->id); id_err: From e99a986161918ac2e1c7f3b5e1d9f61e5d5d32ce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Doug Berger Date: Wed, 22 Jun 2022 20:02:04 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0804/1091] net: dsa: bcm_sf2: force pause link settings commit 7c97bc0128b2eecc703106112679a69d446d1a12 upstream. The pause settings reported by the PHY should also be applied to the GMII port status override otherwise the switch will not generate pause frames towards the link partner despite the advertisement saying otherwise. Fixes: 246d7f773c13 ("net: dsa: add Broadcom SF2 switch driver") Signed-off-by: Doug Berger Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220623030204.1966851-1-f.fainelli@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/dsa/bcm_sf2.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/bcm_sf2.c b/drivers/net/dsa/bcm_sf2.c index 0ee1c0a7b165..282e9e2a50d9 100644 --- a/drivers/net/dsa/bcm_sf2.c +++ b/drivers/net/dsa/bcm_sf2.c @@ -602,6 +602,11 @@ force_link: reg |= LINK_STS; if (state->duplex == DUPLEX_FULL) reg |= DUPLX_MODE; + if (state->pause & MLO_PAUSE_TXRX_MASK) { + if (state->pause & MLO_PAUSE_TX) + reg |= TXFLOW_CNTL; + reg |= RXFLOW_CNTL; + } core_writel(priv, reg, offset); } From 05387c4ff568634ee3b0b033489f0ceca71a692e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: kernel test robot Date: Sat, 27 Mar 2021 10:29:32 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0805/1091] sit: use min commit 284fda1eff8a8b27d2cafd7dc8fb423d13720f21 upstream. Opportunity for min() Generated by: scripts/coccinelle/misc/minmax.cocci CC: Denis Efremov Reported-by: kernel test robot Signed-off-by: kernel test robot Reviewed-by: David Ahern Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/ipv6/sit.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv6/sit.c b/net/ipv6/sit.c index 16e75a996b74..07c2c6f4f7e3 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/sit.c +++ b/net/ipv6/sit.c @@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ static int ipip6_tunnel_get_prl(struct ip_tunnel *t, rcu_read_lock(); - ca = t->prl_count < cmax ? t->prl_count : cmax; + ca = min(t->prl_count, cmax); if (!kp) { /* We don't try hard to allocate much memory for From 7b6bffcfb9d34dc4b279f8fb7b72e9182acb2a08 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: katrinzhou Date: Tue, 28 Jun 2022 11:50:30 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0806/1091] ipv6/sit: fix ipip6_tunnel_get_prl return value commit adabdd8f6acabc0c3fdbba2e7f5a2edd9c5ef22d upstream. When kcalloc fails, ipip6_tunnel_get_prl() should return -ENOMEM. Move the position of label "out" to return correctly. Addresses-Coverity: ("Unused value") Fixes: 300aaeeaab5f ("[IPV6] SIT: Add SIOCGETPRL ioctl to get/dump PRL.") Signed-off-by: katrinzhou Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet Reviewed-by: David Ahern Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220628035030.1039171-1-zys.zljxml@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/ipv6/sit.c | 8 +++----- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv6/sit.c b/net/ipv6/sit.c index 07c2c6f4f7e3..117d374695fe 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/sit.c +++ b/net/ipv6/sit.c @@ -310,8 +310,6 @@ static int ipip6_tunnel_get_prl(struct ip_tunnel *t, kcalloc(cmax, sizeof(*kp), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN) : NULL; - rcu_read_lock(); - ca = min(t->prl_count, cmax); if (!kp) { @@ -327,7 +325,7 @@ static int ipip6_tunnel_get_prl(struct ip_tunnel *t, } } - c = 0; + rcu_read_lock(); for_each_prl_rcu(t->prl) { if (c >= cmax) break; @@ -339,7 +337,7 @@ static int ipip6_tunnel_get_prl(struct ip_tunnel *t, if (kprl.addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY)) break; } -out: + rcu_read_unlock(); len = sizeof(*kp) * c; @@ -348,7 +346,7 @@ out: ret = -EFAULT; kfree(kp); - +out: return ret; } From b13119007056e7a5e07f9d998b24806901fccc0e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Oskolkov Date: Wed, 23 Sep 2020 16:36:17 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0807/1091] rseq/selftests,x86_64: Add rseq_offset_deref_addv() commit ea366dd79c05fcd4cf5e225d2de8a3a7c293160c upstream. This patch adds rseq_offset_deref_addv() function to tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-x86.h, to be used in a selftest in the next patch in the patchset. Once an architecture adds support for this function they should define "RSEQ_ARCH_HAS_OFFSET_DEREF_ADDV". Signed-off-by: Peter Oskolkov Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Acked-by: Mathieu Desnoyers Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200923233618.2572849-2-posk@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-x86.h | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 57 insertions(+) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-x86.h b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-x86.h index b2da6004fe30..640411518e46 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-x86.h +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-x86.h @@ -279,6 +279,63 @@ error1: #endif } +#define RSEQ_ARCH_HAS_OFFSET_DEREF_ADDV + +/* + * pval = *(ptr+off) + * *pval += inc; + */ +static inline __attribute__((always_inline)) +int rseq_offset_deref_addv(intptr_t *ptr, off_t off, intptr_t inc, int cpu) +{ + RSEQ_INJECT_C(9) + + __asm__ __volatile__ goto ( + RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_TABLE(3, 1f, 2f, 4f) /* start, commit, abort */ +#ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE + RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_EXIT_POINT(1f, %l[error1]) +#endif + /* Start rseq by storing table entry pointer into rseq_cs. */ + RSEQ_ASM_STORE_RSEQ_CS(1, 3b, RSEQ_CS_OFFSET(%[rseq_abi])) + RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_abi]), 4f) + RSEQ_INJECT_ASM(3) +#ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE + RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_abi]), %l[error1]) +#endif + /* get p+v */ + "movq %[ptr], %%rbx\n\t" + "addq %[off], %%rbx\n\t" + /* get pv */ + "movq (%%rbx), %%rcx\n\t" + /* *pv += inc */ + "addq %[inc], (%%rcx)\n\t" + "2:\n\t" + RSEQ_INJECT_ASM(4) + RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_ABORT(4, "", abort) + : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ + : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), + [rseq_abi] "r" (&__rseq_abi), + /* final store input */ + [ptr] "m" (*ptr), + [off] "er" (off), + [inc] "er" (inc) + : "memory", "cc", "rax", "rbx", "rcx" + RSEQ_INJECT_CLOBBER + : abort +#ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE + , error1 +#endif + ); + return 0; +abort: + RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED + return -1; +#ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE +error1: + rseq_bug("cpu_id comparison failed"); +#endif +} + static inline __attribute__((always_inline)) int rseq_cmpeqv_trystorev_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, intptr_t *v2, intptr_t newv2, From 8417f4475959590d95caceef4a791bca7cb10116 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shuah Khan Date: Thu, 9 Dec 2021 16:19:09 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0808/1091] selftests/rseq: remove ARRAY_SIZE define from individual tests commit 07ad4f7629d4802ff0d962b0ac23ea6445964e2a upstream. ARRAY_SIZE is defined in several selftests. Remove definitions from individual test files and include header file for the define instead. ARRAY_SIZE define is added in a separate patch to prepare for this change. Remove ARRAY_SIZE from rseq tests and pickup the one defined in kselftest.h. Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- tools/testing/selftests/rseq/basic_percpu_ops_test.c | 3 +-- tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq.c | 3 +-- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/basic_percpu_ops_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/basic_percpu_ops_test.c index eb3f6db36d36..b953a52ff706 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/basic_percpu_ops_test.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/basic_percpu_ops_test.c @@ -9,10 +9,9 @@ #include #include +#include "../kselftest.h" #include "rseq.h" -#define ARRAY_SIZE(arr) (sizeof(arr) / sizeof((arr)[0])) - struct percpu_lock_entry { intptr_t v; } __attribute__((aligned(128))); diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq.c b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq.c index 7159eb777fd3..fb440dfca158 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq.c @@ -27,10 +27,9 @@ #include #include +#include "../kselftest.h" #include "rseq.h" -#define ARRAY_SIZE(arr) (sizeof(arr) / sizeof((arr)[0])) - __thread volatile struct rseq __rseq_abi = { .cpu_id = RSEQ_CPU_ID_UNINITIALIZED, }; From 9aa134cb66b41fb2f5e3db081e9189c5f7c029a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mathieu Desnoyers Date: Mon, 24 Jan 2022 12:12:39 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 0809/1091] selftests/rseq: introduce own copy of rseq uapi header commit 5c105d55a9dc9e01535116ccfc26e703168a574f upstream. The Linux kernel rseq uapi header has a broken layout for the rseq_cs.ptr field on 32-bit little endian architectures. The entire rseq_cs.ptr field is planned for removal, leaving only the 64-bit rseq_cs.ptr64 field available. Both glibc and librseq use their own copy of the Linux kernel uapi header, where they introduce proper union fields to access to the 32-bit low order bits of the rseq_cs pointer on 32-bit architectures. Introduce a copy of the Linux kernel uapi headers in the Linux kernel selftests. Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220124171253.22072-2-mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-abi.h | 151 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq.c | 14 +-- tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq.h | 10 +- 3 files changed, 161 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-abi.h diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-abi.h b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-abi.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..a8c44d9af71f --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-abi.h @@ -0,0 +1,151 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note */ +#ifndef _RSEQ_ABI_H +#define _RSEQ_ABI_H + +/* + * rseq-abi.h + * + * Restartable sequences system call API + * + * Copyright (c) 2015-2022 Mathieu Desnoyers + */ + +#include +#include + +enum rseq_abi_cpu_id_state { + RSEQ_ABI_CPU_ID_UNINITIALIZED = -1, + RSEQ_ABI_CPU_ID_REGISTRATION_FAILED = -2, +}; + +enum rseq_abi_flags { + RSEQ_ABI_FLAG_UNREGISTER = (1 << 0), +}; + +enum rseq_abi_cs_flags_bit { + RSEQ_ABI_CS_FLAG_NO_RESTART_ON_PREEMPT_BIT = 0, + RSEQ_ABI_CS_FLAG_NO_RESTART_ON_SIGNAL_BIT = 1, + RSEQ_ABI_CS_FLAG_NO_RESTART_ON_MIGRATE_BIT = 2, +}; + +enum rseq_abi_cs_flags { + RSEQ_ABI_CS_FLAG_NO_RESTART_ON_PREEMPT = + (1U << RSEQ_ABI_CS_FLAG_NO_RESTART_ON_PREEMPT_BIT), + RSEQ_ABI_CS_FLAG_NO_RESTART_ON_SIGNAL = + (1U << RSEQ_ABI_CS_FLAG_NO_RESTART_ON_SIGNAL_BIT), + RSEQ_ABI_CS_FLAG_NO_RESTART_ON_MIGRATE = + (1U << RSEQ_ABI_CS_FLAG_NO_RESTART_ON_MIGRATE_BIT), +}; + +/* + * struct rseq_abi_cs is aligned on 4 * 8 bytes to ensure it is always + * contained within a single cache-line. It is usually declared as + * link-time constant data. + */ +struct rseq_abi_cs { + /* Version of this structure. */ + __u32 version; + /* enum rseq_abi_cs_flags */ + __u32 flags; + __u64 start_ip; + /* Offset from start_ip. */ + __u64 post_commit_offset; + __u64 abort_ip; +} __attribute__((aligned(4 * sizeof(__u64)))); + +/* + * struct rseq_abi is aligned on 4 * 8 bytes to ensure it is always + * contained within a single cache-line. + * + * A single struct rseq_abi per thread is allowed. + */ +struct rseq_abi { + /* + * Restartable sequences cpu_id_start field. Updated by the + * kernel. Read by user-space with single-copy atomicity + * semantics. This field should only be read by the thread which + * registered this data structure. Aligned on 32-bit. Always + * contains a value in the range of possible CPUs, although the + * value may not be the actual current CPU (e.g. if rseq is not + * initialized). This CPU number value should always be compared + * against the value of the cpu_id field before performing a rseq + * commit or returning a value read from a data structure indexed + * using the cpu_id_start value. + */ + __u32 cpu_id_start; + /* + * Restartable sequences cpu_id field. Updated by the kernel. + * Read by user-space with single-copy atomicity semantics. This + * field should only be read by the thread which registered this + * data structure. Aligned on 32-bit. Values + * RSEQ_CPU_ID_UNINITIALIZED and RSEQ_CPU_ID_REGISTRATION_FAILED + * have a special semantic: the former means "rseq uninitialized", + * and latter means "rseq initialization failed". This value is + * meant to be read within rseq critical sections and compared + * with the cpu_id_start value previously read, before performing + * the commit instruction, or read and compared with the + * cpu_id_start value before returning a value loaded from a data + * structure indexed using the cpu_id_start value. + */ + __u32 cpu_id; + /* + * Restartable sequences rseq_cs field. + * + * Contains NULL when no critical section is active for the current + * thread, or holds a pointer to the currently active struct rseq_cs. + * + * Updated by user-space, which sets the address of the currently + * active rseq_cs at the beginning of assembly instruction sequence + * block, and set to NULL by the kernel when it restarts an assembly + * instruction sequence block, as well as when the kernel detects that + * it is preempting or delivering a signal outside of the range + * targeted by the rseq_cs. Also needs to be set to NULL by user-space + * before reclaiming memory that contains the targeted struct rseq_cs. + * + * Read and set by the kernel. Set by user-space with single-copy + * atomicity semantics. This field should only be updated by the + * thread which registered this data structure. Aligned on 64-bit. + */ + union { + __u64 ptr64; + + /* + * The "arch" field provides architecture accessor for + * the ptr field based on architecture pointer size and + * endianness. + */ + struct { +#ifdef __LP64__ + __u64 ptr; +#elif defined(__BYTE_ORDER) ? (__BYTE_ORDER == __BIG_ENDIAN) : defined(__BIG_ENDIAN) + __u32 padding; /* Initialized to zero. */ + __u32 ptr; +#else + __u32 ptr; + __u32 padding; /* Initialized to zero. */ +#endif + } arch; + } rseq_cs; + + /* + * Restartable sequences flags field. + * + * This field should only be updated by the thread which + * registered this data structure. Read by the kernel. + * Mainly used for single-stepping through rseq critical sections + * with debuggers. + * + * - RSEQ_ABI_CS_FLAG_NO_RESTART_ON_PREEMPT + * Inhibit instruction sequence block restart on preemption + * for this thread. + * - RSEQ_ABI_CS_FLAG_NO_RESTART_ON_SIGNAL + * Inhibit instruction sequence block restart on signal + * delivery for this thread. + * - RSEQ_ABI_CS_FLAG_NO_RESTART_ON_MIGRATE + * Inhibit instruction sequence block restart on migration for + * this thread. + */ + __u32 flags; +} __attribute__((aligned(4 * sizeof(__u64)))); + +#endif /* _RSEQ_ABI_H */ diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq.c b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq.c index fb440dfca158..bfe1b2692ffc 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq.c @@ -30,8 +30,8 @@ #include "../kselftest.h" #include "rseq.h" -__thread volatile struct rseq __rseq_abi = { - .cpu_id = RSEQ_CPU_ID_UNINITIALIZED, +__thread volatile struct rseq_abi __rseq_abi = { + .cpu_id = RSEQ_ABI_CPU_ID_UNINITIALIZED, }; /* @@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ static void signal_restore(sigset_t oldset) abort(); } -static int sys_rseq(volatile struct rseq *rseq_abi, uint32_t rseq_len, +static int sys_rseq(volatile struct rseq_abi *rseq_abi, uint32_t rseq_len, int flags, uint32_t sig) { return syscall(__NR_rseq, rseq_abi, rseq_len, flags, sig); @@ -86,13 +86,13 @@ int rseq_register_current_thread(void) } if (__rseq_refcount++) goto end; - rc = sys_rseq(&__rseq_abi, sizeof(struct rseq), 0, RSEQ_SIG); + rc = sys_rseq(&__rseq_abi, sizeof(struct rseq_abi), 0, RSEQ_SIG); if (!rc) { assert(rseq_current_cpu_raw() >= 0); goto end; } if (errno != EBUSY) - __rseq_abi.cpu_id = RSEQ_CPU_ID_REGISTRATION_FAILED; + __rseq_abi.cpu_id = RSEQ_ABI_CPU_ID_REGISTRATION_FAILED; ret = -1; __rseq_refcount--; end: @@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ int rseq_unregister_current_thread(void) } if (--__rseq_refcount) goto end; - rc = sys_rseq(&__rseq_abi, sizeof(struct rseq), - RSEQ_FLAG_UNREGISTER, RSEQ_SIG); + rc = sys_rseq(&__rseq_abi, sizeof(struct rseq_abi), + RSEQ_ABI_FLAG_UNREGISTER, RSEQ_SIG); if (!rc) goto end; __rseq_refcount = 1; diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq.h b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq.h index d40d60e7499e..1ca283e98d75 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq.h +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq.h @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ #include #include #include -#include +#include "rseq-abi.h" /* * Empty code injection macros, override when testing. @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ #define RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED #endif -extern __thread volatile struct rseq __rseq_abi; +extern __thread volatile struct rseq_abi __rseq_abi; extern int __rseq_handled; #define rseq_likely(x) __builtin_expect(!!(x), 1) @@ -139,11 +139,7 @@ static inline uint32_t rseq_current_cpu(void) static inline void rseq_clear_rseq_cs(void) { -#ifdef __LP64__ - __rseq_abi.rseq_cs.ptr = 0; -#else - __rseq_abi.rseq_cs.ptr.ptr32 = 0; -#endif + __rseq_abi.rseq_cs.arch.ptr = 0; } /* From 7037c511f67d10d1bf591fca3db4361e28dc0d27 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mathieu Desnoyers Date: Mon, 24 Jan 2022 12:12:41 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 0810/1091] selftests/rseq: Remove useless assignment to cpu variable commit 930378d056eac2c96407b02aafe4938d0ac9cc37 upstream. Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220124171253.22072-4-mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- tools/testing/selftests/rseq/param_test.c | 4 +--- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/param_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/param_test.c index e8a657a5f48a..eec4182210ef 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/param_test.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/param_test.c @@ -366,9 +366,7 @@ void *test_percpu_spinlock_thread(void *arg) abort(); reps = thread_data->reps; for (i = 0; i < reps; i++) { - int cpu = rseq_cpu_start(); - - cpu = rseq_this_cpu_lock(&data->lock); + int cpu = rseq_this_cpu_lock(&data->lock); data->c[cpu].count++; rseq_percpu_unlock(&data->lock, cpu); #ifndef BENCHMARK From 158d91ffe0bedd63b793d4d738c5f03b679f5800 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mathieu Desnoyers Date: Mon, 24 Jan 2022 12:12:42 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 0811/1091] selftests/rseq: Remove volatile from __rseq_abi commit 94b80a19ebfe347a01301d750040a61c38200e2b upstream. This is done in preparation for the selftest uplift to become compatible with glibc-2.35. All accesses to the __rseq_abi fields are volatile, but remove the volatile from the TLS variable declaration, otherwise we are stuck with volatile for the upcoming rseq_get_abi() helper. Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220124171253.22072-5-mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq.c | 4 ++-- tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq.h | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq.c b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq.c index bfe1b2692ffc..1f905b60728a 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq.c @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ #include "../kselftest.h" #include "rseq.h" -__thread volatile struct rseq_abi __rseq_abi = { +__thread struct rseq_abi __rseq_abi = { .cpu_id = RSEQ_ABI_CPU_ID_UNINITIALIZED, }; @@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ int rseq_register_current_thread(void) goto end; } if (errno != EBUSY) - __rseq_abi.cpu_id = RSEQ_ABI_CPU_ID_REGISTRATION_FAILED; + RSEQ_WRITE_ONCE(__rseq_abi.cpu_id, RSEQ_ABI_CPU_ID_REGISTRATION_FAILED); ret = -1; __rseq_refcount--; end: diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq.h b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq.h index 1ca283e98d75..417c6c05a359 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq.h +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq.h @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ #define RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED #endif -extern __thread volatile struct rseq_abi __rseq_abi; +extern __thread struct rseq_abi __rseq_abi; extern int __rseq_handled; #define rseq_likely(x) __builtin_expect(!!(x), 1) @@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ static inline uint32_t rseq_current_cpu(void) static inline void rseq_clear_rseq_cs(void) { - __rseq_abi.rseq_cs.arch.ptr = 0; + RSEQ_WRITE_ONCE(__rseq_abi.rseq_cs.arch.ptr, 0); } /* From f491e073b992489056907fbcb40c07129bb29eb7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mathieu Desnoyers Date: Mon, 24 Jan 2022 12:12:43 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 0812/1091] selftests/rseq: Introduce rseq_get_abi() helper commit e546cd48ccc456074ddb8920732aef4af65d7ca7 upstream. This is done in preparation for the selftest uplift to become compatible with glibc-2.35. glibc-2.35 exposes the rseq per-thread data in the TCB, accessible at an offset from the thread pointer, rather than through an actual Thread-Local Storage (TLS) variable, as the kernel selftests initially expected. Introduce a rseq_get_abi() helper, initially using the __rseq_abi TLS variable, in preparation for changing this userspace ABI for one which is compatible with glibc-2.35. Note that the __rseq_abi TLS and glibc-2.35's ABI for per-thread data cannot actively coexist in a process, because the kernel supports only a single rseq registration per thread. Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220124171253.22072-6-mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-arm.h | 32 +++++++++++------------ tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-arm64.h | 32 +++++++++++------------ tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-mips.h | 32 +++++++++++------------ tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-ppc.h | 32 +++++++++++------------ tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-s390.h | 24 ++++++++--------- tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-x86.h | 30 ++++++++++----------- tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq.h | 11 +++++--- 7 files changed, 99 insertions(+), 94 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-arm.h b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-arm.h index 5943c816c07c..6716540e17c6 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-arm.h +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-arm.h @@ -185,8 +185,8 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, intptr_t newv, int cpu) "5:\n\t" : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [current_cpu_id] "m" (__rseq_abi.cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (__rseq_abi.rseq_cs), + [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), [v] "m" (*v), [expect] "r" (expect), [newv] "r" (newv) @@ -255,8 +255,8 @@ int rseq_cmpnev_storeoffp_load(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expectnot, "5:\n\t" : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [current_cpu_id] "m" (__rseq_abi.cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (__rseq_abi.rseq_cs), + [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), /* final store input */ [v] "m" (*v), [expectnot] "r" (expectnot), @@ -316,8 +316,8 @@ int rseq_addv(intptr_t *v, intptr_t count, int cpu) "5:\n\t" : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [current_cpu_id] "m" (__rseq_abi.cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (__rseq_abi.rseq_cs), + [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), [v] "m" (*v), [count] "Ir" (count) RSEQ_INJECT_INPUT @@ -381,8 +381,8 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trystorev_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, "5:\n\t" : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [current_cpu_id] "m" (__rseq_abi.cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (__rseq_abi.rseq_cs), + [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), /* try store input */ [v2] "m" (*v2), [newv2] "r" (newv2), @@ -457,8 +457,8 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trystorev_storev_release(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, "5:\n\t" : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [current_cpu_id] "m" (__rseq_abi.cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (__rseq_abi.rseq_cs), + [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), /* try store input */ [v2] "m" (*v2), [newv2] "r" (newv2), @@ -537,8 +537,8 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_cmpeqv_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, "5:\n\t" : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [current_cpu_id] "m" (__rseq_abi.cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (__rseq_abi.rseq_cs), + [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), /* cmp2 input */ [v2] "m" (*v2), [expect2] "r" (expect2), @@ -657,8 +657,8 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trymemcpy_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, "8:\n\t" : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [current_cpu_id] "m" (__rseq_abi.cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (__rseq_abi.rseq_cs), + [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), /* final store input */ [v] "m" (*v), [expect] "r" (expect), @@ -782,8 +782,8 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trymemcpy_storev_release(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, "8:\n\t" : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [current_cpu_id] "m" (__rseq_abi.cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (__rseq_abi.rseq_cs), + [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), /* final store input */ [v] "m" (*v), [expect] "r" (expect), diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-arm64.h b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-arm64.h index 200dae9e4208..b9d9b3aa6e9b 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-arm64.h +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-arm64.h @@ -230,8 +230,8 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, intptr_t newv, int cpu) RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_ABORT(4, abort) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [current_cpu_id] "Qo" (__rseq_abi.cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (__rseq_abi.rseq_cs), + [current_cpu_id] "Qo" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), [v] "Qo" (*v), [expect] "r" (expect), [newv] "r" (newv) @@ -287,8 +287,8 @@ int rseq_cmpnev_storeoffp_load(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expectnot, RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_ABORT(4, abort) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [current_cpu_id] "Qo" (__rseq_abi.cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (__rseq_abi.rseq_cs), + [current_cpu_id] "Qo" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), [v] "Qo" (*v), [expectnot] "r" (expectnot), [load] "Qo" (*load), @@ -337,8 +337,8 @@ int rseq_addv(intptr_t *v, intptr_t count, int cpu) RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_ABORT(4, abort) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [current_cpu_id] "Qo" (__rseq_abi.cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (__rseq_abi.rseq_cs), + [current_cpu_id] "Qo" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), [v] "Qo" (*v), [count] "r" (count) RSEQ_INJECT_INPUT @@ -388,8 +388,8 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trystorev_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_ABORT(4, abort) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [current_cpu_id] "Qo" (__rseq_abi.cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (__rseq_abi.rseq_cs), + [current_cpu_id] "Qo" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), [expect] "r" (expect), [v] "Qo" (*v), [newv] "r" (newv), @@ -447,8 +447,8 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trystorev_storev_release(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_ABORT(4, abort) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [current_cpu_id] "Qo" (__rseq_abi.cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (__rseq_abi.rseq_cs), + [current_cpu_id] "Qo" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), [expect] "r" (expect), [v] "Qo" (*v), [newv] "r" (newv), @@ -508,8 +508,8 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_cmpeqv_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_ABORT(4, abort) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [current_cpu_id] "Qo" (__rseq_abi.cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (__rseq_abi.rseq_cs), + [current_cpu_id] "Qo" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), [v] "Qo" (*v), [expect] "r" (expect), [v2] "Qo" (*v2), @@ -569,8 +569,8 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trymemcpy_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_ABORT(4, abort) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [current_cpu_id] "Qo" (__rseq_abi.cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (__rseq_abi.rseq_cs), + [current_cpu_id] "Qo" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), [expect] "r" (expect), [v] "Qo" (*v), [newv] "r" (newv), @@ -629,8 +629,8 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trymemcpy_storev_release(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_ABORT(4, abort) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [current_cpu_id] "Qo" (__rseq_abi.cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (__rseq_abi.rseq_cs), + [current_cpu_id] "Qo" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), [expect] "r" (expect), [v] "Qo" (*v), [newv] "r" (newv), diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-mips.h b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-mips.h index e989e7c14b09..2b1f5bd95268 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-mips.h +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-mips.h @@ -190,8 +190,8 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, intptr_t newv, int cpu) "5:\n\t" : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [current_cpu_id] "m" (__rseq_abi.cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (__rseq_abi.rseq_cs), + [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), [v] "m" (*v), [expect] "r" (expect), [newv] "r" (newv) @@ -258,8 +258,8 @@ int rseq_cmpnev_storeoffp_load(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expectnot, "5:\n\t" : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [current_cpu_id] "m" (__rseq_abi.cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (__rseq_abi.rseq_cs), + [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), /* final store input */ [v] "m" (*v), [expectnot] "r" (expectnot), @@ -319,8 +319,8 @@ int rseq_addv(intptr_t *v, intptr_t count, int cpu) "5:\n\t" : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [current_cpu_id] "m" (__rseq_abi.cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (__rseq_abi.rseq_cs), + [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), [v] "m" (*v), [count] "Ir" (count) RSEQ_INJECT_INPUT @@ -382,8 +382,8 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trystorev_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, "5:\n\t" : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [current_cpu_id] "m" (__rseq_abi.cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (__rseq_abi.rseq_cs), + [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), /* try store input */ [v2] "m" (*v2), [newv2] "r" (newv2), @@ -456,8 +456,8 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trystorev_storev_release(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, "5:\n\t" : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [current_cpu_id] "m" (__rseq_abi.cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (__rseq_abi.rseq_cs), + [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), /* try store input */ [v2] "m" (*v2), [newv2] "r" (newv2), @@ -532,8 +532,8 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_cmpeqv_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, "5:\n\t" : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [current_cpu_id] "m" (__rseq_abi.cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (__rseq_abi.rseq_cs), + [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), /* cmp2 input */ [v2] "m" (*v2), [expect2] "r" (expect2), @@ -649,8 +649,8 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trymemcpy_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, "8:\n\t" : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [current_cpu_id] "m" (__rseq_abi.cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (__rseq_abi.rseq_cs), + [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), /* final store input */ [v] "m" (*v), [expect] "r" (expect), @@ -771,8 +771,8 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trymemcpy_storev_release(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, "8:\n\t" : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [current_cpu_id] "m" (__rseq_abi.cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (__rseq_abi.rseq_cs), + [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), /* final store input */ [v] "m" (*v), [expect] "r" (expect), diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-ppc.h b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-ppc.h index 76be90196fe4..2e6b7572ba08 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-ppc.h +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-ppc.h @@ -235,8 +235,8 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, intptr_t newv, int cpu) RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_ABORT(4, abort) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [current_cpu_id] "m" (__rseq_abi.cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (__rseq_abi.rseq_cs), + [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), [v] "m" (*v), [expect] "r" (expect), [newv] "r" (newv) @@ -301,8 +301,8 @@ int rseq_cmpnev_storeoffp_load(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expectnot, RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_ABORT(4, abort) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [current_cpu_id] "m" (__rseq_abi.cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (__rseq_abi.rseq_cs), + [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), /* final store input */ [v] "m" (*v), [expectnot] "r" (expectnot), @@ -359,8 +359,8 @@ int rseq_addv(intptr_t *v, intptr_t count, int cpu) RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_ABORT(4, abort) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [current_cpu_id] "m" (__rseq_abi.cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (__rseq_abi.rseq_cs), + [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), /* final store input */ [v] "m" (*v), [count] "r" (count) @@ -419,8 +419,8 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trystorev_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_ABORT(4, abort) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [current_cpu_id] "m" (__rseq_abi.cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (__rseq_abi.rseq_cs), + [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), /* try store input */ [v2] "m" (*v2), [newv2] "r" (newv2), @@ -489,8 +489,8 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trystorev_storev_release(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_ABORT(4, abort) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [current_cpu_id] "m" (__rseq_abi.cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (__rseq_abi.rseq_cs), + [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), /* try store input */ [v2] "m" (*v2), [newv2] "r" (newv2), @@ -560,8 +560,8 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_cmpeqv_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_ABORT(4, abort) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [current_cpu_id] "m" (__rseq_abi.cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (__rseq_abi.rseq_cs), + [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), /* cmp2 input */ [v2] "m" (*v2), [expect2] "r" (expect2), @@ -635,8 +635,8 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trymemcpy_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_ABORT(4, abort) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [current_cpu_id] "m" (__rseq_abi.cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (__rseq_abi.rseq_cs), + [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), /* final store input */ [v] "m" (*v), [expect] "r" (expect), @@ -711,8 +711,8 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trymemcpy_storev_release(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_ABORT(4, abort) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [current_cpu_id] "m" (__rseq_abi.cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (__rseq_abi.rseq_cs), + [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), /* final store input */ [v] "m" (*v), [expect] "r" (expect), diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-s390.h b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-s390.h index 8ef94ad1cbb4..b906e044d2a3 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-s390.h +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-s390.h @@ -165,8 +165,8 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, intptr_t newv, int cpu) RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_ABORT(4, "", abort) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [current_cpu_id] "m" (__rseq_abi.cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (__rseq_abi.rseq_cs), + [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), [v] "m" (*v), [expect] "r" (expect), [newv] "r" (newv) @@ -233,8 +233,8 @@ int rseq_cmpnev_storeoffp_load(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expectnot, RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_ABORT(4, "", abort) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [current_cpu_id] "m" (__rseq_abi.cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (__rseq_abi.rseq_cs), + [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), /* final store input */ [v] "m" (*v), [expectnot] "r" (expectnot), @@ -288,8 +288,8 @@ int rseq_addv(intptr_t *v, intptr_t count, int cpu) RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_ABORT(4, "", abort) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [current_cpu_id] "m" (__rseq_abi.cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (__rseq_abi.rseq_cs), + [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), /* final store input */ [v] "m" (*v), [count] "r" (count) @@ -347,8 +347,8 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trystorev_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_ABORT(4, "", abort) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [current_cpu_id] "m" (__rseq_abi.cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (__rseq_abi.rseq_cs), + [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), /* try store input */ [v2] "m" (*v2), [newv2] "r" (newv2), @@ -426,8 +426,8 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_cmpeqv_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_ABORT(4, "", abort) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [current_cpu_id] "m" (__rseq_abi.cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (__rseq_abi.rseq_cs), + [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), /* cmp2 input */ [v2] "m" (*v2), [expect2] "r" (expect2), @@ -534,8 +534,8 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trymemcpy_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, #endif : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [current_cpu_id] "m" (__rseq_abi.cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (__rseq_abi.rseq_cs), + [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), /* final store input */ [v] "m" (*v), [expect] "r" (expect), diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-x86.h b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-x86.h index 640411518e46..1d9fa0516e53 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-x86.h +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-x86.h @@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, intptr_t newv, int cpu) RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_ABORT(4, "", abort) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [rseq_abi] "r" (&__rseq_abi), + [rseq_abi] "r" (rseq_get_abi()), [v] "m" (*v), [expect] "r" (expect), [newv] "r" (newv) @@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ int rseq_cmpnev_storeoffp_load(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expectnot, RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_ABORT(4, "", abort) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [rseq_abi] "r" (&__rseq_abi), + [rseq_abi] "r" (rseq_get_abi()), /* final store input */ [v] "m" (*v), [expectnot] "r" (expectnot), @@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ int rseq_addv(intptr_t *v, intptr_t count, int cpu) RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_ABORT(4, "", abort) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [rseq_abi] "r" (&__rseq_abi), + [rseq_abi] "r" (rseq_get_abi()), /* final store input */ [v] "m" (*v), [count] "er" (count) @@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ int rseq_offset_deref_addv(intptr_t *ptr, off_t off, intptr_t inc, int cpu) RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_ABORT(4, "", abort) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [rseq_abi] "r" (&__rseq_abi), + [rseq_abi] "r" (rseq_get_abi()), /* final store input */ [ptr] "m" (*ptr), [off] "er" (off), @@ -372,7 +372,7 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trystorev_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_ABORT(4, "", abort) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [rseq_abi] "r" (&__rseq_abi), + [rseq_abi] "r" (rseq_get_abi()), /* try store input */ [v2] "m" (*v2), [newv2] "r" (newv2), @@ -449,7 +449,7 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_cmpeqv_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_ABORT(4, "", abort) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [rseq_abi] "r" (&__rseq_abi), + [rseq_abi] "r" (rseq_get_abi()), /* cmp2 input */ [v2] "m" (*v2), [expect2] "r" (expect2), @@ -555,7 +555,7 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trymemcpy_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, #endif : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [rseq_abi] "r" (&__rseq_abi), + [rseq_abi] "r" (rseq_get_abi()), /* final store input */ [v] "m" (*v), [expect] "r" (expect), @@ -719,7 +719,7 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, intptr_t newv, int cpu) RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_ABORT(4, "", abort) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [rseq_abi] "r" (&__rseq_abi), + [rseq_abi] "r" (rseq_get_abi()), [v] "m" (*v), [expect] "r" (expect), [newv] "r" (newv) @@ -785,7 +785,7 @@ int rseq_cmpnev_storeoffp_load(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expectnot, RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_ABORT(4, "", abort) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [rseq_abi] "r" (&__rseq_abi), + [rseq_abi] "r" (rseq_get_abi()), /* final store input */ [v] "m" (*v), [expectnot] "r" (expectnot), @@ -836,7 +836,7 @@ int rseq_addv(intptr_t *v, intptr_t count, int cpu) RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_ABORT(4, "", abort) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [rseq_abi] "r" (&__rseq_abi), + [rseq_abi] "r" (rseq_get_abi()), /* final store input */ [v] "m" (*v), [count] "ir" (count) @@ -894,7 +894,7 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trystorev_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_ABORT(4, "", abort) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [rseq_abi] "r" (&__rseq_abi), + [rseq_abi] "r" (rseq_get_abi()), /* try store input */ [v2] "m" (*v2), [newv2] "m" (newv2), @@ -962,7 +962,7 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trystorev_storev_release(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_ABORT(4, "", abort) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [rseq_abi] "r" (&__rseq_abi), + [rseq_abi] "r" (rseq_get_abi()), /* try store input */ [v2] "m" (*v2), [newv2] "r" (newv2), @@ -1032,7 +1032,7 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_cmpeqv_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_ABORT(4, "", abort) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [rseq_abi] "r" (&__rseq_abi), + [rseq_abi] "r" (rseq_get_abi()), /* cmp2 input */ [v2] "m" (*v2), [expect2] "r" (expect2), @@ -1142,7 +1142,7 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trymemcpy_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, #endif : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [rseq_abi] "r" (&__rseq_abi), + [rseq_abi] "r" (rseq_get_abi()), /* final store input */ [v] "m" (*v), [expect] "m" (expect), @@ -1255,7 +1255,7 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trymemcpy_storev_release(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, #endif : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [rseq_abi] "r" (&__rseq_abi), + [rseq_abi] "r" (rseq_get_abi()), /* final store input */ [v] "m" (*v), [expect] "m" (expect), diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq.h b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq.h index 417c6c05a359..343ad4f46c62 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq.h +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq.h @@ -46,6 +46,11 @@ extern __thread struct rseq_abi __rseq_abi; extern int __rseq_handled; +static inline struct rseq_abi *rseq_get_abi(void) +{ + return &__rseq_abi; +} + #define rseq_likely(x) __builtin_expect(!!(x), 1) #define rseq_unlikely(x) __builtin_expect(!!(x), 0) #define rseq_barrier() __asm__ __volatile__("" : : : "memory") @@ -108,7 +113,7 @@ int32_t rseq_fallback_current_cpu(void); */ static inline int32_t rseq_current_cpu_raw(void) { - return RSEQ_ACCESS_ONCE(__rseq_abi.cpu_id); + return RSEQ_ACCESS_ONCE(rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id); } /* @@ -124,7 +129,7 @@ static inline int32_t rseq_current_cpu_raw(void) */ static inline uint32_t rseq_cpu_start(void) { - return RSEQ_ACCESS_ONCE(__rseq_abi.cpu_id_start); + return RSEQ_ACCESS_ONCE(rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id_start); } static inline uint32_t rseq_current_cpu(void) @@ -139,7 +144,7 @@ static inline uint32_t rseq_current_cpu(void) static inline void rseq_clear_rseq_cs(void) { - RSEQ_WRITE_ONCE(__rseq_abi.rseq_cs.arch.ptr, 0); + RSEQ_WRITE_ONCE(rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs.arch.ptr, 0); } /* From 71c04fdf59ca14ac773382ceeee21eb04d7f44a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mathieu Desnoyers Date: Mon, 24 Jan 2022 12:12:44 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 0813/1091] selftests/rseq: Introduce thread pointer getters commit 886ddfba933f5ce9d76c278165d834d114ba4ffc upstream. This is done in preparation for the selftest uplift to become compatible with glibc-2.35. glibc-2.35 exposes the rseq per-thread data in the TCB, accessible at an offset from the thread pointer. The toolchains do not implement accessing the thread pointer on all architectures. Provide thread pointer getters for ppc and x86 which lack (or lacked until recently) toolchain support. Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220124171253.22072-7-mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- .../rseq/rseq-generic-thread-pointer.h | 25 ++++++++++++ .../selftests/rseq/rseq-ppc-thread-pointer.h | 30 ++++++++++++++ .../selftests/rseq/rseq-thread-pointer.h | 19 +++++++++ .../selftests/rseq/rseq-x86-thread-pointer.h | 40 +++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 114 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-generic-thread-pointer.h create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-ppc-thread-pointer.h create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-thread-pointer.h create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-x86-thread-pointer.h diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-generic-thread-pointer.h b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-generic-thread-pointer.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..38c584661571 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-generic-thread-pointer.h @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-only OR MIT */ +/* + * rseq-generic-thread-pointer.h + * + * (C) Copyright 2021 - Mathieu Desnoyers + */ + +#ifndef _RSEQ_GENERIC_THREAD_POINTER +#define _RSEQ_GENERIC_THREAD_POINTER + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* Use gcc builtin thread pointer. */ +static inline void *rseq_thread_pointer(void) +{ + return __builtin_thread_pointer(); +} + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-ppc-thread-pointer.h b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-ppc-thread-pointer.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..263eee84fb76 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-ppc-thread-pointer.h @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-only OR MIT */ +/* + * rseq-ppc-thread-pointer.h + * + * (C) Copyright 2021 - Mathieu Desnoyers + */ + +#ifndef _RSEQ_PPC_THREAD_POINTER +#define _RSEQ_PPC_THREAD_POINTER + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +static inline void *rseq_thread_pointer(void) +{ +#ifdef __powerpc64__ + register void *__result asm ("r13"); +#else + register void *__result asm ("r2"); +#endif + asm ("" : "=r" (__result)); + return __result; +} + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-thread-pointer.h b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-thread-pointer.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..977c25d758b2 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-thread-pointer.h @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-only OR MIT */ +/* + * rseq-thread-pointer.h + * + * (C) Copyright 2021 - Mathieu Desnoyers + */ + +#ifndef _RSEQ_THREAD_POINTER +#define _RSEQ_THREAD_POINTER + +#if defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__i386__) +#include "rseq-x86-thread-pointer.h" +#elif defined(__PPC__) +#include "rseq-ppc-thread-pointer.h" +#else +#include "rseq-generic-thread-pointer.h" +#endif + +#endif diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-x86-thread-pointer.h b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-x86-thread-pointer.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..d3133587d996 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-x86-thread-pointer.h @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-only OR MIT */ +/* + * rseq-x86-thread-pointer.h + * + * (C) Copyright 2021 - Mathieu Desnoyers + */ + +#ifndef _RSEQ_X86_THREAD_POINTER +#define _RSEQ_X86_THREAD_POINTER + +#include + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if __GNUC_PREREQ (11, 1) +static inline void *rseq_thread_pointer(void) +{ + return __builtin_thread_pointer(); +} +#else +static inline void *rseq_thread_pointer(void) +{ + void *__result; + +# ifdef __x86_64__ + __asm__ ("mov %%fs:0, %0" : "=r" (__result)); +# else + __asm__ ("mov %%gs:0, %0" : "=r" (__result)); +# endif + return __result; +} +#endif /* !GCC 11 */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif From 20e2f01085394cbff7b10bfea2d6ae137ece730b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mathieu Desnoyers Date: Mon, 24 Jan 2022 12:12:45 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 0814/1091] selftests/rseq: Uplift rseq selftests for compatibility with glibc-2.35 commit 233e667e1ae3e348686bd9dd0172e62a09d852e1 upstream. glibc-2.35 (upcoming release date 2022-02-01) exposes the rseq per-thread data in the TCB, accessible at an offset from the thread pointer, rather than through an actual Thread-Local Storage (TLS) variable, as the Linux kernel selftests initially expected. The __rseq_abi TLS and glibc-2.35's ABI for per-thread data cannot actively coexist in a process, because the kernel supports only a single rseq registration per thread. Here is the scheme introduced to ensure selftests can work both with an older glibc and with glibc-2.35+: - librseq exposes its own "rseq_offset, rseq_size, rseq_flags" ABI. - librseq queries for glibc rseq ABI (__rseq_offset, __rseq_size, __rseq_flags) using dlsym() in a librseq library constructor. If those are found, copy their values into rseq_offset, rseq_size, and rseq_flags. - Else, if those glibc symbols are not found, handle rseq registration from librseq and use its own IE-model TLS to implement the rseq ABI per-thread storage. Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220124171253.22072-8-mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- tools/testing/selftests/rseq/Makefile | 2 +- tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq.c | 171 ++++++++++++-------------- tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq.h | 13 +- 3 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 93 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/Makefile index 2af9d39a9716..215e1067f037 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/Makefile +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/Makefile @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ endif CFLAGS += -O2 -Wall -g -I./ -I../../../../usr/include/ -L$(OUTPUT) -Wl,-rpath=./ \ $(CLANG_FLAGS) -LDLIBS += -lpthread +LDLIBS += -lpthread -ldl # Own dependencies because we only want to build against 1st prerequisite, but # still track changes to header files and depend on shared object. diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq.c b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq.c index 1f905b60728a..07ba0d463a96 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq.c @@ -26,103 +26,113 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include "../kselftest.h" #include "rseq.h" -__thread struct rseq_abi __rseq_abi = { +static const int *libc_rseq_offset_p; +static const unsigned int *libc_rseq_size_p; +static const unsigned int *libc_rseq_flags_p; + +/* Offset from the thread pointer to the rseq area. */ +int rseq_offset; + +/* Size of the registered rseq area. 0 if the registration was + unsuccessful. */ +unsigned int rseq_size = -1U; + +/* Flags used during rseq registration. */ +unsigned int rseq_flags; + +static int rseq_ownership; + +static +__thread struct rseq_abi __rseq_abi __attribute__((tls_model("initial-exec"))) = { .cpu_id = RSEQ_ABI_CPU_ID_UNINITIALIZED, }; -/* - * Shared with other libraries. This library may take rseq ownership if it is - * still 0 when executing the library constructor. Set to 1 by library - * constructor when handling rseq. Set to 0 in destructor if handling rseq. - */ -int __rseq_handled; - -/* Whether this library have ownership of rseq registration. */ -static int rseq_ownership; - -static __thread volatile uint32_t __rseq_refcount; - -static void signal_off_save(sigset_t *oldset) -{ - sigset_t set; - int ret; - - sigfillset(&set); - ret = pthread_sigmask(SIG_BLOCK, &set, oldset); - if (ret) - abort(); -} - -static void signal_restore(sigset_t oldset) -{ - int ret; - - ret = pthread_sigmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oldset, NULL); - if (ret) - abort(); -} - -static int sys_rseq(volatile struct rseq_abi *rseq_abi, uint32_t rseq_len, +static int sys_rseq(struct rseq_abi *rseq_abi, uint32_t rseq_len, int flags, uint32_t sig) { return syscall(__NR_rseq, rseq_abi, rseq_len, flags, sig); } +int rseq_available(void) +{ + int rc; + + rc = sys_rseq(NULL, 0, 0, 0); + if (rc != -1) + abort(); + switch (errno) { + case ENOSYS: + return 0; + case EINVAL: + return 1; + default: + abort(); + } +} + int rseq_register_current_thread(void) { - int rc, ret = 0; - sigset_t oldset; + int rc; - if (!rseq_ownership) + if (!rseq_ownership) { + /* Treat libc's ownership as a successful registration. */ return 0; - signal_off_save(&oldset); - if (__rseq_refcount == UINT_MAX) { - ret = -1; - goto end; } - if (__rseq_refcount++) - goto end; rc = sys_rseq(&__rseq_abi, sizeof(struct rseq_abi), 0, RSEQ_SIG); - if (!rc) { - assert(rseq_current_cpu_raw() >= 0); - goto end; - } - if (errno != EBUSY) - RSEQ_WRITE_ONCE(__rseq_abi.cpu_id, RSEQ_ABI_CPU_ID_REGISTRATION_FAILED); - ret = -1; - __rseq_refcount--; -end: - signal_restore(oldset); - return ret; + if (rc) + return -1; + assert(rseq_current_cpu_raw() >= 0); + return 0; } int rseq_unregister_current_thread(void) { - int rc, ret = 0; - sigset_t oldset; + int rc; - if (!rseq_ownership) + if (!rseq_ownership) { + /* Treat libc's ownership as a successful unregistration. */ return 0; - signal_off_save(&oldset); - if (!__rseq_refcount) { - ret = -1; - goto end; } - if (--__rseq_refcount) - goto end; - rc = sys_rseq(&__rseq_abi, sizeof(struct rseq_abi), - RSEQ_ABI_FLAG_UNREGISTER, RSEQ_SIG); - if (!rc) - goto end; - __rseq_refcount = 1; - ret = -1; -end: - signal_restore(oldset); - return ret; + rc = sys_rseq(&__rseq_abi, sizeof(struct rseq_abi), RSEQ_ABI_FLAG_UNREGISTER, RSEQ_SIG); + if (rc) + return -1; + return 0; +} + +static __attribute__((constructor)) +void rseq_init(void) +{ + libc_rseq_offset_p = dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, "__rseq_offset"); + libc_rseq_size_p = dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, "__rseq_size"); + libc_rseq_flags_p = dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, "__rseq_flags"); + if (libc_rseq_size_p && libc_rseq_offset_p && libc_rseq_flags_p) { + /* rseq registration owned by glibc */ + rseq_offset = *libc_rseq_offset_p; + rseq_size = *libc_rseq_size_p; + rseq_flags = *libc_rseq_flags_p; + return; + } + if (!rseq_available()) + return; + rseq_ownership = 1; + rseq_offset = (void *)&__rseq_abi - rseq_thread_pointer(); + rseq_size = sizeof(struct rseq_abi); + rseq_flags = 0; +} + +static __attribute__((destructor)) +void rseq_exit(void) +{ + if (!rseq_ownership) + return; + rseq_offset = 0; + rseq_size = -1U; + rseq_ownership = 0; } int32_t rseq_fallback_current_cpu(void) @@ -136,20 +146,3 @@ int32_t rseq_fallback_current_cpu(void) } return cpu; } - -void __attribute__((constructor)) rseq_init(void) -{ - /* Check whether rseq is handled by another library. */ - if (__rseq_handled) - return; - __rseq_handled = 1; - rseq_ownership = 1; -} - -void __attribute__((destructor)) rseq_fini(void) -{ - if (!rseq_ownership) - return; - __rseq_handled = 0; - rseq_ownership = 0; -} diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq.h b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq.h index 343ad4f46c62..0b1437787256 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq.h +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq.h @@ -43,12 +43,19 @@ #define RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED #endif -extern __thread struct rseq_abi __rseq_abi; -extern int __rseq_handled; +#include "rseq-thread-pointer.h" + +/* Offset from the thread pointer to the rseq area. */ +extern int rseq_offset; +/* Size of the registered rseq area. 0 if the registration was + unsuccessful. */ +extern unsigned int rseq_size; +/* Flags used during rseq registration. */ +extern unsigned int rseq_flags; static inline struct rseq_abi *rseq_get_abi(void) { - return &__rseq_abi; + return (struct rseq_abi *) ((uintptr_t) rseq_thread_pointer() + rseq_offset); } #define rseq_likely(x) __builtin_expect(!!(x), 1) From d0ca70238f40f5493bfb968262c34ead972c4743 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mathieu Desnoyers Date: Mon, 24 Jan 2022 12:12:46 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 0815/1091] selftests/rseq: Fix ppc32: wrong rseq_cs 32-bit field pointer on big endian commit 24d1136a29da5953de5c0cbc6c83eb62a1e0bf14 upstream. ppc32 incorrectly uses padding as rseq_cs pointer field. Fix this by using the rseq_cs.arch.ptr field. Use this field across all architectures. Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220124171253.22072-9-mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-arm.h | 16 ++++++++-------- tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-arm64.h | 16 ++++++++-------- tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-mips.h | 16 ++++++++-------- tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-ppc.h | 16 ++++++++-------- tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-s390.h | 12 ++++++------ 5 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-arm.h b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-arm.h index 6716540e17c6..5f567b3b40f2 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-arm.h +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-arm.h @@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, intptr_t newv, int cpu) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs.arch.ptr), [v] "m" (*v), [expect] "r" (expect), [newv] "r" (newv) @@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ int rseq_cmpnev_storeoffp_load(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expectnot, : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs.arch.ptr), /* final store input */ [v] "m" (*v), [expectnot] "r" (expectnot), @@ -317,7 +317,7 @@ int rseq_addv(intptr_t *v, intptr_t count, int cpu) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs.arch.ptr), [v] "m" (*v), [count] "Ir" (count) RSEQ_INJECT_INPUT @@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trystorev_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs.arch.ptr), /* try store input */ [v2] "m" (*v2), [newv2] "r" (newv2), @@ -458,7 +458,7 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trystorev_storev_release(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs.arch.ptr), /* try store input */ [v2] "m" (*v2), [newv2] "r" (newv2), @@ -538,7 +538,7 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_cmpeqv_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs.arch.ptr), /* cmp2 input */ [v2] "m" (*v2), [expect2] "r" (expect2), @@ -658,7 +658,7 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trymemcpy_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs.arch.ptr), /* final store input */ [v] "m" (*v), [expect] "r" (expect), @@ -783,7 +783,7 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trymemcpy_storev_release(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs.arch.ptr), /* final store input */ [v] "m" (*v), [expect] "r" (expect), diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-arm64.h b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-arm64.h index b9d9b3aa6e9b..d0f2b7feee94 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-arm64.h +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-arm64.h @@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, intptr_t newv, int cpu) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), [current_cpu_id] "Qo" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs.arch.ptr), [v] "Qo" (*v), [expect] "r" (expect), [newv] "r" (newv) @@ -288,7 +288,7 @@ int rseq_cmpnev_storeoffp_load(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expectnot, : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), [current_cpu_id] "Qo" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs.arch.ptr), [v] "Qo" (*v), [expectnot] "r" (expectnot), [load] "Qo" (*load), @@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ int rseq_addv(intptr_t *v, intptr_t count, int cpu) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), [current_cpu_id] "Qo" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs.arch.ptr), [v] "Qo" (*v), [count] "r" (count) RSEQ_INJECT_INPUT @@ -389,7 +389,7 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trystorev_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), [current_cpu_id] "Qo" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs.arch.ptr), [expect] "r" (expect), [v] "Qo" (*v), [newv] "r" (newv), @@ -448,7 +448,7 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trystorev_storev_release(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), [current_cpu_id] "Qo" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs.arch.ptr), [expect] "r" (expect), [v] "Qo" (*v), [newv] "r" (newv), @@ -509,7 +509,7 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_cmpeqv_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), [current_cpu_id] "Qo" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs.arch.ptr), [v] "Qo" (*v), [expect] "r" (expect), [v2] "Qo" (*v2), @@ -570,7 +570,7 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trymemcpy_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), [current_cpu_id] "Qo" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs.arch.ptr), [expect] "r" (expect), [v] "Qo" (*v), [newv] "r" (newv), @@ -630,7 +630,7 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trymemcpy_storev_release(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), [current_cpu_id] "Qo" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs.arch.ptr), [expect] "r" (expect), [v] "Qo" (*v), [newv] "r" (newv), diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-mips.h b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-mips.h index 2b1f5bd95268..6df54273825d 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-mips.h +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-mips.h @@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, intptr_t newv, int cpu) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs.arch.ptr), [v] "m" (*v), [expect] "r" (expect), [newv] "r" (newv) @@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ int rseq_cmpnev_storeoffp_load(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expectnot, : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs.arch.ptr), /* final store input */ [v] "m" (*v), [expectnot] "r" (expectnot), @@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ int rseq_addv(intptr_t *v, intptr_t count, int cpu) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs.arch.ptr), [v] "m" (*v), [count] "Ir" (count) RSEQ_INJECT_INPUT @@ -383,7 +383,7 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trystorev_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs.arch.ptr), /* try store input */ [v2] "m" (*v2), [newv2] "r" (newv2), @@ -457,7 +457,7 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trystorev_storev_release(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs.arch.ptr), /* try store input */ [v2] "m" (*v2), [newv2] "r" (newv2), @@ -533,7 +533,7 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_cmpeqv_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs.arch.ptr), /* cmp2 input */ [v2] "m" (*v2), [expect2] "r" (expect2), @@ -650,7 +650,7 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trymemcpy_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs.arch.ptr), /* final store input */ [v] "m" (*v), [expect] "r" (expect), @@ -772,7 +772,7 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trymemcpy_storev_release(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs.arch.ptr), /* final store input */ [v] "m" (*v), [expect] "r" (expect), diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-ppc.h b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-ppc.h index 2e6b7572ba08..c4ba1375285d 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-ppc.h +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-ppc.h @@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, intptr_t newv, int cpu) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs.arch.ptr), [v] "m" (*v), [expect] "r" (expect), [newv] "r" (newv) @@ -302,7 +302,7 @@ int rseq_cmpnev_storeoffp_load(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expectnot, : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs.arch.ptr), /* final store input */ [v] "m" (*v), [expectnot] "r" (expectnot), @@ -360,7 +360,7 @@ int rseq_addv(intptr_t *v, intptr_t count, int cpu) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs.arch.ptr), /* final store input */ [v] "m" (*v), [count] "r" (count) @@ -420,7 +420,7 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trystorev_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs.arch.ptr), /* try store input */ [v2] "m" (*v2), [newv2] "r" (newv2), @@ -490,7 +490,7 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trystorev_storev_release(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs.arch.ptr), /* try store input */ [v2] "m" (*v2), [newv2] "r" (newv2), @@ -561,7 +561,7 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_cmpeqv_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs.arch.ptr), /* cmp2 input */ [v2] "m" (*v2), [expect2] "r" (expect2), @@ -636,7 +636,7 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trymemcpy_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs.arch.ptr), /* final store input */ [v] "m" (*v), [expect] "r" (expect), @@ -712,7 +712,7 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trymemcpy_storev_release(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs.arch.ptr), /* final store input */ [v] "m" (*v), [expect] "r" (expect), diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-s390.h b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-s390.h index b906e044d2a3..9927021f8bd0 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-s390.h +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-s390.h @@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, intptr_t newv, int cpu) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs.arch.ptr), [v] "m" (*v), [expect] "r" (expect), [newv] "r" (newv) @@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ int rseq_cmpnev_storeoffp_load(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expectnot, : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs.arch.ptr), /* final store input */ [v] "m" (*v), [expectnot] "r" (expectnot), @@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ int rseq_addv(intptr_t *v, intptr_t count, int cpu) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs.arch.ptr), /* final store input */ [v] "m" (*v), [count] "r" (count) @@ -348,7 +348,7 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trystorev_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs.arch.ptr), /* try store input */ [v2] "m" (*v2), [newv2] "r" (newv2), @@ -427,7 +427,7 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_cmpeqv_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs.arch.ptr), /* cmp2 input */ [v2] "m" (*v2), [expect2] "r" (expect2), @@ -535,7 +535,7 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trymemcpy_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), [current_cpu_id] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->cpu_id), - [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs), + [rseq_cs] "m" (rseq_get_abi()->rseq_cs.arch.ptr), /* final store input */ [v] "m" (*v), [expect] "r" (expect), From 4e9c8fd7f7f0f2cdceb2d1be45a386064878ec6c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mathieu Desnoyers Date: Mon, 24 Jan 2022 12:12:47 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 0816/1091] selftests/rseq: Fix ppc32 missing instruction selection "u" and "x" for load/store commit de6b52a21420a18dc8a36438d581efd1313d5fe3 upstream. Building the rseq basic test with gcc version 5.4.0 20160609 (Ubuntu 5.4.0-6ubuntu1~16.04.12) Target: powerpc-linux-gnu leads to these errors: /tmp/ccieEWxU.s: Assembler messages: /tmp/ccieEWxU.s:118: Error: syntax error; found `,', expected `(' /tmp/ccieEWxU.s:118: Error: junk at end of line: `,8' /tmp/ccieEWxU.s:121: Error: syntax error; found `,', expected `(' /tmp/ccieEWxU.s:121: Error: junk at end of line: `,8' /tmp/ccieEWxU.s:626: Error: syntax error; found `,', expected `(' /tmp/ccieEWxU.s:626: Error: junk at end of line: `,8' /tmp/ccieEWxU.s:629: Error: syntax error; found `,', expected `(' /tmp/ccieEWxU.s:629: Error: junk at end of line: `,8' /tmp/ccieEWxU.s:735: Error: syntax error; found `,', expected `(' /tmp/ccieEWxU.s:735: Error: junk at end of line: `,8' /tmp/ccieEWxU.s:738: Error: syntax error; found `,', expected `(' /tmp/ccieEWxU.s:738: Error: junk at end of line: `,8' /tmp/ccieEWxU.s:741: Error: syntax error; found `,', expected `(' /tmp/ccieEWxU.s:741: Error: junk at end of line: `,8' Makefile:581: recipe for target 'basic_percpu_ops_test.o' failed Based on discussion with Linux powerpc maintainers and review of the use of the "m" operand in powerpc kernel code, add the missing %Un%Xn (where n is operand number) to the lwz, stw, ld, and std instructions when used with "m" operands. Using "WORD" to mean either a 32-bit or 64-bit type depending on the architecture is misleading. The term "WORD" really means a 32-bit type in both 32-bit and 64-bit powerpc assembler. The intent here is to wrap load/store to intptr_t into common macros for both 32-bit and 64-bit. Rename the macros with a RSEQ_ prefix, and use the terms "INT" for always 32-bit type, and "LONG" for architecture bitness-sized type. Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220124171253.22072-10-mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-ppc.h | 55 +++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-ppc.h b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-ppc.h index c4ba1375285d..87befda47ba4 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-ppc.h +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-ppc.h @@ -47,10 +47,13 @@ do { \ #ifdef __PPC64__ -#define STORE_WORD "std " -#define LOAD_WORD "ld " -#define LOADX_WORD "ldx " -#define CMP_WORD "cmpd " +#define RSEQ_STORE_LONG(arg) "std%U[" __rseq_str(arg) "]%X[" __rseq_str(arg) "] " /* To memory ("m" constraint) */ +#define RSEQ_STORE_INT(arg) "stw%U[" __rseq_str(arg) "]%X[" __rseq_str(arg) "] " /* To memory ("m" constraint) */ +#define RSEQ_LOAD_LONG(arg) "ld%U[" __rseq_str(arg) "]%X[" __rseq_str(arg) "] " /* From memory ("m" constraint) */ +#define RSEQ_LOAD_INT(arg) "lwz%U[" __rseq_str(arg) "]%X[" __rseq_str(arg) "] " /* From memory ("m" constraint) */ +#define RSEQ_LOADX_LONG "ldx " /* From base register ("b" constraint) */ +#define RSEQ_CMP_LONG "cmpd " +#define RSEQ_CMP_LONG_INT "cmpdi " #define __RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_TABLE(label, version, flags, \ start_ip, post_commit_offset, abort_ip) \ @@ -89,10 +92,13 @@ do { \ #else /* #ifdef __PPC64__ */ -#define STORE_WORD "stw " -#define LOAD_WORD "lwz " -#define LOADX_WORD "lwzx " -#define CMP_WORD "cmpw " +#define RSEQ_STORE_LONG(arg) "stw%U[" __rseq_str(arg) "]%X[" __rseq_str(arg) "] " /* To memory ("m" constraint) */ +#define RSEQ_STORE_INT(arg) RSEQ_STORE_LONG(arg) /* To memory ("m" constraint) */ +#define RSEQ_LOAD_LONG(arg) "lwz%U[" __rseq_str(arg) "]%X[" __rseq_str(arg) "] " /* From memory ("m" constraint) */ +#define RSEQ_LOAD_INT(arg) RSEQ_LOAD_LONG(arg) /* From memory ("m" constraint) */ +#define RSEQ_LOADX_LONG "lwzx " /* From base register ("b" constraint) */ +#define RSEQ_CMP_LONG "cmpw " +#define RSEQ_CMP_LONG_INT "cmpwi " #define __RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_TABLE(label, version, flags, \ start_ip, post_commit_offset, abort_ip) \ @@ -125,7 +131,7 @@ do { \ RSEQ_INJECT_ASM(1) \ "lis %%r17, (" __rseq_str(cs_label) ")@ha\n\t" \ "addi %%r17, %%r17, (" __rseq_str(cs_label) ")@l\n\t" \ - "stw %%r17, %[" __rseq_str(rseq_cs) "]\n\t" \ + RSEQ_STORE_INT(rseq_cs) "%%r17, %[" __rseq_str(rseq_cs) "]\n\t" \ __rseq_str(label) ":\n\t" #endif /* #ifdef __PPC64__ */ @@ -136,7 +142,7 @@ do { \ #define RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, current_cpu_id, label) \ RSEQ_INJECT_ASM(2) \ - "lwz %%r17, %[" __rseq_str(current_cpu_id) "]\n\t" \ + RSEQ_LOAD_INT(current_cpu_id) "%%r17, %[" __rseq_str(current_cpu_id) "]\n\t" \ "cmpw cr7, %[" __rseq_str(cpu_id) "], %%r17\n\t" \ "bne- cr7, " __rseq_str(label) "\n\t" @@ -153,25 +159,25 @@ do { \ * RSEQ_ASM_OP_* (else): doesn't have hard-code registers(unless cr7) */ #define RSEQ_ASM_OP_CMPEQ(var, expect, label) \ - LOAD_WORD "%%r17, %[" __rseq_str(var) "]\n\t" \ - CMP_WORD "cr7, %%r17, %[" __rseq_str(expect) "]\n\t" \ + RSEQ_LOAD_LONG(var) "%%r17, %[" __rseq_str(var) "]\n\t" \ + RSEQ_CMP_LONG "cr7, %%r17, %[" __rseq_str(expect) "]\n\t" \ "bne- cr7, " __rseq_str(label) "\n\t" #define RSEQ_ASM_OP_CMPNE(var, expectnot, label) \ - LOAD_WORD "%%r17, %[" __rseq_str(var) "]\n\t" \ - CMP_WORD "cr7, %%r17, %[" __rseq_str(expectnot) "]\n\t" \ + RSEQ_LOAD_LONG(var) "%%r17, %[" __rseq_str(var) "]\n\t" \ + RSEQ_CMP_LONG "cr7, %%r17, %[" __rseq_str(expectnot) "]\n\t" \ "beq- cr7, " __rseq_str(label) "\n\t" #define RSEQ_ASM_OP_STORE(value, var) \ - STORE_WORD "%[" __rseq_str(value) "], %[" __rseq_str(var) "]\n\t" + RSEQ_STORE_LONG(var) "%[" __rseq_str(value) "], %[" __rseq_str(var) "]\n\t" /* Load @var to r17 */ #define RSEQ_ASM_OP_R_LOAD(var) \ - LOAD_WORD "%%r17, %[" __rseq_str(var) "]\n\t" + RSEQ_LOAD_LONG(var) "%%r17, %[" __rseq_str(var) "]\n\t" /* Store r17 to @var */ #define RSEQ_ASM_OP_R_STORE(var) \ - STORE_WORD "%%r17, %[" __rseq_str(var) "]\n\t" + RSEQ_STORE_LONG(var) "%%r17, %[" __rseq_str(var) "]\n\t" /* Add @count to r17 */ #define RSEQ_ASM_OP_R_ADD(count) \ @@ -179,11 +185,11 @@ do { \ /* Load (r17 + voffp) to r17 */ #define RSEQ_ASM_OP_R_LOADX(voffp) \ - LOADX_WORD "%%r17, %[" __rseq_str(voffp) "], %%r17\n\t" + RSEQ_LOADX_LONG "%%r17, %[" __rseq_str(voffp) "], %%r17\n\t" /* TODO: implement a faster memcpy. */ #define RSEQ_ASM_OP_R_MEMCPY() \ - "cmpdi %%r19, 0\n\t" \ + RSEQ_CMP_LONG_INT "%%r19, 0\n\t" \ "beq 333f\n\t" \ "addi %%r20, %%r20, -1\n\t" \ "addi %%r21, %%r21, -1\n\t" \ @@ -191,16 +197,16 @@ do { \ "lbzu %%r18, 1(%%r20)\n\t" \ "stbu %%r18, 1(%%r21)\n\t" \ "addi %%r19, %%r19, -1\n\t" \ - "cmpdi %%r19, 0\n\t" \ + RSEQ_CMP_LONG_INT "%%r19, 0\n\t" \ "bne 222b\n\t" \ "333:\n\t" \ #define RSEQ_ASM_OP_R_FINAL_STORE(var, post_commit_label) \ - STORE_WORD "%%r17, %[" __rseq_str(var) "]\n\t" \ + RSEQ_STORE_LONG(var) "%%r17, %[" __rseq_str(var) "]\n\t" \ __rseq_str(post_commit_label) ":\n\t" #define RSEQ_ASM_OP_FINAL_STORE(value, var, post_commit_label) \ - STORE_WORD "%[" __rseq_str(value) "], %[" __rseq_str(var) "]\n\t" \ + RSEQ_STORE_LONG(var) "%[" __rseq_str(value) "], %[" __rseq_str(var) "]\n\t" \ __rseq_str(post_commit_label) ":\n\t" static inline __attribute__((always_inline)) @@ -743,9 +749,4 @@ error2: #endif } -#undef STORE_WORD -#undef LOAD_WORD -#undef LOADX_WORD -#undef CMP_WORD - #endif /* !RSEQ_SKIP_FASTPATH */ From 6f87493c3aa63f39164fe8cfc8d3746fa2cdcbcd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mathieu Desnoyers Date: Mon, 24 Jan 2022 12:12:48 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 0817/1091] selftests/rseq: Fix ppc32 offsets by using long rather than off_t commit 26dc8a6d8e11552f3b797b5aafe01071ca32d692 upstream. The semantic of off_t is for file offsets. We mean to use it as an offset from a pointer. We really expect it to fit in a single register, and not use a 64-bit type on 32-bit architectures. Fix runtime issues on ppc32 where the offset is always 0 due to inconsistency between the argument type (off_t -> 64-bit) and type expected by the inline assembler (32-bit). Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220124171253.22072-11-mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- tools/testing/selftests/rseq/basic_percpu_ops_test.c | 2 +- tools/testing/selftests/rseq/param_test.c | 2 +- tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-arm.h | 2 +- tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-arm64.h | 2 +- tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-mips.h | 2 +- tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-ppc.h | 2 +- tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-s390.h | 2 +- tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-skip.h | 2 +- tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-x86.h | 6 +++--- 9 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/basic_percpu_ops_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/basic_percpu_ops_test.c index b953a52ff706..517756afc2a4 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/basic_percpu_ops_test.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/basic_percpu_ops_test.c @@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ struct percpu_list_node *this_cpu_list_pop(struct percpu_list *list, for (;;) { struct percpu_list_node *head; intptr_t *targetptr, expectnot, *load; - off_t offset; + long offset; int ret, cpu; cpu = rseq_cpu_start(); diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/param_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/param_test.c index eec4182210ef..e768b8b7d6d3 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/param_test.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/param_test.c @@ -547,7 +547,7 @@ struct percpu_list_node *this_cpu_list_pop(struct percpu_list *list, for (;;) { struct percpu_list_node *head; intptr_t *targetptr, expectnot, *load; - off_t offset; + long offset; int ret; cpu = rseq_cpu_start(); diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-arm.h b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-arm.h index 5f567b3b40f2..ae476af70152 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-arm.h +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-arm.h @@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ error2: static inline __attribute__((always_inline)) int rseq_cmpnev_storeoffp_load(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expectnot, - off_t voffp, intptr_t *load, int cpu) + long voffp, intptr_t *load, int cpu) { RSEQ_INJECT_C(9) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-arm64.h b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-arm64.h index d0f2b7feee94..7806817062c2 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-arm64.h +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-arm64.h @@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ error2: static inline __attribute__((always_inline)) int rseq_cmpnev_storeoffp_load(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expectnot, - off_t voffp, intptr_t *load, int cpu) + long voffp, intptr_t *load, int cpu) { RSEQ_INJECT_C(9) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-mips.h b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-mips.h index 6df54273825d..0d1d9255da70 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-mips.h +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-mips.h @@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ error2: static inline __attribute__((always_inline)) int rseq_cmpnev_storeoffp_load(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expectnot, - off_t voffp, intptr_t *load, int cpu) + long voffp, intptr_t *load, int cpu) { RSEQ_INJECT_C(9) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-ppc.h b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-ppc.h index 87befda47ba4..aa18c0eabf40 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-ppc.h +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-ppc.h @@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ error2: static inline __attribute__((always_inline)) int rseq_cmpnev_storeoffp_load(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expectnot, - off_t voffp, intptr_t *load, int cpu) + long voffp, intptr_t *load, int cpu) { RSEQ_INJECT_C(9) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-s390.h b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-s390.h index 9927021f8bd0..0f523b3ecdef 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-s390.h +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-s390.h @@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ error2: */ static inline __attribute__((always_inline)) int rseq_cmpnev_storeoffp_load(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expectnot, - off_t voffp, intptr_t *load, int cpu) + long voffp, intptr_t *load, int cpu) { RSEQ_INJECT_C(9) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-skip.h b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-skip.h index 72750b5905a9..7b53dac1fcdd 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-skip.h +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-skip.h @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, intptr_t newv, int cpu) static inline __attribute__((always_inline)) int rseq_cmpnev_storeoffp_load(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expectnot, - off_t voffp, intptr_t *load, int cpu) + long voffp, intptr_t *load, int cpu) { return -1; } diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-x86.h b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-x86.h index 1d9fa0516e53..0ee6c041d4be 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-x86.h +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-x86.h @@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ error2: */ static inline __attribute__((always_inline)) int rseq_cmpnev_storeoffp_load(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expectnot, - off_t voffp, intptr_t *load, int cpu) + long voffp, intptr_t *load, int cpu) { RSEQ_INJECT_C(9) @@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ error1: * *pval += inc; */ static inline __attribute__((always_inline)) -int rseq_offset_deref_addv(intptr_t *ptr, off_t off, intptr_t inc, int cpu) +int rseq_offset_deref_addv(intptr_t *ptr, long off, intptr_t inc, int cpu) { RSEQ_INJECT_C(9) @@ -750,7 +750,7 @@ error2: */ static inline __attribute__((always_inline)) int rseq_cmpnev_storeoffp_load(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expectnot, - off_t voffp, intptr_t *load, int cpu) + long voffp, intptr_t *load, int cpu) { RSEQ_INJECT_C(9) From 1c9f13880f476c711dce5303de396638a1d5db68 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mathieu Desnoyers Date: Mon, 24 Jan 2022 12:12:49 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 0818/1091] selftests/rseq: Fix warnings about #if checks of undefined tokens commit d7ed99ade3e62b755584eea07b4e499e79240527 upstream. Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220124171253.22072-12-mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- tools/testing/selftests/rseq/param_test.c | 2 +- tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-x86.h | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/param_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/param_test.c index e768b8b7d6d3..1f399aaf1efe 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/param_test.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/param_test.c @@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ unsigned int yield_mod_cnt, nr_abort; " cbnz " INJECT_ASM_REG ", 222b\n" \ "333:\n" -#elif __PPC__ +#elif defined(__PPC__) #define RSEQ_INJECT_INPUT \ , [loop_cnt_1]"m"(loop_cnt[1]) \ diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-x86.h b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-x86.h index 0ee6c041d4be..e444563c6999 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-x86.h +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-x86.h @@ -600,7 +600,7 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trymemcpy_storev_release(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, #endif /* !RSEQ_SKIP_FASTPATH */ -#elif __i386__ +#elif defined(__i386__) #define rseq_smp_mb() \ __asm__ __volatile__ ("lock; addl $0,-128(%%esp)" ::: "memory", "cc") From 58082d4e81865b68c92f9747517bf46aa16313e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mathieu Desnoyers Date: Mon, 24 Jan 2022 12:12:50 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 0819/1091] selftests/rseq: Remove arm/mips asm goto compiler work-around commit 94c5cf2a0e193afffef8de48ddc42de6df7cac93 upstream. The arm and mips work-around for asm goto size guess issues are not properly documented, and lack reference to specific compiler versions, upstream compiler bug tracker entry, and reproducer. I can only find a loosely documented patch in my original LKML rseq post refering to gcc < 7 on ARM, but it does not appear to be sufficient to track the exact issue. Also, I am not sure MIPS really has the same limitation. Therefore, remove the work-around until we can properly document this. Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20171121141900.18471-17-mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com/ Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-arm.h | 37 ------------------------ tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-mips.h | 37 ------------------------ 2 files changed, 74 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-arm.h b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-arm.h index ae476af70152..64c3a622107b 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-arm.h +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-arm.h @@ -147,14 +147,11 @@ do { \ teardown \ "b %l[" __rseq_str(cmpfail_label) "]\n\t" -#define rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess() __asm__ __volatile__("") - static inline __attribute__((always_inline)) int rseq_cmpeqv_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, intptr_t newv, int cpu) { RSEQ_INJECT_C(9) - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); __asm__ __volatile__ goto ( RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_TABLE(9, 1f, 2f, 4f) /* start, commit, abort */ RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_EXIT_POINT(1f, %l[cmpfail]) @@ -198,14 +195,11 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, intptr_t newv, int cpu) , error1, error2 #endif ); - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); return 0; abort: - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; cmpfail: - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); return 1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE error1: @@ -221,7 +215,6 @@ int rseq_cmpnev_storeoffp_load(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expectnot, { RSEQ_INJECT_C(9) - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); __asm__ __volatile__ goto ( RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_TABLE(9, 1f, 2f, 4f) /* start, commit, abort */ RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_EXIT_POINT(1f, %l[cmpfail]) @@ -270,14 +263,11 @@ int rseq_cmpnev_storeoffp_load(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expectnot, , error1, error2 #endif ); - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); return 0; abort: - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; cmpfail: - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); return 1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE error1: @@ -292,7 +282,6 @@ int rseq_addv(intptr_t *v, intptr_t count, int cpu) { RSEQ_INJECT_C(9) - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); __asm__ __volatile__ goto ( RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_TABLE(9, 1f, 2f, 4f) /* start, commit, abort */ #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE @@ -328,10 +317,8 @@ int rseq_addv(intptr_t *v, intptr_t count, int cpu) , error1 #endif ); - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); return 0; abort: - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE @@ -347,7 +334,6 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trystorev_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, { RSEQ_INJECT_C(9) - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); __asm__ __volatile__ goto ( RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_TABLE(9, 1f, 2f, 4f) /* start, commit, abort */ RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_EXIT_POINT(1f, %l[cmpfail]) @@ -398,14 +384,11 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trystorev_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, , error1, error2 #endif ); - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); return 0; abort: - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; cmpfail: - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); return 1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE error1: @@ -422,7 +405,6 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trystorev_storev_release(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, { RSEQ_INJECT_C(9) - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); __asm__ __volatile__ goto ( RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_TABLE(9, 1f, 2f, 4f) /* start, commit, abort */ RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_EXIT_POINT(1f, %l[cmpfail]) @@ -474,14 +456,11 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trystorev_storev_release(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, , error1, error2 #endif ); - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); return 0; abort: - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; cmpfail: - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); return 1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE error1: @@ -498,7 +477,6 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_cmpeqv_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, { RSEQ_INJECT_C(9) - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); __asm__ __volatile__ goto ( RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_TABLE(9, 1f, 2f, 4f) /* start, commit, abort */ RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_EXIT_POINT(1f, %l[cmpfail]) @@ -554,14 +532,11 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_cmpeqv_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, , error1, error2, error3 #endif ); - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); return 0; abort: - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; cmpfail: - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); return 1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE error1: @@ -582,7 +557,6 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trymemcpy_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, RSEQ_INJECT_C(9) - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); __asm__ __volatile__ goto ( RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_TABLE(9, 1f, 2f, 4f) /* start, commit, abort */ RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_EXIT_POINT(1f, %l[cmpfail]) @@ -678,21 +652,16 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trymemcpy_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, , error1, error2 #endif ); - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); return 0; abort: - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; cmpfail: - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); return 1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE error1: - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); rseq_bug("cpu_id comparison failed"); error2: - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); rseq_bug("expected value comparison failed"); #endif } @@ -706,7 +675,6 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trymemcpy_storev_release(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, RSEQ_INJECT_C(9) - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); __asm__ __volatile__ goto ( RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_TABLE(9, 1f, 2f, 4f) /* start, commit, abort */ RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_EXIT_POINT(1f, %l[cmpfail]) @@ -803,21 +771,16 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trymemcpy_storev_release(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, , error1, error2 #endif ); - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); return 0; abort: - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; cmpfail: - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); return 1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE error1: - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); rseq_bug("cpu_id comparison failed"); error2: - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); rseq_bug("expected value comparison failed"); #endif } diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-mips.h b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-mips.h index 0d1d9255da70..878739fae2fd 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-mips.h +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-mips.h @@ -154,14 +154,11 @@ do { \ teardown \ "b %l[" __rseq_str(cmpfail_label) "]\n\t" -#define rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess() __asm__ __volatile__("") - static inline __attribute__((always_inline)) int rseq_cmpeqv_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, intptr_t newv, int cpu) { RSEQ_INJECT_C(9) - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); __asm__ __volatile__ goto ( RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_TABLE(9, 1f, 2f, 4f) /* start, commit, abort */ RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_EXIT_POINT(1f, %l[cmpfail]) @@ -203,14 +200,11 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, intptr_t newv, int cpu) , error1, error2 #endif ); - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); return 0; abort: - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; cmpfail: - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); return 1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE error1: @@ -226,7 +220,6 @@ int rseq_cmpnev_storeoffp_load(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expectnot, { RSEQ_INJECT_C(9) - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); __asm__ __volatile__ goto ( RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_TABLE(9, 1f, 2f, 4f) /* start, commit, abort */ RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_EXIT_POINT(1f, %l[cmpfail]) @@ -273,14 +266,11 @@ int rseq_cmpnev_storeoffp_load(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expectnot, , error1, error2 #endif ); - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); return 0; abort: - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; cmpfail: - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); return 1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE error1: @@ -295,7 +285,6 @@ int rseq_addv(intptr_t *v, intptr_t count, int cpu) { RSEQ_INJECT_C(9) - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); __asm__ __volatile__ goto ( RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_TABLE(9, 1f, 2f, 4f) /* start, commit, abort */ #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE @@ -331,10 +320,8 @@ int rseq_addv(intptr_t *v, intptr_t count, int cpu) , error1 #endif ); - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); return 0; abort: - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE @@ -350,7 +337,6 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trystorev_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, { RSEQ_INJECT_C(9) - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); __asm__ __volatile__ goto ( RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_TABLE(9, 1f, 2f, 4f) /* start, commit, abort */ RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_EXIT_POINT(1f, %l[cmpfail]) @@ -399,14 +385,11 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trystorev_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, , error1, error2 #endif ); - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); return 0; abort: - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; cmpfail: - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); return 1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE error1: @@ -423,7 +406,6 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trystorev_storev_release(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, { RSEQ_INJECT_C(9) - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); __asm__ __volatile__ goto ( RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_TABLE(9, 1f, 2f, 4f) /* start, commit, abort */ RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_EXIT_POINT(1f, %l[cmpfail]) @@ -473,14 +455,11 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trystorev_storev_release(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, , error1, error2 #endif ); - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); return 0; abort: - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; cmpfail: - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); return 1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE error1: @@ -497,7 +476,6 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_cmpeqv_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, { RSEQ_INJECT_C(9) - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); __asm__ __volatile__ goto ( RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_TABLE(9, 1f, 2f, 4f) /* start, commit, abort */ RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_EXIT_POINT(1f, %l[cmpfail]) @@ -549,14 +527,11 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_cmpeqv_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, , error1, error2, error3 #endif ); - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); return 0; abort: - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; cmpfail: - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); return 1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE error1: @@ -577,7 +552,6 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trymemcpy_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, RSEQ_INJECT_C(9) - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); __asm__ __volatile__ goto ( RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_TABLE(9, 1f, 2f, 4f) /* start, commit, abort */ RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_EXIT_POINT(1f, %l[cmpfail]) @@ -670,21 +644,16 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trymemcpy_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, , error1, error2 #endif ); - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); return 0; abort: - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; cmpfail: - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); return 1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE error1: - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); rseq_bug("cpu_id comparison failed"); error2: - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); rseq_bug("expected value comparison failed"); #endif } @@ -698,7 +667,6 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trymemcpy_storev_release(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, RSEQ_INJECT_C(9) - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); __asm__ __volatile__ goto ( RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_TABLE(9, 1f, 2f, 4f) /* start, commit, abort */ RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_EXIT_POINT(1f, %l[cmpfail]) @@ -792,21 +760,16 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trymemcpy_storev_release(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, , error1, error2 #endif ); - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); return 0; abort: - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; cmpfail: - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); return 1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE error1: - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); rseq_bug("cpu_id comparison failed"); error2: - rseq_workaround_gcc_asm_size_guess(); rseq_bug("expected value comparison failed"); #endif } From 618da2318e15690fe64457927e3ef5a277ea37e3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mathieu Desnoyers Date: Mon, 24 Jan 2022 12:12:51 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 0820/1091] selftests/rseq: Fix: work-around asm goto compiler bugs commit b53823fb2ef854222853be164f3b1e815f315144 upstream. gcc and clang each have their own compiler bugs with respect to asm goto. Implement a work-around for compiler versions known to have those bugs. gcc prior to 4.8.2 miscompiles asm goto. https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=58670 gcc prior to 8.1.0 miscompiles asm goto at O1. https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=103908 clang prior to version 13.0.1 miscompiles asm goto at O2. https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/52735 Work around these issues by adding a volatile inline asm with memory clobber in the fallthrough after the asm goto and at each label target. Emit this for all compilers in case other similar issues are found in the future. Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220124171253.22072-14-mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- tools/testing/selftests/rseq/compiler.h | 30 ++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-arm.h | 39 +++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-arm64.h | 45 +++++++++++++-- tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-ppc.h | 39 +++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-s390.h | 29 ++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-x86.h | 68 +++++++++++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq.h | 1 + 7 files changed, 245 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/rseq/compiler.h diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/compiler.h b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/compiler.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..876eb6a7f75b --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/compiler.h @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-only OR MIT */ +/* + * rseq/compiler.h + * + * Work-around asm goto compiler bugs. + * + * (C) Copyright 2021 - Mathieu Desnoyers + */ + +#ifndef RSEQ_COMPILER_H +#define RSEQ_COMPILER_H + +/* + * gcc prior to 4.8.2 miscompiles asm goto. + * https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=58670 + * + * gcc prior to 8.1.0 miscompiles asm goto at O1. + * https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=103908 + * + * clang prior to version 13.0.1 miscompiles asm goto at O2. + * https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/52735 + * + * Work around these issues by adding a volatile inline asm with + * memory clobber in the fallthrough after the asm goto and at each + * label target. Emit this for all compilers in case other similar + * issues are found in the future. + */ +#define rseq_after_asm_goto() asm volatile ("" : : : "memory") + +#endif /* RSEQ_COMPILER_H_ */ diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-arm.h b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-arm.h index 64c3a622107b..893a11eca9d5 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-arm.h +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-arm.h @@ -195,16 +195,21 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, intptr_t newv, int cpu) , error1, error2 #endif ); + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 0; abort: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; cmpfail: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE error1: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("cpu_id comparison failed"); error2: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("expected value comparison failed"); #endif } @@ -263,16 +268,21 @@ int rseq_cmpnev_storeoffp_load(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expectnot, , error1, error2 #endif ); + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 0; abort: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; cmpfail: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE error1: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("cpu_id comparison failed"); error2: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("expected value comparison failed"); #endif } @@ -317,12 +327,15 @@ int rseq_addv(intptr_t *v, intptr_t count, int cpu) , error1 #endif ); + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 0; abort: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE error1: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("cpu_id comparison failed"); #endif } @@ -384,16 +397,21 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trystorev_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, , error1, error2 #endif ); + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 0; abort: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; cmpfail: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE error1: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("cpu_id comparison failed"); error2: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("expected value comparison failed"); #endif } @@ -456,16 +474,21 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trystorev_storev_release(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, , error1, error2 #endif ); + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 0; abort: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; cmpfail: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE error1: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("cpu_id comparison failed"); error2: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("expected value comparison failed"); #endif } @@ -532,18 +555,24 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_cmpeqv_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, , error1, error2, error3 #endif ); + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 0; abort: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; cmpfail: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE error1: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("cpu_id comparison failed"); error2: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("1st expected value comparison failed"); error3: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("2nd expected value comparison failed"); #endif } @@ -652,16 +681,21 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trymemcpy_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, , error1, error2 #endif ); + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 0; abort: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; cmpfail: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE error1: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("cpu_id comparison failed"); error2: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("expected value comparison failed"); #endif } @@ -771,16 +805,21 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trymemcpy_storev_release(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, , error1, error2 #endif ); + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 0; abort: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; cmpfail: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE error1: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("cpu_id comparison failed"); error2: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("expected value comparison failed"); #endif } diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-arm64.h b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-arm64.h index 7806817062c2..cbe190a4d005 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-arm64.h +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-arm64.h @@ -242,17 +242,21 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, intptr_t newv, int cpu) , error1, error2 #endif ); - + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 0; abort: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; cmpfail: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE error1: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("cpu_id comparison failed"); error2: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("expected value comparison failed"); #endif } @@ -300,16 +304,21 @@ int rseq_cmpnev_storeoffp_load(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expectnot, , error1, error2 #endif ); + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 0; abort: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; cmpfail: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE error1: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("cpu_id comparison failed"); error2: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("expected value comparison failed"); #endif } @@ -348,12 +357,15 @@ int rseq_addv(intptr_t *v, intptr_t count, int cpu) , error1 #endif ); + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 0; abort: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE error1: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("cpu_id comparison failed"); #endif } @@ -402,17 +414,21 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trystorev_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, , error1, error2 #endif ); - + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 0; abort: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; cmpfail: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE error1: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("cpu_id comparison failed"); error2: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("expected value comparison failed"); #endif } @@ -461,17 +477,21 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trystorev_storev_release(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, , error1, error2 #endif ); - + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 0; abort: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; cmpfail: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE error1: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("cpu_id comparison failed"); error2: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("expected value comparison failed"); #endif } @@ -522,19 +542,24 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_cmpeqv_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, , error1, error2, error3 #endif ); - + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 0; abort: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; cmpfail: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE error1: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("cpu_id comparison failed"); error2: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("expected value comparison failed"); error3: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("2nd expected value comparison failed"); #endif } @@ -584,17 +609,21 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trymemcpy_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, , error1, error2 #endif ); - + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 0; abort: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; cmpfail: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE error1: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("cpu_id comparison failed"); error2: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("expected value comparison failed"); #endif } @@ -644,17 +673,21 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trymemcpy_storev_release(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, , error1, error2 #endif ); - + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 0; abort: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; cmpfail: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE error1: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("cpu_id comparison failed"); error2: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("expected value comparison failed"); #endif } diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-ppc.h b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-ppc.h index aa18c0eabf40..bab8e0b9fb11 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-ppc.h +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-ppc.h @@ -254,16 +254,21 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, intptr_t newv, int cpu) , error1, error2 #endif ); + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 0; abort: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; cmpfail: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE error1: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("cpu_id comparison failed"); error2: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("expected value comparison failed"); #endif } @@ -322,16 +327,21 @@ int rseq_cmpnev_storeoffp_load(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expectnot, , error1, error2 #endif ); + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 0; abort: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; cmpfail: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE error1: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("cpu_id comparison failed"); error2: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("expected value comparison failed"); #endif } @@ -378,12 +388,15 @@ int rseq_addv(intptr_t *v, intptr_t count, int cpu) , error1 #endif ); + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 0; abort: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE error1: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("cpu_id comparison failed"); #endif } @@ -442,16 +455,21 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trystorev_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, , error1, error2 #endif ); + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 0; abort: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; cmpfail: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE error1: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("cpu_id comparison failed"); error2: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("expected value comparison failed"); #endif } @@ -512,16 +530,21 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trystorev_storev_release(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, , error1, error2 #endif ); + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 0; abort: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; cmpfail: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE error1: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("cpu_id comparison failed"); error2: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("expected value comparison failed"); #endif } @@ -583,18 +606,24 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_cmpeqv_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, , error1, error2, error3 #endif ); + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 0; abort: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; cmpfail: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE error1: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("cpu_id comparison failed"); error2: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("1st expected value comparison failed"); error3: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("2nd expected value comparison failed"); #endif } @@ -659,16 +688,21 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trymemcpy_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, , error1, error2 #endif ); + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 0; abort: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; cmpfail: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE error1: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("cpu_id comparison failed"); error2: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("expected value comparison failed"); #endif } @@ -735,16 +769,21 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trymemcpy_storev_release(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, , error1, error2 #endif ); + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 0; abort: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; cmpfail: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE error1: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("cpu_id comparison failed"); error2: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("expected value comparison failed"); #endif } diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-s390.h b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-s390.h index 0f523b3ecdef..4e6dc5f0cb42 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-s390.h +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-s390.h @@ -178,16 +178,21 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, intptr_t newv, int cpu) , error1, error2 #endif ); + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 0; abort: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; cmpfail: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE error1: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("cpu_id comparison failed"); error2: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("expected value comparison failed"); #endif } @@ -248,16 +253,21 @@ int rseq_cmpnev_storeoffp_load(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expectnot, , error1, error2 #endif ); + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 0; abort: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; cmpfail: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE error1: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("cpu_id comparison failed"); error2: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("expected value comparison failed"); #endif } @@ -301,12 +311,15 @@ int rseq_addv(intptr_t *v, intptr_t count, int cpu) , error1 #endif ); + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 0; abort: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE error1: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("cpu_id comparison failed"); #endif } @@ -364,16 +377,21 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trystorev_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, , error1, error2 #endif ); + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 0; abort: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; cmpfail: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE error1: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("cpu_id comparison failed"); error2: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("expected value comparison failed"); #endif } @@ -443,18 +461,24 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_cmpeqv_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, , error1, error2, error3 #endif ); + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 0; abort: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; cmpfail: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE error1: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("cpu_id comparison failed"); error2: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("1st expected value comparison failed"); error3: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("2nd expected value comparison failed"); #endif } @@ -555,16 +579,21 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trymemcpy_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, , error1, error2 #endif ); + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 0; abort: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; cmpfail: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE error1: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("cpu_id comparison failed"); error2: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("expected value comparison failed"); #endif } diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-x86.h b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-x86.h index e444563c6999..4ab2e74811ab 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-x86.h +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-x86.h @@ -152,16 +152,21 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, intptr_t newv, int cpu) , error1, error2 #endif ); + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 0; abort: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; cmpfail: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE error1: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("cpu_id comparison failed"); error2: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("expected value comparison failed"); #endif } @@ -220,16 +225,21 @@ int rseq_cmpnev_storeoffp_load(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expectnot, , error1, error2 #endif ); + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 0; abort: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; cmpfail: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE error1: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("cpu_id comparison failed"); error2: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("expected value comparison failed"); #endif } @@ -269,12 +279,15 @@ int rseq_addv(intptr_t *v, intptr_t count, int cpu) , error1 #endif ); + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 0; abort: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE error1: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("cpu_id comparison failed"); #endif } @@ -387,16 +400,21 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trystorev_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, , error1, error2 #endif ); + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 0; abort: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; cmpfail: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE error1: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("cpu_id comparison failed"); error2: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("expected value comparison failed"); #endif } @@ -464,18 +482,24 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_cmpeqv_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, , error1, error2, error3 #endif ); + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 0; abort: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; cmpfail: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE error1: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("cpu_id comparison failed"); error2: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("1st expected value comparison failed"); error3: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("2nd expected value comparison failed"); #endif } @@ -574,16 +598,21 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trymemcpy_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, , error1, error2 #endif ); + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 0; abort: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; cmpfail: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE error1: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("cpu_id comparison failed"); error2: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("expected value comparison failed"); #endif } @@ -730,16 +759,21 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, intptr_t newv, int cpu) , error1, error2 #endif ); + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 0; abort: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; cmpfail: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE error1: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("cpu_id comparison failed"); error2: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("expected value comparison failed"); #endif } @@ -798,16 +832,21 @@ int rseq_cmpnev_storeoffp_load(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expectnot, , error1, error2 #endif ); + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 0; abort: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; cmpfail: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE error1: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("cpu_id comparison failed"); error2: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("expected value comparison failed"); #endif } @@ -847,12 +886,15 @@ int rseq_addv(intptr_t *v, intptr_t count, int cpu) , error1 #endif ); + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 0; abort: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE error1: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("cpu_id comparison failed"); #endif } @@ -909,16 +951,21 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trystorev_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, , error1, error2 #endif ); + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 0; abort: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; cmpfail: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE error1: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("cpu_id comparison failed"); error2: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("expected value comparison failed"); #endif } @@ -977,16 +1024,21 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trystorev_storev_release(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, , error1, error2 #endif ); + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 0; abort: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; cmpfail: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE error1: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("cpu_id comparison failed"); error2: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("expected value comparison failed"); #endif @@ -1047,18 +1099,24 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_cmpeqv_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, , error1, error2, error3 #endif ); + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 0; abort: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; cmpfail: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE error1: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("cpu_id comparison failed"); error2: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("1st expected value comparison failed"); error3: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("2nd expected value comparison failed"); #endif } @@ -1161,16 +1219,21 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trymemcpy_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, , error1, error2 #endif ); + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 0; abort: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; cmpfail: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE error1: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("cpu_id comparison failed"); error2: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("expected value comparison failed"); #endif } @@ -1274,16 +1337,21 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trymemcpy_storev_release(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, , error1, error2 #endif ); + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 0; abort: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); RSEQ_INJECT_FAILED return -1; cmpfail: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); return 1; #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE error1: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("cpu_id comparison failed"); error2: + rseq_after_asm_goto(); rseq_bug("expected value comparison failed"); #endif } diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq.h b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq.h index 0b1437787256..89427bda75af 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq.h +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq.h @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ #include #include #include "rseq-abi.h" +#include "compiler.h" /* * Empty code injection macros, override when testing. From f89d15c9861ceb29bb9d0a7d2154b598295c2521 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mathieu Desnoyers Date: Mon, 24 Jan 2022 12:12:52 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 0821/1091] selftests/rseq: x86-64: use %fs segment selector for accessing rseq thread area commit 4e15bb766b6c6e963a4d33629034d0ec3b7637df upstream. Rather than use rseq_get_abi() and pass its result through a register to the inline assembler, directly access the per-thread rseq area through a memory reference combining the %fs segment selector, the constant offset of the field in struct rseq, and the rseq_offset value (in a register). Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220124171253.22072-15-mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-x86.h | 58 +++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-x86.h b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-x86.h index 4ab2e74811ab..29769664edaa 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-x86.h +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-x86.h @@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ #ifdef __x86_64__ +#define RSEQ_ASM_TP_SEGMENT %%fs + #define rseq_smp_mb() \ __asm__ __volatile__ ("lock; addl $0,-128(%%rsp)" ::: "memory", "cc") #define rseq_smp_rmb() rseq_barrier() @@ -123,14 +125,14 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, intptr_t newv, int cpu) RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_EXIT_POINT(1f, %l[error2]) #endif /* Start rseq by storing table entry pointer into rseq_cs. */ - RSEQ_ASM_STORE_RSEQ_CS(1, 3b, RSEQ_CS_OFFSET(%[rseq_abi])) - RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_abi]), 4f) + RSEQ_ASM_STORE_RSEQ_CS(1, 3b, RSEQ_ASM_TP_SEGMENT:RSEQ_CS_OFFSET(%[rseq_offset])) + RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_ASM_TP_SEGMENT:RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_offset]), 4f) RSEQ_INJECT_ASM(3) "cmpq %[v], %[expect]\n\t" "jnz %l[cmpfail]\n\t" RSEQ_INJECT_ASM(4) #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE - RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_abi]), %l[error1]) + RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_ASM_TP_SEGMENT:RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_offset]), %l[error1]) "cmpq %[v], %[expect]\n\t" "jnz %l[error2]\n\t" #endif @@ -141,7 +143,7 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, intptr_t newv, int cpu) RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_ABORT(4, "", abort) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [rseq_abi] "r" (rseq_get_abi()), + [rseq_offset] "r" ((long)rseq_offset), [v] "m" (*v), [expect] "r" (expect), [newv] "r" (newv) @@ -189,15 +191,15 @@ int rseq_cmpnev_storeoffp_load(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expectnot, RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_EXIT_POINT(1f, %l[error2]) #endif /* Start rseq by storing table entry pointer into rseq_cs. */ - RSEQ_ASM_STORE_RSEQ_CS(1, 3b, RSEQ_CS_OFFSET(%[rseq_abi])) - RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_abi]), 4f) + RSEQ_ASM_STORE_RSEQ_CS(1, 3b, RSEQ_ASM_TP_SEGMENT:RSEQ_CS_OFFSET(%[rseq_offset])) + RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_ASM_TP_SEGMENT:RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_offset]), 4f) RSEQ_INJECT_ASM(3) "movq %[v], %%rbx\n\t" "cmpq %%rbx, %[expectnot]\n\t" "je %l[cmpfail]\n\t" RSEQ_INJECT_ASM(4) #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE - RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_abi]), %l[error1]) + RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_ASM_TP_SEGMENT:RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_offset]), %l[error1]) "movq %[v], %%rbx\n\t" "cmpq %%rbx, %[expectnot]\n\t" "je %l[error2]\n\t" @@ -212,7 +214,7 @@ int rseq_cmpnev_storeoffp_load(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expectnot, RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_ABORT(4, "", abort) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [rseq_abi] "r" (rseq_get_abi()), + [rseq_offset] "r" ((long)rseq_offset), /* final store input */ [v] "m" (*v), [expectnot] "r" (expectnot), @@ -255,11 +257,11 @@ int rseq_addv(intptr_t *v, intptr_t count, int cpu) RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_EXIT_POINT(1f, %l[error1]) #endif /* Start rseq by storing table entry pointer into rseq_cs. */ - RSEQ_ASM_STORE_RSEQ_CS(1, 3b, RSEQ_CS_OFFSET(%[rseq_abi])) - RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_abi]), 4f) + RSEQ_ASM_STORE_RSEQ_CS(1, 3b, RSEQ_ASM_TP_SEGMENT:RSEQ_CS_OFFSET(%[rseq_offset])) + RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_ASM_TP_SEGMENT:RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_offset]), 4f) RSEQ_INJECT_ASM(3) #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE - RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_abi]), %l[error1]) + RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_ASM_TP_SEGMENT:RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_offset]), %l[error1]) #endif /* final store */ "addq %[count], %[v]\n\t" @@ -268,7 +270,7 @@ int rseq_addv(intptr_t *v, intptr_t count, int cpu) RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_ABORT(4, "", abort) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [rseq_abi] "r" (rseq_get_abi()), + [rseq_offset] "r" ((long)rseq_offset), /* final store input */ [v] "m" (*v), [count] "er" (count) @@ -309,11 +311,11 @@ int rseq_offset_deref_addv(intptr_t *ptr, long off, intptr_t inc, int cpu) RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_EXIT_POINT(1f, %l[error1]) #endif /* Start rseq by storing table entry pointer into rseq_cs. */ - RSEQ_ASM_STORE_RSEQ_CS(1, 3b, RSEQ_CS_OFFSET(%[rseq_abi])) - RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_abi]), 4f) + RSEQ_ASM_STORE_RSEQ_CS(1, 3b, RSEQ_ASM_TP_SEGMENT:RSEQ_CS_OFFSET(%[rseq_offset])) + RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_ASM_TP_SEGMENT:RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_offset]), 4f) RSEQ_INJECT_ASM(3) #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE - RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_abi]), %l[error1]) + RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_ASM_TP_SEGMENT:RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_offset]), %l[error1]) #endif /* get p+v */ "movq %[ptr], %%rbx\n\t" @@ -327,7 +329,7 @@ int rseq_offset_deref_addv(intptr_t *ptr, long off, intptr_t inc, int cpu) RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_ABORT(4, "", abort) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [rseq_abi] "r" (rseq_get_abi()), + [rseq_offset] "r" ((long)rseq_offset), /* final store input */ [ptr] "m" (*ptr), [off] "er" (off), @@ -364,14 +366,14 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trystorev_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_EXIT_POINT(1f, %l[error2]) #endif /* Start rseq by storing table entry pointer into rseq_cs. */ - RSEQ_ASM_STORE_RSEQ_CS(1, 3b, RSEQ_CS_OFFSET(%[rseq_abi])) - RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_abi]), 4f) + RSEQ_ASM_STORE_RSEQ_CS(1, 3b, RSEQ_ASM_TP_SEGMENT:RSEQ_CS_OFFSET(%[rseq_offset])) + RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_ASM_TP_SEGMENT:RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_offset]), 4f) RSEQ_INJECT_ASM(3) "cmpq %[v], %[expect]\n\t" "jnz %l[cmpfail]\n\t" RSEQ_INJECT_ASM(4) #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE - RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_abi]), %l[error1]) + RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_ASM_TP_SEGMENT:RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_offset]), %l[error1]) "cmpq %[v], %[expect]\n\t" "jnz %l[error2]\n\t" #endif @@ -385,7 +387,7 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trystorev_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_ABORT(4, "", abort) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [rseq_abi] "r" (rseq_get_abi()), + [rseq_offset] "r" ((long)rseq_offset), /* try store input */ [v2] "m" (*v2), [newv2] "r" (newv2), @@ -444,8 +446,8 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_cmpeqv_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_EXIT_POINT(1f, %l[error3]) #endif /* Start rseq by storing table entry pointer into rseq_cs. */ - RSEQ_ASM_STORE_RSEQ_CS(1, 3b, RSEQ_CS_OFFSET(%[rseq_abi])) - RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_abi]), 4f) + RSEQ_ASM_STORE_RSEQ_CS(1, 3b, RSEQ_ASM_TP_SEGMENT:RSEQ_CS_OFFSET(%[rseq_offset])) + RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_ASM_TP_SEGMENT:RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_offset]), 4f) RSEQ_INJECT_ASM(3) "cmpq %[v], %[expect]\n\t" "jnz %l[cmpfail]\n\t" @@ -454,7 +456,7 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_cmpeqv_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, "jnz %l[cmpfail]\n\t" RSEQ_INJECT_ASM(5) #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE - RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_abi]), %l[error1]) + RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_ASM_TP_SEGMENT:RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_offset]), %l[error1]) "cmpq %[v], %[expect]\n\t" "jnz %l[error2]\n\t" "cmpq %[v2], %[expect2]\n\t" @@ -467,7 +469,7 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_cmpeqv_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_ABORT(4, "", abort) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [rseq_abi] "r" (rseq_get_abi()), + [rseq_offset] "r" ((long)rseq_offset), /* cmp2 input */ [v2] "m" (*v2), [expect2] "r" (expect2), @@ -524,14 +526,14 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trymemcpy_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, "movq %[dst], %[rseq_scratch1]\n\t" "movq %[len], %[rseq_scratch2]\n\t" /* Start rseq by storing table entry pointer into rseq_cs. */ - RSEQ_ASM_STORE_RSEQ_CS(1, 3b, RSEQ_CS_OFFSET(%[rseq_abi])) - RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_abi]), 4f) + RSEQ_ASM_STORE_RSEQ_CS(1, 3b, RSEQ_ASM_TP_SEGMENT:RSEQ_CS_OFFSET(%[rseq_offset])) + RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_ASM_TP_SEGMENT:RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_offset]), 4f) RSEQ_INJECT_ASM(3) "cmpq %[v], %[expect]\n\t" "jnz 5f\n\t" RSEQ_INJECT_ASM(4) #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE - RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_abi]), 6f) + RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_ASM_TP_SEGMENT:RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_offset]), 6f) "cmpq %[v], %[expect]\n\t" "jnz 7f\n\t" #endif @@ -579,7 +581,7 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trymemcpy_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, #endif : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [rseq_abi] "r" (rseq_get_abi()), + [rseq_offset] "r" ((long)rseq_offset), /* final store input */ [v] "m" (*v), [expect] "r" (expect), From dc28252880123e2da728d31b1a693d5d2ffb3abf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mathieu Desnoyers Date: Mon, 24 Jan 2022 12:12:53 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 0822/1091] selftests/rseq: x86-32: use %gs segment selector for accessing rseq thread area commit 127b6429d235ab7c358223bbfd8a8b8d8cc799b6 upstream. Rather than use rseq_get_abi() and pass its result through a register to the inline assembler, directly access the per-thread rseq area through a memory reference combining the %gs segment selector, the constant offset of the field in struct rseq, and the rseq_offset value (in a register). Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220124171253.22072-16-mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-x86.h | 66 +++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-x86.h b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-x86.h index 29769664edaa..f704d3664327 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-x86.h +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-x86.h @@ -633,6 +633,8 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trymemcpy_storev_release(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, #elif defined(__i386__) +#define RSEQ_ASM_TP_SEGMENT %%gs + #define rseq_smp_mb() \ __asm__ __volatile__ ("lock; addl $0,-128(%%esp)" ::: "memory", "cc") #define rseq_smp_rmb() \ @@ -732,14 +734,14 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, intptr_t newv, int cpu) RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_EXIT_POINT(1f, %l[error2]) #endif /* Start rseq by storing table entry pointer into rseq_cs. */ - RSEQ_ASM_STORE_RSEQ_CS(1, 3b, RSEQ_CS_OFFSET(%[rseq_abi])) - RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_abi]), 4f) + RSEQ_ASM_STORE_RSEQ_CS(1, 3b, RSEQ_ASM_TP_SEGMENT:RSEQ_CS_OFFSET(%[rseq_offset])) + RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_ASM_TP_SEGMENT:RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_offset]), 4f) RSEQ_INJECT_ASM(3) "cmpl %[v], %[expect]\n\t" "jnz %l[cmpfail]\n\t" RSEQ_INJECT_ASM(4) #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE - RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_abi]), %l[error1]) + RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_ASM_TP_SEGMENT:RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_offset]), %l[error1]) "cmpl %[v], %[expect]\n\t" "jnz %l[error2]\n\t" #endif @@ -750,7 +752,7 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, intptr_t newv, int cpu) RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_ABORT(4, "", abort) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [rseq_abi] "r" (rseq_get_abi()), + [rseq_offset] "r" (rseq_offset), [v] "m" (*v), [expect] "r" (expect), [newv] "r" (newv) @@ -798,15 +800,15 @@ int rseq_cmpnev_storeoffp_load(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expectnot, RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_EXIT_POINT(1f, %l[error2]) #endif /* Start rseq by storing table entry pointer into rseq_cs. */ - RSEQ_ASM_STORE_RSEQ_CS(1, 3b, RSEQ_CS_OFFSET(%[rseq_abi])) - RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_abi]), 4f) + RSEQ_ASM_STORE_RSEQ_CS(1, 3b, RSEQ_ASM_TP_SEGMENT:RSEQ_CS_OFFSET(%[rseq_offset])) + RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_ASM_TP_SEGMENT:RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_offset]), 4f) RSEQ_INJECT_ASM(3) "movl %[v], %%ebx\n\t" "cmpl %%ebx, %[expectnot]\n\t" "je %l[cmpfail]\n\t" RSEQ_INJECT_ASM(4) #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE - RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_abi]), %l[error1]) + RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_ASM_TP_SEGMENT:RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_offset]), %l[error1]) "movl %[v], %%ebx\n\t" "cmpl %%ebx, %[expectnot]\n\t" "je %l[error2]\n\t" @@ -821,7 +823,7 @@ int rseq_cmpnev_storeoffp_load(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expectnot, RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_ABORT(4, "", abort) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [rseq_abi] "r" (rseq_get_abi()), + [rseq_offset] "r" (rseq_offset), /* final store input */ [v] "m" (*v), [expectnot] "r" (expectnot), @@ -864,11 +866,11 @@ int rseq_addv(intptr_t *v, intptr_t count, int cpu) RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_EXIT_POINT(1f, %l[error1]) #endif /* Start rseq by storing table entry pointer into rseq_cs. */ - RSEQ_ASM_STORE_RSEQ_CS(1, 3b, RSEQ_CS_OFFSET(%[rseq_abi])) - RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_abi]), 4f) + RSEQ_ASM_STORE_RSEQ_CS(1, 3b, RSEQ_ASM_TP_SEGMENT:RSEQ_CS_OFFSET(%[rseq_offset])) + RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_ASM_TP_SEGMENT:RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_offset]), 4f) RSEQ_INJECT_ASM(3) #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE - RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_abi]), %l[error1]) + RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_ASM_TP_SEGMENT:RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_offset]), %l[error1]) #endif /* final store */ "addl %[count], %[v]\n\t" @@ -877,7 +879,7 @@ int rseq_addv(intptr_t *v, intptr_t count, int cpu) RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_ABORT(4, "", abort) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [rseq_abi] "r" (rseq_get_abi()), + [rseq_offset] "r" (rseq_offset), /* final store input */ [v] "m" (*v), [count] "ir" (count) @@ -916,14 +918,14 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trystorev_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_EXIT_POINT(1f, %l[error2]) #endif /* Start rseq by storing table entry pointer into rseq_cs. */ - RSEQ_ASM_STORE_RSEQ_CS(1, 3b, RSEQ_CS_OFFSET(%[rseq_abi])) - RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_abi]), 4f) + RSEQ_ASM_STORE_RSEQ_CS(1, 3b, RSEQ_ASM_TP_SEGMENT:RSEQ_CS_OFFSET(%[rseq_offset])) + RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_ASM_TP_SEGMENT:RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_offset]), 4f) RSEQ_INJECT_ASM(3) "cmpl %[v], %[expect]\n\t" "jnz %l[cmpfail]\n\t" RSEQ_INJECT_ASM(4) #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE - RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_abi]), %l[error1]) + RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_ASM_TP_SEGMENT:RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_offset]), %l[error1]) "cmpl %[v], %[expect]\n\t" "jnz %l[error2]\n\t" #endif @@ -938,7 +940,7 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trystorev_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_ABORT(4, "", abort) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [rseq_abi] "r" (rseq_get_abi()), + [rseq_offset] "r" (rseq_offset), /* try store input */ [v2] "m" (*v2), [newv2] "m" (newv2), @@ -987,15 +989,15 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trystorev_storev_release(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_EXIT_POINT(1f, %l[error2]) #endif /* Start rseq by storing table entry pointer into rseq_cs. */ - RSEQ_ASM_STORE_RSEQ_CS(1, 3b, RSEQ_CS_OFFSET(%[rseq_abi])) - RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_abi]), 4f) + RSEQ_ASM_STORE_RSEQ_CS(1, 3b, RSEQ_ASM_TP_SEGMENT:RSEQ_CS_OFFSET(%[rseq_offset])) + RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_ASM_TP_SEGMENT:RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_offset]), 4f) RSEQ_INJECT_ASM(3) "movl %[expect], %%eax\n\t" "cmpl %[v], %%eax\n\t" "jnz %l[cmpfail]\n\t" RSEQ_INJECT_ASM(4) #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE - RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_abi]), %l[error1]) + RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_ASM_TP_SEGMENT:RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_offset]), %l[error1]) "movl %[expect], %%eax\n\t" "cmpl %[v], %%eax\n\t" "jnz %l[error2]\n\t" @@ -1011,7 +1013,7 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trystorev_storev_release(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_ABORT(4, "", abort) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [rseq_abi] "r" (rseq_get_abi()), + [rseq_offset] "r" (rseq_offset), /* try store input */ [v2] "m" (*v2), [newv2] "r" (newv2), @@ -1062,8 +1064,8 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_cmpeqv_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_EXIT_POINT(1f, %l[error3]) #endif /* Start rseq by storing table entry pointer into rseq_cs. */ - RSEQ_ASM_STORE_RSEQ_CS(1, 3b, RSEQ_CS_OFFSET(%[rseq_abi])) - RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_abi]), 4f) + RSEQ_ASM_STORE_RSEQ_CS(1, 3b, RSEQ_ASM_TP_SEGMENT:RSEQ_CS_OFFSET(%[rseq_offset])) + RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_ASM_TP_SEGMENT:RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_offset]), 4f) RSEQ_INJECT_ASM(3) "cmpl %[v], %[expect]\n\t" "jnz %l[cmpfail]\n\t" @@ -1072,7 +1074,7 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_cmpeqv_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, "jnz %l[cmpfail]\n\t" RSEQ_INJECT_ASM(5) #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE - RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_abi]), %l[error1]) + RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_ASM_TP_SEGMENT:RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_offset]), %l[error1]) "cmpl %[v], %[expect]\n\t" "jnz %l[error2]\n\t" "cmpl %[expect2], %[v2]\n\t" @@ -1086,7 +1088,7 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_cmpeqv_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_ABORT(4, "", abort) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [rseq_abi] "r" (rseq_get_abi()), + [rseq_offset] "r" (rseq_offset), /* cmp2 input */ [v2] "m" (*v2), [expect2] "r" (expect2), @@ -1144,15 +1146,15 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trymemcpy_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, "movl %[dst], %[rseq_scratch1]\n\t" "movl %[len], %[rseq_scratch2]\n\t" /* Start rseq by storing table entry pointer into rseq_cs. */ - RSEQ_ASM_STORE_RSEQ_CS(1, 3b, RSEQ_CS_OFFSET(%[rseq_abi])) - RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_abi]), 4f) + RSEQ_ASM_STORE_RSEQ_CS(1, 3b, RSEQ_ASM_TP_SEGMENT:RSEQ_CS_OFFSET(%[rseq_offset])) + RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_ASM_TP_SEGMENT:RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_offset]), 4f) RSEQ_INJECT_ASM(3) "movl %[expect], %%eax\n\t" "cmpl %%eax, %[v]\n\t" "jnz 5f\n\t" RSEQ_INJECT_ASM(4) #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE - RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_abi]), 6f) + RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_ASM_TP_SEGMENT:RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_offset]), 6f) "movl %[expect], %%eax\n\t" "cmpl %%eax, %[v]\n\t" "jnz 7f\n\t" @@ -1202,7 +1204,7 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trymemcpy_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, #endif : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [rseq_abi] "r" (rseq_get_abi()), + [rseq_offset] "r" (rseq_offset), /* final store input */ [v] "m" (*v), [expect] "m" (expect), @@ -1261,15 +1263,15 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trymemcpy_storev_release(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, "movl %[dst], %[rseq_scratch1]\n\t" "movl %[len], %[rseq_scratch2]\n\t" /* Start rseq by storing table entry pointer into rseq_cs. */ - RSEQ_ASM_STORE_RSEQ_CS(1, 3b, RSEQ_CS_OFFSET(%[rseq_abi])) - RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_abi]), 4f) + RSEQ_ASM_STORE_RSEQ_CS(1, 3b, RSEQ_ASM_TP_SEGMENT:RSEQ_CS_OFFSET(%[rseq_offset])) + RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_ASM_TP_SEGMENT:RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_offset]), 4f) RSEQ_INJECT_ASM(3) "movl %[expect], %%eax\n\t" "cmpl %%eax, %[v]\n\t" "jnz 5f\n\t" RSEQ_INJECT_ASM(4) #ifdef RSEQ_COMPARE_TWICE - RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_abi]), 6f) + RSEQ_ASM_CMP_CPU_ID(cpu_id, RSEQ_ASM_TP_SEGMENT:RSEQ_CPU_ID_OFFSET(%[rseq_offset]), 6f) "movl %[expect], %%eax\n\t" "cmpl %%eax, %[v]\n\t" "jnz 7f\n\t" @@ -1320,7 +1322,7 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trymemcpy_storev_release(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, #endif : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [rseq_abi] "r" (rseq_get_abi()), + [rseq_offset] "r" (rseq_offset), /* final store input */ [v] "m" (*v), [expect] "m" (expect), From b7c996abe545d69d2ee73a190a9dfe037948cbd5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mathieu Desnoyers Date: Thu, 3 Feb 2022 10:05:32 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 0823/1091] selftests/rseq: Change type of rseq_offset to ptrdiff_t commit 889c5d60fbcf332c8b6ab7054d45f2768914a375 upstream. Just before the 2.35 release of glibc, the __rseq_offset userspace ABI was changed from int to ptrdiff_t. Adapt to this change in the kernel selftests. Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Link: https://sourceware.org/pipermail/libc-alpha/2022-February/136024.html Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-x86.h | 14 +++++++------- tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq.c | 5 +++-- tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq.h | 3 ++- 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-x86.h b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-x86.h index f704d3664327..bd01dc41ca13 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-x86.h +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-x86.h @@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, intptr_t newv, int cpu) RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_ABORT(4, "", abort) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [rseq_offset] "r" ((long)rseq_offset), + [rseq_offset] "r" (rseq_offset), [v] "m" (*v), [expect] "r" (expect), [newv] "r" (newv) @@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ int rseq_cmpnev_storeoffp_load(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expectnot, RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_ABORT(4, "", abort) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [rseq_offset] "r" ((long)rseq_offset), + [rseq_offset] "r" (rseq_offset), /* final store input */ [v] "m" (*v), [expectnot] "r" (expectnot), @@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ int rseq_addv(intptr_t *v, intptr_t count, int cpu) RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_ABORT(4, "", abort) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [rseq_offset] "r" ((long)rseq_offset), + [rseq_offset] "r" (rseq_offset), /* final store input */ [v] "m" (*v), [count] "er" (count) @@ -329,7 +329,7 @@ int rseq_offset_deref_addv(intptr_t *ptr, long off, intptr_t inc, int cpu) RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_ABORT(4, "", abort) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [rseq_offset] "r" ((long)rseq_offset), + [rseq_offset] "r" (rseq_offset), /* final store input */ [ptr] "m" (*ptr), [off] "er" (off), @@ -387,7 +387,7 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trystorev_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_ABORT(4, "", abort) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [rseq_offset] "r" ((long)rseq_offset), + [rseq_offset] "r" (rseq_offset), /* try store input */ [v2] "m" (*v2), [newv2] "r" (newv2), @@ -469,7 +469,7 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_cmpeqv_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, RSEQ_ASM_DEFINE_ABORT(4, "", abort) : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [rseq_offset] "r" ((long)rseq_offset), + [rseq_offset] "r" (rseq_offset), /* cmp2 input */ [v2] "m" (*v2), [expect2] "r" (expect2), @@ -581,7 +581,7 @@ int rseq_cmpeqv_trymemcpy_storev(intptr_t *v, intptr_t expect, #endif : /* gcc asm goto does not allow outputs */ : [cpu_id] "r" (cpu), - [rseq_offset] "r" ((long)rseq_offset), + [rseq_offset] "r" (rseq_offset), /* final store input */ [v] "m" (*v), [expect] "r" (expect), diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq.c b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq.c index 07ba0d463a96..986b9458efb2 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq.c @@ -27,16 +27,17 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include "../kselftest.h" #include "rseq.h" -static const int *libc_rseq_offset_p; +static const ptrdiff_t *libc_rseq_offset_p; static const unsigned int *libc_rseq_size_p; static const unsigned int *libc_rseq_flags_p; /* Offset from the thread pointer to the rseq area. */ -int rseq_offset; +ptrdiff_t rseq_offset; /* Size of the registered rseq area. 0 if the registration was unsuccessful. */ diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq.h b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq.h index 89427bda75af..c8f49b018dbb 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq.h +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq.h @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include "rseq-abi.h" #include "compiler.h" @@ -47,7 +48,7 @@ #include "rseq-thread-pointer.h" /* Offset from the thread pointer to the rseq area. */ -extern int rseq_offset; +extern ptrdiff_t rseq_offset; /* Size of the registered rseq area. 0 if the registration was unsuccessful. */ extern unsigned int rseq_size; From 42112e8f94617d83943f8f3b8de2b66041905506 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Roger Pau Monne Date: Wed, 30 Mar 2022 09:03:48 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0824/1091] xen/blkfront: fix leaking data in shared pages MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 2f446ffe9d737e9a844b97887919c4fda18246e7 upstream. When allocating pages to be used for shared communication with the backend always zero them, this avoids leaking unintended data present on the pages. This is CVE-2022-26365, part of XSA-403. Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/block/xen-blkfront.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/block/xen-blkfront.c b/drivers/block/xen-blkfront.c index 3731066f2c1c..b8e0a49dabb6 100644 --- a/drivers/block/xen-blkfront.c +++ b/drivers/block/xen-blkfront.c @@ -301,7 +301,7 @@ static int fill_grant_buffer(struct blkfront_ring_info *rinfo, int num) goto out_of_memory; if (info->feature_persistent) { - granted_page = alloc_page(GFP_NOIO); + granted_page = alloc_page(GFP_NOIO | __GFP_ZERO); if (!granted_page) { kfree(gnt_list_entry); goto out_of_memory; @@ -1744,7 +1744,7 @@ static int setup_blkring(struct xenbus_device *dev, for (i = 0; i < info->nr_ring_pages; i++) rinfo->ring_ref[i] = GRANT_INVALID_REF; - sring = alloc_pages_exact(ring_size, GFP_NOIO); + sring = alloc_pages_exact(ring_size, GFP_NOIO | __GFP_ZERO); if (!sring) { xenbus_dev_fatal(dev, -ENOMEM, "allocating shared ring"); return -ENOMEM; @@ -2283,7 +2283,8 @@ static int blkfront_setup_indirect(struct blkfront_ring_info *rinfo) BUG_ON(!list_empty(&rinfo->indirect_pages)); for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { - struct page *indirect_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL); + struct page *indirect_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL | + __GFP_ZERO); if (!indirect_page) goto out_of_memory; list_add(&indirect_page->lru, &rinfo->indirect_pages); From 04945b5beb73019145ac17a2565526afa7293c14 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Roger Pau Monne Date: Wed, 6 Apr 2022 17:38:04 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0825/1091] xen/netfront: fix leaking data in shared pages MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 307c8de2b02344805ebead3440d8feed28f2f010 upstream. When allocating pages to be used for shared communication with the backend always zero them, this avoids leaking unintended data present on the pages. This is CVE-2022-33740, part of XSA-403. Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/xen-netfront.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c b/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c index 94dd6edd1800..af23d0bc6f7c 100644 --- a/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c +++ b/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c @@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *xennet_alloc_one_rx_buffer(struct netfront_queue *queue) if (unlikely(!skb)) return NULL; - page = alloc_page(GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOWARN); + page = alloc_page(GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOWARN | __GFP_ZERO); if (!page) { kfree_skb(skb); return NULL; From ede57be88a5fff42cd00e6bcd071503194d398dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Roger Pau Monne Date: Thu, 7 Apr 2022 12:20:06 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0826/1091] xen/netfront: force data bouncing when backend is untrusted MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 4491001c2e0fa69efbb748c96ec96b100a5cdb7e upstream. Bounce all data on the skbs to be transmitted into zeroed pages if the backend is untrusted. This avoids leaking data present in the pages shared with the backend but not part of the skb fragments. This requires introducing a new helper in order to allocate skbs with a size multiple of XEN_PAGE_SIZE so we don't leak contiguous data on the granted pages. Reporting whether the backend is to be trusted can be done using a module parameter, or from the xenstore frontend path as set by the toolstack when adding the device. This is CVE-2022-33741, part of XSA-403. Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/xen-netfront.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 48 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c b/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c index af23d0bc6f7c..810fa9968be7 100644 --- a/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c +++ b/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c @@ -63,6 +63,10 @@ module_param_named(max_queues, xennet_max_queues, uint, 0644); MODULE_PARM_DESC(max_queues, "Maximum number of queues per virtual interface"); +static bool __read_mostly xennet_trusted = true; +module_param_named(trusted, xennet_trusted, bool, 0644); +MODULE_PARM_DESC(trusted, "Is the backend trusted"); + #define XENNET_TIMEOUT (5 * HZ) static const struct ethtool_ops xennet_ethtool_ops; @@ -163,6 +167,9 @@ struct netfront_info { /* Is device behaving sane? */ bool broken; + /* Should skbs be bounced into a zeroed buffer? */ + bool bounce; + atomic_t rx_gso_checksum_fixup; }; @@ -590,6 +597,34 @@ static void xennet_mark_tx_pending(struct netfront_queue *queue) queue->tx_link[i] = TX_PENDING; } +struct sk_buff *bounce_skb(const struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + unsigned int headerlen = skb_headroom(skb); + /* Align size to allocate full pages and avoid contiguous data leaks */ + unsigned int size = ALIGN(skb_end_offset(skb) + skb->data_len, + XEN_PAGE_SIZE); + struct sk_buff *n = alloc_skb(size, GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_ZERO); + + if (!n) + return NULL; + + if (!IS_ALIGNED((uintptr_t)n->head, XEN_PAGE_SIZE)) { + WARN_ONCE(1, "misaligned skb allocated\n"); + kfree_skb(n); + return NULL; + } + + /* Set the data pointer */ + skb_reserve(n, headerlen); + /* Set the tail pointer and length */ + skb_put(n, skb->len); + + BUG_ON(skb_copy_bits(skb, -headerlen, n->head, headerlen + skb->len)); + + skb_copy_header(n, skb); + return n; +} + #define MAX_XEN_SKB_FRAGS (65536 / XEN_PAGE_SIZE + 1) static netdev_tx_t xennet_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev) @@ -642,9 +677,13 @@ static netdev_tx_t xennet_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev /* The first req should be at least ETH_HLEN size or the packet will be * dropped by netback. + * + * If the backend is not trusted bounce all data to zeroed pages to + * avoid exposing contiguous data on the granted page not belonging to + * the skb. */ - if (unlikely(PAGE_SIZE - offset < ETH_HLEN)) { - nskb = skb_copy(skb, GFP_ATOMIC); + if (np->bounce || unlikely(PAGE_SIZE - offset < ETH_HLEN)) { + nskb = bounce_skb(skb); if (!nskb) goto drop; dev_consume_skb_any(skb); @@ -1950,6 +1989,10 @@ static int talk_to_netback(struct xenbus_device *dev, info->netdev->irq = 0; + /* Check if backend is trusted. */ + info->bounce = !xennet_trusted || + !xenbus_read_unsigned(dev->nodename, "trusted", 1); + /* Check if backend supports multiple queues */ max_queues = xenbus_read_unsigned(info->xbdev->otherend, "multi-queue-max-queues", 1); @@ -2103,6 +2146,9 @@ static int xennet_connect(struct net_device *dev) err = talk_to_netback(np->xbdev, np); if (err) return err; + if (np->bounce) + dev_info(&np->xbdev->dev, + "bouncing transmitted data to zeroed pages\n"); /* talk_to_netback() sets the correct number of queues */ num_queues = dev->real_num_tx_queues; From 60ac50daad36ef3fe9d70d89cfe3b95d381db997 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Roger Pau Monne Date: Thu, 7 Apr 2022 13:04:24 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0827/1091] xen/blkfront: force data bouncing when backend is untrusted MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 2400617da7eebf9167d71a46122828bc479d64c9 upstream. Split the current bounce buffering logic used with persistent grants into it's own option, and allow enabling it independently of persistent grants. This allows to reuse the same code paths to perform the bounce buffering required to avoid leaking contiguous data in shared pages not part of the request fragments. Reporting whether the backend is to be trusted can be done using a module parameter, or from the xenstore frontend path as set by the toolstack when adding the device. This is CVE-2022-33742, part of XSA-403. Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/block/xen-blkfront.c | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/block/xen-blkfront.c b/drivers/block/xen-blkfront.c index b8e0a49dabb6..d0538c03f033 100644 --- a/drivers/block/xen-blkfront.c +++ b/drivers/block/xen-blkfront.c @@ -151,6 +151,10 @@ static unsigned int xen_blkif_max_ring_order; module_param_named(max_ring_page_order, xen_blkif_max_ring_order, int, 0444); MODULE_PARM_DESC(max_ring_page_order, "Maximum order of pages to be used for the shared ring"); +static bool __read_mostly xen_blkif_trusted = true; +module_param_named(trusted, xen_blkif_trusted, bool, 0644); +MODULE_PARM_DESC(trusted, "Is the backend trusted"); + #define BLK_RING_SIZE(info) \ __CONST_RING_SIZE(blkif, XEN_PAGE_SIZE * (info)->nr_ring_pages) @@ -211,6 +215,7 @@ struct blkfront_info unsigned int feature_discard:1; unsigned int feature_secdiscard:1; unsigned int feature_persistent:1; + unsigned int bounce:1; unsigned int discard_granularity; unsigned int discard_alignment; /* Number of 4KB segments handled */ @@ -300,7 +305,7 @@ static int fill_grant_buffer(struct blkfront_ring_info *rinfo, int num) if (!gnt_list_entry) goto out_of_memory; - if (info->feature_persistent) { + if (info->bounce) { granted_page = alloc_page(GFP_NOIO | __GFP_ZERO); if (!granted_page) { kfree(gnt_list_entry); @@ -320,7 +325,7 @@ out_of_memory: list_for_each_entry_safe(gnt_list_entry, n, &rinfo->grants, node) { list_del(&gnt_list_entry->node); - if (info->feature_persistent) + if (info->bounce) __free_page(gnt_list_entry->page); kfree(gnt_list_entry); i--; @@ -366,7 +371,7 @@ static struct grant *get_grant(grant_ref_t *gref_head, /* Assign a gref to this page */ gnt_list_entry->gref = gnttab_claim_grant_reference(gref_head); BUG_ON(gnt_list_entry->gref == -ENOSPC); - if (info->feature_persistent) + if (info->bounce) grant_foreign_access(gnt_list_entry, info); else { /* Grant access to the GFN passed by the caller */ @@ -390,7 +395,7 @@ static struct grant *get_indirect_grant(grant_ref_t *gref_head, /* Assign a gref to this page */ gnt_list_entry->gref = gnttab_claim_grant_reference(gref_head); BUG_ON(gnt_list_entry->gref == -ENOSPC); - if (!info->feature_persistent) { + if (!info->bounce) { struct page *indirect_page; /* Fetch a pre-allocated page to use for indirect grefs */ @@ -705,7 +710,7 @@ static int blkif_queue_rw_req(struct request *req, struct blkfront_ring_info *ri .grant_idx = 0, .segments = NULL, .rinfo = rinfo, - .need_copy = rq_data_dir(req) && info->feature_persistent, + .need_copy = rq_data_dir(req) && info->bounce, }; /* @@ -1026,11 +1031,12 @@ static void xlvbd_flush(struct blkfront_info *info) { blk_queue_write_cache(info->rq, info->feature_flush ? true : false, info->feature_fua ? true : false); - pr_info("blkfront: %s: %s %s %s %s %s\n", + pr_info("blkfront: %s: %s %s %s %s %s %s %s\n", info->gd->disk_name, flush_info(info), "persistent grants:", info->feature_persistent ? "enabled;" : "disabled;", "indirect descriptors:", - info->max_indirect_segments ? "enabled;" : "disabled;"); + info->max_indirect_segments ? "enabled;" : "disabled;", + "bounce buffer:", info->bounce ? "enabled" : "disabled;"); } static int xen_translate_vdev(int vdevice, int *minor, unsigned int *offset) @@ -1265,7 +1271,7 @@ static void blkif_free_ring(struct blkfront_ring_info *rinfo) if (!list_empty(&rinfo->indirect_pages)) { struct page *indirect_page, *n; - BUG_ON(info->feature_persistent); + BUG_ON(info->bounce); list_for_each_entry_safe(indirect_page, n, &rinfo->indirect_pages, lru) { list_del(&indirect_page->lru); __free_page(indirect_page); @@ -1282,7 +1288,7 @@ static void blkif_free_ring(struct blkfront_ring_info *rinfo) 0, 0UL); rinfo->persistent_gnts_c--; } - if (info->feature_persistent) + if (info->bounce) __free_page(persistent_gnt->page); kfree(persistent_gnt); } @@ -1303,7 +1309,7 @@ static void blkif_free_ring(struct blkfront_ring_info *rinfo) for (j = 0; j < segs; j++) { persistent_gnt = rinfo->shadow[i].grants_used[j]; gnttab_end_foreign_access(persistent_gnt->gref, 0, 0UL); - if (info->feature_persistent) + if (info->bounce) __free_page(persistent_gnt->page); kfree(persistent_gnt); } @@ -1493,7 +1499,7 @@ static int blkif_completion(unsigned long *id, data.s = s; num_sg = s->num_sg; - if (bret->operation == BLKIF_OP_READ && info->feature_persistent) { + if (bret->operation == BLKIF_OP_READ && info->bounce) { for_each_sg(s->sg, sg, num_sg, i) { BUG_ON(sg->offset + sg->length > PAGE_SIZE); @@ -1552,7 +1558,7 @@ static int blkif_completion(unsigned long *id, * Add the used indirect page back to the list of * available pages for indirect grefs. */ - if (!info->feature_persistent) { + if (!info->bounce) { indirect_page = s->indirect_grants[i]->page; list_add(&indirect_page->lru, &rinfo->indirect_pages); } @@ -1847,6 +1853,10 @@ static int talk_to_blkback(struct xenbus_device *dev, if (!info) return -ENODEV; + /* Check if backend is trusted. */ + info->bounce = !xen_blkif_trusted || + !xenbus_read_unsigned(dev->nodename, "trusted", 1); + max_page_order = xenbus_read_unsigned(info->xbdev->otherend, "max-ring-page-order", 0); ring_page_order = min(xen_blkif_max_ring_order, max_page_order); @@ -2273,10 +2283,10 @@ static int blkfront_setup_indirect(struct blkfront_ring_info *rinfo) if (err) goto out_of_memory; - if (!info->feature_persistent && info->max_indirect_segments) { + if (!info->bounce && info->max_indirect_segments) { /* - * We are using indirect descriptors but not persistent - * grants, we need to allocate a set of pages that can be + * We are using indirect descriptors but don't have a bounce + * buffer, we need to allocate a set of pages that can be * used for mapping indirect grefs */ int num = INDIRECT_GREFS(grants) * BLK_RING_SIZE(info); @@ -2376,6 +2386,8 @@ static void blkfront_gather_backend_features(struct blkfront_info *info) info->feature_persistent = !!xenbus_read_unsigned(info->xbdev->otherend, "feature-persistent", 0); + if (info->feature_persistent) + info->bounce = true; indirect_segments = xenbus_read_unsigned(info->xbdev->otherend, "feature-max-indirect-segments", 0); @@ -2751,6 +2763,13 @@ static void blkfront_delay_work(struct work_struct *work) struct blkfront_info *info; bool need_schedule_work = false; + /* + * Note that when using bounce buffers but not persistent grants + * there's no need to run blkfront_delay_work because grants are + * revoked in blkif_completion or else an error is reported and the + * connection is closed. + */ + mutex_lock(&blkfront_mutex); list_for_each_entry(info, &info_list, info_list) { From 5c03cad51b84fb26ccea7fd99130d8ec47949cfc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleksandr Tyshchenko Date: Fri, 1 Jul 2022 09:57:42 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0828/1091] xen/arm: Fix race in RB-tree based P2M accounting commit b75cd218274e01d026dc5240e86fdeb44bbed0c8 upstream. During the PV driver life cycle the mappings are added to the RB-tree by set_foreign_p2m_mapping(), which is called from gnttab_map_refs() and are removed by clear_foreign_p2m_mapping() which is called from gnttab_unmap_refs(). As both functions end up calling __set_phys_to_machine_multi() which updates the RB-tree, this function can be called concurrently. There is already a "p2m_lock" to protect against concurrent accesses, but the problem is that the first read of "phys_to_mach.rb_node" in __set_phys_to_machine_multi() is not covered by it, so this might lead to the incorrect mappings update (removing in our case) in RB-tree. In my environment the related issue happens rarely and only when PV net backend is running, the xen_add_phys_to_mach_entry() claims that it cannot add new pfn <-> mfn mapping to the tree since it is already exists which results in a failure when mapping foreign pages. But there might be other bad consequences related to the non-protected root reads such use-after-free, etc. While at it, also fix the similar usage in __pfn_to_mfn(), so initialize "struct rb_node *n" with the "p2m_lock" held in both functions to avoid possible bad consequences. This is CVE-2022-33744 / XSA-406. Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Tyshchenko Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm/xen/p2m.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/xen/p2m.c b/arch/arm/xen/p2m.c index acb464547a54..4a1991a103ea 100644 --- a/arch/arm/xen/p2m.c +++ b/arch/arm/xen/p2m.c @@ -62,11 +62,12 @@ out: unsigned long __pfn_to_mfn(unsigned long pfn) { - struct rb_node *n = phys_to_mach.rb_node; + struct rb_node *n; struct xen_p2m_entry *entry; unsigned long irqflags; read_lock_irqsave(&p2m_lock, irqflags); + n = phys_to_mach.rb_node; while (n) { entry = rb_entry(n, struct xen_p2m_entry, rbnode_phys); if (entry->pfn <= pfn && @@ -153,10 +154,11 @@ bool __set_phys_to_machine_multi(unsigned long pfn, int rc; unsigned long irqflags; struct xen_p2m_entry *p2m_entry; - struct rb_node *n = phys_to_mach.rb_node; + struct rb_node *n; if (mfn == INVALID_P2M_ENTRY) { write_lock_irqsave(&p2m_lock, irqflags); + n = phys_to_mach.rb_node; while (n) { p2m_entry = rb_entry(n, struct xen_p2m_entry, rbnode_phys); if (p2m_entry->pfn <= pfn && From ea89a522b4cce87e19ec2f8927f75ecd8debf552 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Carlo Lobrano Date: Fri, 3 Sep 2021 14:09:53 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0829/1091] net: usb: qmi_wwan: add Telit 0x1060 composition commit 8d17a33b076d24aa4861f336a125c888fb918605 upstream. This patch adds support for Telit LN920 0x1060 composition 0x1060: tty, adb, rmnet, tty, tty, tty, tty Signed-off-by: Carlo Lobrano Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Cc: Fabio Porcedda Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c b/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c index 566ea48fd607..a1e66b9cf7af 100644 --- a/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c @@ -1315,6 +1315,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id products[] = { {QMI_QUIRK_SET_DTR(0x1bc7, 0x1031, 3)}, /* Telit LE910C1-EUX */ {QMI_QUIRK_SET_DTR(0x1bc7, 0x1040, 2)}, /* Telit LE922A */ {QMI_QUIRK_SET_DTR(0x1bc7, 0x1050, 2)}, /* Telit FN980 */ + {QMI_QUIRK_SET_DTR(0x1bc7, 0x1060, 2)}, /* Telit LN920 */ {QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x1bc7, 0x1100, 3)}, /* Telit ME910 */ {QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x1bc7, 0x1101, 3)}, /* Telit ME910 dual modem */ {QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x1bc7, 0x1200, 5)}, /* Telit LE920 */ From d40057538beef6d797ce699506c05da9e387755a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniele Palmas Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2021 10:57:22 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0830/1091] net: usb: qmi_wwan: add Telit 0x1070 composition MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 94f2a444f28a649926c410eb9a38afb13a83ebe0 upstream. Add the following Telit FN990 composition: 0x1070: tty, adb, rmnet, tty, tty, tty, tty Signed-off-by: Daniele Palmas Acked-by: Bjørn Mork Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211210095722.22269-1-dnlplm@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Cc: Fabio Porcedda Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c b/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c index a1e66b9cf7af..8ef0a013874c 100644 --- a/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c @@ -1316,6 +1316,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id products[] = { {QMI_QUIRK_SET_DTR(0x1bc7, 0x1040, 2)}, /* Telit LE922A */ {QMI_QUIRK_SET_DTR(0x1bc7, 0x1050, 2)}, /* Telit FN980 */ {QMI_QUIRK_SET_DTR(0x1bc7, 0x1060, 2)}, /* Telit LN920 */ + {QMI_QUIRK_SET_DTR(0x1bc7, 0x1070, 2)}, /* Telit FN990 */ {QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x1bc7, 0x1100, 3)}, /* Telit ME910 */ {QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x1bc7, 0x1101, 3)}, /* Telit ME910 dual modem */ {QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x1bc7, 0x1200, 5)}, /* Telit LE920 */ From 0ac2845937ce03f474be97687b7d016447b24c3e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Thu, 30 Jun 2022 11:55:42 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0831/1091] clocksource/drivers/ixp4xx: remove EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL from ixp4xx_timer_setup() ixp4xx_timer_setup is exported, and so can not be an __init function. But it does not need to be exported as it is only called from one in-kernel function, so just remove the EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL() marking to resolve the build warning. This is fixed "properly" in commit 41929c9f628b ("clocksource/drivers/ixp4xx: Drop boardfile probe path") but that can not be backported to older kernels as the reworking of the IXP4xx codebase is not suitable for stable releases. Cc: Linus Walleij Cc: Daniel Lezcano Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/clocksource/timer-ixp4xx.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/clocksource/timer-ixp4xx.c b/drivers/clocksource/timer-ixp4xx.c index 9396745e1c17..ad904bbbac6f 100644 --- a/drivers/clocksource/timer-ixp4xx.c +++ b/drivers/clocksource/timer-ixp4xx.c @@ -258,7 +258,6 @@ void __init ixp4xx_timer_setup(resource_size_t timerbase, } ixp4xx_timer_register(base, timer_irq, timer_freq); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ixp4xx_timer_setup); #ifdef CONFIG_OF static __init int ixp4xx_of_timer_init(struct device_node *np) From 49286fbdad47ecca61a4818e77bd0aced7f59383 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Thu, 7 Jul 2022 17:36:53 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0832/1091] Linux 5.4.204 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220705115610.236040773@linuxfoundation.org Tested-by: Jon Hunter Tested-by: Florian Fainelli Tested-by: Hulk Robot Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing Tested-by: Sudip Mukherjee Tested-by: Guenter Roeck Tested-by: Shuah Khan Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Makefile | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index 86f518e49c33..b5d1718ae70c 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 VERSION = 5 PATCHLEVEL = 4 -SUBLEVEL = 203 +SUBLEVEL = 204 EXTRAVERSION = NAME = Kleptomaniac Octopus From 3defefd22ad5fbbe639b6157fb7e6311b2bf333d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sabrina Dubroca Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2022 10:10:50 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0833/1091] esp: limit skb_page_frag_refill use to a single page commit 5bd8baab087dff657e05387aee802e70304cc813 upstream. Commit ebe48d368e97 ("esp: Fix possible buffer overflow in ESP transformation") tried to fix skb_page_frag_refill usage in ESP by capping allocsize to 32k, but that doesn't completely solve the issue, as skb_page_frag_refill may return a single page. If that happens, we will write out of bounds, despite the check introduced in the previous patch. This patch forces COW in cases where we would end up calling skb_page_frag_refill with a size larger than a page (first in esp_output_head with tailen, then in esp_output_tail with skb->data_len). Fixes: cac2661c53f3 ("esp4: Avoid skb_cow_data whenever possible") Fixes: 03e2a30f6a27 ("esp6: Avoid skb_cow_data whenever possible") Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/net/esp.h | 2 -- net/ipv4/esp4.c | 5 ++--- net/ipv6/esp6.c | 5 ++--- 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/esp.h b/include/net/esp.h index 465e38890ee9..117652eb6ea3 100644 --- a/include/net/esp.h +++ b/include/net/esp.h @@ -4,8 +4,6 @@ #include -#define ESP_SKB_FRAG_MAXSIZE (PAGE_SIZE << SKB_FRAG_PAGE_ORDER) - struct ip_esp_hdr; static inline struct ip_esp_hdr *ip_esp_hdr(const struct sk_buff *skb) diff --git a/net/ipv4/esp4.c b/net/ipv4/esp4.c index ef20f550d2f8..f555dd4bac65 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/esp4.c +++ b/net/ipv4/esp4.c @@ -277,7 +277,6 @@ int esp_output_head(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb, struct esp_info * struct page *page; struct sk_buff *trailer; int tailen = esp->tailen; - unsigned int allocsz; /* this is non-NULL only with UDP Encapsulation */ if (x->encap) { @@ -287,8 +286,8 @@ int esp_output_head(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb, struct esp_info * return err; } - allocsz = ALIGN(skb->data_len + tailen, L1_CACHE_BYTES); - if (allocsz > ESP_SKB_FRAG_MAXSIZE) + if (ALIGN(tailen, L1_CACHE_BYTES) > PAGE_SIZE || + ALIGN(skb->data_len, L1_CACHE_BYTES) > PAGE_SIZE) goto cow; if (!skb_cloned(skb)) { diff --git a/net/ipv6/esp6.c b/net/ipv6/esp6.c index 79f117e33b80..b64791d3b0f8 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/esp6.c +++ b/net/ipv6/esp6.c @@ -230,10 +230,9 @@ int esp6_output_head(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb, struct esp_info struct page *page; struct sk_buff *trailer; int tailen = esp->tailen; - unsigned int allocsz; - allocsz = ALIGN(skb->data_len + tailen, L1_CACHE_BYTES); - if (allocsz > ESP_SKB_FRAG_MAXSIZE) + if (ALIGN(tailen, L1_CACHE_BYTES) > PAGE_SIZE || + ALIGN(skb->data_len, L1_CACHE_BYTES) > PAGE_SIZE) goto cow; if (!skb_cloned(skb)) { From e7e3e90d671078455a3a08189f89d85b3da2de9e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jann Horn Date: Wed, 8 Jun 2022 20:22:05 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0834/1091] mm/slub: add missing TID updates on slab deactivation commit eeaa345e128515135ccb864c04482180c08e3259 upstream. The fastpath in slab_alloc_node() assumes that c->slab is stable as long as the TID stays the same. However, two places in __slab_alloc() currently don't update the TID when deactivating the CPU slab. If multiple operations race the right way, this could lead to an object getting lost; or, in an even more unlikely situation, it could even lead to an object being freed onto the wrong slab's freelist, messing up the `inuse` counter and eventually causing a page to be freed to the page allocator while it still contains slab objects. (I haven't actually tested these cases though, this is just based on looking at the code. Writing testcases for this stuff seems like it'd be a pain...) The race leading to state inconsistency is (all operations on the same CPU and kmem_cache): - task A: begin do_slab_free(): - read TID - read pcpu freelist (==NULL) - check `slab == c->slab` (true) - [PREEMPT A->B] - task B: begin slab_alloc_node(): - fastpath fails (`c->freelist` is NULL) - enter __slab_alloc() - slub_get_cpu_ptr() (disables preemption) - enter ___slab_alloc() - take local_lock_irqsave() - read c->freelist as NULL - get_freelist() returns NULL - write `c->slab = NULL` - drop local_unlock_irqrestore() - goto new_slab - slub_percpu_partial() is NULL - get_partial() returns NULL - slub_put_cpu_ptr() (enables preemption) - [PREEMPT B->A] - task A: finish do_slab_free(): - this_cpu_cmpxchg_double() succeeds() - [CORRUPT STATE: c->slab==NULL, c->freelist!=NULL] From there, the object on c->freelist will get lost if task B is allowed to continue from here: It will proceed to the retry_load_slab label, set c->slab, then jump to load_freelist, which clobbers c->freelist. But if we instead continue as follows, we get worse corruption: - task A: run __slab_free() on object from other struct slab: - CPU_PARTIAL_FREE case (slab was on no list, is now on pcpu partial) - task A: run slab_alloc_node() with NUMA node constraint: - fastpath fails (c->slab is NULL) - call __slab_alloc() - slub_get_cpu_ptr() (disables preemption) - enter ___slab_alloc() - c->slab is NULL: goto new_slab - slub_percpu_partial() is non-NULL - set c->slab to slub_percpu_partial(c) - [CORRUPT STATE: c->slab points to slab-1, c->freelist has objects from slab-2] - goto redo - node_match() fails - goto deactivate_slab - existing c->freelist is passed into deactivate_slab() - inuse count of slab-1 is decremented to account for object from slab-2 At this point, the inuse count of slab-1 is 1 lower than it should be. This means that if we free all allocated objects in slab-1 except for one, SLUB will think that slab-1 is completely unused, and may free its page, leading to use-after-free. Fixes: c17dda40a6a4e ("slub: Separate out kmem_cache_cpu processing from deactivate_slab") Fixes: 03e404af26dc2 ("slub: fast release on full slab") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jann Horn Acked-by: Christoph Lameter Acked-by: David Rientjes Reviewed-by: Muchun Song Tested-by: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220608182205.2945720-1-jannh@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- mm/slub.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c index 63fe43c8d332..5211496f6d24 100644 --- a/mm/slub.c +++ b/mm/slub.c @@ -2214,6 +2214,7 @@ redo: c->page = NULL; c->freelist = NULL; + c->tid = next_tid(c->tid); } /* @@ -2347,8 +2348,6 @@ static inline void flush_slab(struct kmem_cache *s, struct kmem_cache_cpu *c) { stat(s, CPUSLAB_FLUSH); deactivate_slab(s, c->page, c->freelist, c); - - c->tid = next_tid(c->tid); } /* @@ -2632,6 +2631,7 @@ redo: if (!freelist) { c->page = NULL; + c->tid = next_tid(c->tid); stat(s, DEACTIVATE_BYPASS); goto new_slab; } From 5b48f5711f1c630841ab78dcc061de902f0e37bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oliver Hartkopp Date: Fri, 20 May 2022 20:32:39 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0835/1091] can: bcm: use call_rcu() instead of costly synchronize_rcu() commit f1b4e32aca0811aa011c76e5d6cf2fa19224b386 upstream. In commit d5f9023fa61e ("can: bcm: delay release of struct bcm_op after synchronize_rcu()") Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo introduced two synchronize_rcu() calls in bcm_release() (only once at socket close) and in bcm_delete_rx_op() (called on removal of each single bcm_op). Unfortunately this slow removal of the bcm_op's affects user space applications like cansniffer where the modification of a filter removes 2048 bcm_op's which blocks the cansniffer application for 40(!) seconds. In commit 181d4447905d ("can: gw: use call_rcu() instead of costly synchronize_rcu()") Eric Dumazet replaced the synchronize_rcu() calls with several call_rcu()'s to safely remove the data structures after the removal of CAN ID subscriptions with can_rx_unregister() calls. This patch adopts Erics approach for the can-bcm which should be applicable since the removal of tasklet_kill() in bcm_remove_op() and the introduction of the HRTIMER_MODE_SOFT timer handling in Linux 5.4. Fixes: d5f9023fa61e ("can: bcm: delay release of struct bcm_op after synchronize_rcu()") # >= 5.4 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220520183239.19111-1-socketcan@hartkopp.net Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Eric Dumazet Cc: Norbert Slusarek Cc: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/can/bcm.c | 18 ++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/can/bcm.c b/net/can/bcm.c index 1e17778d5cee..63d81147fb4e 100644 --- a/net/can/bcm.c +++ b/net/can/bcm.c @@ -102,6 +102,7 @@ static inline u64 get_u64(const struct canfd_frame *cp, int offset) struct bcm_op { struct list_head list; + struct rcu_head rcu; int ifindex; canid_t can_id; u32 flags; @@ -720,10 +721,9 @@ static struct bcm_op *bcm_find_op(struct list_head *ops, return NULL; } -static void bcm_remove_op(struct bcm_op *op) +static void bcm_free_op_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu_head) { - hrtimer_cancel(&op->timer); - hrtimer_cancel(&op->thrtimer); + struct bcm_op *op = container_of(rcu_head, struct bcm_op, rcu); if ((op->frames) && (op->frames != &op->sframe)) kfree(op->frames); @@ -734,6 +734,14 @@ static void bcm_remove_op(struct bcm_op *op) kfree(op); } +static void bcm_remove_op(struct bcm_op *op) +{ + hrtimer_cancel(&op->timer); + hrtimer_cancel(&op->thrtimer); + + call_rcu(&op->rcu, bcm_free_op_rcu); +} + static void bcm_rx_unreg(struct net_device *dev, struct bcm_op *op) { if (op->rx_reg_dev == dev) { @@ -759,6 +767,9 @@ static int bcm_delete_rx_op(struct list_head *ops, struct bcm_msg_head *mh, if ((op->can_id == mh->can_id) && (op->ifindex == ifindex) && (op->flags & CAN_FD_FRAME) == (mh->flags & CAN_FD_FRAME)) { + /* disable automatic timer on frame reception */ + op->flags |= RX_NO_AUTOTIMER; + /* * Don't care if we're bound or not (due to netdev * problems) can_rx_unregister() is always a save @@ -787,7 +798,6 @@ static int bcm_delete_rx_op(struct list_head *ops, struct bcm_msg_head *mh, bcm_rx_handler, op); list_del(&op->list); - synchronize_rcu(); bcm_remove_op(op); return 1; /* done */ } From eb7bbd7728da4ae4b64ceb556b808606f6576186 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Liang He Date: Sun, 19 Jun 2022 15:02:57 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0836/1091] can: grcan: grcan_probe(): remove extra of_node_get() commit 562fed945ea482833667f85496eeda766d511386 upstream. In grcan_probe(), of_find_node_by_path() has already increased the refcount. There is no need to call of_node_get() again, so remove it. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220619070257.4067022-1-windhl@126.com Fixes: 1e93ed26acf0 ("can: grcan: grcan_probe(): fix broken system id check for errata workaround needs") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.18 Cc: Andreas Larsson Signed-off-by: Liang He Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/can/grcan.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/can/grcan.c b/drivers/net/can/grcan.c index e613cd5707e2..ca864ece89ae 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/grcan.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/grcan.c @@ -1660,7 +1660,6 @@ static int grcan_probe(struct platform_device *ofdev) */ sysid_parent = of_find_node_by_path("/ambapp0"); if (sysid_parent) { - of_node_get(sysid_parent); err = of_property_read_u32(sysid_parent, "systemid", &sysid); if (!err && ((sysid & GRLIB_VERSION_MASK) >= GRCAN_TXBUG_SAFE_GRLIB_VERSION)) From 6f655b5e13fa4b27e915b6c209ac0da74fd75963 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Rhett Aultman Date: Sun, 3 Jul 2022 19:33:06 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0837/1091] can: gs_usb: gs_usb_open/close(): fix memory leak commit 2bda24ef95c0311ab93bda00db40486acf30bd0a upstream. The gs_usb driver appears to suffer from a malady common to many USB CAN adapter drivers in that it performs usb_alloc_coherent() to allocate a number of USB request blocks (URBs) for RX, and then later relies on usb_kill_anchored_urbs() to free them, but this doesn't actually free them. As a result, this may be leaking DMA memory that's been used by the driver. This commit is an adaptation of the techniques found in the esd_usb2 driver where a similar design pattern led to a memory leak. It explicitly frees the RX URBs and their DMA memory via a call to usb_free_coherent(). Since the RX URBs were allocated in the gs_can_open(), we remove them in gs_can_close() rather than in the disconnect function as was done in esd_usb2. For more information, see the 928150fad41b ("can: esd_usb2: fix memory leak"). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/alpine.DEB.2.22.394.2206031547001.1630869@thelappy Fixes: d08e973a77d1 ("can: gs_usb: Added support for the GS_USB CAN devices") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Rhett Aultman Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/can/usb/gs_usb.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/can/usb/gs_usb.c b/drivers/net/can/usb/gs_usb.c index 76747d94c760..bf4ab30186af 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/usb/gs_usb.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/usb/gs_usb.c @@ -184,6 +184,8 @@ struct gs_can { struct usb_anchor tx_submitted; atomic_t active_tx_urbs; + void *rxbuf[GS_MAX_RX_URBS]; + dma_addr_t rxbuf_dma[GS_MAX_RX_URBS]; }; /* usb interface struct */ @@ -592,6 +594,7 @@ static int gs_can_open(struct net_device *netdev) for (i = 0; i < GS_MAX_RX_URBS; i++) { struct urb *urb; u8 *buf; + dma_addr_t buf_dma; /* alloc rx urb */ urb = usb_alloc_urb(0, GFP_KERNEL); @@ -602,7 +605,7 @@ static int gs_can_open(struct net_device *netdev) buf = usb_alloc_coherent(dev->udev, sizeof(struct gs_host_frame), GFP_KERNEL, - &urb->transfer_dma); + &buf_dma); if (!buf) { netdev_err(netdev, "No memory left for USB buffer\n"); @@ -610,6 +613,8 @@ static int gs_can_open(struct net_device *netdev) return -ENOMEM; } + urb->transfer_dma = buf_dma; + /* fill, anchor, and submit rx urb */ usb_fill_bulk_urb(urb, dev->udev, @@ -633,10 +638,17 @@ static int gs_can_open(struct net_device *netdev) rc); usb_unanchor_urb(urb); + usb_free_coherent(dev->udev, + sizeof(struct gs_host_frame), + buf, + buf_dma); usb_free_urb(urb); break; } + dev->rxbuf[i] = buf; + dev->rxbuf_dma[i] = buf_dma; + /* Drop reference, * USB core will take care of freeing it */ @@ -701,13 +713,20 @@ static int gs_can_close(struct net_device *netdev) int rc; struct gs_can *dev = netdev_priv(netdev); struct gs_usb *parent = dev->parent; + unsigned int i; netif_stop_queue(netdev); /* Stop polling */ parent->active_channels--; - if (!parent->active_channels) + if (!parent->active_channels) { usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&parent->rx_submitted); + for (i = 0; i < GS_MAX_RX_URBS; i++) + usb_free_coherent(dev->udev, + sizeof(struct gs_host_frame), + dev->rxbuf[i], + dev->rxbuf_dma[i]); + } /* Stop sending URBs */ usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&dev->tx_submitted); From 04894ab34faf40ab72a8a5ab5b404bb0606bbbff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oliver Neukum Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2022 14:53:51 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0838/1091] usbnet: fix memory leak in error case commit b55a21b764c1e182014630fa5486d717484ac58f upstream. usbnet_write_cmd_async() mixed up which buffers need to be freed in which error case. v2: add Fixes tag v3: fix uninitialized buf pointer Fixes: 877bd862f32b8 ("usbnet: introduce usbnet 3 command helpers") Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220705125351.17309-1-oneukum@suse.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c | 17 ++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c b/drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c index 997936c3a30f..6598a4cba158 100644 --- a/drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c @@ -2120,7 +2120,7 @@ static void usbnet_async_cmd_cb(struct urb *urb) int usbnet_write_cmd_async(struct usbnet *dev, u8 cmd, u8 reqtype, u16 value, u16 index, const void *data, u16 size) { - struct usb_ctrlrequest *req = NULL; + struct usb_ctrlrequest *req; struct urb *urb; int err = -ENOMEM; void *buf = NULL; @@ -2138,7 +2138,7 @@ int usbnet_write_cmd_async(struct usbnet *dev, u8 cmd, u8 reqtype, if (!buf) { netdev_err(dev->net, "Error allocating buffer" " in %s!\n", __func__); - goto fail_free; + goto fail_free_urb; } } @@ -2162,14 +2162,21 @@ int usbnet_write_cmd_async(struct usbnet *dev, u8 cmd, u8 reqtype, if (err < 0) { netdev_err(dev->net, "Error submitting the control" " message: status=%d\n", err); - goto fail_free; + goto fail_free_all; } return 0; +fail_free_all: + kfree(req); fail_free_buf: kfree(buf); -fail_free: - kfree(req); + /* + * avoid a double free + * needed because the flag can be set only + * after filling the URB + */ + urb->transfer_flags = 0; +fail_free_urb: usb_free_urb(urb); fail: return err; From 800bb66ab27521f388f0454886e4834f28c0b637 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Duoming Zhou Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2022 20:56:10 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0839/1091] net: rose: fix UAF bug caused by rose_t0timer_expiry commit 148ca04518070910739dfc4eeda765057856403d upstream. There are UAF bugs caused by rose_t0timer_expiry(). The root cause is that del_timer() could not stop the timer handler that is running and there is no synchronization. One of the race conditions is shown below: (thread 1) | (thread 2) | rose_device_event | rose_rt_device_down | rose_remove_neigh rose_t0timer_expiry | rose_stop_t0timer(rose_neigh) ... | del_timer(&neigh->t0timer) | kfree(rose_neigh) //[1]FREE neigh->dce_mode //[2]USE | The rose_neigh is deallocated in position [1] and use in position [2]. The crash trace triggered by POC is like below: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in expire_timers+0x144/0x320 Write of size 8 at addr ffff888009b19658 by task swapper/0/0 ... Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0xbf/0xee print_address_description+0x7b/0x440 print_report+0x101/0x230 ? expire_timers+0x144/0x320 kasan_report+0xed/0x120 ? expire_timers+0x144/0x320 expire_timers+0x144/0x320 __run_timers+0x3ff/0x4d0 run_timer_softirq+0x41/0x80 __do_softirq+0x233/0x544 ... This patch changes rose_stop_ftimer() and rose_stop_t0timer() in rose_remove_neigh() to del_timer_sync() in order that the timer handler could be finished before the resources such as rose_neigh and so on are deallocated. As a result, the UAF bugs could be mitigated. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Duoming Zhou Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220705125610.77971-1-duoming@zju.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/rose/rose_route.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/rose/rose_route.c b/net/rose/rose_route.c index c53307623236..5f32113c9bbd 100644 --- a/net/rose/rose_route.c +++ b/net/rose/rose_route.c @@ -227,8 +227,8 @@ static void rose_remove_neigh(struct rose_neigh *rose_neigh) { struct rose_neigh *s; - rose_stop_ftimer(rose_neigh); - rose_stop_t0timer(rose_neigh); + del_timer_sync(&rose_neigh->ftimer); + del_timer_sync(&rose_neigh->t0timer); skb_queue_purge(&rose_neigh->queue); From 14ff1184310fc5f1f8e9318b05f0afba7995c566 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yian Chen Date: Fri, 20 May 2022 17:21:15 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0840/1091] iommu/vt-d: Fix PCI bus rescan device hot add commit 316f92a705a4c2bf4712135180d56f3cca09243a upstream. Notifier calling chain uses priority to determine the execution order of the notifiers or listeners registered to the chain. PCI bus device hot add utilizes the notification mechanism. The current code sets low priority (INT_MIN) to Intel dmar_pci_bus_notifier and postpones DMAR decoding after adding new device into IOMMU. The result is that struct device pointer cannot be found in DRHD search for the new device's DMAR/IOMMU. Subsequently, the device is put under the "catch-all" IOMMU instead of the correct one. This could cause system hang when device TLB invalidation is sent to the wrong IOMMU. Invalidation timeout error and hard lockup have been observed and data inconsistency/crush may occur as well. This patch fixes the issue by setting a positive priority(1) for dmar_pci_bus_notifier while the priority of IOMMU bus notifier uses the default value(0), therefore DMAR decoding will be in advance of DRHD search for a new device to find the correct IOMMU. Following is a 2-step example that triggers the bug by simulating PCI device hot add behavior in Intel Sapphire Rapids server. echo 1 > /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:6a:01.0/remove echo 1 > /sys/bus/pci/rescan Fixes: 59ce0515cdaf ("iommu/vt-d: Update DRHD/RMRR/ATSR device scope") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.15+ Reported-by: Zhang, Bernice Signed-off-by: Jacob Pan Signed-off-by: Yian Chen Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220521002115.1624069-1-yian.chen@intel.com Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iommu/dmar.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/iommu/dmar.c b/drivers/iommu/dmar.c index 24616525c90d..9f7c1e29e86a 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/dmar.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/dmar.c @@ -363,7 +363,7 @@ static int dmar_pci_bus_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb, static struct notifier_block dmar_pci_bus_nb = { .notifier_call = dmar_pci_bus_notifier, - .priority = INT_MIN, + .priority = 1, }; static struct dmar_drhd_unit * From 407c1b491fbd774b9c38545718a8225b12acacb1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Guiling Deng Date: Tue, 28 Jun 2022 09:36:41 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0841/1091] fbdev: fbmem: Fix logo center image dx issue commit 955f04766d4e6eb94bf3baa539e096808c74ebfb upstream. Image.dx gets wrong value because of missing '()'. If xres == logo->width and n == 1, image.dx = -16. Signed-off-by: Guiling Deng Fixes: 3d8b1933eb1c ("fbdev: fbmem: add config option to center the bootup logo") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.0+ Signed-off-by: Helge Deller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c index 03b1bf994cc9..b47cf33d2e93 100644 --- a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c +++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c @@ -512,7 +512,7 @@ static int fb_show_logo_line(struct fb_info *info, int rotate, while (n && (n * (logo->width + 8) - 8 > xres)) --n; - image.dx = (xres - n * (logo->width + 8) - 8) / 2; + image.dx = (xres - (n * (logo->width + 8) - 8)) / 2; image.dy = y ?: (yres - logo->height) / 2; } else { image.dx = 0; From 997d86cd3e39251f75c2302b538e74b4e8c9e8f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Helge Deller Date: Wed, 29 Jun 2022 15:53:55 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0842/1091] fbmem: Check virtual screen sizes in fb_set_var() commit 6c11df58fd1ac0aefcb3b227f72769272b939e56 upstream. Verify that the fbdev or drm driver correctly adjusted the virtual screen sizes. On failure report the failing driver and reject the screen size change. Signed-off-by: Helge Deller Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.4+ Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c index b47cf33d2e93..e3b44526297b 100644 --- a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c +++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c @@ -1014,6 +1014,16 @@ fb_set_var(struct fb_info *info, struct fb_var_screeninfo *var) if (ret) return ret; + /* verify that virtual resolution >= physical resolution */ + if (var->xres_virtual < var->xres || + var->yres_virtual < var->yres) { + pr_warn("WARNING: fbcon: Driver '%s' missed to adjust virtual screen size (%ux%u vs. %ux%u)\n", + info->fix.id, + var->xres_virtual, var->yres_virtual, + var->xres, var->yres); + return -EINVAL; + } + if ((var->activate & FB_ACTIVATE_MASK) != FB_ACTIVATE_NOW) return 0; From 4f34f380f952289e818c76617bbb5c9a3a9a9dd0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Helge Deller Date: Sat, 25 Jun 2022 12:56:49 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0843/1091] fbcon: Disallow setting font bigger than screen size commit 65a01e601dbba8b7a51a2677811f70f783766682 upstream. Prevent that users set a font size which is bigger than the physical screen. It's unlikely this may happen (because screens are usually much larger than the fonts and each font char is limited to 32x32 pixels), but it may happen on smaller screens/LCD displays. Signed-off-by: Helge Deller Reviewed-by: Daniel Vetter Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.14+ Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c index 1decded4845f..4bc484ea1a14 100644 --- a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c +++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c @@ -2490,6 +2490,11 @@ static int fbcon_set_font(struct vc_data *vc, struct console_font *font, if (charcount != 256 && charcount != 512) return -EINVAL; + /* font bigger than screen resolution ? */ + if (w > FBCON_SWAP(info->var.rotate, info->var.xres, info->var.yres) || + h > FBCON_SWAP(info->var.rotate, info->var.yres, info->var.xres)) + return -EINVAL; + /* Make sure drawing engine can handle the font */ if (!(info->pixmap.blit_x & (1 << (font->width - 1))) || !(info->pixmap.blit_y & (1 << (font->height - 1)))) From af93e821973426ded00158ea66a977039483997e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Helge Deller Date: Sat, 25 Jun 2022 13:00:34 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0844/1091] fbcon: Prevent that screen size is smaller than font size commit e64242caef18b4a5840b0e7a9bff37abd4f4f933 upstream. We need to prevent that users configure a screen size which is smaller than the currently selected font size. Otherwise rendering chars on the screen will access memory outside the graphics memory region. This patch adds a new function fbcon_modechange_possible() which implements this check and which later may be extended with other checks if necessary. The new function is called from the FBIOPUT_VSCREENINFO ioctl handler in fbmem.c, which will return -EINVAL if userspace asked for a too small screen size. Signed-off-by: Helge Deller Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.4+ Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c | 4 +++- include/linux/fbcon.h | 4 ++++ 3 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c index 4bc484ea1a14..8721b7513136 100644 --- a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c +++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c @@ -2761,6 +2761,34 @@ void fbcon_update_vcs(struct fb_info *info, bool all) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(fbcon_update_vcs); +/* let fbcon check if it supports a new screen resolution */ +int fbcon_modechange_possible(struct fb_info *info, struct fb_var_screeninfo *var) +{ + struct fbcon_ops *ops = info->fbcon_par; + struct vc_data *vc; + unsigned int i; + + WARN_CONSOLE_UNLOCKED(); + + if (!ops) + return 0; + + /* prevent setting a screen size which is smaller than font size */ + for (i = first_fb_vc; i <= last_fb_vc; i++) { + vc = vc_cons[i].d; + if (!vc || vc->vc_mode != KD_TEXT || + registered_fb[con2fb_map[i]] != info) + continue; + + if (vc->vc_font.width > FBCON_SWAP(var->rotate, var->xres, var->yres) || + vc->vc_font.height > FBCON_SWAP(var->rotate, var->yres, var->xres)) + return -EINVAL; + } + + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fbcon_modechange_possible); + int fbcon_mode_deleted(struct fb_info *info, struct fb_videomode *mode) { diff --git a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c index e3b44526297b..23ce47655c93 100644 --- a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c +++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c @@ -1114,7 +1114,9 @@ static long do_fb_ioctl(struct fb_info *info, unsigned int cmd, return -EFAULT; console_lock(); lock_fb_info(info); - ret = fb_set_var(info, &var); + ret = fbcon_modechange_possible(info, &var); + if (!ret) + ret = fb_set_var(info, &var); if (!ret) fbcon_update_vcs(info, var.activate & FB_ACTIVATE_ALL); unlock_fb_info(info); diff --git a/include/linux/fbcon.h b/include/linux/fbcon.h index ff5596dd30f8..2382dec6d6ab 100644 --- a/include/linux/fbcon.h +++ b/include/linux/fbcon.h @@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ void fbcon_new_modelist(struct fb_info *info); void fbcon_get_requirement(struct fb_info *info, struct fb_blit_caps *caps); void fbcon_fb_blanked(struct fb_info *info, int blank); +int fbcon_modechange_possible(struct fb_info *info, + struct fb_var_screeninfo *var); void fbcon_update_vcs(struct fb_info *info, bool all); void fbcon_remap_all(struct fb_info *info); int fbcon_set_con2fb_map_ioctl(void __user *argp); @@ -33,6 +35,8 @@ static inline void fbcon_new_modelist(struct fb_info *info) {} static inline void fbcon_get_requirement(struct fb_info *info, struct fb_blit_caps *caps) {} static inline void fbcon_fb_blanked(struct fb_info *info, int blank) {} +static inline int fbcon_modechange_possible(struct fb_info *info, + struct fb_var_screeninfo *var) { return 0; } static inline void fbcon_update_vcs(struct fb_info *info, bool all) {} static inline void fbcon_remap_all(struct fb_info *info) {} static inline int fbcon_set_con2fb_map_ioctl(void __user *argp) { return 0; } From 782b65ee7bbe2b183f22439bba69ec2ea20bfeac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hsin-Yi Wang Date: Fri, 1 Jul 2022 01:33:29 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0845/1091] video: of_display_timing.h: include errno.h commit 3663a2fb325b8782524f3edb0ae32d6faa615109 upstream. If CONFIG_OF is not enabled, default of_get_display_timing() returns an errno, so include the header. Fixes: 422b67e0b31a ("videomode: provide dummy inline functions for !CONFIG_OF") Suggested-by: Stephen Boyd Signed-off-by: Hsin-Yi Wang Reviewed-by: Stephen Boyd Signed-off-by: Helge Deller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/video/of_display_timing.h | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/video/of_display_timing.h b/include/video/of_display_timing.h index e1126a74882a..eff166fdd81b 100644 --- a/include/video/of_display_timing.h +++ b/include/video/of_display_timing.h @@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ #ifndef __LINUX_OF_DISPLAY_TIMING_H #define __LINUX_OF_DISPLAY_TIMING_H +#include + struct device_node; struct display_timing; struct display_timings; From 0adb049bac09a7292bb5ae3742ab4c059f5efc3e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Thu, 30 Jun 2022 14:16:54 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0846/1091] powerpc/powernv: delay rng platform device creation until later in boot commit 887502826549caa7e4215fd9e628f48f14c0825a upstream. The platform device for the rng must be created much later in boot. Otherwise it tries to connect to a parent that doesn't yet exist, resulting in this splat: [ 0.000478] kobject: '(null)' ((____ptrval____)): is not initialized, yet kobject_get() is being called. [ 0.002925] [c000000002a0fb30] [c00000000073b0bc] kobject_get+0x8c/0x100 (unreliable) [ 0.003071] [c000000002a0fba0] [c00000000087e464] device_add+0xf4/0xb00 [ 0.003194] [c000000002a0fc80] [c000000000a7f6e4] of_device_add+0x64/0x80 [ 0.003321] [c000000002a0fcb0] [c000000000a800d0] of_platform_device_create_pdata+0xd0/0x1b0 [ 0.003476] [c000000002a0fd00] [c00000000201fa44] pnv_get_random_long_early+0x240/0x2e4 [ 0.003623] [c000000002a0fe20] [c000000002060c38] random_init+0xc0/0x214 This patch fixes the issue by doing the platform device creation inside of machine_subsys_initcall. Fixes: f3eac426657d ("powerpc/powernv: wire up rng during setup_arch") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Sachin Sant Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Tested-by: Sachin Sant [mpe: Change "of node" to "platform device" in change log] Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220630121654.1939181-1-Jason@zx2c4.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/rng.c | 16 ++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/rng.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/rng.c index eba4142998b0..7186e17cfd3d 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/rng.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/rng.c @@ -176,12 +176,8 @@ static int __init pnv_get_random_long_early(unsigned long *v) NULL) != pnv_get_random_long_early) return 0; - for_each_compatible_node(dn, NULL, "ibm,power-rng") { - if (rng_create(dn)) - continue; - /* Create devices for hwrng driver */ - of_platform_device_create(dn, NULL, NULL); - } + for_each_compatible_node(dn, NULL, "ibm,power-rng") + rng_create(dn); if (!ppc_md.get_random_seed) return 0; @@ -205,10 +201,18 @@ void __init pnv_rng_init(void) static int __init pnv_rng_late_init(void) { + struct device_node *dn; unsigned long v; + /* In case it wasn't called during init for some other reason. */ if (ppc_md.get_random_seed == pnv_get_random_long_early) pnv_get_random_long_early(&v); + + if (ppc_md.get_random_seed == powernv_get_random_long) { + for_each_compatible_node(dn, NULL, "ibm,power-rng") + of_platform_device_create(dn, NULL, NULL); + } + return 0; } machine_subsys_initcall(powernv, pnv_rng_late_init); From 93f228fcbef21072209f318e0817e6859105a6b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jimmy Assarsson Date: Fri, 8 Jul 2022 20:47:51 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0847/1091] can: kvaser_usb: replace run-time checks with struct kvaser_usb_driver_info commit 49f274c72357d2d74cba70b172cf369768909707 upstream. Unify and move compile-time known information into new struct kvaser_usb_driver_info, in favor of run-time checks. All Kvaser USBcanII supports listen-only mode and error counter reporting. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220603083820.800246-2-extja@kvaser.com Suggested-by: Marc Kleine-Budde Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jimmy Assarsson [mkl: move struct kvaser_usb_driver_info into kvaser_usb_core.c] Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/can/usb/kvaser_usb/kvaser_usb.h | 22 +- .../net/can/usb/kvaser_usb/kvaser_usb_core.c | 244 ++++++++++-------- .../net/can/usb/kvaser_usb/kvaser_usb_leaf.c | 24 +- 3 files changed, 155 insertions(+), 135 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/can/usb/kvaser_usb/kvaser_usb.h b/drivers/net/can/usb/kvaser_usb/kvaser_usb.h index 390b6bde883c..2e358e20d3d9 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/usb/kvaser_usb/kvaser_usb.h +++ b/drivers/net/can/usb/kvaser_usb/kvaser_usb.h @@ -35,9 +35,9 @@ #define KVASER_USB_RX_BUFFER_SIZE 3072 #define KVASER_USB_MAX_NET_DEVICES 5 -/* USB devices features */ -#define KVASER_USB_HAS_SILENT_MODE BIT(0) -#define KVASER_USB_HAS_TXRX_ERRORS BIT(1) +/* Kvaser USB device quirks */ +#define KVASER_USB_QUIRK_HAS_SILENT_MODE BIT(0) +#define KVASER_USB_QUIRK_HAS_TXRX_ERRORS BIT(1) /* Device capabilities */ #define KVASER_USB_CAP_BERR_CAP 0x01 @@ -65,12 +65,7 @@ struct kvaser_usb_dev_card_data_hydra { struct kvaser_usb_dev_card_data { u32 ctrlmode_supported; u32 capabilities; - union { - struct { - enum kvaser_usb_leaf_family family; - } leaf; - struct kvaser_usb_dev_card_data_hydra hydra; - }; + struct kvaser_usb_dev_card_data_hydra hydra; }; /* Context for an outstanding, not yet ACKed, transmission */ @@ -84,7 +79,7 @@ struct kvaser_usb { struct usb_device *udev; struct usb_interface *intf; struct kvaser_usb_net_priv *nets[KVASER_USB_MAX_NET_DEVICES]; - const struct kvaser_usb_dev_ops *ops; + const struct kvaser_usb_driver_info *driver_info; const struct kvaser_usb_dev_cfg *cfg; struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *bulk_in, *bulk_out; @@ -166,6 +161,12 @@ struct kvaser_usb_dev_ops { int *cmd_len, u16 transid); }; +struct kvaser_usb_driver_info { + u32 quirks; + enum kvaser_usb_leaf_family family; + const struct kvaser_usb_dev_ops *ops; +}; + struct kvaser_usb_dev_cfg { const struct can_clock clock; const unsigned int timestamp_freq; @@ -185,4 +186,5 @@ int kvaser_usb_send_cmd_async(struct kvaser_usb_net_priv *priv, void *cmd, int len); int kvaser_usb_can_rx_over_error(struct net_device *netdev); + #endif /* KVASER_USB_H */ diff --git a/drivers/net/can/usb/kvaser_usb/kvaser_usb_core.c b/drivers/net/can/usb/kvaser_usb/kvaser_usb_core.c index 0f1d3e807d63..ae43c423a8ce 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/usb/kvaser_usb/kvaser_usb_core.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/usb/kvaser_usb/kvaser_usb_core.c @@ -79,104 +79,125 @@ #define USB_ATI_MEMO_PRO_2HS_V2_PRODUCT_ID 269 #define USB_HYBRID_PRO_CANLIN_PRODUCT_ID 270 -static inline bool kvaser_is_leaf(const struct usb_device_id *id) -{ - return (id->idProduct >= USB_LEAF_DEVEL_PRODUCT_ID && - id->idProduct <= USB_CAN_R_PRODUCT_ID) || - (id->idProduct >= USB_LEAF_LITE_V2_PRODUCT_ID && - id->idProduct <= USB_MINI_PCIE_2HS_PRODUCT_ID); -} +static const struct kvaser_usb_driver_info kvaser_usb_driver_info_hydra = { + .quirks = 0, + .ops = &kvaser_usb_hydra_dev_ops, +}; -static inline bool kvaser_is_usbcan(const struct usb_device_id *id) -{ - return id->idProduct >= USB_USBCAN_REVB_PRODUCT_ID && - id->idProduct <= USB_MEMORATOR_PRODUCT_ID; -} +static const struct kvaser_usb_driver_info kvaser_usb_driver_info_usbcan = { + .quirks = KVASER_USB_QUIRK_HAS_TXRX_ERRORS | + KVASER_USB_QUIRK_HAS_SILENT_MODE, + .family = KVASER_USBCAN, + .ops = &kvaser_usb_leaf_dev_ops, +}; -static inline bool kvaser_is_hydra(const struct usb_device_id *id) -{ - return id->idProduct >= USB_BLACKBIRD_V2_PRODUCT_ID && - id->idProduct <= USB_HYBRID_PRO_CANLIN_PRODUCT_ID; -} +static const struct kvaser_usb_driver_info kvaser_usb_driver_info_leaf = { + .quirks = 0, + .family = KVASER_LEAF, + .ops = &kvaser_usb_leaf_dev_ops, +}; + +static const struct kvaser_usb_driver_info kvaser_usb_driver_info_leaf_err = { + .quirks = KVASER_USB_QUIRK_HAS_TXRX_ERRORS, + .family = KVASER_LEAF, + .ops = &kvaser_usb_leaf_dev_ops, +}; + +static const struct kvaser_usb_driver_info kvaser_usb_driver_info_leaf_err_listen = { + .quirks = KVASER_USB_QUIRK_HAS_TXRX_ERRORS | + KVASER_USB_QUIRK_HAS_SILENT_MODE, + .family = KVASER_LEAF, + .ops = &kvaser_usb_leaf_dev_ops, +}; static const struct usb_device_id kvaser_usb_table[] = { /* Leaf USB product IDs */ - { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_LEAF_DEVEL_PRODUCT_ID) }, - { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_LEAF_LITE_PRODUCT_ID) }, + { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_LEAF_DEVEL_PRODUCT_ID), + .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&kvaser_usb_driver_info_leaf }, + { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_LEAF_LITE_PRODUCT_ID), + .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&kvaser_usb_driver_info_leaf }, { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_LEAF_PRO_PRODUCT_ID), - .driver_info = KVASER_USB_HAS_TXRX_ERRORS | - KVASER_USB_HAS_SILENT_MODE }, + .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&kvaser_usb_driver_info_leaf_err_listen }, { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_LEAF_SPRO_PRODUCT_ID), - .driver_info = KVASER_USB_HAS_TXRX_ERRORS | - KVASER_USB_HAS_SILENT_MODE }, + .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&kvaser_usb_driver_info_leaf_err_listen }, { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_LEAF_PRO_LS_PRODUCT_ID), - .driver_info = KVASER_USB_HAS_TXRX_ERRORS | - KVASER_USB_HAS_SILENT_MODE }, + .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&kvaser_usb_driver_info_leaf_err_listen }, { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_LEAF_PRO_SWC_PRODUCT_ID), - .driver_info = KVASER_USB_HAS_TXRX_ERRORS | - KVASER_USB_HAS_SILENT_MODE }, + .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&kvaser_usb_driver_info_leaf_err_listen }, { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_LEAF_PRO_LIN_PRODUCT_ID), - .driver_info = KVASER_USB_HAS_TXRX_ERRORS | - KVASER_USB_HAS_SILENT_MODE }, + .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&kvaser_usb_driver_info_leaf_err_listen }, { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_LEAF_SPRO_LS_PRODUCT_ID), - .driver_info = KVASER_USB_HAS_TXRX_ERRORS | - KVASER_USB_HAS_SILENT_MODE }, + .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&kvaser_usb_driver_info_leaf_err_listen }, { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_LEAF_SPRO_SWC_PRODUCT_ID), - .driver_info = KVASER_USB_HAS_TXRX_ERRORS | - KVASER_USB_HAS_SILENT_MODE }, + .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&kvaser_usb_driver_info_leaf_err_listen }, { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_MEMO2_DEVEL_PRODUCT_ID), - .driver_info = KVASER_USB_HAS_TXRX_ERRORS | - KVASER_USB_HAS_SILENT_MODE }, + .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&kvaser_usb_driver_info_leaf_err_listen }, { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_MEMO2_HSHS_PRODUCT_ID), - .driver_info = KVASER_USB_HAS_TXRX_ERRORS | - KVASER_USB_HAS_SILENT_MODE }, + .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&kvaser_usb_driver_info_leaf_err_listen }, { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_UPRO_HSHS_PRODUCT_ID), - .driver_info = KVASER_USB_HAS_TXRX_ERRORS }, - { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_LEAF_LITE_GI_PRODUCT_ID) }, + .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&kvaser_usb_driver_info_leaf_err }, + { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_LEAF_LITE_GI_PRODUCT_ID), + .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&kvaser_usb_driver_info_leaf }, { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_LEAF_PRO_OBDII_PRODUCT_ID), - .driver_info = KVASER_USB_HAS_TXRX_ERRORS | - KVASER_USB_HAS_SILENT_MODE }, + .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&kvaser_usb_driver_info_leaf_err_listen }, { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_MEMO2_HSLS_PRODUCT_ID), - .driver_info = KVASER_USB_HAS_TXRX_ERRORS }, + .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&kvaser_usb_driver_info_leaf_err }, { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_LEAF_LITE_CH_PRODUCT_ID), - .driver_info = KVASER_USB_HAS_TXRX_ERRORS }, + .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&kvaser_usb_driver_info_leaf_err }, { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_BLACKBIRD_SPRO_PRODUCT_ID), - .driver_info = KVASER_USB_HAS_TXRX_ERRORS }, + .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&kvaser_usb_driver_info_leaf_err }, { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_OEM_MERCURY_PRODUCT_ID), - .driver_info = KVASER_USB_HAS_TXRX_ERRORS }, + .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&kvaser_usb_driver_info_leaf_err }, { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_OEM_LEAF_PRODUCT_ID), - .driver_info = KVASER_USB_HAS_TXRX_ERRORS }, + .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&kvaser_usb_driver_info_leaf_err }, { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_CAN_R_PRODUCT_ID), - .driver_info = KVASER_USB_HAS_TXRX_ERRORS }, - { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_LEAF_LITE_V2_PRODUCT_ID) }, - { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_MINI_PCIE_HS_PRODUCT_ID) }, - { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_LEAF_LIGHT_HS_V2_OEM_PRODUCT_ID) }, - { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_USBCAN_LIGHT_2HS_PRODUCT_ID) }, - { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_MINI_PCIE_2HS_PRODUCT_ID) }, + .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&kvaser_usb_driver_info_leaf_err }, + { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_LEAF_LITE_V2_PRODUCT_ID), + .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&kvaser_usb_driver_info_leaf }, + { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_MINI_PCIE_HS_PRODUCT_ID), + .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&kvaser_usb_driver_info_leaf }, + { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_LEAF_LIGHT_HS_V2_OEM_PRODUCT_ID), + .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&kvaser_usb_driver_info_leaf }, + { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_USBCAN_LIGHT_2HS_PRODUCT_ID), + .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&kvaser_usb_driver_info_leaf }, + { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_MINI_PCIE_2HS_PRODUCT_ID), + .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&kvaser_usb_driver_info_leaf }, /* USBCANII USB product IDs */ { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_USBCAN2_PRODUCT_ID), - .driver_info = KVASER_USB_HAS_TXRX_ERRORS }, + .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&kvaser_usb_driver_info_usbcan }, { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_USBCAN_REVB_PRODUCT_ID), - .driver_info = KVASER_USB_HAS_TXRX_ERRORS }, + .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&kvaser_usb_driver_info_usbcan }, { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_MEMORATOR_PRODUCT_ID), - .driver_info = KVASER_USB_HAS_TXRX_ERRORS }, + .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&kvaser_usb_driver_info_usbcan }, { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_VCI2_PRODUCT_ID), - .driver_info = KVASER_USB_HAS_TXRX_ERRORS }, + .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&kvaser_usb_driver_info_usbcan }, /* Minihydra USB product IDs */ - { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_BLACKBIRD_V2_PRODUCT_ID) }, - { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_MEMO_PRO_5HS_PRODUCT_ID) }, - { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_USBCAN_PRO_5HS_PRODUCT_ID) }, - { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_USBCAN_LIGHT_4HS_PRODUCT_ID) }, - { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_LEAF_PRO_HS_V2_PRODUCT_ID) }, - { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_USBCAN_PRO_2HS_V2_PRODUCT_ID) }, - { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_MEMO_2HS_PRODUCT_ID) }, - { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_MEMO_PRO_2HS_V2_PRODUCT_ID) }, - { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_HYBRID_CANLIN_PRODUCT_ID) }, - { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_ATI_USBCAN_PRO_2HS_V2_PRODUCT_ID) }, - { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_ATI_MEMO_PRO_2HS_V2_PRODUCT_ID) }, - { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_HYBRID_PRO_CANLIN_PRODUCT_ID) }, + { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_BLACKBIRD_V2_PRODUCT_ID), + .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&kvaser_usb_driver_info_hydra }, + { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_MEMO_PRO_5HS_PRODUCT_ID), + .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&kvaser_usb_driver_info_hydra }, + { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_USBCAN_PRO_5HS_PRODUCT_ID), + .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&kvaser_usb_driver_info_hydra }, + { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_USBCAN_LIGHT_4HS_PRODUCT_ID), + .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&kvaser_usb_driver_info_hydra }, + { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_LEAF_PRO_HS_V2_PRODUCT_ID), + .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&kvaser_usb_driver_info_hydra }, + { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_USBCAN_PRO_2HS_V2_PRODUCT_ID), + .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&kvaser_usb_driver_info_hydra }, + { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_MEMO_2HS_PRODUCT_ID), + .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&kvaser_usb_driver_info_hydra }, + { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_MEMO_PRO_2HS_V2_PRODUCT_ID), + .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&kvaser_usb_driver_info_hydra }, + { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_HYBRID_2CANLIN_PRODUCT_ID), + .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&kvaser_usb_driver_info_hydra }, + { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_ATI_USBCAN_PRO_2HS_V2_PRODUCT_ID), + .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&kvaser_usb_driver_info_hydra }, + { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_ATI_MEMO_PRO_2HS_V2_PRODUCT_ID), + .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&kvaser_usb_driver_info_hydra }, + { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_HYBRID_PRO_CANLIN_PRODUCT_ID), + .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&kvaser_usb_driver_info_hydra }, { } }; MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(usb, kvaser_usb_table); @@ -267,6 +288,7 @@ int kvaser_usb_can_rx_over_error(struct net_device *netdev) static void kvaser_usb_read_bulk_callback(struct urb *urb) { struct kvaser_usb *dev = urb->context; + const struct kvaser_usb_dev_ops *ops = dev->driver_info->ops; int err; unsigned int i; @@ -283,8 +305,8 @@ static void kvaser_usb_read_bulk_callback(struct urb *urb) goto resubmit_urb; } - dev->ops->dev_read_bulk_callback(dev, urb->transfer_buffer, - urb->actual_length); + ops->dev_read_bulk_callback(dev, urb->transfer_buffer, + urb->actual_length); resubmit_urb: usb_fill_bulk_urb(urb, dev->udev, @@ -378,6 +400,7 @@ static int kvaser_usb_open(struct net_device *netdev) { struct kvaser_usb_net_priv *priv = netdev_priv(netdev); struct kvaser_usb *dev = priv->dev; + const struct kvaser_usb_dev_ops *ops = dev->driver_info->ops; int err; err = open_candev(netdev); @@ -388,11 +411,11 @@ static int kvaser_usb_open(struct net_device *netdev) if (err) goto error; - err = dev->ops->dev_set_opt_mode(priv); + err = ops->dev_set_opt_mode(priv); if (err) goto error; - err = dev->ops->dev_start_chip(priv); + err = ops->dev_start_chip(priv); if (err) { netdev_warn(netdev, "Cannot start device, error %d\n", err); goto error; @@ -449,22 +472,23 @@ static int kvaser_usb_close(struct net_device *netdev) { struct kvaser_usb_net_priv *priv = netdev_priv(netdev); struct kvaser_usb *dev = priv->dev; + const struct kvaser_usb_dev_ops *ops = dev->driver_info->ops; int err; netif_stop_queue(netdev); - err = dev->ops->dev_flush_queue(priv); + err = ops->dev_flush_queue(priv); if (err) netdev_warn(netdev, "Cannot flush queue, error %d\n", err); - if (dev->ops->dev_reset_chip) { - err = dev->ops->dev_reset_chip(dev, priv->channel); + if (ops->dev_reset_chip) { + err = ops->dev_reset_chip(dev, priv->channel); if (err) netdev_warn(netdev, "Cannot reset card, error %d\n", err); } - err = dev->ops->dev_stop_chip(priv); + err = ops->dev_stop_chip(priv); if (err) netdev_warn(netdev, "Cannot stop device, error %d\n", err); @@ -503,6 +527,7 @@ static netdev_tx_t kvaser_usb_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, { struct kvaser_usb_net_priv *priv = netdev_priv(netdev); struct kvaser_usb *dev = priv->dev; + const struct kvaser_usb_dev_ops *ops = dev->driver_info->ops; struct net_device_stats *stats = &netdev->stats; struct kvaser_usb_tx_urb_context *context = NULL; struct urb *urb; @@ -545,8 +570,8 @@ static netdev_tx_t kvaser_usb_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, goto freeurb; } - buf = dev->ops->dev_frame_to_cmd(priv, skb, &context->dlc, &cmd_len, - context->echo_index); + buf = ops->dev_frame_to_cmd(priv, skb, &context->dlc, &cmd_len, + context->echo_index); if (!buf) { stats->tx_dropped++; dev_kfree_skb(skb); @@ -630,15 +655,16 @@ static void kvaser_usb_remove_interfaces(struct kvaser_usb *dev) } } -static int kvaser_usb_init_one(struct kvaser_usb *dev, - const struct usb_device_id *id, int channel) +static int kvaser_usb_init_one(struct kvaser_usb *dev, int channel) { struct net_device *netdev; struct kvaser_usb_net_priv *priv; + const struct kvaser_usb_driver_info *driver_info = dev->driver_info; + const struct kvaser_usb_dev_ops *ops = driver_info->ops; int err; - if (dev->ops->dev_reset_chip) { - err = dev->ops->dev_reset_chip(dev, channel); + if (ops->dev_reset_chip) { + err = ops->dev_reset_chip(dev, channel); if (err) return err; } @@ -667,20 +693,19 @@ static int kvaser_usb_init_one(struct kvaser_usb *dev, priv->can.state = CAN_STATE_STOPPED; priv->can.clock.freq = dev->cfg->clock.freq; priv->can.bittiming_const = dev->cfg->bittiming_const; - priv->can.do_set_bittiming = dev->ops->dev_set_bittiming; - priv->can.do_set_mode = dev->ops->dev_set_mode; - if ((id->driver_info & KVASER_USB_HAS_TXRX_ERRORS) || + priv->can.do_set_bittiming = ops->dev_set_bittiming; + priv->can.do_set_mode = ops->dev_set_mode; + if ((driver_info->quirks & KVASER_USB_QUIRK_HAS_TXRX_ERRORS) || (priv->dev->card_data.capabilities & KVASER_USB_CAP_BERR_CAP)) - priv->can.do_get_berr_counter = dev->ops->dev_get_berr_counter; - if (id->driver_info & KVASER_USB_HAS_SILENT_MODE) + priv->can.do_get_berr_counter = ops->dev_get_berr_counter; + if (driver_info->quirks & KVASER_USB_QUIRK_HAS_SILENT_MODE) priv->can.ctrlmode_supported |= CAN_CTRLMODE_LISTENONLY; priv->can.ctrlmode_supported |= dev->card_data.ctrlmode_supported; if (priv->can.ctrlmode_supported & CAN_CTRLMODE_FD) { priv->can.data_bittiming_const = dev->cfg->data_bittiming_const; - priv->can.do_set_data_bittiming = - dev->ops->dev_set_data_bittiming; + priv->can.do_set_data_bittiming = ops->dev_set_data_bittiming; } netdev->flags |= IFF_ECHO; @@ -711,29 +736,22 @@ static int kvaser_usb_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, struct kvaser_usb *dev; int err; int i; + const struct kvaser_usb_driver_info *driver_info; + const struct kvaser_usb_dev_ops *ops; + + driver_info = (const struct kvaser_usb_driver_info *)id->driver_info; + if (!driver_info) + return -ENODEV; dev = devm_kzalloc(&intf->dev, sizeof(*dev), GFP_KERNEL); if (!dev) return -ENOMEM; - if (kvaser_is_leaf(id)) { - dev->card_data.leaf.family = KVASER_LEAF; - dev->ops = &kvaser_usb_leaf_dev_ops; - } else if (kvaser_is_usbcan(id)) { - dev->card_data.leaf.family = KVASER_USBCAN; - dev->ops = &kvaser_usb_leaf_dev_ops; - } else if (kvaser_is_hydra(id)) { - dev->ops = &kvaser_usb_hydra_dev_ops; - } else { - dev_err(&intf->dev, - "Product ID (%d) is not a supported Kvaser USB device\n", - id->idProduct); - return -ENODEV; - } - dev->intf = intf; + dev->driver_info = driver_info; + ops = driver_info->ops; - err = dev->ops->dev_setup_endpoints(dev); + err = ops->dev_setup_endpoints(dev); if (err) { dev_err(&intf->dev, "Cannot get usb endpoint(s)"); return err; @@ -747,22 +765,22 @@ static int kvaser_usb_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, dev->card_data.ctrlmode_supported = 0; dev->card_data.capabilities = 0; - err = dev->ops->dev_init_card(dev); + err = ops->dev_init_card(dev); if (err) { dev_err(&intf->dev, "Failed to initialize card, error %d\n", err); return err; } - err = dev->ops->dev_get_software_info(dev); + err = ops->dev_get_software_info(dev); if (err) { dev_err(&intf->dev, "Cannot get software info, error %d\n", err); return err; } - if (dev->ops->dev_get_software_details) { - err = dev->ops->dev_get_software_details(dev); + if (ops->dev_get_software_details) { + err = ops->dev_get_software_details(dev); if (err) { dev_err(&intf->dev, "Cannot get software details, error %d\n", err); @@ -780,14 +798,14 @@ static int kvaser_usb_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, dev_dbg(&intf->dev, "Max outstanding tx = %d URBs\n", dev->max_tx_urbs); - err = dev->ops->dev_get_card_info(dev); + err = ops->dev_get_card_info(dev); if (err) { dev_err(&intf->dev, "Cannot get card info, error %d\n", err); return err; } - if (dev->ops->dev_get_capabilities) { - err = dev->ops->dev_get_capabilities(dev); + if (ops->dev_get_capabilities) { + err = ops->dev_get_capabilities(dev); if (err) { dev_err(&intf->dev, "Cannot get capabilities, error %d\n", err); @@ -797,7 +815,7 @@ static int kvaser_usb_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, } for (i = 0; i < dev->nchannels; i++) { - err = kvaser_usb_init_one(dev, id, i); + err = kvaser_usb_init_one(dev, i); if (err) { kvaser_usb_remove_interfaces(dev); return err; diff --git a/drivers/net/can/usb/kvaser_usb/kvaser_usb_leaf.c b/drivers/net/can/usb/kvaser_usb/kvaser_usb_leaf.c index 8b5d1add899a..fb51f80012a0 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/usb/kvaser_usb/kvaser_usb_leaf.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/usb/kvaser_usb/kvaser_usb_leaf.c @@ -405,7 +405,7 @@ kvaser_usb_leaf_frame_to_cmd(const struct kvaser_usb_net_priv *priv, sizeof(struct kvaser_cmd_tx_can); cmd->u.tx_can.channel = priv->channel; - switch (dev->card_data.leaf.family) { + switch (dev->driver_info->family) { case KVASER_LEAF: cmd_tx_can_flags = &cmd->u.tx_can.leaf.flags; break; @@ -551,7 +551,7 @@ static int kvaser_usb_leaf_get_software_info_inner(struct kvaser_usb *dev) if (err) return err; - switch (dev->card_data.leaf.family) { + switch (dev->driver_info->family) { case KVASER_LEAF: kvaser_usb_leaf_get_software_info_leaf(dev, &cmd.u.leaf.softinfo); break; @@ -598,7 +598,7 @@ static int kvaser_usb_leaf_get_card_info(struct kvaser_usb *dev) dev->nchannels = cmd.u.cardinfo.nchannels; if (dev->nchannels > KVASER_USB_MAX_NET_DEVICES || - (dev->card_data.leaf.family == KVASER_USBCAN && + (dev->driver_info->family == KVASER_USBCAN && dev->nchannels > MAX_USBCAN_NET_DEVICES)) return -EINVAL; @@ -734,7 +734,7 @@ kvaser_usb_leaf_rx_error_update_can_state(struct kvaser_usb_net_priv *priv, new_state < CAN_STATE_BUS_OFF) priv->can.can_stats.restarts++; - switch (dev->card_data.leaf.family) { + switch (dev->driver_info->family) { case KVASER_LEAF: if (es->leaf.error_factor) { priv->can.can_stats.bus_error++; @@ -813,7 +813,7 @@ static void kvaser_usb_leaf_rx_error(const struct kvaser_usb *dev, } } - switch (dev->card_data.leaf.family) { + switch (dev->driver_info->family) { case KVASER_LEAF: if (es->leaf.error_factor) { cf->can_id |= CAN_ERR_BUSERROR | CAN_ERR_PROT; @@ -1005,7 +1005,7 @@ static void kvaser_usb_leaf_rx_can_msg(const struct kvaser_usb *dev, stats = &priv->netdev->stats; if ((cmd->u.rx_can_header.flag & MSG_FLAG_ERROR_FRAME) && - (dev->card_data.leaf.family == KVASER_LEAF && + (dev->driver_info->family == KVASER_LEAF && cmd->id == CMD_LEAF_LOG_MESSAGE)) { kvaser_usb_leaf_leaf_rx_error(dev, cmd); return; @@ -1021,7 +1021,7 @@ static void kvaser_usb_leaf_rx_can_msg(const struct kvaser_usb *dev, return; } - switch (dev->card_data.leaf.family) { + switch (dev->driver_info->family) { case KVASER_LEAF: rx_data = cmd->u.leaf.rx_can.data; break; @@ -1036,7 +1036,7 @@ static void kvaser_usb_leaf_rx_can_msg(const struct kvaser_usb *dev, return; } - if (dev->card_data.leaf.family == KVASER_LEAF && cmd->id == + if (dev->driver_info->family == KVASER_LEAF && cmd->id == CMD_LEAF_LOG_MESSAGE) { cf->can_id = le32_to_cpu(cmd->u.leaf.log_message.id); if (cf->can_id & KVASER_EXTENDED_FRAME) @@ -1133,14 +1133,14 @@ static void kvaser_usb_leaf_handle_command(const struct kvaser_usb *dev, break; case CMD_LEAF_LOG_MESSAGE: - if (dev->card_data.leaf.family != KVASER_LEAF) + if (dev->driver_info->family != KVASER_LEAF) goto warn; kvaser_usb_leaf_rx_can_msg(dev, cmd); break; case CMD_CHIP_STATE_EVENT: case CMD_CAN_ERROR_EVENT: - if (dev->card_data.leaf.family == KVASER_LEAF) + if (dev->driver_info->family == KVASER_LEAF) kvaser_usb_leaf_leaf_rx_error(dev, cmd); else kvaser_usb_leaf_usbcan_rx_error(dev, cmd); @@ -1152,12 +1152,12 @@ static void kvaser_usb_leaf_handle_command(const struct kvaser_usb *dev, /* Ignored commands */ case CMD_USBCAN_CLOCK_OVERFLOW_EVENT: - if (dev->card_data.leaf.family != KVASER_USBCAN) + if (dev->driver_info->family != KVASER_USBCAN) goto warn; break; case CMD_FLUSH_QUEUE_REPLY: - if (dev->card_data.leaf.family != KVASER_LEAF) + if (dev->driver_info->family != KVASER_LEAF) goto warn; break; From 9afdff9dd82010fe8dacc811912e469dc4b960a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jimmy Assarsson Date: Fri, 8 Jul 2022 20:47:52 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0848/1091] can: kvaser_usb: kvaser_usb_leaf: fix CAN clock frequency regression commit e6c80e601053ffdac5709f11ff3ec1e19ed05f7b upstream. The firmware of M32C based Leaf devices expects bittiming parameters calculated for 16MHz clock. Since we use the actual clock frequency of the device, the device may end up with wrong bittiming parameters, depending on user requested parameters. This regression affects M32C based Leaf devices with non-16MHz clock. Fixes: 68daa476f499 ("can: kvaser_usb: get CAN clock frequency from device") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220603083820.800246-3-extja@kvaser.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jimmy Assarsson Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/can/usb/kvaser_usb/kvaser_usb.h | 1 + .../net/can/usb/kvaser_usb/kvaser_usb_core.c | 29 ++++++++++++------- .../net/can/usb/kvaser_usb/kvaser_usb_leaf.c | 25 ++++++++++------ 3 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/can/usb/kvaser_usb/kvaser_usb.h b/drivers/net/can/usb/kvaser_usb/kvaser_usb.h index 2e358e20d3d9..478e2eeec136 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/usb/kvaser_usb/kvaser_usb.h +++ b/drivers/net/can/usb/kvaser_usb/kvaser_usb.h @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ /* Kvaser USB device quirks */ #define KVASER_USB_QUIRK_HAS_SILENT_MODE BIT(0) #define KVASER_USB_QUIRK_HAS_TXRX_ERRORS BIT(1) +#define KVASER_USB_QUIRK_IGNORE_CLK_FREQ BIT(2) /* Device capabilities */ #define KVASER_USB_CAP_BERR_CAP 0x01 diff --git a/drivers/net/can/usb/kvaser_usb/kvaser_usb_core.c b/drivers/net/can/usb/kvaser_usb/kvaser_usb_core.c index ae43c423a8ce..416763fd1f11 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/usb/kvaser_usb/kvaser_usb_core.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/usb/kvaser_usb/kvaser_usb_core.c @@ -92,26 +92,33 @@ static const struct kvaser_usb_driver_info kvaser_usb_driver_info_usbcan = { }; static const struct kvaser_usb_driver_info kvaser_usb_driver_info_leaf = { - .quirks = 0, + .quirks = KVASER_USB_QUIRK_IGNORE_CLK_FREQ, .family = KVASER_LEAF, .ops = &kvaser_usb_leaf_dev_ops, }; static const struct kvaser_usb_driver_info kvaser_usb_driver_info_leaf_err = { - .quirks = KVASER_USB_QUIRK_HAS_TXRX_ERRORS, + .quirks = KVASER_USB_QUIRK_HAS_TXRX_ERRORS | + KVASER_USB_QUIRK_IGNORE_CLK_FREQ, .family = KVASER_LEAF, .ops = &kvaser_usb_leaf_dev_ops, }; static const struct kvaser_usb_driver_info kvaser_usb_driver_info_leaf_err_listen = { .quirks = KVASER_USB_QUIRK_HAS_TXRX_ERRORS | - KVASER_USB_QUIRK_HAS_SILENT_MODE, + KVASER_USB_QUIRK_HAS_SILENT_MODE | + KVASER_USB_QUIRK_IGNORE_CLK_FREQ, .family = KVASER_LEAF, .ops = &kvaser_usb_leaf_dev_ops, }; +static const struct kvaser_usb_driver_info kvaser_usb_driver_info_leafimx = { + .quirks = 0, + .ops = &kvaser_usb_leaf_dev_ops, +}; + static const struct usb_device_id kvaser_usb_table[] = { - /* Leaf USB product IDs */ + /* Leaf M32C USB product IDs */ { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_LEAF_DEVEL_PRODUCT_ID), .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&kvaser_usb_driver_info_leaf }, { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_LEAF_LITE_PRODUCT_ID), @@ -152,16 +159,18 @@ static const struct usb_device_id kvaser_usb_table[] = { .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&kvaser_usb_driver_info_leaf_err }, { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_CAN_R_PRODUCT_ID), .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&kvaser_usb_driver_info_leaf_err }, + + /* Leaf i.MX28 USB product IDs */ { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_LEAF_LITE_V2_PRODUCT_ID), - .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&kvaser_usb_driver_info_leaf }, + .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&kvaser_usb_driver_info_leafimx }, { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_MINI_PCIE_HS_PRODUCT_ID), - .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&kvaser_usb_driver_info_leaf }, + .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&kvaser_usb_driver_info_leafimx }, { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_LEAF_LIGHT_HS_V2_OEM_PRODUCT_ID), - .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&kvaser_usb_driver_info_leaf }, + .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&kvaser_usb_driver_info_leafimx }, { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_USBCAN_LIGHT_2HS_PRODUCT_ID), - .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&kvaser_usb_driver_info_leaf }, + .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&kvaser_usb_driver_info_leafimx }, { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_MINI_PCIE_2HS_PRODUCT_ID), - .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&kvaser_usb_driver_info_leaf }, + .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&kvaser_usb_driver_info_leafimx }, /* USBCANII USB product IDs */ { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_USBCAN2_PRODUCT_ID), @@ -190,7 +199,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id kvaser_usb_table[] = { .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&kvaser_usb_driver_info_hydra }, { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_MEMO_PRO_2HS_V2_PRODUCT_ID), .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&kvaser_usb_driver_info_hydra }, - { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_HYBRID_2CANLIN_PRODUCT_ID), + { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_HYBRID_CANLIN_PRODUCT_ID), .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&kvaser_usb_driver_info_hydra }, { USB_DEVICE(KVASER_VENDOR_ID, USB_ATI_USBCAN_PRO_2HS_V2_PRODUCT_ID), .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&kvaser_usb_driver_info_hydra }, diff --git a/drivers/net/can/usb/kvaser_usb/kvaser_usb_leaf.c b/drivers/net/can/usb/kvaser_usb/kvaser_usb_leaf.c index fb51f80012a0..b8c2f2c30050 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/usb/kvaser_usb/kvaser_usb_leaf.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/usb/kvaser_usb/kvaser_usb_leaf.c @@ -525,16 +525,23 @@ static void kvaser_usb_leaf_get_software_info_leaf(struct kvaser_usb *dev, dev->fw_version = le32_to_cpu(softinfo->fw_version); dev->max_tx_urbs = le16_to_cpu(softinfo->max_outstanding_tx); - switch (sw_options & KVASER_USB_LEAF_SWOPTION_FREQ_MASK) { - case KVASER_USB_LEAF_SWOPTION_FREQ_16_MHZ_CLK: + if (dev->driver_info->quirks & KVASER_USB_QUIRK_IGNORE_CLK_FREQ) { + /* Firmware expects bittiming parameters calculated for 16MHz + * clock, regardless of the actual clock + */ dev->cfg = &kvaser_usb_leaf_dev_cfg_16mhz; - break; - case KVASER_USB_LEAF_SWOPTION_FREQ_24_MHZ_CLK: - dev->cfg = &kvaser_usb_leaf_dev_cfg_24mhz; - break; - case KVASER_USB_LEAF_SWOPTION_FREQ_32_MHZ_CLK: - dev->cfg = &kvaser_usb_leaf_dev_cfg_32mhz; - break; + } else { + switch (sw_options & KVASER_USB_LEAF_SWOPTION_FREQ_MASK) { + case KVASER_USB_LEAF_SWOPTION_FREQ_16_MHZ_CLK: + dev->cfg = &kvaser_usb_leaf_dev_cfg_16mhz; + break; + case KVASER_USB_LEAF_SWOPTION_FREQ_24_MHZ_CLK: + dev->cfg = &kvaser_usb_leaf_dev_cfg_24mhz; + break; + case KVASER_USB_LEAF_SWOPTION_FREQ_32_MHZ_CLK: + dev->cfg = &kvaser_usb_leaf_dev_cfg_32mhz; + break; + } } } From 845dac0276a51532205c71bcc103aedf2564f30c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jimmy Assarsson Date: Fri, 8 Jul 2022 20:47:53 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0849/1091] can: kvaser_usb: kvaser_usb_leaf: fix bittiming limits commit b3b6df2c56d80b8c6740433cff5f016668b8de70 upstream. Use correct bittiming limits depending on device. For devices based on USBcanII, Leaf M32C or Leaf i.MX28. Fixes: 080f40a6fa28 ("can: kvaser_usb: Add support for Kvaser CAN/USB devices") Fixes: b4f20130af23 ("can: kvaser_usb: add support for Kvaser Leaf v2 and usb mini PCIe") Fixes: f5d4abea3ce0 ("can: kvaser_usb: Add support for the USBcan-II family") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220603083820.800246-4-extja@kvaser.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jimmy Assarsson [mkl: remove stray netlink.h include] [mkl: keep struct can_bittiming_const kvaser_usb_flexc_bittiming_const in kvaser_usb_hydra.c] Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/can/usb/kvaser_usb/kvaser_usb.h | 2 + .../net/can/usb/kvaser_usb/kvaser_usb_hydra.c | 4 +- .../net/can/usb/kvaser_usb/kvaser_usb_leaf.c | 76 +++++++++++-------- 3 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/can/usb/kvaser_usb/kvaser_usb.h b/drivers/net/can/usb/kvaser_usb/kvaser_usb.h index 478e2eeec136..61e67986b625 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/usb/kvaser_usb/kvaser_usb.h +++ b/drivers/net/can/usb/kvaser_usb/kvaser_usb.h @@ -188,4 +188,6 @@ int kvaser_usb_send_cmd_async(struct kvaser_usb_net_priv *priv, void *cmd, int kvaser_usb_can_rx_over_error(struct net_device *netdev); +extern const struct can_bittiming_const kvaser_usb_flexc_bittiming_const; + #endif /* KVASER_USB_H */ diff --git a/drivers/net/can/usb/kvaser_usb/kvaser_usb_hydra.c b/drivers/net/can/usb/kvaser_usb/kvaser_usb_hydra.c index 218fadc91155..a7c408acb0c0 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/usb/kvaser_usb/kvaser_usb_hydra.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/usb/kvaser_usb/kvaser_usb_hydra.c @@ -371,7 +371,7 @@ static const struct can_bittiming_const kvaser_usb_hydra_kcan_bittiming_c = { .brp_inc = 1, }; -static const struct can_bittiming_const kvaser_usb_hydra_flexc_bittiming_c = { +const struct can_bittiming_const kvaser_usb_flexc_bittiming_const = { .name = "kvaser_usb_flex", .tseg1_min = 4, .tseg1_max = 16, @@ -2024,5 +2024,5 @@ static const struct kvaser_usb_dev_cfg kvaser_usb_hydra_dev_cfg_flexc = { .freq = 24000000, }, .timestamp_freq = 1, - .bittiming_const = &kvaser_usb_hydra_flexc_bittiming_c, + .bittiming_const = &kvaser_usb_flexc_bittiming_const, }; diff --git a/drivers/net/can/usb/kvaser_usb/kvaser_usb_leaf.c b/drivers/net/can/usb/kvaser_usb/kvaser_usb_leaf.c index b8c2f2c30050..0e0403dd0550 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/usb/kvaser_usb/kvaser_usb_leaf.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/usb/kvaser_usb/kvaser_usb_leaf.c @@ -100,16 +100,6 @@ #define USBCAN_ERROR_STATE_RX_ERROR BIT(1) #define USBCAN_ERROR_STATE_BUSERROR BIT(2) -/* bittiming parameters */ -#define KVASER_USB_TSEG1_MIN 1 -#define KVASER_USB_TSEG1_MAX 16 -#define KVASER_USB_TSEG2_MIN 1 -#define KVASER_USB_TSEG2_MAX 8 -#define KVASER_USB_SJW_MAX 4 -#define KVASER_USB_BRP_MIN 1 -#define KVASER_USB_BRP_MAX 64 -#define KVASER_USB_BRP_INC 1 - /* ctrl modes */ #define KVASER_CTRL_MODE_NORMAL 1 #define KVASER_CTRL_MODE_SILENT 2 @@ -342,48 +332,68 @@ struct kvaser_usb_err_summary { }; }; -static const struct can_bittiming_const kvaser_usb_leaf_bittiming_const = { - .name = "kvaser_usb", - .tseg1_min = KVASER_USB_TSEG1_MIN, - .tseg1_max = KVASER_USB_TSEG1_MAX, - .tseg2_min = KVASER_USB_TSEG2_MIN, - .tseg2_max = KVASER_USB_TSEG2_MAX, - .sjw_max = KVASER_USB_SJW_MAX, - .brp_min = KVASER_USB_BRP_MIN, - .brp_max = KVASER_USB_BRP_MAX, - .brp_inc = KVASER_USB_BRP_INC, +static const struct can_bittiming_const kvaser_usb_leaf_m16c_bittiming_const = { + .name = "kvaser_usb_ucii", + .tseg1_min = 4, + .tseg1_max = 16, + .tseg2_min = 2, + .tseg2_max = 8, + .sjw_max = 4, + .brp_min = 1, + .brp_max = 16, + .brp_inc = 1, }; -static const struct kvaser_usb_dev_cfg kvaser_usb_leaf_dev_cfg_8mhz = { +static const struct can_bittiming_const kvaser_usb_leaf_m32c_bittiming_const = { + .name = "kvaser_usb_leaf", + .tseg1_min = 3, + .tseg1_max = 16, + .tseg2_min = 2, + .tseg2_max = 8, + .sjw_max = 4, + .brp_min = 2, + .brp_max = 128, + .brp_inc = 2, +}; + +static const struct kvaser_usb_dev_cfg kvaser_usb_leaf_usbcan_dev_cfg = { .clock = { .freq = 8000000, }, .timestamp_freq = 1, - .bittiming_const = &kvaser_usb_leaf_bittiming_const, + .bittiming_const = &kvaser_usb_leaf_m16c_bittiming_const, }; -static const struct kvaser_usb_dev_cfg kvaser_usb_leaf_dev_cfg_16mhz = { +static const struct kvaser_usb_dev_cfg kvaser_usb_leaf_m32c_dev_cfg = { .clock = { .freq = 16000000, }, .timestamp_freq = 1, - .bittiming_const = &kvaser_usb_leaf_bittiming_const, + .bittiming_const = &kvaser_usb_leaf_m32c_bittiming_const, }; -static const struct kvaser_usb_dev_cfg kvaser_usb_leaf_dev_cfg_24mhz = { +static const struct kvaser_usb_dev_cfg kvaser_usb_leaf_imx_dev_cfg_16mhz = { + .clock = { + .freq = 16000000, + }, + .timestamp_freq = 1, + .bittiming_const = &kvaser_usb_flexc_bittiming_const, +}; + +static const struct kvaser_usb_dev_cfg kvaser_usb_leaf_imx_dev_cfg_24mhz = { .clock = { .freq = 24000000, }, .timestamp_freq = 1, - .bittiming_const = &kvaser_usb_leaf_bittiming_const, + .bittiming_const = &kvaser_usb_flexc_bittiming_const, }; -static const struct kvaser_usb_dev_cfg kvaser_usb_leaf_dev_cfg_32mhz = { +static const struct kvaser_usb_dev_cfg kvaser_usb_leaf_imx_dev_cfg_32mhz = { .clock = { .freq = 32000000, }, .timestamp_freq = 1, - .bittiming_const = &kvaser_usb_leaf_bittiming_const, + .bittiming_const = &kvaser_usb_flexc_bittiming_const, }; static void * @@ -529,17 +539,17 @@ static void kvaser_usb_leaf_get_software_info_leaf(struct kvaser_usb *dev, /* Firmware expects bittiming parameters calculated for 16MHz * clock, regardless of the actual clock */ - dev->cfg = &kvaser_usb_leaf_dev_cfg_16mhz; + dev->cfg = &kvaser_usb_leaf_m32c_dev_cfg; } else { switch (sw_options & KVASER_USB_LEAF_SWOPTION_FREQ_MASK) { case KVASER_USB_LEAF_SWOPTION_FREQ_16_MHZ_CLK: - dev->cfg = &kvaser_usb_leaf_dev_cfg_16mhz; + dev->cfg = &kvaser_usb_leaf_imx_dev_cfg_16mhz; break; case KVASER_USB_LEAF_SWOPTION_FREQ_24_MHZ_CLK: - dev->cfg = &kvaser_usb_leaf_dev_cfg_24mhz; + dev->cfg = &kvaser_usb_leaf_imx_dev_cfg_24mhz; break; case KVASER_USB_LEAF_SWOPTION_FREQ_32_MHZ_CLK: - dev->cfg = &kvaser_usb_leaf_dev_cfg_32mhz; + dev->cfg = &kvaser_usb_leaf_imx_dev_cfg_32mhz; break; } } @@ -566,7 +576,7 @@ static int kvaser_usb_leaf_get_software_info_inner(struct kvaser_usb *dev) dev->fw_version = le32_to_cpu(cmd.u.usbcan.softinfo.fw_version); dev->max_tx_urbs = le16_to_cpu(cmd.u.usbcan.softinfo.max_outstanding_tx); - dev->cfg = &kvaser_usb_leaf_dev_cfg_8mhz; + dev->cfg = &kvaser_usb_leaf_usbcan_dev_cfg; break; } From c465bbcd3c74866b5f691b2f73a873666b4b39d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Sandeen Date: Thu, 7 Jul 2022 16:07:53 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0850/1091] xfs: remove incorrect ASSERT in xfs_rename commit e445976537ad139162980bee015b7364e5b64fff upstream. This ASSERT in xfs_rename is a) incorrect, because (RENAME_WHITEOUT|RENAME_NOREPLACE) is a valid combination, and b) unnecessary, because actual invalid flag combinations are already handled at the vfs level in do_renameat2() before we get called. So, remove it. Reported-by: Paolo Bonzini Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong Fixes: 7dcf5c3e4527 ("xfs: add RENAME_WHITEOUT support") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c index b339ff93df99..7a9048c4c2f9 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c +++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c @@ -3232,7 +3232,6 @@ xfs_rename( * appropriately. */ if (flags & RENAME_WHITEOUT) { - ASSERT(!(flags & (RENAME_NOREPLACE | RENAME_EXCHANGE))); error = xfs_rename_alloc_whiteout(target_dp, &wip); if (error) return error; From 3cf8ece9113242c10f83c7675ea4f4f67959ee43 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miaoqian Lin Date: Thu, 12 May 2022 06:16:10 +0400 Subject: [PATCH 0851/1091] ARM: meson: Fix refcount leak in meson_smp_prepare_cpus [ Upstream commit 34d2cd3fccced12b958b8848e3eff0ee4296764c ] of_find_compatible_node() returns a node pointer with refcount incremented, we should use of_node_put() on it when done. Add missing of_node_put() to avoid refcount leak. Fixes: d850f3e5d296 ("ARM: meson: Add SMP bringup code for Meson8 and Meson8b") Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin Reviewed-by: Martin Blumenstingl Signed-off-by: Neil Armstrong Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220512021611.47921-1-linmq006@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/arm/mach-meson/platsmp.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-meson/platsmp.c b/arch/arm/mach-meson/platsmp.c index 4b8ad728bb42..32ac60b89fdc 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mach-meson/platsmp.c +++ b/arch/arm/mach-meson/platsmp.c @@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ static void __init meson_smp_prepare_cpus(const char *scu_compatible, } sram_base = of_iomap(node, 0); + of_node_put(node); if (!sram_base) { pr_err("Couldn't map SRAM registers\n"); return; @@ -91,6 +92,7 @@ static void __init meson_smp_prepare_cpus(const char *scu_compatible, } scu_base = of_iomap(node, 0); + of_node_put(node); if (!scu_base) { pr_err("Couldn't map SCU registers\n"); return; From 12a6905369313d05852331d53053d05c8bdc05c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Samuel Holland Date: Wed, 25 May 2022 21:49:56 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 0852/1091] pinctrl: sunxi: a83t: Fix NAND function name for some pins [ Upstream commit aaefa29270d9551b604165a08406543efa9d16f5 ] The other NAND pins on Port C use the "nand0" function name. "nand0" also matches all of the other Allwinner SoCs. Fixes: 4730f33f0d82 ("pinctrl: sunxi: add allwinner A83T PIO controller support") Signed-off-by: Samuel Holland Acked-by: Jernej Skrabec Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220526024956.49500-1-samuel@sholland.org Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/pinctrl/sunxi/pinctrl-sun8i-a83t.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/pinctrl/sunxi/pinctrl-sun8i-a83t.c b/drivers/pinctrl/sunxi/pinctrl-sun8i-a83t.c index 4ada80317a3b..b5c1a8f363f3 100644 --- a/drivers/pinctrl/sunxi/pinctrl-sun8i-a83t.c +++ b/drivers/pinctrl/sunxi/pinctrl-sun8i-a83t.c @@ -158,26 +158,26 @@ static const struct sunxi_desc_pin sun8i_a83t_pins[] = { SUNXI_PIN(SUNXI_PINCTRL_PIN(C, 14), SUNXI_FUNCTION(0x0, "gpio_in"), SUNXI_FUNCTION(0x1, "gpio_out"), - SUNXI_FUNCTION(0x2, "nand"), /* DQ6 */ + SUNXI_FUNCTION(0x2, "nand0"), /* DQ6 */ SUNXI_FUNCTION(0x3, "mmc2")), /* D6 */ SUNXI_PIN(SUNXI_PINCTRL_PIN(C, 15), SUNXI_FUNCTION(0x0, "gpio_in"), SUNXI_FUNCTION(0x1, "gpio_out"), - SUNXI_FUNCTION(0x2, "nand"), /* DQ7 */ + SUNXI_FUNCTION(0x2, "nand0"), /* DQ7 */ SUNXI_FUNCTION(0x3, "mmc2")), /* D7 */ SUNXI_PIN(SUNXI_PINCTRL_PIN(C, 16), SUNXI_FUNCTION(0x0, "gpio_in"), SUNXI_FUNCTION(0x1, "gpio_out"), - SUNXI_FUNCTION(0x2, "nand"), /* DQS */ + SUNXI_FUNCTION(0x2, "nand0"), /* DQS */ SUNXI_FUNCTION(0x3, "mmc2")), /* RST */ SUNXI_PIN(SUNXI_PINCTRL_PIN(C, 17), SUNXI_FUNCTION(0x0, "gpio_in"), SUNXI_FUNCTION(0x1, "gpio_out"), - SUNXI_FUNCTION(0x2, "nand")), /* CE2 */ + SUNXI_FUNCTION(0x2, "nand0")), /* CE2 */ SUNXI_PIN(SUNXI_PINCTRL_PIN(C, 18), SUNXI_FUNCTION(0x0, "gpio_in"), SUNXI_FUNCTION(0x1, "gpio_out"), - SUNXI_FUNCTION(0x2, "nand")), /* CE3 */ + SUNXI_FUNCTION(0x2, "nand0")), /* CE3 */ /* Hole */ SUNXI_PIN(SUNXI_PINCTRL_PIN(D, 2), SUNXI_FUNCTION(0x0, "gpio_in"), From 123540275034905db9d5403a17fbf0eb58d6fadb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrei Lalaev Date: Wed, 25 May 2022 22:04:25 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 0853/1091] pinctrl: sunxi: sunxi_pconf_set: use correct offset [ Upstream commit cd4c1e65a32afd003b08ad4aafe1e4d3e4e8e61b ] Some Allwinner SoCs have 2 pinctrls (PIO and R_PIO). Previous implementation used absolute pin numbering and it was incorrect for R_PIO pinctrl. It's necessary to take into account the base pin number. Fixes: 90be64e27621 ("pinctrl: sunxi: implement pin_config_set") Signed-off-by: Andrei Lalaev Reviewed-by: Samuel Holland Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220525190423.410609-1-andrey.lalaev@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/pinctrl/sunxi/pinctrl-sunxi.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/pinctrl/sunxi/pinctrl-sunxi.c b/drivers/pinctrl/sunxi/pinctrl-sunxi.c index 77783582080c..c4052eab6bfc 100644 --- a/drivers/pinctrl/sunxi/pinctrl-sunxi.c +++ b/drivers/pinctrl/sunxi/pinctrl-sunxi.c @@ -536,6 +536,8 @@ static int sunxi_pconf_set(struct pinctrl_dev *pctldev, unsigned pin, struct sunxi_pinctrl *pctl = pinctrl_dev_get_drvdata(pctldev); int i; + pin -= pctl->desc->pin_base; + for (i = 0; i < num_configs; i++) { enum pin_config_param param; unsigned long flags; From 6b4747d5af436a24f49c29f5ce23e5eed3a380ed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Claudiu Beznea Date: Mon, 23 May 2022 12:24:19 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 0854/1091] ARM: at91: pm: use proper compatible for sama5d2's rtc [ Upstream commit ddc980da8043779119acaca106c6d9b445c9b65b ] Use proper compatible strings for SAMA5D2's RTC IPs. This is necessary for configuring wakeup sources for ULP1 PM mode. Fixes: d7484f5c6b3b ("ARM: at91: pm: configure wakeup sources for ULP1 mode") Signed-off-by: Claudiu Beznea Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220523092421.317345-2-claudiu.beznea@microchip.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/arm/mach-at91/pm.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-at91/pm.c b/arch/arm/mach-at91/pm.c index 676cc2a318f4..3e24e104e687 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mach-at91/pm.c +++ b/arch/arm/mach-at91/pm.c @@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ static const struct wakeup_source_info ws_info[] = { static const struct of_device_id sama5d2_ws_ids[] = { { .compatible = "atmel,sama5d2-gem", .data = &ws_info[0] }, - { .compatible = "atmel,at91rm9200-rtc", .data = &ws_info[1] }, + { .compatible = "atmel,sama5d2-rtc", .data = &ws_info[1] }, { .compatible = "atmel,sama5d3-udc", .data = &ws_info[2] }, { .compatible = "atmel,at91rm9200-ohci", .data = &ws_info[2] }, { .compatible = "usb-ohci", .data = &ws_info[2] }, From aa698affa62ced1dacee8684cb184e05c28a88b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Claudiu Beznea Date: Mon, 23 May 2022 12:24:20 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 0855/1091] ARM: at91: pm: use proper compatibles for sam9x60's rtc and rtt [ Upstream commit 641522665dbb25ce117c78746df1aad8b58c80e5 ] Use proper compatible strings for SAM9X60's RTC and RTT IPs. These are necessary for configuring wakeup sources for ULP1 PM mode. Fixes: eaedc0d379da ("ARM: at91: pm: add ULP1 support for SAM9X60") Signed-off-by: Claudiu Beznea Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220523092421.317345-3-claudiu.beznea@microchip.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/arm/mach-at91/pm.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-at91/pm.c b/arch/arm/mach-at91/pm.c index 3e24e104e687..5d75ab82d5a6 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mach-at91/pm.c +++ b/arch/arm/mach-at91/pm.c @@ -114,12 +114,12 @@ static const struct of_device_id sama5d2_ws_ids[] = { }; static const struct of_device_id sam9x60_ws_ids[] = { - { .compatible = "atmel,at91sam9x5-rtc", .data = &ws_info[1] }, + { .compatible = "microchip,sam9x60-rtc", .data = &ws_info[1] }, { .compatible = "atmel,at91rm9200-ohci", .data = &ws_info[2] }, { .compatible = "usb-ohci", .data = &ws_info[2] }, { .compatible = "atmel,at91sam9g45-ehci", .data = &ws_info[2] }, { .compatible = "usb-ehci", .data = &ws_info[2] }, - { .compatible = "atmel,at91sam9260-rtt", .data = &ws_info[4] }, + { .compatible = "microchip,sam9x60-rtt", .data = &ws_info[4] }, { .compatible = "cdns,sam9x60-macb", .data = &ws_info[5] }, { /* sentinel */ } }; From 0711d15ccb27aee4690120ea970a5e268c49a8d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Rick Lindsley Date: Sat, 2 Jul 2022 03:37:12 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0856/1091] ibmvnic: Properly dispose of all skbs during a failover. [ Upstream commit 1b18f09d31cfa7148df15a7d5c5e0e86f105f7d1 ] During a reset, there may have been transmits in flight that are no longer valid and cannot be fulfilled. Resetting and clearing the queues is insufficient; each skb also needs to be explicitly freed so that upper levels are not left waiting for confirmation of a transmit that will never happen. If this happens frequently enough, the apparent backlog will cause TCP to begin "congestion control" unnecessarily, culminating in permanently decreased throughput. Fixes: d7c0ef36bde03 ("ibmvnic: Free and re-allocate scrqs when tx/rx scrqs change") Tested-by: Nick Child Reviewed-by: Brian King Signed-off-by: Rick Lindsley Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/ibm/ibmvnic.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/ibm/ibmvnic.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/ibm/ibmvnic.c index 34bf6f4eef4a..bc313d85fe13 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/ibm/ibmvnic.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/ibm/ibmvnic.c @@ -5022,6 +5022,15 @@ static int ibmvnic_reset_init(struct ibmvnic_adapter *adapter) release_sub_crqs(adapter, 0); rc = init_sub_crqs(adapter); } else { + /* no need to reinitialize completely, but we do + * need to clean up transmits that were in flight + * when we processed the reset. Failure to do so + * will confound the upper layer, usually TCP, by + * creating the illusion of transmits that are + * awaiting completion. + */ + clean_tx_pools(adapter); + rc = reset_sub_crq_queues(adapter); } } else { From 681738560bf2a96f6e0b1043a10300fabea5dd55 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vladimir Oltean Date: Sun, 3 Jul 2022 10:36:24 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 0857/1091] selftests: forwarding: fix flood_unicast_test when h2 supports IFF_UNICAST_FLT [ Upstream commit b8e629b05f5d23f9649c901bef09fab8b0c2e4b9 ] As mentioned in the blamed commit, flood_unicast_test() works by checking the match count on a tc filter placed on the receiving interface. But the second host interface (host2_if) has no interest in receiving a packet with MAC DA de:ad:be:ef:13:37, so its RX filter drops it even before the ingress tc filter gets to be executed. So we will incorrectly get the message "Packet was not flooded when should", when in fact, the packet was flooded as expected but dropped due to an unrelated reason, at some other layer on the receiving side. Force h2 to accept this packet by temporarily placing it in promiscuous mode. Alternatively we could either deliver to its MAC address or use tcpdump_start, but this has the fewest complications. This fixes the "flooding" test from bridge_vlan_aware.sh and bridge_vlan_unaware.sh, which calls flood_test from the lib. Fixes: 236dd50bf67a ("selftests: forwarding: Add a test for flooded traffic") Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel Tested-by: Ido Schimmel Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/lib.sh | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/lib.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/lib.sh index 85c587a03c8a..be977cd4bfe3 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/lib.sh +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/lib.sh @@ -960,6 +960,7 @@ flood_test_do() # Add an ACL on `host2_if` which will tell us whether the packet # was flooded to it or not. + ip link set $host2_if promisc on tc qdisc add dev $host2_if ingress tc filter add dev $host2_if ingress protocol ip pref 1 handle 101 \ flower dst_mac $mac action drop @@ -977,6 +978,7 @@ flood_test_do() tc filter del dev $host2_if ingress protocol ip pref 1 handle 101 flower tc qdisc del dev $host2_if ingress + ip link set $host2_if promisc off return $err } From 7adf3d45c460ed2ffc6e31364f42b5994d1f70e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vladimir Oltean Date: Sun, 3 Jul 2022 10:36:25 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 0858/1091] selftests: forwarding: fix learning_test when h1 supports IFF_UNICAST_FLT [ Upstream commit 1a635d3e1c80626237fdae47a5545b6655d8d81c ] The first host interface has by default no interest in receiving packets MAC DA de:ad:be:ef:13:37, so it might drop them before they hit the tc filter and this might confuse the selftest. Enable promiscuous mode such that the filter properly counts received packets. Fixes: d4deb01467ec ("selftests: forwarding: Add a test for FDB learning") Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel Tested-by: Ido Schimmel Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/lib.sh | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/lib.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/lib.sh index be977cd4bfe3..b759f7903c06 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/lib.sh +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/lib.sh @@ -894,6 +894,7 @@ learning_test() # FDB entry was installed. bridge link set dev $br_port1 flood off + ip link set $host1_if promisc on tc qdisc add dev $host1_if ingress tc filter add dev $host1_if ingress protocol ip pref 1 handle 101 \ flower dst_mac $mac action drop @@ -943,6 +944,7 @@ learning_test() tc filter del dev $host1_if ingress protocol ip pref 1 handle 101 flower tc qdisc del dev $host1_if ingress + ip link set $host1_if promisc off bridge link set dev $br_port1 flood on From acb72388aed5ba6b5b1ecbcdd879d3af2069c9f1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vladimir Oltean Date: Sun, 3 Jul 2022 10:36:26 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 0859/1091] selftests: forwarding: fix error message in learning_test [ Upstream commit 83844aacab2015da1dba1df0cc61fc4b4c4e8076 ] When packets are not received, they aren't received on $host1_if, so the message talking about the second host not receiving them is incorrect. Fix it. Fixes: d4deb01467ec ("selftests: forwarding: Add a test for FDB learning") Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/lib.sh | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/lib.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/lib.sh index b759f7903c06..f190ad58e00d 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/lib.sh +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/lib.sh @@ -905,7 +905,7 @@ learning_test() tc -j -s filter show dev $host1_if ingress \ | jq -e ".[] | select(.options.handle == 101) \ | select(.options.actions[0].stats.packets == 1)" &> /dev/null - check_fail $? "Packet reached second host when should not" + check_fail $? "Packet reached first host when should not" $MZ $host1_if -c 1 -p 64 -a $mac -t ip -q sleep 1 From 67586906893c36a747559ba2fdaab67c664b541c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Satish Nagireddy Date: Tue, 28 Jun 2022 12:12:16 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0860/1091] i2c: cadence: Unregister the clk notifier in error path [ Upstream commit 3501f0c663063513ad604fb1b3f06af637d3396d ] This patch ensures that the clock notifier is unregistered when driver probe is returning error. Fixes: df8eb5691c48 ("i2c: Add driver for Cadence I2C controller") Signed-off-by: Satish Nagireddy Tested-by: Lars-Peter Clausen Reviewed-by: Michal Simek Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-cadence.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-cadence.c b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-cadence.c index 8a3a0991bc1c..3a1bdc75275f 100644 --- a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-cadence.c +++ b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-cadence.c @@ -985,6 +985,7 @@ static int cdns_i2c_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) return 0; err_clk_dis: + clk_notifier_unregister(id->clk, &id->clk_rate_change_nb); clk_disable_unprepare(id->clk); pm_runtime_set_suspended(&pdev->dev); pm_runtime_disable(&pdev->dev); From 858c2d07089501bab3cf65fb050aef447b9f0633 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Robinson Date: Mon, 6 Jun 2022 17:10:34 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0861/1091] dmaengine: imx-sdma: Allow imx8m for imx7 FW revs commit a7cd3cf0b2e5aaacfe5e02c472bd28e98e640be7 upstream. The revision of the imx-sdma IP that is in the i.MX8M series is the same is that as that in the i.MX7 series but the imx7d MODULE_FIRMWARE directive is wrapped in a condiditional which means it's not defined when built for aarch64 SOC_IMX8M platforms and hence you get the following errors when the driver loads on imx8m devices: imx-sdma 302c0000.dma-controller: Direct firmware load for imx/sdma/sdma-imx7d.bin failed with error -2 imx-sdma 302c0000.dma-controller: external firmware not found, using ROM firmware Add the SOC_IMX8M into the check so the firmware can load on i.MX8. Fixes: 1474d48bd639 ("arm64: dts: imx8mq: Add SDMA nodes") Fixes: 941acd566b18 ("dmaengine: imx-sdma: Only check ratio on parts that support 1:1") Signed-off-by: Peter Robinson Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.2+ Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220606161034.3544803-1-pbrobinson@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/dma/imx-sdma.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/dma/imx-sdma.c b/drivers/dma/imx-sdma.c index 801bef83df2a..8ec7a7041e84 100644 --- a/drivers/dma/imx-sdma.c +++ b/drivers/dma/imx-sdma.c @@ -2208,7 +2208,7 @@ MODULE_DESCRIPTION("i.MX SDMA driver"); #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SOC_IMX6Q) MODULE_FIRMWARE("imx/sdma/sdma-imx6q.bin"); #endif -#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SOC_IMX7D) +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SOC_IMX7D) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SOC_IMX8M) MODULE_FIRMWARE("imx/sdma/sdma-imx7d.bin"); #endif MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); From 0e517d0d7febe722bca973b8af842bc90d120364 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shuah Khan Date: Thu, 30 Jun 2022 20:32:55 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 0862/1091] misc: rtsx_usb: fix use of dma mapped buffer for usb bulk transfer commit eb7f8e28420372787933eec079735c35034bda7d upstream. rtsx_usb driver allocates coherent dma buffer for urb transfers. This buffer is passed to usb_bulk_msg() and usb core tries to map already mapped buffer running into a dma mapping error. xhci_hcd 0000:01:00.0: rejecting DMA map of vmalloc memory WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 279 at include/linux/dma-mapping.h:326 usb_ hcd_map_urb_for_dma+0x7d6/0x820 ... xhci_map_urb_for_dma+0x291/0x4e0 usb_hcd_submit_urb+0x199/0x12b0 ... usb_submit_urb+0x3b8/0x9e0 usb_start_wait_urb+0xe3/0x2d0 usb_bulk_msg+0x115/0x240 rtsx_usb_transfer_data+0x185/0x1a8 [rtsx_usb] rtsx_usb_send_cmd+0xbb/0x123 [rtsx_usb] rtsx_usb_write_register+0x12c/0x143 [rtsx_usb] rtsx_usb_probe+0x226/0x4b2 [rtsx_usb] Fix it to use kmalloc() to get DMA-able memory region instead. Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan Cc: stable Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/667d627d502e1ba9ff4f9b94966df3299d2d3c0d.1656642167.git.skhan@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/misc/cardreader/rtsx_usb.c | 13 +++++++------ include/linux/rtsx_usb.h | 1 - 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/misc/cardreader/rtsx_usb.c b/drivers/misc/cardreader/rtsx_usb.c index 4aef33d07cc3..7c547a088921 100644 --- a/drivers/misc/cardreader/rtsx_usb.c +++ b/drivers/misc/cardreader/rtsx_usb.c @@ -631,8 +631,7 @@ static int rtsx_usb_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, ucr->pusb_dev = usb_dev; - ucr->iobuf = usb_alloc_coherent(ucr->pusb_dev, IOBUF_SIZE, - GFP_KERNEL, &ucr->iobuf_dma); + ucr->iobuf = kmalloc(IOBUF_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); if (!ucr->iobuf) return -ENOMEM; @@ -668,8 +667,9 @@ static int rtsx_usb_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, out_init_fail: usb_set_intfdata(ucr->pusb_intf, NULL); - usb_free_coherent(ucr->pusb_dev, IOBUF_SIZE, ucr->iobuf, - ucr->iobuf_dma); + kfree(ucr->iobuf); + ucr->iobuf = NULL; + ucr->cmd_buf = ucr->rsp_buf = NULL; return ret; } @@ -682,8 +682,9 @@ static void rtsx_usb_disconnect(struct usb_interface *intf) mfd_remove_devices(&intf->dev); usb_set_intfdata(ucr->pusb_intf, NULL); - usb_free_coherent(ucr->pusb_dev, IOBUF_SIZE, ucr->iobuf, - ucr->iobuf_dma); + kfree(ucr->iobuf); + ucr->iobuf = NULL; + ucr->cmd_buf = ucr->rsp_buf = NULL; } #ifdef CONFIG_PM diff --git a/include/linux/rtsx_usb.h b/include/linux/rtsx_usb.h index 159729cffd8e..a07f7341ebc2 100644 --- a/include/linux/rtsx_usb.h +++ b/include/linux/rtsx_usb.h @@ -55,7 +55,6 @@ struct rtsx_ucr { struct usb_interface *pusb_intf; struct usb_sg_request current_sg; unsigned char *iobuf; - dma_addr_t iobuf_dma; struct timer_list sg_timer; struct mutex dev_mutex; From 29612c43a2c5bddfc3e551fc564c0280d1a5b134 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shuah Khan Date: Thu, 30 Jun 2022 20:32:56 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 0863/1091] misc: rtsx_usb: use separate command and response buffers commit 3776c78559853fd151be7c41e369fd076fb679d5 upstream. rtsx_usb uses same buffer for command and response. There could be a potential conflict using the same buffer for both especially if retries and timeouts are involved. Use separate command and response buffers to avoid conflicts. Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan Cc: stable Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/07e3721804ff07aaab9ef5b39a5691d0718b9ade.1656642167.git.skhan@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/misc/cardreader/rtsx_usb.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++--------- include/linux/rtsx_usb.h | 1 - 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/misc/cardreader/rtsx_usb.c b/drivers/misc/cardreader/rtsx_usb.c index 7c547a088921..f6ce0d20ad91 100644 --- a/drivers/misc/cardreader/rtsx_usb.c +++ b/drivers/misc/cardreader/rtsx_usb.c @@ -631,15 +631,18 @@ static int rtsx_usb_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, ucr->pusb_dev = usb_dev; - ucr->iobuf = kmalloc(IOBUF_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!ucr->iobuf) + ucr->cmd_buf = kmalloc(IOBUF_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ucr->cmd_buf) return -ENOMEM; + ucr->rsp_buf = kmalloc(IOBUF_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ucr->rsp_buf) + goto out_free_cmd_buf; + usb_set_intfdata(intf, ucr); ucr->vendor_id = id->idVendor; ucr->product_id = id->idProduct; - ucr->cmd_buf = ucr->rsp_buf = ucr->iobuf; mutex_init(&ucr->dev_mutex); @@ -667,9 +670,11 @@ static int rtsx_usb_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, out_init_fail: usb_set_intfdata(ucr->pusb_intf, NULL); - kfree(ucr->iobuf); - ucr->iobuf = NULL; - ucr->cmd_buf = ucr->rsp_buf = NULL; + kfree(ucr->rsp_buf); + ucr->rsp_buf = NULL; +out_free_cmd_buf: + kfree(ucr->cmd_buf); + ucr->cmd_buf = NULL; return ret; } @@ -682,9 +687,12 @@ static void rtsx_usb_disconnect(struct usb_interface *intf) mfd_remove_devices(&intf->dev); usb_set_intfdata(ucr->pusb_intf, NULL); - kfree(ucr->iobuf); - ucr->iobuf = NULL; - ucr->cmd_buf = ucr->rsp_buf = NULL; + + kfree(ucr->cmd_buf); + ucr->cmd_buf = NULL; + + kfree(ucr->rsp_buf); + ucr->rsp_buf = NULL; } #ifdef CONFIG_PM diff --git a/include/linux/rtsx_usb.h b/include/linux/rtsx_usb.h index a07f7341ebc2..3247ed8e9ff0 100644 --- a/include/linux/rtsx_usb.h +++ b/include/linux/rtsx_usb.h @@ -54,7 +54,6 @@ struct rtsx_ucr { struct usb_device *pusb_dev; struct usb_interface *pusb_intf; struct usb_sg_request current_sg; - unsigned char *iobuf; struct timer_list sg_timer; struct mutex dev_mutex; From aaf875578fd96b2e517200ca1c1f545f6817c42e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shuah Khan Date: Fri, 1 Jul 2022 10:53:52 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 0864/1091] misc: rtsx_usb: set return value in rsp_buf alloc err path commit 2cd37c2e72449a7add6da1183d20a6247d6db111 upstream. Set return value in rsp_buf alloc error path before going to error handling. drivers/misc/cardreader/rtsx_usb.c:639:6: warning: variable 'ret' is used uninitialized whenever 'if' condition is true [-Wsometimes-uninitialized] if (!ucr->rsp_buf) ^~~~~~~~~~~~~ drivers/misc/cardreader/rtsx_usb.c:678:9: note: uninitialized use occurs here return ret; ^~~ drivers/misc/cardreader/rtsx_usb.c:639:2: note: remove the 'if' if its condition is always false if (!ucr->rsp_buf) ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ drivers/misc/cardreader/rtsx_usb.c:622:9: note: initialize the variable 'ret' to silence this warning int ret; ^ = 0 Fixes: 3776c7855985 ("misc: rtsx_usb: use separate command and response buffers") Reported-by: kernel test robot Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220701165352.15687-1-skhan@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/misc/cardreader/rtsx_usb.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/misc/cardreader/rtsx_usb.c b/drivers/misc/cardreader/rtsx_usb.c index f6ce0d20ad91..8acf6e6aff31 100644 --- a/drivers/misc/cardreader/rtsx_usb.c +++ b/drivers/misc/cardreader/rtsx_usb.c @@ -636,8 +636,10 @@ static int rtsx_usb_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, return -ENOMEM; ucr->rsp_buf = kmalloc(IOBUF_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!ucr->rsp_buf) + if (!ucr->rsp_buf) { + ret = -ENOMEM; goto out_free_cmd_buf; + } usb_set_intfdata(intf, ucr); From d88022b41efff477929ff5cb061d05d49e04abab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Samuel Holland Date: Fri, 1 Jul 2022 22:19:02 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 0865/1091] dt-bindings: dma: allwinner,sun50i-a64-dma: Fix min/max typo commit 607a48c78e6b427b0b684d24e61c19e846ad65d6 upstream. The conditional block for variants with a second clock should have set minItems, not maxItems, which was already 2. Since clock-names requires two items, this typo should not have caused any problems. Fixes: edd14218bd66 ("dt-bindings: dmaengine: Convert Allwinner A31 and A64 DMA to a schema") Signed-off-by: Samuel Holland Reviewed-by: Rob Herring Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220702031903.21703-1-samuel@sholland.org Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- .../devicetree/bindings/dma/allwinner,sun50i-a64-dma.yaml | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/dma/allwinner,sun50i-a64-dma.yaml b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/dma/allwinner,sun50i-a64-dma.yaml index 4cb9d6b93138..c61c4a6b57f1 100644 --- a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/dma/allwinner,sun50i-a64-dma.yaml +++ b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/dma/allwinner,sun50i-a64-dma.yaml @@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ if: then: properties: clocks: - maxItems: 2 + minItems: 2 required: - clock-names From 5af3f2a697d5001d4735629de1f05789c4de59ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Linus Torvalds Date: Sun, 10 Jul 2022 13:55:49 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0866/1091] ida: don't use BUG_ON() for debugging commit fc82bbf4dede758007763867d0282353c06d1121 upstream. This is another old BUG_ON() that just shouldn't exist (see also commit a382f8fee42c: "signal handling: don't use BUG_ON() for debugging"). In fact, as Matthew Wilcox points out, this condition shouldn't really even result in a warning, since a negative id allocation result is just a normal allocation failure: "I wonder if we should even warn here -- sure, the caller is trying to free something that wasn't allocated, but we don't warn for kfree(NULL)" and goes on to point out how that current error check is only causing people to unnecessarily do their own index range checking before freeing it. This was noted by Itay Iellin, because the bluetooth HCI socket cookie code does *not* do that range checking, and ends up just freeing the error case too, triggering the BUG_ON(). The HCI code requires CAP_NET_RAW, and seems to just result in an ugly splat, but there really is no reason to BUG_ON() here, and we have generally striven for allocation models where it's always ok to just do free(alloc()); even if the allocation were to fail for some random reason (usually obviously that "random" reason being some resource limit). Fixes: 88eca0207cf1 ("ida: simplified functions for id allocation") Reported-by: Itay Iellin Suggested-by: Matthew Wilcox Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- lib/idr.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/lib/idr.c b/lib/idr.c index 4d2eef0259d2..b2bc190431dd 100644 --- a/lib/idr.c +++ b/lib/idr.c @@ -489,7 +489,8 @@ void ida_free(struct ida *ida, unsigned int id) struct ida_bitmap *bitmap; unsigned long flags; - BUG_ON((int)id < 0); + if ((int)id < 0) + return; xas_lock_irqsave(&xas, flags); bitmap = xas_load(&xas); From 164e88024f82a38a08b5a55f20cd1b2908ec5eb7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dmitry Osipenko Date: Fri, 20 May 2022 21:14:32 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 0867/1091] dmaengine: pl330: Fix lockdep warning about non-static key commit b64b3b2f1d81f83519582e1feee87d77f51f5f17 upstream. The DEFINE_SPINLOCK() macro shouldn't be used for dynamically allocated spinlocks. The lockdep warns about this and disables locking validator. Fix the warning by making lock static. INFO: trying to register non-static key. The code is fine but needs lockdep annotation, or maybe you didn't initialize this object before use? turning off the locking correctness validator. Hardware name: Radxa ROCK Pi 4C (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace.part.0+0xcc/0xe0 show_stack+0x18/0x6c dump_stack_lvl+0x8c/0xb8 dump_stack+0x18/0x34 register_lock_class+0x4a8/0x4cc __lock_acquire+0x78/0x20cc lock_acquire.part.0+0xe0/0x230 lock_acquire+0x68/0x84 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x84/0xc4 add_desc+0x44/0xc0 pl330_get_desc+0x15c/0x1d0 pl330_prep_dma_cyclic+0x100/0x270 snd_dmaengine_pcm_trigger+0xec/0x1c0 dmaengine_pcm_trigger+0x18/0x24 ... Fixes: e588710311ee ("dmaengine: pl330: fix descriptor allocation fail") Signed-off-by: Dmitry Osipenko Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220520181432.149904-1-dmitry.osipenko@collabora.com Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/dma/pl330.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/dma/pl330.c b/drivers/dma/pl330.c index 9a94d5b9e059..77a6495bb6b1 100644 --- a/drivers/dma/pl330.c +++ b/drivers/dma/pl330.c @@ -2585,7 +2585,7 @@ static struct dma_pl330_desc *pl330_get_desc(struct dma_pl330_chan *pch) /* If the DMAC pool is empty, alloc new */ if (!desc) { - DEFINE_SPINLOCK(lock); + static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(lock); LIST_HEAD(pool); if (!add_desc(&pool, &lock, GFP_ATOMIC, 1)) From f19026ede26ec859c8dbf15eb5b4db24522ad88a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michael Walle Date: Thu, 26 May 2022 15:51:11 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0868/1091] dmaengine: at_xdma: handle errors of at_xdmac_alloc_desc() correctly commit 3770d92bd5237d686e49da7b2fb86f53ee6ed259 upstream. It seems that it is valid to have less than the requested number of descriptors. But what is not valid and leads to subsequent errors is to have zero descriptors. In that case, abort the probing. Fixes: e1f7c9eee707 ("dmaengine: at_xdmac: creation of the atmel eXtended DMA Controller driver") Signed-off-by: Michael Walle Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220526135111.1470926-1-michael@walle.cc Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/dma/at_xdmac.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/dma/at_xdmac.c b/drivers/dma/at_xdmac.c index 6473a4a81d58..a406b3c0d170 100644 --- a/drivers/dma/at_xdmac.c +++ b/drivers/dma/at_xdmac.c @@ -1848,6 +1848,11 @@ static int at_xdmac_alloc_chan_resources(struct dma_chan *chan) for (i = 0; i < init_nr_desc_per_channel; i++) { desc = at_xdmac_alloc_desc(chan, GFP_ATOMIC); if (!desc) { + if (i == 0) { + dev_warn(chan2dev(chan), + "can't allocate any descriptors\n"); + return -EIO; + } dev_warn(chan2dev(chan), "only %d descriptors have been allocated\n", i); break; From b31ab132561c7f1b6459039152b8d09e44eb3565 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miaoqian Lin Date: Sun, 5 Jun 2022 08:27:23 +0400 Subject: [PATCH 0869/1091] dmaengine: ti: Fix refcount leak in ti_dra7_xbar_route_allocate commit c132fe78ad7b4ce8b5d49a501a15c29d08eeb23a upstream. of_parse_phandle() returns a node pointer with refcount incremented, we should use of_node_put() on it when not needed anymore. Add missing of_node_put() in to fix this. Fixes: ec9bfa1e1a79 ("dmaengine: ti-dma-crossbar: dra7: Use bitops instead of idr") Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220605042723.17668-2-linmq006@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/dma/ti/dma-crossbar.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/dma/ti/dma-crossbar.c b/drivers/dma/ti/dma-crossbar.c index f255056696ee..d192362e285e 100644 --- a/drivers/dma/ti/dma-crossbar.c +++ b/drivers/dma/ti/dma-crossbar.c @@ -270,6 +270,7 @@ static void *ti_dra7_xbar_route_allocate(struct of_phandle_args *dma_spec, mutex_unlock(&xbar->mutex); dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Run out of free DMA requests\n"); kfree(map); + of_node_put(dma_spec->np); return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); } set_bit(map->xbar_out, xbar->dma_inuse); From 1be11d7f3c890035aa2620f37dda3c230c9eff09 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miaoqian Lin Date: Sun, 5 Jun 2022 08:27:22 +0400 Subject: [PATCH 0870/1091] dmaengine: ti: Add missing put_device in ti_dra7_xbar_route_allocate commit 615a4bfc426e11dba05c2cf343f9ac752fb381d2 upstream. of_find_device_by_node() takes reference, we should use put_device() to release it when not need anymore. Fixes: a074ae38f859 ("dmaengine: Add driver for TI DMA crossbar on DRA7x") Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin Acked-by: Peter Ujfalusi Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220605042723.17668-1-linmq006@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/dma/ti/dma-crossbar.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/dma/ti/dma-crossbar.c b/drivers/dma/ti/dma-crossbar.c index d192362e285e..26cf62af08fc 100644 --- a/drivers/dma/ti/dma-crossbar.c +++ b/drivers/dma/ti/dma-crossbar.c @@ -247,6 +247,7 @@ static void *ti_dra7_xbar_route_allocate(struct of_phandle_args *dma_spec, if (dma_spec->args[0] >= xbar->xbar_requests) { dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Invalid XBAR request number: %d\n", dma_spec->args[0]); + put_device(&pdev->dev); return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); } @@ -254,12 +255,14 @@ static void *ti_dra7_xbar_route_allocate(struct of_phandle_args *dma_spec, dma_spec->np = of_parse_phandle(ofdma->of_node, "dma-masters", 0); if (!dma_spec->np) { dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Can't get DMA master\n"); + put_device(&pdev->dev); return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); } map = kzalloc(sizeof(*map), GFP_KERNEL); if (!map) { of_node_put(dma_spec->np); + put_device(&pdev->dev); return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); } @@ -271,6 +274,7 @@ static void *ti_dra7_xbar_route_allocate(struct of_phandle_args *dma_spec, dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Run out of free DMA requests\n"); kfree(map); of_node_put(dma_spec->np); + put_device(&pdev->dev); return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); } set_bit(map->xbar_out, xbar->dma_inuse); From 0ec831fa971d8099e3c4f46093ffb41d044cc10c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2022 16:30:50 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0871/1091] Linux 5.4.205 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220711090538.722676354@linuxfoundation.org Tested-by: Florian Fainelli Tested-by: Guenter Roeck Tested-by: Shuah Khan Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing Tested-by: Jon Hunter Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Makefile | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index b5d1718ae70c..c40565492ffb 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 VERSION = 5 PATCHLEVEL = 4 -SUBLEVEL = 204 +SUBLEVEL = 205 EXTRAVERSION = NAME = Kleptomaniac Octopus From 15a3adfe75937c9e4e0e48f0ed40dd39a0e526e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2022 09:21:15 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0872/1091] Revert "mtd: rawnand: gpmi: Fix setting busy timeout setting" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit This reverts commit 71c76f56b97c15d367f0855bbf2127029bdabecc which is commit 06781a5026350cde699d2d10c9914a25c1524f45 upstream. It is reported to cause data loss, so revert it to prevent that from happening for users of this driver. Reported-by: Tomasz Moń Reported-by: Sascha Hauer Cc: Miquel Raynal Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220701110341.3094023-1-s.hauer@pengutronix.de/ Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/mtd/nand/raw/gpmi-nand/gpmi-nand.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/mtd/nand/raw/gpmi-nand/gpmi-nand.c b/drivers/mtd/nand/raw/gpmi-nand/gpmi-nand.c index 41f7dd58bdcf..02218c3b548f 100644 --- a/drivers/mtd/nand/raw/gpmi-nand/gpmi-nand.c +++ b/drivers/mtd/nand/raw/gpmi-nand/gpmi-nand.c @@ -682,7 +682,7 @@ static void gpmi_nfc_compute_timings(struct gpmi_nand_data *this, hw->timing0 = BF_GPMI_TIMING0_ADDRESS_SETUP(addr_setup_cycles) | BF_GPMI_TIMING0_DATA_HOLD(data_hold_cycles) | BF_GPMI_TIMING0_DATA_SETUP(data_setup_cycles); - hw->timing1 = BF_GPMI_TIMING1_BUSY_TIMEOUT(DIV_ROUND_UP(busy_timeout_cycles, 4096)); + hw->timing1 = BF_GPMI_TIMING1_BUSY_TIMEOUT(busy_timeout_cycles * 4096); /* * Derive NFC ideal delay from {3}: From 6584107915561f860b7b05dcca5c903dd62a308d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2022 10:14:53 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0873/1091] Linux 5.4.206 Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Makefile | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index c40565492ffb..755123455105 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 VERSION = 5 PATCHLEVEL = 4 -SUBLEVEL = 205 +SUBLEVEL = 206 EXTRAVERSION = NAME = Kleptomaniac Octopus From 5e7cc47ab923f99f36af794df73b226181eef29a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Meng Tang Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2022 14:00:05 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0874/1091] ALSA: hda - Add fixup for Dell Latitidue E5430 commit 841bdf85c226803a78a9319af9b2caa9bf3e2eda upstream. Another Dell model, another fixup entry: Latitude E5430 needs the same fixup as other Latitude E series as workaround for noise problems. Signed-off-by: Meng Tang Cc: Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220712060005.20176-1-tangmeng@uniontech.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c index 804fc0d331b4..738dcbb7876d 100644 --- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c +++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c @@ -8056,6 +8056,7 @@ static const struct snd_pci_quirk alc269_fixup_tbl[] = { SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1025, 0x142b, "Acer Swift SF314-42", ALC255_FIXUP_ACER_MIC_NO_PRESENCE), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1025, 0x1430, "Acer TravelMate B311R-31", ALC256_FIXUP_ACER_MIC_NO_PRESENCE), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1028, 0x0470, "Dell M101z", ALC269_FIXUP_DELL_M101Z), + SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1028, 0x053c, "Dell Latitude E5430", ALC292_FIXUP_DELL_E7X), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1028, 0x054b, "Dell XPS one 2710", ALC275_FIXUP_DELL_XPS), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1028, 0x05bd, "Dell Latitude E6440", ALC292_FIXUP_DELL_E7X), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1028, 0x05be, "Dell Latitude E6540", ALC292_FIXUP_DELL_E7X), From 33d33a66e31c1843b87a1368158e2207b56144ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Meng Tang Date: Mon, 11 Jul 2022 18:17:44 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0875/1091] ALSA: hda/conexant: Apply quirk for another HP ProDesk 600 G3 model commit d16d69bf5a25d91c6d8f3e29711be12551bf56cd upstream. There is another HP ProDesk 600 G3 model with the PCI SSID 103c:82b4 that requires the quirk HP_MIC_NO_PRESENCE. Add the corresponding entry to the quirk table. Signed-off-by: Meng Tang Cc: Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220711101744.25189-1-tangmeng@uniontech.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/pci/hda/patch_conexant.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/patch_conexant.c b/sound/pci/hda/patch_conexant.c index b81b0a1bada5..d4bfb1149327 100644 --- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_conexant.c +++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_conexant.c @@ -905,6 +905,7 @@ static const struct snd_pci_quirk cxt5066_fixups[] = { SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x828c, "HP EliteBook 840 G4", CXT_FIXUP_HP_DOCK), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x8299, "HP 800 G3 SFF", CXT_FIXUP_HP_MIC_NO_PRESENCE), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x829a, "HP 800 G3 DM", CXT_FIXUP_HP_MIC_NO_PRESENCE), + SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x82b4, "HP ProDesk 600 G3", CXT_FIXUP_HP_MIC_NO_PRESENCE), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x836e, "HP ProBook 455 G5", CXT_FIXUP_MUTE_LED_GPIO), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x837f, "HP ProBook 470 G5", CXT_FIXUP_MUTE_LED_GPIO), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x83b2, "HP EliteBook 840 G5", CXT_FIXUP_HP_DOCK), From 7e2fbf2d9b61ecbb4b8777fcf9f7fd4d6097741f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Meng Tang Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2022 17:22:22 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0876/1091] ALSA: hda/realtek - Fix headset mic problem for a HP machine with alc671 commit dbe75d314748e08fc6e4576d153d8a69621ee5ca upstream. On a HP 288 Pro G6, the front mic could not be detected.In order to get it working, the pin configuration needs to be set correctly, and the ALC671_FIXUP_HP_HEADSET_MIC2 fixup needs to be applied. Signed-off-by: Meng Tang Cc: Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220712092222.21738-1-tangmeng@uniontech.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c index 738dcbb7876d..c45432652512 100644 --- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c +++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c @@ -10261,6 +10261,7 @@ static const struct snd_pci_quirk alc662_fixup_tbl[] = { SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x1632, "HP RP5800", ALC662_FIXUP_HP_RP5800), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x8719, "HP", ALC897_FIXUP_HP_HSMIC_VERB), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x873e, "HP", ALC671_FIXUP_HP_HEADSET_MIC2), + SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x877e, "HP 288 Pro G6", ALC671_FIXUP_HP_HEADSET_MIC2), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x885f, "HP 288 Pro G8", ALC671_FIXUP_HP_HEADSET_MIC2), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1043, 0x1080, "Asus UX501VW", ALC668_FIXUP_HEADSET_MODE), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1043, 0x11cd, "Asus N550", ALC662_FIXUP_ASUS_Nx50), From bbb82d4d9b3db7ab3a833bd5822bdab21255436f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Meng Tang Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2022 14:33:32 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0877/1091] ALSA: hda/realtek - Fix headset mic problem for a HP machine with alc221 commit 4ba5c853d7945b3855c3dcb293f7f9f019db641e upstream. On a HP 288 Pro G2 MT (X9W02AV), the front mic could not be detected. In order to get it working, the pin configuration needs to be set correctly, and the ALC221_FIXUP_HP_288PRO_MIC_NO_PRESENCE fixup needs to be applied. Signed-off-by: Meng Tang Cc: Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220713063332.30095-1-tangmeng@uniontech.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c index c45432652512..338e9c709725 100644 --- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c +++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c @@ -6427,6 +6427,7 @@ enum { ALC298_FIXUP_LENOVO_SPK_VOLUME, ALC256_FIXUP_DELL_INSPIRON_7559_SUBWOOFER, ALC269_FIXUP_ATIV_BOOK_8, + ALC221_FIXUP_HP_288PRO_MIC_NO_PRESENCE, ALC221_FIXUP_HP_MIC_NO_PRESENCE, ALC256_FIXUP_ASUS_HEADSET_MODE, ALC256_FIXUP_ASUS_MIC, @@ -7305,6 +7306,16 @@ static const struct hda_fixup alc269_fixups[] = { .chained = true, .chain_id = ALC269_FIXUP_NO_SHUTUP }, + [ALC221_FIXUP_HP_288PRO_MIC_NO_PRESENCE] = { + .type = HDA_FIXUP_PINS, + .v.pins = (const struct hda_pintbl[]) { + { 0x19, 0x01a1913c }, /* use as headset mic, without its own jack detect */ + { 0x1a, 0x01813030 }, /* use as headphone mic, without its own jack detect */ + { } + }, + .chained = true, + .chain_id = ALC269_FIXUP_HEADSET_MODE + }, [ALC221_FIXUP_HP_MIC_NO_PRESENCE] = { .type = HDA_FIXUP_PINS, .v.pins = (const struct hda_pintbl[]) { @@ -8163,6 +8174,7 @@ static const struct snd_pci_quirk alc269_fixup_tbl[] = { SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x2335, "HP", ALC269_FIXUP_HP_MUTE_LED_MIC1), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x2336, "HP", ALC269_FIXUP_HP_MUTE_LED_MIC1), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x2337, "HP", ALC269_FIXUP_HP_MUTE_LED_MIC1), + SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x2b5e, "HP 288 Pro G2 MT", ALC221_FIXUP_HP_288PRO_MIC_NO_PRESENCE), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x802e, "HP Z240 SFF", ALC221_FIXUP_HP_MIC_NO_PRESENCE), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x802f, "HP Z240", ALC221_FIXUP_HP_MIC_NO_PRESENCE), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x820d, "HP Pavilion 15", ALC269_FIXUP_HP_MUTE_LED_MIC3), From 9026b280eb7f365916be79b02a6b3e5607955261 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Meng Tang Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2022 17:41:33 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0878/1091] ALSA: hda/realtek - Enable the headset-mic on a Xiaomi's laptop commit 9b043a8f386485c74c0f8eea2c287d5bdbdf3279 upstream. The headset on this machine is not defined, after applying the quirk ALC256_FIXUP_ASUS_HEADSET_MIC, the headset-mic works well Signed-off-by: Meng Tang Cc: Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220713094133.9894-1-tangmeng@uniontech.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c index 338e9c709725..145e494f776a 100644 --- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c +++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c @@ -8423,6 +8423,7 @@ static const struct snd_pci_quirk alc269_fixup_tbl[] = { SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1d72, 0x1602, "RedmiBook", ALC255_FIXUP_XIAOMI_HEADSET_MIC), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1d72, 0x1701, "XiaomiNotebook Pro", ALC298_FIXUP_DELL1_MIC_NO_PRESENCE), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1d72, 0x1901, "RedmiBook 14", ALC256_FIXUP_ASUS_HEADSET_MIC), + SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1d72, 0x1945, "Redmi G", ALC256_FIXUP_ASUS_HEADSET_MIC), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1d72, 0x1947, "RedmiBook Air", ALC255_FIXUP_XIAOMI_HEADSET_MIC), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x8086, 0x2074, "Intel NUC 8", ALC233_FIXUP_INTEL_NUC8_DMIC), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x8086, 0x2080, "Intel NUC 8 Rugged", ALC256_FIXUP_INTEL_NUC8_RUGGED), From 7425479d20f9e96f7c3ec8e8a93fe0d7478724cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Juergen Gross Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2022 15:53:22 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0879/1091] xen/netback: avoid entering xenvif_rx_next_skb() with an empty rx queue commit 94e8100678889ab428e68acadf042de723f094b9 upstream. xenvif_rx_next_skb() is expecting the rx queue not being empty, but in case the loop in xenvif_rx_action() is doing multiple iterations, the availability of another skb in the rx queue is not being checked. This can lead to crashes: [40072.537261] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000080 [40072.537407] IP: xenvif_rx_skb+0x23/0x590 [xen_netback] [40072.537534] PGD 0 P4D 0 [40072.537644] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [40072.537749] CPU: 0 PID: 12505 Comm: v1-c40247-q2-gu Not tainted 4.12.14-122.121-default #1 SLE12-SP5 [40072.537867] Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL580 Gen9/ProLiant DL580 Gen9, BIOS U17 11/23/2021 [40072.537999] task: ffff880433b38100 task.stack: ffffc90043d40000 [40072.538112] RIP: e030:xenvif_rx_skb+0x23/0x590 [xen_netback] [40072.538217] RSP: e02b:ffffc90043d43de0 EFLAGS: 00010246 [40072.538319] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc90043cd7cd0 RCX: 00000000000000f7 [40072.538430] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000006 RDI: ffffc90043d43df8 [40072.538531] RBP: 000000000000003f R08: 000077ff80000000 R09: 0000000000000008 [40072.538644] R10: 0000000000007ff0 R11: 00000000000008f6 R12: ffffc90043ce2708 [40072.538745] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffc90043d43ed0 R15: ffff88043ea748c0 [40072.538861] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880484600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [40072.538988] CS: e033 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [40072.539088] CR2: 0000000000000080 CR3: 0000000407ac8000 CR4: 0000000000040660 [40072.539211] Call Trace: [40072.539319] xenvif_rx_action+0x71/0x90 [xen_netback] [40072.539429] xenvif_kthread_guest_rx+0x14a/0x29c [xen_netback] Fix that by stopping the loop in case the rx queue becomes empty. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 98f6d57ced73 ("xen-netback: process guest rx packets in batches") Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220713135322.19616-1-jgross@suse.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/xen-netback/rx.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/rx.c b/drivers/net/xen-netback/rx.c index 7f68067c0174..85a5a622ec18 100644 --- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/rx.c +++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/rx.c @@ -482,6 +482,7 @@ void xenvif_rx_action(struct xenvif_queue *queue) queue->rx_copy.completed = &completed_skbs; while (xenvif_rx_ring_slots_available(queue) && + !skb_queue_empty(&queue->rx_queue) && work_done < RX_BATCH_SIZE) { xenvif_rx_skb(queue); work_done++; From ecc6dec12c33aa92c086cd702af9f544ddaf3c75 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zheng Yejian Date: Mon, 11 Jul 2022 09:47:31 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0880/1091] tracing/histograms: Fix memory leak problem commit 7edc3945bdce9c39198a10d6129377a5c53559c2 upstream. This reverts commit 46bbe5c671e06f070428b9be142cc4ee5cedebac. As commit 46bbe5c671e0 ("tracing: fix double free") said, the "double free" problem reported by clang static analyzer is: > In parse_var_defs() if there is a problem allocating > var_defs.expr, the earlier var_defs.name is freed. > This free is duplicated by free_var_defs() which frees > the rest of the list. However, if there is a problem allocating N-th var_defs.expr: + in parse_var_defs(), the freed 'earlier var_defs.name' is actually the N-th var_defs.name; + then in free_var_defs(), the names from 0th to (N-1)-th are freed; IF ALLOCATING PROBLEM HAPPENED HERE!!! -+ \ | 0th 1th (N-1)-th N-th V +-------------+-------------+-----+-------------+----------- var_defs: | name | expr | name | expr | ... | name | expr | name | /// +-------------+-------------+-----+-------------+----------- These two frees don't act on same name, so there was no "double free" problem before. Conversely, after that commit, we get a "memory leak" problem because the above "N-th var_defs.name" is not freed. If enable CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK and inject a fault at where the N-th var_defs.expr allocated, then execute on shell like: $ echo 'hist:key=call_site:val=$v1,$v2:v1=bytes_req,v2=bytes_alloc' > \ /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/kmem/kmalloc/trigger Then kmemleak reports: unreferenced object 0xffff8fb100ef3518 (size 8): comm "bash", pid 196, jiffies 4295681690 (age 28.538s) hex dump (first 8 bytes): 76 31 00 00 b1 8f ff ff v1...... backtrace: [<0000000038fe4895>] kstrdup+0x2d/0x60 [<00000000c99c049a>] event_hist_trigger_parse+0x206f/0x20e0 [<00000000ae70d2cc>] trigger_process_regex+0xc0/0x110 [<0000000066737a4c>] event_trigger_write+0x75/0xd0 [<000000007341e40c>] vfs_write+0xbb/0x2a0 [<0000000087fde4c2>] ksys_write+0x59/0xd0 [<00000000581e9cdf>] do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x80 [<00000000cf3b065c>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220711014731.69520-1-zhengyejian1@huawei.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 46bbe5c671e0 ("tracing: fix double free") Reported-by: Hulk Robot Suggested-by: Steven Rostedt Reviewed-by: Tom Zanussi Signed-off-by: Zheng Yejian Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c b/kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c index 83e181055685..b8f1f0eadd2e 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c +++ b/kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c @@ -4832,6 +4832,8 @@ static int parse_var_defs(struct hist_trigger_data *hist_data) s = kstrdup(field_str, GFP_KERNEL); if (!s) { + kfree(hist_data->attrs->var_defs.name[n_vars]); + hist_data->attrs->var_defs.name[n_vars] = NULL; ret = -ENOMEM; goto free; } From fb5a7f1548d653061bea36526f0fce87246c44f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Steven Rostedt (Google)" Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2022 10:50:40 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 0881/1091] net: sock: tracing: Fix sock_exceed_buf_limit not to dereference stale pointer commit 820b8963adaea34a87abbecb906d1f54c0aabfb7 upstream. The trace event sock_exceed_buf_limit saves the prot->sysctl_mem pointer and then dereferences it in the TP_printk() portion. This is unsafe as the TP_printk() portion is executed at the time the buffer is read. That is, it can be seconds, minutes, days, months, even years later. If the proto is freed, then this dereference will can also lead to a kernel crash. Instead, save the sysctl_mem array into the ring buffer and have the TP_printk() reference that instead. This is the proper and safe way to read pointers in trace events. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220706052130.16368-12-kuniyu@amazon.com/ Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 3847ce32aea9f ("core: add tracepoints for queueing skb to rcvbuf") Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) Acked-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/trace/events/sock.h | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/trace/events/sock.h b/include/trace/events/sock.h index 51fe9f6719eb..ad11938c0972 100644 --- a/include/trace/events/sock.h +++ b/include/trace/events/sock.h @@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(sock_exceed_buf_limit, TP_STRUCT__entry( __array(char, name, 32) - __field(long *, sysctl_mem) + __array(long, sysctl_mem, 3) __field(long, allocated) __field(int, sysctl_rmem) __field(int, rmem_alloc) @@ -109,7 +109,9 @@ TRACE_EVENT(sock_exceed_buf_limit, TP_fast_assign( strncpy(__entry->name, prot->name, 32); - __entry->sysctl_mem = prot->sysctl_mem; + __entry->sysctl_mem[0] = READ_ONCE(prot->sysctl_mem[0]); + __entry->sysctl_mem[1] = READ_ONCE(prot->sysctl_mem[1]); + __entry->sysctl_mem[2] = READ_ONCE(prot->sysctl_mem[2]); __entry->allocated = allocated; __entry->sysctl_rmem = sk_get_rmem0(sk, prot); __entry->rmem_alloc = atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc); From 2c1cc40fb2a1b94c6fd6bd509ca371e74caeb91a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nicolas Dichtel Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2022 13:48:52 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0882/1091] ip: fix dflt addr selection for connected nexthop commit 747c14307214b55dbd8250e1ab44cad8305756f1 upstream. When a nexthop is added, without a gw address, the default scope was set to 'host'. Thus, when a source address is selected, 127.0.0.1 may be chosen but rejected when the route is used. When using a route without a nexthop id, the scope can be configured in the route, thus the problem doesn't exist. To explain more deeply: when a user creates a nexthop, it cannot specify the scope. To create it, the function nh_create_ipv4() calls fib_check_nh() with scope set to 0. fib_check_nh() calls fib_check_nh_nongw() wich was setting scope to 'host'. Then, nh_create_ipv4() calls fib_info_update_nhc_saddr() with scope set to 'host'. The src addr is chosen before the route is inserted. When a 'standard' route (ie without a reference to a nexthop) is added, fib_create_info() calls fib_info_update_nhc_saddr() with the scope set by the user. iproute2 set the scope to 'link' by default. Here is a way to reproduce the problem: ip netns add foo ip -n foo link set lo up ip netns add bar ip -n bar link set lo up sleep 1 ip -n foo link add name eth0 type dummy ip -n foo link set eth0 up ip -n foo address add 192.168.0.1/24 dev eth0 ip -n foo link add name veth0 type veth peer name veth1 netns bar ip -n foo link set veth0 up ip -n bar link set veth1 up ip -n bar address add 192.168.1.1/32 dev veth1 ip -n bar route add default dev veth1 ip -n foo nexthop add id 1 dev veth0 ip -n foo route add 192.168.1.1 nhid 1 Try to get/use the route: > $ ip -n foo route get 192.168.1.1 > RTNETLINK answers: Invalid argument > $ ip netns exec foo ping -c1 192.168.1.1 > ping: connect: Invalid argument Try without nexthop group (iproute2 sets scope to 'link' by dflt): ip -n foo route del 192.168.1.1 ip -n foo route add 192.168.1.1 dev veth0 Try to get/use the route: > $ ip -n foo route get 192.168.1.1 > 192.168.1.1 dev veth0 src 192.168.0.1 uid 0 > cache > $ ip netns exec foo ping -c1 192.168.1.1 > PING 192.168.1.1 (192.168.1.1) 56(84) bytes of data. > 64 bytes from 192.168.1.1: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=0.039 ms > > --- 192.168.1.1 ping statistics --- > 1 packets transmitted, 1 received, 0% packet loss, time 0ms > rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 0.039/0.039/0.039/0.000 ms CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 597cfe4fc339 ("nexthop: Add support for IPv4 nexthops") Reported-by: Edwin Brossette Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220713114853.29406-1-nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c b/net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c index f99ad4a98907..16fe03461563 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c +++ b/net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c @@ -1217,7 +1217,7 @@ static int fib_check_nh_nongw(struct net *net, struct fib_nh *nh, nh->fib_nh_dev = in_dev->dev; dev_hold(nh->fib_nh_dev); - nh->fib_nh_scope = RT_SCOPE_HOST; + nh->fib_nh_scope = RT_SCOPE_LINK; if (!netif_carrier_ok(nh->fib_nh_dev)) nh->fib_nh_flags |= RTNH_F_LINKDOWN; err = 0; From b4d99aa5ae908a388a9fd61960211a05bd0f1cb6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dmitry Osipenko Date: Tue, 28 Jun 2022 08:55:45 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0883/1091] ARM: 9213/1: Print message about disabled Spectre workarounds only once commit e4ced82deb5fb17222fb82e092c3f8311955b585 upstream. Print the message about disabled Spectre workarounds only once. The message is printed each time CPU goes out from idling state on NVIDIA Tegra boards, causing storm in KMSG that makes system unusable. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Dmitry Osipenko Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c b/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c index bcb9181601d9..f2c8ff0683fd 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c +++ b/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c @@ -109,8 +109,7 @@ static unsigned int spectre_v2_install_workaround(unsigned int method) #else static unsigned int spectre_v2_install_workaround(unsigned int method) { - pr_info("CPU%u: Spectre V2: workarounds disabled by configuration\n", - smp_processor_id()); + pr_info_once("Spectre V2: workarounds disabled by configuration\n"); return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE; } From dba5484769096e5f7c0aef36414352dff11d2fd8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ard Biesheuvel Date: Thu, 30 Jun 2022 16:46:54 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0884/1091] ARM: 9214/1: alignment: advance IT state after emulating Thumb instruction commit e5c46fde75e43c15a29b40e5fc5641727f97ae47 upstream. After emulating a misaligned load or store issued in Thumb mode, we have to advance the IT state by hand, or it will get out of sync with the actual instruction stream, which means we'll end up applying the wrong condition code to subsequent instructions. This might corrupt the program state rather catastrophically. So borrow the it_advance() helper from the probing code, and use it on CPSR if the emulated instruction is Thumb. Cc: Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm/include/asm/ptrace.h | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm/mm/alignment.c | 3 +++ arch/arm/probes/decode.h | 26 +------------------------- 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/ptrace.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/ptrace.h index 91d6b7856be4..73c83f4d33b3 100644 --- a/arch/arm/include/asm/ptrace.h +++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/ptrace.h @@ -164,5 +164,31 @@ static inline unsigned long user_stack_pointer(struct pt_regs *regs) ((current_stack_pointer | (THREAD_SIZE - 1)) - 7) - 1; \ }) + +/* + * Update ITSTATE after normal execution of an IT block instruction. + * + * The 8 IT state bits are split into two parts in CPSR: + * ITSTATE<1:0> are in CPSR<26:25> + * ITSTATE<7:2> are in CPSR<15:10> + */ +static inline unsigned long it_advance(unsigned long cpsr) +{ + if ((cpsr & 0x06000400) == 0) { + /* ITSTATE<2:0> == 0 means end of IT block, so clear IT state */ + cpsr &= ~PSR_IT_MASK; + } else { + /* We need to shift left ITSTATE<4:0> */ + const unsigned long mask = 0x06001c00; /* Mask ITSTATE<4:0> */ + unsigned long it = cpsr & mask; + it <<= 1; + it |= it >> (27 - 10); /* Carry ITSTATE<2> to correct place */ + it &= mask; + cpsr &= ~mask; + cpsr |= it; + } + return cpsr; +} + #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ #endif diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/alignment.c b/arch/arm/mm/alignment.c index 788c5cf46de5..1fc6c4810a5c 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mm/alignment.c +++ b/arch/arm/mm/alignment.c @@ -935,6 +935,9 @@ do_alignment(unsigned long addr, unsigned int fsr, struct pt_regs *regs) if (type == TYPE_LDST) do_alignment_finish_ldst(addr, instr, regs, offset); + if (thumb_mode(regs)) + regs->ARM_cpsr = it_advance(regs->ARM_cpsr); + return 0; bad_or_fault: diff --git a/arch/arm/probes/decode.h b/arch/arm/probes/decode.h index 973173598992..facc889d05ee 100644 --- a/arch/arm/probes/decode.h +++ b/arch/arm/probes/decode.h @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include void __init arm_probes_decode_init(void); @@ -35,31 +36,6 @@ void __init find_str_pc_offset(void); #endif -/* - * Update ITSTATE after normal execution of an IT block instruction. - * - * The 8 IT state bits are split into two parts in CPSR: - * ITSTATE<1:0> are in CPSR<26:25> - * ITSTATE<7:2> are in CPSR<15:10> - */ -static inline unsigned long it_advance(unsigned long cpsr) - { - if ((cpsr & 0x06000400) == 0) { - /* ITSTATE<2:0> == 0 means end of IT block, so clear IT state */ - cpsr &= ~PSR_IT_MASK; - } else { - /* We need to shift left ITSTATE<4:0> */ - const unsigned long mask = 0x06001c00; /* Mask ITSTATE<4:0> */ - unsigned long it = cpsr & mask; - it <<= 1; - it |= it >> (27 - 10); /* Carry ITSTATE<2> to correct place */ - it &= mask; - cpsr &= ~mask; - cpsr |= it; - } - return cpsr; -} - static inline void __kprobes bx_write_pc(long pcv, struct pt_regs *regs) { long cpsr = regs->ARM_cpsr; From 444be5a02b77f3b7a8ac9c1a0b074fbb3bd89cd0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Felix Fietkau Date: Sat, 2 Jul 2022 16:52:27 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0885/1091] wifi: mac80211: fix queue selection for mesh/OCB interfaces commit 50e2ab39291947b6c6c7025cf01707c270fcde59 upstream. When using iTXQ, the code assumes that there is only one vif queue for broadcast packets, using the BE queue. Allowing non-BE queue marking violates that assumption and txq->ac == skb_queue_mapping is no longer guaranteed. This can cause issues with queue handling in the driver and also causes issues with the recent ATF change, resulting in an AQL underflow warning. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220702145227.39356-1-nbd@nbd.name Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/mac80211/wme.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/mac80211/wme.c b/net/mac80211/wme.c index 72920d82928c..ace44ff96635 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/wme.c +++ b/net/mac80211/wme.c @@ -145,8 +145,8 @@ u16 __ieee80211_select_queue(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, bool qos; /* all mesh/ocb stations are required to support WME */ - if (sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_MESH_POINT || - sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_OCB) + if (sta && (sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_MESH_POINT || + sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_OCB)) qos = true; else if (sta) qos = sta->sta.wme; From ad44e05f3e016bdcb1ad25af35ade5b5f41ccd68 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tejun Heo Date: Mon, 13 Jun 2022 12:19:50 -1000 Subject: [PATCH 0886/1091] cgroup: Use separate src/dst nodes when preloading css_sets for migration commit 07fd5b6cdf3cc30bfde8fe0f644771688be04447 upstream. Each cset (css_set) is pinned by its tasks. When we're moving tasks around across csets for a migration, we need to hold the source and destination csets to ensure that they don't go away while we're moving tasks about. This is done by linking cset->mg_preload_node on either the mgctx->preloaded_src_csets or mgctx->preloaded_dst_csets list. Using the same cset->mg_preload_node for both the src and dst lists was deemed okay as a cset can't be both the source and destination at the same time. Unfortunately, this overloading becomes problematic when multiple tasks are involved in a migration and some of them are identity noop migrations while others are actually moving across cgroups. For example, this can happen with the following sequence on cgroup1: #1> mkdir -p /sys/fs/cgroup/misc/a/b #2> echo $$ > /sys/fs/cgroup/misc/a/cgroup.procs #3> RUN_A_COMMAND_WHICH_CREATES_MULTIPLE_THREADS & #4> PID=$! #5> echo $PID > /sys/fs/cgroup/misc/a/b/tasks #6> echo $PID > /sys/fs/cgroup/misc/a/cgroup.procs the process including the group leader back into a. In this final migration, non-leader threads would be doing identity migration while the group leader is doing an actual one. After #3, let's say the whole process was in cset A, and that after #4, the leader moves to cset B. Then, during #6, the following happens: 1. cgroup_migrate_add_src() is called on B for the leader. 2. cgroup_migrate_add_src() is called on A for the other threads. 3. cgroup_migrate_prepare_dst() is called. It scans the src list. 4. It notices that B wants to migrate to A, so it tries to A to the dst list but realizes that its ->mg_preload_node is already busy. 5. and then it notices A wants to migrate to A as it's an identity migration, it culls it by list_del_init()'ing its ->mg_preload_node and putting references accordingly. 6. The rest of migration takes place with B on the src list but nothing on the dst list. This means that A isn't held while migration is in progress. If all tasks leave A before the migration finishes and the incoming task pins it, the cset will be destroyed leading to use-after-free. This is caused by overloading cset->mg_preload_node for both src and dst preload lists. We wanted to exclude the cset from the src list but ended up inadvertently excluding it from the dst list too. This patch fixes the issue by separating out cset->mg_preload_node into ->mg_src_preload_node and ->mg_dst_preload_node, so that the src and dst preloadings don't interfere with each other. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo Reported-by: Mukesh Ojha Reported-by: shisiyuan Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1654187688-27411-1-git-send-email-shisiyuan@xiaomi.com Link: https://www.spinics.net/lists/cgroups/msg33313.html Fixes: f817de98513d ("cgroup: prepare migration path for unified hierarchy") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.16+ Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/linux/cgroup-defs.h | 3 ++- kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/cgroup-defs.h b/include/linux/cgroup-defs.h index 1ccfa3779e18..d15884957e7f 100644 --- a/include/linux/cgroup-defs.h +++ b/include/linux/cgroup-defs.h @@ -255,7 +255,8 @@ struct css_set { * List of csets participating in the on-going migration either as * source or destination. Protected by cgroup_mutex. */ - struct list_head mg_preload_node; + struct list_head mg_src_preload_node; + struct list_head mg_dst_preload_node; struct list_head mg_node; /* diff --git a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c index 177d57ce9016..23f0db2900e4 100644 --- a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c +++ b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c @@ -743,7 +743,8 @@ struct css_set init_css_set = { .task_iters = LIST_HEAD_INIT(init_css_set.task_iters), .threaded_csets = LIST_HEAD_INIT(init_css_set.threaded_csets), .cgrp_links = LIST_HEAD_INIT(init_css_set.cgrp_links), - .mg_preload_node = LIST_HEAD_INIT(init_css_set.mg_preload_node), + .mg_src_preload_node = LIST_HEAD_INIT(init_css_set.mg_src_preload_node), + .mg_dst_preload_node = LIST_HEAD_INIT(init_css_set.mg_dst_preload_node), .mg_node = LIST_HEAD_INIT(init_css_set.mg_node), /* @@ -1219,7 +1220,8 @@ static struct css_set *find_css_set(struct css_set *old_cset, INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cset->threaded_csets); INIT_HLIST_NODE(&cset->hlist); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cset->cgrp_links); - INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cset->mg_preload_node); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cset->mg_src_preload_node); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cset->mg_dst_preload_node); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cset->mg_node); /* Copy the set of subsystem state objects generated in @@ -2629,21 +2631,27 @@ int cgroup_migrate_vet_dst(struct cgroup *dst_cgrp) */ void cgroup_migrate_finish(struct cgroup_mgctx *mgctx) { - LIST_HEAD(preloaded); struct css_set *cset, *tmp_cset; lockdep_assert_held(&cgroup_mutex); spin_lock_irq(&css_set_lock); - list_splice_tail_init(&mgctx->preloaded_src_csets, &preloaded); - list_splice_tail_init(&mgctx->preloaded_dst_csets, &preloaded); - - list_for_each_entry_safe(cset, tmp_cset, &preloaded, mg_preload_node) { + list_for_each_entry_safe(cset, tmp_cset, &mgctx->preloaded_src_csets, + mg_src_preload_node) { cset->mg_src_cgrp = NULL; cset->mg_dst_cgrp = NULL; cset->mg_dst_cset = NULL; - list_del_init(&cset->mg_preload_node); + list_del_init(&cset->mg_src_preload_node); + put_css_set_locked(cset); + } + + list_for_each_entry_safe(cset, tmp_cset, &mgctx->preloaded_dst_csets, + mg_dst_preload_node) { + cset->mg_src_cgrp = NULL; + cset->mg_dst_cgrp = NULL; + cset->mg_dst_cset = NULL; + list_del_init(&cset->mg_dst_preload_node); put_css_set_locked(cset); } @@ -2685,7 +2693,7 @@ void cgroup_migrate_add_src(struct css_set *src_cset, src_cgrp = cset_cgroup_from_root(src_cset, dst_cgrp->root); - if (!list_empty(&src_cset->mg_preload_node)) + if (!list_empty(&src_cset->mg_src_preload_node)) return; WARN_ON(src_cset->mg_src_cgrp); @@ -2696,7 +2704,7 @@ void cgroup_migrate_add_src(struct css_set *src_cset, src_cset->mg_src_cgrp = src_cgrp; src_cset->mg_dst_cgrp = dst_cgrp; get_css_set(src_cset); - list_add_tail(&src_cset->mg_preload_node, &mgctx->preloaded_src_csets); + list_add_tail(&src_cset->mg_src_preload_node, &mgctx->preloaded_src_csets); } /** @@ -2721,7 +2729,7 @@ int cgroup_migrate_prepare_dst(struct cgroup_mgctx *mgctx) /* look up the dst cset for each src cset and link it to src */ list_for_each_entry_safe(src_cset, tmp_cset, &mgctx->preloaded_src_csets, - mg_preload_node) { + mg_src_preload_node) { struct css_set *dst_cset; struct cgroup_subsys *ss; int ssid; @@ -2740,7 +2748,7 @@ int cgroup_migrate_prepare_dst(struct cgroup_mgctx *mgctx) if (src_cset == dst_cset) { src_cset->mg_src_cgrp = NULL; src_cset->mg_dst_cgrp = NULL; - list_del_init(&src_cset->mg_preload_node); + list_del_init(&src_cset->mg_src_preload_node); put_css_set(src_cset); put_css_set(dst_cset); continue; @@ -2748,8 +2756,8 @@ int cgroup_migrate_prepare_dst(struct cgroup_mgctx *mgctx) src_cset->mg_dst_cset = dst_cset; - if (list_empty(&dst_cset->mg_preload_node)) - list_add_tail(&dst_cset->mg_preload_node, + if (list_empty(&dst_cset->mg_dst_preload_node)) + list_add_tail(&dst_cset->mg_dst_preload_node, &mgctx->preloaded_dst_csets); else put_css_set(dst_cset); @@ -2980,7 +2988,8 @@ static int cgroup_update_dfl_csses(struct cgroup *cgrp) goto out_finish; spin_lock_irq(&css_set_lock); - list_for_each_entry(src_cset, &mgctx.preloaded_src_csets, mg_preload_node) { + list_for_each_entry(src_cset, &mgctx.preloaded_src_csets, + mg_src_preload_node) { struct task_struct *task, *ntask; /* all tasks in src_csets need to be migrated */ From 393594aad55179eb761af41533d8d1d6eb4543b0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dmitry Osipenko Date: Thu, 30 Jun 2022 23:06:01 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 0887/1091] drm/panfrost: Fix shrinker list corruption by madvise IOCTL commit 9fc33eaaa979d112d10fea729edcd2a2e21aa912 upstream. Calling madvise IOCTL twice on BO causes memory shrinker list corruption and crashes kernel because BO is already on the list and it's added to the list again, while BO should be removed from the list before it's re-added. Fix it. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 013b65101315 ("drm/panfrost: Add madvise and shrinker support") Acked-by: Alyssa Rosenzweig Reviewed-by: Steven Price Signed-off-by: Dmitry Osipenko Signed-off-by: Steven Price Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20220630200601.1884120-3-dmitry.osipenko@collabora.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/gpu/drm/panfrost/panfrost_drv.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/panfrost/panfrost_drv.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/panfrost/panfrost_drv.c index f57dd195dfb8..b4bab8647f76 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/panfrost/panfrost_drv.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/panfrost/panfrost_drv.c @@ -428,8 +428,8 @@ static int panfrost_ioctl_madvise(struct drm_device *dev, void *data, if (args->retained) { if (args->madv == PANFROST_MADV_DONTNEED) - list_add_tail(&bo->base.madv_list, - &pfdev->shrinker_list); + list_move_tail(&bo->base.madv_list, + &pfdev->shrinker_list); else if (args->madv == PANFROST_MADV_WILLNEED) list_del_init(&bo->base.madv_list); } From d85d19f3b664bd099898f1aac9b294cf21f079e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryusuke Konishi Date: Thu, 23 Jun 2022 17:54:01 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 0888/1091] nilfs2: fix incorrect masking of permission flags for symlinks commit 5924e6ec1585445f251ea92713eb15beb732622a upstream. The permission flags of newly created symlinks are wrongly dropped on nilfs2 with the current umask value even though symlinks should have 777 (rwxrwxrwx) permissions: $ umask 0022 $ touch file && ln -s file symlink; ls -l file symlink -rw-r--r--. 1 root root 0 Jun 23 16:29 file lrwxr-xr-x. 1 root root 4 Jun 23 16:29 symlink -> file This fixes the bug by inserting a missing check that excludes symlinks. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1655974441-5612-1-git-send-email-konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi Reported-by: Tommy Pettersson Reported-by: Ciprian Craciun Tested-by: Ryusuke Konishi Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/nilfs2/nilfs.h | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/nilfs2/nilfs.h b/fs/nilfs2/nilfs.h index 4895d978369a..dc772eaa13cf 100644 --- a/fs/nilfs2/nilfs.h +++ b/fs/nilfs2/nilfs.h @@ -198,6 +198,9 @@ static inline int nilfs_acl_chmod(struct inode *inode) static inline int nilfs_init_acl(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir) { + if (S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) + return 0; + inode->i_mode &= ~current_umask(); return 0; } From 31e99fa969fd67d77ea92c5527c9cf1c85faa589 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xiu Jianfeng Date: Fri, 27 May 2022 19:17:26 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0889/1091] Revert "evm: Fix memleak in init_desc" commit 51dd64bb99e4478fc5280171acd8e1b529eadaf7 upstream. This reverts commit ccf11dbaa07b328fa469415c362d33459c140a37. Commit ccf11dbaa07b ("evm: Fix memleak in init_desc") said there is memleak in init_desc. That may be incorrect, as we can see, tmp_tfm is saved in one of the two global variables hmac_tfm or evm_tfm[hash_algo], then if init_desc is called next time, there is no need to alloc tfm again, so in the error path of kmalloc desc or crypto_shash_init(desc), It is not a problem without freeing tmp_tfm. And also that commit did not reset the global variable to NULL after freeing tmp_tfm and this makes *tfm a dangling pointer which may cause a UAF issue. Reported-by: Guozihua (Scott) Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 7 ++----- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c index 25dac691491b..ee6bd945f3d6 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c @@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type, uint8_t hash_algo) { long rc; const char *algo; - struct crypto_shash **tfm, *tmp_tfm = NULL; + struct crypto_shash **tfm, *tmp_tfm; struct shash_desc *desc; if (type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC) { @@ -120,16 +120,13 @@ unlock: alloc: desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(*tfm), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!desc) { - crypto_free_shash(tmp_tfm); + if (!desc) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); - } desc->tfm = *tfm; rc = crypto_shash_init(desc); if (rc) { - crypto_free_shash(tmp_tfm); kfree(desc); return ERR_PTR(rc); } From 423f2695007ddb379b86fceb6c10a42e84794158 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira Date: Mon, 21 Sep 2020 16:39:49 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0890/1091] sched/rt: Disable RT_RUNTIME_SHARE by default commit 2586af1ac187f6b3a50930a4e33497074e81762d upstream. The RT_RUNTIME_SHARE sched feature enables the sharing of rt_runtime between CPUs, allowing a CPU to run a real-time task up to 100% of the time while leaving more space for non-real-time tasks to run on the CPU that lend rt_runtime. The problem is that a CPU can easily borrow enough rt_runtime to allow a spinning rt-task to run forever, starving per-cpu tasks like kworkers, which are non-real-time by design. This patch disables RT_RUNTIME_SHARE by default, avoiding this problem. The feature will still be present for users that want to enable it, though. Signed-off-by: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Tested-by: Wei Wang Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b776ab46817e3db5d8ef79175fa0d71073c051c7.1600697903.git.bristot@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Mark-PK Tsai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- kernel/sched/features.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/sched/features.h b/kernel/sched/features.h index 2410db5e9a35..66c74aa4753e 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/features.h +++ b/kernel/sched/features.h @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ SCHED_FEAT(WARN_DOUBLE_CLOCK, false) SCHED_FEAT(RT_PUSH_IPI, true) #endif -SCHED_FEAT(RT_RUNTIME_SHARE, true) +SCHED_FEAT(RT_RUNTIME_SHARE, false) SCHED_FEAT(LB_MIN, false) SCHED_FEAT(ATTACH_AGE_LOAD, true) From 18881d7e517169193d9ef6c89c7f322e3e164277 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Baokun Li Date: Thu, 28 Apr 2022 21:40:31 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0891/1091] ext4: fix race condition between ext4_write and ext4_convert_inline_data commit f87c7a4b084afc13190cbb263538e444cb2b392a upstream. Hulk Robot reported a BUG_ON: ================================================================== EXT4-fs error (device loop3): ext4_mb_generate_buddy:805: group 0, block bitmap and bg descriptor inconsistent: 25 vs 31513 free clusters kernel BUG at fs/ext4/ext4_jbd2.c:53! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI CPU: 0 PID: 25371 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.10.0+ #1 RIP: 0010:ext4_put_nojournal fs/ext4/ext4_jbd2.c:53 [inline] RIP: 0010:__ext4_journal_stop+0x10e/0x110 fs/ext4/ext4_jbd2.c:116 [...] Call Trace: ext4_write_inline_data_end+0x59a/0x730 fs/ext4/inline.c:795 generic_perform_write+0x279/0x3c0 mm/filemap.c:3344 ext4_buffered_write_iter+0x2e3/0x3d0 fs/ext4/file.c:270 ext4_file_write_iter+0x30a/0x11c0 fs/ext4/file.c:520 do_iter_readv_writev+0x339/0x3c0 fs/read_write.c:732 do_iter_write+0x107/0x430 fs/read_write.c:861 vfs_writev fs/read_write.c:934 [inline] do_pwritev+0x1e5/0x380 fs/read_write.c:1031 [...] ================================================================== Above issue may happen as follows: cpu1 cpu2 __________________________|__________________________ do_pwritev vfs_writev do_iter_write ext4_file_write_iter ext4_buffered_write_iter generic_perform_write ext4_da_write_begin vfs_fallocate ext4_fallocate ext4_convert_inline_data ext4_convert_inline_data_nolock ext4_destroy_inline_data_nolock clear EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA ext4_map_blocks ext4_ext_map_blocks ext4_mb_new_blocks ext4_mb_regular_allocator ext4_mb_good_group_nolock ext4_mb_init_group ext4_mb_init_cache ext4_mb_generate_buddy --> error ext4_test_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA) ext4_restore_inline_data set EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA ext4_block_write_begin ext4_da_write_end ext4_test_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA) ext4_write_inline_data_end handle=NULL ext4_journal_stop(handle) __ext4_journal_stop ext4_put_nojournal(handle) ref_cnt = (unsigned long)handle BUG_ON(ref_cnt == 0) ---> BUG_ON The lock held by ext4_convert_inline_data is xattr_sem, but the lock held by generic_perform_write is i_rwsem. Therefore, the two locks can be concurrent. To solve above issue, we add inode_lock() for ext4_convert_inline_data(). At the same time, move ext4_convert_inline_data() in front of ext4_punch_hole(), remove similar handling from ext4_punch_hole(). Fixes: 0c8d414f163f ("ext4: let fallocate handle inline data correctly") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Hulk Robot Signed-off-by: Baokun Li Reviewed-by: Jan Kara Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220428134031.4153381-1-libaokun1@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/ext4/extents.c | 8 +++++--- fs/ext4/inode.c | 9 --------- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/extents.c b/fs/ext4/extents.c index f1bbce4350c4..d5e649e578cb 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/extents.c +++ b/fs/ext4/extents.c @@ -4932,13 +4932,15 @@ long ext4_fallocate(struct file *file, int mode, loff_t offset, loff_t len) FALLOC_FL_INSERT_RANGE)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; - if (mode & FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE) - return ext4_punch_hole(inode, offset, len); - + inode_lock(inode); ret = ext4_convert_inline_data(inode); + inode_unlock(inode); if (ret) return ret; + if (mode & FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE) + return ext4_punch_hole(inode, offset, len); + if (mode & FALLOC_FL_COLLAPSE_RANGE) return ext4_collapse_range(inode, offset, len); diff --git a/fs/ext4/inode.c b/fs/ext4/inode.c index 1cac574911a7..d8fee911d4f4 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/inode.c +++ b/fs/ext4/inode.c @@ -4322,15 +4322,6 @@ int ext4_punch_hole(struct inode *inode, loff_t offset, loff_t length) trace_ext4_punch_hole(inode, offset, length, 0); - ext4_clear_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA); - if (ext4_has_inline_data(inode)) { - down_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_mmap_sem); - ret = ext4_convert_inline_data(inode); - up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_mmap_sem); - if (ret) - return ret; - } - /* * Write out all dirty pages to avoid race conditions * Then release them. From 851730a1989f5058c68dc18cbcc178d58cfc2e8e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kris Bahnsen Date: Thu, 30 Jun 2022 14:03:27 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0892/1091] ARM: dts: imx6qdl-ts7970: Fix ngpio typo and count [ Upstream commit e95ea0f687e679fcb0a3a67d0755b81ee7d60db0 ] Device-tree incorrectly used "ngpio" which caused the driver to fallback to 32 ngpios. This platform has 62 GPIO registers. Fixes: 9ff8e9fccef9 ("ARM: dts: TS-7970: add basic device tree") Signed-off-by: Kris Bahnsen Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6qdl-ts7970.dtsi | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6qdl-ts7970.dtsi b/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6qdl-ts7970.dtsi index f0be516dc28e..9181fbeb833d 100644 --- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6qdl-ts7970.dtsi +++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6qdl-ts7970.dtsi @@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ reg = <0x28>; #gpio-cells = <2>; gpio-controller; - ngpio = <32>; + ngpios = <62>; }; sgtl5000: codec@a { From 41ea241fb3c2579e0ba9196f071ec6780e80271a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ard Biesheuvel Date: Tue, 31 May 2022 09:53:42 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0893/1091] ARM: 9209/1: Spectre-BHB: avoid pr_info() every time a CPU comes out of idle [ Upstream commit 0609e200246bfd3b7516091c491bec4308349055 ] Jon reports that the Spectre-BHB init code is filling up the kernel log with spurious notifications about which mitigation has been enabled, every time any CPU comes out of a low power state. Given that Spectre-BHB mitigations are system wide, only a single mitigation can be enabled, and we already print an error if two types of CPUs coexist in a single system that require different Spectre-BHB mitigations. This means that the pr_info() that describes the selected mitigation does not need to be emitted for each CPU anyway, and so we can simply emit it only once. In order to clarify the above in the log message, update it to describe that the selected mitigation will be enabled on all CPUs, including ones that are unaffected. If another CPU comes up later that is affected and requires a different mitigation, we report an error as before. Fixes: b9baf5c8c5c3 ("ARM: Spectre-BHB workaround") Tested-by: Jon Hunter Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c b/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c index f2c8ff0683fd..b09c54499f95 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c +++ b/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c @@ -221,10 +221,10 @@ static int spectre_bhb_install_workaround(int method) return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE; spectre_bhb_method = method; - } - pr_info("CPU%u: Spectre BHB: using %s workaround\n", - smp_processor_id(), spectre_bhb_method_name(method)); + pr_info("CPU%u: Spectre BHB: enabling %s workaround for all CPUs\n", + smp_processor_id(), spectre_bhb_method_name(method)); + } return SPECTRE_MITIGATED; } From 0f02e7c02bb037ef7081534605405dfe173947bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zhen Lei Date: Mon, 13 Jun 2022 15:05:41 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0894/1091] ARM: 9210/1: Mark the FDT_FIXED sections as shareable [ Upstream commit 598f0a99fa8a35be44b27106b43ddc66417af3b1 ] commit 7a1be318f579 ("ARM: 9012/1: move device tree mapping out of linear region") use FDT_FIXED_BASE to map the whole FDT_FIXED_SIZE memory area which contains fdt. But it only reserves the exact physical memory that fdt occupied. Unfortunately, this mapping is non-shareable. An illegal or speculative read access can bring the RAM content from non-fdt zone into cache, PIPT makes it to be hit by subsequently read access through shareable mapping(such as linear mapping), and the cache consistency between cores is lost due to non-shareable property. |<---------FDT_FIXED_SIZE------>| | | ------------------------------- | | | | ------------------------------- 1. CoreA read through MT_ROM mapping, the old data is loaded into the cache. 2. CoreB write to update data through linear mapping. CoreA received the notification to invalid the corresponding cachelines, but the property non-shareable makes it to be ignored. 3. CoreA read through linear mapping, cache hit, the old data is read. To eliminate this risk, add a new memory type MT_MEMORY_RO. Compared to MT_ROM, it is shareable and non-executable. Here's an example: list_del corruption. prev->next should be c0ecbf74, but was c08410dc kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:53! ... ... PC is at __list_del_entry_valid+0x58/0x98 LR is at __list_del_entry_valid+0x58/0x98 psr: 60000093 sp : c0ecbf30 ip : 00000000 fp : 00000001 r10: c08410d0 r9 : 00000001 r8 : c0825e0c r7 : 20000013 r6 : c08410d0 r5 : c0ecbf74 r4 : c0ecbf74 r3 : c0825d08 r2 : 00000000 r1 : df7ce6f4 r0 : 00000044 ... ... Stack: (0xc0ecbf30 to 0xc0ecc000) bf20: c0ecbf74 c0164fd0 c0ecbf70 c0165170 bf40: c0eca000 c0840c00 c0840c00 c0824500 c0825e0c c0189bbc c088f404 60000013 bf60: 60000013 c0e85100 000004ec 00000000 c0ebcdc0 c0ecbf74 c0ecbf74 c0825d08 ... ... < next prev > (__list_del_entry_valid) from (__list_del_entry+0xc/0x20) (__list_del_entry) from (finish_swait+0x60/0x7c) (finish_swait) from (rcu_gp_kthread+0x560/0xa20) (rcu_gp_kthread) from (kthread+0x14c/0x15c) (kthread) from (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x24) The faulty list node to be deleted is a local variable, its address is c0ecbf74. The dumped stack shows that 'prev' = c0ecbf74, but its value before lib/list_debug.c:53 is c08410dc. A large amount of printing results in swapping out the cacheline containing the old data(MT_ROM mapping is read only, so the cacheline cannot be dirty), and the subsequent dump operation obtains new data from the DDR. Fixes: 7a1be318f579 ("ARM: 9012/1: move device tree mapping out of linear region") Suggested-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Zhen Lei Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel Reviewed-by: Kefeng Wang Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/arm/include/asm/mach/map.h | 1 + arch/arm/mm/mmu.c | 15 ++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/mach/map.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/mach/map.h index 92282558caf7..2b8970d8e5a2 100644 --- a/arch/arm/include/asm/mach/map.h +++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/mach/map.h @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ enum { MT_HIGH_VECTORS, MT_MEMORY_RWX, MT_MEMORY_RW, + MT_MEMORY_RO, MT_ROM, MT_MEMORY_RWX_NONCACHED, MT_MEMORY_RW_DTCM, diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/mmu.c b/arch/arm/mm/mmu.c index 6e7f841f67ff..463cbb0631be 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mm/mmu.c +++ b/arch/arm/mm/mmu.c @@ -316,6 +316,13 @@ static struct mem_type mem_types[] __ro_after_init = { .prot_sect = PMD_TYPE_SECT | PMD_SECT_AP_WRITE, .domain = DOMAIN_KERNEL, }, + [MT_MEMORY_RO] = { + .prot_pte = L_PTE_PRESENT | L_PTE_YOUNG | L_PTE_DIRTY | + L_PTE_XN | L_PTE_RDONLY, + .prot_l1 = PMD_TYPE_TABLE, + .prot_sect = PMD_TYPE_SECT, + .domain = DOMAIN_KERNEL, + }, [MT_ROM] = { .prot_sect = PMD_TYPE_SECT, .domain = DOMAIN_KERNEL, @@ -515,6 +522,7 @@ static void __init build_mem_type_table(void) /* Also setup NX memory mapping */ mem_types[MT_MEMORY_RW].prot_sect |= PMD_SECT_XN; + mem_types[MT_MEMORY_RO].prot_sect |= PMD_SECT_XN; } if (cpu_arch >= CPU_ARCH_ARMv7 && (cr & CR_TRE)) { /* @@ -597,6 +605,7 @@ static void __init build_mem_type_table(void) mem_types[MT_ROM].prot_sect |= PMD_SECT_APX|PMD_SECT_AP_WRITE; mem_types[MT_MINICLEAN].prot_sect |= PMD_SECT_APX|PMD_SECT_AP_WRITE; mem_types[MT_CACHECLEAN].prot_sect |= PMD_SECT_APX|PMD_SECT_AP_WRITE; + mem_types[MT_MEMORY_RO].prot_sect |= PMD_SECT_APX|PMD_SECT_AP_WRITE; #endif /* @@ -617,6 +626,8 @@ static void __init build_mem_type_table(void) mem_types[MT_MEMORY_RWX].prot_pte |= L_PTE_SHARED; mem_types[MT_MEMORY_RW].prot_sect |= PMD_SECT_S; mem_types[MT_MEMORY_RW].prot_pte |= L_PTE_SHARED; + mem_types[MT_MEMORY_RO].prot_sect |= PMD_SECT_S; + mem_types[MT_MEMORY_RO].prot_pte |= L_PTE_SHARED; mem_types[MT_MEMORY_DMA_READY].prot_pte |= L_PTE_SHARED; mem_types[MT_MEMORY_RWX_NONCACHED].prot_sect |= PMD_SECT_S; mem_types[MT_MEMORY_RWX_NONCACHED].prot_pte |= L_PTE_SHARED; @@ -680,6 +691,8 @@ static void __init build_mem_type_table(void) mem_types[MT_MEMORY_RWX].prot_pte |= kern_pgprot; mem_types[MT_MEMORY_RW].prot_sect |= ecc_mask | cp->pmd; mem_types[MT_MEMORY_RW].prot_pte |= kern_pgprot; + mem_types[MT_MEMORY_RO].prot_sect |= ecc_mask | cp->pmd; + mem_types[MT_MEMORY_RO].prot_pte |= kern_pgprot; mem_types[MT_MEMORY_DMA_READY].prot_pte |= kern_pgprot; mem_types[MT_MEMORY_RWX_NONCACHED].prot_sect |= ecc_mask; mem_types[MT_ROM].prot_sect |= cp->pmd; @@ -1361,7 +1374,7 @@ static void __init devicemaps_init(const struct machine_desc *mdesc) map.pfn = __phys_to_pfn(__atags_pointer & SECTION_MASK); map.virtual = FDT_FIXED_BASE; map.length = FDT_FIXED_SIZE; - map.type = MT_ROM; + map.type = MT_MEMORY_RO; create_mapping(&map); } From 72f231b9a88abcfac9f5ddaa1a0aacb3f9f87ba5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hangyu Hua Date: Fri, 24 Jun 2022 06:04:06 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0895/1091] drm/i915: fix a possible refcount leak in intel_dp_add_mst_connector() MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit 85144df9ff4652816448369de76897c57cbb1b93 ] If drm_connector_init fails, intel_connector_free will be called to take care of proper free. So it is necessary to drop the refcount of port before intel_connector_free. Fixes: 091a4f91942a ("drm/i915: Handle drm-layer errors in intel_dp_add_mst_connector") Signed-off-by: Hangyu Hua Reviewed-by: José Roberto de Souza Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20220624130406.17996-1-jose.souza@intel.com Signed-off-by: José Roberto de Souza (cherry picked from commit cea9ed611e85d36a05db52b6457bf584b7d969e2) Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dp_mst.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dp_mst.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dp_mst.c index 74d45a0eecb8..c59b43fb34a8 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dp_mst.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dp_mst.c @@ -520,6 +520,7 @@ static struct drm_connector *intel_dp_add_mst_connector(struct drm_dp_mst_topolo ret = drm_connector_init(dev, connector, &intel_dp_mst_connector_funcs, DRM_MODE_CONNECTOR_DisplayPort); if (ret) { + drm_dp_mst_put_port_malloc(port); intel_connector_free(intel_connector); return NULL; } From 388f3df7c3c8b7f2a32b9ae0a9b2f9f6ad3b1b77 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Huaxin Lu Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2022 13:14:17 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0896/1091] ima: Fix a potential integer overflow in ima_appraise_measurement [ Upstream commit d2ee2cfc4aa85ff6a2a3b198a3a524ec54e3d999 ] When the ima-modsig is enabled, the rc passed to evm_verifyxattr() may be negative, which may cause the integer overflow problem. Fixes: 39b07096364a ("ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures") Signed-off-by: Huaxin Lu Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 23b04c6521b2..9368688449b0 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -352,7 +352,8 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, goto out; } - status = evm_verifyxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, xattr_value, rc, iint); + status = evm_verifyxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, xattr_value, + rc < 0 ? 0 : rc, iint); switch (status) { case INTEGRITY_PASS: case INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE: From 1273fd5153e80be1d36b64c97dfa45ddbf6c99d5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Francesco Dolcini Date: Fri, 24 Jun 2022 12:13:01 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0897/1091] ASoC: sgtl5000: Fix noise on shutdown/remove [ Upstream commit 040e3360af3736348112d29425bf5d0be5b93115 ] Put the SGTL5000 in a silent/safe state on shutdown/remove, this is required since the SGTL5000 produces a constant noise on its output after it is configured and its clock is removed. Without this change this is happening every time the module is unbound/removed or from reboot till the clock is enabled again. The issue was experienced on both a Toradex Colibri/Apalis iMX6, but can be easily reproduced everywhere just playing something on the codec and after that removing/unbinding the driver. Fixes: 9b34e6cc3bc2 ("ASoC: Add Freescale SGTL5000 codec support") Signed-off-by: Francesco Dolcini Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220624101301.441314-1-francesco.dolcini@toradex.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- sound/soc/codecs/sgtl5000.c | 9 +++++++++ sound/soc/codecs/sgtl5000.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+) diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/sgtl5000.c b/sound/soc/codecs/sgtl5000.c index 8a1e485982d8..76d3c0681f37 100644 --- a/sound/soc/codecs/sgtl5000.c +++ b/sound/soc/codecs/sgtl5000.c @@ -1788,6 +1788,9 @@ static int sgtl5000_i2c_remove(struct i2c_client *client) { struct sgtl5000_priv *sgtl5000 = i2c_get_clientdata(client); + regmap_write(sgtl5000->regmap, SGTL5000_CHIP_DIG_POWER, SGTL5000_DIG_POWER_DEFAULT); + regmap_write(sgtl5000->regmap, SGTL5000_CHIP_ANA_POWER, SGTL5000_ANA_POWER_DEFAULT); + clk_disable_unprepare(sgtl5000->mclk); regulator_bulk_disable(sgtl5000->num_supplies, sgtl5000->supplies); regulator_bulk_free(sgtl5000->num_supplies, sgtl5000->supplies); @@ -1795,6 +1798,11 @@ static int sgtl5000_i2c_remove(struct i2c_client *client) return 0; } +static void sgtl5000_i2c_shutdown(struct i2c_client *client) +{ + sgtl5000_i2c_remove(client); +} + static const struct i2c_device_id sgtl5000_id[] = { {"sgtl5000", 0}, {}, @@ -1815,6 +1823,7 @@ static struct i2c_driver sgtl5000_i2c_driver = { }, .probe = sgtl5000_i2c_probe, .remove = sgtl5000_i2c_remove, + .shutdown = sgtl5000_i2c_shutdown, .id_table = sgtl5000_id, }; diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/sgtl5000.h b/sound/soc/codecs/sgtl5000.h index 56ec5863f250..3a808c762299 100644 --- a/sound/soc/codecs/sgtl5000.h +++ b/sound/soc/codecs/sgtl5000.h @@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ /* * SGTL5000_CHIP_DIG_POWER */ +#define SGTL5000_DIG_POWER_DEFAULT 0x0000 #define SGTL5000_ADC_EN 0x0040 #define SGTL5000_DAC_EN 0x0020 #define SGTL5000_DAP_POWERUP 0x0010 From 2968830c9b47ce093237483c6207c61065712386 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jon Hunter Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2022 09:39:13 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0898/1091] net: stmmac: dwc-qos: Disable split header for Tegra194 [ Upstream commit 029c1c2059e9c4b38f97a06204cdecd10cfbeb8a ] There is a long-standing issue with the Synopsys DWC Ethernet driver for Tegra194 where random system crashes have been observed [0]. The problem occurs when the split header feature is enabled in the stmmac driver. In the bad case, a larger than expected buffer length is received and causes the calculation of the total buffer length to overflow. This results in a very large buffer length that causes the kernel to crash. Why this larger buffer length is received is not clear, however, the feedback from the NVIDIA design team is that the split header feature is not supported for Tegra194. Therefore, disable split header support for Tegra194 to prevent these random crashes from occurring. [0] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-tegra/b0b17697-f23e-8fa5-3757-604a86f3a095@nvidia.com/ Fixes: 67afd6d1cfdf ("net: stmmac: Add Split Header support and enable it in XGMAC cores") Signed-off-by: Jon Hunter Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220706083913.13750-1-jonathanh@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac-dwc-qos-eth.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac-dwc-qos-eth.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac-dwc-qos-eth.c index dd9967aeda22..0f0094ced776 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac-dwc-qos-eth.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac-dwc-qos-eth.c @@ -357,6 +357,7 @@ static void *tegra_eqos_probe(struct platform_device *pdev, data->fix_mac_speed = tegra_eqos_fix_speed; data->init = tegra_eqos_init; data->bsp_priv = eqos; + data->sph_disable = 1; err = tegra_eqos_init(pdev, eqos); if (err < 0) From 8d2daf565f61e15ea080515b8aa7491fb7f61d2c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2022 16:39:59 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0899/1091] inetpeer: Fix data-races around sysctl. [ Upstream commit 3d32edf1f3c38d3301f6434e56316f293466d7fb ] While reading inetpeer sysctl variables, they can be changed concurrently. So, we need to add READ_ONCE() to avoid data-races. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/ipv4/inetpeer.c | 12 ++++++++---- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/inetpeer.c b/net/ipv4/inetpeer.c index ff327a62c9ce..a18668552d33 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/inetpeer.c +++ b/net/ipv4/inetpeer.c @@ -148,16 +148,20 @@ static void inet_peer_gc(struct inet_peer_base *base, struct inet_peer *gc_stack[], unsigned int gc_cnt) { + int peer_threshold, peer_maxttl, peer_minttl; struct inet_peer *p; __u32 delta, ttl; int i; - if (base->total >= inet_peer_threshold) + peer_threshold = READ_ONCE(inet_peer_threshold); + peer_maxttl = READ_ONCE(inet_peer_maxttl); + peer_minttl = READ_ONCE(inet_peer_minttl); + + if (base->total >= peer_threshold) ttl = 0; /* be aggressive */ else - ttl = inet_peer_maxttl - - (inet_peer_maxttl - inet_peer_minttl) / HZ * - base->total / inet_peer_threshold * HZ; + ttl = peer_maxttl - (peer_maxttl - peer_minttl) / HZ * + base->total / peer_threshold * HZ; for (i = 0; i < gc_cnt; i++) { p = gc_stack[i]; From 861f1852af6dc2a442300a6bcdb281eab9b1a4ba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2022 16:40:00 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0900/1091] net: Fix data-races around sysctl_mem. [ Upstream commit 310731e2f1611d1d13aae237abcf8e66d33345d5 ] While reading .sysctl_mem, it can be changed concurrently. So, we need to add READ_ONCE() to avoid data-races. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- include/net/sock.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/net/sock.h b/include/net/sock.h index 7f213cfcb3cc..9d687070d272 100644 --- a/include/net/sock.h +++ b/include/net/sock.h @@ -1400,7 +1400,7 @@ void __sk_mem_reclaim(struct sock *sk, int amount); /* sysctl_mem values are in pages, we convert them in SK_MEM_QUANTUM units */ static inline long sk_prot_mem_limits(const struct sock *sk, int index) { - long val = sk->sk_prot->sysctl_mem[index]; + long val = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_prot->sysctl_mem[index]); #if PAGE_SIZE > SK_MEM_QUANTUM val <<= PAGE_SHIFT - SK_MEM_QUANTUM_SHIFT; From 0e41a0f73ccb9be112a80bde3804a771633caaef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2022 16:40:01 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0901/1091] cipso: Fix data-races around sysctl. [ Upstream commit dd44f04b9214adb68ef5684ae87a81ba03632250 ] While reading cipso sysctl variables, they can be changed concurrently. So, we need to add READ_ONCE() to avoid data-races. Fixes: 446fda4f2682 ("[NetLabel]: CIPSOv4 engine") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Acked-by: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt | 2 +- net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c | 12 +++++++----- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt b/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt index 8af3771a3ebf..f60d4159fff4 100644 --- a/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt +++ b/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt @@ -876,7 +876,7 @@ cipso_cache_enable - BOOLEAN cipso_cache_bucket_size - INTEGER The CIPSO label cache consists of a fixed size hash table with each hash bucket containing a number of cache entries. This variable limits - the number of entries in each hash bucket; the larger the value the + the number of entries in each hash bucket; the larger the value is, the more CIPSO label mappings that can be cached. When the number of entries in a given hash bucket reaches this limit adding new entries causes the oldest entry in the bucket to be removed to make room. diff --git a/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c index c1ac802d6894..42eaad5e515f 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c +++ b/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c @@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ static int cipso_v4_cache_check(const unsigned char *key, struct cipso_v4_map_cache_entry *prev_entry = NULL; u32 hash; - if (!cipso_v4_cache_enabled) + if (!READ_ONCE(cipso_v4_cache_enabled)) return -ENOENT; hash = cipso_v4_map_cache_hash(key, key_len); @@ -297,13 +297,14 @@ static int cipso_v4_cache_check(const unsigned char *key, int cipso_v4_cache_add(const unsigned char *cipso_ptr, const struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr) { + int bkt_size = READ_ONCE(cipso_v4_cache_bucketsize); int ret_val = -EPERM; u32 bkt; struct cipso_v4_map_cache_entry *entry = NULL; struct cipso_v4_map_cache_entry *old_entry = NULL; u32 cipso_ptr_len; - if (!cipso_v4_cache_enabled || cipso_v4_cache_bucketsize <= 0) + if (!READ_ONCE(cipso_v4_cache_enabled) || bkt_size <= 0) return 0; cipso_ptr_len = cipso_ptr[1]; @@ -323,7 +324,7 @@ int cipso_v4_cache_add(const unsigned char *cipso_ptr, bkt = entry->hash & (CIPSO_V4_CACHE_BUCKETS - 1); spin_lock_bh(&cipso_v4_cache[bkt].lock); - if (cipso_v4_cache[bkt].size < cipso_v4_cache_bucketsize) { + if (cipso_v4_cache[bkt].size < bkt_size) { list_add(&entry->list, &cipso_v4_cache[bkt].list); cipso_v4_cache[bkt].size += 1; } else { @@ -1200,7 +1201,8 @@ static int cipso_v4_gentag_rbm(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def, /* This will send packets using the "optimized" format when * possible as specified in section 3.4.2.6 of the * CIPSO draft. */ - if (cipso_v4_rbm_optfmt && ret_val > 0 && ret_val <= 10) + if (READ_ONCE(cipso_v4_rbm_optfmt) && ret_val > 0 && + ret_val <= 10) tag_len = 14; else tag_len = 4 + ret_val; @@ -1603,7 +1605,7 @@ int cipso_v4_validate(const struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned char **option) * all the CIPSO validations here but it doesn't * really specify _exactly_ what we need to validate * ... so, just make it a sysctl tunable. */ - if (cipso_v4_rbm_strictvalid) { + if (READ_ONCE(cipso_v4_rbm_strictvalid)) { if (cipso_v4_map_lvl_valid(doi_def, tag[3]) < 0) { err_offset = opt_iter + 3; From 0cba7ca667ceb06934746ddd9833a25847bde81d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2022 16:40:02 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0902/1091] icmp: Fix data-races around sysctl. [ Upstream commit 48d7ee321ea5182c6a70782aa186422a70e67e22 ] While reading icmp sysctl variables, they can be changed concurrently. So, we need to add READ_ONCE() to avoid data-races. Fixes: 4cdf507d5452 ("icmp: add a global rate limitation") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/ipv4/icmp.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/icmp.c b/net/ipv4/icmp.c index f86f948a4b4c..a590ff81e5f8 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/icmp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/icmp.c @@ -261,11 +261,12 @@ bool icmp_global_allow(void) spin_lock(&icmp_global.lock); delta = min_t(u32, now - icmp_global.stamp, HZ); if (delta >= HZ / 50) { - incr = sysctl_icmp_msgs_per_sec * delta / HZ ; + incr = READ_ONCE(sysctl_icmp_msgs_per_sec) * delta / HZ; if (incr) WRITE_ONCE(icmp_global.stamp, now); } - credit = min_t(u32, icmp_global.credit + incr, sysctl_icmp_msgs_burst); + credit = min_t(u32, icmp_global.credit + incr, + READ_ONCE(sysctl_icmp_msgs_burst)); if (credit) { /* We want to use a credit of one in average, but need to randomize * it for security reasons. From 7c1acd98fb221dc0d847451b9ab86319f8b9916c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2022 16:40:03 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0903/1091] ipv4: Fix a data-race around sysctl_fib_sync_mem. [ Upstream commit 73318c4b7dbd0e781aaababff17376b2894745c0 ] While reading sysctl_fib_sync_mem, it can be changed concurrently. So, we need to add READ_ONCE() to avoid a data-race. Fixes: 9ab948a91b2c ("ipv4: Allow amount of dirty memory from fib resizing to be controllable") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/ipv4/fib_trie.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/fib_trie.c b/net/ipv4/fib_trie.c index 51673d00bbea..a1f830da4ad3 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/fib_trie.c +++ b/net/ipv4/fib_trie.c @@ -500,7 +500,7 @@ static void tnode_free(struct key_vector *tn) tn = container_of(head, struct tnode, rcu)->kv; } - if (tnode_free_size >= sysctl_fib_sync_mem) { + if (tnode_free_size >= READ_ONCE(sysctl_fib_sync_mem)) { tnode_free_size = 0; synchronize_rcu(); } From bf676c94086558f71e18bb5bba7a58e917837de6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Wanner Date: Thu, 7 Jul 2022 14:58:12 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0904/1091] ARM: dts: at91: sama5d2: Fix typo in i2s1 node [ Upstream commit 2fdf15b50a46e366740df4cccbe2343269b4ff55 ] Fix typo in i2s1 causing errors in dt binding validation. Change assigned-parrents to assigned-clock-parents to match i2s0 node formatting. Fixes: 1ca81883c557 ("ARM: dts: at91: sama5d2: add nodes for I2S controllers") Signed-off-by: Ryan Wanner [claudiu.beznea: use imperative addressing in commit description, remove blank line after fixes tag, fix typo in commit message] Signed-off-by: Claudiu Beznea Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220707215812.193008-1-Ryan.Wanner@microchip.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/arm/boot/dts/sama5d2.dtsi | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/sama5d2.dtsi b/arch/arm/boot/dts/sama5d2.dtsi index 09816a2ee367..dbfdffd54003 100644 --- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/sama5d2.dtsi +++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/sama5d2.dtsi @@ -933,7 +933,7 @@ clocks = <&pmc PMC_TYPE_PERIPHERAL 55>, <&pmc PMC_TYPE_GCK 55>; clock-names = "pclk", "gclk"; assigned-clocks = <&pmc PMC_TYPE_CORE PMC_I2S1_MUX>; - assigned-parrents = <&pmc PMC_TYPE_GCK 55>; + assigned-clock-parents = <&pmc PMC_TYPE_GCK 55>; status = "disabled"; }; From 40d58aad2f66815f724f58ad81d78996edeace6e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michal Suchanek Date: Fri, 8 Jul 2022 19:45:29 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0905/1091] ARM: dts: sunxi: Fix SPI NOR campatible on Orange Pi Zero [ Upstream commit 884b66976a7279ee889ba885fe364244d50b79e7 ] The device tree should include generic "jedec,spi-nor" compatible, and a manufacturer-specific one. The macronix part is what is shipped on the boards that come with a flash chip. Fixes: 45857ae95478 ("ARM: dts: orange-pi-zero: add node for SPI NOR") Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek Acked-by: Jernej Skrabec Signed-off-by: Jernej Skrabec Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220708174529.3360-1-msuchanek@suse.de Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/arm/boot/dts/sun8i-h2-plus-orangepi-zero.dts | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/sun8i-h2-plus-orangepi-zero.dts b/arch/arm/boot/dts/sun8i-h2-plus-orangepi-zero.dts index f19ed981da9d..3706216ffb40 100644 --- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/sun8i-h2-plus-orangepi-zero.dts +++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/sun8i-h2-plus-orangepi-zero.dts @@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ flash@0 { #address-cells = <1>; #size-cells = <1>; - compatible = "mxicy,mx25l1606e", "winbond,w25q128"; + compatible = "mxicy,mx25l1606e", "jedec,spi-nor"; reg = <0>; spi-max-frequency = <40000000>; }; From 3093a6fe3170763f765acd692f5f52124cf08d52 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chris Wilson Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2022 16:21:33 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0906/1091] drm/i915/gt: Serialize TLB invalidates with GT resets MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit a1c5a7bf79c1faa5633b918b5c0666545e84c4d1 ] Avoid trying to invalidate the TLB in the middle of performing an engine reset, as this may result in the reset timing out. Currently, the TLB invalidate is only serialised by its own mutex, forgoing the uncore lock, but we can take the uncore->lock as well to serialise the mmio access, thereby serialising with the GDRST. Tested on a NUC5i7RYB, BIOS RYBDWi35.86A.0380.2019.0517.1530 with i915 selftest/hangcheck. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4 and upper Fixes: 7938d61591d3 ("drm/i915: Flush TLBs before releasing backing store") Reported-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab Tested-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab Reviewed-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson Cc: Tvrtko Ursulin Reviewed-by: Andi Shyti Acked-by: Thomas Hellström Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/1e59a7c45dd919a530256b9ac721ac6ea86c0677.1657639152.git.mchehab@kernel.org (cherry picked from commit 33da97894758737895e90c909f16786052680ef4) Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/intel_gt.c | 15 ++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/intel_gt.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/intel_gt.c index c8c070375d29..f6d7f5d307d7 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/intel_gt.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/intel_gt.c @@ -339,6 +339,20 @@ void intel_gt_invalidate_tlbs(struct intel_gt *gt) mutex_lock(>->tlb_invalidate_lock); intel_uncore_forcewake_get(uncore, FORCEWAKE_ALL); + spin_lock_irq(&uncore->lock); /* serialise invalidate with GT reset */ + + for_each_engine(engine, gt, id) { + struct reg_and_bit rb; + + rb = get_reg_and_bit(engine, regs == gen8_regs, regs, num); + if (!i915_mmio_reg_offset(rb.reg)) + continue; + + intel_uncore_write_fw(uncore, rb.reg, rb.bit); + } + + spin_unlock_irq(&uncore->lock); + for_each_engine(engine, gt, id) { /* * HW architecture suggest typical invalidation time at 40us, @@ -353,7 +367,6 @@ void intel_gt_invalidate_tlbs(struct intel_gt *gt) if (!i915_mmio_reg_offset(rb.reg)) continue; - intel_uncore_write_fw(uncore, rb.reg, rb.bit); if (__intel_wait_for_register_fw(uncore, rb.reg, rb.bit, 0, timeout_us, timeout_ms, From 8bc1f6871490c72623d6f4bd6dd45b86e5f9d1df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Mon, 11 Jul 2022 17:15:27 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0907/1091] icmp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_icmp_ratelimit. [ Upstream commit 2a4eb714841f288cf51c7d942d98af6a8c6e4b01 ] While reading sysctl_icmp_ratelimit, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/ipv4/icmp.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/icmp.c b/net/ipv4/icmp.c index a590ff81e5f8..e05e972445fe 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/icmp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/icmp.c @@ -328,7 +328,8 @@ static bool icmpv4_xrlim_allow(struct net *net, struct rtable *rt, vif = l3mdev_master_ifindex(dst->dev); peer = inet_getpeer_v4(net->ipv4.peers, fl4->daddr, vif, 1); - rc = inet_peer_xrlim_allow(peer, net->ipv4.sysctl_icmp_ratelimit); + rc = inet_peer_xrlim_allow(peer, + READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_icmp_ratelimit)); if (peer) inet_putpeer(peer); out: From df691b991043f8bea9b5ec9ebb8d29317fa7ab68 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Mon, 11 Jul 2022 17:15:28 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0908/1091] icmp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_icmp_ratemask. [ Upstream commit 1ebcb25ad6fc3d50fca87350acf451b9a66dd31e ] While reading sysctl_icmp_ratemask, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/ipv4/icmp.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/icmp.c b/net/ipv4/icmp.c index e05e972445fe..9bc01411be4c 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/icmp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/icmp.c @@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ static bool icmpv4_mask_allow(struct net *net, int type, int code) return true; /* Limit if icmp type is enabled in ratemask. */ - if (!((1 << type) & net->ipv4.sysctl_icmp_ratemask)) + if (!((1 << type) & READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_icmp_ratemask))) return true; return false; From cc9540ba5b3652c473af7e54892a48cdced87983 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Mon, 11 Jul 2022 17:15:29 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0909/1091] raw: Fix a data-race around sysctl_raw_l3mdev_accept. [ Upstream commit 1dace014928e6e385363032d359a04dee9158af0 ] While reading sysctl_raw_l3mdev_accept, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader. Fixes: 6897445fb194 ("net: provide a sysctl raw_l3mdev_accept for raw socket lookup with VRFs") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- include/net/raw.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/net/raw.h b/include/net/raw.h index 8ad8df594853..c51a635671a7 100644 --- a/include/net/raw.h +++ b/include/net/raw.h @@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ static inline bool raw_sk_bound_dev_eq(struct net *net, int bound_dev_if, int dif, int sdif) { #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NET_L3_MASTER_DEV) - return inet_bound_dev_eq(!!net->ipv4.sysctl_raw_l3mdev_accept, + return inet_bound_dev_eq(READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_raw_l3mdev_accept), bound_dev_if, dif, sdif); #else return inet_bound_dev_eq(true, bound_dev_if, dif, sdif); From 9b61d3f6df1bdfdabded85b4fab46f342041c2a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Mon, 11 Jul 2022 17:15:32 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0910/1091] ipv4: Fix data-races around sysctl_ip_dynaddr. [ Upstream commit e49e4aff7ec19b2d0d0957ee30e93dade57dab9e ] While reading sysctl_ip_dynaddr, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt | 2 +- net/ipv4/af_inet.c | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt b/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt index f60d4159fff4..787a9c077ef1 100644 --- a/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt +++ b/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt @@ -953,7 +953,7 @@ ip_nonlocal_bind - BOOLEAN which can be quite useful - but may break some applications. Default: 0 -ip_dynaddr - BOOLEAN +ip_dynaddr - INTEGER If set non-zero, enables support for dynamic addresses. If set to a non-zero value larger than 1, a kernel log message will be printed when dynamic address rewriting diff --git a/net/ipv4/af_inet.c b/net/ipv4/af_inet.c index a7a6b1adb698..9ab73fcc7411 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/af_inet.c +++ b/net/ipv4/af_inet.c @@ -1215,7 +1215,7 @@ static int inet_sk_reselect_saddr(struct sock *sk) if (new_saddr == old_saddr) return 0; - if (sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_ip_dynaddr > 1) { + if (READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_ip_dynaddr) > 1) { pr_info("%s(): shifting inet->saddr from %pI4 to %pI4\n", __func__, &old_saddr, &new_saddr); } @@ -1270,7 +1270,7 @@ int inet_sk_rebuild_header(struct sock *sk) * Other protocols have to map its equivalent state to TCP_SYN_SENT. * DCCP maps its DCCP_REQUESTING state to TCP_SYN_SENT. -acme */ - if (!sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_ip_dynaddr || + if (!READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_ip_dynaddr) || sk->sk_state != TCP_SYN_SENT || (sk->sk_userlocks & SOCK_BINDADDR_LOCK) || (err = inet_sk_reselect_saddr(sk)) != 0) From b8d77f2396d5f2b9f97fdb35d6064d8c19da6488 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Liang He Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2022 14:14:17 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0911/1091] net: ftgmac100: Hold reference returned by of_get_child_by_name() [ Upstream commit 49b9f431ff0d845a36be0b3ede35ec324f2e5fee ] In ftgmac100_probe(), we should hold the refernece returned by of_get_child_by_name() and use it to call of_node_put() for reference balance. Fixes: 39bfab8844a0 ("net: ftgmac100: Add support for DT phy-handle property") Signed-off-by: Liang He Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/faraday/ftgmac100.c | 15 ++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/faraday/ftgmac100.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/faraday/ftgmac100.c index d7478d332820..98e94d914597 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/faraday/ftgmac100.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/faraday/ftgmac100.c @@ -1734,6 +1734,19 @@ static void ftgmac100_setup_clk(struct ftgmac100 *priv) FTGMAC_100MHZ); } +static bool ftgmac100_has_child_node(struct device_node *np, const char *name) +{ + struct device_node *child_np = of_get_child_by_name(np, name); + bool ret = false; + + if (child_np) { + ret = true; + of_node_put(child_np); + } + + return ret; +} + static int ftgmac100_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) { struct resource *res; @@ -1850,7 +1863,7 @@ static int ftgmac100_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) /* Display what we found */ phy_attached_info(phy); - } else if (np && !of_get_child_by_name(np, "mdio")) { + } else if (np && !ftgmac100_has_child_node(np, "mdio")) { /* Support legacy ASPEED devicetree descriptions that decribe a * MAC with an embedded MDIO controller but have no "mdio" * child node. Automatically scan the MDIO bus for available From bcad880865bfb421885364b1f0c7351280fe2b97 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?=C3=8D=C3=B1igo=20Huguet?= Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2022 08:26:42 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0912/1091] sfc: fix use after free when disabling sriov MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit ebe41da5d47ac0fff877e57bd14c54dccf168827 ] Use after free is detected by kfence when disabling sriov. What was read after being freed was vf->pci_dev: it was freed from pci_disable_sriov and later read in efx_ef10_sriov_free_vf_vports, called from efx_ef10_sriov_free_vf_vswitching. Set the pointer to NULL at release time to not trying to read it later. Reproducer and dmesg log (note that kfence doesn't detect it every time): $ echo 1 > /sys/class/net/enp65s0f0np0/device/sriov_numvfs $ echo 0 > /sys/class/net/enp65s0f0np0/device/sriov_numvfs BUG: KFENCE: use-after-free read in efx_ef10_sriov_free_vf_vswitching+0x82/0x170 [sfc] Use-after-free read at 0x00000000ff3c1ba5 (in kfence-#224): efx_ef10_sriov_free_vf_vswitching+0x82/0x170 [sfc] efx_ef10_pci_sriov_disable+0x38/0x70 [sfc] efx_pci_sriov_configure+0x24/0x40 [sfc] sriov_numvfs_store+0xfe/0x140 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x11c/0x1b0 new_sync_write+0x11f/0x1b0 vfs_write+0x1eb/0x280 ksys_write+0x5f/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae kfence-#224: 0x00000000edb8ef95-0x00000000671f5ce1, size=2792, cache=kmalloc-4k allocated by task 6771 on cpu 10 at 3137.860196s: pci_alloc_dev+0x21/0x60 pci_iov_add_virtfn+0x2a2/0x320 sriov_enable+0x212/0x3e0 efx_ef10_sriov_configure+0x67/0x80 [sfc] efx_pci_sriov_configure+0x24/0x40 [sfc] sriov_numvfs_store+0xba/0x140 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x11c/0x1b0 new_sync_write+0x11f/0x1b0 vfs_write+0x1eb/0x280 ksys_write+0x5f/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae freed by task 6771 on cpu 12 at 3170.991309s: device_release+0x34/0x90 kobject_cleanup+0x3a/0x130 pci_iov_remove_virtfn+0xd9/0x120 sriov_disable+0x30/0xe0 efx_ef10_pci_sriov_disable+0x57/0x70 [sfc] efx_pci_sriov_configure+0x24/0x40 [sfc] sriov_numvfs_store+0xfe/0x140 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x11c/0x1b0 new_sync_write+0x11f/0x1b0 vfs_write+0x1eb/0x280 ksys_write+0x5f/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Fixes: 3c5eb87605e85 ("sfc: create vports for VFs and assign random MAC addresses") Reported-by: Yanghang Liu Signed-off-by: Íñigo Huguet Acked-by: Martin Habets Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220712062642.6915-1-ihuguet@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/ef10_sriov.c | 10 +++++++--- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/ef10_sriov.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/ef10_sriov.c index e7c6aa29d323..b318ce83f5bf 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/ef10_sriov.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/ef10_sriov.c @@ -412,8 +412,9 @@ fail1: static int efx_ef10_pci_sriov_disable(struct efx_nic *efx, bool force) { struct pci_dev *dev = efx->pci_dev; + struct efx_ef10_nic_data *nic_data = efx->nic_data; unsigned int vfs_assigned = pci_vfs_assigned(dev); - int rc = 0; + int i, rc = 0; if (vfs_assigned && !force) { netif_info(efx, drv, efx->net_dev, "VFs are assigned to guests; " @@ -421,10 +422,13 @@ static int efx_ef10_pci_sriov_disable(struct efx_nic *efx, bool force) return -EBUSY; } - if (!vfs_assigned) + if (!vfs_assigned) { + for (i = 0; i < efx->vf_count; i++) + nic_data->vf[i].pci_dev = NULL; pci_disable_sriov(dev); - else + } else { rc = -EBUSY; + } efx_ef10_sriov_free_vf_vswitching(efx); efx->vf_count = 0; From 487f0f77f1cdedc66ed79474990c814541c25ff1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrea Mayer Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2022 19:58:35 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0913/1091] seg6: fix skb checksum evaluation in SRH encapsulation/insertion [ Upstream commit df8386d13ea280d55beee1b95f61a59234a3798b ] Support for SRH encapsulation and insertion was introduced with commit 6c8702c60b88 ("ipv6: sr: add support for SRH encapsulation and injection with lwtunnels"), through the seg6_do_srh_encap() and seg6_do_srh_inline() functions, respectively. The former encapsulates the packet in an outer IPv6 header along with the SRH, while the latter inserts the SRH between the IPv6 header and the payload. Then, the headers are initialized/updated according to the operating mode (i.e., encap/inline). Finally, the skb checksum is calculated to reflect the changes applied to the headers. The IPv6 payload length ('payload_len') is not initialized within seg6_do_srh_{inline,encap}() but is deferred in seg6_do_srh(), i.e. the caller of seg6_do_srh_{inline,encap}(). However, this operation invalidates the skb checksum, since the 'payload_len' is updated only after the checksum is evaluated. To solve this issue, the initialization of the IPv6 payload length is moved from seg6_do_srh() directly into the seg6_do_srh_{inline,encap}() functions and before the skb checksum update takes place. Fixes: 6c8702c60b88 ("ipv6: sr: add support for SRH encapsulation and injection with lwtunnels") Reported-by: Paolo Abeni Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220705190727.69d532417be7438b15404ee1@uniroma2.it Signed-off-by: Andrea Mayer Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/ipv6/seg6_iptunnel.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv6/seg6_iptunnel.c b/net/ipv6/seg6_iptunnel.c index 6954db1fd26e..b626e0b62a54 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/seg6_iptunnel.c +++ b/net/ipv6/seg6_iptunnel.c @@ -171,6 +171,8 @@ int seg6_do_srh_encap(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ipv6_sr_hdr *osrh, int proto) } #endif + hdr->payload_len = htons(skb->len - sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)); + skb_postpush_rcsum(skb, hdr, tot_len); return 0; @@ -223,6 +225,8 @@ int seg6_do_srh_inline(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ipv6_sr_hdr *osrh) } #endif + hdr->payload_len = htons(skb->len - sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)); + skb_postpush_rcsum(skb, hdr, sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + hdrlen); return 0; @@ -284,7 +288,6 @@ static int seg6_do_srh(struct sk_buff *skb) break; } - ipv6_hdr(skb)->payload_len = htons(skb->len - sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)); skb_set_transport_header(skb, sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)); return 0; From de7849d9de1df52fcade7032c49537c603a67873 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrea Mayer Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2022 19:58:36 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0914/1091] seg6: fix skb checksum in SRv6 End.B6 and End.B6.Encaps behaviors [ Upstream commit f048880fc77058d864aff5c674af7918b30f312a ] The SRv6 End.B6 and End.B6.Encaps behaviors rely on functions seg6_do_srh_{encap,inline}() to, respectively: i) encapsulate the packet within an outer IPv6 header with the specified Segment Routing Header (SRH); ii) insert the specified SRH directly after the IPv6 header of the packet. This patch removes the initialization of the IPv6 header payload length from the input_action_end_b6{_encap}() functions, as it is now handled properly by seg6_do_srh_{encap,inline}() to avoid corruption of the skb checksum. Fixes: 140f04c33bbc ("ipv6: sr: implement several seg6local actions") Signed-off-by: Andrea Mayer Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/ipv6/seg6_local.c | 2 -- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv6/seg6_local.c b/net/ipv6/seg6_local.c index 802eebf8ac4b..ef5b5cee2201 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/seg6_local.c +++ b/net/ipv6/seg6_local.c @@ -421,7 +421,6 @@ static int input_action_end_b6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct seg6_local_lwt *slwt) if (err) goto drop; - ipv6_hdr(skb)->payload_len = htons(skb->len - sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)); skb_set_transport_header(skb, sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)); seg6_lookup_nexthop(skb, NULL, 0); @@ -453,7 +452,6 @@ static int input_action_end_b6_encap(struct sk_buff *skb, if (err) goto drop; - ipv6_hdr(skb)->payload_len = htons(skb->len - sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)); skb_set_transport_header(skb, sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)); seg6_lookup_nexthop(skb, NULL, 0); From ba60ca0ed12ead60975b9084eec71459733d5005 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrea Mayer Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2022 19:58:37 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0915/1091] seg6: bpf: fix skb checksum in bpf_push_seg6_encap() [ Upstream commit 4889fbd98deaf243c3baadc54e296d71c6af1eb0 ] Both helper functions bpf_lwt_seg6_action() and bpf_lwt_push_encap() use the bpf_push_seg6_encap() to encapsulate the packet in an IPv6 with Segment Routing Header (SRH) or insert an SRH between the IPv6 header and the payload. To achieve this result, such helper functions rely on bpf_push_seg6_encap() which, in turn, leverages seg6_do_srh_{encap,inline}() to perform the required operation (i.e. encap/inline). This patch removes the initialization of the IPv6 header payload length from bpf_push_seg6_encap(), as it is now handled properly by seg6_do_srh_{encap,inline}() to prevent corruption of the skb checksum. Fixes: fe94cc290f53 ("bpf: Add IPv6 Segment Routing helpers") Signed-off-by: Andrea Mayer Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/core/filter.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c index eba96343c7af..75f53b5e6389 100644 --- a/net/core/filter.c +++ b/net/core/filter.c @@ -4955,7 +4955,6 @@ static int bpf_push_seg6_encap(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 type, void *hdr, u32 len if (err) return err; - ipv6_hdr(skb)->payload_len = htons(skb->len - sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)); skb_set_transport_header(skb, sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)); return seg6_lookup_nexthop(skb, NULL, 0); From da346adcf5573fd8663cabfdfe8371009629a906 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?=C3=8D=C3=B1igo=20Huguet?= Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2022 11:21:16 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0916/1091] sfc: fix kernel panic when creating VF MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit ada74c5539eba06cf8b47d068f92e0b3963a9a6e ] When creating VFs a kernel panic can happen when calling to efx_ef10_try_update_nic_stats_vf. When releasing a DMA coherent buffer, sometimes, I don't know in what specific circumstances, it has to unmap memory with vunmap. It is disallowed to do that in IRQ context or with BH disabled. Otherwise, we hit this line in vunmap, causing the crash: BUG_ON(in_interrupt()); This patch reenables BH to release the buffer. Log messages when the bug is hit: kernel BUG at mm/vmalloc.c:2727! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 6 PID: 1462 Comm: NetworkManager Kdump: loaded Tainted: G I --------- --- 5.14.0-119.el9.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R740/06WXJT, BIOS 2.8.2 08/27/2020 RIP: 0010:vunmap+0x2e/0x30 ...skip... Call Trace: __iommu_dma_free+0x96/0x100 efx_nic_free_buffer+0x2b/0x40 [sfc] efx_ef10_try_update_nic_stats_vf+0x14a/0x1c0 [sfc] efx_ef10_update_stats_vf+0x18/0x40 [sfc] efx_start_all+0x15e/0x1d0 [sfc] efx_net_open+0x5a/0xe0 [sfc] __dev_open+0xe7/0x1a0 __dev_change_flags+0x1d7/0x240 dev_change_flags+0x21/0x60 ...skip... Fixes: d778819609a2 ("sfc: DMA the VF stats only when requested") Reported-by: Ma Yuying Signed-off-by: Íñigo Huguet Acked-by: Edward Cree Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220713092116.21238-1-ihuguet@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/ef10.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/ef10.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/ef10.c index 936e64dd81b5..b23741d3c9be 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/ef10.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/ef10.c @@ -2056,7 +2056,10 @@ static int efx_ef10_try_update_nic_stats_vf(struct efx_nic *efx) efx_update_sw_stats(efx, stats); out: + /* releasing a DMA coherent buffer with BH disabled can panic */ + spin_unlock_bh(&efx->stats_lock); efx_nic_free_buffer(efx, &stats_buf); + spin_lock_bh(&efx->stats_lock); return rc; } From 70433d9ea6ffaa3cc0cfe43cd2e9254806a7026b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Muchun Song Date: Thu, 9 Jun 2022 18:40:32 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0917/1091] mm: sysctl: fix missing numa_stat when !CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE [ Upstream commit 43b5240ca6b33108998810593248186b1e3ae34a ] "numa_stat" should not be included in the scope of CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE, if CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE is not configured even if CONFIG_NUMA is configured, "numa_stat" is missed form /proc. Move it out of CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE to fix it. Fixes: 4518085e127d ("mm, sysctl: make NUMA stats configurable") Signed-off-by: Muchun Song Cc: Acked-by: Michal Hocko Acked-by: Mel Gorman Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- kernel/sysctl.c | 20 +++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c index 0457d36540e3..6f971807bf79 100644 --- a/kernel/sysctl.c +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c @@ -1443,6 +1443,17 @@ static struct ctl_table vm_table[] = { .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO, .extra2 = &one_hundred, }, +#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA + { + .procname = "numa_stat", + .data = &sysctl_vm_numa_stat, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = sysctl_vm_numa_stat_handler, + .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO, + .extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE, + }, +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE { .procname = "nr_hugepages", @@ -1459,15 +1470,6 @@ static struct ctl_table vm_table[] = { .mode = 0644, .proc_handler = &hugetlb_mempolicy_sysctl_handler, }, - { - .procname = "numa_stat", - .data = &sysctl_vm_numa_stat, - .maxlen = sizeof(int), - .mode = 0644, - .proc_handler = sysctl_vm_numa_stat_handler, - .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO, - .extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE, - }, #endif { .procname = "hugetlb_shm_group", From 569f1ee032c9723ef00c0f33debc55bcd9ca6fbb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stephan Gerhold Date: Tue, 21 Jun 2022 13:06:20 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0918/1091] virtio_mmio: Add missing PM calls to freeze/restore [ Upstream commit ed7ac37fde33ccd84e4bd2b9363c191f925364c7 ] Most virtio drivers provide freeze/restore callbacks to finish up device usage before suspend and to reinitialize the virtio device after resume. However, these callbacks are currently only called when using virtio_pci. virtio_mmio does not have any PM ops defined. This causes problems for example after suspend to disk (hibernation), since the virtio devices might lose their state after the VMM is restarted. Calling virtio_device_freeze()/restore() ensures that the virtio devices are re-initialized correctly. Fix this by implementing the dev_pm_ops for virtio_mmio, similar to virtio_pci_common. Signed-off-by: Stephan Gerhold Message-Id: <20220621110621.3638025-2-stephan.gerhold@kernkonzept.com> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/virtio/virtio_mmio.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/virtio/virtio_mmio.c b/drivers/virtio/virtio_mmio.c index 74547323aa83..2a2d817caeff 100644 --- a/drivers/virtio/virtio_mmio.c +++ b/drivers/virtio/virtio_mmio.c @@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -514,6 +515,25 @@ static const struct virtio_config_ops virtio_mmio_config_ops = { .bus_name = vm_bus_name, }; +#ifdef CONFIG_PM_SLEEP +static int virtio_mmio_freeze(struct device *dev) +{ + struct virtio_mmio_device *vm_dev = dev_get_drvdata(dev); + + return virtio_device_freeze(&vm_dev->vdev); +} + +static int virtio_mmio_restore(struct device *dev) +{ + struct virtio_mmio_device *vm_dev = dev_get_drvdata(dev); + + return virtio_device_restore(&vm_dev->vdev); +} + +static const struct dev_pm_ops virtio_mmio_pm_ops = { + SET_SYSTEM_SLEEP_PM_OPS(virtio_mmio_freeze, virtio_mmio_restore) +}; +#endif static void virtio_mmio_release_dev(struct device *_d) { @@ -767,6 +787,9 @@ static struct platform_driver virtio_mmio_driver = { .name = "virtio-mmio", .of_match_table = virtio_mmio_match, .acpi_match_table = ACPI_PTR(virtio_mmio_acpi_match), +#ifdef CONFIG_PM_SLEEP + .pm = &virtio_mmio_pm_ops, +#endif }, }; From 0c9203e75dae024fb3a6ec1fac5a8c76fdfecc3b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stephan Gerhold Date: Tue, 21 Jun 2022 13:06:21 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0919/1091] virtio_mmio: Restore guest page size on resume [ Upstream commit e0c2ce8217955537dd5434baeba061f209797119 ] Virtio devices might lose their state when the VMM is restarted after a suspend to disk (hibernation) cycle. This means that the guest page size register must be restored for the virtio_mmio legacy interface, since otherwise the virtio queues are not functional. This is particularly problematic for QEMU that currently still defaults to using the legacy interface for virtio_mmio. Write the guest page size register again in virtio_mmio_restore() to make legacy virtio_mmio devices work correctly after hibernation. Signed-off-by: Stephan Gerhold Message-Id: <20220621110621.3638025-3-stephan.gerhold@kernkonzept.com> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/virtio/virtio_mmio.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/virtio/virtio_mmio.c b/drivers/virtio/virtio_mmio.c index 2a2d817caeff..e781e5e9215f 100644 --- a/drivers/virtio/virtio_mmio.c +++ b/drivers/virtio/virtio_mmio.c @@ -527,6 +527,9 @@ static int virtio_mmio_restore(struct device *dev) { struct virtio_mmio_device *vm_dev = dev_get_drvdata(dev); + if (vm_dev->version == 1) + writel(PAGE_SIZE, vm_dev->base + VIRTIO_MMIO_GUEST_PAGE_SIZE); + return virtio_device_restore(&vm_dev->vdev); } From b749af1b8f11aafc6ed7f60365970326f9de1e71 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Westphal Date: Tue, 21 Jun 2022 18:26:03 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0920/1091] netfilter: br_netfilter: do not skip all hooks with 0 priority [ Upstream commit c2577862eeb0be94f151f2f1fff662b028061b00 ] When br_netfilter module is loaded, skbs may be diverted to the ipv4/ipv6 hooks, just like as if we were routing. Unfortunately, bridge filter hooks with priority 0 may be skipped in this case. Example: 1. an nftables bridge ruleset is loaded, with a prerouting hook that has priority 0. 2. interface is added to the bridge. 3. no tcp packet is ever seen by the bridge prerouting hook. 4. flush the ruleset 5. load the bridge ruleset again. 6. tcp packets are processed as expected. After 1) the only registered hook is the bridge prerouting hook, but its not called yet because the bridge hasn't been brought up yet. After 2), hook order is: 0 br_nf_pre_routing // br_netfilter internal hook 0 chain bridge f prerouting // nftables bridge ruleset The packet is diverted to br_nf_pre_routing. If call-iptables is off, the nftables bridge ruleset is called as expected. But if its enabled, br_nf_hook_thresh() will skip it because it assumes that all 0-priority hooks had been called previously in bridge context. To avoid this, check for the br_nf_pre_routing hook itself, we need to resume directly after it, even if this hook has a priority of 0. Unfortunately, this still results in different packet flow. With this fix, the eval order after in 3) is: 1. br_nf_pre_routing 2. ip(6)tables (if enabled) 3. nftables bridge but after 5 its the much saner: 1. nftables bridge 2. br_nf_pre_routing 3. ip(6)tables (if enabled) Unfortunately I don't see a solution here: It would be possible to move br_nf_pre_routing to a higher priority so that it will be called later in the pipeline, but this also impacts ebtables evaluation order, and would still result in this very ordering problem for all nftables-bridge hooks with the same priority as the br_nf_pre_routing one. Searching back through the git history I don't think this has ever behaved in any other way, hence, no fixes-tag. Reported-by: Radim Hrazdil Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c b/net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c index 480e4111b24c..19726d81025d 100644 --- a/net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c +++ b/net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c @@ -1012,9 +1012,24 @@ int br_nf_hook_thresh(unsigned int hook, struct net *net, return okfn(net, sk, skb); ops = nf_hook_entries_get_hook_ops(e); - for (i = 0; i < e->num_hook_entries && - ops[i]->priority <= NF_BR_PRI_BRNF; i++) - ; + for (i = 0; i < e->num_hook_entries; i++) { + /* These hooks have already been called */ + if (ops[i]->priority < NF_BR_PRI_BRNF) + continue; + + /* These hooks have not been called yet, run them. */ + if (ops[i]->priority > NF_BR_PRI_BRNF) + break; + + /* take a closer look at NF_BR_PRI_BRNF. */ + if (ops[i]->hook == br_nf_pre_routing) { + /* This hook diverted the skb to this function, + * hooks after this have not been run yet. + */ + i++; + break; + } + } nf_hook_state_init(&state, hook, NFPROTO_BRIDGE, indev, outdev, sk, net, okfn); From 8dda30f81c751b01cd71f2cfaeef26ad4393b1d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Liang He Date: Sat, 18 Jun 2022 10:25:45 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0921/1091] cpufreq: pmac32-cpufreq: Fix refcount leak bug [ Upstream commit ccd7567d4b6cf187fdfa55f003a9e461ee629e36 ] In pmac_cpufreq_init_MacRISC3(), we need to add corresponding of_node_put() for the three node pointers whose refcount have been incremented by of_find_node_by_name(). Signed-off-by: Liang He Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/cpufreq/pmac32-cpufreq.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/cpufreq/pmac32-cpufreq.c b/drivers/cpufreq/pmac32-cpufreq.c index 73621bc11976..3704476bb83a 100644 --- a/drivers/cpufreq/pmac32-cpufreq.c +++ b/drivers/cpufreq/pmac32-cpufreq.c @@ -471,6 +471,10 @@ static int pmac_cpufreq_init_MacRISC3(struct device_node *cpunode) if (slew_done_gpio_np) slew_done_gpio = read_gpio(slew_done_gpio_np); + of_node_put(volt_gpio_np); + of_node_put(freq_gpio_np); + of_node_put(slew_done_gpio_np); + /* If we use the frequency GPIOs, calculate the min/max speeds based * on the bus frequencies */ From 70d8aee1de6e1e332942d21b7ec0ef495e26934d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kai-Heng Feng Date: Tue, 28 Jun 2022 20:37:26 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0922/1091] platform/x86: hp-wmi: Ignore Sanitization Mode event [ Upstream commit 9ab762a84b8094540c18a170e5ddd6488632c456 ] After system resume the hp-wmi driver may complain: [ 702.620180] hp_wmi: Unknown event_id - 23 - 0x0 According to HP it means 'Sanitization Mode' and it's harmless to just ignore the event. Cc: Jorge Lopez Signed-off-by: Kai-Heng Feng Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220628123726.250062-1-kai.heng.feng@canonical.com Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/platform/x86/hp-wmi.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/hp-wmi.c b/drivers/platform/x86/hp-wmi.c index 63a530a3d9fe..c3fdb0ecad96 100644 --- a/drivers/platform/x86/hp-wmi.c +++ b/drivers/platform/x86/hp-wmi.c @@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ enum hp_wmi_event_ids { HPWMI_BACKLIT_KB_BRIGHTNESS = 0x0D, HPWMI_PEAKSHIFT_PERIOD = 0x0F, HPWMI_BATTERY_CHARGE_PERIOD = 0x10, + HPWMI_SANITIZATION_MODE = 0x17, }; struct bios_args { @@ -629,6 +630,8 @@ static void hp_wmi_notify(u32 value, void *context) break; case HPWMI_BATTERY_CHARGE_PERIOD: break; + case HPWMI_SANITIZATION_MODE: + break; default: pr_info("Unknown event_id - %d - 0x%x\n", event_id, event_data); break; From 4919d82f7041157a421ca9bf39a78551d5ad8a1b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hangyu Hua Date: Wed, 29 Jun 2022 14:34:18 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0923/1091] net: tipc: fix possible refcount leak in tipc_sk_create() [ Upstream commit 00aff3590fc0a73bddd3b743863c14e76fd35c0c ] Free sk in case tipc_sk_insert() fails. Signed-off-by: Hangyu Hua Reviewed-by: Tung Nguyen Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/tipc/socket.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/net/tipc/socket.c b/net/tipc/socket.c index d543c4556df2..58c4d61d603f 100644 --- a/net/tipc/socket.c +++ b/net/tipc/socket.c @@ -455,6 +455,7 @@ static int tipc_sk_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, sock_init_data(sock, sk); tipc_set_sk_state(sk, TIPC_OPEN); if (tipc_sk_insert(tsk)) { + sk_free(sk); pr_warn("Socket create failed; port number exhausted\n"); return -EINVAL; } From 08082a642aaaf5af084e947c607b2d555941cf53 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michael Walle Date: Mon, 27 Jun 2022 19:06:43 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0924/1091] NFC: nxp-nci: don't print header length mismatch on i2c error [ Upstream commit 9577fc5fdc8b07b891709af6453545db405e24ad ] Don't print a misleading header length mismatch error if the i2c call returns an error. Instead just return the error code without any error message. Signed-off-by: Michael Walle Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/nfc/nxp-nci/i2c.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/nfc/nxp-nci/i2c.c b/drivers/nfc/nxp-nci/i2c.c index 3943a30053b3..f426dcdfcdd6 100644 --- a/drivers/nfc/nxp-nci/i2c.c +++ b/drivers/nfc/nxp-nci/i2c.c @@ -122,7 +122,9 @@ static int nxp_nci_i2c_fw_read(struct nxp_nci_i2c_phy *phy, skb_put_data(*skb, &header, NXP_NCI_FW_HDR_LEN); r = i2c_master_recv(client, skb_put(*skb, frame_len), frame_len); - if (r != frame_len) { + if (r < 0) { + goto fw_read_exit_free_skb; + } else if (r != frame_len) { nfc_err(&client->dev, "Invalid frame length: %u (expected %zu)\n", r, frame_len); @@ -166,7 +168,9 @@ static int nxp_nci_i2c_nci_read(struct nxp_nci_i2c_phy *phy, return 0; r = i2c_master_recv(client, skb_put(*skb, header.plen), header.plen); - if (r != header.plen) { + if (r < 0) { + goto nci_read_exit_free_skb; + } else if (r != header.plen) { nfc_err(&client->dev, "Invalid frame payload length: %u (expected %u)\n", r, header.plen); From 555cee1bc40bebf99076c66f412e92019a10f24d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ruozhu Li Date: Thu, 23 Jun 2022 14:45:39 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0925/1091] nvme: fix regression when disconnect a recovering ctrl [ Upstream commit f7f70f4aa09dc43d7455c060143e86a017c30548 ] We encountered a problem that the disconnect command hangs. After analyzing the log and stack, we found that the triggering process is as follows: CPU0 CPU1 nvme_rdma_error_recovery_work nvme_rdma_teardown_io_queues nvme_do_delete_ctrl nvme_stop_queues nvme_remove_namespaces --clear ctrl->namespaces nvme_start_queues --no ns in ctrl->namespaces nvme_ns_remove return(because ctrl is deleting) blk_freeze_queue blk_mq_freeze_queue_wait --wait for ns to unquiesce to clean infligt IO, hang forever This problem was not found in older kernels because we will flush err work in nvme_stop_ctrl before nvme_remove_namespaces.It does not seem to be modified for functional reasons, the patch can be revert to solve the problem. Revert commit 794a4cb3d2f7 ("nvme: remove the .stop_ctrl callout") Signed-off-by: Ruozhu Li Reviewed-by: Sagi Grimberg Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/nvme/host/core.c | 2 ++ drivers/nvme/host/nvme.h | 1 + drivers/nvme/host/rdma.c | 12 +++++++++--- drivers/nvme/host/tcp.c | 10 +++++++--- 4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/core.c b/drivers/nvme/host/core.c index 79e22618817d..d2ea6ca37c41 100644 --- a/drivers/nvme/host/core.c +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/core.c @@ -4034,6 +4034,8 @@ void nvme_stop_ctrl(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl) nvme_stop_keep_alive(ctrl); flush_work(&ctrl->async_event_work); cancel_work_sync(&ctrl->fw_act_work); + if (ctrl->ops->stop_ctrl) + ctrl->ops->stop_ctrl(ctrl); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_stop_ctrl); diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/nvme.h b/drivers/nvme/host/nvme.h index 1d1431dd4f9e..81a5b968253f 100644 --- a/drivers/nvme/host/nvme.h +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/nvme.h @@ -402,6 +402,7 @@ struct nvme_ctrl_ops { void (*free_ctrl)(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl); void (*submit_async_event)(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl); void (*delete_ctrl)(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl); + void (*stop_ctrl)(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl); int (*get_address)(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, char *buf, int size); }; diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/rdma.c b/drivers/nvme/host/rdma.c index 4213c71b02a4..d5d7b2f98edc 100644 --- a/drivers/nvme/host/rdma.c +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/rdma.c @@ -973,6 +973,14 @@ static void nvme_rdma_teardown_io_queues(struct nvme_rdma_ctrl *ctrl, } } +static void nvme_rdma_stop_ctrl(struct nvme_ctrl *nctrl) +{ + struct nvme_rdma_ctrl *ctrl = to_rdma_ctrl(nctrl); + + cancel_work_sync(&ctrl->err_work); + cancel_delayed_work_sync(&ctrl->reconnect_work); +} + static void nvme_rdma_free_ctrl(struct nvme_ctrl *nctrl) { struct nvme_rdma_ctrl *ctrl = to_rdma_ctrl(nctrl); @@ -1947,9 +1955,6 @@ static const struct blk_mq_ops nvme_rdma_admin_mq_ops = { static void nvme_rdma_shutdown_ctrl(struct nvme_rdma_ctrl *ctrl, bool shutdown) { - cancel_work_sync(&ctrl->err_work); - cancel_delayed_work_sync(&ctrl->reconnect_work); - nvme_rdma_teardown_io_queues(ctrl, shutdown); blk_mq_quiesce_queue(ctrl->ctrl.admin_q); if (shutdown) @@ -1999,6 +2004,7 @@ static const struct nvme_ctrl_ops nvme_rdma_ctrl_ops = { .submit_async_event = nvme_rdma_submit_async_event, .delete_ctrl = nvme_rdma_delete_ctrl, .get_address = nvmf_get_address, + .stop_ctrl = nvme_rdma_stop_ctrl, }; /* diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/tcp.c b/drivers/nvme/host/tcp.c index 4378344f0e7a..2a27ac9aedba 100644 --- a/drivers/nvme/host/tcp.c +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/tcp.c @@ -1973,9 +1973,6 @@ static void nvme_tcp_error_recovery_work(struct work_struct *work) static void nvme_tcp_teardown_ctrl(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, bool shutdown) { - cancel_work_sync(&to_tcp_ctrl(ctrl)->err_work); - cancel_delayed_work_sync(&to_tcp_ctrl(ctrl)->connect_work); - nvme_tcp_teardown_io_queues(ctrl, shutdown); blk_mq_quiesce_queue(ctrl->admin_q); if (shutdown) @@ -2014,6 +2011,12 @@ out_fail: nvme_tcp_reconnect_or_remove(ctrl); } +static void nvme_tcp_stop_ctrl(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl) +{ + cancel_work_sync(&to_tcp_ctrl(ctrl)->err_work); + cancel_delayed_work_sync(&to_tcp_ctrl(ctrl)->connect_work); +} + static void nvme_tcp_free_ctrl(struct nvme_ctrl *nctrl) { struct nvme_tcp_ctrl *ctrl = to_tcp_ctrl(nctrl); @@ -2322,6 +2325,7 @@ static const struct nvme_ctrl_ops nvme_tcp_ctrl_ops = { .submit_async_event = nvme_tcp_submit_async_event, .delete_ctrl = nvme_tcp_delete_ctrl, .get_address = nvmf_get_address, + .stop_ctrl = nvme_tcp_stop_ctrl, }; static bool From ede990cfc42775bd0141e21f37ee365dcaeeb50f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jianglei Nie Date: Wed, 29 Jun 2022 15:55:50 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0926/1091] net: sfp: fix memory leak in sfp_probe() [ Upstream commit 0a18d802d65cf662644fd1d369c86d84a5630652 ] sfp_probe() allocates a memory chunk from sfp with sfp_alloc(). When devm_add_action() fails, sfp is not freed, which leads to a memory leak. We should use devm_add_action_or_reset() instead of devm_add_action(). Signed-off-by: Jianglei Nie Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220629075550.2152003-1-niejianglei2021@163.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/phy/sfp.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/phy/sfp.c b/drivers/net/phy/sfp.c index 5657c604602e..beaa00342a13 100644 --- a/drivers/net/phy/sfp.c +++ b/drivers/net/phy/sfp.c @@ -1878,7 +1878,7 @@ static int sfp_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) platform_set_drvdata(pdev, sfp); - err = devm_add_action(sfp->dev, sfp_cleanup, sfp); + err = devm_add_action_or_reset(sfp->dev, sfp_cleanup, sfp); if (err < 0) return err; From f298d2e4c60c16f03d113f085e1a55b7a90f5ec4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mark Brown Date: Sat, 4 Jun 2022 11:52:46 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0927/1091] ASoC: ops: Fix off by one in range control validation [ Upstream commit 5871321fb4558c55bf9567052b618ff0be6b975e ] We currently report that range controls accept a range of 0..(max-min) but accept writes in the range 0..(max-min+1). Remove that extra +1. Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220604105246.4055214-1-broonie@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- sound/soc/soc-ops.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/soc-ops.c b/sound/soc/soc-ops.c index 7a37312c8e0c..453b61b42dd9 100644 --- a/sound/soc/soc-ops.c +++ b/sound/soc/soc-ops.c @@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ int snd_soc_put_volsw_range(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, return -EINVAL; if (mc->platform_max && tmp > mc->platform_max) return -EINVAL; - if (tmp > mc->max - mc->min + 1) + if (tmp > mc->max - mc->min) return -EINVAL; if (invert) @@ -551,7 +551,7 @@ int snd_soc_put_volsw_range(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, return -EINVAL; if (mc->platform_max && tmp > mc->platform_max) return -EINVAL; - if (tmp > mc->max - mc->min + 1) + if (tmp > mc->max - mc->min) return -EINVAL; if (invert) From 20b921f22a8bad99dc20f35dcfb72d386758203a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Charles Keepax Date: Tue, 21 Jun 2022 11:20:39 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0928/1091] ASoC: wm5110: Fix DRE control [ Upstream commit 0bc0ae9a5938d512fd5d44f11c9c04892dcf4961 ] The DRE controls on wm5110 should return a value of 1 if the DRE state is actually changed, update to fix this. Signed-off-by: Charles Keepax Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220621102041.1713504-2-ckeepax@opensource.cirrus.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- sound/soc/codecs/wm5110.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/wm5110.c b/sound/soc/codecs/wm5110.c index 9dc215b5c504..06ec3f48c808 100644 --- a/sound/soc/codecs/wm5110.c +++ b/sound/soc/codecs/wm5110.c @@ -413,6 +413,7 @@ static int wm5110_put_dre(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, unsigned int rnew = (!!ucontrol->value.integer.value[1]) << mc->rshift; unsigned int lold, rold; unsigned int lena, rena; + bool change = false; int ret; snd_soc_dapm_mutex_lock(dapm); @@ -440,8 +441,8 @@ static int wm5110_put_dre(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, goto err; } - ret = regmap_update_bits(arizona->regmap, ARIZONA_DRE_ENABLE, - mask, lnew | rnew); + ret = regmap_update_bits_check(arizona->regmap, ARIZONA_DRE_ENABLE, + mask, lnew | rnew, &change); if (ret) { dev_err(arizona->dev, "Failed to set DRE: %d\n", ret); goto err; @@ -454,6 +455,9 @@ static int wm5110_put_dre(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, if (!rnew && rold) wm5110_clear_pga_volume(arizona, mc->rshift); + if (change) + ret = 1; + err: snd_soc_dapm_mutex_unlock(dapm); From 0e7e515a673315d781c7f9884c1485a162b77106 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Charles Keepax Date: Thu, 23 Jun 2022 11:51:17 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0929/1091] ASoC: cs47l15: Fix event generation for low power mux control [ Upstream commit 7f103af4a10f375b9b346b4d0b730f6a66b8c451 ] cs47l15_in1_adc_put always returns zero regardless of if the control value was updated. This results in missing notifications to user-space of the control change. Update the handling to return 1 when the value is changed. Signed-off-by: Charles Keepax Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220623105120.1981154-3-ckeepax@opensource.cirrus.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- sound/soc/codecs/cs47l15.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/cs47l15.c b/sound/soc/codecs/cs47l15.c index ece1276f38eb..1f7148794a5a 100644 --- a/sound/soc/codecs/cs47l15.c +++ b/sound/soc/codecs/cs47l15.c @@ -122,6 +122,9 @@ static int cs47l15_in1_adc_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, snd_soc_kcontrol_component(kcontrol); struct cs47l15 *cs47l15 = snd_soc_component_get_drvdata(component); + if (!!ucontrol->value.integer.value[0] == cs47l15->in1_lp_mode) + return 0; + switch (ucontrol->value.integer.value[0]) { case 0: /* Set IN1 to normal mode */ @@ -150,7 +153,7 @@ static int cs47l15_in1_adc_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, break; } - return 0; + return 1; } static const struct snd_kcontrol_new cs47l15_snd_controls[] = { From 79067a663247bcc69054a5340a7f3b5c7abd35c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Charles Keepax Date: Thu, 23 Jun 2022 11:51:18 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0930/1091] ASoC: madera: Fix event generation for OUT1 demux [ Upstream commit e3cabbef3db8269207a6b8808f510137669f8deb ] madera_out1_demux_put returns the value of snd_soc_dapm_mux_update_power, which returns a 1 if a path was found for the kcontrol. This is obviously different to the expected return a 1 if the control was updated value. This results in spurious notifications to user-space. Update the handling to only return a 1 when the value is changed. Signed-off-by: Charles Keepax Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220623105120.1981154-4-ckeepax@opensource.cirrus.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- sound/soc/codecs/madera.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/madera.c b/sound/soc/codecs/madera.c index 52639811cc52..e375dca9ba8d 100644 --- a/sound/soc/codecs/madera.c +++ b/sound/soc/codecs/madera.c @@ -568,7 +568,13 @@ int madera_out1_demux_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, end: snd_soc_dapm_mutex_unlock(dapm); - return snd_soc_dapm_mux_update_power(dapm, kcontrol, mux, e, NULL); + ret = snd_soc_dapm_mux_update_power(dapm, kcontrol, mux, e, NULL); + if (ret < 0) { + dev_err(madera->dev, "Failed to update demux power state: %d\n", ret); + return ret; + } + + return change; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(madera_out1_demux_put); From b0f41db500841f9d0f7e31621e332364557fb5c5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Charles Keepax Date: Thu, 23 Jun 2022 11:51:19 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0931/1091] ASoC: madera: Fix event generation for rate controls [ Upstream commit 980555e95f7cabdc9c80a07107622b097ba23703 ] madera_adsp_rate_put always returns zero regardless of if the control value was updated. This results in missing notifications to user-space of the control change. Update the handling to return 1 when the value is changed. Signed-off-by: Charles Keepax Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220623105120.1981154-5-ckeepax@opensource.cirrus.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- sound/soc/codecs/madera.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/madera.c b/sound/soc/codecs/madera.c index e375dca9ba8d..4a56082a4c43 100644 --- a/sound/soc/codecs/madera.c +++ b/sound/soc/codecs/madera.c @@ -853,7 +853,7 @@ static int madera_adsp_rate_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, struct soc_enum *e = (struct soc_enum *)kcontrol->private_value; const int adsp_num = e->shift_l; const unsigned int item = ucontrol->value.enumerated.item[0]; - int ret; + int ret = 0; if (item >= e->items) return -EINVAL; @@ -870,10 +870,10 @@ static int madera_adsp_rate_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, "Cannot change '%s' while in use by active audio paths\n", kcontrol->id.name); ret = -EBUSY; - } else { + } else if (priv->adsp_rate_cache[adsp_num] != e->values[item]) { /* Volatile register so defer until the codec is powered up */ priv->adsp_rate_cache[adsp_num] = e->values[item]; - ret = 0; + ret = 1; } mutex_unlock(&priv->rate_lock); From 549f70b29953a9093c8902de0e1ab7a466b28291 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stafford Horne Date: Wed, 15 Jun 2022 08:54:26 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 0932/1091] irqchip: or1k-pic: Undefine mask_ack for level triggered hardware [ Upstream commit 8520501346ed8d1c4a6dfa751cb57328a9c843f1 ] The mask_ack operation clears the interrupt by writing to the PICSR register. This we don't want for level triggered interrupt because it does not actually clear the interrupt on the source hardware. This was causing issues in qemu with multi core setups where interrupts would continue to fire even though they had been cleared in PICSR. Just remove the mask_ack operation. Acked-by: Marc Zyngier Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/irqchip/irq-or1k-pic.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/irqchip/irq-or1k-pic.c b/drivers/irqchip/irq-or1k-pic.c index 03d2366118dd..d5f1fabc45d7 100644 --- a/drivers/irqchip/irq-or1k-pic.c +++ b/drivers/irqchip/irq-or1k-pic.c @@ -66,7 +66,6 @@ static struct or1k_pic_dev or1k_pic_level = { .name = "or1k-PIC-level", .irq_unmask = or1k_pic_unmask, .irq_mask = or1k_pic_mask, - .irq_mask_ack = or1k_pic_mask_ack, }, .handle = handle_level_irq, .flags = IRQ_LEVEL | IRQ_NOPROBE, From a3c7c1a726a4c6b63b85e8c183f207543fd75e1b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Juergen Gross Date: Thu, 30 Jun 2022 09:14:40 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0933/1091] x86: Clear .brk area at early boot [ Upstream commit 38fa5479b41376dc9d7f57e71c83514285a25ca0 ] The .brk section has the same properties as .bss: it is an alloc-only section and should be cleared before being used. Not doing so is especially a problem for Xen PV guests, as the hypervisor will validate page tables (check for writable page tables and hypervisor private bits) before accepting them to be used. Make sure .brk is initially zero by letting clear_bss() clear the brk area, too. Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220630071441.28576-3-jgross@suse.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/x86/kernel/head64.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c index 206a4b6144c2..950286016f63 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c @@ -383,6 +383,8 @@ static void __init clear_bss(void) { memset(__bss_start, 0, (unsigned long) __bss_stop - (unsigned long) __bss_start); + memset(__brk_base, 0, + (unsigned long) __brk_limit - (unsigned long) __brk_base); } static unsigned long get_cmd_line_ptr(void) From c7d4b3ec6306b0997768db366dabafd75b5cb761 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Linus Walleij Date: Sun, 26 Jun 2022 09:43:15 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0934/1091] soc: ixp4xx/npe: Fix unused match warning [ Upstream commit 620f83b8326ce9706b1118334f0257ae028ce045 ] The kernel test robot found this inconsistency: drivers/soc/ixp4xx/ixp4xx-npe.c:737:34: warning: 'ixp4xx_npe_of_match' defined but not used [-Wunused-const-variable=] 737 | static const struct of_device_id ixp4xx_npe_of_match[] = { This is because the match is enclosed in the of_match_ptr() which compiles into NULL when OF is disabled and this is unnecessary. Fix it by dropping of_match_ptr() around the match. Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220626074315.61209-1-linus.walleij@linaro.org' Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/soc/ixp4xx/ixp4xx-npe.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/soc/ixp4xx/ixp4xx-npe.c b/drivers/soc/ixp4xx/ixp4xx-npe.c index 6065aaab6740..8482a4892b83 100644 --- a/drivers/soc/ixp4xx/ixp4xx-npe.c +++ b/drivers/soc/ixp4xx/ixp4xx-npe.c @@ -735,7 +735,7 @@ static const struct of_device_id ixp4xx_npe_of_match[] = { static struct platform_driver ixp4xx_npe_driver = { .driver = { .name = "ixp4xx-npe", - .of_match_table = of_match_ptr(ixp4xx_npe_of_match), + .of_match_table = ixp4xx_npe_of_match, }, .probe = ixp4xx_npe_probe, .remove = ixp4xx_npe_remove, From 172cd32ada70062ae414c55a00b06ecae33570db Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gabriel Fernandez Date: Fri, 24 Jun 2022 11:27:13 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0935/1091] ARM: dts: stm32: use the correct clock source for CEC on stm32mp151 [ Upstream commit 78ece8cce1ba0c3f3e5a7c6c1b914b3794f04c44 ] The peripheral clock of CEC is not LSE but CEC. Signed-off-by: Gabriel Fernandez Signed-off-by: Alexandre Torgue Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/arm/boot/dts/stm32mp157c.dtsi | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/stm32mp157c.dtsi b/arch/arm/boot/dts/stm32mp157c.dtsi index a687c024daa9..0e9e930c60f0 100644 --- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/stm32mp157c.dtsi +++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/stm32mp157c.dtsi @@ -515,7 +515,7 @@ compatible = "st,stm32-cec"; reg = <0x40016000 0x400>; interrupts = ; - clocks = <&rcc CEC_K>, <&clk_lse>; + clocks = <&rcc CEC_K>, <&rcc CEC>; clock-names = "cec", "hdmi-cec"; status = "disabled"; }; From cbc98dcc38e27c7696c7aeec4106b97a92b35e5f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Linus Torvalds Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2022 12:20:59 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0936/1091] signal handling: don't use BUG_ON() for debugging [ Upstream commit a382f8fee42ca10c9bfce0d2352d4153f931f5dc ] These are indeed "should not happen" situations, but it turns out recent changes made the 'task_is_stopped_or_trace()' case trigger (fix for that exists, is pending more testing), and the BUG_ON() makes it unnecessarily hard to actually debug for no good reason. It's been that way for a long time, but let's make it clear: BUG_ON() is not good for debugging, and should never be used in situations where you could just say "this shouldn't happen, but we can continue". Use WARN_ON_ONCE() instead to make sure it gets logged, and then just continue running. Instead of making the system basically unusuable because you crashed the machine while potentially holding some very core locks (eg this function is commonly called while holding 'tasklist_lock' for writing). Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- kernel/signal.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c index 3f61367fd168..1f4293a107b4 100644 --- a/kernel/signal.c +++ b/kernel/signal.c @@ -1916,12 +1916,12 @@ bool do_notify_parent(struct task_struct *tsk, int sig) bool autoreap = false; u64 utime, stime; - BUG_ON(sig == -1); + WARN_ON_ONCE(sig == -1); - /* do_notify_parent_cldstop should have been called instead. */ - BUG_ON(task_is_stopped_or_traced(tsk)); + /* do_notify_parent_cldstop should have been called instead. */ + WARN_ON_ONCE(task_is_stopped_or_traced(tsk)); - BUG_ON(!tsk->ptrace && + WARN_ON_ONCE(!tsk->ptrace && (tsk->group_leader != tsk || !thread_group_empty(tsk))); /* Wake up all pidfd waiters */ From 42373b717a3f86abbd9d40e2564faa7f9b202bc5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lucien Buchmann Date: Sat, 25 Jun 2022 02:17:44 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0937/1091] USB: serial: ftdi_sio: add Belimo device ids commit 7c239a071d1f04b7137789810807b4108d475c72 upstream. Those two product ids are known. Signed-off-by: Lucien Buchmann Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio.c | 3 +++ drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio_ids.h | 6 ++++++ 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio.c b/drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio.c index 48323165139a..d671e096594b 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio.c +++ b/drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio.c @@ -1023,6 +1023,9 @@ static const struct usb_device_id id_table_combined[] = { { USB_DEVICE(FTDI_VID, CHETCO_SEASMART_DISPLAY_PID) }, { USB_DEVICE(FTDI_VID, CHETCO_SEASMART_LITE_PID) }, { USB_DEVICE(FTDI_VID, CHETCO_SEASMART_ANALOG_PID) }, + /* Belimo Automation devices */ + { USB_DEVICE(FTDI_VID, BELIMO_ZTH_PID) }, + { USB_DEVICE(FTDI_VID, BELIMO_ZIP_PID) }, /* ICP DAS I-756xU devices */ { USB_DEVICE(ICPDAS_VID, ICPDAS_I7560U_PID) }, { USB_DEVICE(ICPDAS_VID, ICPDAS_I7561U_PID) }, diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio_ids.h b/drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio_ids.h index d1a9564697a4..4e92c165c86b 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio_ids.h +++ b/drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio_ids.h @@ -1568,6 +1568,12 @@ #define CHETCO_SEASMART_LITE_PID 0xA5AE /* SeaSmart Lite USB Adapter */ #define CHETCO_SEASMART_ANALOG_PID 0xA5AF /* SeaSmart Analog Adapter */ +/* + * Belimo Automation + */ +#define BELIMO_ZTH_PID 0x8050 +#define BELIMO_ZIP_PID 0xC811 + /* * Unjo AB */ From 40034fe6b8a76aedd029bbf0adf10abe88b6cd0c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Linyu Yuan Date: Fri, 1 Jul 2022 16:08:54 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0938/1091] usb: typec: add missing uevent when partner support PD commit 6fb9e1d94789e8ee5a258a23bc588693f743fd6c upstream. System like Android allow user control power role from UI, it is possible to implement application base on typec uevent to refresh UI, but found there is chance that UI show different state from typec attribute file. In typec_set_pwr_opmode(), when partner support PD, there is no uevent send to user space which cause the problem. Fix it by sending uevent notification when change power mode to PD. Fixes: bdecb33af34f ("usb: typec: API for controlling USB Type-C Multiplexers") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linyu Yuan Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1656662934-10226-1-git-send-email-quic_linyyuan@quicinc.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/typec/class.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/typec/class.c b/drivers/usb/typec/class.c index 526509ed92e5..db926641b79d 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/typec/class.c +++ b/drivers/usb/typec/class.c @@ -1383,6 +1383,7 @@ void typec_set_pwr_opmode(struct typec_port *port, partner->usb_pd = 1; sysfs_notify(&partner_dev->kobj, NULL, "supports_usb_power_delivery"); + kobject_uevent(&partner_dev->kobj, KOBJ_CHANGE); } put_device(partner_dev); } From edcb2612218d000fd9a084676b0fea75b4e679f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thinh Nguyen Date: Mon, 27 Jun 2022 18:41:19 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0939/1091] usb: dwc3: gadget: Fix event pending check commit 7441b273388b9a59d8387a03ffbbca9d5af6348c upstream. The DWC3_EVENT_PENDING flag is used to protect against invalid call to top-half interrupt handler, which can occur when there's a delay in software detection of the interrupt line deassertion. However, the clearing of this flag was done prior to unmasking the interrupt line, creating opportunity where the top-half handler can come. This breaks the serialization and creates a race between the top-half and bottom-half handler, resulting in losing synchronization between the controller and the driver when processing events. To fix this, make sure the clearing of the DWC3_EVENT_PENDING is done at the end of the bottom-half handler. Fixes: d325a1de49d6 ("usb: dwc3: gadget: Prevent losing events in event cache") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Thinh Nguyen Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/8670aaf1cf52e7d1e6df2a827af2d77263b93b75.1656380429.git.Thinh.Nguyen@synopsys.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c b/drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c index 18a53a3dfac6..80fee7ea83ca 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c +++ b/drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c @@ -3535,7 +3535,6 @@ static irqreturn_t dwc3_process_event_buf(struct dwc3_event_buffer *evt) } evt->count = 0; - evt->flags &= ~DWC3_EVENT_PENDING; ret = IRQ_HANDLED; /* Unmask interrupt */ @@ -3548,6 +3547,9 @@ static irqreturn_t dwc3_process_event_buf(struct dwc3_event_buffer *evt) dwc3_writel(dwc->regs, DWC3_DEV_IMOD(0), dwc->imod_interval); } + /* Keep the clearing of DWC3_EVENT_PENDING at the end */ + evt->flags &= ~DWC3_EVENT_PENDING; + return ret; } From 07379bd79d869e0bd3d93225853198999e58058d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chanho Park Date: Mon, 27 Jun 2022 15:51:13 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 0940/1091] tty: serial: samsung_tty: set dma burst_size to 1 commit f7e35e4bf1e8dc2c8cbd5e0955dc1bd58558dae0 upstream. The src_maxburst and dst_maxburst have been changed to 1 but the settings of the UCON register aren't changed yet. They should be changed as well according to the dmaengine slave config. Fixes: aa2f80e752c7 ("serial: samsung: fix maxburst parameter for DMA transactions") Cc: stable Cc: Marek Szyprowski Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski Signed-off-by: Chanho Park Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220627065113.139520-1-chanho61.park@samsung.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/tty/serial/samsung.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/samsung.c b/drivers/tty/serial/samsung.c index 6040d5a6139a..1df74bad1063 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/serial/samsung.c +++ b/drivers/tty/serial/samsung.c @@ -238,8 +238,7 @@ static void enable_tx_dma(struct s3c24xx_uart_port *ourport) /* Enable tx dma mode */ ucon = rd_regl(port, S3C2410_UCON); ucon &= ~(S3C64XX_UCON_TXBURST_MASK | S3C64XX_UCON_TXMODE_MASK); - ucon |= (dma_get_cache_alignment() >= 16) ? - S3C64XX_UCON_TXBURST_16 : S3C64XX_UCON_TXBURST_1; + ucon |= S3C64XX_UCON_TXBURST_1; ucon |= S3C64XX_UCON_TXMODE_DMA; wr_regl(port, S3C2410_UCON, ucon); @@ -512,7 +511,7 @@ static void enable_rx_dma(struct s3c24xx_uart_port *ourport) S3C64XX_UCON_DMASUS_EN | S3C64XX_UCON_TIMEOUT_EN | S3C64XX_UCON_RXMODE_MASK); - ucon |= S3C64XX_UCON_RXBURST_16 | + ucon |= S3C64XX_UCON_RXBURST_1 | 0xf << S3C64XX_UCON_TIMEOUT_SHIFT | S3C64XX_UCON_EMPTYINT_EN | S3C64XX_UCON_TIMEOUT_EN | From f4c7f5028b48d513b2bf8e04f119e5acb08eb699 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yi Yang Date: Tue, 28 Jun 2022 16:35:15 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0941/1091] serial: 8250: fix return error code in serial8250_request_std_resource() commit 6e690d54cfa802f939cefbd2fa2c91bd0b8bd1b6 upstream. If port->mapbase = NULL in serial8250_request_std_resource() , it need return a error code instead of 0. If uart_set_info() fail to request new regions by serial8250_request_std_resource() but the return value of serial8250_request_std_resource() is 0, The system incorrectly considers that the resource application is successful and does not attempt to restore the old setting. A null pointer reference is triggered when the port resource is later invoked. Signed-off-by: Yi Yang Cc: stable Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220628083515.64138-1-yiyang13@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c b/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c index cb975228726e..f8819f72304a 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c +++ b/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c @@ -2828,8 +2828,10 @@ static int serial8250_request_std_resource(struct uart_8250_port *up) case UPIO_MEM32BE: case UPIO_MEM16: case UPIO_MEM: - if (!port->mapbase) + if (!port->mapbase) { + ret = -EINVAL; break; + } if (!request_mem_region(port->mapbase, size, "serial")) { ret = -EBUSY; From 0c8649a4978856240cfa46703f0179fd2a288419 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Ilpo=20J=C3=A4rvinen?= Date: Mon, 27 Jun 2022 18:07:52 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 0942/1091] serial: stm32: Clear prev values before setting RTS delays MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 5c5f44e36217de5ead789ff25da71c31c2331c96 upstream. The code lacks clearing of previous DEAT/DEDT values. Thus, changing values on the fly results in garbage delays tending towards the maximum value as more and more bits are ORed together. (Leaving RS485 mode would have cleared the old values though). Fixes: 1bcda09d2910 ("serial: stm32: add support for RS485 hardware control mode") Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220627150753.34510-1-ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/tty/serial/stm32-usart.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/stm32-usart.c b/drivers/tty/serial/stm32-usart.c index d5a084ffde89..5e0b9f783cac 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/serial/stm32-usart.c +++ b/drivers/tty/serial/stm32-usart.c @@ -73,6 +73,8 @@ static void stm32_config_reg_rs485(u32 *cr1, u32 *cr3, u32 delay_ADE, *cr3 |= USART_CR3_DEM; over8 = *cr1 & USART_CR1_OVER8; + *cr1 &= ~(USART_CR1_DEDT_MASK | USART_CR1_DEAT_MASK); + if (over8) rs485_deat_dedt = delay_ADE * baud * 8; else From 579c8a2e636188588da92323ec34d2a56713b31c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Ilpo=20J=C3=A4rvinen?= Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 10:56:37 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 0943/1091] serial: pl011: UPSTAT_AUTORTS requires .throttle/unthrottle MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 211565b100993c90b53bf40851eacaefc830cfe0 upstream. The driver must provide throttle and unthrottle in uart_ops when it sets UPSTAT_AUTORTS. Add them using existing stop_rx & enable_interrupts functions. Fixes: 2a76fa283098 (serial: pl011: Adopt generic flag to store auto RTS status) Cc: stable Cc: Lukas Wunner Reported-by: Nuno Gonçalves Tested-by: Nuno Gonçalves Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220614075637.8558-1-ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/tty/serial/amba-pl011.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/amba-pl011.c b/drivers/tty/serial/amba-pl011.c index 0bd8c05d72d6..52b7d559b44b 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/serial/amba-pl011.c +++ b/drivers/tty/serial/amba-pl011.c @@ -1335,6 +1335,15 @@ static void pl011_stop_rx(struct uart_port *port) pl011_dma_rx_stop(uap); } +static void pl011_throttle_rx(struct uart_port *port) +{ + unsigned long flags; + + spin_lock_irqsave(&port->lock, flags); + pl011_stop_rx(port); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&port->lock, flags); +} + static void pl011_enable_ms(struct uart_port *port) { struct uart_amba_port *uap = @@ -1728,9 +1737,10 @@ static int pl011_allocate_irq(struct uart_amba_port *uap) */ static void pl011_enable_interrupts(struct uart_amba_port *uap) { + unsigned long flags; unsigned int i; - spin_lock_irq(&uap->port.lock); + spin_lock_irqsave(&uap->port.lock, flags); /* Clear out any spuriously appearing RX interrupts */ pl011_write(UART011_RTIS | UART011_RXIS, uap, REG_ICR); @@ -1752,7 +1762,14 @@ static void pl011_enable_interrupts(struct uart_amba_port *uap) if (!pl011_dma_rx_running(uap)) uap->im |= UART011_RXIM; pl011_write(uap->im, uap, REG_IMSC); - spin_unlock_irq(&uap->port.lock); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&uap->port.lock, flags); +} + +static void pl011_unthrottle_rx(struct uart_port *port) +{ + struct uart_amba_port *uap = container_of(port, struct uart_amba_port, port); + + pl011_enable_interrupts(uap); } static int pl011_startup(struct uart_port *port) @@ -2127,6 +2144,8 @@ static const struct uart_ops amba_pl011_pops = { .stop_tx = pl011_stop_tx, .start_tx = pl011_start_tx, .stop_rx = pl011_stop_rx, + .throttle = pl011_throttle_rx, + .unthrottle = pl011_unthrottle_rx, .enable_ms = pl011_enable_ms, .break_ctl = pl011_break_ctl, .startup = pl011_startup, From 08d90846e438ac22dc56fc49ec0b0d195831c5ed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Marc Kleine-Budde Date: Thu, 17 Mar 2022 08:57:35 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0944/1091] can: m_can: m_can_tx_handler(): fix use after free of skb commit 2e8e79c416aae1de224c0f1860f2e3350fa171f8 upstream. can_put_echo_skb() will clone skb then free the skb. Move the can_put_echo_skb() for the m_can version 3.0.x directly before the start of the xmit in hardware, similar to the 3.1.x branch. Fixes: 80646733f11c ("can: m_can: update to support CAN FD features") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220317081305.739554-1-mkl@pengutronix.de Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Hangyu Hua Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde [sudip: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/can/m_can/m_can.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/can/m_can/m_can.c b/drivers/net/can/m_can/m_can.c index 9ae3efce0f66..26f721664e76 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/m_can/m_can.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/m_can/m_can.c @@ -1443,8 +1443,6 @@ static netdev_tx_t m_can_tx_handler(struct m_can_classdev *cdev) M_CAN_FIFO_DATA(i / 4), *(u32 *)(cf->data + i)); - can_put_echo_skb(skb, dev, 0); - if (cdev->can.ctrlmode & CAN_CTRLMODE_FD) { cccr = m_can_read(cdev, M_CAN_CCCR); cccr &= ~(CCCR_CMR_MASK << CCCR_CMR_SHIFT); @@ -1461,6 +1459,9 @@ static netdev_tx_t m_can_tx_handler(struct m_can_classdev *cdev) m_can_write(cdev, M_CAN_CCCR, cccr); } m_can_write(cdev, M_CAN_TXBTIE, 0x1); + + can_put_echo_skb(skb, dev, 0); + m_can_write(cdev, M_CAN_TXBAR, 0x1); /* End of xmit function for version 3.0.x */ } else { From 002c3bbb4713859e8f3d1e756637572a09dcca49 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Thu, 21 Jul 2022 20:59:29 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0945/1091] Linux 5.4.207 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220719114552.477018590@linuxfoundation.org Tested-by: Florian Fainelli Tested-by: Hulk Robot Tested-by: Guenter Roeck Tested-by: Jon Hunter Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing Tested-by: Sudip Mukherjee Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Makefile | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index 755123455105..89d19f04faab 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 VERSION = 5 PATCHLEVEL = 4 -SUBLEVEL = 206 +SUBLEVEL = 207 EXTRAVERSION = NAME = Kleptomaniac Octopus From d3891851c52f30a3ca29f5f1b591da10ee357835 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Sat, 23 Jul 2022 15:30:47 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0946/1091] Revert "cgroup: Use separate src/dst nodes when preloading css_sets for migration" This reverts commit ad44e05f3e016bdcb1ad25af35ade5b5f41ccd68 which is commit 07fd5b6cdf3cc30bfde8fe0f644771688be04447 upstream. It breaks the kernel ABI and is not something that is an issue for Android devices, so revert it. Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Change-Id: I89125948bbf90805d25a446afeab69f6581442bc --- include/linux/cgroup-defs.h | 3 +-- kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c | 37 ++++++++++++++----------------------- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/cgroup-defs.h b/include/linux/cgroup-defs.h index f5ebec80986d..e77b6b0da731 100644 --- a/include/linux/cgroup-defs.h +++ b/include/linux/cgroup-defs.h @@ -255,8 +255,7 @@ struct css_set { * List of csets participating in the on-going migration either as * source or destination. Protected by cgroup_mutex. */ - struct list_head mg_src_preload_node; - struct list_head mg_dst_preload_node; + struct list_head mg_preload_node; struct list_head mg_node; /* diff --git a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c index 23f0db2900e4..177d57ce9016 100644 --- a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c +++ b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c @@ -743,8 +743,7 @@ struct css_set init_css_set = { .task_iters = LIST_HEAD_INIT(init_css_set.task_iters), .threaded_csets = LIST_HEAD_INIT(init_css_set.threaded_csets), .cgrp_links = LIST_HEAD_INIT(init_css_set.cgrp_links), - .mg_src_preload_node = LIST_HEAD_INIT(init_css_set.mg_src_preload_node), - .mg_dst_preload_node = LIST_HEAD_INIT(init_css_set.mg_dst_preload_node), + .mg_preload_node = LIST_HEAD_INIT(init_css_set.mg_preload_node), .mg_node = LIST_HEAD_INIT(init_css_set.mg_node), /* @@ -1220,8 +1219,7 @@ static struct css_set *find_css_set(struct css_set *old_cset, INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cset->threaded_csets); INIT_HLIST_NODE(&cset->hlist); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cset->cgrp_links); - INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cset->mg_src_preload_node); - INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cset->mg_dst_preload_node); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cset->mg_preload_node); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cset->mg_node); /* Copy the set of subsystem state objects generated in @@ -2631,27 +2629,21 @@ int cgroup_migrate_vet_dst(struct cgroup *dst_cgrp) */ void cgroup_migrate_finish(struct cgroup_mgctx *mgctx) { + LIST_HEAD(preloaded); struct css_set *cset, *tmp_cset; lockdep_assert_held(&cgroup_mutex); spin_lock_irq(&css_set_lock); - list_for_each_entry_safe(cset, tmp_cset, &mgctx->preloaded_src_csets, - mg_src_preload_node) { - cset->mg_src_cgrp = NULL; - cset->mg_dst_cgrp = NULL; - cset->mg_dst_cset = NULL; - list_del_init(&cset->mg_src_preload_node); - put_css_set_locked(cset); - } + list_splice_tail_init(&mgctx->preloaded_src_csets, &preloaded); + list_splice_tail_init(&mgctx->preloaded_dst_csets, &preloaded); - list_for_each_entry_safe(cset, tmp_cset, &mgctx->preloaded_dst_csets, - mg_dst_preload_node) { + list_for_each_entry_safe(cset, tmp_cset, &preloaded, mg_preload_node) { cset->mg_src_cgrp = NULL; cset->mg_dst_cgrp = NULL; cset->mg_dst_cset = NULL; - list_del_init(&cset->mg_dst_preload_node); + list_del_init(&cset->mg_preload_node); put_css_set_locked(cset); } @@ -2693,7 +2685,7 @@ void cgroup_migrate_add_src(struct css_set *src_cset, src_cgrp = cset_cgroup_from_root(src_cset, dst_cgrp->root); - if (!list_empty(&src_cset->mg_src_preload_node)) + if (!list_empty(&src_cset->mg_preload_node)) return; WARN_ON(src_cset->mg_src_cgrp); @@ -2704,7 +2696,7 @@ void cgroup_migrate_add_src(struct css_set *src_cset, src_cset->mg_src_cgrp = src_cgrp; src_cset->mg_dst_cgrp = dst_cgrp; get_css_set(src_cset); - list_add_tail(&src_cset->mg_src_preload_node, &mgctx->preloaded_src_csets); + list_add_tail(&src_cset->mg_preload_node, &mgctx->preloaded_src_csets); } /** @@ -2729,7 +2721,7 @@ int cgroup_migrate_prepare_dst(struct cgroup_mgctx *mgctx) /* look up the dst cset for each src cset and link it to src */ list_for_each_entry_safe(src_cset, tmp_cset, &mgctx->preloaded_src_csets, - mg_src_preload_node) { + mg_preload_node) { struct css_set *dst_cset; struct cgroup_subsys *ss; int ssid; @@ -2748,7 +2740,7 @@ int cgroup_migrate_prepare_dst(struct cgroup_mgctx *mgctx) if (src_cset == dst_cset) { src_cset->mg_src_cgrp = NULL; src_cset->mg_dst_cgrp = NULL; - list_del_init(&src_cset->mg_src_preload_node); + list_del_init(&src_cset->mg_preload_node); put_css_set(src_cset); put_css_set(dst_cset); continue; @@ -2756,8 +2748,8 @@ int cgroup_migrate_prepare_dst(struct cgroup_mgctx *mgctx) src_cset->mg_dst_cset = dst_cset; - if (list_empty(&dst_cset->mg_dst_preload_node)) - list_add_tail(&dst_cset->mg_dst_preload_node, + if (list_empty(&dst_cset->mg_preload_node)) + list_add_tail(&dst_cset->mg_preload_node, &mgctx->preloaded_dst_csets); else put_css_set(dst_cset); @@ -2988,8 +2980,7 @@ static int cgroup_update_dfl_csses(struct cgroup *cgrp) goto out_finish; spin_lock_irq(&css_set_lock); - list_for_each_entry(src_cset, &mgctx.preloaded_src_csets, - mg_src_preload_node) { + list_for_each_entry(src_cset, &mgctx.preloaded_src_csets, mg_preload_node) { struct task_struct *task, *ntask; /* all tasks in src_csets need to be migrated */ From e5a6b05d0c68435b7ef6aa51a400a3592770fdc4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Fabien Dessenne Date: Mon, 27 Jun 2022 16:23:50 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0947/1091] pinctrl: stm32: fix optional IRQ support to gpios commit a1d4ef1adf8bbd302067534ead671a94759687ed upstream. To act as an interrupt controller, a gpio bank relies on the "interrupt-parent" of the pin controller. When this optional "interrupt-parent" misses, do not create any IRQ domain. This fixes a "NULL pointer in stm32_gpio_domain_alloc()" kernel crash when the interrupt-parent = property is not declared in the Device Tree. Fixes: 0eb9f683336d ("pinctrl: Add IRQ support to STM32 gpios") Signed-off-by: Fabien Dessenne Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220627142350.742973-1-fabien.dessenne@foss.st.com Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/pinctrl/stm32/pinctrl-stm32.c | 18 +++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/pinctrl/stm32/pinctrl-stm32.c b/drivers/pinctrl/stm32/pinctrl-stm32.c index f9abd4364fba..e8149ff1d401 100644 --- a/drivers/pinctrl/stm32/pinctrl-stm32.c +++ b/drivers/pinctrl/stm32/pinctrl-stm32.c @@ -1215,15 +1215,17 @@ static int stm32_gpiolib_register_bank(struct stm32_pinctrl *pctl, bank->bank_ioport_nr = bank_ioport_nr; spin_lock_init(&bank->lock); - /* create irq hierarchical domain */ - bank->fwnode = of_node_to_fwnode(np); + if (pctl->domain) { + /* create irq hierarchical domain */ + bank->fwnode = of_node_to_fwnode(np); - bank->domain = irq_domain_create_hierarchy(pctl->domain, 0, - STM32_GPIO_IRQ_LINE, bank->fwnode, - &stm32_gpio_domain_ops, bank); + bank->domain = irq_domain_create_hierarchy(pctl->domain, 0, STM32_GPIO_IRQ_LINE, + bank->fwnode, &stm32_gpio_domain_ops, + bank); - if (!bank->domain) - return -ENODEV; + if (!bank->domain) + return -ENODEV; + } err = gpiochip_add_data(&bank->gpio_chip, bank); if (err) { @@ -1393,6 +1395,8 @@ int stm32_pctl_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) pctl->domain = stm32_pctrl_get_irq_domain(np); if (IS_ERR(pctl->domain)) return PTR_ERR(pctl->domain); + if (!pctl->domain) + dev_warn(dev, "pinctrl without interrupt support\n"); /* hwspinlock is optional */ hwlock_id = of_hwspin_lock_get_id(pdev->dev.of_node, 0); From c3dc751184454e4a2f21b7e9d3df4e7f526f20aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ben Dooks Date: Sun, 29 May 2022 16:22:00 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 0948/1091] riscv: add as-options for modules with assembly compontents commit c1f6eff304e4dfa4558b6a8c6b2d26a91db6c998 upstream. When trying to load modules built for RISC-V which include assembly files the kernel loader errors with "unexpected relocation type 'R_RISCV_ALIGN'" due to R_RISCV_ALIGN relocations being generated by the assembler. The R_RISCV_ALIGN relocations can be removed at the expense of code space by adding -mno-relax to gcc and as. In commit 7a8e7da42250138 ("RISC-V: Fixes to module loading") -mno-relax is added to the build variable KBUILD_CFLAGS_MODULE. See [1] for more info. The issue is that when kbuild builds a .S file, it invokes gcc with the -mno-relax flag, but this is not being passed through to the assembler. Adding -Wa,-mno-relax to KBUILD_AFLAGS_MODULE ensures that the assembler is invoked correctly. This may have now been fixed in gcc[2] and this addition should not stop newer gcc and as from working. [1] https://github.com/riscv/riscv-elf-psabi-doc/issues/183 [2] https://github.com/gcc-mirror/gcc/commit/3b0a7d624e64eeb81e4d5e8c62c46d86ef521857 Signed-off-by: Ben Dooks Reviewed-by: Bin Meng Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220529152200.609809-1-ben.dooks@codethink.co.uk Fixes: ab1ef68e5401 ("RISC-V: Add sections of PLT and GOT for kernel module") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/riscv/Makefile | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/riscv/Makefile b/arch/riscv/Makefile index 7b579a003e30..d1a961539101 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/Makefile +++ b/arch/riscv/Makefile @@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ ifeq ($(CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS),y) endif KBUILD_CFLAGS_MODULE += $(call cc-option,-mno-relax) +KBUILD_AFLAGS_MODULE += $(call as-option,-Wa$(comma)-mno-relax) # GCC versions that support the "-mstrict-align" option default to allowing # unaligned accesses. While unaligned accesses are explicitly allowed in the From c3856fe718ad870f2640acf1cecc71941c3f337d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ido Schimmel Date: Tue, 19 Jul 2022 15:26:26 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 0949/1091] mlxsw: spectrum_router: Fix IPv4 nexthop gateway indication commit e5ec6a2513383fe2ecc2ee3b5f51d97acbbcd4d8 upstream. mlxsw needs to distinguish nexthops with a gateway from connected nexthops in order to write the former to the adjacency table of the device. The check used to rely on the fact that nexthops with a gateway have a 'link' scope whereas connected nexthops have a 'host' scope. This is no longer correct after commit 747c14307214 ("ip: fix dflt addr selection for connected nexthop"). Fix that by instead checking the address family of the gateway IP. This is a more direct way and also consistent with the IPv6 counterpart in mlxsw_sp_rt6_is_gateway(). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 747c14307214 ("ip: fix dflt addr selection for connected nexthop") Fixes: 597cfe4fc339 ("nexthop: Add support for IPv4 nexthops") Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel Reviewed-by: Amit Cohen Reviewed-by: Nicolas Dichtel Reviewed-by: David Ahern Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_router.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_router.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_router.c index 2f013fc71698..91214cce874b 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_router.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_router.c @@ -3871,7 +3871,7 @@ static bool mlxsw_sp_fi_is_gateway(const struct mlxsw_sp *mlxsw_sp, { const struct fib_nh *nh = fib_info_nh(fi, 0); - return nh->fib_nh_scope == RT_SCOPE_LINK || + return nh->fib_nh_gw_family || mlxsw_sp_nexthop4_ipip_type(mlxsw_sp, nh, NULL); } From ed3fea55066b4e054c4d212e54f9965abcac9685 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Snowberg Date: Wed, 20 Jul 2022 12:40:27 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 0950/1091] lockdown: Fix kexec lockdown bypass with ima policy commit 543ce63b664e2c2f9533d089a4664b559c3e6b5b upstream. The lockdown LSM is primarily used in conjunction with UEFI Secure Boot. This LSM may also be used on machines without UEFI. It can also be enabled when UEFI Secure Boot is disabled. One of lockdown's features is to prevent kexec from loading untrusted kernels. Lockdown can be enabled through a bootparam or after the kernel has booted through securityfs. If IMA appraisal is used with the "ima_appraise=log" boot param, lockdown can be defeated with kexec on any machine when Secure Boot is disabled or unavailable. IMA prevents setting "ima_appraise=log" from the boot param when Secure Boot is enabled, but this does not cover cases where lockdown is used without Secure Boot. To defeat lockdown, boot without Secure Boot and add ima_appraise=log to the kernel command line; then: $ echo "integrity" > /sys/kernel/security/lockdown $ echo "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig" > \ /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy $ kexec -ls unsigned-kernel Add a call to verify ima appraisal is set to "enforce" whenever lockdown is enabled. This fixes CVE-2022-21505. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 29d3c1c8dfe7 ("kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down") Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg Acked-by: Mimi Zohar Reviewed-by: John Haxby Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index a073e49d5cd7..14aef74d3588 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -1542,6 +1542,10 @@ bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id id) if (id >= READING_MAX_ID) return false; + if (id == READING_KEXEC_IMAGE && !(ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) + && security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_KEXEC)) + return false; + func = read_idmap[id] ?: FILE_CHECK; rcu_read_lock(); From 3048666143be83807b1250045be3bb919a989981 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Demi Marie Obenour Date: Sun, 10 Jul 2022 19:05:22 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 0951/1091] xen/gntdev: Ignore failure to unmap INVALID_GRANT_HANDLE commit 166d3863231667c4f64dee72b77d1102cdfad11f upstream. The error paths of gntdev_mmap() can call unmap_grant_pages() even though not all of the pages have been successfully mapped. This will trigger the WARN_ON()s in __unmap_grant_pages_done(). The number of warnings can be very large; I have observed thousands of lines of warnings in the systemd journal. Avoid this problem by only warning on unmapping failure if the handle being unmapped is not INVALID_GRANT_HANDLE. The handle field of any page that was not successfully mapped will be INVALID_GRANT_HANDLE, so this catches all cases where unmapping can legitimately fail. Fixes: dbe97cff7dd9 ("xen/gntdev: Avoid blocking in unmap_grant_pages()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Suggested-by: Juergen Gross Signed-off-by: Demi Marie Obenour Reviewed-by: Oleksandr Tyshchenko Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220710230522.1563-1-demi@invisiblethingslab.com Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/xen/gntdev.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/xen/gntdev.c b/drivers/xen/gntdev.c index f46479347765..bba849e5d8a7 100644 --- a/drivers/xen/gntdev.c +++ b/drivers/xen/gntdev.c @@ -413,7 +413,8 @@ static void __unmap_grant_pages_done(int result, unsigned int offset = data->unmap_ops - map->unmap_ops; for (i = 0; i < data->count; i++) { - WARN_ON(map->unmap_ops[offset+i].status); + WARN_ON(map->unmap_ops[offset+i].status && + map->unmap_ops[offset+i].handle != -1); pr_debug("unmap handle=%d st=%d\n", map->unmap_ops[offset+i].handle, map->unmap_ops[offset+i].status); From 8e94cc8830117690801b4fac47aad2643a366c14 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeffrey Hugo Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2022 21:36:08 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0952/1091] PCI: hv: Fix multi-MSI to allow more than one MSI vector commit 08e61e861a0e47e5e1a3fb78406afd6b0cea6b6d upstream. If the allocation of multiple MSI vectors for multi-MSI fails in the core PCI framework, the framework will retry the allocation as a single MSI vector, assuming that meets the min_vecs specified by the requesting driver. Hyper-V advertises that multi-MSI is supported, but reuses the VECTOR domain to implement that for x86. The VECTOR domain does not support multi-MSI, so the alloc will always fail and fallback to a single MSI allocation. In short, Hyper-V advertises a capability it does not implement. Hyper-V can support multi-MSI because it coordinates with the hypervisor to map the MSIs in the IOMMU's interrupt remapper, which is something the VECTOR domain does not have. Therefore the fix is simple - copy what the x86 IOMMU drivers (AMD/Intel-IR) do by removing X86_IRQ_ALLOC_CONTIGUOUS_VECTORS after calling the VECTOR domain's pci_msi_prepare(). 5.4 backport - adds the hv_msi_prepare wrapper function. X86_IRQ_ALLOC_TYPE_PCI_MSI changed to X86_IRQ_ALLOC_TYPE_MSI (same value). Fixes: 4daace0d8ce8 ("PCI: hv: Add paravirtual PCI front-end for Microsoft Hyper-V VMs") Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Hugo Reviewed-by: Dexuan Cui Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1649856981-14649-1-git-send-email-quic_jhugo@quicinc.com Signed-off-by: Wei Liu Signed-off-by: Carl Vanderlip Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/pci/controller/pci-hyperv.c | 17 ++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/pci/controller/pci-hyperv.c b/drivers/pci/controller/pci-hyperv.c index 8c45d6c32c30..c4d7538a05da 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/controller/pci-hyperv.c +++ b/drivers/pci/controller/pci-hyperv.c @@ -1172,6 +1172,21 @@ static void hv_irq_mask(struct irq_data *data) pci_msi_mask_irq(data); } +static int hv_msi_prepare(struct irq_domain *domain, struct device *dev, + int nvec, msi_alloc_info_t *info) +{ + int ret = pci_msi_prepare(domain, dev, nvec, info); + + /* + * By using the interrupt remapper in the hypervisor IOMMU, contiguous + * CPU vectors is not needed for multi-MSI + */ + if (info->type == X86_IRQ_ALLOC_TYPE_MSI) + info->flags &= ~X86_IRQ_ALLOC_CONTIGUOUS_VECTORS; + + return ret; +} + /** * hv_irq_unmask() - "Unmask" the IRQ by setting its current * affinity. @@ -1518,7 +1533,7 @@ static irq_hw_number_t hv_msi_domain_ops_get_hwirq(struct msi_domain_info *info, static struct msi_domain_ops hv_msi_ops = { .get_hwirq = hv_msi_domain_ops_get_hwirq, - .msi_prepare = pci_msi_prepare, + .msi_prepare = hv_msi_prepare, .set_desc = pci_msi_set_desc, .msi_free = hv_msi_free, }; From 584c9d41800ba53e705205213f6d1bafeacc24a8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeffrey Hugo Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2022 21:36:09 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0953/1091] PCI: hv: Fix hv_arch_irq_unmask() for multi-MSI commit 455880dfe292a2bdd3b4ad6a107299fce610e64b upstream. In the multi-MSI case, hv_arch_irq_unmask() will only operate on the first MSI of the N allocated. This is because only the first msi_desc is cached and it is shared by all the MSIs of the multi-MSI block. This means that hv_arch_irq_unmask() gets the correct address, but the wrong data (always 0). This can break MSIs. Lets assume MSI0 is vector 34 on CPU0, and MSI1 is vector 33 on CPU0. hv_arch_irq_unmask() is called on MSI0. It uses a hypercall to configure the MSI address and data (0) to vector 34 of CPU0. This is correct. Then hv_arch_irq_unmask is called on MSI1. It uses another hypercall to configure the MSI address and data (0) to vector 33 of CPU0. This is wrong, and results in both MSI0 and MSI1 being routed to vector 33. Linux will observe extra instances of MSI1 and no instances of MSI0 despite the endpoint device behaving correctly. For the multi-MSI case, we need unique address and data info for each MSI, but the cached msi_desc does not provide that. However, that information can be gotten from the int_desc cached in the chip_data by compose_msi_msg(). Fix the multi-MSI case to use that cached information instead. Since hv_set_msi_entry_from_desc() is no longer applicable, remove it. 5.4 backport - hv_set_msi_entry_from_desc doesn't exist to be removed. msi_desc replaces msi_entry for location int_desc is written to. Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Hugo Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1651068453-29588-1-git-send-email-quic_jhugo@quicinc.com Signed-off-by: Wei Liu Signed-off-by: Carl Vanderlip Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/pci/controller/pci-hyperv.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/pci/controller/pci-hyperv.c b/drivers/pci/controller/pci-hyperv.c index c4d7538a05da..9fe94b28e36e 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/controller/pci-hyperv.c +++ b/drivers/pci/controller/pci-hyperv.c @@ -1202,6 +1202,7 @@ static void hv_irq_unmask(struct irq_data *data) struct msi_desc *msi_desc = irq_data_get_msi_desc(data); struct irq_cfg *cfg = irqd_cfg(data); struct retarget_msi_interrupt *params; + struct tran_int_desc *int_desc; struct hv_pcibus_device *hbus; struct cpumask *dest; cpumask_var_t tmp; @@ -1216,6 +1217,7 @@ static void hv_irq_unmask(struct irq_data *data) pdev = msi_desc_to_pci_dev(msi_desc); pbus = pdev->bus; hbus = container_of(pbus->sysdata, struct hv_pcibus_device, sysdata); + int_desc = data->chip_data; spin_lock_irqsave(&hbus->retarget_msi_interrupt_lock, flags); @@ -1223,8 +1225,8 @@ static void hv_irq_unmask(struct irq_data *data) memset(params, 0, sizeof(*params)); params->partition_id = HV_PARTITION_ID_SELF; params->int_entry.source = 1; /* MSI(-X) */ - params->int_entry.address = msi_desc->msg.address_lo; - params->int_entry.data = msi_desc->msg.data; + params->int_entry.address = int_desc->address & 0xffffffff; + params->int_entry.data = int_desc->data; params->device_id = (hbus->hdev->dev_instance.b[5] << 24) | (hbus->hdev->dev_instance.b[4] << 16) | (hbus->hdev->dev_instance.b[7] << 8) | From 7121d7120fd48115a158720f3424de71d44c77a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeffrey Hugo Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2022 21:36:10 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0954/1091] PCI: hv: Reuse existing IRTE allocation in compose_msi_msg() commit b4b77778ecc5bfbd4e77de1b2fd5c1dd3c655f1f upstream. Currently if compose_msi_msg() is called multiple times, it will free any previous IRTE allocation, and generate a new allocation. While nothing prevents this from occurring, it is extraneous when Linux could just reuse the existing allocation and avoid a bunch of overhead. However, when future IRTE allocations operate on blocks of MSIs instead of a single line, freeing the allocation will impact all of the lines. This could cause an issue where an allocation of N MSIs occurs, then some of the lines are retargeted, and finally the allocation is freed/reallocated. The freeing of the allocation removes all of the configuration for the entire block, which requires all the lines to be retargeted, which might not happen since some lines might already be unmasked/active. Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Hugo Reviewed-by: Dexuan Cui Tested-by: Dexuan Cui Tested-by: Michael Kelley Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1652282582-21595-1-git-send-email-quic_jhugo@quicinc.com Signed-off-by: Wei Liu Signed-off-by: Carl Vanderlip Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/pci/controller/pci-hyperv.c | 16 +++++++++------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/pci/controller/pci-hyperv.c b/drivers/pci/controller/pci-hyperv.c index 9fe94b28e36e..a8d73bfe279c 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/controller/pci-hyperv.c +++ b/drivers/pci/controller/pci-hyperv.c @@ -1387,6 +1387,15 @@ static void hv_compose_msi_msg(struct irq_data *data, struct msi_msg *msg) u32 size; int ret; + /* Reuse the previous allocation */ + if (data->chip_data) { + int_desc = data->chip_data; + msg->address_hi = int_desc->address >> 32; + msg->address_lo = int_desc->address & 0xffffffff; + msg->data = int_desc->data; + return; + } + pdev = msi_desc_to_pci_dev(irq_data_get_msi_desc(data)); dest = irq_data_get_effective_affinity_mask(data); pbus = pdev->bus; @@ -1395,13 +1404,6 @@ static void hv_compose_msi_msg(struct irq_data *data, struct msi_msg *msg) if (!hpdev) goto return_null_message; - /* Free any previous message that might have already been composed. */ - if (data->chip_data) { - int_desc = data->chip_data; - data->chip_data = NULL; - hv_int_desc_free(hpdev, int_desc); - } - int_desc = kzalloc(sizeof(*int_desc), GFP_ATOMIC); if (!int_desc) goto drop_reference; From 2230428fb866cb2a7a62e35b7aedfd43d3afa797 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeffrey Hugo Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2022 21:36:11 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0955/1091] PCI: hv: Fix interrupt mapping for multi-MSI commit a2bad844a67b1c7740bda63e87453baf63c3a7f7 upstream. According to Dexuan, the hypervisor folks beleive that multi-msi allocations are not correct. compose_msi_msg() will allocate multi-msi one by one. However, multi-msi is a block of related MSIs, with alignment requirements. In order for the hypervisor to allocate properly aligned and consecutive entries in the IOMMU Interrupt Remapping Table, there should be a single mapping request that requests all of the multi-msi vectors in one shot. Dexuan suggests detecting the multi-msi case and composing a single request related to the first MSI. Then for the other MSIs in the same block, use the cached information. This appears to be viable, so do it. 5.4 backport - add hv_msi_get_int_vector helper function. Fixed merge conflict due to delivery_mode name change (APIC_DELIVERY_MODE_FIXED is the value given to dest_Fixed). Removed unused variable in hv_compose_msi_msg. Fixed reference to msi_desc->pci to point to the same is_msix variable. Removed changes to compose_msi_req_v3 since it doesn't exist yet. Suggested-by: Dexuan Cui Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Hugo Reviewed-by: Dexuan Cui Tested-by: Michael Kelley Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1652282599-21643-1-git-send-email-quic_jhugo@quicinc.com Signed-off-by: Wei Liu Signed-off-by: Carl Vanderlip Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/pci/controller/pci-hyperv.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 53 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/pci/controller/pci-hyperv.c b/drivers/pci/controller/pci-hyperv.c index a8d73bfe279c..3d48fa685aaa 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/controller/pci-hyperv.c +++ b/drivers/pci/controller/pci-hyperv.c @@ -1110,6 +1110,10 @@ static void hv_int_desc_free(struct hv_pci_dev *hpdev, u8 buffer[sizeof(struct pci_delete_interrupt)]; } ctxt; + if (!int_desc->vector_count) { + kfree(int_desc); + return; + } memset(&ctxt, 0, sizeof(ctxt)); int_pkt = (struct pci_delete_interrupt *)&ctxt.pkt.message; int_pkt->message_type.type = @@ -1172,6 +1176,13 @@ static void hv_irq_mask(struct irq_data *data) pci_msi_mask_irq(data); } +static unsigned int hv_msi_get_int_vector(struct irq_data *data) +{ + struct irq_cfg *cfg = irqd_cfg(data); + + return cfg->vector; +} + static int hv_msi_prepare(struct irq_domain *domain, struct device *dev, int nvec, msi_alloc_info_t *info) { @@ -1313,12 +1324,12 @@ static void hv_pci_compose_compl(void *context, struct pci_response *resp, static u32 hv_compose_msi_req_v1( struct pci_create_interrupt *int_pkt, struct cpumask *affinity, - u32 slot, u8 vector) + u32 slot, u8 vector, u8 vector_count) { int_pkt->message_type.type = PCI_CREATE_INTERRUPT_MESSAGE; int_pkt->wslot.slot = slot; int_pkt->int_desc.vector = vector; - int_pkt->int_desc.vector_count = 1; + int_pkt->int_desc.vector_count = vector_count; int_pkt->int_desc.delivery_mode = dest_Fixed; /* @@ -1332,14 +1343,14 @@ static u32 hv_compose_msi_req_v1( static u32 hv_compose_msi_req_v2( struct pci_create_interrupt2 *int_pkt, struct cpumask *affinity, - u32 slot, u8 vector) + u32 slot, u8 vector, u8 vector_count) { int cpu; int_pkt->message_type.type = PCI_CREATE_INTERRUPT_MESSAGE2; int_pkt->wslot.slot = slot; int_pkt->int_desc.vector = vector; - int_pkt->int_desc.vector_count = 1; + int_pkt->int_desc.vector_count = vector_count; int_pkt->int_desc.delivery_mode = dest_Fixed; /* @@ -1367,7 +1378,6 @@ static u32 hv_compose_msi_req_v2( */ static void hv_compose_msi_msg(struct irq_data *data, struct msi_msg *msg) { - struct irq_cfg *cfg = irqd_cfg(data); struct hv_pcibus_device *hbus; struct hv_pci_dev *hpdev; struct pci_bus *pbus; @@ -1376,6 +1386,8 @@ static void hv_compose_msi_msg(struct irq_data *data, struct msi_msg *msg) unsigned long flags; struct compose_comp_ctxt comp; struct tran_int_desc *int_desc; + struct msi_desc *msi_desc; + u8 vector, vector_count; struct { struct pci_packet pci_pkt; union { @@ -1396,7 +1408,8 @@ static void hv_compose_msi_msg(struct irq_data *data, struct msi_msg *msg) return; } - pdev = msi_desc_to_pci_dev(irq_data_get_msi_desc(data)); + msi_desc = irq_data_get_msi_desc(data); + pdev = msi_desc_to_pci_dev(msi_desc); dest = irq_data_get_effective_affinity_mask(data); pbus = pdev->bus; hbus = container_of(pbus->sysdata, struct hv_pcibus_device, sysdata); @@ -1408,6 +1421,36 @@ static void hv_compose_msi_msg(struct irq_data *data, struct msi_msg *msg) if (!int_desc) goto drop_reference; + if (!msi_desc->msi_attrib.is_msix && msi_desc->nvec_used > 1) { + /* + * If this is not the first MSI of Multi MSI, we already have + * a mapping. Can exit early. + */ + if (msi_desc->irq != data->irq) { + data->chip_data = int_desc; + int_desc->address = msi_desc->msg.address_lo | + (u64)msi_desc->msg.address_hi << 32; + int_desc->data = msi_desc->msg.data + + (data->irq - msi_desc->irq); + msg->address_hi = msi_desc->msg.address_hi; + msg->address_lo = msi_desc->msg.address_lo; + msg->data = int_desc->data; + put_pcichild(hpdev); + return; + } + /* + * The vector we select here is a dummy value. The correct + * value gets sent to the hypervisor in unmask(). This needs + * to be aligned with the count, and also not zero. Multi-msi + * is powers of 2 up to 32, so 32 will always work here. + */ + vector = 32; + vector_count = msi_desc->nvec_used; + } else { + vector = hv_msi_get_int_vector(data); + vector_count = 1; + } + memset(&ctxt, 0, sizeof(ctxt)); init_completion(&comp.comp_pkt.host_event); ctxt.pci_pkt.completion_func = hv_pci_compose_compl; @@ -1418,14 +1461,16 @@ static void hv_compose_msi_msg(struct irq_data *data, struct msi_msg *msg) size = hv_compose_msi_req_v1(&ctxt.int_pkts.v1, dest, hpdev->desc.win_slot.slot, - cfg->vector); + vector, + vector_count); break; case PCI_PROTOCOL_VERSION_1_2: size = hv_compose_msi_req_v2(&ctxt.int_pkts.v2, dest, hpdev->desc.win_slot.slot, - cfg->vector); + vector, + vector_count); break; default: From c68f6e2e4fda5f36d403f64fa57a2804ec59a87d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Pali=20Roh=C3=A1r?= Date: Tue, 28 Jun 2022 12:09:22 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0956/1091] serial: mvebu-uart: correctly report configured baudrate value MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 4f532c1e25319e42996ec18a1f473fd50c8e575d upstream. Functions tty_termios_encode_baud_rate() and uart_update_timeout() should be called with the baudrate value which was set to hardware. Linux then report exact values via ioctl(TCGETS2) to userspace. Change mvebu_uart_baud_rate_set() function to return baudrate value which was set to hardware and propagate this value to above mentioned functions. With this change userspace would see precise value in termios c_ospeed field. Fixes: 68a0db1d7da2 ("serial: mvebu-uart: add function to change baudrate") Cc: stable Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen Signed-off-by: Pali Rohár Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220628100922.10717-1-pali@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/tty/serial/mvebu-uart.c | 25 +++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/mvebu-uart.c b/drivers/tty/serial/mvebu-uart.c index 13db15118cb9..2ce0d05be368 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/serial/mvebu-uart.c +++ b/drivers/tty/serial/mvebu-uart.c @@ -443,13 +443,13 @@ static void mvebu_uart_shutdown(struct uart_port *port) } } -static int mvebu_uart_baud_rate_set(struct uart_port *port, unsigned int baud) +static unsigned int mvebu_uart_baud_rate_set(struct uart_port *port, unsigned int baud) { unsigned int d_divisor, m_divisor; u32 brdv, osamp; if (!port->uartclk) - return -EOPNOTSUPP; + return 0; /* * The baudrate is derived from the UART clock thanks to two divisors: @@ -473,7 +473,7 @@ static int mvebu_uart_baud_rate_set(struct uart_port *port, unsigned int baud) osamp &= ~OSAMP_DIVISORS_MASK; writel(osamp, port->membase + UART_OSAMP); - return 0; + return DIV_ROUND_CLOSEST(port->uartclk, d_divisor * m_divisor); } static void mvebu_uart_set_termios(struct uart_port *port, @@ -510,15 +510,11 @@ static void mvebu_uart_set_termios(struct uart_port *port, max_baud = 230400; baud = uart_get_baud_rate(port, termios, old, min_baud, max_baud); - if (mvebu_uart_baud_rate_set(port, baud)) { - /* No clock available, baudrate cannot be changed */ - if (old) - baud = uart_get_baud_rate(port, old, NULL, - min_baud, max_baud); - } else { - tty_termios_encode_baud_rate(termios, baud, baud); - uart_update_timeout(port, termios->c_cflag, baud); - } + baud = mvebu_uart_baud_rate_set(port, baud); + + /* In case baudrate cannot be changed, report previous old value */ + if (baud == 0 && old) + baud = tty_termios_baud_rate(old); /* Only the following flag changes are supported */ if (old) { @@ -529,6 +525,11 @@ static void mvebu_uart_set_termios(struct uart_port *port, termios->c_cflag |= CS8; } + if (baud != 0) { + tty_termios_encode_baud_rate(termios, baud, baud); + uart_update_timeout(port, termios->c_cflag, baud); + } + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&port->lock, flags); } From f4248bdb7d5c1150a2a6f8c3d3b6da0b71f62a20 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hangyu Hua Date: Wed, 1 Jun 2022 14:46:25 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0957/1091] xfrm: xfrm_policy: fix a possible double xfrm_pols_put() in xfrm_bundle_lookup() [ Upstream commit f85daf0e725358be78dfd208dea5fd665d8cb901 ] xfrm_policy_lookup() will call xfrm_pol_hold_rcu() to get a refcount of pols[0]. This refcount can be dropped in xfrm_expand_policies() when xfrm_expand_policies() return error. pols[0]'s refcount is balanced in here. But xfrm_bundle_lookup() will also call xfrm_pols_put() with num_pols == 1 to drop this refcount when xfrm_expand_policies() return error. This patch also fix an illegal address access. pols[0] will save a error point when xfrm_policy_lookup fails. This lead to xfrm_pols_put to resolve an illegal address in xfrm_bundle_lookup's error path. Fix these by setting num_pols = 0 in xfrm_expand_policies()'s error path. Fixes: 80c802f3073e ("xfrm: cache bundles instead of policies for outgoing flows") Signed-off-by: Hangyu Hua Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c index 3ecb77c58c44..28a8cdef8e51 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c @@ -2679,8 +2679,10 @@ static int xfrm_expand_policies(const struct flowi *fl, u16 family, *num_xfrms = 0; return 0; } - if (IS_ERR(pols[0])) + if (IS_ERR(pols[0])) { + *num_pols = 0; return PTR_ERR(pols[0]); + } *num_xfrms = pols[0]->xfrm_nr; @@ -2695,6 +2697,7 @@ static int xfrm_expand_policies(const struct flowi *fl, u16 family, if (pols[1]) { if (IS_ERR(pols[1])) { xfrm_pols_put(pols, *num_pols); + *num_pols = 0; return PTR_ERR(pols[1]); } (*num_pols)++; From 78bdf732cf5d74d1c6ecda06830a91f80a4aef6f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miaoqian Lin Date: Mon, 23 May 2022 18:10:09 +0400 Subject: [PATCH 0958/1091] power/reset: arm-versatile: Fix refcount leak in versatile_reboot_probe [ Upstream commit 80192eff64eee9b3bc0594a47381937b94b9d65a ] of_find_matching_node_and_match() returns a node pointer with refcount incremented, we should use of_node_put() on it when not need anymore. Add missing of_node_put() to avoid refcount leak. Fixes: 0e545f57b708 ("power: reset: driver for the Versatile syscon reboot") Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij Signed-off-by: Sebastian Reichel Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/power/reset/arm-versatile-reboot.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/power/reset/arm-versatile-reboot.c b/drivers/power/reset/arm-versatile-reboot.c index 08d0a07b58ef..c7624d7611a7 100644 --- a/drivers/power/reset/arm-versatile-reboot.c +++ b/drivers/power/reset/arm-versatile-reboot.c @@ -146,6 +146,7 @@ static int __init versatile_reboot_probe(void) versatile_reboot_type = (enum versatile_reboot)reboot_id->data; syscon_regmap = syscon_node_to_regmap(np); + of_node_put(np); if (IS_ERR(syscon_regmap)) return PTR_ERR(syscon_regmap); From 6194c021496addc11763d1ffa89ce5751889fe3c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: William Dean Date: Sun, 10 Jul 2022 23:49:22 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0959/1091] pinctrl: ralink: Check for null return of devm_kcalloc [ Upstream commit c3b821e8e406d5650e587b7ac624ac24e9b780a8 ] Because of the possible failure of the allocation, data->domains might be NULL pointer and will cause the dereference of the NULL pointer later. Therefore, it might be better to check it and directly return -ENOMEM without releasing data manually if fails, because the comment of the devm_kmalloc() says "Memory allocated with this function is automatically freed on driver detach.". Fixes: a86854d0c599b ("treewide: devm_kzalloc() -> devm_kcalloc()") Reported-by: Hacash Robot Signed-off-by: William Dean Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220710154922.2610876-1-williamsukatube@163.com Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/staging/mt7621-pinctrl/pinctrl-rt2880.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/staging/mt7621-pinctrl/pinctrl-rt2880.c b/drivers/staging/mt7621-pinctrl/pinctrl-rt2880.c index 0ba4e4e070a9..7cfbdfb10e23 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/mt7621-pinctrl/pinctrl-rt2880.c +++ b/drivers/staging/mt7621-pinctrl/pinctrl-rt2880.c @@ -267,6 +267,8 @@ static int rt2880_pinmux_pins(struct rt2880_priv *p) p->func[i]->pin_count, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!p->func[i]->pins) + return -ENOMEM; for (j = 0; j < p->func[i]->pin_count; j++) p->func[i]->pins[j] = p->func[i]->pin_first + j; From 98c3c8fd0d4c560e0f8335b79c407bbf7fc9462c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2022 15:07:26 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 0960/1091] perf/core: Fix data race between perf_event_set_output() and perf_mmap_close() [ Upstream commit 68e3c69803dada336893640110cb87221bb01dcf ] Yang Jihing reported a race between perf_event_set_output() and perf_mmap_close(): CPU1 CPU2 perf_mmap_close(e2) if (atomic_dec_and_test(&e2->rb->mmap_count)) // 1 - > 0 detach_rest = true ioctl(e1, IOC_SET_OUTPUT, e2) perf_event_set_output(e1, e2) ... list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &e2->rb->event_list, rb_entry) ring_buffer_attach(e, NULL); // e1 isn't yet added and // therefore not detached ring_buffer_attach(e1, e2->rb) list_add_rcu(&e1->rb_entry, &e2->rb->event_list) After this; e1 is attached to an unmapped rb and a subsequent perf_mmap() will loop forever more: again: mutex_lock(&e->mmap_mutex); if (event->rb) { ... if (!atomic_inc_not_zero(&e->rb->mmap_count)) { ... mutex_unlock(&e->mmap_mutex); goto again; } } The loop in perf_mmap_close() holds e2->mmap_mutex, while the attach in perf_event_set_output() holds e1->mmap_mutex. As such there is no serialization to avoid this race. Change perf_event_set_output() to take both e1->mmap_mutex and e2->mmap_mutex to alleviate that problem. Additionally, have the loop in perf_mmap() detach the rb directly, this avoids having to wait for the concurrent perf_mmap_close() to get around to doing it to make progress. Fixes: 9bb5d40cd93c ("perf: Fix mmap() accounting hole") Reported-by: Yang Jihong Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Tested-by: Yang Jihong Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/YsQ3jm2GR38SW7uD@worktop.programming.kicks-ass.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- kernel/events/core.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c index 8336dcb2bd43..0a54780e0942 100644 --- a/kernel/events/core.c +++ b/kernel/events/core.c @@ -5819,10 +5819,10 @@ again: if (!atomic_inc_not_zero(&event->rb->mmap_count)) { /* - * Raced against perf_mmap_close() through - * perf_event_set_output(). Try again, hope for better - * luck. + * Raced against perf_mmap_close(); remove the + * event and try again. */ + ring_buffer_attach(event, NULL); mutex_unlock(&event->mmap_mutex); goto again; } @@ -10763,14 +10763,25 @@ err_size: goto out; } +static void mutex_lock_double(struct mutex *a, struct mutex *b) +{ + if (b < a) + swap(a, b); + + mutex_lock(a); + mutex_lock_nested(b, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING); +} + static int perf_event_set_output(struct perf_event *event, struct perf_event *output_event) { struct ring_buffer *rb = NULL; int ret = -EINVAL; - if (!output_event) + if (!output_event) { + mutex_lock(&event->mmap_mutex); goto set; + } /* don't allow circular references */ if (event == output_event) @@ -10808,8 +10819,15 @@ perf_event_set_output(struct perf_event *event, struct perf_event *output_event) event->pmu != output_event->pmu) goto out; + /* + * Hold both mmap_mutex to serialize against perf_mmap_close(). Since + * output_event is already on rb->event_list, and the list iteration + * restarts after every removal, it is guaranteed this new event is + * observed *OR* if output_event is already removed, it's guaranteed we + * observe !rb->mmap_count. + */ + mutex_lock_double(&event->mmap_mutex, &output_event->mmap_mutex); set: - mutex_lock(&event->mmap_mutex); /* Can't redirect output if we've got an active mmap() */ if (atomic_read(&event->mmap_count)) goto unlock; @@ -10819,6 +10837,12 @@ set: rb = ring_buffer_get(output_event); if (!rb) goto unlock; + + /* did we race against perf_mmap_close() */ + if (!atomic_read(&rb->mmap_count)) { + ring_buffer_put(rb); + goto unlock; + } } ring_buffer_attach(event, rb); @@ -10826,20 +10850,13 @@ set: ret = 0; unlock: mutex_unlock(&event->mmap_mutex); + if (output_event) + mutex_unlock(&output_event->mmap_mutex); out: return ret; } -static void mutex_lock_double(struct mutex *a, struct mutex *b) -{ - if (b < a) - swap(a, b); - - mutex_lock(a); - mutex_lock_nested(b, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING); -} - static int perf_event_set_clock(struct perf_event *event, clockid_t clk_id) { bool nmi_safe = false; From 16cb6717f4f42487ef10583eb8bc98e7d1e33d65 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lennert Buytenhek Date: Thu, 2 Jun 2022 18:58:11 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 0961/1091] igc: Reinstate IGC_REMOVED logic and implement it properly [ Upstream commit 7c1ddcee5311f3315096217881d2dbe47cc683f9 ] The initially merged version of the igc driver code (via commit 146740f9abc4, "igc: Add support for PF") contained the following IGC_REMOVED checks in the igc_rd32/wr32() MMIO accessors: u32 igc_rd32(struct igc_hw *hw, u32 reg) { u8 __iomem *hw_addr = READ_ONCE(hw->hw_addr); u32 value = 0; if (IGC_REMOVED(hw_addr)) return ~value; value = readl(&hw_addr[reg]); /* reads should not return all F's */ if (!(~value) && (!reg || !(~readl(hw_addr)))) hw->hw_addr = NULL; return value; } And: #define wr32(reg, val) \ do { \ u8 __iomem *hw_addr = READ_ONCE((hw)->hw_addr); \ if (!IGC_REMOVED(hw_addr)) \ writel((val), &hw_addr[(reg)]); \ } while (0) E.g. igb has similar checks in its MMIO accessors, and has a similar macro E1000_REMOVED, which is implemented as follows: #define E1000_REMOVED(h) unlikely(!(h)) These checks serve to detect and take note of an 0xffffffff MMIO read return from the device, which can be caused by a PCIe link flap or some other kind of PCI bus error, and to avoid performing MMIO reads and writes from that point onwards. However, the IGC_REMOVED macro was not originally implemented: #ifndef IGC_REMOVED #define IGC_REMOVED(a) (0) #endif /* IGC_REMOVED */ This led to the IGC_REMOVED logic to be removed entirely in a subsequent commit (commit 3c215fb18e70, "igc: remove IGC_REMOVED function"), with the rationale that such checks matter only for virtualization and that igc does not support virtualization -- but a PCIe device can become detached even without virtualization being in use, and without proper checks, a PCIe bus error affecting an igc adapter will lead to various NULL pointer dereferences, as the first access after the error will set hw->hw_addr to NULL, and subsequent accesses will blindly dereference this now-NULL pointer. This patch reinstates the IGC_REMOVED checks in igc_rd32/wr32(), and implements IGC_REMOVED the way it is done for igb, by checking for the unlikely() case of hw_addr being NULL. This change prevents the oopses seen when a PCIe link flap occurs on an igc adapter. Fixes: 146740f9abc4 ("igc: Add support for PF") Signed-off-by: Lennert Buytenhek Tested-by: Naama Meir Acked-by: Sasha Neftin Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igc/igc_regs.h | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igc/igc_regs.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igc/igc_regs.h index 50d7c04dccf5..7bc7d7618fe1 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igc/igc_regs.h +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igc/igc_regs.h @@ -236,4 +236,6 @@ do { \ #define array_rd32(reg, offset) (igc_rd32(hw, (reg) + ((offset) << 2))) +#define IGC_REMOVED(h) unlikely(!(h)) + #endif From 5af6d9226376fbd0dba6876139385e770342726f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2022 13:51:52 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0962/1091] ip: Fix data-races around sysctl_ip_no_pmtu_disc. [ Upstream commit 0968d2a441bf6afb551fd99e60fa65ed67068963 ] While reading sysctl_ip_no_pmtu_disc, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/ipv4/af_inet.c | 2 +- net/ipv4/icmp.c | 2 +- net/ipv6/af_inet6.c | 2 +- net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/af_inet.c b/net/ipv4/af_inet.c index 9ab73fcc7411..06153386776d 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/af_inet.c +++ b/net/ipv4/af_inet.c @@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ lookup_protocol: inet->hdrincl = 1; } - if (net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_no_pmtu_disc) + if (READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_no_pmtu_disc)) inet->pmtudisc = IP_PMTUDISC_DONT; else inet->pmtudisc = IP_PMTUDISC_WANT; diff --git a/net/ipv4/icmp.c b/net/ipv4/icmp.c index 9bc01411be4c..b44f51e404ae 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/icmp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/icmp.c @@ -886,7 +886,7 @@ static bool icmp_unreach(struct sk_buff *skb) * values please see * Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt */ - switch (net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_no_pmtu_disc) { + switch (READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_no_pmtu_disc)) { default: net_dbg_ratelimited("%pI4: fragmentation needed and DF set\n", &iph->daddr); diff --git a/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c b/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c index 942da168f18f..56f396ecc26b 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c +++ b/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c @@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ lookup_protocol: inet->mc_list = NULL; inet->rcv_tos = 0; - if (net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_no_pmtu_disc) + if (READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_no_pmtu_disc)) inet->pmtudisc = IP_PMTUDISC_DONT; else inet->pmtudisc = IP_PMTUDISC_WANT; diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c index 268bba29bb60..bee1a8143d75 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c @@ -2488,7 +2488,7 @@ int __xfrm_init_state(struct xfrm_state *x, bool init_replay, bool offload) int err; if (family == AF_INET && - xs_net(x)->ipv4.sysctl_ip_no_pmtu_disc) + READ_ONCE(xs_net(x)->ipv4.sysctl_ip_no_pmtu_disc)) x->props.flags |= XFRM_STATE_NOPMTUDISC; err = -EPROTONOSUPPORT; From 7828309df0f89419a9349761a37c7d1b0da45697 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2022 13:51:53 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0963/1091] ip: Fix data-races around sysctl_ip_fwd_use_pmtu. [ Upstream commit 60c158dc7b1f0558f6cadd5b50d0386da0000d50 ] While reading sysctl_ip_fwd_use_pmtu, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers. Fixes: f87c10a8aa1e ("ipv4: introduce ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward and protect forwarding path against pmtu spoofing") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- include/net/ip.h | 2 +- net/ipv4/route.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/ip.h b/include/net/ip.h index 3f3ea86b2173..21fc0a29a8d4 100644 --- a/include/net/ip.h +++ b/include/net/ip.h @@ -442,7 +442,7 @@ static inline unsigned int ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward(const struct dst_entry *dst, struct net *net = dev_net(dst->dev); unsigned int mtu; - if (net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_fwd_use_pmtu || + if (READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_fwd_use_pmtu) || ip_mtu_locked(dst) || !forwarding) return dst_mtu(dst); diff --git a/net/ipv4/route.c b/net/ipv4/route.c index 9280e5087159..7004e379c325 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/route.c +++ b/net/ipv4/route.c @@ -1423,7 +1423,7 @@ u32 ip_mtu_from_fib_result(struct fib_result *res, __be32 daddr) struct fib_info *fi = res->fi; u32 mtu = 0; - if (dev_net(dev)->ipv4.sysctl_ip_fwd_use_pmtu || + if (READ_ONCE(dev_net(dev)->ipv4.sysctl_ip_fwd_use_pmtu) || fi->fib_metrics->metrics[RTAX_LOCK - 1] & (1 << RTAX_MTU)) mtu = fi->fib_mtu; From 281de3719986af659186e2bbef2f169753391a05 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2022 13:51:55 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0964/1091] ip: Fix data-races around sysctl_ip_nonlocal_bind. [ Upstream commit 289d3b21fb0bfc94c4e98f10635bba1824e5f83c ] While reading sysctl_ip_nonlocal_bind, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- include/net/inet_sock.h | 2 +- net/sctp/protocol.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/inet_sock.h b/include/net/inet_sock.h index 34c4436fd18f..40f92f5a3047 100644 --- a/include/net/inet_sock.h +++ b/include/net/inet_sock.h @@ -375,7 +375,7 @@ static inline bool inet_get_convert_csum(struct sock *sk) static inline bool inet_can_nonlocal_bind(struct net *net, struct inet_sock *inet) { - return net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_nonlocal_bind || + return READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_nonlocal_bind) || inet->freebind || inet->transparent; } diff --git a/net/sctp/protocol.c b/net/sctp/protocol.c index bb370a7948f4..363a64c12414 100644 --- a/net/sctp/protocol.c +++ b/net/sctp/protocol.c @@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ static int sctp_v4_available(union sctp_addr *addr, struct sctp_sock *sp) if (addr->v4.sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY) && ret != RTN_LOCAL && !sp->inet.freebind && - !net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_nonlocal_bind) + !READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_nonlocal_bind)) return 0; if (ipv6_only_sock(sctp_opt2sk(sp))) From 25a635a67c830766110410fea88ec4e6ee29684b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2022 13:51:57 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0965/1091] ip: Fix a data-race around sysctl_fwmark_reflect. [ Upstream commit 85d0b4dbd74b95cc492b1f4e34497d3f894f5d9a ] While reading sysctl_fwmark_reflect, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader. Fixes: e110861f8609 ("net: add a sysctl to reflect the fwmark on replies") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- include/net/ip.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/net/ip.h b/include/net/ip.h index 21fc0a29a8d4..db841ab388c0 100644 --- a/include/net/ip.h +++ b/include/net/ip.h @@ -381,7 +381,7 @@ void ipfrag_init(void); void ip_static_sysctl_init(void); #define IP4_REPLY_MARK(net, mark) \ - ((net)->ipv4.sysctl_fwmark_reflect ? (mark) : 0) + (READ_ONCE((net)->ipv4.sysctl_fwmark_reflect) ? (mark) : 0) static inline bool ip_is_fragment(const struct iphdr *iph) { From a7386602a2fe2f6192477e8ede291a815da09d81 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2022 13:51:58 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0966/1091] tcp/dccp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_fwmark_accept. [ Upstream commit 1a0008f9df59451d0a17806c1ee1a19857032fa8 ] While reading sysctl_tcp_fwmark_accept, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader. Fixes: 84f39b08d786 ("net: support marking accepting TCP sockets") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- include/net/inet_sock.h | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/net/inet_sock.h b/include/net/inet_sock.h index 40f92f5a3047..58db7c69c146 100644 --- a/include/net/inet_sock.h +++ b/include/net/inet_sock.h @@ -107,7 +107,8 @@ static inline struct inet_request_sock *inet_rsk(const struct request_sock *sk) static inline u32 inet_request_mark(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { - if (!sk->sk_mark && sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_fwmark_accept) + if (!sk->sk_mark && + READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_fwmark_accept)) return skb->mark; return sk->sk_mark; From f966773e13cdd3f12baa90071b7b660f6c633ccb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2022 13:52:00 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0967/1091] tcp: Fix data-races around sysctl_tcp_mtu_probing. [ Upstream commit f47d00e077e7d61baf69e46dde3210c886360207 ] While reading sysctl_tcp_mtu_probing, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers. Fixes: 5d424d5a674f ("[TCP]: MTU probing") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 2 +- net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c index 739fc69cdcc6..5ac81c4f076d 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c @@ -1537,7 +1537,7 @@ void tcp_mtup_init(struct sock *sk) struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk); struct net *net = sock_net(sk); - icsk->icsk_mtup.enabled = net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_mtu_probing > 1; + icsk->icsk_mtup.enabled = READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_mtu_probing) > 1; icsk->icsk_mtup.search_high = tp->rx_opt.mss_clamp + sizeof(struct tcphdr) + icsk->icsk_af_ops->net_header_len; icsk->icsk_mtup.search_low = tcp_mss_to_mtu(sk, net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_base_mss); diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c index fa2ae96ecdc4..57fa707e9e98 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c @@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ static void tcp_mtu_probing(struct inet_connection_sock *icsk, struct sock *sk) int mss; /* Black hole detection */ - if (!net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_mtu_probing) + if (!READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_mtu_probing)) return; if (!icsk->icsk_mtup.enabled) { From 30b73edc1d2459ba2c71cb58fbf84a1a6e640fbf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2022 13:52:01 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0968/1091] tcp: Fix data-races around sysctl_tcp_base_mss. [ Upstream commit 88d78bc097cd8ebc6541e93316c9d9bf651b13e8 ] While reading sysctl_tcp_base_mss, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers. Fixes: 5d424d5a674f ("[TCP]: MTU probing") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 2 +- net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c index 5ac81c4f076d..b84bedf2804a 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c @@ -1540,7 +1540,7 @@ void tcp_mtup_init(struct sock *sk) icsk->icsk_mtup.enabled = READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_mtu_probing) > 1; icsk->icsk_mtup.search_high = tp->rx_opt.mss_clamp + sizeof(struct tcphdr) + icsk->icsk_af_ops->net_header_len; - icsk->icsk_mtup.search_low = tcp_mss_to_mtu(sk, net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_base_mss); + icsk->icsk_mtup.search_low = tcp_mss_to_mtu(sk, READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_base_mss)); icsk->icsk_mtup.probe_size = 0; if (icsk->icsk_mtup.enabled) icsk->icsk_mtup.probe_timestamp = tcp_jiffies32; diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c index 57fa707e9e98..0c3ee2aa244f 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c @@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ static void tcp_mtu_probing(struct inet_connection_sock *icsk, struct sock *sk) icsk->icsk_mtup.probe_timestamp = tcp_jiffies32; } else { mss = tcp_mtu_to_mss(sk, icsk->icsk_mtup.search_low) >> 1; - mss = min(net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_base_mss, mss); + mss = min(READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_base_mss), mss); mss = max(mss, net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_mtu_probe_floor); mss = max(mss, net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_min_snd_mss); icsk->icsk_mtup.search_low = tcp_mss_to_mtu(sk, mss); From fdb96b69f5909ffcdd6f1e0902219fc6d7689ff7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2022 13:52:02 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0969/1091] tcp: Fix data-races around sysctl_tcp_min_snd_mss. [ Upstream commit 78eb166cdefcc3221c8c7c1e2d514e91a2eb5014 ] While reading sysctl_tcp_min_snd_mss, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers. Fixes: 5f3e2bf008c2 ("tcp: add tcp_min_snd_mss sysctl") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 3 ++- net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c index b84bedf2804a..7c0b96319fc0 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c @@ -1494,7 +1494,8 @@ static inline int __tcp_mtu_to_mss(struct sock *sk, int pmtu) mss_now -= icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len; /* Then reserve room for full set of TCP options and 8 bytes of data */ - mss_now = max(mss_now, sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_min_snd_mss); + mss_now = max(mss_now, + READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_min_snd_mss)); return mss_now; } diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c index 0c3ee2aa244f..0460c5deee3f 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c @@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ static void tcp_mtu_probing(struct inet_connection_sock *icsk, struct sock *sk) mss = tcp_mtu_to_mss(sk, icsk->icsk_mtup.search_low) >> 1; mss = min(READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_base_mss), mss); mss = max(mss, net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_mtu_probe_floor); - mss = max(mss, net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_min_snd_mss); + mss = max(mss, READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_min_snd_mss)); icsk->icsk_mtup.search_low = tcp_mss_to_mtu(sk, mss); } tcp_sync_mss(sk, icsk->icsk_pmtu_cookie); From 033963b220633ed1602d458e7e4ac06afa9fefb2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2022 13:52:03 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0970/1091] tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_mtu_probe_floor. [ Upstream commit 8e92d4423615a5257d0d871fc067aa561f597deb ] While reading sysctl_tcp_mtu_probe_floor, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader. Fixes: c04b79b6cfd7 ("tcp: add new tcp_mtu_probe_floor sysctl") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c index 0460c5deee3f..c48aeaef3ec7 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c @@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ static void tcp_mtu_probing(struct inet_connection_sock *icsk, struct sock *sk) } else { mss = tcp_mtu_to_mss(sk, icsk->icsk_mtup.search_low) >> 1; mss = min(READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_base_mss), mss); - mss = max(mss, net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_mtu_probe_floor); + mss = max(mss, READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_mtu_probe_floor)); mss = max(mss, READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_min_snd_mss)); icsk->icsk_mtup.search_low = tcp_mss_to_mtu(sk, mss); } From b04817c94fbd285a967d9b830b274fe9998c9c0b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2022 13:52:04 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0971/1091] tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_probe_threshold. [ Upstream commit 92c0aa4175474483d6cf373314343d4e624e882a ] While reading sysctl_tcp_probe_threshold, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader. Fixes: 6b58e0a5f32d ("ipv4: Use binary search to choose tcp PMTU probe_size") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c index 7c0b96319fc0..e60cb69d00a4 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c @@ -2134,7 +2134,7 @@ static int tcp_mtu_probe(struct sock *sk) * probing process by not resetting search range to its orignal. */ if (probe_size > tcp_mtu_to_mss(sk, icsk->icsk_mtup.search_high) || - interval < net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_probe_threshold) { + interval < READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_probe_threshold)) { /* Check whether enough time has elaplased for * another round of probing. */ From 73a11588751a2c13f25d9da8117efc9a79b1843f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2022 13:52:05 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0972/1091] tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_probe_interval. [ Upstream commit 2a85388f1d94a9f8b5a529118a2c5eaa0520d85c ] While reading sysctl_tcp_probe_interval, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader. Fixes: 05cbc0db03e8 ("ipv4: Create probe timer for tcp PMTU as per RFC4821") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c index e60cb69d00a4..9bfe6965b873 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c @@ -2052,7 +2052,7 @@ static inline void tcp_mtu_check_reprobe(struct sock *sk) u32 interval; s32 delta; - interval = net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_probe_interval; + interval = READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_probe_interval); delta = tcp_jiffies32 - icsk->icsk_mtup.probe_timestamp; if (unlikely(delta >= interval * HZ)) { int mss = tcp_current_mss(sk); From 911b81fca2d7d17668b4062df771486034e343b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Robert Hancock Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 17:29:19 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 0973/1091] i2c: cadence: Change large transfer count reset logic to be unconditional [ Upstream commit 4ca8ca873d454635c20d508261bfc0081af75cf8 ] Problems were observed on the Xilinx ZynqMP platform with large I2C reads. When a read of 277 bytes was performed, the controller NAKed the transfer after only 252 bytes were transferred and returned an ENXIO error on the transfer. There is some code in cdns_i2c_master_isr to handle this case by resetting the transfer count in the controller before it reaches 0, to allow larger transfers to work, but it was conditional on the CDNS_I2C_BROKEN_HOLD_BIT quirk being set on the controller, and ZynqMP uses the r1p14 version of the core where this quirk is not being set. The requirement to do this to support larger reads seems like an inherently required workaround due to the core only having an 8-bit transfer size register, so it does not appear that this should be conditional on the broken HOLD bit quirk which is used elsewhere in the driver. Remove the dependency on the CDNS_I2C_BROKEN_HOLD_BIT for this transfer size reset logic to fix this problem. Fixes: 63cab195bf49 ("i2c: removed work arounds in i2c driver for Zynq Ultrascale+ MPSoC") Signed-off-by: Robert Hancock Reviewed-by: Shubhrajyoti Datta Acked-by: Michal Simek Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-cadence.c | 30 +++++------------------------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-cadence.c b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-cadence.c index 3a1bdc75275f..8750e444f449 100644 --- a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-cadence.c +++ b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-cadence.c @@ -198,9 +198,9 @@ static inline bool cdns_is_holdquirk(struct cdns_i2c *id, bool hold_wrkaround) */ static irqreturn_t cdns_i2c_isr(int irq, void *ptr) { - unsigned int isr_status, avail_bytes, updatetx; + unsigned int isr_status, avail_bytes; unsigned int bytes_to_send; - bool hold_quirk; + bool updatetx; struct cdns_i2c *id = ptr; /* Signal completion only after everything is updated */ int done_flag = 0; @@ -219,11 +219,7 @@ static irqreturn_t cdns_i2c_isr(int irq, void *ptr) * Check if transfer size register needs to be updated again for a * large data receive operation. */ - updatetx = 0; - if (id->recv_count > id->curr_recv_count) - updatetx = 1; - - hold_quirk = (id->quirks & CDNS_I2C_BROKEN_HOLD_BIT) && updatetx; + updatetx = id->recv_count > id->curr_recv_count; /* When receiving, handle data interrupt and completion interrupt */ if (id->p_recv_buf && @@ -246,7 +242,7 @@ static irqreturn_t cdns_i2c_isr(int irq, void *ptr) id->recv_count--; id->curr_recv_count--; - if (cdns_is_holdquirk(id, hold_quirk)) + if (cdns_is_holdquirk(id, updatetx)) break; } @@ -257,7 +253,7 @@ static irqreturn_t cdns_i2c_isr(int irq, void *ptr) * maintain transfer size non-zero while performing a large * receive operation. */ - if (cdns_is_holdquirk(id, hold_quirk)) { + if (cdns_is_holdquirk(id, updatetx)) { /* wait while fifo is full */ while (cdns_i2c_readreg(CDNS_I2C_XFER_SIZE_OFFSET) != (id->curr_recv_count - CDNS_I2C_FIFO_DEPTH)) @@ -279,22 +275,6 @@ static irqreturn_t cdns_i2c_isr(int irq, void *ptr) CDNS_I2C_XFER_SIZE_OFFSET); id->curr_recv_count = id->recv_count; } - } else if (id->recv_count && !hold_quirk && - !id->curr_recv_count) { - - /* Set the slave address in address register*/ - cdns_i2c_writereg(id->p_msg->addr & CDNS_I2C_ADDR_MASK, - CDNS_I2C_ADDR_OFFSET); - - if (id->recv_count > CDNS_I2C_TRANSFER_SIZE) { - cdns_i2c_writereg(CDNS_I2C_TRANSFER_SIZE, - CDNS_I2C_XFER_SIZE_OFFSET); - id->curr_recv_count = CDNS_I2C_TRANSFER_SIZE; - } else { - cdns_i2c_writereg(id->recv_count, - CDNS_I2C_XFER_SIZE_OFFSET); - id->curr_recv_count = id->recv_count; - } } /* Clear hold (if not repeated start) and signal completion */ From 573768dede0e2b7de38ecbc11cb3ee47643902dc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Junxiao Chang Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2022 15:47:01 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0974/1091] net: stmmac: fix dma queue left shift overflow issue [ Upstream commit 613b065ca32e90209024ec4a6bb5ca887ee70980 ] When queue number is > 4, left shift overflows due to 32 bits integer variable. Mask calculation is wrong for MTL_RXQ_DMA_MAP1. If CONFIG_UBSAN is enabled, kernel dumps below warning: [ 10.363842] ================================================================== [ 10.363882] UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in /build/linux-intel-iotg-5.15-8e6Tf4/ linux-intel-iotg-5.15-5.15.0/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac4_core.c:224:12 [ 10.363929] shift exponent 40 is too large for 32-bit type 'unsigned int' [ 10.363953] CPU: 1 PID: 599 Comm: NetworkManager Not tainted 5.15.0-1003-intel-iotg [ 10.363956] Hardware name: ADLINK Technology Inc. LEC-EL/LEC-EL, BIOS 0.15.11 12/22/2021 [ 10.363958] Call Trace: [ 10.363960] [ 10.363963] dump_stack_lvl+0x4a/0x5f [ 10.363971] dump_stack+0x10/0x12 [ 10.363974] ubsan_epilogue+0x9/0x45 [ 10.363976] __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds.cold+0x61/0x10e [ 10.363979] ? wake_up_klogd+0x4a/0x50 [ 10.363983] ? vprintk_emit+0x8f/0x240 [ 10.363986] dwmac4_map_mtl_dma.cold+0x42/0x91 [stmmac] [ 10.364001] stmmac_mtl_configuration+0x1ce/0x7a0 [stmmac] [ 10.364009] ? dwmac410_dma_init_channel+0x70/0x70 [stmmac] [ 10.364020] stmmac_hw_setup.cold+0xf/0xb14 [stmmac] [ 10.364030] ? page_pool_alloc_pages+0x4d/0x70 [ 10.364034] ? stmmac_clear_tx_descriptors+0x6e/0xe0 [stmmac] [ 10.364042] stmmac_open+0x39e/0x920 [stmmac] [ 10.364050] __dev_open+0xf0/0x1a0 [ 10.364054] __dev_change_flags+0x188/0x1f0 [ 10.364057] dev_change_flags+0x26/0x60 [ 10.364059] do_setlink+0x908/0xc40 [ 10.364062] ? do_setlink+0xb10/0xc40 [ 10.364064] ? __nla_validate_parse+0x4c/0x1a0 [ 10.364068] __rtnl_newlink+0x597/0xa10 [ 10.364072] ? __nla_reserve+0x41/0x50 [ 10.364074] ? __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x1d0/0x4d0 [ 10.364079] ? pskb_expand_head+0x75/0x310 [ 10.364082] ? nla_reserve_64bit+0x21/0x40 [ 10.364086] ? skb_free_head+0x65/0x80 [ 10.364089] ? security_sock_rcv_skb+0x2c/0x50 [ 10.364094] ? __cond_resched+0x19/0x30 [ 10.364097] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x15a/0x420 [ 10.364100] rtnl_newlink+0x49/0x70 This change fixes MTL_RXQ_DMA_MAP1 mask issue and channel/queue mapping warning. Fixes: d43042f4da3e ("net: stmmac: mapping mtl rx to dma channel") BugLink: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216195 Reported-by: Cedric Wassenaar Signed-off-by: Junxiao Chang Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac4_core.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac4_core.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac4_core.c index 66e60c7e9850..c440b192ec71 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac4_core.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac4_core.c @@ -215,6 +215,9 @@ static void dwmac4_map_mtl_dma(struct mac_device_info *hw, u32 queue, u32 chan) if (queue == 0 || queue == 4) { value &= ~MTL_RXQ_DMA_Q04MDMACH_MASK; value |= MTL_RXQ_DMA_Q04MDMACH(chan); + } else if (queue > 4) { + value &= ~MTL_RXQ_DMA_QXMDMACH_MASK(queue - 4); + value |= MTL_RXQ_DMA_QXMDMACH(chan, queue - 4); } else { value &= ~MTL_RXQ_DMA_QXMDMACH_MASK(queue); value |= MTL_RXQ_DMA_QXMDMACH(chan, queue); From 2aad2c5745ecb59819bcf6181cd0153a1cf680c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tariq Toukan Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2022 11:42:16 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 0975/1091] net/tls: Fix race in TLS device down flow [ Upstream commit f08d8c1bb97c48f24a82afaa2fd8c140f8d3da8b ] Socket destruction flow and tls_device_down function sync against each other using tls_device_lock and the context refcount, to guarantee the device resources are freed via tls_dev_del() by the end of tls_device_down. In the following unfortunate flow, this won't happen: - refcount is decreased to zero in tls_device_sk_destruct. - tls_device_down starts, skips the context as refcount is zero, going all the way until it flushes the gc work, and returns without freeing the device resources. - only then, tls_device_queue_ctx_destruction is called, queues the gc work and frees the context's device resources. Solve it by decreasing the refcount in the socket's destruction flow under the tls_device_lock, for perfect synchronization. This does not slow down the common likely destructor flow, in which both the refcount is decreased and the spinlock is acquired, anyway. Fixes: e8f69799810c ("net/tls: Add generic NIC offload infrastructure") Reviewed-by: Maxim Mikityanskiy Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/tls/tls_device.c | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/tls/tls_device.c b/net/tls/tls_device.c index abb93f7343c5..2c3cf47d730b 100644 --- a/net/tls/tls_device.c +++ b/net/tls/tls_device.c @@ -94,13 +94,16 @@ static void tls_device_queue_ctx_destruction(struct tls_context *ctx) unsigned long flags; spin_lock_irqsave(&tls_device_lock, flags); + if (unlikely(!refcount_dec_and_test(&ctx->refcount))) + goto unlock; + list_move_tail(&ctx->list, &tls_device_gc_list); /* schedule_work inside the spinlock * to make sure tls_device_down waits for that work. */ schedule_work(&tls_device_gc_work); - +unlock: spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tls_device_lock, flags); } @@ -191,8 +194,7 @@ static void tls_device_sk_destruct(struct sock *sk) clean_acked_data_disable(inet_csk(sk)); } - if (refcount_dec_and_test(&tls_ctx->refcount)) - tls_device_queue_ctx_destruction(tls_ctx); + tls_device_queue_ctx_destruction(tls_ctx); } void tls_device_free_resources_tx(struct sock *sk) From 1656ecaddf90e2a070ec2d2404cdae3edf80faca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2022 10:17:41 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0976/1091] igmp: Fix data-races around sysctl_igmp_llm_reports. [ Upstream commit f6da2267e71106474fbc0943dc24928b9cb79119 ] While reading sysctl_igmp_llm_reports, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers. This test can be packed into a helper, so such changes will be in the follow-up series after net is merged into net-next. if (ipv4_is_local_multicast(pmc->multiaddr) && !READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_igmp_llm_reports)) Fixes: df2cf4a78e48 ("IGMP: Inhibit reports for local multicast groups") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/ipv4/igmp.c | 21 +++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/igmp.c b/net/ipv4/igmp.c index cac2fdd08df0..7cd444d75c3d 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/igmp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/igmp.c @@ -469,7 +469,8 @@ static struct sk_buff *add_grec(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ip_mc_list *pmc, if (pmc->multiaddr == IGMP_ALL_HOSTS) return skb; - if (ipv4_is_local_multicast(pmc->multiaddr) && !net->ipv4.sysctl_igmp_llm_reports) + if (ipv4_is_local_multicast(pmc->multiaddr) && + !READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_igmp_llm_reports)) return skb; mtu = READ_ONCE(dev->mtu); @@ -595,7 +596,7 @@ static int igmpv3_send_report(struct in_device *in_dev, struct ip_mc_list *pmc) if (pmc->multiaddr == IGMP_ALL_HOSTS) continue; if (ipv4_is_local_multicast(pmc->multiaddr) && - !net->ipv4.sysctl_igmp_llm_reports) + !READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_igmp_llm_reports)) continue; spin_lock_bh(&pmc->lock); if (pmc->sfcount[MCAST_EXCLUDE]) @@ -738,7 +739,8 @@ static int igmp_send_report(struct in_device *in_dev, struct ip_mc_list *pmc, if (type == IGMPV3_HOST_MEMBERSHIP_REPORT) return igmpv3_send_report(in_dev, pmc); - if (ipv4_is_local_multicast(group) && !net->ipv4.sysctl_igmp_llm_reports) + if (ipv4_is_local_multicast(group) && + !READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_igmp_llm_reports)) return 0; if (type == IGMP_HOST_LEAVE_MESSAGE) @@ -922,7 +924,8 @@ static bool igmp_heard_report(struct in_device *in_dev, __be32 group) if (group == IGMP_ALL_HOSTS) return false; - if (ipv4_is_local_multicast(group) && !net->ipv4.sysctl_igmp_llm_reports) + if (ipv4_is_local_multicast(group) && + !READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_igmp_llm_reports)) return false; rcu_read_lock(); @@ -1047,7 +1050,7 @@ static bool igmp_heard_query(struct in_device *in_dev, struct sk_buff *skb, if (im->multiaddr == IGMP_ALL_HOSTS) continue; if (ipv4_is_local_multicast(im->multiaddr) && - !net->ipv4.sysctl_igmp_llm_reports) + !READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_igmp_llm_reports)) continue; spin_lock_bh(&im->lock); if (im->tm_running) @@ -1298,7 +1301,8 @@ static void __igmp_group_dropped(struct ip_mc_list *im, gfp_t gfp) #ifdef CONFIG_IP_MULTICAST if (im->multiaddr == IGMP_ALL_HOSTS) return; - if (ipv4_is_local_multicast(im->multiaddr) && !net->ipv4.sysctl_igmp_llm_reports) + if (ipv4_is_local_multicast(im->multiaddr) && + !READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_igmp_llm_reports)) return; reporter = im->reporter; @@ -1340,7 +1344,8 @@ static void igmp_group_added(struct ip_mc_list *im) #ifdef CONFIG_IP_MULTICAST if (im->multiaddr == IGMP_ALL_HOSTS) return; - if (ipv4_is_local_multicast(im->multiaddr) && !net->ipv4.sysctl_igmp_llm_reports) + if (ipv4_is_local_multicast(im->multiaddr) && + !READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_igmp_llm_reports)) return; if (in_dev->dead) @@ -1644,7 +1649,7 @@ static void ip_mc_rejoin_groups(struct in_device *in_dev) if (im->multiaddr == IGMP_ALL_HOSTS) continue; if (ipv4_is_local_multicast(im->multiaddr) && - !net->ipv4.sysctl_igmp_llm_reports) + !READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_igmp_llm_reports)) continue; /* a failover is happening and switches From ff55c025e64730114b6e43041f7ecd013d9fe3ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2022 10:17:42 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0977/1091] igmp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_igmp_max_memberships. [ Upstream commit 6305d821e3b9b5379d348528e5b5faf316383bc2 ] While reading sysctl_igmp_max_memberships, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/ipv4/igmp.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/igmp.c b/net/ipv4/igmp.c index 7cd444d75c3d..660b41040c77 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/igmp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/igmp.c @@ -2199,7 +2199,7 @@ static int __ip_mc_join_group(struct sock *sk, struct ip_mreqn *imr, count++; } err = -ENOBUFS; - if (count >= net->ipv4.sysctl_igmp_max_memberships) + if (count >= READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_igmp_max_memberships)) goto done; iml = sock_kmalloc(sk, sizeof(*iml), GFP_KERNEL); if (!iml) From b222de2560ab56ca30452d35b7cc0fdd7be98ed2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2022 10:17:47 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0978/1091] tcp: Fix data-races around sysctl_tcp_syncookies. [ Upstream commit f2e383b5bb6bbc60a0b94b87b3e49a2b1aefd11e ] While reading sysctl_tcp_syncookies, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/core/filter.c | 4 ++-- net/ipv4/syncookies.c | 3 ++- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 20 ++++++++++++-------- net/ipv6/syncookies.c | 3 ++- 4 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c index 75f53b5e6389..72bf78032f45 100644 --- a/net/core/filter.c +++ b/net/core/filter.c @@ -5839,7 +5839,7 @@ BPF_CALL_5(bpf_tcp_check_syncookie, struct sock *, sk, void *, iph, u32, iph_len if (sk->sk_protocol != IPPROTO_TCP || sk->sk_state != TCP_LISTEN) return -EINVAL; - if (!sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_syncookies) + if (!READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_syncookies)) return -EINVAL; if (!th->ack || th->rst || th->syn) @@ -5914,7 +5914,7 @@ BPF_CALL_5(bpf_tcp_gen_syncookie, struct sock *, sk, void *, iph, u32, iph_len, if (sk->sk_protocol != IPPROTO_TCP || sk->sk_state != TCP_LISTEN) return -EINVAL; - if (!sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_syncookies) + if (!READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_syncookies)) return -ENOENT; if (!th->syn || th->ack || th->fin || th->rst) diff --git a/net/ipv4/syncookies.c b/net/ipv4/syncookies.c index 6811174ad518..f1cbf8911844 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/syncookies.c +++ b/net/ipv4/syncookies.c @@ -297,7 +297,8 @@ struct sock *cookie_v4_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) struct flowi4 fl4; u32 tsoff = 0; - if (!sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_syncookies || !th->ack || th->rst) + if (!READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_syncookies) || + !th->ack || th->rst) goto out; if (tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow(sk)) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index 0808110451a0..85204903b2fa 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -6530,11 +6530,14 @@ static bool tcp_syn_flood_action(const struct sock *sk, const char *proto) { struct request_sock_queue *queue = &inet_csk(sk)->icsk_accept_queue; const char *msg = "Dropping request"; - bool want_cookie = false; struct net *net = sock_net(sk); + bool want_cookie = false; + u8 syncookies; + + syncookies = READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_syncookies); #ifdef CONFIG_SYN_COOKIES - if (net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_syncookies) { + if (syncookies) { msg = "Sending cookies"; want_cookie = true; __NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPREQQFULLDOCOOKIES); @@ -6542,8 +6545,7 @@ static bool tcp_syn_flood_action(const struct sock *sk, const char *proto) #endif __NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPREQQFULLDROP); - if (!queue->synflood_warned && - net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_syncookies != 2 && + if (!queue->synflood_warned && syncookies != 2 && xchg(&queue->synflood_warned, 1) == 0) net_info_ratelimited("%s: Possible SYN flooding on port %d. %s. Check SNMP counters.\n", proto, sk->sk_num, msg); @@ -6578,7 +6580,7 @@ u16 tcp_get_syncookie_mss(struct request_sock_ops *rsk_ops, struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); u16 mss; - if (sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_syncookies != 2 && + if (READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_syncookies) != 2 && !inet_csk_reqsk_queue_is_full(sk)) return 0; @@ -6612,13 +6614,15 @@ int tcp_conn_request(struct request_sock_ops *rsk_ops, bool want_cookie = false; struct dst_entry *dst; struct flowi fl; + u8 syncookies; + + syncookies = READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_syncookies); /* TW buckets are converted to open requests without * limitations, they conserve resources and peer is * evidently real one. */ - if ((net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_syncookies == 2 || - inet_csk_reqsk_queue_is_full(sk)) && !isn) { + if ((syncookies == 2 || inet_csk_reqsk_queue_is_full(sk)) && !isn) { want_cookie = tcp_syn_flood_action(sk, rsk_ops->slab_name); if (!want_cookie) goto drop; @@ -6669,7 +6673,7 @@ int tcp_conn_request(struct request_sock_ops *rsk_ops, if (!want_cookie && !isn) { /* Kill the following clause, if you dislike this way. */ - if (!net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_syncookies && + if (!syncookies && (net->ipv4.sysctl_max_syn_backlog - inet_csk_reqsk_queue_len(sk) < (net->ipv4.sysctl_max_syn_backlog >> 2)) && !tcp_peer_is_proven(req, dst)) { diff --git a/net/ipv6/syncookies.c b/net/ipv6/syncookies.c index 37ab254f7b92..7e5550546594 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/syncookies.c +++ b/net/ipv6/syncookies.c @@ -141,7 +141,8 @@ struct sock *cookie_v6_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) __u8 rcv_wscale; u32 tsoff = 0; - if (!sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_syncookies || !th->ack || th->rst) + if (!READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_syncookies) || + !th->ack || th->rst) goto out; if (tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow(sk)) From ea309c467dac4f8b0a9ab01424ea7e9e29073ca7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2022 10:17:49 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0979/1091] tcp: Fix data-races around sysctl_tcp_reordering. [ Upstream commit 46778cd16e6a5ad1b2e3a91f6c057c907379418e ] While reading sysctl_tcp_reordering, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/ipv4/tcp.c | 2 +- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 10 +++++++--- net/ipv4/tcp_metrics.c | 3 ++- 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c index 4815cf72569e..790246011fff 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c @@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ void tcp_init_sock(struct sock *sk) tp->snd_cwnd_clamp = ~0; tp->mss_cache = TCP_MSS_DEFAULT; - tp->reordering = sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_reordering; + tp->reordering = READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_reordering); tcp_assign_congestion_control(sk); tp->tsoffset = 0; diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index 85204903b2fa..fbdb5de29a97 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -1994,6 +1994,7 @@ void tcp_enter_loss(struct sock *sk) struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); struct net *net = sock_net(sk); bool new_recovery = icsk->icsk_ca_state < TCP_CA_Recovery; + u8 reordering; tcp_timeout_mark_lost(sk); @@ -2014,10 +2015,12 @@ void tcp_enter_loss(struct sock *sk) /* Timeout in disordered state after receiving substantial DUPACKs * suggests that the degree of reordering is over-estimated. */ + reordering = READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_reordering); if (icsk->icsk_ca_state <= TCP_CA_Disorder && - tp->sacked_out >= net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_reordering) + tp->sacked_out >= reordering) tp->reordering = min_t(unsigned int, tp->reordering, - net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_reordering); + reordering); + tcp_set_ca_state(sk, TCP_CA_Loss); tp->high_seq = tp->snd_nxt; tcp_ecn_queue_cwr(tp); @@ -3319,7 +3322,8 @@ static inline bool tcp_may_raise_cwnd(const struct sock *sk, const int flag) * new SACK or ECE mark may first advance cwnd here and later reduce * cwnd in tcp_fastretrans_alert() based on more states. */ - if (tcp_sk(sk)->reordering > sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_reordering) + if (tcp_sk(sk)->reordering > + READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_reordering)) return flag & FLAG_FORWARD_PROGRESS; return flag & FLAG_DATA_ACKED; diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_metrics.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_metrics.c index c4848e7a0aad..9a7d8a599857 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_metrics.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_metrics.c @@ -425,7 +425,8 @@ void tcp_update_metrics(struct sock *sk) if (!tcp_metric_locked(tm, TCP_METRIC_REORDERING)) { val = tcp_metric_get(tm, TCP_METRIC_REORDERING); if (val < tp->reordering && - tp->reordering != net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_reordering) + tp->reordering != + READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_reordering)) tcp_metric_set(tm, TCP_METRIC_REORDERING, tp->reordering); } From b0d9f04c870e46e6447fde854094b16159c79222 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2022 10:17:50 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0980/1091] tcp: Fix data-races around some timeout sysctl knobs. [ Upstream commit 39e24435a776e9de5c6dd188836cf2523547804b ] While reading these sysctl knobs, they can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to their readers. - tcp_retries1 - tcp_retries2 - tcp_orphan_retries - tcp_fin_timeout Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- include/net/tcp.h | 3 ++- net/ipv4/tcp.c | 2 +- net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 2 +- net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c | 10 +++++----- 4 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/tcp.h b/include/net/tcp.h index 65be8bd1f0f4..96dae0937998 100644 --- a/include/net/tcp.h +++ b/include/net/tcp.h @@ -1465,7 +1465,8 @@ static inline u32 keepalive_time_elapsed(const struct tcp_sock *tp) static inline int tcp_fin_time(const struct sock *sk) { - int fin_timeout = tcp_sk(sk)->linger2 ? : sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_fin_timeout; + int fin_timeout = tcp_sk(sk)->linger2 ? : + READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_fin_timeout); const int rto = inet_csk(sk)->icsk_rto; if (fin_timeout < (rto << 2) - (rto >> 1)) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c index 790246011fff..333d221e0717 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c @@ -3466,7 +3466,7 @@ static int do_tcp_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, case TCP_LINGER2: val = tp->linger2; if (val >= 0) - val = (val ? : net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_fin_timeout) / HZ; + val = (val ? : READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_fin_timeout)) / HZ; break; case TCP_DEFER_ACCEPT: val = retrans_to_secs(icsk->icsk_accept_queue.rskq_defer_accept, diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c index 9bfe6965b873..8b602a202acb 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c @@ -3847,7 +3847,7 @@ void tcp_send_probe0(struct sock *sk) icsk->icsk_probes_out++; if (err <= 0) { - if (icsk->icsk_backoff < net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_retries2) + if (icsk->icsk_backoff < READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_retries2)) icsk->icsk_backoff++; timeout = tcp_probe0_when(sk, TCP_RTO_MAX); } else { diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c index c48aeaef3ec7..26da44e196ed 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c @@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ static int tcp_out_of_resources(struct sock *sk, bool do_reset) */ static int tcp_orphan_retries(struct sock *sk, bool alive) { - int retries = sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_orphan_retries; /* May be zero. */ + int retries = READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_orphan_retries); /* May be zero. */ /* We know from an ICMP that something is wrong. */ if (sk->sk_err_soft && !alive) @@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ static int tcp_write_timeout(struct sock *sk) retry_until = icsk->icsk_syn_retries ? : net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_syn_retries; expired = icsk->icsk_retransmits >= retry_until; } else { - if (retransmits_timed_out(sk, net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_retries1, 0)) { + if (retransmits_timed_out(sk, READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_retries1), 0)) { /* Black hole detection */ tcp_mtu_probing(icsk, sk); @@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ static int tcp_write_timeout(struct sock *sk) sk_rethink_txhash(sk); } - retry_until = net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_retries2; + retry_until = READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_retries2); if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD)) { const bool alive = icsk->icsk_rto < TCP_RTO_MAX; @@ -381,7 +381,7 @@ static void tcp_probe_timer(struct sock *sk) msecs_to_jiffies(icsk->icsk_user_timeout)) goto abort; - max_probes = sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_retries2; + max_probes = READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_retries2); if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD)) { const bool alive = inet_csk_rto_backoff(icsk, TCP_RTO_MAX) < TCP_RTO_MAX; @@ -580,7 +580,7 @@ out_reset_timer: } inet_csk_reset_xmit_timer(sk, ICSK_TIME_RETRANS, tcp_clamp_rto_to_user_timeout(sk), TCP_RTO_MAX); - if (retransmits_timed_out(sk, net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_retries1 + 1, 0)) + if (retransmits_timed_out(sk, READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_retries1) + 1, 0)) __sk_dst_reset(sk); out:; From e9362a993886613ef0284c2a4911c6017c97d803 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2022 10:17:51 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0981/1091] tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_notsent_lowat. [ Upstream commit 55be873695ed8912eb77ff46d1d1cadf028bd0f3 ] While reading sysctl_tcp_notsent_lowat, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader. Fixes: c9bee3b7fdec ("tcp: TCP_NOTSENT_LOWAT socket option") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- include/net/tcp.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/net/tcp.h b/include/net/tcp.h index 96dae0937998..eb984ec22f22 100644 --- a/include/net/tcp.h +++ b/include/net/tcp.h @@ -1947,7 +1947,7 @@ void __tcp_v4_send_check(struct sk_buff *skb, __be32 saddr, __be32 daddr); static inline u32 tcp_notsent_lowat(const struct tcp_sock *tp) { struct net *net = sock_net((struct sock *)tp); - return tp->notsent_lowat ?: net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_notsent_lowat; + return tp->notsent_lowat ?: READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_notsent_lowat); } /* @wake is one when sk_stream_write_space() calls us. From dc58e68d1e26f8da477b0ddad575cb2d7cf7e38f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2022 10:17:52 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0982/1091] tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_tw_reuse. [ Upstream commit cbfc6495586a3f09f6f07d9fb3c7cafe807e3c55 ] While reading sysctl_tcp_tw_reuse, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c index 72fe93ace7d7..b95e1a3487c8 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c @@ -105,10 +105,10 @@ static u32 tcp_v4_init_ts_off(const struct net *net, const struct sk_buff *skb) int tcp_twsk_unique(struct sock *sk, struct sock *sktw, void *twp) { + int reuse = READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_tw_reuse); const struct inet_timewait_sock *tw = inet_twsk(sktw); const struct tcp_timewait_sock *tcptw = tcp_twsk(sktw); struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); - int reuse = sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_tw_reuse; if (reuse == 2) { /* Still does not detect *everything* that goes through From 78420d8e46dfd15dcbfce566de9fd4d0f218304a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2022 10:17:53 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0983/1091] tcp: Fix data-races around sysctl_max_syn_backlog. [ Upstream commit 79539f34743d3e14cc1fa6577d326a82cc64d62f ] While reading sysctl_max_syn_backlog, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index fbdb5de29a97..c1f26603cd2c 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -6676,10 +6676,12 @@ int tcp_conn_request(struct request_sock_ops *rsk_ops, goto drop_and_free; if (!want_cookie && !isn) { + int max_syn_backlog = READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_max_syn_backlog); + /* Kill the following clause, if you dislike this way. */ if (!syncookies && - (net->ipv4.sysctl_max_syn_backlog - inet_csk_reqsk_queue_len(sk) < - (net->ipv4.sysctl_max_syn_backlog >> 2)) && + (max_syn_backlog - inet_csk_reqsk_queue_len(sk) < + (max_syn_backlog >> 2)) && !tcp_peer_is_proven(req, dst)) { /* Without syncookies last quarter of * backlog is filled with destinations, From 25d53d858a6c0b89a6e69e376c2a57c4f4c2c8cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2022 10:17:54 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0984/1091] tcp: Fix data-races around sysctl_tcp_fastopen. [ Upstream commit 5a54213318c43f4009ae158347aa6016e3b9b55a ] While reading sysctl_tcp_fastopen, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers. Fixes: 2100c8d2d9db ("net-tcp: Fast Open base") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/ipv4/af_inet.c | 2 +- net/ipv4/tcp.c | 6 ++++-- net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c | 4 ++-- 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/af_inet.c b/net/ipv4/af_inet.c index 06153386776d..d61ca7be6eda 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/af_inet.c +++ b/net/ipv4/af_inet.c @@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ int inet_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog) * because the socket was in TCP_LISTEN state previously but * was shutdown() rather than close(). */ - tcp_fastopen = sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_fastopen; + tcp_fastopen = READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_fastopen); if ((tcp_fastopen & TFO_SERVER_WO_SOCKOPT1) && (tcp_fastopen & TFO_SERVER_ENABLE) && !inet_csk(sk)->icsk_accept_queue.fastopenq.max_qlen) { diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c index 333d221e0717..4b31f6e9ec61 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c @@ -1148,7 +1148,8 @@ static int tcp_sendmsg_fastopen(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, struct sockaddr *uaddr = msg->msg_name; int err, flags; - if (!(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_fastopen & TFO_CLIENT_ENABLE) || + if (!(READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_fastopen) & + TFO_CLIENT_ENABLE) || (uaddr && msg->msg_namelen >= sizeof(uaddr->sa_family) && uaddr->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; @@ -3127,7 +3128,8 @@ static int do_tcp_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, case TCP_FASTOPEN_CONNECT: if (val > 1 || val < 0) { err = -EINVAL; - } else if (net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_fastopen & TFO_CLIENT_ENABLE) { + } else if (READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_fastopen) & + TFO_CLIENT_ENABLE) { if (sk->sk_state == TCP_CLOSE) tp->fastopen_connect = val; else diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c index a5ec77a5ad6f..21705b2ddaff 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c @@ -349,7 +349,7 @@ static bool tcp_fastopen_no_cookie(const struct sock *sk, const struct dst_entry *dst, int flag) { - return (sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_fastopen & flag) || + return (READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_fastopen) & flag) || tcp_sk(sk)->fastopen_no_cookie || (dst && dst_metric(dst, RTAX_FASTOPEN_NO_COOKIE)); } @@ -364,7 +364,7 @@ struct sock *tcp_try_fastopen(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct dst_entry *dst) { bool syn_data = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq != TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq + 1; - int tcp_fastopen = sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_fastopen; + int tcp_fastopen = READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_fastopen); struct tcp_fastopen_cookie valid_foc = { .len = -1 }; struct sock *child; int ret = 0; From d88d59faf4e6f9cc4767664206afdb999b10ec77 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Przemyslaw Patynowski Date: Fri, 24 Jun 2022 17:33:01 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0985/1091] iavf: Fix handling of dummy receive descriptors [ Upstream commit a9f49e0060301a9bfebeca76739158d0cf91cdf6 ] Fix memory leak caused by not handling dummy receive descriptor properly. iavf_get_rx_buffer now sets the rx_buffer return value for dummy receive descriptors. Without this patch, when the hardware writes a dummy descriptor, iavf would not free the page allocated for the previous receive buffer. This is an unlikely event but can still happen. [Jesse: massaged commit message] Fixes: efa14c398582 ("iavf: allow null RX descriptors") Signed-off-by: Przemyslaw Patynowski Signed-off-by: Jesse Brandeburg Tested-by: Konrad Jankowski Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/iavf/iavf_txrx.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/iavf/iavf_txrx.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/iavf/iavf_txrx.c index 7a30d5d5ef53..c6905d1b6182 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/iavf/iavf_txrx.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/iavf/iavf_txrx.c @@ -1263,11 +1263,10 @@ static struct iavf_rx_buffer *iavf_get_rx_buffer(struct iavf_ring *rx_ring, { struct iavf_rx_buffer *rx_buffer; - if (!size) - return NULL; - rx_buffer = &rx_ring->rx_bi[rx_ring->next_to_clean]; prefetchw(rx_buffer->page); + if (!size) + return rx_buffer; /* we are reusing so sync this buffer for CPU use */ dma_sync_single_range_for_cpu(rx_ring->dev, From 55a2a28b32854d3768f0fb8dfe0c3e37460513db Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dawid Lukwinski Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2022 14:45:41 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0986/1091] i40e: Fix erroneous adapter reinitialization during recovery process [ Upstream commit f838a63369818faadec4ad1736cfbd20ab5da00e ] Fix an issue when driver incorrectly detects state of recovery process and erroneously reinitializes interrupts, which results in a kernel error and call trace message. The issue was caused by a combination of two factors: 1. Assuming the EMP reset issued after completing firmware recovery means the whole recovery process is complete. 2. Erroneous reinitialization of interrupt vector after detecting the above mentioned EMP reset. Fixes (1) by changing how recovery state change is detected and (2) by adjusting the conditional expression to ensure using proper interrupt reinitialization method, depending on the situation. Fixes: 4ff0ee1af016 ("i40e: Introduce recovery mode support") Signed-off-by: Dawid Lukwinski Signed-off-by: Jan Sokolowski Tested-by: Konrad Jankowski Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220715214542.2968762-1-anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c | 13 +++++-------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c index 05442bbc218c..0610d344fdbf 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c @@ -10068,7 +10068,7 @@ static int i40e_reset(struct i40e_pf *pf) **/ static void i40e_rebuild(struct i40e_pf *pf, bool reinit, bool lock_acquired) { - int old_recovery_mode_bit = test_bit(__I40E_RECOVERY_MODE, pf->state); + const bool is_recovery_mode_reported = i40e_check_recovery_mode(pf); struct i40e_vsi *vsi = pf->vsi[pf->lan_vsi]; struct i40e_hw *hw = &pf->hw; i40e_status ret; @@ -10076,13 +10076,11 @@ static void i40e_rebuild(struct i40e_pf *pf, bool reinit, bool lock_acquired) int v; if (test_bit(__I40E_EMP_RESET_INTR_RECEIVED, pf->state) && - i40e_check_recovery_mode(pf)) { + is_recovery_mode_reported) i40e_set_ethtool_ops(pf->vsi[pf->lan_vsi]->netdev); - } if (test_bit(__I40E_DOWN, pf->state) && - !test_bit(__I40E_RECOVERY_MODE, pf->state) && - !old_recovery_mode_bit) + !test_bit(__I40E_RECOVERY_MODE, pf->state)) goto clear_recovery; dev_dbg(&pf->pdev->dev, "Rebuilding internal switch\n"); @@ -10109,13 +10107,12 @@ static void i40e_rebuild(struct i40e_pf *pf, bool reinit, bool lock_acquired) * accordingly with regard to resources initialization * and deinitialization */ - if (test_bit(__I40E_RECOVERY_MODE, pf->state) || - old_recovery_mode_bit) { + if (test_bit(__I40E_RECOVERY_MODE, pf->state)) { if (i40e_get_capabilities(pf, i40e_aqc_opc_list_func_capabilities)) goto end_unlock; - if (test_bit(__I40E_RECOVERY_MODE, pf->state)) { + if (is_recovery_mode_reported) { /* we're staying in recovery mode so we'll reinitialize * misc vector here */ From 031af9e617a6f51075d97e56fc9e712c7dde2508 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Piotr Skajewski Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2022 14:44:56 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0987/1091] ixgbe: Add locking to prevent panic when setting sriov_numvfs to zero [ Upstream commit 1e53834ce541d4fe271cdcca7703e50be0a44f8a ] It is possible to disable VFs while the PF driver is processing requests from the VF driver. This can result in a panic. BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 000000000000106c PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 8 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/8 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G I --------- - Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R740/06WXJT, BIOS 2.8.2 08/27/2020 RIP: 0010:ixgbe_msg_task+0x4c8/0x1690 [ixgbe] Code: 00 00 48 8d 04 40 48 c1 e0 05 89 7c 24 24 89 fd 48 89 44 24 10 83 ff 01 0f 84 b8 04 00 00 4c 8b 64 24 10 4d 03 a5 48 22 00 00 <41> 80 7c 24 4c 00 0f 84 8a 03 00 00 0f b7 c7 83 f8 08 0f 84 8f 0a RSP: 0018:ffffb337869f8df8 EFLAGS: 00010002 RAX: 0000000000001020 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000000000000002b RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 0000000000000006 RBP: 0000000000000006 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000029780 R10: 00006957d8f42832 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000001020 R13: ffff8a00e8978ac0 R14: 000000000000002b R15: ffff8a00e8979c80 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8a07dfd00000(0000) knlGS:00000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000000000106c CR3: 0000000063e10004 CR4: 00000000007726e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: ? ttwu_do_wakeup+0x19/0x140 ? try_to_wake_up+0x1cd/0x550 ? ixgbevf_update_xcast_mode+0x71/0xc0 [ixgbevf] ixgbe_msix_other+0x17e/0x310 [ixgbe] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x40/0x180 handle_irq_event_percpu+0x30/0x80 handle_irq_event+0x36/0x53 handle_edge_irq+0x82/0x190 handle_irq+0x1c/0x30 do_IRQ+0x49/0xd0 common_interrupt+0xf/0xf This can be eventually be reproduced with the following script: while : do echo 63 > /sys/class/net//device/sriov_numvfs sleep 1 echo 0 > /sys/class/net//device/sriov_numvfs sleep 1 done Add lock when disabling SR-IOV to prevent process VF mailbox communication. Fixes: d773d1310625 ("ixgbe: Fix memory leak when SR-IOV VFs are direct assigned") Signed-off-by: Piotr Skajewski Tested-by: Marek Szlosek Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220715214456.2968711-1-anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe.h | 1 + drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_main.c | 3 +++ drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_sriov.c | 6 ++++++ 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe.h index 39e73ad60352..fa49ef2afde5 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe.h +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe.h @@ -773,6 +773,7 @@ struct ixgbe_adapter { #ifdef CONFIG_IXGBE_IPSEC struct ixgbe_ipsec *ipsec; #endif /* CONFIG_IXGBE_IPSEC */ + spinlock_t vfs_lock; }; static inline u8 ixgbe_max_rss_indices(struct ixgbe_adapter *adapter) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_main.c index 8a894e5d923f..f8aa1a0b89c5 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_main.c @@ -6396,6 +6396,9 @@ static int ixgbe_sw_init(struct ixgbe_adapter *adapter, /* n-tuple support exists, always init our spinlock */ spin_lock_init(&adapter->fdir_perfect_lock); + /* init spinlock to avoid concurrency of VF resources */ + spin_lock_init(&adapter->vfs_lock); + #ifdef CONFIG_IXGBE_DCB ixgbe_init_dcb(adapter); #endif diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_sriov.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_sriov.c index cf5c2b9465eb..0e73e3b1af19 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_sriov.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_sriov.c @@ -204,10 +204,13 @@ void ixgbe_enable_sriov(struct ixgbe_adapter *adapter, unsigned int max_vfs) int ixgbe_disable_sriov(struct ixgbe_adapter *adapter) { unsigned int num_vfs = adapter->num_vfs, vf; + unsigned long flags; int rss; + spin_lock_irqsave(&adapter->vfs_lock, flags); /* set num VFs to 0 to prevent access to vfinfo */ adapter->num_vfs = 0; + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&adapter->vfs_lock, flags); /* put the reference to all of the vf devices */ for (vf = 0; vf < num_vfs; ++vf) { @@ -1305,8 +1308,10 @@ static void ixgbe_rcv_ack_from_vf(struct ixgbe_adapter *adapter, u32 vf) void ixgbe_msg_task(struct ixgbe_adapter *adapter) { struct ixgbe_hw *hw = &adapter->hw; + unsigned long flags; u32 vf; + spin_lock_irqsave(&adapter->vfs_lock, flags); for (vf = 0; vf < adapter->num_vfs; vf++) { /* process any reset requests */ if (!ixgbe_check_for_rst(hw, vf)) @@ -1320,6 +1325,7 @@ void ixgbe_msg_task(struct ixgbe_adapter *adapter) if (!ixgbe_check_for_ack(hw, vf)) ixgbe_rcv_ack_from_vf(adapter, vf); } + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&adapter->vfs_lock, flags); } void ixgbe_disable_tx_rx(struct ixgbe_adapter *adapter) From 91d6aa19dd72ed5389f2310382a97cb49a69af1e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Haibo Chen Date: Mon, 18 Jul 2022 16:31:41 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 0988/1091] gpio: pca953x: only use single read/write for No AI mode [ Upstream commit db8edaa09d7461ec08672a92a2eef63d5882bb79 ] For the device use NO AI mode(not support auto address increment), only use the single read/write when config the regmap. We meet issue on PCA9557PW on i.MX8QXP/DXL evk board, this device do not support AI mode, but when do the regmap sync, regmap will sync 3 byte data to register 1, logically this means write first data to register 1, write second data to register 2, write third data to register 3. But this device do not support AI mode, finally, these three data write only into register 1 one by one. the reault is the value of register 1 alway equal to the latest data, here is the third data, no operation happened on register 2 and register 3. This is not what we expect. Fixes: 49427232764d ("gpio: pca953x: Perform basic regmap conversion") Signed-off-by: Haibo Chen Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/gpio/gpio-pca953x.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/gpio/gpio-pca953x.c b/drivers/gpio/gpio-pca953x.c index 54da66d02b0e..317f54f19477 100644 --- a/drivers/gpio/gpio-pca953x.c +++ b/drivers/gpio/gpio-pca953x.c @@ -379,6 +379,9 @@ static const struct regmap_config pca953x_i2c_regmap = { .reg_bits = 8, .val_bits = 8, + .use_single_read = true, + .use_single_write = true, + .readable_reg = pca953x_readable_register, .writeable_reg = pca953x_writeable_register, .volatile_reg = pca953x_volatile_register, From a8569f76df7ec5b4b51155c57523a0b356db5741 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hristo Venev Date: Sat, 16 Jul 2022 11:51:34 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 0989/1091] be2net: Fix buffer overflow in be_get_module_eeprom [ Upstream commit d7241f679a59cfe27f92cb5c6272cb429fb1f7ec ] be_cmd_read_port_transceiver_data assumes that it is given a buffer that is at least PAGE_DATA_LEN long, or twice that if the module supports SFF 8472. However, this is not always the case. Fix this by passing the desired offset and length to be_cmd_read_port_transceiver_data so that we only copy the bytes once. Fixes: e36edd9d26cf ("be2net: add ethtool "-m" option support") Signed-off-by: Hristo Venev Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220716085134.6095-1-hristo@venev.name Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_cmds.c | 10 +++--- drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_cmds.h | 2 +- .../net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_ethtool.c | 31 ++++++++++++------- 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_cmds.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_cmds.c index 649c5c429bd7..1288b5e3d220 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_cmds.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_cmds.c @@ -2287,7 +2287,7 @@ err: /* Uses sync mcc */ int be_cmd_read_port_transceiver_data(struct be_adapter *adapter, - u8 page_num, u8 *data) + u8 page_num, u32 off, u32 len, u8 *data) { struct be_dma_mem cmd; struct be_mcc_wrb *wrb; @@ -2321,10 +2321,10 @@ int be_cmd_read_port_transceiver_data(struct be_adapter *adapter, req->port = cpu_to_le32(adapter->hba_port_num); req->page_num = cpu_to_le32(page_num); status = be_mcc_notify_wait(adapter); - if (!status) { + if (!status && len > 0) { struct be_cmd_resp_port_type *resp = cmd.va; - memcpy(data, resp->page_data, PAGE_DATA_LEN); + memcpy(data, resp->page_data + off, len); } err: mutex_unlock(&adapter->mcc_lock); @@ -2415,7 +2415,7 @@ int be_cmd_query_cable_type(struct be_adapter *adapter) int status; status = be_cmd_read_port_transceiver_data(adapter, TR_PAGE_A0, - page_data); + 0, PAGE_DATA_LEN, page_data); if (!status) { switch (adapter->phy.interface_type) { case PHY_TYPE_QSFP: @@ -2440,7 +2440,7 @@ int be_cmd_query_sfp_info(struct be_adapter *adapter) int status; status = be_cmd_read_port_transceiver_data(adapter, TR_PAGE_A0, - page_data); + 0, PAGE_DATA_LEN, page_data); if (!status) { strlcpy(adapter->phy.vendor_name, page_data + SFP_VENDOR_NAME_OFFSET, SFP_VENDOR_NAME_LEN - 1); diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_cmds.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_cmds.h index c30d6d6f0f3a..9e17d6a7ab8c 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_cmds.h +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_cmds.h @@ -2427,7 +2427,7 @@ int be_cmd_set_beacon_state(struct be_adapter *adapter, u8 port_num, u8 beacon, int be_cmd_get_beacon_state(struct be_adapter *adapter, u8 port_num, u32 *state); int be_cmd_read_port_transceiver_data(struct be_adapter *adapter, - u8 page_num, u8 *data); + u8 page_num, u32 off, u32 len, u8 *data); int be_cmd_query_cable_type(struct be_adapter *adapter); int be_cmd_query_sfp_info(struct be_adapter *adapter); int lancer_cmd_read_object(struct be_adapter *adapter, struct be_dma_mem *cmd, diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_ethtool.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_ethtool.c index 5bb5abf99588..7cc1f41971c5 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_ethtool.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_ethtool.c @@ -1339,7 +1339,7 @@ static int be_get_module_info(struct net_device *netdev, return -EOPNOTSUPP; status = be_cmd_read_port_transceiver_data(adapter, TR_PAGE_A0, - page_data); + 0, PAGE_DATA_LEN, page_data); if (!status) { if (!page_data[SFP_PLUS_SFF_8472_COMP]) { modinfo->type = ETH_MODULE_SFF_8079; @@ -1357,25 +1357,32 @@ static int be_get_module_eeprom(struct net_device *netdev, { struct be_adapter *adapter = netdev_priv(netdev); int status; + u32 begin, end; if (!check_privilege(adapter, MAX_PRIVILEGES)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; - status = be_cmd_read_port_transceiver_data(adapter, TR_PAGE_A0, - data); - if (status) - goto err; + begin = eeprom->offset; + end = eeprom->offset + eeprom->len; - if (eeprom->offset + eeprom->len > PAGE_DATA_LEN) { - status = be_cmd_read_port_transceiver_data(adapter, - TR_PAGE_A2, - data + - PAGE_DATA_LEN); + if (begin < PAGE_DATA_LEN) { + status = be_cmd_read_port_transceiver_data(adapter, TR_PAGE_A0, begin, + min_t(u32, end, PAGE_DATA_LEN) - begin, + data); + if (status) + goto err; + + data += PAGE_DATA_LEN - begin; + begin = PAGE_DATA_LEN; + } + + if (end > PAGE_DATA_LEN) { + status = be_cmd_read_port_transceiver_data(adapter, TR_PAGE_A2, + begin - PAGE_DATA_LEN, + end - begin, data); if (status) goto err; } - if (eeprom->offset) - memcpy(data, data + eeprom->offset, eeprom->len); err: return be_cmd_status(status); } From 6727f39e99e0f545d815edebb6c94228485427ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Mon, 18 Jul 2022 10:26:39 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0990/1091] ipv4: Fix a data-race around sysctl_fib_multipath_use_neigh. [ Upstream commit 87507bcb4f5de16bb419e9509d874f4db6c0ad0f ] While reading sysctl_fib_multipath_use_neigh, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader. Fixes: a6db4494d218 ("net: ipv4: Consider failed nexthops in multipath routes") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c b/net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c index 16fe03461563..28da0443f3e9 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c +++ b/net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c @@ -2209,7 +2209,7 @@ void fib_select_multipath(struct fib_result *res, int hash) } change_nexthops(fi) { - if (net->ipv4.sysctl_fib_multipath_use_neigh) { + if (READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_fib_multipath_use_neigh)) { if (!fib_good_nh(nexthop_nh)) continue; if (!first) { From f39b03bd727a8fea62e82f10fe2e0d753b9930ff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Mon, 18 Jul 2022 10:26:43 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0991/1091] udp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_udp_l3mdev_accept. [ Upstream commit 3d72bb4188c708bb16758c60822fc4dda7a95174 ] While reading sysctl_udp_l3mdev_accept, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader. Fixes: 63a6fff353d0 ("net: Avoid receiving packets with an l3mdev on unbound UDP sockets") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- include/net/udp.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/net/udp.h b/include/net/udp.h index 9787a42f7ed3..e66854e767dc 100644 --- a/include/net/udp.h +++ b/include/net/udp.h @@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ static inline bool udp_sk_bound_dev_eq(struct net *net, int bound_dev_if, int dif, int sdif) { #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NET_L3_MASTER_DEV) - return inet_bound_dev_eq(!!net->ipv4.sysctl_udp_l3mdev_accept, + return inet_bound_dev_eq(!!READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_udp_l3mdev_accept), bound_dev_if, dif, sdif); #else return inet_bound_dev_eq(true, bound_dev_if, dif, sdif); From 795aee11fda4d73615bc56b9111052f32da64830 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Mon, 18 Jul 2022 10:26:44 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0992/1091] tcp: Fix data-races around sysctl knobs related to SYN option. [ Upstream commit 3666f666e99600518ab20982af04a078bbdad277 ] While reading these knobs, they can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to their readers. - tcp_sack - tcp_window_scaling - tcp_timestamps Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/crypto/chelsio/chtls/chtls_cm.c | 6 +++--- net/core/secure_seq.c | 4 ++-- net/ipv4/syncookies.c | 6 +++--- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 6 +++--- net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 10 +++++----- 5 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/chelsio/chtls/chtls_cm.c b/drivers/crypto/chelsio/chtls/chtls_cm.c index 82b76df43ae5..3b79bcd03e7b 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/chelsio/chtls/chtls_cm.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/chelsio/chtls/chtls_cm.c @@ -1103,8 +1103,8 @@ static struct sock *chtls_recv_sock(struct sock *lsk, csk->sndbuf = newsk->sk_sndbuf; csk->smac_idx = ((struct port_info *)netdev_priv(ndev))->smt_idx; RCV_WSCALE(tp) = select_rcv_wscale(tcp_full_space(newsk), - sock_net(newsk)-> - ipv4.sysctl_tcp_window_scaling, + READ_ONCE(sock_net(newsk)-> + ipv4.sysctl_tcp_window_scaling), tp->window_clamp); neigh_release(n); inet_inherit_port(&tcp_hashinfo, lsk, newsk); @@ -1235,7 +1235,7 @@ static void chtls_pass_accept_request(struct sock *sk, chtls_set_req_addr(oreq, iph->daddr, iph->saddr); ip_dsfield = ipv4_get_dsfield(iph); if (req->tcpopt.wsf <= 14 && - sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_window_scaling) { + READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_window_scaling)) { inet_rsk(oreq)->wscale_ok = 1; inet_rsk(oreq)->snd_wscale = req->tcpopt.wsf; } diff --git a/net/core/secure_seq.c b/net/core/secure_seq.c index a1867c65ac63..6d86506e315f 100644 --- a/net/core/secure_seq.c +++ b/net/core/secure_seq.c @@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ u32 secure_tcpv6_ts_off(const struct net *net, .daddr = *(struct in6_addr *)daddr, }; - if (net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_timestamps != 1) + if (READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_timestamps) != 1) return 0; ts_secret_init(); @@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral); #ifdef CONFIG_INET u32 secure_tcp_ts_off(const struct net *net, __be32 saddr, __be32 daddr) { - if (net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_timestamps != 1) + if (READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_timestamps) != 1) return 0; ts_secret_init(); diff --git a/net/ipv4/syncookies.c b/net/ipv4/syncookies.c index f1cbf8911844..3f6c9514c7a9 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/syncookies.c +++ b/net/ipv4/syncookies.c @@ -243,12 +243,12 @@ bool cookie_timestamp_decode(const struct net *net, return true; } - if (!net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_timestamps) + if (!READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_timestamps)) return false; tcp_opt->sack_ok = (options & TS_OPT_SACK) ? TCP_SACK_SEEN : 0; - if (tcp_opt->sack_ok && !net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_sack) + if (tcp_opt->sack_ok && !READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_sack)) return false; if ((options & TS_OPT_WSCALE_MASK) == TS_OPT_WSCALE_MASK) @@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ bool cookie_timestamp_decode(const struct net *net, tcp_opt->wscale_ok = 1; tcp_opt->snd_wscale = options & TS_OPT_WSCALE_MASK; - return net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_window_scaling != 0; + return READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_window_scaling) != 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(cookie_timestamp_decode); diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index c1f26603cd2c..28df6c3feb3f 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -3906,7 +3906,7 @@ void tcp_parse_options(const struct net *net, break; case TCPOPT_WINDOW: if (opsize == TCPOLEN_WINDOW && th->syn && - !estab && net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_window_scaling) { + !estab && READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_window_scaling)) { __u8 snd_wscale = *(__u8 *)ptr; opt_rx->wscale_ok = 1; if (snd_wscale > TCP_MAX_WSCALE) { @@ -3922,7 +3922,7 @@ void tcp_parse_options(const struct net *net, case TCPOPT_TIMESTAMP: if ((opsize == TCPOLEN_TIMESTAMP) && ((estab && opt_rx->tstamp_ok) || - (!estab && net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_timestamps))) { + (!estab && READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_timestamps)))) { opt_rx->saw_tstamp = 1; opt_rx->rcv_tsval = get_unaligned_be32(ptr); opt_rx->rcv_tsecr = get_unaligned_be32(ptr + 4); @@ -3930,7 +3930,7 @@ void tcp_parse_options(const struct net *net, break; case TCPOPT_SACK_PERM: if (opsize == TCPOLEN_SACK_PERM && th->syn && - !estab && net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_sack) { + !estab && READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_sack)) { opt_rx->sack_ok = TCP_SACK_SEEN; tcp_sack_reset(opt_rx); } diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c index 8b602a202acb..5cc345c4006e 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c @@ -620,18 +620,18 @@ static unsigned int tcp_syn_options(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, opts->mss = tcp_advertise_mss(sk); remaining -= TCPOLEN_MSS_ALIGNED; - if (likely(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_timestamps && !*md5)) { + if (likely(READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_timestamps) && !*md5)) { opts->options |= OPTION_TS; opts->tsval = tcp_skb_timestamp(skb) + tp->tsoffset; opts->tsecr = tp->rx_opt.ts_recent; remaining -= TCPOLEN_TSTAMP_ALIGNED; } - if (likely(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_window_scaling)) { + if (likely(READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_window_scaling))) { opts->ws = tp->rx_opt.rcv_wscale; opts->options |= OPTION_WSCALE; remaining -= TCPOLEN_WSCALE_ALIGNED; } - if (likely(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_sack)) { + if (likely(READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_sack))) { opts->options |= OPTION_SACK_ADVERTISE; if (unlikely(!(OPTION_TS & opts->options))) remaining -= TCPOLEN_SACKPERM_ALIGNED; @@ -3407,7 +3407,7 @@ static void tcp_connect_init(struct sock *sk) * See tcp_input.c:tcp_rcv_state_process case TCP_SYN_SENT. */ tp->tcp_header_len = sizeof(struct tcphdr); - if (sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_timestamps) + if (READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_timestamps)) tp->tcp_header_len += TCPOLEN_TSTAMP_ALIGNED; #ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG @@ -3443,7 +3443,7 @@ static void tcp_connect_init(struct sock *sk) tp->advmss - (tp->rx_opt.ts_recent_stamp ? tp->tcp_header_len - sizeof(struct tcphdr) : 0), &tp->rcv_wnd, &tp->window_clamp, - sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_window_scaling, + READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_window_scaling), &rcv_wscale, rcv_wnd); From 83767fe800a311370330d4ec83aa76093b744a80 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Mon, 18 Jul 2022 10:26:45 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0993/1091] tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_early_retrans. [ Upstream commit 52e65865deb6a36718a463030500f16530eaab74 ] While reading sysctl_tcp_early_retrans, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader. Fixes: eed530b6c676 ("tcp: early retransmit") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c index 5cc345c4006e..72ee1fca0501 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c @@ -2509,7 +2509,7 @@ bool tcp_schedule_loss_probe(struct sock *sk, bool advancing_rto) if (rcu_access_pointer(tp->fastopen_rsk)) return false; - early_retrans = sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_early_retrans; + early_retrans = READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_early_retrans); /* Schedule a loss probe in 2*RTT for SACK capable connections * not in loss recovery, that are either limited by cwnd or application. */ From 92c35113c63306091df9211375eebd0abd8c2160 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Mon, 18 Jul 2022 10:26:46 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0994/1091] tcp: Fix data-races around sysctl_tcp_recovery. [ Upstream commit e7d2ef837e14a971a05f60ea08c47f3fed1a36e4 ] While reading sysctl_tcp_recovery, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers. Fixes: 4f41b1c58a32 ("tcp: use RACK to detect losses") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 3 ++- net/ipv4/tcp_recovery.c | 6 ++++-- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index 28df6c3feb3f..2f57c365ebd5 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -1950,7 +1950,8 @@ static inline void tcp_init_undo(struct tcp_sock *tp) static bool tcp_is_rack(const struct sock *sk) { - return sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_recovery & TCP_RACK_LOSS_DETECTION; + return READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_recovery) & + TCP_RACK_LOSS_DETECTION; } /* If we detect SACK reneging, forget all SACK information diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_recovery.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_recovery.c index 8757bb6cb1d9..22ec8dcc1428 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_recovery.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_recovery.c @@ -33,7 +33,8 @@ static u32 tcp_rack_reo_wnd(const struct sock *sk) return 0; if (tp->sacked_out >= tp->reordering && - !(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_recovery & TCP_RACK_NO_DUPTHRESH)) + !(READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_recovery) & + TCP_RACK_NO_DUPTHRESH)) return 0; } @@ -204,7 +205,8 @@ void tcp_rack_update_reo_wnd(struct sock *sk, struct rate_sample *rs) { struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); - if (sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_recovery & TCP_RACK_STATIC_REO_WND || + if ((READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_recovery) & + TCP_RACK_STATIC_REO_WND) || !rs->prior_delivered) return; From 492f3713b282c0e67e951cd804edd22eccc25412 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Mon, 18 Jul 2022 10:26:47 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0995/1091] tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_thin_linear_timeouts. [ Upstream commit 7c6f2a86ca590d5187a073d987e9599985fb1c7c ] While reading sysctl_tcp_thin_linear_timeouts, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader. Fixes: 36e31b0af587 ("net: TCP thin linear timeouts") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c index 26da44e196ed..a0107eb02ae4 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c @@ -569,7 +569,7 @@ out_reset_timer: * linear-timeout retransmissions into a black hole */ if (sk->sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED && - (tp->thin_lto || net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_thin_linear_timeouts) && + (tp->thin_lto || READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_thin_linear_timeouts)) && tcp_stream_is_thin(tp) && icsk->icsk_retransmits <= TCP_THIN_LINEAR_RETRIES) { icsk->icsk_backoff = 0; From 369d99c2b89f54473adcf9acdf40ea562b5a6e0e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Mon, 18 Jul 2022 10:26:48 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0996/1091] tcp: Fix data-races around sysctl_tcp_slow_start_after_idle. [ Upstream commit 4845b5713ab18a1bb6e31d1fbb4d600240b8b691 ] While reading sysctl_tcp_slow_start_after_idle, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers. Fixes: 35089bb203f4 ("[TCP]: Add tcp_slow_start_after_idle sysctl.") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- include/net/tcp.h | 4 ++-- net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/tcp.h b/include/net/tcp.h index eb984ec22f22..aaf1d5d5a13b 100644 --- a/include/net/tcp.h +++ b/include/net/tcp.h @@ -1373,8 +1373,8 @@ static inline void tcp_slow_start_after_idle_check(struct sock *sk) struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); s32 delta; - if (!sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_slow_start_after_idle || tp->packets_out || - ca_ops->cong_control) + if (!READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_slow_start_after_idle) || + tp->packets_out || ca_ops->cong_control) return; delta = tcp_jiffies32 - tp->lsndtime; if (delta > inet_csk(sk)->icsk_rto) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c index 72ee1fca0501..5d9a1a498a18 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c @@ -1673,7 +1673,7 @@ static void tcp_cwnd_validate(struct sock *sk, bool is_cwnd_limited) if (tp->packets_out > tp->snd_cwnd_used) tp->snd_cwnd_used = tp->packets_out; - if (sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_slow_start_after_idle && + if (READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_slow_start_after_idle) && (s32)(tcp_jiffies32 - tp->snd_cwnd_stamp) >= inet_csk(sk)->icsk_rto && !ca_ops->cong_control) tcp_cwnd_application_limited(sk); From 7f68bed16c7bae60ebce659010e67a85c9dca4f0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Mon, 18 Jul 2022 10:26:49 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0997/1091] tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_retrans_collapse. [ Upstream commit 1a63cb91f0c2fcdeced6d6edee8d1d886583d139 ] While reading sysctl_tcp_retrans_collapse, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c index 5d9a1a498a18..97f29ece3800 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c @@ -2871,7 +2871,7 @@ static void tcp_retrans_try_collapse(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *to, struct sk_buff *skb = to, *tmp; bool first = true; - if (!sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_retrans_collapse) + if (!READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_retrans_collapse)) return; if (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_flags & TCPHDR_SYN) return; From 6cc566df6806fcc583511be0ef073a209346ef36 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Mon, 18 Jul 2022 10:26:50 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0998/1091] tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_stdurg. [ Upstream commit 4e08ed41cb1194009fc1a916a59ce3ed4afd77cd ] While reading sysctl_tcp_stdurg, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index 2f57c365ebd5..f9884956aa13 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -5356,7 +5356,7 @@ static void tcp_check_urg(struct sock *sk, const struct tcphdr *th) struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); u32 ptr = ntohs(th->urg_ptr); - if (ptr && !sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_stdurg) + if (ptr && !READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_stdurg)) ptr--; ptr += ntohl(th->seq); From c64b99819de44c83dc04960a98c76eb552a7b841 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Mon, 18 Jul 2022 10:26:51 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 0999/1091] tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_rfc1337. [ Upstream commit 0b484c91911e758e53656d570de58c2ed81ec6f2 ] While reading sysctl_tcp_rfc1337, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c index 9b038cb0a43d..324f43fadb37 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c @@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ tcp_timewait_state_process(struct inet_timewait_sock *tw, struct sk_buff *skb, * Oh well... nobody has a sufficient solution to this * protocol bug yet. */ - if (twsk_net(tw)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_rfc1337 == 0) { + if (!READ_ONCE(twsk_net(tw)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_rfc1337)) { kill: inet_twsk_deschedule_put(tw); return TCP_TW_SUCCESS; From 50a1d3d097503a90cf84ebe120afcde37e9c33b3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Mon, 18 Jul 2022 10:26:53 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 1000/1091] tcp: Fix data-races around sysctl_tcp_max_reordering. [ Upstream commit a11e5b3e7a59fde1a90b0eaeaa82320495cf8cae ] While reading sysctl_tcp_max_reordering, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers. Fixes: dca145ffaa8d ("tcp: allow for bigger reordering level") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index f9884956aa13..c151c4dd4ae6 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -905,7 +905,7 @@ static void tcp_check_sack_reordering(struct sock *sk, const u32 low_seq, tp->undo_marker ? tp->undo_retrans : 0); #endif tp->reordering = min_t(u32, (metric + mss - 1) / mss, - sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_max_reordering); + READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_max_reordering)); } /* This exciting event is worth to be remembered. 8) */ @@ -1886,7 +1886,7 @@ static void tcp_check_reno_reordering(struct sock *sk, const int addend) return; tp->reordering = min_t(u32, tp->packets_out + addend, - sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_max_reordering); + READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_max_reordering)); tp->reord_seen++; NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPRENOREORDER); } From 76668d2a2f367d25ff448e6d7087406af7d7bb2b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Marc Kleine-Budde Date: Tue, 19 Jul 2022 09:22:35 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 1001/1091] spi: bcm2835: bcm2835_spi_handle_err(): fix NULL pointer deref for non DMA transfers commit 4ceaa684459d414992acbefb4e4c31f2dfc50641 upstream. In case a IRQ based transfer times out the bcm2835_spi_handle_err() function is called. Since commit 1513ceee70f2 ("spi: bcm2835: Drop dma_pending flag") the TX and RX DMA transfers are unconditionally canceled, leading to NULL pointer derefs if ctlr->dma_tx or ctlr->dma_rx are not set. Fix the NULL pointer deref by checking that ctlr->dma_tx and ctlr->dma_rx are valid pointers before accessing them. Fixes: 1513ceee70f2 ("spi: bcm2835: Drop dma_pending flag") Cc: Lukas Wunner Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220719072234.2782764-1-mkl@pengutronix.de Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/spi/spi-bcm2835.c | 12 ++++++++---- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/spi/spi-bcm2835.c b/drivers/spi/spi-bcm2835.c index c86c3ac6097d..b1003876cb35 100644 --- a/drivers/spi/spi-bcm2835.c +++ b/drivers/spi/spi-bcm2835.c @@ -1159,10 +1159,14 @@ static void bcm2835_spi_handle_err(struct spi_controller *ctlr, struct bcm2835_spi *bs = spi_controller_get_devdata(ctlr); /* if an error occurred and we have an active dma, then terminate */ - dmaengine_terminate_sync(ctlr->dma_tx); - bs->tx_dma_active = false; - dmaengine_terminate_sync(ctlr->dma_rx); - bs->rx_dma_active = false; + if (ctlr->dma_tx) { + dmaengine_terminate_sync(ctlr->dma_tx); + bs->tx_dma_active = false; + } + if (ctlr->dma_rx) { + dmaengine_terminate_sync(ctlr->dma_rx); + bs->rx_dma_active = false; + } bcm2835_spi_undo_prologue(bs); /* and reset */ From a1f8765f68bc9bf5744b365bb9f5e0b6db93edfe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wang Cheng Date: Thu, 19 May 2022 14:08:54 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 1002/1091] mm/mempolicy: fix uninit-value in mpol_rebind_policy() commit 018160ad314d75b1409129b2247b614a9f35894c upstream. mpol_set_nodemask()(mm/mempolicy.c) does not set up nodemask when pol->mode is MPOL_LOCAL. Check pol->mode before access pol->w.cpuset_mems_allowed in mpol_rebind_policy()(mm/mempolicy.c). BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in mpol_rebind_policy mm/mempolicy.c:352 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in mpol_rebind_task+0x2ac/0x2c0 mm/mempolicy.c:368 mpol_rebind_policy mm/mempolicy.c:352 [inline] mpol_rebind_task+0x2ac/0x2c0 mm/mempolicy.c:368 cpuset_change_task_nodemask kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c:1711 [inline] cpuset_attach+0x787/0x15e0 kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c:2278 cgroup_migrate_execute+0x1023/0x1d20 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:2515 cgroup_migrate kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:2771 [inline] cgroup_attach_task+0x540/0x8b0 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:2804 __cgroup1_procs_write+0x5cc/0x7a0 kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c:520 cgroup1_tasks_write+0x94/0xb0 kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c:539 cgroup_file_write+0x4c2/0x9e0 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:3852 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x66a/0x9f0 fs/kernfs/file.c:296 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2162 [inline] new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:503 [inline] vfs_write+0x1318/0x2030 fs/read_write.c:590 ksys_write+0x28b/0x510 fs/read_write.c:643 __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:655 [inline] __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:652 [inline] __x64_sys_write+0xdb/0x120 fs/read_write.c:652 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x54/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:82 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Uninit was created at: slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:524 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3251 [inline] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3259 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc+0x902/0x11c0 mm/slub.c:3264 mpol_new mm/mempolicy.c:293 [inline] do_set_mempolicy+0x421/0xb70 mm/mempolicy.c:853 kernel_set_mempolicy mm/mempolicy.c:1504 [inline] __do_sys_set_mempolicy mm/mempolicy.c:1510 [inline] __se_sys_set_mempolicy+0x44c/0xb60 mm/mempolicy.c:1507 __x64_sys_set_mempolicy+0xd8/0x110 mm/mempolicy.c:1507 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x54/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:82 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae KMSAN: uninit-value in mpol_rebind_task (2) https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=d6eb90f952c2a5de9ea718a1b873c55cb13b59dc This patch seems to fix below bug too. KMSAN: uninit-value in mpol_rebind_mm (2) https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=f2fecd0d7013f54ec4162f60743a2b28df40926b The uninit-value is pol->w.cpuset_mems_allowed in mpol_rebind_policy(). When syzkaller reproducer runs to the beginning of mpol_new(), mpol_new() mm/mempolicy.c do_mbind() mm/mempolicy.c kernel_mbind() mm/mempolicy.c `mode` is 1(MPOL_PREFERRED), nodes_empty(*nodes) is `true` and `flags` is 0. Then mode = MPOL_LOCAL; ... policy->mode = mode; policy->flags = flags; will be executed. So in mpol_set_nodemask(), mpol_set_nodemask() mm/mempolicy.c do_mbind() kernel_mbind() pol->mode is 4 (MPOL_LOCAL), that `nodemask` in `pol` is not initialized, which will be accessed in mpol_rebind_policy(). Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220512123428.fq3wofedp6oiotd4@ppc.localdomain Signed-off-by: Wang Cheng Reported-by: Tested-by: Cc: David Rientjes Cc: Vlastimil Babka Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- mm/mempolicy.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/mm/mempolicy.c b/mm/mempolicy.c index d79ab5116a7b..f7b231f67156 100644 --- a/mm/mempolicy.c +++ b/mm/mempolicy.c @@ -348,7 +348,7 @@ static void mpol_rebind_preferred(struct mempolicy *pol, */ static void mpol_rebind_policy(struct mempolicy *pol, const nodemask_t *newmask) { - if (!pol) + if (!pol || pol->mode == MPOL_LOCAL) return; if (!mpol_store_user_nodemask(pol) && !(pol->flags & MPOL_F_LOCAL) && nodes_equal(pol->w.cpuset_mems_allowed, *newmask)) From 4f1d21c77b15b6eb60f2929bca33e34f95383b24 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Thu, 7 Jul 2022 12:39:00 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 1003/1091] bpf: Make sure mac_header was set before using it commit 0326195f523a549e0a9d7fd44c70b26fd7265090 upstream. Classic BPF has a way to load bytes starting from the mac header. Some skbs do not have a mac header, and skb_mac_header() in this case is returning a pointer that 65535 bytes after skb->head. Existing range check in bpf_internal_load_pointer_neg_helper() was properly kicking and no illegal access was happening. New sanity check in skb_mac_header() is firing, so we need to avoid it. WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 28990 at include/linux/skbuff.h:2785 skb_mac_header include/linux/skbuff.h:2785 [inline] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 28990 at include/linux/skbuff.h:2785 bpf_internal_load_pointer_neg_helper+0x1b1/0x1c0 kernel/bpf/core.c:74 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 28990 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc4-syzkaller-00865-g4874fb9484be #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 06/29/2022 RIP: 0010:skb_mac_header include/linux/skbuff.h:2785 [inline] RIP: 0010:bpf_internal_load_pointer_neg_helper+0x1b1/0x1c0 kernel/bpf/core.c:74 Code: ff ff 45 31 f6 e9 5a ff ff ff e8 aa 27 40 00 e9 3b ff ff ff e8 90 27 40 00 e9 df fe ff ff e8 86 27 40 00 eb 9e e8 2f 2c f3 ff <0f> 0b eb b1 e8 96 27 40 00 e9 79 fe ff ff 90 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000309f668 EFLAGS: 00010216 RAX: 0000000000000118 RBX: ffffffffffeff00c RCX: ffffc9000e417000 RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: ffffffff81873f21 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: ffff8880842878c0 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 000000000000ffff R10: 000000000000ffff R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000004 R13: ffff88803ac56c00 R14: 000000000000ffff R15: dffffc0000000000 FS: 00007f5c88a16700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fdaa9f6c058 CR3: 000000003a82c000 CR4: 00000000003506e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: ____bpf_skb_load_helper_32 net/core/filter.c:276 [inline] bpf_skb_load_helper_32+0x191/0x220 net/core/filter.c:264 Fixes: f9aefd6b2aa3 ("net: warn if mac header was not set") Reported-by: syzbot Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220707123900.945305-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- kernel/bpf/core.c | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c index 1238ef9c569d..6b33a8a148b8 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/core.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c @@ -64,11 +64,13 @@ void *bpf_internal_load_pointer_neg_helper(const struct sk_buff *skb, int k, uns { u8 *ptr = NULL; - if (k >= SKF_NET_OFF) + if (k >= SKF_NET_OFF) { ptr = skb_network_header(skb) + k - SKF_NET_OFF; - else if (k >= SKF_LL_OFF) + } else if (k >= SKF_LL_OFF) { + if (unlikely(!skb_mac_header_was_set(skb))) + return NULL; ptr = skb_mac_header(skb) + k - SKF_LL_OFF; - + } if (ptr >= skb->head && ptr + size <= skb_tail_pointer(skb)) return ptr; From bc7581e36d40891110179251e6447a9483d6f40e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexander Aring Date: Wed, 6 Apr 2022 13:34:16 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 1004/1091] dlm: fix pending remove if msg allocation fails [ Upstream commit ba58995909b5098ca4003af65b0ccd5a8d13dd25 ] This patch unsets ls_remove_len and ls_remove_name if a message allocation of a remove messages fails. In this case we never send a remove message out but set the per ls ls_remove_len ls_remove_name variable for a pending remove. Unset those variable should indicate possible waiters in wait_pending_remove() that no pending remove is going on at this moment. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexander Aring Signed-off-by: David Teigland Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/dlm/lock.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/dlm/lock.c b/fs/dlm/lock.c index 4ae8becdb51d..9165bf56c6e8 100644 --- a/fs/dlm/lock.c +++ b/fs/dlm/lock.c @@ -4067,13 +4067,14 @@ static void send_repeat_remove(struct dlm_ls *ls, char *ms_name, int len) rv = _create_message(ls, sizeof(struct dlm_message) + len, dir_nodeid, DLM_MSG_REMOVE, &ms, &mh); if (rv) - return; + goto out; memcpy(ms->m_extra, name, len); ms->m_hash = hash; send_message(mh, ms); +out: spin_lock(&ls->ls_remove_spin); ls->ls_remove_len = 0; memset(ls->ls_remove_name, 0, DLM_RESNAME_MAXLEN); From 3f71d0e292eb144ea1a5524e503ede6a33a86696 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: GUO Zihua Date: Thu, 7 Apr 2022 10:16:19 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 1005/1091] ima: remove the IMA_TEMPLATE Kconfig option [ Upstream commit 891163adf180bc369b2f11c9dfce6d2758d2a5bd ] The original 'ima' measurement list template contains a hash, defined as 20 bytes, and a null terminated pathname, limited to 255 characters. Other measurement list templates permit both larger hashes and longer pathnames. When the "ima" template is configured as the default, a new measurement list template (ima_template=) must be specified before specifying a larger hash algorithm (ima_hash=) on the boot command line. To avoid this boot command line ordering issue, remove the legacy "ima" template configuration option, allowing it to still be specified on the boot command line. The root cause of this issue is that during the processing of ima_hash, we would try to check whether the hash algorithm is compatible with the template. If the template is not set at the moment we do the check, we check the algorithm against the configured default template. If the default template is "ima", then we reject any hash algorithm other than sha1 and md5. For example, if the compiled default template is "ima", and the default algorithm is sha1 (which is the current default). In the cmdline, we put in "ima_hash=sha256 ima_template=ima-ng". The expected behavior would be that ima starts with ima-ng as the template and sha256 as the hash algorithm. However, during the processing of "ima_hash=", "ima_template=" has not been processed yet, and hash_setup would check the configured hash algorithm against the compiled default: ima, and reject sha256. So at the end, the hash algorithm that is actually used will be sha1. With template "ima" removed from the configured default, we ensure that the default tempalte would at least be "ima-ng" which allows for basically any hash algorithm. This change would not break the algorithm compatibility checks for IMA. Fixes: 4286587dccd43 ("ima: add Kconfig default measurement list template") Signed-off-by: GUO Zihua Cc: Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 12 +++++------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig index 748f3ee27b23..44b3315f3235 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig @@ -69,10 +69,9 @@ choice hash, defined as 20 bytes, and a null terminated pathname, limited to 255 characters. The 'ima-ng' measurement list template permits both larger hash digests and longer - pathnames. + pathnames. The configured default template can be replaced + by specifying "ima_template=" on the boot command line. - config IMA_TEMPLATE - bool "ima" config IMA_NG_TEMPLATE bool "ima-ng (default)" config IMA_SIG_TEMPLATE @@ -82,7 +81,6 @@ endchoice config IMA_DEFAULT_TEMPLATE string depends on IMA - default "ima" if IMA_TEMPLATE default "ima-ng" if IMA_NG_TEMPLATE default "ima-sig" if IMA_SIG_TEMPLATE @@ -102,15 +100,15 @@ choice config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA256 bool "SHA256" - depends on CRYPTO_SHA256=y && !IMA_TEMPLATE + depends on CRYPTO_SHA256=y config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA512 bool "SHA512" - depends on CRYPTO_SHA512=y && !IMA_TEMPLATE + depends on CRYPTO_SHA512=y config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_WP512 bool "WP512" - depends on CRYPTO_WP512=y && !IMA_TEMPLATE + depends on CRYPTO_WP512=y endchoice config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH From 68b4ee68e8c8800cf8d6b61cc74b4031a0742a4c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Will Deacon Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2019 11:58:53 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 1006/1091] locking/refcount: Define constants for saturation and max refcount values [ Upstream commit 23e6b169c9917fbd77534f8c5f378cb073f548bd ] The REFCOUNT_FULL implementation uses a different saturation point than the x86 implementation, which means that the shared refcount code in lib/refcount.c (e.g. refcount_dec_not_one()) needs to be aware of the difference. Rather than duplicate the definitions from the lkdtm driver, instead move them into and update all references accordingly. Signed-off-by: Will Deacon Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel Reviewed-by: Kees Cook Tested-by: Hanjun Guo Cc: Ard Biesheuvel Cc: Elena Reshetova Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Thomas Gleixner Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191121115902.2551-2-will@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/misc/lkdtm/refcount.c | 8 -------- include/linux/refcount.h | 10 +++++++++- lib/refcount.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++---------------- 3 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/refcount.c b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/refcount.c index 0a146b32da13..abf3b7c1f686 100644 --- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/refcount.c +++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/refcount.c @@ -6,14 +6,6 @@ #include "lkdtm.h" #include -#ifdef CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL -#define REFCOUNT_MAX (UINT_MAX - 1) -#define REFCOUNT_SATURATED UINT_MAX -#else -#define REFCOUNT_MAX INT_MAX -#define REFCOUNT_SATURATED (INT_MIN / 2) -#endif - static void overflow_check(refcount_t *ref) { switch (refcount_read(ref)) { diff --git a/include/linux/refcount.h b/include/linux/refcount.h index e28cce21bad6..79f62e8d2256 100644 --- a/include/linux/refcount.h +++ b/include/linux/refcount.h @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ #include #include +#include #include struct mutex; @@ -12,7 +13,7 @@ struct mutex; * struct refcount_t - variant of atomic_t specialized for reference counts * @refs: atomic_t counter field * - * The counter saturates at UINT_MAX and will not move once + * The counter saturates at REFCOUNT_SATURATED and will not move once * there. This avoids wrapping the counter and causing 'spurious' * use-after-free bugs. */ @@ -56,6 +57,9 @@ extern void refcount_dec_checked(refcount_t *r); #ifdef CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL +#define REFCOUNT_MAX (UINT_MAX - 1) +#define REFCOUNT_SATURATED UINT_MAX + #define refcount_add_not_zero refcount_add_not_zero_checked #define refcount_add refcount_add_checked @@ -68,6 +72,10 @@ extern void refcount_dec_checked(refcount_t *r); #define refcount_dec refcount_dec_checked #else + +#define REFCOUNT_MAX INT_MAX +#define REFCOUNT_SATURATED (INT_MIN / 2) + # ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_REFCOUNT # include # else diff --git a/lib/refcount.c b/lib/refcount.c index 6e904af0fb3e..48b78a423d7d 100644 --- a/lib/refcount.c +++ b/lib/refcount.c @@ -5,8 +5,8 @@ * The interface matches the atomic_t interface (to aid in porting) but only * provides the few functions one should use for reference counting. * - * It differs in that the counter saturates at UINT_MAX and will not move once - * there. This avoids wrapping the counter and causing 'spurious' + * It differs in that the counter saturates at REFCOUNT_SATURATED and will not + * move once there. This avoids wrapping the counter and causing 'spurious' * use-after-free issues. * * Memory ordering rules are slightly relaxed wrt regular atomic_t functions @@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ * @i: the value to add to the refcount * @r: the refcount * - * Will saturate at UINT_MAX and WARN. + * Will saturate at REFCOUNT_SATURATED and WARN. * * Provides no memory ordering, it is assumed the caller has guaranteed the * object memory to be stable (RCU, etc.). It does provide a control dependency @@ -69,16 +69,17 @@ bool refcount_add_not_zero_checked(unsigned int i, refcount_t *r) if (!val) return false; - if (unlikely(val == UINT_MAX)) + if (unlikely(val == REFCOUNT_SATURATED)) return true; new = val + i; if (new < val) - new = UINT_MAX; + new = REFCOUNT_SATURATED; } while (!atomic_try_cmpxchg_relaxed(&r->refs, &val, new)); - WARN_ONCE(new == UINT_MAX, "refcount_t: saturated; leaking memory.\n"); + WARN_ONCE(new == REFCOUNT_SATURATED, + "refcount_t: saturated; leaking memory.\n"); return true; } @@ -89,7 +90,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(refcount_add_not_zero_checked); * @i: the value to add to the refcount * @r: the refcount * - * Similar to atomic_add(), but will saturate at UINT_MAX and WARN. + * Similar to atomic_add(), but will saturate at REFCOUNT_SATURATED and WARN. * * Provides no memory ordering, it is assumed the caller has guaranteed the * object memory to be stable (RCU, etc.). It does provide a control dependency @@ -110,7 +111,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(refcount_add_checked); * refcount_inc_not_zero_checked - increment a refcount unless it is 0 * @r: the refcount to increment * - * Similar to atomic_inc_not_zero(), but will saturate at UINT_MAX and WARN. + * Similar to atomic_inc_not_zero(), but will saturate at REFCOUNT_SATURATED + * and WARN. * * Provides no memory ordering, it is assumed the caller has guaranteed the * object memory to be stable (RCU, etc.). It does provide a control dependency @@ -133,7 +135,8 @@ bool refcount_inc_not_zero_checked(refcount_t *r) } while (!atomic_try_cmpxchg_relaxed(&r->refs, &val, new)); - WARN_ONCE(new == UINT_MAX, "refcount_t: saturated; leaking memory.\n"); + WARN_ONCE(new == REFCOUNT_SATURATED, + "refcount_t: saturated; leaking memory.\n"); return true; } @@ -143,7 +146,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(refcount_inc_not_zero_checked); * refcount_inc_checked - increment a refcount * @r: the refcount to increment * - * Similar to atomic_inc(), but will saturate at UINT_MAX and WARN. + * Similar to atomic_inc(), but will saturate at REFCOUNT_SATURATED and WARN. * * Provides no memory ordering, it is assumed the caller already has a * reference on the object. @@ -164,7 +167,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(refcount_inc_checked); * * Similar to atomic_dec_and_test(), but it will WARN, return false and * ultimately leak on underflow and will fail to decrement when saturated - * at UINT_MAX. + * at REFCOUNT_SATURATED. * * Provides release memory ordering, such that prior loads and stores are done * before, and provides an acquire ordering on success such that free() @@ -182,7 +185,7 @@ bool refcount_sub_and_test_checked(unsigned int i, refcount_t *r) unsigned int new, val = atomic_read(&r->refs); do { - if (unlikely(val == UINT_MAX)) + if (unlikely(val == REFCOUNT_SATURATED)) return false; new = val - i; @@ -207,7 +210,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(refcount_sub_and_test_checked); * @r: the refcount * * Similar to atomic_dec_and_test(), it will WARN on underflow and fail to - * decrement when saturated at UINT_MAX. + * decrement when saturated at REFCOUNT_SATURATED. * * Provides release memory ordering, such that prior loads and stores are done * before, and provides an acquire ordering on success such that free() @@ -226,7 +229,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(refcount_dec_and_test_checked); * @r: the refcount * * Similar to atomic_dec(), it will WARN on underflow and fail to decrement - * when saturated at UINT_MAX. + * when saturated at REFCOUNT_SATURATED. * * Provides release memory ordering, such that prior loads and stores are done * before. @@ -277,7 +280,7 @@ bool refcount_dec_not_one(refcount_t *r) unsigned int new, val = atomic_read(&r->refs); do { - if (unlikely(val == UINT_MAX)) + if (unlikely(val == REFCOUNT_SATURATED)) return true; if (val == 1) @@ -302,7 +305,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(refcount_dec_not_one); * @lock: the mutex to be locked * * Similar to atomic_dec_and_mutex_lock(), it will WARN on underflow and fail - * to decrement when saturated at UINT_MAX. + * to decrement when saturated at REFCOUNT_SATURATED. * * Provides release memory ordering, such that prior loads and stores are done * before, and provides a control dependency such that free() must come after. @@ -333,7 +336,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(refcount_dec_and_mutex_lock); * @lock: the spinlock to be locked * * Similar to atomic_dec_and_lock(), it will WARN on underflow and fail to - * decrement when saturated at UINT_MAX. + * decrement when saturated at REFCOUNT_SATURATED. * * Provides release memory ordering, such that prior loads and stores are done * before, and provides a control dependency such that free() must come after. From 513b19a43becee5f7af6d283bb9d3d241a8a21a8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Will Deacon Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2019 11:58:54 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 1007/1091] locking/refcount: Ensure integer operands are treated as signed [ Upstream commit 97a1420adf0cdf0cf6f41bab0b2acf658c96b94b ] In preparation for changing the saturation point of REFCOUNT_FULL to INT_MIN/2, change the type of integer operands passed into the API from 'unsigned int' to 'int' so that we can avoid casting during comparisons when we don't want to fall foul of C integral conversion rules for signed and unsigned types. Since the kernel is compiled with '-fno-strict-overflow', we don't need to worry about the UB introduced by signed overflow here. Furthermore, we're already making heavy use of the atomic_t API, which operates exclusively on signed types. Signed-off-by: Will Deacon Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel Reviewed-by: Kees Cook Tested-by: Hanjun Guo Cc: Ard Biesheuvel Cc: Elena Reshetova Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Thomas Gleixner Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191121115902.2551-3-will@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- include/linux/refcount.h | 14 +++++++------- lib/refcount.c | 6 +++--- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/refcount.h b/include/linux/refcount.h index 79f62e8d2256..89066a1471dd 100644 --- a/include/linux/refcount.h +++ b/include/linux/refcount.h @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ typedef struct refcount_struct { * @r: the refcount * @n: value to which the refcount will be set */ -static inline void refcount_set(refcount_t *r, unsigned int n) +static inline void refcount_set(refcount_t *r, int n) { atomic_set(&r->refs, n); } @@ -44,13 +44,13 @@ static inline unsigned int refcount_read(const refcount_t *r) return atomic_read(&r->refs); } -extern __must_check bool refcount_add_not_zero_checked(unsigned int i, refcount_t *r); -extern void refcount_add_checked(unsigned int i, refcount_t *r); +extern __must_check bool refcount_add_not_zero_checked(int i, refcount_t *r); +extern void refcount_add_checked(int i, refcount_t *r); extern __must_check bool refcount_inc_not_zero_checked(refcount_t *r); extern void refcount_inc_checked(refcount_t *r); -extern __must_check bool refcount_sub_and_test_checked(unsigned int i, refcount_t *r); +extern __must_check bool refcount_sub_and_test_checked(int i, refcount_t *r); extern __must_check bool refcount_dec_and_test_checked(refcount_t *r); extern void refcount_dec_checked(refcount_t *r); @@ -79,12 +79,12 @@ extern void refcount_dec_checked(refcount_t *r); # ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_REFCOUNT # include # else -static inline __must_check bool refcount_add_not_zero(unsigned int i, refcount_t *r) +static inline __must_check bool refcount_add_not_zero(int i, refcount_t *r) { return atomic_add_unless(&r->refs, i, 0); } -static inline void refcount_add(unsigned int i, refcount_t *r) +static inline void refcount_add(int i, refcount_t *r) { atomic_add(i, &r->refs); } @@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ static inline void refcount_inc(refcount_t *r) atomic_inc(&r->refs); } -static inline __must_check bool refcount_sub_and_test(unsigned int i, refcount_t *r) +static inline __must_check bool refcount_sub_and_test(int i, refcount_t *r) { return atomic_sub_and_test(i, &r->refs); } diff --git a/lib/refcount.c b/lib/refcount.c index 48b78a423d7d..719b0bc42ab1 100644 --- a/lib/refcount.c +++ b/lib/refcount.c @@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ * * Return: false if the passed refcount is 0, true otherwise */ -bool refcount_add_not_zero_checked(unsigned int i, refcount_t *r) +bool refcount_add_not_zero_checked(int i, refcount_t *r) { unsigned int new, val = atomic_read(&r->refs); @@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(refcount_add_not_zero_checked); * cases, refcount_inc(), or one of its variants, should instead be used to * increment a reference count. */ -void refcount_add_checked(unsigned int i, refcount_t *r) +void refcount_add_checked(int i, refcount_t *r) { WARN_ONCE(!refcount_add_not_zero_checked(i, r), "refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.\n"); } @@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(refcount_inc_checked); * * Return: true if the resulting refcount is 0, false otherwise */ -bool refcount_sub_and_test_checked(unsigned int i, refcount_t *r) +bool refcount_sub_and_test_checked(int i, refcount_t *r) { unsigned int new, val = atomic_read(&r->refs); From 04bff7d7b8081c4bb2e8171be31d33df297eee5b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Will Deacon Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2019 11:58:55 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 1008/1091] locking/refcount: Remove unused refcount_*_checked() variants [ Upstream commit 7221762c48c6bbbcc6cc51d8b803c06930215e34 ] The full-fat refcount implementation is exposed via a set of functions suffixed with "_checked()", the idea being that code can choose to use the more expensive, yet more secure implementation on a case-by-case basis. In reality, this hasn't happened, so with a grand total of zero users, let's remove the checked variants for now by simply dropping the suffix and predicating the out-of-line functions on CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL=y. Signed-off-by: Will Deacon Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel Reviewed-by: Kees Cook Tested-by: Hanjun Guo Cc: Ard Biesheuvel Cc: Elena Reshetova Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Thomas Gleixner Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191121115902.2551-4-will@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- include/linux/refcount.h | 25 ++++++------------- lib/refcount.c | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++------------------- 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/refcount.h b/include/linux/refcount.h index 89066a1471dd..edd505d1a23b 100644 --- a/include/linux/refcount.h +++ b/include/linux/refcount.h @@ -44,32 +44,21 @@ static inline unsigned int refcount_read(const refcount_t *r) return atomic_read(&r->refs); } -extern __must_check bool refcount_add_not_zero_checked(int i, refcount_t *r); -extern void refcount_add_checked(int i, refcount_t *r); - -extern __must_check bool refcount_inc_not_zero_checked(refcount_t *r); -extern void refcount_inc_checked(refcount_t *r); - -extern __must_check bool refcount_sub_and_test_checked(int i, refcount_t *r); - -extern __must_check bool refcount_dec_and_test_checked(refcount_t *r); -extern void refcount_dec_checked(refcount_t *r); - #ifdef CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL #define REFCOUNT_MAX (UINT_MAX - 1) #define REFCOUNT_SATURATED UINT_MAX -#define refcount_add_not_zero refcount_add_not_zero_checked -#define refcount_add refcount_add_checked +extern __must_check bool refcount_add_not_zero(int i, refcount_t *r); +extern void refcount_add(int i, refcount_t *r); -#define refcount_inc_not_zero refcount_inc_not_zero_checked -#define refcount_inc refcount_inc_checked +extern __must_check bool refcount_inc_not_zero(refcount_t *r); +extern void refcount_inc(refcount_t *r); -#define refcount_sub_and_test refcount_sub_and_test_checked +extern __must_check bool refcount_sub_and_test(int i, refcount_t *r); -#define refcount_dec_and_test refcount_dec_and_test_checked -#define refcount_dec refcount_dec_checked +extern __must_check bool refcount_dec_and_test(refcount_t *r); +extern void refcount_dec(refcount_t *r); #else diff --git a/lib/refcount.c b/lib/refcount.c index 719b0bc42ab1..a2f670998cee 100644 --- a/lib/refcount.c +++ b/lib/refcount.c @@ -43,8 +43,10 @@ #include #include +#ifdef CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL + /** - * refcount_add_not_zero_checked - add a value to a refcount unless it is 0 + * refcount_add_not_zero - add a value to a refcount unless it is 0 * @i: the value to add to the refcount * @r: the refcount * @@ -61,7 +63,7 @@ * * Return: false if the passed refcount is 0, true otherwise */ -bool refcount_add_not_zero_checked(int i, refcount_t *r) +bool refcount_add_not_zero(int i, refcount_t *r) { unsigned int new, val = atomic_read(&r->refs); @@ -83,10 +85,10 @@ bool refcount_add_not_zero_checked(int i, refcount_t *r) return true; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(refcount_add_not_zero_checked); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(refcount_add_not_zero); /** - * refcount_add_checked - add a value to a refcount + * refcount_add - add a value to a refcount * @i: the value to add to the refcount * @r: the refcount * @@ -101,14 +103,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(refcount_add_not_zero_checked); * cases, refcount_inc(), or one of its variants, should instead be used to * increment a reference count. */ -void refcount_add_checked(int i, refcount_t *r) +void refcount_add(int i, refcount_t *r) { - WARN_ONCE(!refcount_add_not_zero_checked(i, r), "refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.\n"); + WARN_ONCE(!refcount_add_not_zero(i, r), "refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.\n"); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(refcount_add_checked); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(refcount_add); /** - * refcount_inc_not_zero_checked - increment a refcount unless it is 0 + * refcount_inc_not_zero - increment a refcount unless it is 0 * @r: the refcount to increment * * Similar to atomic_inc_not_zero(), but will saturate at REFCOUNT_SATURATED @@ -120,7 +122,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(refcount_add_checked); * * Return: true if the increment was successful, false otherwise */ -bool refcount_inc_not_zero_checked(refcount_t *r) +bool refcount_inc_not_zero(refcount_t *r) { unsigned int new, val = atomic_read(&r->refs); @@ -140,10 +142,10 @@ bool refcount_inc_not_zero_checked(refcount_t *r) return true; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(refcount_inc_not_zero_checked); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(refcount_inc_not_zero); /** - * refcount_inc_checked - increment a refcount + * refcount_inc - increment a refcount * @r: the refcount to increment * * Similar to atomic_inc(), but will saturate at REFCOUNT_SATURATED and WARN. @@ -154,14 +156,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(refcount_inc_not_zero_checked); * Will WARN if the refcount is 0, as this represents a possible use-after-free * condition. */ -void refcount_inc_checked(refcount_t *r) +void refcount_inc(refcount_t *r) { - WARN_ONCE(!refcount_inc_not_zero_checked(r), "refcount_t: increment on 0; use-after-free.\n"); + WARN_ONCE(!refcount_inc_not_zero(r), "refcount_t: increment on 0; use-after-free.\n"); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(refcount_inc_checked); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(refcount_inc); /** - * refcount_sub_and_test_checked - subtract from a refcount and test if it is 0 + * refcount_sub_and_test - subtract from a refcount and test if it is 0 * @i: amount to subtract from the refcount * @r: the refcount * @@ -180,7 +182,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(refcount_inc_checked); * * Return: true if the resulting refcount is 0, false otherwise */ -bool refcount_sub_and_test_checked(int i, refcount_t *r) +bool refcount_sub_and_test(int i, refcount_t *r) { unsigned int new, val = atomic_read(&r->refs); @@ -203,10 +205,10 @@ bool refcount_sub_and_test_checked(int i, refcount_t *r) return false; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(refcount_sub_and_test_checked); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(refcount_sub_and_test); /** - * refcount_dec_and_test_checked - decrement a refcount and test if it is 0 + * refcount_dec_and_test - decrement a refcount and test if it is 0 * @r: the refcount * * Similar to atomic_dec_and_test(), it will WARN on underflow and fail to @@ -218,14 +220,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(refcount_sub_and_test_checked); * * Return: true if the resulting refcount is 0, false otherwise */ -bool refcount_dec_and_test_checked(refcount_t *r) +bool refcount_dec_and_test(refcount_t *r) { - return refcount_sub_and_test_checked(1, r); + return refcount_sub_and_test(1, r); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(refcount_dec_and_test_checked); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(refcount_dec_and_test); /** - * refcount_dec_checked - decrement a refcount + * refcount_dec - decrement a refcount * @r: the refcount * * Similar to atomic_dec(), it will WARN on underflow and fail to decrement @@ -234,11 +236,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(refcount_dec_and_test_checked); * Provides release memory ordering, such that prior loads and stores are done * before. */ -void refcount_dec_checked(refcount_t *r) +void refcount_dec(refcount_t *r) { - WARN_ONCE(refcount_dec_and_test_checked(r), "refcount_t: decrement hit 0; leaking memory.\n"); + WARN_ONCE(refcount_dec_and_test(r), "refcount_t: decrement hit 0; leaking memory.\n"); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(refcount_dec_checked); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(refcount_dec); + +#endif /* CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL */ /** * refcount_dec_if_one - decrement a refcount if it is 1 From 9c9269977f03ab9c448c8b71581a951e0eb4fb7b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Will Deacon Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2019 11:58:56 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 1009/1091] locking/refcount: Move the bulk of the REFCOUNT_FULL implementation into the header [ Upstream commit 77e9971c79c29542ab7dd4140f9343bf2ff36158 ] In an effort to improve performance of the REFCOUNT_FULL implementation, move the bulk of its functions into linux/refcount.h. This allows them to be inlined in the same way as if they had been provided via CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_REFCOUNT. Signed-off-by: Will Deacon Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel Reviewed-by: Kees Cook Tested-by: Hanjun Guo Cc: Ard Biesheuvel Cc: Elena Reshetova Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Thomas Gleixner Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191121115902.2551-5-will@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- include/linux/refcount.h | 237 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- lib/refcount.c | 238 +-------------------------------------- 2 files changed, 229 insertions(+), 246 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/refcount.h b/include/linux/refcount.h index edd505d1a23b..e719b5b1220e 100644 --- a/include/linux/refcount.h +++ b/include/linux/refcount.h @@ -45,22 +45,241 @@ static inline unsigned int refcount_read(const refcount_t *r) } #ifdef CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL +#include #define REFCOUNT_MAX (UINT_MAX - 1) #define REFCOUNT_SATURATED UINT_MAX -extern __must_check bool refcount_add_not_zero(int i, refcount_t *r); -extern void refcount_add(int i, refcount_t *r); +/* + * Variant of atomic_t specialized for reference counts. + * + * The interface matches the atomic_t interface (to aid in porting) but only + * provides the few functions one should use for reference counting. + * + * It differs in that the counter saturates at REFCOUNT_SATURATED and will not + * move once there. This avoids wrapping the counter and causing 'spurious' + * use-after-free issues. + * + * Memory ordering rules are slightly relaxed wrt regular atomic_t functions + * and provide only what is strictly required for refcounts. + * + * The increments are fully relaxed; these will not provide ordering. The + * rationale is that whatever is used to obtain the object we're increasing the + * reference count on will provide the ordering. For locked data structures, + * its the lock acquire, for RCU/lockless data structures its the dependent + * load. + * + * Do note that inc_not_zero() provides a control dependency which will order + * future stores against the inc, this ensures we'll never modify the object + * if we did not in fact acquire a reference. + * + * The decrements will provide release order, such that all the prior loads and + * stores will be issued before, it also provides a control dependency, which + * will order us against the subsequent free(). + * + * The control dependency is against the load of the cmpxchg (ll/sc) that + * succeeded. This means the stores aren't fully ordered, but this is fine + * because the 1->0 transition indicates no concurrency. + * + * Note that the allocator is responsible for ordering things between free() + * and alloc(). + * + * The decrements dec_and_test() and sub_and_test() also provide acquire + * ordering on success. + * + */ -extern __must_check bool refcount_inc_not_zero(refcount_t *r); -extern void refcount_inc(refcount_t *r); +/** + * refcount_add_not_zero - add a value to a refcount unless it is 0 + * @i: the value to add to the refcount + * @r: the refcount + * + * Will saturate at REFCOUNT_SATURATED and WARN. + * + * Provides no memory ordering, it is assumed the caller has guaranteed the + * object memory to be stable (RCU, etc.). It does provide a control dependency + * and thereby orders future stores. See the comment on top. + * + * Use of this function is not recommended for the normal reference counting + * use case in which references are taken and released one at a time. In these + * cases, refcount_inc(), or one of its variants, should instead be used to + * increment a reference count. + * + * Return: false if the passed refcount is 0, true otherwise + */ +static inline __must_check bool refcount_add_not_zero(int i, refcount_t *r) +{ + unsigned int new, val = atomic_read(&r->refs); -extern __must_check bool refcount_sub_and_test(int i, refcount_t *r); + do { + if (!val) + return false; -extern __must_check bool refcount_dec_and_test(refcount_t *r); -extern void refcount_dec(refcount_t *r); + if (unlikely(val == REFCOUNT_SATURATED)) + return true; -#else + new = val + i; + if (new < val) + new = REFCOUNT_SATURATED; + + } while (!atomic_try_cmpxchg_relaxed(&r->refs, &val, new)); + + WARN_ONCE(new == REFCOUNT_SATURATED, + "refcount_t: saturated; leaking memory.\n"); + + return true; +} + +/** + * refcount_add - add a value to a refcount + * @i: the value to add to the refcount + * @r: the refcount + * + * Similar to atomic_add(), but will saturate at REFCOUNT_SATURATED and WARN. + * + * Provides no memory ordering, it is assumed the caller has guaranteed the + * object memory to be stable (RCU, etc.). It does provide a control dependency + * and thereby orders future stores. See the comment on top. + * + * Use of this function is not recommended for the normal reference counting + * use case in which references are taken and released one at a time. In these + * cases, refcount_inc(), or one of its variants, should instead be used to + * increment a reference count. + */ +static inline void refcount_add(int i, refcount_t *r) +{ + WARN_ONCE(!refcount_add_not_zero(i, r), "refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.\n"); +} + +/** + * refcount_inc_not_zero - increment a refcount unless it is 0 + * @r: the refcount to increment + * + * Similar to atomic_inc_not_zero(), but will saturate at REFCOUNT_SATURATED + * and WARN. + * + * Provides no memory ordering, it is assumed the caller has guaranteed the + * object memory to be stable (RCU, etc.). It does provide a control dependency + * and thereby orders future stores. See the comment on top. + * + * Return: true if the increment was successful, false otherwise + */ +static inline __must_check bool refcount_inc_not_zero(refcount_t *r) +{ + unsigned int new, val = atomic_read(&r->refs); + + do { + new = val + 1; + + if (!val) + return false; + + if (unlikely(!new)) + return true; + + } while (!atomic_try_cmpxchg_relaxed(&r->refs, &val, new)); + + WARN_ONCE(new == REFCOUNT_SATURATED, + "refcount_t: saturated; leaking memory.\n"); + + return true; +} + +/** + * refcount_inc - increment a refcount + * @r: the refcount to increment + * + * Similar to atomic_inc(), but will saturate at REFCOUNT_SATURATED and WARN. + * + * Provides no memory ordering, it is assumed the caller already has a + * reference on the object. + * + * Will WARN if the refcount is 0, as this represents a possible use-after-free + * condition. + */ +static inline void refcount_inc(refcount_t *r) +{ + WARN_ONCE(!refcount_inc_not_zero(r), "refcount_t: increment on 0; use-after-free.\n"); +} + +/** + * refcount_sub_and_test - subtract from a refcount and test if it is 0 + * @i: amount to subtract from the refcount + * @r: the refcount + * + * Similar to atomic_dec_and_test(), but it will WARN, return false and + * ultimately leak on underflow and will fail to decrement when saturated + * at REFCOUNT_SATURATED. + * + * Provides release memory ordering, such that prior loads and stores are done + * before, and provides an acquire ordering on success such that free() + * must come after. + * + * Use of this function is not recommended for the normal reference counting + * use case in which references are taken and released one at a time. In these + * cases, refcount_dec(), or one of its variants, should instead be used to + * decrement a reference count. + * + * Return: true if the resulting refcount is 0, false otherwise + */ +static inline __must_check bool refcount_sub_and_test(int i, refcount_t *r) +{ + unsigned int new, val = atomic_read(&r->refs); + + do { + if (unlikely(val == REFCOUNT_SATURATED)) + return false; + + new = val - i; + if (new > val) { + WARN_ONCE(new > val, "refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.\n"); + return false; + } + + } while (!atomic_try_cmpxchg_release(&r->refs, &val, new)); + + if (!new) { + smp_acquire__after_ctrl_dep(); + return true; + } + return false; + +} + +/** + * refcount_dec_and_test - decrement a refcount and test if it is 0 + * @r: the refcount + * + * Similar to atomic_dec_and_test(), it will WARN on underflow and fail to + * decrement when saturated at REFCOUNT_SATURATED. + * + * Provides release memory ordering, such that prior loads and stores are done + * before, and provides an acquire ordering on success such that free() + * must come after. + * + * Return: true if the resulting refcount is 0, false otherwise + */ +static inline __must_check bool refcount_dec_and_test(refcount_t *r) +{ + return refcount_sub_and_test(1, r); +} + +/** + * refcount_dec - decrement a refcount + * @r: the refcount + * + * Similar to atomic_dec(), it will WARN on underflow and fail to decrement + * when saturated at REFCOUNT_SATURATED. + * + * Provides release memory ordering, such that prior loads and stores are done + * before. + */ +static inline void refcount_dec(refcount_t *r) +{ + WARN_ONCE(refcount_dec_and_test(r), "refcount_t: decrement hit 0; leaking memory.\n"); +} + +#else /* CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL */ #define REFCOUNT_MAX INT_MAX #define REFCOUNT_SATURATED (INT_MIN / 2) @@ -103,7 +322,7 @@ static inline void refcount_dec(refcount_t *r) atomic_dec(&r->refs); } # endif /* !CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_REFCOUNT */ -#endif /* CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL */ +#endif /* !CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL */ extern __must_check bool refcount_dec_if_one(refcount_t *r); extern __must_check bool refcount_dec_not_one(refcount_t *r); diff --git a/lib/refcount.c b/lib/refcount.c index a2f670998cee..3a534fbebdcc 100644 --- a/lib/refcount.c +++ b/lib/refcount.c @@ -1,41 +1,6 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* - * Variant of atomic_t specialized for reference counts. - * - * The interface matches the atomic_t interface (to aid in porting) but only - * provides the few functions one should use for reference counting. - * - * It differs in that the counter saturates at REFCOUNT_SATURATED and will not - * move once there. This avoids wrapping the counter and causing 'spurious' - * use-after-free issues. - * - * Memory ordering rules are slightly relaxed wrt regular atomic_t functions - * and provide only what is strictly required for refcounts. - * - * The increments are fully relaxed; these will not provide ordering. The - * rationale is that whatever is used to obtain the object we're increasing the - * reference count on will provide the ordering. For locked data structures, - * its the lock acquire, for RCU/lockless data structures its the dependent - * load. - * - * Do note that inc_not_zero() provides a control dependency which will order - * future stores against the inc, this ensures we'll never modify the object - * if we did not in fact acquire a reference. - * - * The decrements will provide release order, such that all the prior loads and - * stores will be issued before, it also provides a control dependency, which - * will order us against the subsequent free(). - * - * The control dependency is against the load of the cmpxchg (ll/sc) that - * succeeded. This means the stores aren't fully ordered, but this is fine - * because the 1->0 transition indicates no concurrency. - * - * Note that the allocator is responsible for ordering things between free() - * and alloc(). - * - * The decrements dec_and_test() and sub_and_test() also provide acquire - * ordering on success. - * + * Out-of-line refcount functions common to all refcount implementations. */ #include @@ -43,207 +8,6 @@ #include #include -#ifdef CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL - -/** - * refcount_add_not_zero - add a value to a refcount unless it is 0 - * @i: the value to add to the refcount - * @r: the refcount - * - * Will saturate at REFCOUNT_SATURATED and WARN. - * - * Provides no memory ordering, it is assumed the caller has guaranteed the - * object memory to be stable (RCU, etc.). It does provide a control dependency - * and thereby orders future stores. See the comment on top. - * - * Use of this function is not recommended for the normal reference counting - * use case in which references are taken and released one at a time. In these - * cases, refcount_inc(), or one of its variants, should instead be used to - * increment a reference count. - * - * Return: false if the passed refcount is 0, true otherwise - */ -bool refcount_add_not_zero(int i, refcount_t *r) -{ - unsigned int new, val = atomic_read(&r->refs); - - do { - if (!val) - return false; - - if (unlikely(val == REFCOUNT_SATURATED)) - return true; - - new = val + i; - if (new < val) - new = REFCOUNT_SATURATED; - - } while (!atomic_try_cmpxchg_relaxed(&r->refs, &val, new)); - - WARN_ONCE(new == REFCOUNT_SATURATED, - "refcount_t: saturated; leaking memory.\n"); - - return true; -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(refcount_add_not_zero); - -/** - * refcount_add - add a value to a refcount - * @i: the value to add to the refcount - * @r: the refcount - * - * Similar to atomic_add(), but will saturate at REFCOUNT_SATURATED and WARN. - * - * Provides no memory ordering, it is assumed the caller has guaranteed the - * object memory to be stable (RCU, etc.). It does provide a control dependency - * and thereby orders future stores. See the comment on top. - * - * Use of this function is not recommended for the normal reference counting - * use case in which references are taken and released one at a time. In these - * cases, refcount_inc(), or one of its variants, should instead be used to - * increment a reference count. - */ -void refcount_add(int i, refcount_t *r) -{ - WARN_ONCE(!refcount_add_not_zero(i, r), "refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.\n"); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(refcount_add); - -/** - * refcount_inc_not_zero - increment a refcount unless it is 0 - * @r: the refcount to increment - * - * Similar to atomic_inc_not_zero(), but will saturate at REFCOUNT_SATURATED - * and WARN. - * - * Provides no memory ordering, it is assumed the caller has guaranteed the - * object memory to be stable (RCU, etc.). It does provide a control dependency - * and thereby orders future stores. See the comment on top. - * - * Return: true if the increment was successful, false otherwise - */ -bool refcount_inc_not_zero(refcount_t *r) -{ - unsigned int new, val = atomic_read(&r->refs); - - do { - new = val + 1; - - if (!val) - return false; - - if (unlikely(!new)) - return true; - - } while (!atomic_try_cmpxchg_relaxed(&r->refs, &val, new)); - - WARN_ONCE(new == REFCOUNT_SATURATED, - "refcount_t: saturated; leaking memory.\n"); - - return true; -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(refcount_inc_not_zero); - -/** - * refcount_inc - increment a refcount - * @r: the refcount to increment - * - * Similar to atomic_inc(), but will saturate at REFCOUNT_SATURATED and WARN. - * - * Provides no memory ordering, it is assumed the caller already has a - * reference on the object. - * - * Will WARN if the refcount is 0, as this represents a possible use-after-free - * condition. - */ -void refcount_inc(refcount_t *r) -{ - WARN_ONCE(!refcount_inc_not_zero(r), "refcount_t: increment on 0; use-after-free.\n"); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(refcount_inc); - -/** - * refcount_sub_and_test - subtract from a refcount and test if it is 0 - * @i: amount to subtract from the refcount - * @r: the refcount - * - * Similar to atomic_dec_and_test(), but it will WARN, return false and - * ultimately leak on underflow and will fail to decrement when saturated - * at REFCOUNT_SATURATED. - * - * Provides release memory ordering, such that prior loads and stores are done - * before, and provides an acquire ordering on success such that free() - * must come after. - * - * Use of this function is not recommended for the normal reference counting - * use case in which references are taken and released one at a time. In these - * cases, refcount_dec(), or one of its variants, should instead be used to - * decrement a reference count. - * - * Return: true if the resulting refcount is 0, false otherwise - */ -bool refcount_sub_and_test(int i, refcount_t *r) -{ - unsigned int new, val = atomic_read(&r->refs); - - do { - if (unlikely(val == REFCOUNT_SATURATED)) - return false; - - new = val - i; - if (new > val) { - WARN_ONCE(new > val, "refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.\n"); - return false; - } - - } while (!atomic_try_cmpxchg_release(&r->refs, &val, new)); - - if (!new) { - smp_acquire__after_ctrl_dep(); - return true; - } - return false; - -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(refcount_sub_and_test); - -/** - * refcount_dec_and_test - decrement a refcount and test if it is 0 - * @r: the refcount - * - * Similar to atomic_dec_and_test(), it will WARN on underflow and fail to - * decrement when saturated at REFCOUNT_SATURATED. - * - * Provides release memory ordering, such that prior loads and stores are done - * before, and provides an acquire ordering on success such that free() - * must come after. - * - * Return: true if the resulting refcount is 0, false otherwise - */ -bool refcount_dec_and_test(refcount_t *r) -{ - return refcount_sub_and_test(1, r); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(refcount_dec_and_test); - -/** - * refcount_dec - decrement a refcount - * @r: the refcount - * - * Similar to atomic_dec(), it will WARN on underflow and fail to decrement - * when saturated at REFCOUNT_SATURATED. - * - * Provides release memory ordering, such that prior loads and stores are done - * before. - */ -void refcount_dec(refcount_t *r) -{ - WARN_ONCE(refcount_dec_and_test(r), "refcount_t: decrement hit 0; leaking memory.\n"); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(refcount_dec); - -#endif /* CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL */ - /** * refcount_dec_if_one - decrement a refcount if it is 1 * @r: the refcount From 809554147d609163cfbaf815c443c575b538a7ef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Will Deacon Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2019 11:58:57 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 1010/1091] locking/refcount: Improve performance of generic REFCOUNT_FULL code [ Upstream commit dcb786493f3e48da3272b710028d42ec608cfda1 ] Rewrite the generic REFCOUNT_FULL implementation so that the saturation point is moved to INT_MIN / 2. This allows us to defer the sanity checks until after the atomic operation, which removes many uses of cmpxchg() in favour of atomic_fetch_{add,sub}(). Some crude perf results obtained from lkdtm show substantially less overhead, despite the checking: $ perf stat -r 3 -B -- echo {ATOMIC,REFCOUNT}_TIMING >/sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT # arm64 ATOMIC_TIMING: 46.50451 +- 0.00134 seconds time elapsed ( +- 0.00% ) REFCOUNT_TIMING (REFCOUNT_FULL, mainline): 77.57522 +- 0.00982 seconds time elapsed ( +- 0.01% ) REFCOUNT_TIMING (REFCOUNT_FULL, this series): 48.7181 +- 0.0256 seconds time elapsed ( +- 0.05% ) # x86 ATOMIC_TIMING: 31.6225 +- 0.0776 seconds time elapsed ( +- 0.25% ) REFCOUNT_TIMING (!REFCOUNT_FULL, mainline/x86 asm): 31.6689 +- 0.0901 seconds time elapsed ( +- 0.28% ) REFCOUNT_TIMING (REFCOUNT_FULL, mainline): 53.203 +- 0.138 seconds time elapsed ( +- 0.26% ) REFCOUNT_TIMING (REFCOUNT_FULL, this series): 31.7408 +- 0.0486 seconds time elapsed ( +- 0.15% ) Signed-off-by: Will Deacon Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel Reviewed-by: Kees Cook Tested-by: Hanjun Guo Tested-by: Jan Glauber Cc: Ard Biesheuvel Cc: Elena Reshetova Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Thomas Gleixner Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191121115902.2551-6-will@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- include/linux/refcount.h | 131 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 75 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/refcount.h b/include/linux/refcount.h index e719b5b1220e..e3b218d669ce 100644 --- a/include/linux/refcount.h +++ b/include/linux/refcount.h @@ -47,8 +47,8 @@ static inline unsigned int refcount_read(const refcount_t *r) #ifdef CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL #include -#define REFCOUNT_MAX (UINT_MAX - 1) -#define REFCOUNT_SATURATED UINT_MAX +#define REFCOUNT_MAX INT_MAX +#define REFCOUNT_SATURATED (INT_MIN / 2) /* * Variant of atomic_t specialized for reference counts. @@ -56,9 +56,47 @@ static inline unsigned int refcount_read(const refcount_t *r) * The interface matches the atomic_t interface (to aid in porting) but only * provides the few functions one should use for reference counting. * - * It differs in that the counter saturates at REFCOUNT_SATURATED and will not - * move once there. This avoids wrapping the counter and causing 'spurious' - * use-after-free issues. + * Saturation semantics + * ==================== + * + * refcount_t differs from atomic_t in that the counter saturates at + * REFCOUNT_SATURATED and will not move once there. This avoids wrapping the + * counter and causing 'spurious' use-after-free issues. In order to avoid the + * cost associated with introducing cmpxchg() loops into all of the saturating + * operations, we temporarily allow the counter to take on an unchecked value + * and then explicitly set it to REFCOUNT_SATURATED on detecting that underflow + * or overflow has occurred. Although this is racy when multiple threads + * access the refcount concurrently, by placing REFCOUNT_SATURATED roughly + * equidistant from 0 and INT_MAX we minimise the scope for error: + * + * INT_MAX REFCOUNT_SATURATED UINT_MAX + * 0 (0x7fff_ffff) (0xc000_0000) (0xffff_ffff) + * +--------------------------------+----------------+----------------+ + * <---------- bad value! ----------> + * + * (in a signed view of the world, the "bad value" range corresponds to + * a negative counter value). + * + * As an example, consider a refcount_inc() operation that causes the counter + * to overflow: + * + * int old = atomic_fetch_add_relaxed(r); + * // old is INT_MAX, refcount now INT_MIN (0x8000_0000) + * if (old < 0) + * atomic_set(r, REFCOUNT_SATURATED); + * + * If another thread also performs a refcount_inc() operation between the two + * atomic operations, then the count will continue to edge closer to 0. If it + * reaches a value of 1 before /any/ of the threads reset it to the saturated + * value, then a concurrent refcount_dec_and_test() may erroneously free the + * underlying object. Given the precise timing details involved with the + * round-robin scheduling of each thread manipulating the refcount and the need + * to hit the race multiple times in succession, there doesn't appear to be a + * practical avenue of attack even if using refcount_add() operations with + * larger increments. + * + * Memory ordering + * =============== * * Memory ordering rules are slightly relaxed wrt regular atomic_t functions * and provide only what is strictly required for refcounts. @@ -109,25 +147,19 @@ static inline unsigned int refcount_read(const refcount_t *r) */ static inline __must_check bool refcount_add_not_zero(int i, refcount_t *r) { - unsigned int new, val = atomic_read(&r->refs); + int old = refcount_read(r); do { - if (!val) - return false; + if (!old) + break; + } while (!atomic_try_cmpxchg_relaxed(&r->refs, &old, old + i)); - if (unlikely(val == REFCOUNT_SATURATED)) - return true; + if (unlikely(old < 0 || old + i < 0)) { + refcount_set(r, REFCOUNT_SATURATED); + WARN_ONCE(1, "refcount_t: saturated; leaking memory.\n"); + } - new = val + i; - if (new < val) - new = REFCOUNT_SATURATED; - - } while (!atomic_try_cmpxchg_relaxed(&r->refs, &val, new)); - - WARN_ONCE(new == REFCOUNT_SATURATED, - "refcount_t: saturated; leaking memory.\n"); - - return true; + return old; } /** @@ -148,7 +180,13 @@ static inline __must_check bool refcount_add_not_zero(int i, refcount_t *r) */ static inline void refcount_add(int i, refcount_t *r) { - WARN_ONCE(!refcount_add_not_zero(i, r), "refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.\n"); + int old = atomic_fetch_add_relaxed(i, &r->refs); + + WARN_ONCE(!old, "refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.\n"); + if (unlikely(old <= 0 || old + i <= 0)) { + refcount_set(r, REFCOUNT_SATURATED); + WARN_ONCE(old, "refcount_t: saturated; leaking memory.\n"); + } } /** @@ -166,23 +204,7 @@ static inline void refcount_add(int i, refcount_t *r) */ static inline __must_check bool refcount_inc_not_zero(refcount_t *r) { - unsigned int new, val = atomic_read(&r->refs); - - do { - new = val + 1; - - if (!val) - return false; - - if (unlikely(!new)) - return true; - - } while (!atomic_try_cmpxchg_relaxed(&r->refs, &val, new)); - - WARN_ONCE(new == REFCOUNT_SATURATED, - "refcount_t: saturated; leaking memory.\n"); - - return true; + return refcount_add_not_zero(1, r); } /** @@ -199,7 +221,7 @@ static inline __must_check bool refcount_inc_not_zero(refcount_t *r) */ static inline void refcount_inc(refcount_t *r) { - WARN_ONCE(!refcount_inc_not_zero(r), "refcount_t: increment on 0; use-after-free.\n"); + refcount_add(1, r); } /** @@ -224,26 +246,19 @@ static inline void refcount_inc(refcount_t *r) */ static inline __must_check bool refcount_sub_and_test(int i, refcount_t *r) { - unsigned int new, val = atomic_read(&r->refs); + int old = atomic_fetch_sub_release(i, &r->refs); - do { - if (unlikely(val == REFCOUNT_SATURATED)) - return false; - - new = val - i; - if (new > val) { - WARN_ONCE(new > val, "refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.\n"); - return false; - } - - } while (!atomic_try_cmpxchg_release(&r->refs, &val, new)); - - if (!new) { + if (old == i) { smp_acquire__after_ctrl_dep(); return true; } - return false; + if (unlikely(old < 0 || old - i < 0)) { + refcount_set(r, REFCOUNT_SATURATED); + WARN_ONCE(1, "refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.\n"); + } + + return false; } /** @@ -276,9 +291,13 @@ static inline __must_check bool refcount_dec_and_test(refcount_t *r) */ static inline void refcount_dec(refcount_t *r) { - WARN_ONCE(refcount_dec_and_test(r), "refcount_t: decrement hit 0; leaking memory.\n"); -} + int old = atomic_fetch_sub_release(1, &r->refs); + if (unlikely(old <= 1)) { + refcount_set(r, REFCOUNT_SATURATED); + WARN_ONCE(1, "refcount_t: decrement hit 0; leaking memory.\n"); + } +} #else /* CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL */ #define REFCOUNT_MAX INT_MAX From 0d3182fbe689e3808c03b6cde6be98237f9e0a4a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Will Deacon Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2019 11:58:58 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 1011/1091] locking/refcount: Move saturation warnings out of line [ Upstream commit 1eb085d94256aaa69b00cf5a86e3c5f5bb2bc460 ] Having the refcount saturation and warnings inline bloats the text, despite the fact that these paths should never be executed in normal operation. Move the refcount saturation and warnings out of line to reduce the image size when refcount_t checking is enabled. Relative to an x86_64 defconfig, the sizes reported by bloat-o-meter are: # defconfig+REFCOUNT_FULL, inline saturation (i.e. before this patch) Total: Before=14762076, After=14915442, chg +1.04% # defconfig+REFCOUNT_FULL, out-of-line saturation (i.e. after this patch) Total: Before=14762076, After=14835497, chg +0.50% A side-effect of this change is that we now only get one warning per refcount saturation type, rather than one per problematic call-site. Signed-off-by: Will Deacon Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel Reviewed-by: Kees Cook Tested-by: Hanjun Guo Cc: Ard Biesheuvel Cc: Elena Reshetova Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Thomas Gleixner Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191121115902.2551-7-will@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- include/linux/refcount.h | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++------------------- lib/refcount.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/refcount.h b/include/linux/refcount.h index e3b218d669ce..1cd0a876a789 100644 --- a/include/linux/refcount.h +++ b/include/linux/refcount.h @@ -23,6 +23,16 @@ typedef struct refcount_struct { #define REFCOUNT_INIT(n) { .refs = ATOMIC_INIT(n), } +enum refcount_saturation_type { + REFCOUNT_ADD_NOT_ZERO_OVF, + REFCOUNT_ADD_OVF, + REFCOUNT_ADD_UAF, + REFCOUNT_SUB_UAF, + REFCOUNT_DEC_LEAK, +}; + +void refcount_warn_saturate(refcount_t *r, enum refcount_saturation_type t); + /** * refcount_set - set a refcount's value * @r: the refcount @@ -154,10 +164,8 @@ static inline __must_check bool refcount_add_not_zero(int i, refcount_t *r) break; } while (!atomic_try_cmpxchg_relaxed(&r->refs, &old, old + i)); - if (unlikely(old < 0 || old + i < 0)) { - refcount_set(r, REFCOUNT_SATURATED); - WARN_ONCE(1, "refcount_t: saturated; leaking memory.\n"); - } + if (unlikely(old < 0 || old + i < 0)) + refcount_warn_saturate(r, REFCOUNT_ADD_NOT_ZERO_OVF); return old; } @@ -182,11 +190,10 @@ static inline void refcount_add(int i, refcount_t *r) { int old = atomic_fetch_add_relaxed(i, &r->refs); - WARN_ONCE(!old, "refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.\n"); - if (unlikely(old <= 0 || old + i <= 0)) { - refcount_set(r, REFCOUNT_SATURATED); - WARN_ONCE(old, "refcount_t: saturated; leaking memory.\n"); - } + if (unlikely(!old)) + refcount_warn_saturate(r, REFCOUNT_ADD_UAF); + else if (unlikely(old < 0 || old + i < 0)) + refcount_warn_saturate(r, REFCOUNT_ADD_OVF); } /** @@ -253,10 +260,8 @@ static inline __must_check bool refcount_sub_and_test(int i, refcount_t *r) return true; } - if (unlikely(old < 0 || old - i < 0)) { - refcount_set(r, REFCOUNT_SATURATED); - WARN_ONCE(1, "refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.\n"); - } + if (unlikely(old < 0 || old - i < 0)) + refcount_warn_saturate(r, REFCOUNT_SUB_UAF); return false; } @@ -291,12 +296,8 @@ static inline __must_check bool refcount_dec_and_test(refcount_t *r) */ static inline void refcount_dec(refcount_t *r) { - int old = atomic_fetch_sub_release(1, &r->refs); - - if (unlikely(old <= 1)) { - refcount_set(r, REFCOUNT_SATURATED); - WARN_ONCE(1, "refcount_t: decrement hit 0; leaking memory.\n"); - } + if (unlikely(atomic_fetch_sub_release(1, &r->refs) <= 1)) + refcount_warn_saturate(r, REFCOUNT_DEC_LEAK); } #else /* CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL */ diff --git a/lib/refcount.c b/lib/refcount.c index 3a534fbebdcc..8b7e249c0e10 100644 --- a/lib/refcount.c +++ b/lib/refcount.c @@ -8,6 +8,34 @@ #include #include +#define REFCOUNT_WARN(str) WARN_ONCE(1, "refcount_t: " str ".\n") + +void refcount_warn_saturate(refcount_t *r, enum refcount_saturation_type t) +{ + refcount_set(r, REFCOUNT_SATURATED); + + switch (t) { + case REFCOUNT_ADD_NOT_ZERO_OVF: + REFCOUNT_WARN("saturated; leaking memory"); + break; + case REFCOUNT_ADD_OVF: + REFCOUNT_WARN("saturated; leaking memory"); + break; + case REFCOUNT_ADD_UAF: + REFCOUNT_WARN("addition on 0; use-after-free"); + break; + case REFCOUNT_SUB_UAF: + REFCOUNT_WARN("underflow; use-after-free"); + break; + case REFCOUNT_DEC_LEAK: + REFCOUNT_WARN("decrement hit 0; leaking memory"); + break; + default: + REFCOUNT_WARN("unknown saturation event!?"); + } +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(refcount_warn_saturate); + /** * refcount_dec_if_one - decrement a refcount if it is 1 * @r: the refcount From dab787c73f6e38d8e7ed3c1e683385e8f0fe28a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Will Deacon Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2019 11:58:59 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 1012/1091] locking/refcount: Consolidate REFCOUNT_{MAX,SATURATED} definitions [ Upstream commit 65b008552469f1c37f5e06e0016924502e40b4f5 ] The definitions of REFCOUNT_MAX and REFCOUNT_SATURATED are the same, regardless of CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL, so consolidate them into a single pair of definitions. Signed-off-by: Will Deacon Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel Reviewed-by: Kees Cook Tested-by: Hanjun Guo Cc: Ard Biesheuvel Cc: Elena Reshetova Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Thomas Gleixner Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191121115902.2551-8-will@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- include/linux/refcount.h | 9 ++------- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/refcount.h b/include/linux/refcount.h index 1cd0a876a789..757d4630115c 100644 --- a/include/linux/refcount.h +++ b/include/linux/refcount.h @@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ typedef struct refcount_struct { } refcount_t; #define REFCOUNT_INIT(n) { .refs = ATOMIC_INIT(n), } +#define REFCOUNT_MAX INT_MAX +#define REFCOUNT_SATURATED (INT_MIN / 2) enum refcount_saturation_type { REFCOUNT_ADD_NOT_ZERO_OVF, @@ -57,9 +59,6 @@ static inline unsigned int refcount_read(const refcount_t *r) #ifdef CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL #include -#define REFCOUNT_MAX INT_MAX -#define REFCOUNT_SATURATED (INT_MIN / 2) - /* * Variant of atomic_t specialized for reference counts. * @@ -300,10 +299,6 @@ static inline void refcount_dec(refcount_t *r) refcount_warn_saturate(r, REFCOUNT_DEC_LEAK); } #else /* CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL */ - -#define REFCOUNT_MAX INT_MAX -#define REFCOUNT_SATURATED (INT_MIN / 2) - # ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_REFCOUNT # include # else From d0d583484d2ed9f5903edbbfa7e2a68f78b950b0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Will Deacon Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2019 11:59:00 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 1013/1091] locking/refcount: Consolidate implementations of refcount_t [ Upstream commit fb041bb7c0a918b95c6889fc965cdc4a75b4c0ca ] The generic implementation of refcount_t should be good enough for everybody, so remove ARCH_HAS_REFCOUNT and REFCOUNT_FULL entirely, leaving the generic implementation enabled unconditionally. Signed-off-by: Will Deacon Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel Acked-by: Kees Cook Tested-by: Hanjun Guo Cc: Ard Biesheuvel Cc: Elena Reshetova Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Thomas Gleixner Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191121115902.2551-9-will@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/Kconfig | 21 ---- arch/arm/Kconfig | 1 - arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1 - arch/s390/configs/debug_defconfig | 1 - arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 - arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h | 6 -- arch/x86/include/asm/refcount.h | 126 ----------------------- arch/x86/mm/extable.c | 49 --------- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/Kconfig.debug | 1 - include/linux/refcount.h | 158 +++++++++++------------------ lib/refcount.c | 2 +- 11 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 308 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/refcount.h diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig index a8df66e64544..2219a07dca1e 100644 --- a/arch/Kconfig +++ b/arch/Kconfig @@ -915,27 +915,6 @@ config STRICT_MODULE_RWX config ARCH_HAS_PHYS_TO_DMA bool -config ARCH_HAS_REFCOUNT - bool - help - An architecture selects this when it has implemented refcount_t - using open coded assembly primitives that provide an optimized - refcount_t implementation, possibly at the expense of some full - refcount state checks of CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL=y. - - The refcount overflow check behavior, however, must be retained. - Catching overflows is the primary security concern for protecting - against bugs in reference counts. - -config REFCOUNT_FULL - bool "Perform full reference count validation at the expense of speed" - help - Enabling this switches the refcounting infrastructure from a fast - unchecked atomic_t implementation to a fully state checked - implementation, which can be (slightly) slower but provides protections - against various use-after-free conditions that can be used in - security flaw exploits. - config HAVE_ARCH_COMPILER_H bool help diff --git a/arch/arm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/Kconfig index a1622b9290fd..a4364cce85f8 100644 --- a/arch/arm/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm/Kconfig @@ -119,7 +119,6 @@ config ARM select OLD_SIGSUSPEND3 select PCI_SYSCALL if PCI select PERF_USE_VMALLOC - select REFCOUNT_FULL select RTC_LIB select SYS_SUPPORTS_APM_EMULATION # Above selects are sorted alphabetically; please add new ones diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig index a1a828ca188c..6b73143f0cf8 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig @@ -181,7 +181,6 @@ config ARM64 select PCI_SYSCALL if PCI select POWER_RESET select POWER_SUPPLY - select REFCOUNT_FULL select SPARSE_IRQ select SWIOTLB select SYSCTL_EXCEPTION_TRACE diff --git a/arch/s390/configs/debug_defconfig b/arch/s390/configs/debug_defconfig index 38d64030aacf..2e60c80395ab 100644 --- a/arch/s390/configs/debug_defconfig +++ b/arch/s390/configs/debug_defconfig @@ -62,7 +62,6 @@ CONFIG_OPROFILE=m CONFIG_KPROBES=y CONFIG_JUMP_LABEL=y CONFIG_STATIC_KEYS_SELFTEST=y -CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL=y CONFIG_LOCK_EVENT_COUNTS=y CONFIG_MODULES=y CONFIG_MODULE_FORCE_LOAD=y diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index c6c71592f6e4..6002252692af 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -73,7 +73,6 @@ config X86 select ARCH_HAS_PMEM_API if X86_64 select ARCH_HAS_PTE_DEVMAP if X86_64 select ARCH_HAS_PTE_SPECIAL - select ARCH_HAS_REFCOUNT select ARCH_HAS_UACCESS_FLUSHCACHE if X86_64 select ARCH_HAS_UACCESS_MCSAFE if X86_64 && X86_MCE select ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h index 1b563f9167ea..cd339b88d5d4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h @@ -141,9 +141,6 @@ # define _ASM_EXTABLE_EX(from, to) \ _ASM_EXTABLE_HANDLE(from, to, ex_handler_ext) -# define _ASM_EXTABLE_REFCOUNT(from, to) \ - _ASM_EXTABLE_HANDLE(from, to, ex_handler_refcount) - # define _ASM_NOKPROBE(entry) \ .pushsection "_kprobe_blacklist","aw" ; \ _ASM_ALIGN ; \ @@ -172,9 +169,6 @@ # define _ASM_EXTABLE_EX(from, to) \ _ASM_EXTABLE_HANDLE(from, to, ex_handler_ext) -# define _ASM_EXTABLE_REFCOUNT(from, to) \ - _ASM_EXTABLE_HANDLE(from, to, ex_handler_refcount) - /* For C file, we already have NOKPROBE_SYMBOL macro */ #endif diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/refcount.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/refcount.h deleted file mode 100644 index 232f856e0db0..000000000000 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/refcount.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,126 +0,0 @@ -#ifndef __ASM_X86_REFCOUNT_H -#define __ASM_X86_REFCOUNT_H -/* - * x86-specific implementation of refcount_t. Based on PAX_REFCOUNT from - * PaX/grsecurity. - */ -#include -#include - -/* - * This is the first portion of the refcount error handling, which lives in - * .text.unlikely, and is jumped to from the CPU flag check (in the - * following macros). This saves the refcount value location into CX for - * the exception handler to use (in mm/extable.c), and then triggers the - * central refcount exception. The fixup address for the exception points - * back to the regular execution flow in .text. - */ -#define _REFCOUNT_EXCEPTION \ - ".pushsection .text..refcount\n" \ - "111:\tlea %[var], %%" _ASM_CX "\n" \ - "112:\t" ASM_UD2 "\n" \ - ASM_UNREACHABLE \ - ".popsection\n" \ - "113:\n" \ - _ASM_EXTABLE_REFCOUNT(112b, 113b) - -/* Trigger refcount exception if refcount result is negative. */ -#define REFCOUNT_CHECK_LT_ZERO \ - "js 111f\n\t" \ - _REFCOUNT_EXCEPTION - -/* Trigger refcount exception if refcount result is zero or negative. */ -#define REFCOUNT_CHECK_LE_ZERO \ - "jz 111f\n\t" \ - REFCOUNT_CHECK_LT_ZERO - -/* Trigger refcount exception unconditionally. */ -#define REFCOUNT_ERROR \ - "jmp 111f\n\t" \ - _REFCOUNT_EXCEPTION - -static __always_inline void refcount_add(unsigned int i, refcount_t *r) -{ - asm volatile(LOCK_PREFIX "addl %1,%0\n\t" - REFCOUNT_CHECK_LT_ZERO - : [var] "+m" (r->refs.counter) - : "ir" (i) - : "cc", "cx"); -} - -static __always_inline void refcount_inc(refcount_t *r) -{ - asm volatile(LOCK_PREFIX "incl %0\n\t" - REFCOUNT_CHECK_LT_ZERO - : [var] "+m" (r->refs.counter) - : : "cc", "cx"); -} - -static __always_inline void refcount_dec(refcount_t *r) -{ - asm volatile(LOCK_PREFIX "decl %0\n\t" - REFCOUNT_CHECK_LE_ZERO - : [var] "+m" (r->refs.counter) - : : "cc", "cx"); -} - -static __always_inline __must_check -bool refcount_sub_and_test(unsigned int i, refcount_t *r) -{ - bool ret = GEN_BINARY_SUFFIXED_RMWcc(LOCK_PREFIX "subl", - REFCOUNT_CHECK_LT_ZERO, - r->refs.counter, e, "er", i, "cx"); - - if (ret) { - smp_acquire__after_ctrl_dep(); - return true; - } - - return false; -} - -static __always_inline __must_check bool refcount_dec_and_test(refcount_t *r) -{ - bool ret = GEN_UNARY_SUFFIXED_RMWcc(LOCK_PREFIX "decl", - REFCOUNT_CHECK_LT_ZERO, - r->refs.counter, e, "cx"); - - if (ret) { - smp_acquire__after_ctrl_dep(); - return true; - } - - return false; -} - -static __always_inline __must_check -bool refcount_add_not_zero(unsigned int i, refcount_t *r) -{ - int c, result; - - c = atomic_read(&(r->refs)); - do { - if (unlikely(c == 0)) - return false; - - result = c + i; - - /* Did we try to increment from/to an undesirable state? */ - if (unlikely(c < 0 || c == INT_MAX || result < c)) { - asm volatile(REFCOUNT_ERROR - : : [var] "m" (r->refs.counter) - : "cc", "cx"); - break; - } - - } while (!atomic_try_cmpxchg(&(r->refs), &c, result)); - - return c != 0; -} - -static __always_inline __must_check bool refcount_inc_not_zero(refcount_t *r) -{ - return refcount_add_not_zero(1, r); -} - -#endif diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/extable.c b/arch/x86/mm/extable.c index 4d75bc656f97..30bb0bd3b1b8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/extable.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/extable.c @@ -44,55 +44,6 @@ __visible bool ex_handler_fault(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup, } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ex_handler_fault); -/* - * Handler for UD0 exception following a failed test against the - * result of a refcount inc/dec/add/sub. - */ -__visible bool ex_handler_refcount(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup, - struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr, - unsigned long error_code, - unsigned long fault_addr) -{ - /* First unconditionally saturate the refcount. */ - *(int *)regs->cx = INT_MIN / 2; - - /* - * Strictly speaking, this reports the fixup destination, not - * the fault location, and not the actually overflowing - * instruction, which is the instruction before the "js", but - * since that instruction could be a variety of lengths, just - * report the location after the overflow, which should be close - * enough for finding the overflow, as it's at least back in - * the function, having returned from .text.unlikely. - */ - regs->ip = ex_fixup_addr(fixup); - - /* - * This function has been called because either a negative refcount - * value was seen by any of the refcount functions, or a zero - * refcount value was seen by refcount_dec(). - * - * If we crossed from INT_MAX to INT_MIN, OF (Overflow Flag: result - * wrapped around) will be set. Additionally, seeing the refcount - * reach 0 will set ZF (Zero Flag: result was zero). In each of - * these cases we want a report, since it's a boundary condition. - * The SF case is not reported since it indicates post-boundary - * manipulations below zero or above INT_MAX. And if none of the - * flags are set, something has gone very wrong, so report it. - */ - if (regs->flags & (X86_EFLAGS_OF | X86_EFLAGS_ZF)) { - bool zero = regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_ZF; - - refcount_error_report(regs, zero ? "hit zero" : "overflow"); - } else if ((regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_SF) == 0) { - /* Report if none of OF, ZF, nor SF are set. */ - refcount_error_report(regs, "unexpected saturation"); - } - - return true; -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(ex_handler_refcount); - /* * Handler for when we fail to restore a task's FPU state. We should never get * here because the FPU state of a task using the FPU (task->thread.fpu.state) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/Kconfig.debug b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/Kconfig.debug index 41c8e39a73ba..e4f03fcb125e 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/Kconfig.debug +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/Kconfig.debug @@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ config DRM_I915_DEBUG depends on DRM_I915 select DEBUG_FS select PREEMPT_COUNT - select REFCOUNT_FULL select I2C_CHARDEV select STACKDEPOT select DRM_DP_AUX_CHARDEV diff --git a/include/linux/refcount.h b/include/linux/refcount.h index 757d4630115c..0ac50cf62d06 100644 --- a/include/linux/refcount.h +++ b/include/linux/refcount.h @@ -1,64 +1,4 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ -#ifndef _LINUX_REFCOUNT_H -#define _LINUX_REFCOUNT_H - -#include -#include -#include -#include - -struct mutex; - -/** - * struct refcount_t - variant of atomic_t specialized for reference counts - * @refs: atomic_t counter field - * - * The counter saturates at REFCOUNT_SATURATED and will not move once - * there. This avoids wrapping the counter and causing 'spurious' - * use-after-free bugs. - */ -typedef struct refcount_struct { - atomic_t refs; -} refcount_t; - -#define REFCOUNT_INIT(n) { .refs = ATOMIC_INIT(n), } -#define REFCOUNT_MAX INT_MAX -#define REFCOUNT_SATURATED (INT_MIN / 2) - -enum refcount_saturation_type { - REFCOUNT_ADD_NOT_ZERO_OVF, - REFCOUNT_ADD_OVF, - REFCOUNT_ADD_UAF, - REFCOUNT_SUB_UAF, - REFCOUNT_DEC_LEAK, -}; - -void refcount_warn_saturate(refcount_t *r, enum refcount_saturation_type t); - -/** - * refcount_set - set a refcount's value - * @r: the refcount - * @n: value to which the refcount will be set - */ -static inline void refcount_set(refcount_t *r, int n) -{ - atomic_set(&r->refs, n); -} - -/** - * refcount_read - get a refcount's value - * @r: the refcount - * - * Return: the refcount's value - */ -static inline unsigned int refcount_read(const refcount_t *r) -{ - return atomic_read(&r->refs); -} - -#ifdef CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL -#include - /* * Variant of atomic_t specialized for reference counts. * @@ -136,6 +76,64 @@ static inline unsigned int refcount_read(const refcount_t *r) * */ +#ifndef _LINUX_REFCOUNT_H +#define _LINUX_REFCOUNT_H + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +struct mutex; + +/** + * struct refcount_t - variant of atomic_t specialized for reference counts + * @refs: atomic_t counter field + * + * The counter saturates at REFCOUNT_SATURATED and will not move once + * there. This avoids wrapping the counter and causing 'spurious' + * use-after-free bugs. + */ +typedef struct refcount_struct { + atomic_t refs; +} refcount_t; + +#define REFCOUNT_INIT(n) { .refs = ATOMIC_INIT(n), } +#define REFCOUNT_MAX INT_MAX +#define REFCOUNT_SATURATED (INT_MIN / 2) + +enum refcount_saturation_type { + REFCOUNT_ADD_NOT_ZERO_OVF, + REFCOUNT_ADD_OVF, + REFCOUNT_ADD_UAF, + REFCOUNT_SUB_UAF, + REFCOUNT_DEC_LEAK, +}; + +void refcount_warn_saturate(refcount_t *r, enum refcount_saturation_type t); + +/** + * refcount_set - set a refcount's value + * @r: the refcount + * @n: value to which the refcount will be set + */ +static inline void refcount_set(refcount_t *r, int n) +{ + atomic_set(&r->refs, n); +} + +/** + * refcount_read - get a refcount's value + * @r: the refcount + * + * Return: the refcount's value + */ +static inline unsigned int refcount_read(const refcount_t *r) +{ + return atomic_read(&r->refs); +} + /** * refcount_add_not_zero - add a value to a refcount unless it is 0 * @i: the value to add to the refcount @@ -298,46 +296,6 @@ static inline void refcount_dec(refcount_t *r) if (unlikely(atomic_fetch_sub_release(1, &r->refs) <= 1)) refcount_warn_saturate(r, REFCOUNT_DEC_LEAK); } -#else /* CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL */ -# ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_REFCOUNT -# include -# else -static inline __must_check bool refcount_add_not_zero(int i, refcount_t *r) -{ - return atomic_add_unless(&r->refs, i, 0); -} - -static inline void refcount_add(int i, refcount_t *r) -{ - atomic_add(i, &r->refs); -} - -static inline __must_check bool refcount_inc_not_zero(refcount_t *r) -{ - return atomic_add_unless(&r->refs, 1, 0); -} - -static inline void refcount_inc(refcount_t *r) -{ - atomic_inc(&r->refs); -} - -static inline __must_check bool refcount_sub_and_test(int i, refcount_t *r) -{ - return atomic_sub_and_test(i, &r->refs); -} - -static inline __must_check bool refcount_dec_and_test(refcount_t *r) -{ - return atomic_dec_and_test(&r->refs); -} - -static inline void refcount_dec(refcount_t *r) -{ - atomic_dec(&r->refs); -} -# endif /* !CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_REFCOUNT */ -#endif /* !CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL */ extern __must_check bool refcount_dec_if_one(refcount_t *r); extern __must_check bool refcount_dec_not_one(refcount_t *r); diff --git a/lib/refcount.c b/lib/refcount.c index 8b7e249c0e10..ebac8b7d15a7 100644 --- a/lib/refcount.c +++ b/lib/refcount.c @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* - * Out-of-line refcount functions common to all refcount implementations. + * Out-of-line refcount functions. */ #include From 1d778b54a5c003b1786d7dc46976d30746a66913 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Al Viro Date: Sat, 15 Feb 2020 11:46:30 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 1014/1091] x86: get rid of small constant size cases in raw_copy_{to,from}_user() [ Upstream commit 4b842e4e25b12951fa10dedb4bc16bc47e3b850c ] Very few call sites where that would be triggered remain, and none of those is anywhere near hot enough to bother. Signed-off-by: Al Viro Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 12 ---- arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h | 27 -------- arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h | 108 +----------------------------- 3 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 145 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h index 61d93f062a36..a19effb98fdc 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -378,18 +378,6 @@ do { \ : "=r" (err), ltype(x) \ : "m" (__m(addr)), "i" (errret), "0" (err)) -#define __get_user_asm_nozero(x, addr, err, itype, rtype, ltype, errret) \ - asm volatile("\n" \ - "1: mov"itype" %2,%"rtype"1\n" \ - "2:\n" \ - ".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n" \ - "3: mov %3,%0\n" \ - " jmp 2b\n" \ - ".previous\n" \ - _ASM_EXTABLE_UA(1b, 3b) \ - : "=r" (err), ltype(x) \ - : "m" (__m(addr)), "i" (errret), "0" (err)) - /* * This doesn't do __uaccess_begin/end - the exception handling * around it must do that. diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h index ba2dc1930630..388a40660c7b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h @@ -23,33 +23,6 @@ raw_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n) static __always_inline unsigned long raw_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n) { - if (__builtin_constant_p(n)) { - unsigned long ret; - - switch (n) { - case 1: - ret = 0; - __uaccess_begin_nospec(); - __get_user_asm_nozero(*(u8 *)to, from, ret, - "b", "b", "=q", 1); - __uaccess_end(); - return ret; - case 2: - ret = 0; - __uaccess_begin_nospec(); - __get_user_asm_nozero(*(u16 *)to, from, ret, - "w", "w", "=r", 2); - __uaccess_end(); - return ret; - case 4: - ret = 0; - __uaccess_begin_nospec(); - __get_user_asm_nozero(*(u32 *)to, from, ret, - "l", "k", "=r", 4); - __uaccess_end(); - return ret; - } - } return __copy_user_ll(to, (__force const void *)from, n); } diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h index 5cd1caa8bc65..bc10e3dc64fe 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h @@ -65,117 +65,13 @@ copy_to_user_mcsafe(void *to, const void *from, unsigned len) static __always_inline __must_check unsigned long raw_copy_from_user(void *dst, const void __user *src, unsigned long size) { - int ret = 0; - - if (!__builtin_constant_p(size)) - return copy_user_generic(dst, (__force void *)src, size); - switch (size) { - case 1: - __uaccess_begin_nospec(); - __get_user_asm_nozero(*(u8 *)dst, (u8 __user *)src, - ret, "b", "b", "=q", 1); - __uaccess_end(); - return ret; - case 2: - __uaccess_begin_nospec(); - __get_user_asm_nozero(*(u16 *)dst, (u16 __user *)src, - ret, "w", "w", "=r", 2); - __uaccess_end(); - return ret; - case 4: - __uaccess_begin_nospec(); - __get_user_asm_nozero(*(u32 *)dst, (u32 __user *)src, - ret, "l", "k", "=r", 4); - __uaccess_end(); - return ret; - case 8: - __uaccess_begin_nospec(); - __get_user_asm_nozero(*(u64 *)dst, (u64 __user *)src, - ret, "q", "", "=r", 8); - __uaccess_end(); - return ret; - case 10: - __uaccess_begin_nospec(); - __get_user_asm_nozero(*(u64 *)dst, (u64 __user *)src, - ret, "q", "", "=r", 10); - if (likely(!ret)) - __get_user_asm_nozero(*(u16 *)(8 + (char *)dst), - (u16 __user *)(8 + (char __user *)src), - ret, "w", "w", "=r", 2); - __uaccess_end(); - return ret; - case 16: - __uaccess_begin_nospec(); - __get_user_asm_nozero(*(u64 *)dst, (u64 __user *)src, - ret, "q", "", "=r", 16); - if (likely(!ret)) - __get_user_asm_nozero(*(u64 *)(8 + (char *)dst), - (u64 __user *)(8 + (char __user *)src), - ret, "q", "", "=r", 8); - __uaccess_end(); - return ret; - default: - return copy_user_generic(dst, (__force void *)src, size); - } + return copy_user_generic(dst, (__force void *)src, size); } static __always_inline __must_check unsigned long raw_copy_to_user(void __user *dst, const void *src, unsigned long size) { - int ret = 0; - - if (!__builtin_constant_p(size)) - return copy_user_generic((__force void *)dst, src, size); - switch (size) { - case 1: - __uaccess_begin(); - __put_user_asm(*(u8 *)src, (u8 __user *)dst, - ret, "b", "b", "iq", 1); - __uaccess_end(); - return ret; - case 2: - __uaccess_begin(); - __put_user_asm(*(u16 *)src, (u16 __user *)dst, - ret, "w", "w", "ir", 2); - __uaccess_end(); - return ret; - case 4: - __uaccess_begin(); - __put_user_asm(*(u32 *)src, (u32 __user *)dst, - ret, "l", "k", "ir", 4); - __uaccess_end(); - return ret; - case 8: - __uaccess_begin(); - __put_user_asm(*(u64 *)src, (u64 __user *)dst, - ret, "q", "", "er", 8); - __uaccess_end(); - return ret; - case 10: - __uaccess_begin(); - __put_user_asm(*(u64 *)src, (u64 __user *)dst, - ret, "q", "", "er", 10); - if (likely(!ret)) { - asm("":::"memory"); - __put_user_asm(4[(u16 *)src], 4 + (u16 __user *)dst, - ret, "w", "w", "ir", 2); - } - __uaccess_end(); - return ret; - case 16: - __uaccess_begin(); - __put_user_asm(*(u64 *)src, (u64 __user *)dst, - ret, "q", "", "er", 16); - if (likely(!ret)) { - asm("":::"memory"); - __put_user_asm(1[(u64 *)src], 1 + (u64 __user *)dst, - ret, "q", "", "er", 8); - } - __uaccess_end(); - return ret; - default: - return copy_user_generic((__force void *)dst, src, size); - } + return copy_user_generic((__force void *)dst, src, size); } static __always_inline __must_check From 592a1c6066dd3a29df417bc1cee756b653ec06c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Wed, 2 Feb 2022 00:49:42 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 1015/1091] x86/uaccess: Implement macros for CMPXCHG on user addresses [ Upstream commit 989b5db215a2f22f89d730b607b071d964780f10 ] Add support for CMPXCHG loops on userspace addresses. Provide both an "unsafe" version for tight loops that do their own uaccess begin/end, as well as a "safe" version for use cases where the CMPXCHG is not buried in a loop, e.g. KVM will resume the guest instead of looping when emulation of a guest atomic accesses fails the CMPXCHG. Provide 8-byte versions for 32-bit kernels so that KVM can do CMPXCHG on guest PAE PTEs, which are accessed via userspace addresses. Guard the asm_volatile_goto() variation with CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO_TIED_OUTPUT, the "+m" constraint fails on some compilers that otherwise support CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO_OUTPUT. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Message-Id: <20220202004945.2540433-3-seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 142 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 142 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h index a19effb98fdc..865795e2355e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -441,6 +441,103 @@ __pu_label: \ __builtin_expect(__gu_err, 0); \ }) +#ifdef CONFIG_CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO_TIED_OUTPUT +#define __try_cmpxchg_user_asm(itype, ltype, _ptr, _pold, _new, label) ({ \ + bool success; \ + __typeof__(_ptr) _old = (__typeof__(_ptr))(_pold); \ + __typeof__(*(_ptr)) __old = *_old; \ + __typeof__(*(_ptr)) __new = (_new); \ + asm_volatile_goto("\n" \ + "1: " LOCK_PREFIX "cmpxchg"itype" %[new], %[ptr]\n"\ + _ASM_EXTABLE_UA(1b, %l[label]) \ + : CC_OUT(z) (success), \ + [ptr] "+m" (*_ptr), \ + [old] "+a" (__old) \ + : [new] ltype (__new) \ + : "memory" \ + : label); \ + if (unlikely(!success)) \ + *_old = __old; \ + likely(success); }) + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 +#define __try_cmpxchg64_user_asm(_ptr, _pold, _new, label) ({ \ + bool success; \ + __typeof__(_ptr) _old = (__typeof__(_ptr))(_pold); \ + __typeof__(*(_ptr)) __old = *_old; \ + __typeof__(*(_ptr)) __new = (_new); \ + asm_volatile_goto("\n" \ + "1: " LOCK_PREFIX "cmpxchg8b %[ptr]\n" \ + _ASM_EXTABLE_UA(1b, %l[label]) \ + : CC_OUT(z) (success), \ + "+A" (__old), \ + [ptr] "+m" (*_ptr) \ + : "b" ((u32)__new), \ + "c" ((u32)((u64)__new >> 32)) \ + : "memory" \ + : label); \ + if (unlikely(!success)) \ + *_old = __old; \ + likely(success); }) +#endif // CONFIG_X86_32 +#else // !CONFIG_CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO_TIED_OUTPUT +#define __try_cmpxchg_user_asm(itype, ltype, _ptr, _pold, _new, label) ({ \ + int __err = 0; \ + bool success; \ + __typeof__(_ptr) _old = (__typeof__(_ptr))(_pold); \ + __typeof__(*(_ptr)) __old = *_old; \ + __typeof__(*(_ptr)) __new = (_new); \ + asm volatile("\n" \ + "1: " LOCK_PREFIX "cmpxchg"itype" %[new], %[ptr]\n"\ + CC_SET(z) \ + "2:\n" \ + _ASM_EXTABLE_TYPE_REG(1b, 2b, EX_TYPE_EFAULT_REG, \ + %[errout]) \ + : CC_OUT(z) (success), \ + [errout] "+r" (__err), \ + [ptr] "+m" (*_ptr), \ + [old] "+a" (__old) \ + : [new] ltype (__new) \ + : "memory", "cc"); \ + if (unlikely(__err)) \ + goto label; \ + if (unlikely(!success)) \ + *_old = __old; \ + likely(success); }) + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 +/* + * Unlike the normal CMPXCHG, hardcode ECX for both success/fail and error. + * There are only six GPRs available and four (EAX, EBX, ECX, and EDX) are + * hardcoded by CMPXCHG8B, leaving only ESI and EDI. If the compiler uses + * both ESI and EDI for the memory operand, compilation will fail if the error + * is an input+output as there will be no register available for input. + */ +#define __try_cmpxchg64_user_asm(_ptr, _pold, _new, label) ({ \ + int __result; \ + __typeof__(_ptr) _old = (__typeof__(_ptr))(_pold); \ + __typeof__(*(_ptr)) __old = *_old; \ + __typeof__(*(_ptr)) __new = (_new); \ + asm volatile("\n" \ + "1: " LOCK_PREFIX "cmpxchg8b %[ptr]\n" \ + "mov $0, %%ecx\n\t" \ + "setz %%cl\n" \ + "2:\n" \ + _ASM_EXTABLE_TYPE_REG(1b, 2b, EX_TYPE_EFAULT_REG, %%ecx) \ + : [result]"=c" (__result), \ + "+A" (__old), \ + [ptr] "+m" (*_ptr) \ + : "b" ((u32)__new), \ + "c" ((u32)((u64)__new >> 32)) \ + : "memory", "cc"); \ + if (unlikely(__result < 0)) \ + goto label; \ + if (unlikely(!__result)) \ + *_old = __old; \ + likely(__result); }) +#endif // CONFIG_X86_32 +#endif // CONFIG_CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO_TIED_OUTPUT + /* FIXME: this hack is definitely wrong -AK */ struct __large_struct { unsigned long buf[100]; }; #define __m(x) (*(struct __large_struct __user *)(x)) @@ -722,6 +819,51 @@ do { \ if (unlikely(__gu_err)) goto err_label; \ } while (0) +extern void __try_cmpxchg_user_wrong_size(void); + +#ifndef CONFIG_X86_32 +#define __try_cmpxchg64_user_asm(_ptr, _oldp, _nval, _label) \ + __try_cmpxchg_user_asm("q", "r", (_ptr), (_oldp), (_nval), _label) +#endif + +/* + * Force the pointer to u to match the size expected by the asm helper. + * clang/LLVM compiles all cases and only discards the unused paths after + * processing errors, which breaks i386 if the pointer is an 8-byte value. + */ +#define unsafe_try_cmpxchg_user(_ptr, _oldp, _nval, _label) ({ \ + bool __ret; \ + __chk_user_ptr(_ptr); \ + switch (sizeof(*(_ptr))) { \ + case 1: __ret = __try_cmpxchg_user_asm("b", "q", \ + (__force u8 *)(_ptr), (_oldp), \ + (_nval), _label); \ + break; \ + case 2: __ret = __try_cmpxchg_user_asm("w", "r", \ + (__force u16 *)(_ptr), (_oldp), \ + (_nval), _label); \ + break; \ + case 4: __ret = __try_cmpxchg_user_asm("l", "r", \ + (__force u32 *)(_ptr), (_oldp), \ + (_nval), _label); \ + break; \ + case 8: __ret = __try_cmpxchg64_user_asm((__force u64 *)(_ptr), (_oldp),\ + (_nval), _label); \ + break; \ + default: __try_cmpxchg_user_wrong_size(); \ + } \ + __ret; }) + +/* "Returns" 0 on success, 1 on failure, -EFAULT if the access faults. */ +#define __try_cmpxchg_user(_ptr, _oldp, _nval, _label) ({ \ + int __ret = -EFAULT; \ + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); \ + __ret = !unsafe_try_cmpxchg_user(_ptr, _oldp, _nval, _label); \ +_label: \ + __uaccess_end(); \ + __ret; \ + }) + /* * We want the unsafe accessors to always be inlined and use * the error labels - thus the macro games. From b524137fa1d8cd9aabb65fbf34da10e24f8fc9d7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michel Lespinasse Date: Mon, 8 Jun 2020 21:33:14 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 1016/1091] mmap locking API: initial implementation as rwsem wrappers [ Upstream commit 9740ca4e95b43b91a4a848694a20d01ba6818f7b ] This patch series adds a new mmap locking API replacing the existing mmap_sem lock and unlocks. Initially the API is just implemente in terms of inlined rwsem calls, so it doesn't provide any new functionality. There are two justifications for the new API: - At first, it provides an easy hooking point to instrument mmap_sem locking latencies independently of any other rwsems. - In the future, it may be a starting point for replacing the rwsem implementation with a different one, such as range locks. This is something that is being explored, even though there is no wide concensus about this possible direction yet. (see https://patchwork.kernel.org/cover/11401483/) This patch (of 12): This change wraps the existing mmap_sem related rwsem calls into a new mmap locking API. There are two justifications for the new API: - At first, it provides an easy hooking point to instrument mmap_sem locking latencies independently of any other rwsems. - In the future, it may be a starting point for replacing the rwsem implementation with a different one, such as range locks. Signed-off-by: Michel Lespinasse Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Reviewed-by: Daniel Jordan Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso Reviewed-by: Laurent Dufour Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Matthew Wilcox Cc: Liam Howlett Cc: Jerome Glisse Cc: David Rientjes Cc: Hugh Dickins Cc: Ying Han Cc: Jason Gunthorpe Cc: John Hubbard Cc: Michel Lespinasse Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200520052908.204642-1-walken@google.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200520052908.204642-2-walken@google.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- include/linux/mm.h | 1 + include/linux/mmap_lock.h | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 55 insertions(+) create mode 100644 include/linux/mmap_lock.h diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h index c125fea49752..d35c29d322d8 100644 --- a/include/linux/mm.h +++ b/include/linux/mm.h @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include diff --git a/include/linux/mmap_lock.h b/include/linux/mmap_lock.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..97ac53b66052 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/linux/mmap_lock.h @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +#ifndef _LINUX_MMAP_LOCK_H +#define _LINUX_MMAP_LOCK_H + +static inline void mmap_init_lock(struct mm_struct *mm) +{ + init_rwsem(&mm->mmap_sem); +} + +static inline void mmap_write_lock(struct mm_struct *mm) +{ + down_write(&mm->mmap_sem); +} + +static inline int mmap_write_lock_killable(struct mm_struct *mm) +{ + return down_write_killable(&mm->mmap_sem); +} + +static inline bool mmap_write_trylock(struct mm_struct *mm) +{ + return down_write_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem) != 0; +} + +static inline void mmap_write_unlock(struct mm_struct *mm) +{ + up_write(&mm->mmap_sem); +} + +static inline void mmap_write_downgrade(struct mm_struct *mm) +{ + downgrade_write(&mm->mmap_sem); +} + +static inline void mmap_read_lock(struct mm_struct *mm) +{ + down_read(&mm->mmap_sem); +} + +static inline int mmap_read_lock_killable(struct mm_struct *mm) +{ + return down_read_killable(&mm->mmap_sem); +} + +static inline bool mmap_read_trylock(struct mm_struct *mm) +{ + return down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem) != 0; +} + +static inline void mmap_read_unlock(struct mm_struct *mm) +{ + up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); +} + +#endif /* _LINUX_MMAP_LOCK_H */ From 0a0fbbd6cb654f748d87c0db10c31741101f2ab2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thomas Gleixner Date: Wed, 8 Sep 2021 15:29:15 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 1017/1091] x86/mce: Deduplicate exception handling [ Upstream commit e42404afc4ca856c48f1e05752541faa3587c472 ] Prepare code for further simplification. No functional change. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210908132525.096452100@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c index 8a2b8e791314..9b98a7d8ac60 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c @@ -397,13 +397,16 @@ static int msr_to_offset(u32 msr) return -1; } -__visible bool ex_handler_rdmsr_fault(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup, - struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr, - unsigned long error_code, - unsigned long fault_addr) +static void ex_handler_msr_mce(struct pt_regs *regs, bool wrmsr) { - pr_emerg("MSR access error: RDMSR from 0x%x at rIP: 0x%lx (%pS)\n", - (unsigned int)regs->cx, regs->ip, (void *)regs->ip); + if (wrmsr) { + pr_emerg("MSR access error: WRMSR to 0x%x (tried to write 0x%08x%08x) at rIP: 0x%lx (%pS)\n", + (unsigned int)regs->cx, (unsigned int)regs->dx, (unsigned int)regs->ax, + regs->ip, (void *)regs->ip); + } else { + pr_emerg("MSR access error: RDMSR from 0x%x at rIP: 0x%lx (%pS)\n", + (unsigned int)regs->cx, regs->ip, (void *)regs->ip); + } show_stack_regs(regs); @@ -411,7 +414,14 @@ __visible bool ex_handler_rdmsr_fault(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup, while (true) cpu_relax(); +} +__visible bool ex_handler_rdmsr_fault(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup, + struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr, + unsigned long error_code, + unsigned long fault_addr) +{ + ex_handler_msr_mce(regs, false); return true; } @@ -447,17 +457,7 @@ __visible bool ex_handler_wrmsr_fault(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup, unsigned long error_code, unsigned long fault_addr) { - pr_emerg("MSR access error: WRMSR to 0x%x (tried to write 0x%08x%08x) at rIP: 0x%lx (%pS)\n", - (unsigned int)regs->cx, (unsigned int)regs->dx, (unsigned int)regs->ax, - regs->ip, (void *)regs->ip); - - show_stack_regs(regs); - - panic("MCA architectural violation!\n"); - - while (true) - cpu_relax(); - + ex_handler_msr_mce(regs, true); return true; } From 352affc31e269ee6c3ec1c4d2fe65b72b7367df6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Wed, 10 Nov 2021 11:01:03 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 1018/1091] bitfield.h: Fix "type of reg too small for mask" test [ Upstream commit bff8c3848e071d387d8b0784dc91fa49cd563774 ] The test: 'mask > (typeof(_reg))~0ull' only works correctly when both sides are unsigned, consider: - 0xff000000 vs (int)~0ull - 0x000000ff vs (int)~0ull Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211110101324.950210584@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- include/linux/bitfield.h | 19 ++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/linux/bitfield.h b/include/linux/bitfield.h index 4c0224ff0a14..4f1c0f8e1bb0 100644 --- a/include/linux/bitfield.h +++ b/include/linux/bitfield.h @@ -41,6 +41,22 @@ #define __bf_shf(x) (__builtin_ffsll(x) - 1) +#define __scalar_type_to_unsigned_cases(type) \ + unsigned type: (unsigned type)0, \ + signed type: (unsigned type)0 + +#define __unsigned_scalar_typeof(x) typeof( \ + _Generic((x), \ + char: (unsigned char)0, \ + __scalar_type_to_unsigned_cases(char), \ + __scalar_type_to_unsigned_cases(short), \ + __scalar_type_to_unsigned_cases(int), \ + __scalar_type_to_unsigned_cases(long), \ + __scalar_type_to_unsigned_cases(long long), \ + default: (x))) + +#define __bf_cast_unsigned(type, x) ((__unsigned_scalar_typeof(type))(x)) + #define __BF_FIELD_CHECK(_mask, _reg, _val, _pfx) \ ({ \ BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(!__builtin_constant_p(_mask), \ @@ -49,7 +65,8 @@ BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(__builtin_constant_p(_val) ? \ ~((_mask) >> __bf_shf(_mask)) & (_val) : 0, \ _pfx "value too large for the field"); \ - BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG((_mask) > (typeof(_reg))~0ull, \ + BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(__bf_cast_unsigned(_mask, _mask) > \ + __bf_cast_unsigned(_reg, ~0ull), \ _pfx "type of reg too small for mask"); \ __BUILD_BUG_ON_NOT_POWER_OF_2((_mask) + \ (1ULL << __bf_shf(_mask))); \ From 015af30d373d33548c9afcffbbaaf266459731de Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Takashi Iwai Date: Fri, 18 Dec 2020 15:56:24 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 1019/1091] ALSA: memalloc: Align buffer allocations in page size commit 5c1733e33c888a3cb7f576564d8ad543d5ad4a9e upstream. Currently the standard memory allocator (snd_dma_malloc_pages*()) passes the byte size to allocate as is. Most of the backends allocates real pages, hence the actual allocations are aligned in page size. However, the genalloc doesn't seem assuring the size alignment, hence it may result in the access outside the buffer when the whole memory pages are exposed via mmap. For avoiding such inconsistencies, this patch makes the allocation size always to be aligned in page size. Note that, after this change, snd_dma_buffer.bytes field contains the aligned size, not the originally requested size. This value is also used for releasing the pages in return. Reviewed-by: Lars-Peter Clausen Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201218145625.2045-2-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/core/memalloc.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/sound/core/memalloc.c b/sound/core/memalloc.c index fe1ea03582cb..9fc7c81ec6ae 100644 --- a/sound/core/memalloc.c +++ b/sound/core/memalloc.c @@ -124,6 +124,7 @@ int snd_dma_alloc_pages(int type, struct device *device, size_t size, if (WARN_ON(!device)) return -EINVAL; + size = PAGE_ALIGN(size); dmab->dev.type = type; dmab->dev.dev = device; dmab->bytes = 0; From 55bf99849be0fca0c5ea0ee43d87c85880e84981 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Date: Fri, 3 Sep 2021 15:27:29 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 1020/1091] Bluetooth: Add bt_skb_sendmsg helper commit 38f64f650dc0e44c146ff88d15a7339efa325918 upstream. bt_skb_sendmsg helps takes care of allocation the skb and copying the the contents of msg over to the skb while checking for possible errors so it should be safe to call it without holding lock_sock. Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann Cc: Harshit Mogalapalli Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h b/include/net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h index fabee6db0abb..457e4cdf539b 100644 --- a/include/net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h +++ b/include/net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h @@ -370,6 +370,34 @@ out: return NULL; } +/* Shall not be called with lock_sock held */ +static inline struct sk_buff *bt_skb_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, + struct msghdr *msg, + size_t len, size_t mtu, + size_t headroom, size_t tailroom) +{ + struct sk_buff *skb; + size_t size = min_t(size_t, len, mtu); + int err; + + skb = bt_skb_send_alloc(sk, size + headroom + tailroom, + msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &err); + if (!skb) + return ERR_PTR(err); + + skb_reserve(skb, headroom); + skb_tailroom_reserve(skb, mtu, tailroom); + + if (!copy_from_iter_full(skb_put(skb, size), size, &msg->msg_iter)) { + kfree_skb(skb); + return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT); + } + + skb->priority = sk->sk_priority; + + return skb; +} + int bt_to_errno(u16 code); void hci_sock_set_flag(struct sock *sk, int nr); From f00b06003b11e54c9a8df422e0db5aa38d7aeecc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Date: Fri, 3 Sep 2021 15:27:30 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 1021/1091] Bluetooth: Add bt_skb_sendmmsg helper commit 97e4e80299844bb5f6ce5a7540742ffbffae3d97 upstream. This works similarly to bt_skb_sendmsg but can split the msg into multiple skb fragments which is useful for stream sockets. Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann Cc: Harshit Mogalapalli Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h b/include/net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h index 457e4cdf539b..5bfb6fcb8b45 100644 --- a/include/net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h +++ b/include/net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h @@ -398,6 +398,44 @@ static inline struct sk_buff *bt_skb_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, return skb; } +/* Similar to bt_skb_sendmsg but can split the msg into multiple fragments + * accourding to the MTU. + */ +static inline struct sk_buff *bt_skb_sendmmsg(struct sock *sk, + struct msghdr *msg, + size_t len, size_t mtu, + size_t headroom, size_t tailroom) +{ + struct sk_buff *skb, **frag; + + skb = bt_skb_sendmsg(sk, msg, len, mtu, headroom, tailroom); + if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(skb)) + return skb; + + len -= skb->len; + if (!len) + return skb; + + /* Add remaining data over MTU as continuation fragments */ + frag = &skb_shinfo(skb)->frag_list; + while (len) { + struct sk_buff *tmp; + + tmp = bt_skb_sendmsg(sk, msg, len, mtu, headroom, tailroom); + if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(tmp)) { + kfree_skb(skb); + return tmp; + } + + len -= tmp->len; + + *frag = tmp; + frag = &(*frag)->next; + } + + return skb; +} + int bt_to_errno(u16 code); void hci_sock_set_flag(struct sock *sk, int nr); From bf46574d46555aaf4811b29777ac4a23d4ecfc11 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Date: Fri, 3 Sep 2021 15:27:31 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 1022/1091] Bluetooth: SCO: Replace use of memcpy_from_msg with bt_skb_sendmsg commit 0771cbb3b97d3c1d68eecd7f00055f599954c34e upstream. This makes use of bt_skb_sendmsg instead of allocating a different buffer to be used with memcpy_from_msg which cause one extra copy. Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann Cc: Harshit Mogalapalli Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/bluetooth/sco.c | 34 +++++++++++----------------------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/sco.c b/net/bluetooth/sco.c index fbfb12e43010..7eb087f911c8 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/sco.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/sco.c @@ -279,27 +279,19 @@ static int sco_connect(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sock *sk) return err; } -static int sco_send_frame(struct sock *sk, void *buf, int len, - unsigned int msg_flags) +static int sco_send_frame(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { struct sco_conn *conn = sco_pi(sk)->conn; - struct sk_buff *skb; - int err; /* Check outgoing MTU */ - if (len > conn->mtu) + if (skb->len > conn->mtu) return -EINVAL; - BT_DBG("sk %p len %d", sk, len); + BT_DBG("sk %p len %d", sk, skb->len); - skb = bt_skb_send_alloc(sk, len, msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &err); - if (!skb) - return err; - - memcpy(skb_put(skb, len), buf, len); hci_send_sco(conn->hcon, skb); - return len; + return skb->len; } static void sco_recv_frame(struct sco_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) @@ -715,7 +707,7 @@ static int sco_sock_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len) { struct sock *sk = sock->sk; - void *buf; + struct sk_buff *skb; int err; BT_DBG("sock %p, sk %p", sock, sk); @@ -727,24 +719,20 @@ static int sco_sock_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_OOB) return -EOPNOTSUPP; - buf = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!buf) - return -ENOMEM; - - if (memcpy_from_msg(buf, msg, len)) { - kfree(buf); - return -EFAULT; - } + skb = bt_skb_sendmsg(sk, msg, len, len, 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(skb)) + return PTR_ERR(skb); lock_sock(sk); if (sk->sk_state == BT_CONNECTED) - err = sco_send_frame(sk, buf, len, msg->msg_flags); + err = sco_send_frame(sk, skb); else err = -ENOTCONN; release_sock(sk); - kfree(buf); + if (err) + kfree_skb(skb); return err; } From 10bacb891722e040b89c2f34d1dcfe63344a6561 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Date: Fri, 3 Sep 2021 15:27:32 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 1023/1091] Bluetooth: RFCOMM: Replace use of memcpy_from_msg with bt_skb_sendmmsg commit 81be03e026dc0c16dc1c64e088b2a53b73caa895 upstream. This makes use of bt_skb_sendmmsg instead using memcpy_from_msg which is not considered safe to be used when lock_sock is held. Also make rfcomm_dlc_send handle skb with fragments and queue them all atomically. Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann Cc: Harshit Mogalapalli Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/bluetooth/rfcomm/core.c | 52 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ net/bluetooth/rfcomm/sock.c | 50 +++++++++-------------------------- 2 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/rfcomm/core.c b/net/bluetooth/rfcomm/core.c index 3a9e9d9670be..83a8c48dfaa8 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/rfcomm/core.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/rfcomm/core.c @@ -553,22 +553,58 @@ struct rfcomm_dlc *rfcomm_dlc_exists(bdaddr_t *src, bdaddr_t *dst, u8 channel) return dlc; } -int rfcomm_dlc_send(struct rfcomm_dlc *d, struct sk_buff *skb) +static int rfcomm_dlc_send_frag(struct rfcomm_dlc *d, struct sk_buff *frag) { - int len = skb->len; - - if (d->state != BT_CONNECTED) - return -ENOTCONN; + int len = frag->len; BT_DBG("dlc %p mtu %d len %d", d, d->mtu, len); if (len > d->mtu) return -EINVAL; - rfcomm_make_uih(skb, d->addr); - skb_queue_tail(&d->tx_queue, skb); + rfcomm_make_uih(frag, d->addr); + __skb_queue_tail(&d->tx_queue, frag); - if (!test_bit(RFCOMM_TX_THROTTLED, &d->flags)) + return len; +} + +int rfcomm_dlc_send(struct rfcomm_dlc *d, struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + unsigned long flags; + struct sk_buff *frag, *next; + int len; + + if (d->state != BT_CONNECTED) + return -ENOTCONN; + + frag = skb_shinfo(skb)->frag_list; + skb_shinfo(skb)->frag_list = NULL; + + /* Queue all fragments atomically. */ + spin_lock_irqsave(&d->tx_queue.lock, flags); + + len = rfcomm_dlc_send_frag(d, skb); + if (len < 0 || !frag) + goto unlock; + + for (; frag; frag = next) { + int ret; + + next = frag->next; + + ret = rfcomm_dlc_send_frag(d, frag); + if (ret < 0) { + kfree_skb(frag); + goto unlock; + } + + len += ret; + } + +unlock: + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&d->tx_queue.lock, flags); + + if (len > 0 && !test_bit(RFCOMM_TX_THROTTLED, &d->flags)) rfcomm_schedule(); return len; } diff --git a/net/bluetooth/rfcomm/sock.c b/net/bluetooth/rfcomm/sock.c index 90bb53aa4bee..38326e7402a6 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/rfcomm/sock.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/rfcomm/sock.c @@ -578,47 +578,21 @@ static int rfcomm_sock_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, lock_sock(sk); sent = bt_sock_wait_ready(sk, msg->msg_flags); - if (sent) - goto done; - while (len) { - size_t size = min_t(size_t, len, d->mtu); - int err; - - skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk, size + RFCOMM_SKB_RESERVE, - msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &err); - if (!skb) { - if (sent == 0) - sent = err; - break; - } - skb_reserve(skb, RFCOMM_SKB_HEAD_RESERVE); - - err = memcpy_from_msg(skb_put(skb, size), msg, size); - if (err) { - kfree_skb(skb); - if (sent == 0) - sent = err; - break; - } - - skb->priority = sk->sk_priority; - - err = rfcomm_dlc_send(d, skb); - if (err < 0) { - kfree_skb(skb); - if (sent == 0) - sent = err; - break; - } - - sent += size; - len -= size; - } - -done: release_sock(sk); + if (sent) + return sent; + + skb = bt_skb_sendmmsg(sk, msg, len, d->mtu, RFCOMM_SKB_HEAD_RESERVE, + RFCOMM_SKB_TAIL_RESERVE); + if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(skb)) + return PTR_ERR(skb); + + sent = rfcomm_dlc_send(d, skb); + if (sent < 0) + kfree_skb(skb); + return sent; } From aa2d34cab3e656e1738c9c4cf0c47f29baaf3679 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Date: Thu, 16 Sep 2021 13:10:48 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 1024/1091] Bluetooth: Fix passing NULL to PTR_ERR commit 266191aa8d14b84958aaeb5e96ee4e97839e3d87 upstream. Passing NULL to PTR_ERR will result in 0 (success), also since the likes of bt_skb_sendmsg does never return NULL it is safe to replace the instances of IS_ERR_OR_NULL with IS_ERR when checking its return. Reported-by: Dan Carpenter Tested-by: Tedd Ho-Jeong An Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann Cc: Harshit Mogalapalli Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h | 2 +- net/bluetooth/rfcomm/sock.c | 2 +- net/bluetooth/sco.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h b/include/net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h index 5bfb6fcb8b45..d27f34ea3084 100644 --- a/include/net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h +++ b/include/net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h @@ -422,7 +422,7 @@ static inline struct sk_buff *bt_skb_sendmmsg(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *tmp; tmp = bt_skb_sendmsg(sk, msg, len, mtu, headroom, tailroom); - if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(tmp)) { + if (IS_ERR(tmp)) { kfree_skb(skb); return tmp; } diff --git a/net/bluetooth/rfcomm/sock.c b/net/bluetooth/rfcomm/sock.c index 38326e7402a6..e67310a749d2 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/rfcomm/sock.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/rfcomm/sock.c @@ -586,7 +586,7 @@ static int rfcomm_sock_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, skb = bt_skb_sendmmsg(sk, msg, len, d->mtu, RFCOMM_SKB_HEAD_RESERVE, RFCOMM_SKB_TAIL_RESERVE); - if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(skb)) + if (IS_ERR(skb)) return PTR_ERR(skb); sent = rfcomm_dlc_send(d, skb); diff --git a/net/bluetooth/sco.c b/net/bluetooth/sco.c index 7eb087f911c8..44e77ae0c4b7 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/sco.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/sco.c @@ -720,7 +720,7 @@ static int sco_sock_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, return -EOPNOTSUPP; skb = bt_skb_sendmsg(sk, msg, len, len, 0, 0); - if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(skb)) + if (IS_ERR(skb)) return PTR_ERR(skb); lock_sock(sk); From 836b47e6436bcab6e17f9b0cbf887b03f1fcb3d8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Date: Thu, 16 Sep 2021 13:10:49 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 1025/1091] Bluetooth: SCO: Fix sco_send_frame returning skb->len commit 037ce005af6b8a3e40ee07c6e9266c8997e6a4d6 upstream. The skb in modified by hci_send_sco which pushes SCO headers thus changing skb->len causing sco_sock_sendmsg to fail. Fixes: 0771cbb3b97d ("Bluetooth: SCO: Replace use of memcpy_from_msg with bt_skb_sendmsg") Tested-by: Tedd Ho-Jeong An Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann Cc: Harshit Mogalapalli Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/bluetooth/sco.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/sco.c b/net/bluetooth/sco.c index 44e77ae0c4b7..78a549e506b1 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/sco.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/sco.c @@ -282,16 +282,17 @@ static int sco_connect(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sock *sk) static int sco_send_frame(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { struct sco_conn *conn = sco_pi(sk)->conn; + int len = skb->len; /* Check outgoing MTU */ - if (skb->len > conn->mtu) + if (len > conn->mtu) return -EINVAL; - BT_DBG("sk %p len %d", sk, skb->len); + BT_DBG("sk %p len %d", sk, len); hci_send_sco(conn->hcon, skb); - return skb->len; + return len; } static void sco_recv_frame(struct sco_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) @@ -731,7 +732,8 @@ static int sco_sock_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, err = -ENOTCONN; release_sock(sk); - if (err) + + if (err < 0) kfree_skb(skb); return err; } From 126137a53d7e9cc1614f0ec7347af1630b7fbcac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2022 17:59:38 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 1026/1091] Bluetooth: Fix bt_skb_sendmmsg not allocating partial chunks commit 29fb608396d6a62c1b85acc421ad7a4399085b9f upstream. Since bt_skb_sendmmsg can be used with the likes of SOCK_STREAM it shall return the partial chunks it could allocate instead of freeing everything as otherwise it can cause problems like bellow. Fixes: 81be03e026dc ("Bluetooth: RFCOMM: Replace use of memcpy_from_msg with bt_skb_sendmmsg") Reported-by: Paul Menzel Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/d7206e12-1b99-c3be-84f4-df22af427ef5@molgen.mpg.de BugLink: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=215594 Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Tested-by: Paul Menzel (Nokia N9 (MeeGo/Harmattan) Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann Cc: Harshit Mogalapalli Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h b/include/net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h index d27f34ea3084..421d41ef4e9c 100644 --- a/include/net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h +++ b/include/net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h @@ -423,8 +423,7 @@ static inline struct sk_buff *bt_skb_sendmmsg(struct sock *sk, tmp = bt_skb_sendmsg(sk, msg, len, mtu, headroom, tailroom); if (IS_ERR(tmp)) { - kfree_skb(skb); - return tmp; + return skb; } len -= tmp->len; From aa60c0cce8b4599921e341c3bb7fb326e2779388 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jiri Slaby Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2021 12:16:46 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 1027/1091] tty: drivers/tty/, stop using tty_schedule_flip() commit 5f6a85158ccacc3f09744b3aafe8b11ab3b6c6f6 upstream. Since commit a9c3f68f3cd8d (tty: Fix low_latency BUG) in 2014, tty_flip_buffer_push() is only a wrapper to tty_schedule_flip(). We are going to remove the latter (as it is used less), so call the former in drivers/tty/. Cc: Vladimir Zapolskiy Reviewed-by: Johan Hovold Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211122111648.30379-2-jslaby@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/tty/cyclades.c | 6 +++--- drivers/tty/goldfish.c | 2 +- drivers/tty/moxa.c | 4 ++-- drivers/tty/serial/lpc32xx_hs.c | 2 +- drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c | 6 +++--- drivers/tty/vt/vt.c | 2 +- 6 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/tty/cyclades.c b/drivers/tty/cyclades.c index 4562c8060d09..26581d2456c8 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/cyclades.c +++ b/drivers/tty/cyclades.c @@ -556,7 +556,7 @@ static void cyy_chip_rx(struct cyclades_card *cinfo, int chip, } info->idle_stats.recv_idle = jiffies; } - tty_schedule_flip(port); + tty_flip_buffer_push(port); /* end of service */ cyy_writeb(info, CyRIR, save_xir & 0x3f); @@ -996,7 +996,7 @@ static void cyz_handle_rx(struct cyclades_port *info) mod_timer(&info->rx_full_timer, jiffies + 1); #endif info->idle_stats.recv_idle = jiffies; - tty_schedule_flip(&info->port); + tty_flip_buffer_push(&info->port); /* Update rx_get */ cy_writel(&buf_ctrl->rx_get, new_rx_get); @@ -1172,7 +1172,7 @@ static void cyz_handle_cmd(struct cyclades_card *cinfo) if (delta_count) wake_up_interruptible(&info->port.delta_msr_wait); if (special_count) - tty_schedule_flip(&info->port); + tty_flip_buffer_push(&info->port); } } diff --git a/drivers/tty/goldfish.c b/drivers/tty/goldfish.c index 9180ca5e4dcd..d6e82eb61fc2 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/goldfish.c +++ b/drivers/tty/goldfish.c @@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ static irqreturn_t goldfish_tty_interrupt(int irq, void *dev_id) address = (unsigned long)(void *)buf; goldfish_tty_rw(qtty, address, count, 0); - tty_schedule_flip(&qtty->port); + tty_flip_buffer_push(&qtty->port); return IRQ_HANDLED; } diff --git a/drivers/tty/moxa.c b/drivers/tty/moxa.c index 1254b39074ed..e67a1aef1fd0 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/moxa.c +++ b/drivers/tty/moxa.c @@ -1385,7 +1385,7 @@ static int moxa_poll_port(struct moxa_port *p, unsigned int handle, if (inited && !tty_throttled(tty) && MoxaPortRxQueue(p) > 0) { /* RX */ MoxaPortReadData(p); - tty_schedule_flip(&p->port); + tty_flip_buffer_push(&p->port); } } else { clear_bit(EMPTYWAIT, &p->statusflags); @@ -1410,7 +1410,7 @@ static int moxa_poll_port(struct moxa_port *p, unsigned int handle, if (tty && (intr & IntrBreak) && !I_IGNBRK(tty)) { /* BREAK */ tty_insert_flip_char(&p->port, 0, TTY_BREAK); - tty_schedule_flip(&p->port); + tty_flip_buffer_push(&p->port); } if (intr & IntrLine) diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/lpc32xx_hs.c b/drivers/tty/serial/lpc32xx_hs.c index 9a836dcac157..a03618f89c0d 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/serial/lpc32xx_hs.c +++ b/drivers/tty/serial/lpc32xx_hs.c @@ -345,7 +345,7 @@ static irqreturn_t serial_lpc32xx_interrupt(int irq, void *dev_id) LPC32XX_HSUART_IIR(port->membase)); port->icount.overrun++; tty_insert_flip_char(tport, 0, TTY_OVERRUN); - tty_schedule_flip(tport); + tty_flip_buffer_push(tport); } /* Data received? */ diff --git a/drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c b/drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c index b6e78fdbfdff..68643f61f6f9 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c +++ b/drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c @@ -310,7 +310,7 @@ int kbd_rate(struct kbd_repeat *rpt) static void put_queue(struct vc_data *vc, int ch) { tty_insert_flip_char(&vc->port, ch, 0); - tty_schedule_flip(&vc->port); + tty_flip_buffer_push(&vc->port); } static void puts_queue(struct vc_data *vc, char *cp) @@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ static void puts_queue(struct vc_data *vc, char *cp) tty_insert_flip_char(&vc->port, *cp, 0); cp++; } - tty_schedule_flip(&vc->port); + tty_flip_buffer_push(&vc->port); } static void applkey(struct vc_data *vc, int key, char mode) @@ -564,7 +564,7 @@ static void fn_inc_console(struct vc_data *vc) static void fn_send_intr(struct vc_data *vc) { tty_insert_flip_char(&vc->port, 0, TTY_BREAK); - tty_schedule_flip(&vc->port); + tty_flip_buffer_push(&vc->port); } static void fn_scroll_forw(struct vc_data *vc) diff --git a/drivers/tty/vt/vt.c b/drivers/tty/vt/vt.c index c3df1660cb5c..9d9e056f94ac 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/vt/vt.c +++ b/drivers/tty/vt/vt.c @@ -1837,7 +1837,7 @@ static void respond_string(const char *p, struct tty_port *port) tty_insert_flip_char(port, *p, 0); p++; } - tty_schedule_flip(port); + tty_flip_buffer_push(port); } static void cursor_report(struct vc_data *vc, struct tty_struct *tty) From f20912215c9ca3403b2dbbbeac26e98663defb67 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jiri Slaby Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2021 12:16:47 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 1028/1091] tty: the rest, stop using tty_schedule_flip() commit b68b914494df4f79b4e9b58953110574af1cb7a2 upstream. Since commit a9c3f68f3cd8d (tty: Fix low_latency BUG) in 2014, tty_flip_buffer_push() is only a wrapper to tty_schedule_flip(). We are going to remove the latter (as it is used less), so call the former in the rest of the users. Cc: Richard Henderson Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky Cc: Matt Turner Cc: William Hubbs Cc: Chris Brannon Cc: Kirk Reiser Cc: Samuel Thibault Cc: Heiko Carstens Cc: Vasily Gorbik Cc: Christian Borntraeger Cc: Alexander Gordeev Reviewed-by: Johan Hovold Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211122111648.30379-3-jslaby@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/alpha/kernel/srmcons.c | 2 +- drivers/s390/char/keyboard.h | 4 ++-- drivers/staging/speakup/spk_ttyio.c | 4 ++-- 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/alpha/kernel/srmcons.c b/arch/alpha/kernel/srmcons.c index 438b10c44d73..2b7a314b8452 100644 --- a/arch/alpha/kernel/srmcons.c +++ b/arch/alpha/kernel/srmcons.c @@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ srmcons_do_receive_chars(struct tty_port *port) } while((result.bits.status & 1) && (++loops < 10)); if (count) - tty_schedule_flip(port); + tty_flip_buffer_push(port); return count; } diff --git a/drivers/s390/char/keyboard.h b/drivers/s390/char/keyboard.h index c467589c7f45..c06d399b9b1f 100644 --- a/drivers/s390/char/keyboard.h +++ b/drivers/s390/char/keyboard.h @@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ static inline void kbd_put_queue(struct tty_port *port, int ch) { tty_insert_flip_char(port, ch, 0); - tty_schedule_flip(port); + tty_flip_buffer_push(port); } static inline void @@ -64,5 +64,5 @@ kbd_puts_queue(struct tty_port *port, char *cp) { while (*cp) tty_insert_flip_char(port, *cp++, 0); - tty_schedule_flip(port); + tty_flip_buffer_push(port); } diff --git a/drivers/staging/speakup/spk_ttyio.c b/drivers/staging/speakup/spk_ttyio.c index 472804c3f44d..aec822236174 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/speakup/spk_ttyio.c +++ b/drivers/staging/speakup/spk_ttyio.c @@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ static int spk_ttyio_receive_buf2(struct tty_struct *tty, } if (!ldisc_data->buf_free) - /* ttyio_in will tty_schedule_flip */ + /* ttyio_in will tty_flip_buffer_push */ return 0; /* Make sure the consumer has read buf before we have seen @@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ static unsigned char ttyio_in(int timeout) mb(); ldisc_data->buf_free = true; /* Let TTY push more characters */ - tty_schedule_flip(speakup_tty->port); + tty_flip_buffer_push(speakup_tty->port); return rv; } From 2ea77b0b6d22ad993af113e34d09998d2546e733 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jiri Slaby Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2021 12:16:48 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 1029/1091] tty: drop tty_schedule_flip() commit 5db96ef23bda6c2a61a51693c85b78b52d03f654 upstream. Since commit a9c3f68f3cd8d (tty: Fix low_latency BUG) in 2014, tty_flip_buffer_push() is only a wrapper to tty_schedule_flip(). All users were converted in the previous patches, so remove tty_schedule_flip() completely while inlining its body into tty_flip_buffer_push(). One less exported function. Reviewed-by: Johan Hovold Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211122111648.30379-4-jslaby@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c | 30 ++++++++---------------------- include/linux/tty_flip.h | 1 - 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c b/drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c index 47f2370ad85c..47fabfd73db5 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c +++ b/drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c @@ -394,27 +394,6 @@ int __tty_insert_flip_char(struct tty_port *port, unsigned char ch, char flag) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__tty_insert_flip_char); -/** - * tty_schedule_flip - push characters to ldisc - * @port: tty port to push from - * - * Takes any pending buffers and transfers their ownership to the - * ldisc side of the queue. It then schedules those characters for - * processing by the line discipline. - */ - -void tty_schedule_flip(struct tty_port *port) -{ - struct tty_bufhead *buf = &port->buf; - - /* paired w/ acquire in flush_to_ldisc(); ensures - * flush_to_ldisc() sees buffer data. - */ - smp_store_release(&buf->tail->commit, buf->tail->used); - queue_work(system_unbound_wq, &buf->work); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(tty_schedule_flip); - /** * tty_prepare_flip_string - make room for characters * @port: tty port @@ -557,7 +536,14 @@ static void flush_to_ldisc(struct work_struct *work) void tty_flip_buffer_push(struct tty_port *port) { - tty_schedule_flip(port); + struct tty_bufhead *buf = &port->buf; + + /* + * Paired w/ acquire in flush_to_ldisc(); ensures flush_to_ldisc() sees + * buffer data. + */ + smp_store_release(&buf->tail->commit, buf->tail->used); + queue_work(system_unbound_wq, &buf->work); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tty_flip_buffer_push); diff --git a/include/linux/tty_flip.h b/include/linux/tty_flip.h index 767f62086bd9..e183f74b19a0 100644 --- a/include/linux/tty_flip.h +++ b/include/linux/tty_flip.h @@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ extern int tty_insert_flip_string_fixed_flag(struct tty_port *port, extern int tty_prepare_flip_string(struct tty_port *port, unsigned char **chars, size_t size); extern void tty_flip_buffer_push(struct tty_port *port); -void tty_schedule_flip(struct tty_port *port); int __tty_insert_flip_char(struct tty_port *port, unsigned char ch, char flag); static inline int tty_insert_flip_char(struct tty_port *port, From 815d936e92f9012da625ebb42936c63893765a34 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jiri Slaby Date: Thu, 7 Jul 2022 10:25:57 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 1030/1091] tty: extract tty_flip_buffer_commit() from tty_flip_buffer_push() MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 716b10580283fda66f2b88140e3964f8a7f9da89 upstream. We will need this new helper in the next patch. Cc: Hillf Danton Cc: 一只狗 Cc: Dan Carpenter Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220707082558.9250-1-jslaby@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c | 15 ++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c b/drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c index 47fabfd73db5..8155f16df8a9 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c +++ b/drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c @@ -523,6 +523,15 @@ static void flush_to_ldisc(struct work_struct *work) } +static inline void tty_flip_buffer_commit(struct tty_buffer *tail) +{ + /* + * Paired w/ acquire in flush_to_ldisc(); ensures flush_to_ldisc() sees + * buffer data. + */ + smp_store_release(&tail->commit, tail->used); +} + /** * tty_flip_buffer_push - terminal * @port: tty port to push @@ -538,11 +547,7 @@ void tty_flip_buffer_push(struct tty_port *port) { struct tty_bufhead *buf = &port->buf; - /* - * Paired w/ acquire in flush_to_ldisc(); ensures flush_to_ldisc() sees - * buffer data. - */ - smp_store_release(&buf->tail->commit, buf->tail->used); + tty_flip_buffer_commit(buf->tail); queue_work(system_unbound_wq, &buf->work); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tty_flip_buffer_push); From f7785092cb7f022f59ebdaa181651f7c877df132 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jiri Slaby Date: Thu, 7 Jul 2022 10:25:58 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 1031/1091] tty: use new tty_insert_flip_string_and_push_buffer() in pty_write() MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit a501ab75e7624d133a5a3c7ec010687c8b961d23 upstream. There is a race in pty_write(). pty_write() can be called in parallel with e.g. ioctl(TIOCSTI) or ioctl(TCXONC) which also inserts chars to the buffer. Provided, tty_flip_buffer_push() in pty_write() is called outside the lock, it can commit inconsistent tail. This can lead to out of bounds writes and other issues. See the Link below. To fix this, we have to introduce a new helper called tty_insert_flip_string_and_push_buffer(). It does both tty_insert_flip_string() and tty_flip_buffer_commit() under the port lock. It also calls queue_work(), but outside the lock. See 71a174b39f10 (pty: do tty_flip_buffer_push without port->lock in pty_write) for the reasons. Keep the helper internal-only (in drivers' tty.h). It is not intended to be used widely. Link: https://seclists.org/oss-sec/2022/q2/155 Fixes: 71a174b39f10 (pty: do tty_flip_buffer_push without port->lock in pty_write) Cc: 一只狗 Cc: Dan Carpenter Suggested-by: Hillf Danton Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220707082558.9250-2-jslaby@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/tty/pty.c | 14 ++------------ drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/tty_flip.h | 3 +++ 3 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/tty/pty.c b/drivers/tty/pty.c index c6a1d8c4e689..73226e482e91 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/pty.c +++ b/drivers/tty/pty.c @@ -111,21 +111,11 @@ static void pty_unthrottle(struct tty_struct *tty) static int pty_write(struct tty_struct *tty, const unsigned char *buf, int c) { struct tty_struct *to = tty->link; - unsigned long flags; - if (tty->stopped) + if (tty->stopped || !c) return 0; - if (c > 0) { - spin_lock_irqsave(&to->port->lock, flags); - /* Stuff the data into the input queue of the other end */ - c = tty_insert_flip_string(to->port, buf, c); - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&to->port->lock, flags); - /* And shovel */ - if (c) - tty_flip_buffer_push(to->port); - } - return c; + return tty_insert_flip_string_and_push_buffer(to->port, buf, c); } /** diff --git a/drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c b/drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c index 8155f16df8a9..49f39c041c35 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c +++ b/drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c @@ -552,6 +552,37 @@ void tty_flip_buffer_push(struct tty_port *port) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tty_flip_buffer_push); +/** + * tty_insert_flip_string_and_push_buffer - add characters to the tty buffer and + * push + * @port: tty port + * @chars: characters + * @size: size + * + * The function combines tty_insert_flip_string() and tty_flip_buffer_push() + * with the exception of properly holding the @port->lock. + * + * To be used only internally (by pty currently). + * + * Returns: the number added. + */ +int tty_insert_flip_string_and_push_buffer(struct tty_port *port, + const unsigned char *chars, size_t size) +{ + struct tty_bufhead *buf = &port->buf; + unsigned long flags; + + spin_lock_irqsave(&port->lock, flags); + size = tty_insert_flip_string(port, chars, size); + if (size) + tty_flip_buffer_commit(buf->tail); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&port->lock, flags); + + queue_work(system_unbound_wq, &buf->work); + + return size; +} + /** * tty_buffer_init - prepare a tty buffer structure * @tty: tty to initialise diff --git a/include/linux/tty_flip.h b/include/linux/tty_flip.h index e183f74b19a0..c326bfdb5ec2 100644 --- a/include/linux/tty_flip.h +++ b/include/linux/tty_flip.h @@ -39,4 +39,7 @@ static inline int tty_insert_flip_string(struct tty_port *port, extern void tty_buffer_lock_exclusive(struct tty_port *port); extern void tty_buffer_unlock_exclusive(struct tty_port *port); +int tty_insert_flip_string_and_push_buffer(struct tty_port *port, + const unsigned char *chars, size_t cnt); + #endif /* _LINUX_TTY_FLIP_H */ From f88d8c18822963d75a2b85d0ea6bb5d791dd95bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jose Alonso Date: Mon, 13 Jun 2022 15:32:44 -0300 Subject: [PATCH 1032/1091] net: usb: ax88179_178a needs FLAG_SEND_ZLP commit 36a15e1cb134c0395261ba1940762703f778438c upstream. The extra byte inserted by usbnet.c when (length % dev->maxpacket == 0) is causing problems to device. This patch sets FLAG_SEND_ZLP to avoid this. Tested with: 0b95:1790 ASIX Electronics Corp. AX88179 Gigabit Ethernet Problems observed: ====================================================================== 1) Using ssh/sshfs. The remote sshd daemon can abort with the message: "message authentication code incorrect" This happens because the tcp message sent is corrupted during the USB "Bulk out". The device calculate the tcp checksum and send a valid tcp message to the remote sshd. Then the encryption detects the error and aborts. 2) NETDEV WATCHDOG: ... (ax88179_178a): transmit queue 0 timed out 3) Stop normal work without any log message. The "Bulk in" continue receiving packets normally. The host sends "Bulk out" and the device responds with -ECONNRESET. (The netusb.c code tx_complete ignore -ECONNRESET) Under normal conditions these errors take days to happen and in intense usage take hours. A test with ping gives packet loss, showing that something is wrong: ping -4 -s 462 {destination} # 462 = 512 - 42 - 8 Not all packets fail. My guess is that the device tries to find another packet starting at the extra byte and will fail or not depending on the next bytes (old buffer content). ====================================================================== Signed-off-by: Jose Alonso Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/usb/ax88179_178a.c | 16 ++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/ax88179_178a.c b/drivers/net/usb/ax88179_178a.c index ea9c8361bf46..5ee3e457a79c 100644 --- a/drivers/net/usb/ax88179_178a.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/ax88179_178a.c @@ -1690,7 +1690,7 @@ static const struct driver_info ax88179_info = { .link_reset = ax88179_link_reset, .reset = ax88179_reset, .stop = ax88179_stop, - .flags = FLAG_ETHER | FLAG_FRAMING_AX, + .flags = FLAG_ETHER | FLAG_FRAMING_AX | FLAG_SEND_ZLP, .rx_fixup = ax88179_rx_fixup, .tx_fixup = ax88179_tx_fixup, }; @@ -1703,7 +1703,7 @@ static const struct driver_info ax88178a_info = { .link_reset = ax88179_link_reset, .reset = ax88179_reset, .stop = ax88179_stop, - .flags = FLAG_ETHER | FLAG_FRAMING_AX, + .flags = FLAG_ETHER | FLAG_FRAMING_AX | FLAG_SEND_ZLP, .rx_fixup = ax88179_rx_fixup, .tx_fixup = ax88179_tx_fixup, }; @@ -1716,7 +1716,7 @@ static const struct driver_info cypress_GX3_info = { .link_reset = ax88179_link_reset, .reset = ax88179_reset, .stop = ax88179_stop, - .flags = FLAG_ETHER | FLAG_FRAMING_AX, + .flags = FLAG_ETHER | FLAG_FRAMING_AX | FLAG_SEND_ZLP, .rx_fixup = ax88179_rx_fixup, .tx_fixup = ax88179_tx_fixup, }; @@ -1729,7 +1729,7 @@ static const struct driver_info dlink_dub1312_info = { .link_reset = ax88179_link_reset, .reset = ax88179_reset, .stop = ax88179_stop, - .flags = FLAG_ETHER | FLAG_FRAMING_AX, + .flags = FLAG_ETHER | FLAG_FRAMING_AX | FLAG_SEND_ZLP, .rx_fixup = ax88179_rx_fixup, .tx_fixup = ax88179_tx_fixup, }; @@ -1742,7 +1742,7 @@ static const struct driver_info sitecom_info = { .link_reset = ax88179_link_reset, .reset = ax88179_reset, .stop = ax88179_stop, - .flags = FLAG_ETHER | FLAG_FRAMING_AX, + .flags = FLAG_ETHER | FLAG_FRAMING_AX | FLAG_SEND_ZLP, .rx_fixup = ax88179_rx_fixup, .tx_fixup = ax88179_tx_fixup, }; @@ -1755,7 +1755,7 @@ static const struct driver_info samsung_info = { .link_reset = ax88179_link_reset, .reset = ax88179_reset, .stop = ax88179_stop, - .flags = FLAG_ETHER | FLAG_FRAMING_AX, + .flags = FLAG_ETHER | FLAG_FRAMING_AX | FLAG_SEND_ZLP, .rx_fixup = ax88179_rx_fixup, .tx_fixup = ax88179_tx_fixup, }; @@ -1768,7 +1768,7 @@ static const struct driver_info lenovo_info = { .link_reset = ax88179_link_reset, .reset = ax88179_reset, .stop = ax88179_stop, - .flags = FLAG_ETHER | FLAG_FRAMING_AX, + .flags = FLAG_ETHER | FLAG_FRAMING_AX | FLAG_SEND_ZLP, .rx_fixup = ax88179_rx_fixup, .tx_fixup = ax88179_tx_fixup, }; @@ -1781,7 +1781,7 @@ static const struct driver_info belkin_info = { .link_reset = ax88179_link_reset, .reset = ax88179_reset, .stop = ax88179_stop, - .flags = FLAG_ETHER | FLAG_FRAMING_AX, + .flags = FLAG_ETHER | FLAG_FRAMING_AX | FLAG_SEND_ZLP, .rx_fixup = ax88179_rx_fixup, .tx_fixup = ax88179_tx_fixup, }; From ca5762c5896e315a8bc29499a6b826394d86ea19 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jan Beulich Date: Tue, 7 Jun 2022 17:00:53 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 1033/1091] x86: drop bogus "cc" clobber from __try_cmpxchg_user_asm() commit 1df931d95f4dc1c11db1123e85d4e08156e46ef9 upstream. As noted (and fixed) a couple of times in the past, "=@cc" outputs and clobbering of "cc" don't work well together. The compiler appears to mean to reject such, but doesn't - in its upstream form - quite manage to yet for "cc". Furthermore two similar macros don't clobber "cc", and clobbering "cc" is pointless in asm()-s for x86 anyway - the compiler always assumes status flags to be clobbered there. Fixes: 989b5db215a2 ("x86/uaccess: Implement macros for CMPXCHG on user addresses") Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich Message-Id: <485c0c0b-a3a7-0b7c-5264-7d00c01de032@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h index 865795e2355e..d6a0e57ecc07 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -498,7 +498,7 @@ __pu_label: \ [ptr] "+m" (*_ptr), \ [old] "+a" (__old) \ : [new] ltype (__new) \ - : "memory", "cc"); \ + : "memory"); \ if (unlikely(__err)) \ goto label; \ if (unlikely(!success)) \ From 77ba2b9b46f8acead2606759e8196b7076eaeeea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Fri, 29 Jul 2022 17:14:20 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 1034/1091] Linux 5.4.208 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220727161008.993711844@linuxfoundation.org Tested-by: Florian Fainelli Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing Tested-by: Jon Hunter Tested-by: Sudip Mukherjee Tested-by: Shuah Khan Tested-by: Guenter Roeck Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Makefile | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index 89d19f04faab..884a3f314baf 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 VERSION = 5 PATCHLEVEL = 4 -SUBLEVEL = 207 +SUBLEVEL = 208 EXTRAVERSION = NAME = Kleptomaniac Octopus From 380aec8a64ec7475bebcc7e6daa31244f85a042a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Sat, 30 Jul 2022 14:34:42 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 1035/1091] ANDROID: add tty_schedule_flip() back to the kernel Commit 2ea77b0b6d22 ("tty: drop tty_schedule_flip()") removed tty_schedule_flip() as all in-kernel users were properly converted over to use tty_flip_buffer_push(), but this function still needs to be here for older out-of-tree Android-only drivers to preserve the ABI. So provide a wrapper function for it to keep them alive for now. Bug: 161946584 Fixes: 2ea77b0b6d22 ("tty: drop tty_schedule_flip()") Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Change-Id: I8893f07cf68bc3502ac6f0f7f0a26b0eec3726a2 --- drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c | 6 ++++++ include/linux/tty_flip.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c b/drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c index 49f39c041c35..d792ab8f20af 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c +++ b/drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c @@ -643,3 +643,9 @@ void tty_buffer_flush_work(struct tty_port *port) { flush_work(&port->buf.work); } + +void tty_schedule_flip(struct tty_port *port) +{ + tty_flip_buffer_push(port); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(tty_schedule_flip); diff --git a/include/linux/tty_flip.h b/include/linux/tty_flip.h index c326bfdb5ec2..94d351196bfc 100644 --- a/include/linux/tty_flip.h +++ b/include/linux/tty_flip.h @@ -42,4 +42,5 @@ extern void tty_buffer_unlock_exclusive(struct tty_port *port); int tty_insert_flip_string_and_push_buffer(struct tty_port *port, const unsigned char *chars, size_t cnt); +void tty_schedule_flip(struct tty_port *port); #endif /* _LINUX_TTY_FLIP_H */ From 5b72a540b050d810fd71707f80870fa4626b271c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Sat, 30 Jul 2022 14:46:45 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 1036/1091] ANDROID: restore some removed refcount functions Due to the refcount functions being cleaned up and majorly simplified in 5.4.208, a number of previously exported functions that were part of inline functions were removed and the real functions used instead. As those were part of the Android ABI, restore functions for these "checked" refcount abis so that existing code continues to build properly, while anything that is rebuilt, will be able to take advantage of the new inline functions instead. The functions restored are: refcount_inc_checked refcount_inc_not_zero_checked refcount_dec_checked refcount_dec_and_test_checked Bug: 161946584 Fixes: d0d583484d2e ("locking/refcount: Consolidate implementations of refcount_t") Cc: Will Deacon Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Change-Id: Ic080315ac173da8b374e0e5f2394cf2b6c1c109c --- lib/refcount.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+) diff --git a/lib/refcount.c b/lib/refcount.c index ebac8b7d15a7..004a0b3c05c0 100644 --- a/lib/refcount.c +++ b/lib/refcount.c @@ -184,3 +184,32 @@ bool refcount_dec_and_lock_irqsave(refcount_t *r, spinlock_t *lock, return true; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(refcount_dec_and_lock_irqsave); + +/**************************************************************************/ +/* + * Android backport use only, due to these functions going away in 5.4.208 + * Do not use these in new code, this is only for ABI preservation. + */ +void refcount_inc_checked(refcount_t *r) +{ + refcount_inc(r); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(refcount_inc_checked); + +bool refcount_inc_not_zero_checked(refcount_t *r) +{ + return refcount_inc_not_zero(r); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(refcount_inc_not_zero_checked); + +void refcount_dec_checked(refcount_t *r) +{ + refcount_dec(r); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(refcount_dec_checked); + +bool refcount_dec_and_test_checked(refcount_t *r) +{ + return refcount_sub_and_test(1, r); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(refcount_dec_and_test_checked); From 098e07ef0059296e710a801cdbd74b59016e6624 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Date: Thu, 21 Jul 2022 09:10:50 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 1037/1091] Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix use-after-free caused by l2cap_chan_put commit d0be8347c623e0ac4202a1d4e0373882821f56b0 upstream. This fixes the following trace which is caused by hci_rx_work starting up *after* the final channel reference has been put() during sock_close() but *before* the references to the channel have been destroyed, so instead the code now rely on kref_get_unless_zero/l2cap_chan_hold_unless_zero to prevent referencing a channel that is about to be destroyed. refcount_t: increment on 0; use-after-free. BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in refcount_dec_and_test+0x20/0xd0 Read of size 4 at addr ffffffc114f5bf18 by task kworker/u17:14/705 CPU: 4 PID: 705 Comm: kworker/u17:14 Tainted: G S W 4.14.234-00003-g1fb6d0bd49a4-dirty #28 Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. SM8150 V2 PM8150 Google Inc. MSM sm8150 Flame DVT (DT) Workqueue: hci0 hci_rx_work Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x378 show_stack+0x20/0x2c dump_stack+0x124/0x148 print_address_description+0x80/0x2e8 __kasan_report+0x168/0x188 kasan_report+0x10/0x18 __asan_load4+0x84/0x8c refcount_dec_and_test+0x20/0xd0 l2cap_chan_put+0x48/0x12c l2cap_recv_frame+0x4770/0x6550 l2cap_recv_acldata+0x44c/0x7a4 hci_acldata_packet+0x100/0x188 hci_rx_work+0x178/0x23c process_one_work+0x35c/0x95c worker_thread+0x4cc/0x960 kthread+0x1a8/0x1c4 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 Cc: stable@kernel.org Reported-by: Lee Jones Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Tested-by: Lee Jones Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h | 1 + net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h b/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h index 8efc2419a815..b2046b02d11d 100644 --- a/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h +++ b/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h @@ -802,6 +802,7 @@ enum { }; void l2cap_chan_hold(struct l2cap_chan *c); +struct l2cap_chan *l2cap_chan_hold_unless_zero(struct l2cap_chan *c); void l2cap_chan_put(struct l2cap_chan *c); static inline void l2cap_chan_lock(struct l2cap_chan *chan) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c index 959a16b13303..286fca6a9ab2 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c @@ -110,7 +110,8 @@ static struct l2cap_chan *__l2cap_get_chan_by_scid(struct l2cap_conn *conn, } /* Find channel with given SCID. - * Returns locked channel. */ + * Returns a reference locked channel. + */ static struct l2cap_chan *l2cap_get_chan_by_scid(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u16 cid) { @@ -118,15 +119,19 @@ static struct l2cap_chan *l2cap_get_chan_by_scid(struct l2cap_conn *conn, mutex_lock(&conn->chan_lock); c = __l2cap_get_chan_by_scid(conn, cid); - if (c) - l2cap_chan_lock(c); + if (c) { + /* Only lock if chan reference is not 0 */ + c = l2cap_chan_hold_unless_zero(c); + if (c) + l2cap_chan_lock(c); + } mutex_unlock(&conn->chan_lock); return c; } /* Find channel with given DCID. - * Returns locked channel. + * Returns a reference locked channel. */ static struct l2cap_chan *l2cap_get_chan_by_dcid(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u16 cid) @@ -135,8 +140,12 @@ static struct l2cap_chan *l2cap_get_chan_by_dcid(struct l2cap_conn *conn, mutex_lock(&conn->chan_lock); c = __l2cap_get_chan_by_dcid(conn, cid); - if (c) - l2cap_chan_lock(c); + if (c) { + /* Only lock if chan reference is not 0 */ + c = l2cap_chan_hold_unless_zero(c); + if (c) + l2cap_chan_lock(c); + } mutex_unlock(&conn->chan_lock); return c; @@ -161,8 +170,12 @@ static struct l2cap_chan *l2cap_get_chan_by_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, mutex_lock(&conn->chan_lock); c = __l2cap_get_chan_by_ident(conn, ident); - if (c) - l2cap_chan_lock(c); + if (c) { + /* Only lock if chan reference is not 0 */ + c = l2cap_chan_hold_unless_zero(c); + if (c) + l2cap_chan_lock(c); + } mutex_unlock(&conn->chan_lock); return c; @@ -496,6 +509,16 @@ void l2cap_chan_hold(struct l2cap_chan *c) kref_get(&c->kref); } +struct l2cap_chan *l2cap_chan_hold_unless_zero(struct l2cap_chan *c) +{ + BT_DBG("chan %p orig refcnt %u", c, kref_read(&c->kref)); + + if (!kref_get_unless_zero(&c->kref)) + return NULL; + + return c; +} + void l2cap_chan_put(struct l2cap_chan *c) { BT_DBG("chan %p orig refcnt %d", c, kref_read(&c->kref)); @@ -1812,7 +1835,10 @@ static struct l2cap_chan *l2cap_global_chan_by_psm(int state, __le16 psm, src_match = !bacmp(&c->src, src); dst_match = !bacmp(&c->dst, dst); if (src_match && dst_match) { - l2cap_chan_hold(c); + c = l2cap_chan_hold_unless_zero(c); + if (!c) + continue; + read_unlock(&chan_list_lock); return c; } @@ -1827,7 +1853,7 @@ static struct l2cap_chan *l2cap_global_chan_by_psm(int state, __le16 psm, } if (c1) - l2cap_chan_hold(c1); + c1 = l2cap_chan_hold_unless_zero(c1); read_unlock(&chan_list_lock); @@ -4221,6 +4247,7 @@ static inline int l2cap_config_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, unlock: l2cap_chan_unlock(chan); + l2cap_chan_put(chan); return err; } @@ -4334,6 +4361,7 @@ static inline int l2cap_config_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, done: l2cap_chan_unlock(chan); + l2cap_chan_put(chan); return err; } @@ -5062,6 +5090,7 @@ send_move_response: l2cap_send_move_chan_rsp(chan, result); l2cap_chan_unlock(chan); + l2cap_chan_put(chan); return 0; } @@ -5154,6 +5183,7 @@ static void l2cap_move_continue(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u16 icid, u16 result) } l2cap_chan_unlock(chan); + l2cap_chan_put(chan); } static void l2cap_move_fail(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 ident, u16 icid, @@ -5183,6 +5213,7 @@ static void l2cap_move_fail(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 ident, u16 icid, l2cap_send_move_chan_cfm(chan, L2CAP_MC_UNCONFIRMED); l2cap_chan_unlock(chan); + l2cap_chan_put(chan); } static int l2cap_move_channel_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, @@ -5246,6 +5277,7 @@ static int l2cap_move_channel_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, l2cap_send_move_chan_cfm_rsp(conn, cmd->ident, icid); l2cap_chan_unlock(chan); + l2cap_chan_put(chan); return 0; } @@ -5281,6 +5313,7 @@ static inline int l2cap_move_channel_confirm_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, } l2cap_chan_unlock(chan); + l2cap_chan_put(chan); return 0; } @@ -5653,12 +5686,11 @@ static inline int l2cap_le_credits(struct l2cap_conn *conn, if (credits > max_credits) { BT_ERR("LE credits overflow"); l2cap_send_disconn_req(chan, ECONNRESET); - l2cap_chan_unlock(chan); /* Return 0 so that we don't trigger an unnecessary * command reject packet. */ - return 0; + goto unlock; } chan->tx_credits += credits; @@ -5669,7 +5701,9 @@ static inline int l2cap_le_credits(struct l2cap_conn *conn, if (chan->tx_credits) chan->ops->resume(chan); +unlock: l2cap_chan_unlock(chan); + l2cap_chan_put(chan); return 0; } @@ -6983,6 +7017,7 @@ drop: done: l2cap_chan_unlock(chan); + l2cap_chan_put(chan); } static void l2cap_conless_channel(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __le16 psm, @@ -7386,7 +7421,7 @@ static struct l2cap_chan *l2cap_global_fixed_chan(struct l2cap_chan *c, if (src_type != c->src_type) continue; - l2cap_chan_hold(c); + c = l2cap_chan_hold_unless_zero(c); read_unlock(&chan_list_lock); return c; } From 911904c577e0e9a45653265616109f4037f5eeb0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: ChenXiaoSong Date: Thu, 7 Jul 2022 18:53:29 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 1038/1091] ntfs: fix use-after-free in ntfs_ucsncmp() commit 38c9c22a85aeed28d0831f230136e9cf6fa2ed44 upstream. Syzkaller reported use-after-free bug as follows: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ntfs_ucsncmp+0x123/0x130 Read of size 2 at addr ffff8880751acee8 by task a.out/879 CPU: 7 PID: 879 Comm: a.out Not tainted 5.19.0-rc4-next-20220630-00001-gcc5218c8bd2c-dirty #7 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x1c0/0x2b0 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xd4/0x484 print_report.cold+0x55/0x232 kasan_report+0xbf/0xf0 ntfs_ucsncmp+0x123/0x130 ntfs_are_names_equal.cold+0x2b/0x41 ntfs_attr_find+0x43b/0xb90 ntfs_attr_lookup+0x16d/0x1e0 ntfs_read_locked_attr_inode+0x4aa/0x2360 ntfs_attr_iget+0x1af/0x220 ntfs_read_locked_inode+0x246c/0x5120 ntfs_iget+0x132/0x180 load_system_files+0x1cc6/0x3480 ntfs_fill_super+0xa66/0x1cf0 mount_bdev+0x38d/0x460 legacy_get_tree+0x10d/0x220 vfs_get_tree+0x93/0x300 do_new_mount+0x2da/0x6d0 path_mount+0x496/0x19d0 __x64_sys_mount+0x284/0x300 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 RIP: 0033:0x7f3f2118d9ea Code: 48 8b 0d a9 f4 0b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 76 f4 0b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffc269deac8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f3f2118d9ea RDX: 0000000020000000 RSI: 0000000020000100 RDI: 00007ffc269dec00 RBP: 00007ffc269dec80 R08: 00007ffc269deb00 R09: 00007ffc269dec44 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 000055f81ab1d220 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:0000000085430378 refcount:1 mapcount:1 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x555c6a81d pfn:0x751ac memcg:ffff888101f7e180 anon flags: 0xfffffc00a0014(uptodate|lru|mappedtodisk|swapbacked|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) raw: 000fffffc00a0014 ffffea0001bf2988 ffffea0001de2448 ffff88801712e201 raw: 0000000555c6a81d 0000000000000000 0000000100000000 ffff888101f7e180 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff8880751acd80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff8880751ace00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 >ffff8880751ace80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ^ ffff8880751acf00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff8880751acf80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ================================================================== The reason is that struct ATTR_RECORD->name_offset is 6485, end address of name string is out of bounds. Fix this by adding sanity check on end address of attribute name string. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style cleanups] [chenxiaosong2@huawei.com: cleanup suggested by Hawkins Jiawei] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220709064511.3304299-1-chenxiaosong2@huawei.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220707105329.4020708-1-chenxiaosong2@huawei.com Signed-off-by: ChenXiaoSong Signed-off-by: Hawkins Jiawei Cc: Anton Altaparmakov Cc: ChenXiaoSong Cc: Yongqiang Liu Cc: Zhang Yi Cc: Zhang Xiaoxu Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/ntfs/attrib.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ntfs/attrib.c b/fs/ntfs/attrib.c index d563abc3e136..914e99173130 100644 --- a/fs/ntfs/attrib.c +++ b/fs/ntfs/attrib.c @@ -592,8 +592,12 @@ static int ntfs_attr_find(const ATTR_TYPE type, const ntfschar *name, a = (ATTR_RECORD*)((u8*)ctx->attr + le32_to_cpu(ctx->attr->length)); for (;; a = (ATTR_RECORD*)((u8*)a + le32_to_cpu(a->length))) { - if ((u8*)a < (u8*)ctx->mrec || (u8*)a > (u8*)ctx->mrec + - le32_to_cpu(ctx->mrec->bytes_allocated)) + u8 *mrec_end = (u8 *)ctx->mrec + + le32_to_cpu(ctx->mrec->bytes_allocated); + u8 *name_end = (u8 *)a + le16_to_cpu(a->name_offset) + + a->name_length * sizeof(ntfschar); + if ((u8*)a < (u8*)ctx->mrec || (u8*)a > mrec_end || + name_end > mrec_end) break; ctx->attr = a; if (unlikely(le32_to_cpu(a->type) > le32_to_cpu(type) || From b9f937d3d54de7dd8062fab45e1fba90e70de240 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Harald Freudenberger Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2022 15:17:21 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 1039/1091] s390/archrandom: prevent CPACF trng invocations in interrupt context commit 918e75f77af7d2e049bb70469ec0a2c12782d96a upstream. This patch slightly reworks the s390 arch_get_random_seed_{int,long} implementation: Make sure the CPACF trng instruction is never called in any interrupt context. This is done by adding an additional condition in_task(). Justification: There are some constrains to satisfy for the invocation of the arch_get_random_seed_{int,long}() functions: - They should provide good random data during kernel initialization. - They should not be called in interrupt context as the TRNG instruction is relatively heavy weight and may for example make some network loads cause to timeout and buck. However, it was not clear what kind of interrupt context is exactly encountered during kernel init or network traffic eventually calling arch_get_random_seed_long(). After some days of investigations it is clear that the s390 start_kernel function is not running in any interrupt context and so the trng is called: Jul 11 18:33:39 t35lp54 kernel: [<00000001064e90ca>] arch_get_random_seed_long.part.0+0x32/0x70 Jul 11 18:33:39 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000010715f246>] random_init+0xf6/0x238 Jul 11 18:33:39 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000010712545c>] start_kernel+0x4a4/0x628 Jul 11 18:33:39 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000010590402a>] startup_continue+0x2a/0x40 The condition in_task() is true and the CPACF trng provides random data during kernel startup. The network traffic however, is more difficult. A typical call stack looks like this: Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b5600fc>] extract_entropy.constprop.0+0x23c/0x240 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b560136>] crng_reseed+0x36/0xd8 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b5604b8>] crng_make_state+0x78/0x340 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b5607e0>] _get_random_bytes+0x60/0xf8 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b56108a>] get_random_u32+0xda/0x248 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008aefe7a8>] kfence_guarded_alloc+0x48/0x4b8 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008aeff35e>] __kfence_alloc+0x18e/0x1b8 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008aef7f10>] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x368/0x4d8 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b611eac>] kmalloc_reserve+0x44/0xa0 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b611f98>] __alloc_skb+0x90/0x178 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b6120dc>] __napi_alloc_skb+0x5c/0x118 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b8f06b4>] qeth_extract_skb+0x13c/0x680 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b8f6526>] qeth_poll+0x256/0x3f8 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b63d76e>] __napi_poll.constprop.0+0x46/0x2f8 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b63dbec>] net_rx_action+0x1cc/0x408 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b937302>] __do_softirq+0x132/0x6b0 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008abf46ce>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x13e/0x170 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008abf531a>] irq_exit_rcu+0x22/0x50 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b922506>] do_io_irq+0xe6/0x198 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b935826>] io_int_handler+0xd6/0x110 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b9358a6>] psw_idle_exit+0x0/0xa Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: ([<000000008ab9c59a>] arch_cpu_idle+0x52/0xe0) Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b933cfe>] default_idle_call+0x6e/0xd0 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008ac59f4e>] do_idle+0xf6/0x1b0 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008ac5a28e>] cpu_startup_entry+0x36/0x40 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008abb0d90>] smp_start_secondary+0x148/0x158 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b935b9e>] restart_int_handler+0x6e/0x90 which confirms that the call is in softirq context. So in_task() covers exactly the cases where we want to have CPACF trng called: not in nmi, not in hard irq, not in soft irq but in normal task context and during kernel init. Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger Acked-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Reviewed-by: Juergen Christ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220713131721.257907-1-freude@linux.ibm.com Fixes: e4f74400308c ("s390/archrandom: simplify back to earlier design and initialize earlier") [agordeev@linux.ibm.com changed desc, added Fixes and Link, removed -stable] Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/s390/include/asm/archrandom.h | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/archrandom.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/archrandom.h index 2c6e1c6ecbe7..4120c428dc37 100644 --- a/arch/s390/include/asm/archrandom.h +++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/archrandom.h @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ /* * Kernel interface for the s390 arch_random_* functions * - * Copyright IBM Corp. 2017, 2020 + * Copyright IBM Corp. 2017, 2022 * * Author: Harald Freudenberger * @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM #include +#include #include #include @@ -32,7 +33,8 @@ static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_int(unsigned int *v) static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v) { - if (static_branch_likely(&s390_arch_random_available)) { + if (static_branch_likely(&s390_arch_random_available) && + in_task()) { cpacf_trng(NULL, 0, (u8 *)v, sizeof(*v)); atomic64_add(sizeof(*v), &s390_arch_random_counter); return true; @@ -42,7 +44,8 @@ static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v) static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v) { - if (static_branch_likely(&s390_arch_random_available)) { + if (static_branch_likely(&s390_arch_random_available) && + in_task()) { cpacf_trng(NULL, 0, (u8 *)v, sizeof(*v)); atomic64_add(sizeof(*v), &s390_arch_random_counter); return true; From f240d0cad26c3778e30d404afa093c25148ed8c5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Wed, 20 Jul 2022 09:50:12 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 1040/1091] tcp: Fix data-races around sysctl_tcp_dsack. commit 58ebb1c8b35a8ef38cd6927431e0fa7b173a632d upstream. While reading sysctl_tcp_dsack, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index c151c4dd4ae6..01def4f67fcd 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -4260,7 +4260,7 @@ static void tcp_dsack_set(struct sock *sk, u32 seq, u32 end_seq) { struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); - if (tcp_is_sack(tp) && sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_dsack) { + if (tcp_is_sack(tp) && READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_dsack)) { int mib_idx; if (before(seq, tp->rcv_nxt)) @@ -4306,7 +4306,7 @@ static void tcp_send_dupack(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb) NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_DELAYEDACKLOST); tcp_enter_quickack_mode(sk, TCP_MAX_QUICKACKS); - if (tcp_is_sack(tp) && sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_dsack) { + if (tcp_is_sack(tp) && READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_dsack)) { u32 end_seq = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq; tcp_rcv_spurious_retrans(sk, skb); From f4b83df0110569cf0ca33e4e01ae59adbbc8710a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Wed, 20 Jul 2022 09:50:13 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 1041/1091] tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_app_win. commit 02ca527ac5581cf56749db9fd03d854e842253dd upstream. While reading sysctl_tcp_app_win, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index 01def4f67fcd..0fcb741778fa 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ static void tcp_grow_window(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb) */ void tcp_init_buffer_space(struct sock *sk) { - int tcp_app_win = sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_app_win; + int tcp_app_win = READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_app_win); struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); int maxwin; From 3be498bcf6ea671debc4f6ebe03f8560fadc9cac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Wed, 20 Jul 2022 09:50:14 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 1042/1091] tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_adv_win_scale. commit 36eeee75ef0157e42fb6593dcc65daab289b559e upstream. While reading sysctl_tcp_adv_win_scale, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/net/tcp.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/net/tcp.h b/include/net/tcp.h index aaf1d5d5a13b..8459145497b7 100644 --- a/include/net/tcp.h +++ b/include/net/tcp.h @@ -1389,7 +1389,7 @@ void tcp_select_initial_window(const struct sock *sk, int __space, static inline int tcp_win_from_space(const struct sock *sk, int space) { - int tcp_adv_win_scale = sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_adv_win_scale; + int tcp_adv_win_scale = READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_adv_win_scale); return tcp_adv_win_scale <= 0 ? (space>>(-tcp_adv_win_scale)) : From f9a03fd8ed316834afdafb8812ddbdf5a69fce7e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Wed, 20 Jul 2022 09:50:15 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 1043/1091] tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_frto. commit 706c6202a3589f290e1ef9be0584a8f4a3cc0507 upstream. While reading sysctl_tcp_frto, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index 0fcb741778fa..f5f50a30b30c 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -2030,7 +2030,7 @@ void tcp_enter_loss(struct sock *sk) * loss recovery is underway except recurring timeout(s) on * the same SND.UNA (sec 3.2). Disable F-RTO on path MTU probing */ - tp->frto = net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_frto && + tp->frto = READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_frto) && (new_recovery || icsk->icsk_retransmits) && !inet_csk(sk)->icsk_mtup.probe_size; } From cd23a2ad7b7cfe4db35854b4122e13f801f3b4df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Wed, 20 Jul 2022 09:50:16 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 1044/1091] tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_nometrics_save. commit 8499a2454d9e8a55ce616ede9f9580f36fd5b0f3 upstream. While reading sysctl_tcp_nometrics_save, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/ipv4/tcp_metrics.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_metrics.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_metrics.c index 9a7d8a599857..0af6249a993a 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_metrics.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_metrics.c @@ -329,7 +329,7 @@ void tcp_update_metrics(struct sock *sk) int m; sk_dst_confirm(sk); - if (net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_nometrics_save || !dst) + if (READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_nometrics_save) || !dst) return; rcu_read_lock(); From 15d0198601594bfcad2604c760cfe23bef11f31f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Maciej Fijalkowski Date: Thu, 7 Jul 2022 12:20:42 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 1045/1091] ice: check (DD | EOF) bits on Rx descriptor rather than (EOP | RS) commit 283d736ff7c7e96ac5b32c6c0de40372f8eb171e upstream. Tx side sets EOP and RS bits on descriptors to indicate that a particular descriptor is the last one and needs to generate an irq when it was sent. These bits should not be checked on completion path regardless whether it's the Tx or the Rx. DD bit serves this purpose and it indicates that a particular descriptor is either for Rx or was successfully Txed. EOF is also set as loopback test does not xmit fragmented frames. Look at (DD | EOF) bits setting in ice_lbtest_receive_frames() instead of EOP and RS pair. Fixes: 0e674aeb0b77 ("ice: Add handler for ethtool selftest") Signed-off-by: Maciej Fijalkowski Tested-by: George Kuruvinakunnel Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_ethtool.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_ethtool.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_ethtool.c index b297a3ca22fc..83678120573e 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_ethtool.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_ethtool.c @@ -619,7 +619,8 @@ static int ice_lbtest_receive_frames(struct ice_ring *rx_ring) rx_desc = ICE_RX_DESC(rx_ring, i); if (!(rx_desc->wb.status_error0 & - cpu_to_le16(ICE_TX_DESC_CMD_EOP | ICE_TX_DESC_CMD_RS))) + (cpu_to_le16(BIT(ICE_RX_FLEX_DESC_STATUS0_DD_S)) | + cpu_to_le16(BIT(ICE_RX_FLEX_DESC_STATUS0_EOF_S))))) continue; rx_buf = &rx_ring->rx_buf[i]; From b1343528c7ae65f0a1918d276f17e650ce43a52b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Maciej Fijalkowski Date: Thu, 7 Jul 2022 12:20:43 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 1046/1091] ice: do not setup vlan for loopback VSI commit cc019545a238518fa9da1e2a889f6e1bb1005a63 upstream. Currently loopback test is failiing due to the error returned from ice_vsi_vlan_setup(). Skip calling it when preparing loopback VSI. Fixes: 0e674aeb0b77 ("ice: Add handler for ethtool selftest") Signed-off-by: Maciej Fijalkowski Tested-by: George Kuruvinakunnel Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_main.c | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_main.c index 88750a96cb3f..7d28563ab794 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_main.c @@ -3495,10 +3495,12 @@ int ice_vsi_cfg(struct ice_vsi *vsi) if (vsi->netdev) { ice_set_rx_mode(vsi->netdev); - err = ice_vsi_vlan_setup(vsi); + if (vsi->type != ICE_VSI_LB) { + err = ice_vsi_vlan_setup(vsi); - if (err) - return err; + if (err) + return err; + } } ice_vsi_cfg_dcb_rings(vsi); From d62e255ecc33c6e3c82bcd2aaf0916886f7ab134 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Liang He Date: Tue, 19 Jul 2022 15:15:29 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 1047/1091] scsi: ufs: host: Hold reference returned by of_parse_phandle() commit a3435afba87dc6cd83f5595e7607f3c40f93ef01 upstream. In ufshcd_populate_vreg(), we should hold the reference returned by of_parse_phandle() and then use it to call of_node_put() for refcount balance. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220719071529.1081166-1-windhl@126.com Fixes: aa4976130934 ("ufs: Add regulator enable support") Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche Signed-off-by: Liang He Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd-pltfrm.c | 15 +++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd-pltfrm.c b/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd-pltfrm.c index 10eec501f6b3..bfc589f4baf5 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd-pltfrm.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd-pltfrm.c @@ -125,9 +125,20 @@ out: return ret; } +static bool phandle_exists(const struct device_node *np, + const char *phandle_name, int index) +{ + struct device_node *parse_np = of_parse_phandle(np, phandle_name, index); + + if (parse_np) + of_node_put(parse_np); + + return parse_np != NULL; +} + #define MAX_PROP_SIZE 32 static int ufshcd_populate_vreg(struct device *dev, const char *name, - struct ufs_vreg **out_vreg) + struct ufs_vreg **out_vreg) { int ret = 0; char prop_name[MAX_PROP_SIZE]; @@ -140,7 +151,7 @@ static int ufshcd_populate_vreg(struct device *dev, const char *name, } snprintf(prop_name, MAX_PROP_SIZE, "%s-supply", name); - if (!of_parse_phandle(np, prop_name, 0)) { + if (!phandle_exists(np, prop_name, 0)) { dev_info(dev, "%s: Unable to find %s regulator, assuming enabled\n", __func__, prop_name); goto out; From dfdc635d55f92db58a63dc52d0f5d6ee651c73ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Wed, 20 Jul 2022 09:50:20 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 1048/1091] tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_limit_output_bytes. commit 9fb90193fbd66b4c5409ef729fd081861f8b6351 upstream. While reading sysctl_tcp_limit_output_bytes, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader. Fixes: 46d3ceabd8d9 ("tcp: TCP Small Queues") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c index 97f29ece3800..99e077422975 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c @@ -2276,7 +2276,7 @@ static bool tcp_small_queue_check(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb, sk->sk_pacing_rate >> READ_ONCE(sk->sk_pacing_shift)); if (sk->sk_pacing_status == SK_PACING_NONE) limit = min_t(unsigned long, limit, - sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_limit_output_bytes); + READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_limit_output_bytes)); limit <<= factor; if (static_branch_unlikely(&tcp_tx_delay_enabled) && From 3d492b008b3ded9b1c110500eb2e83b5b9a8e3d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Wed, 20 Jul 2022 09:50:21 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 1049/1091] tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit. commit db3815a2fa691da145cfbe834584f31ad75df9ff upstream. While reading sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader. Fixes: 282f23c6ee34 ("tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index f5f50a30b30c..a8d8ff488281 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -3484,7 +3484,7 @@ static void tcp_send_challenge_ack(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb) /* Then check host-wide RFC 5961 rate limit. */ now = jiffies / HZ; if (now != challenge_timestamp) { - u32 ack_limit = net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit; + u32 ack_limit = READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit); u32 half = (ack_limit + 1) >> 1; challenge_timestamp = now; From 421e5dd1f12e56b1418d1525b536ff04250df373 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Wed, 27 Jul 2022 18:22:20 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 1050/1091] net: ping6: Fix memleak in ipv6_renew_options(). commit e27326009a3d247b831eda38878c777f6f4eb3d1 upstream. When we close ping6 sockets, some resources are left unfreed because pingv6_prot is missing sk->sk_prot->destroy(). As reported by syzbot [0], just three syscalls leak 96 bytes and easily cause OOM. struct ipv6_sr_hdr *hdr; char data[24] = {0}; int fd; hdr = (struct ipv6_sr_hdr *)data; hdr->hdrlen = 2; hdr->type = IPV6_SRCRT_TYPE_4; fd = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_DGRAM, NEXTHDR_ICMP); setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_RTHDR, data, 24); close(fd); To fix memory leaks, let's add a destroy function. Note the socket() syscall checks if the GID is within the range of net.ipv4.ping_group_range. The default value is [1, 0] so that no GID meets the condition (1 <= GID <= 0). Thus, the local DoS does not succeed until we change the default value. However, at least Ubuntu/Fedora/RHEL loosen it. $ cat /usr/lib/sysctl.d/50-default.conf ... -net.ipv4.ping_group_range = 0 2147483647 Also, there could be another path reported with these options, and some of them require CAP_NET_RAW. setsockopt IPV6_ADDRFORM (inet6_sk(sk)->pktoptions) IPV6_RECVPATHMTU (inet6_sk(sk)->rxpmtu) IPV6_HOPOPTS (inet6_sk(sk)->opt) IPV6_RTHDRDSTOPTS (inet6_sk(sk)->opt) IPV6_RTHDR (inet6_sk(sk)->opt) IPV6_DSTOPTS (inet6_sk(sk)->opt) IPV6_2292PKTOPTIONS (inet6_sk(sk)->opt) getsockopt IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MGR (inet6_sk(sk)->ipv6_fl_list) For the record, I left a different splat with syzbot's one. unreferenced object 0xffff888006270c60 (size 96): comm "repro2", pid 231, jiffies 4294696626 (age 13.118s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 01 00 00 00 44 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....D........... 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ backtrace: [<00000000f6bc7ea9>] sock_kmalloc (net/core/sock.c:2564 net/core/sock.c:2554) [<000000006d699550>] do_ipv6_setsockopt.constprop.0 (net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:715) [<00000000c3c3b1f5>] ipv6_setsockopt (net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:1024) [<000000007096a025>] __sys_setsockopt (net/socket.c:2254) [<000000003a8ff47b>] __x64_sys_setsockopt (net/socket.c:2265 net/socket.c:2262 net/socket.c:2262) [<000000007c409dcb>] do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80) [<00000000e939c4a9>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120) [0]: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=a8430774139ec3ab7176 Fixes: 6d0bfe226116 ("net: ipv6: Add IPv6 support to the ping socket.") Reported-by: syzbot+a8430774139ec3ab7176@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: Ayushman Dutta Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Reviewed-by: David Ahern Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220728012220.46918-1-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/ipv6/ping.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/ipv6/ping.c b/net/ipv6/ping.c index 98ac32b49d8c..051bbd0726df 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ping.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ping.c @@ -22,6 +22,11 @@ #include #include +static void ping_v6_destroy(struct sock *sk) +{ + inet6_destroy_sock(sk); +} + /* Compatibility glue so we can support IPv6 when it's compiled as a module */ static int dummy_ipv6_recv_error(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, int len, int *addr_len) @@ -165,6 +170,7 @@ struct proto pingv6_prot = { .owner = THIS_MODULE, .init = ping_init_sock, .close = ping_close, + .destroy = ping_v6_destroy, .connect = ip6_datagram_connect_v6_only, .disconnect = __udp_disconnect, .setsockopt = ipv6_setsockopt, From 73e5a0b59129e8cfb9332a8260ec7e7a8aa8fa41 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ziyang Xuan Date: Thu, 28 Jul 2022 09:33:07 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 1051/1091] ipv6/addrconf: fix a null-ptr-deref bug for ip6_ptr commit 85f0173df35e5462d89947135a6a5599c6c3ef6f upstream. Change net device's MTU to smaller than IPV6_MIN_MTU or unregister device while matching route. That may trigger null-ptr-deref bug for ip6_ptr probability as following. ========================================================= BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in find_match.part.0+0x70/0x134 Read of size 4 at addr 0000000000000308 by task ping6/263 CPU: 2 PID: 263 Comm: ping6 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc7+ #14 Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x1a8/0x230 show_stack+0x20/0x70 dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x84 print_report+0xc4/0x120 kasan_report+0x84/0x120 __asan_load4+0x94/0xd0 find_match.part.0+0x70/0x134 __find_rr_leaf+0x408/0x470 fib6_table_lookup+0x264/0x540 ip6_pol_route+0xf4/0x260 ip6_pol_route_output+0x58/0x70 fib6_rule_lookup+0x1a8/0x330 ip6_route_output_flags_noref+0xd8/0x1a0 ip6_route_output_flags+0x58/0x160 ip6_dst_lookup_tail+0x5b4/0x85c ip6_dst_lookup_flow+0x98/0x120 rawv6_sendmsg+0x49c/0xc70 inet_sendmsg+0x68/0x94 Reproducer as following: Firstly, prepare conditions: $ip netns add ns1 $ip netns add ns2 $ip link add veth1 type veth peer name veth2 $ip link set veth1 netns ns1 $ip link set veth2 netns ns2 $ip netns exec ns1 ip -6 addr add 2001:0db8:0:f101::1/64 dev veth1 $ip netns exec ns2 ip -6 addr add 2001:0db8:0:f101::2/64 dev veth2 $ip netns exec ns1 ifconfig veth1 up $ip netns exec ns2 ifconfig veth2 up $ip netns exec ns1 ip -6 route add 2000::/64 dev veth1 metric 1 $ip netns exec ns2 ip -6 route add 2001::/64 dev veth2 metric 1 Secondly, execute the following two commands in two ssh windows respectively: $ip netns exec ns1 sh $while true; do ip -6 addr add 2001:0db8:0:f101::1/64 dev veth1; ip -6 route add 2000::/64 dev veth1 metric 1; ping6 2000::2; done $ip netns exec ns1 sh $while true; do ip link set veth1 mtu 1000; ip link set veth1 mtu 1500; sleep 5; done It is because ip6_ptr has been assigned to NULL in addrconf_ifdown() firstly, then ip6_ignore_linkdown() accesses ip6_ptr directly without NULL check. cpu0 cpu1 fib6_table_lookup __find_rr_leaf addrconf_notify [ NETDEV_CHANGEMTU ] addrconf_ifdown RCU_INIT_POINTER(dev->ip6_ptr, NULL) find_match ip6_ignore_linkdown So we can add NULL check for ip6_ptr before using in ip6_ignore_linkdown() to fix the null-ptr-deref bug. Fixes: dcd1f572954f ("net/ipv6: Remove fib6_idev") Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan Reviewed-by: David Ahern Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220728013307.656257-1-william.xuanziyang@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/net/addrconf.h | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/net/addrconf.h b/include/net/addrconf.h index 8d90fb9184e8..880e609b7352 100644 --- a/include/net/addrconf.h +++ b/include/net/addrconf.h @@ -399,6 +399,9 @@ static inline bool ip6_ignore_linkdown(const struct net_device *dev) { const struct inet6_dev *idev = __in6_dev_get(dev); + if (unlikely(!idev)) + return true; + return !!idev->cnf.ignore_routes_with_linkdown; } From e20dd1b0e0ea15bee1e528536a0840dba972ca0e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2022 10:17:44 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 1052/1091] igmp: Fix data-races around sysctl_igmp_qrv. [ Upstream commit 8ebcc62c738f68688ee7c6fec2efe5bc6d3d7e60 ] While reading sysctl_igmp_qrv, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers. This test can be packed into a helper, so such changes will be in the follow-up series after net is merged into net-next. qrv ?: READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_igmp_qrv); Fixes: a9fe8e29945d ("ipv4: implement igmp_qrv sysctl to tune igmp robustness variable") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/ipv4/igmp.c | 24 +++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/igmp.c b/net/ipv4/igmp.c index 660b41040c77..1023f881091e 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/igmp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/igmp.c @@ -829,7 +829,7 @@ static void igmp_ifc_event(struct in_device *in_dev) struct net *net = dev_net(in_dev->dev); if (IGMP_V1_SEEN(in_dev) || IGMP_V2_SEEN(in_dev)) return; - WRITE_ONCE(in_dev->mr_ifc_count, in_dev->mr_qrv ?: net->ipv4.sysctl_igmp_qrv); + WRITE_ONCE(in_dev->mr_ifc_count, in_dev->mr_qrv ?: READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_igmp_qrv)); igmp_ifc_start_timer(in_dev, 1); } @@ -1011,7 +1011,7 @@ static bool igmp_heard_query(struct in_device *in_dev, struct sk_buff *skb, * received value was zero, use the default or statically * configured value. */ - in_dev->mr_qrv = ih3->qrv ?: net->ipv4.sysctl_igmp_qrv; + in_dev->mr_qrv = ih3->qrv ?: READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_igmp_qrv); in_dev->mr_qi = IGMPV3_QQIC(ih3->qqic)*HZ ?: IGMP_QUERY_INTERVAL; /* RFC3376, 8.3. Query Response Interval: @@ -1191,7 +1191,7 @@ static void igmpv3_add_delrec(struct in_device *in_dev, struct ip_mc_list *im, pmc->interface = im->interface; in_dev_hold(in_dev); pmc->multiaddr = im->multiaddr; - pmc->crcount = in_dev->mr_qrv ?: net->ipv4.sysctl_igmp_qrv; + pmc->crcount = in_dev->mr_qrv ?: READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_igmp_qrv); pmc->sfmode = im->sfmode; if (pmc->sfmode == MCAST_INCLUDE) { struct ip_sf_list *psf; @@ -1242,9 +1242,11 @@ static void igmpv3_del_delrec(struct in_device *in_dev, struct ip_mc_list *im) swap(im->tomb, pmc->tomb); swap(im->sources, pmc->sources); for (psf = im->sources; psf; psf = psf->sf_next) - psf->sf_crcount = in_dev->mr_qrv ?: net->ipv4.sysctl_igmp_qrv; + psf->sf_crcount = in_dev->mr_qrv ?: + READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_igmp_qrv); } else { - im->crcount = in_dev->mr_qrv ?: net->ipv4.sysctl_igmp_qrv; + im->crcount = in_dev->mr_qrv ?: + READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_igmp_qrv); } in_dev_put(pmc->interface); kfree_pmc(pmc); @@ -1351,7 +1353,7 @@ static void igmp_group_added(struct ip_mc_list *im) if (in_dev->dead) return; - im->unsolicit_count = net->ipv4.sysctl_igmp_qrv; + im->unsolicit_count = READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_igmp_qrv); if (IGMP_V1_SEEN(in_dev) || IGMP_V2_SEEN(in_dev)) { spin_lock_bh(&im->lock); igmp_start_timer(im, IGMP_INITIAL_REPORT_DELAY); @@ -1365,7 +1367,7 @@ static void igmp_group_added(struct ip_mc_list *im) * IN() to IN(A). */ if (im->sfmode == MCAST_EXCLUDE) - im->crcount = in_dev->mr_qrv ?: net->ipv4.sysctl_igmp_qrv; + im->crcount = in_dev->mr_qrv ?: READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_igmp_qrv); igmp_ifc_event(in_dev); #endif @@ -1756,7 +1758,7 @@ static void ip_mc_reset(struct in_device *in_dev) in_dev->mr_qi = IGMP_QUERY_INTERVAL; in_dev->mr_qri = IGMP_QUERY_RESPONSE_INTERVAL; - in_dev->mr_qrv = net->ipv4.sysctl_igmp_qrv; + in_dev->mr_qrv = READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_igmp_qrv); } #else static void ip_mc_reset(struct in_device *in_dev) @@ -1890,7 +1892,7 @@ static int ip_mc_del1_src(struct ip_mc_list *pmc, int sfmode, #ifdef CONFIG_IP_MULTICAST if (psf->sf_oldin && !IGMP_V1_SEEN(in_dev) && !IGMP_V2_SEEN(in_dev)) { - psf->sf_crcount = in_dev->mr_qrv ?: net->ipv4.sysctl_igmp_qrv; + psf->sf_crcount = in_dev->mr_qrv ?: READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_igmp_qrv); psf->sf_next = pmc->tomb; pmc->tomb = psf; rv = 1; @@ -1954,7 +1956,7 @@ static int ip_mc_del_src(struct in_device *in_dev, __be32 *pmca, int sfmode, /* filter mode change */ pmc->sfmode = MCAST_INCLUDE; #ifdef CONFIG_IP_MULTICAST - pmc->crcount = in_dev->mr_qrv ?: net->ipv4.sysctl_igmp_qrv; + pmc->crcount = in_dev->mr_qrv ?: READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_igmp_qrv); WRITE_ONCE(in_dev->mr_ifc_count, pmc->crcount); for (psf = pmc->sources; psf; psf = psf->sf_next) psf->sf_crcount = 0; @@ -2133,7 +2135,7 @@ static int ip_mc_add_src(struct in_device *in_dev, __be32 *pmca, int sfmode, #ifdef CONFIG_IP_MULTICAST /* else no filters; keep old mode for reports */ - pmc->crcount = in_dev->mr_qrv ?: net->ipv4.sysctl_igmp_qrv; + pmc->crcount = in_dev->mr_qrv ?: READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_igmp_qrv); WRITE_ONCE(in_dev->mr_ifc_count, pmc->crcount); for (psf = pmc->sources; psf; psf = psf->sf_next) psf->sf_crcount = 0; From fb200869eabebc98e5d49200c156c43929b6ec57 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Liang He Date: Wed, 20 Jul 2022 21:10:03 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 1053/1091] net: sungem_phy: Add of_node_put() for reference returned by of_get_parent() [ Upstream commit ebbbe23fdf6070e31509638df3321688358cc211 ] In bcm5421_init(), we should call of_node_put() for the reference returned by of_get_parent() which has increased the refcount. Fixes: 3c326fe9cb7a ("[PATCH] ppc64: Add new PHY to sungem") Signed-off-by: Liang He Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220720131003.1287426-1-windhl@126.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/sungem_phy.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/sungem_phy.c b/drivers/net/sungem_phy.c index 291fa449993f..45f295403cb5 100644 --- a/drivers/net/sungem_phy.c +++ b/drivers/net/sungem_phy.c @@ -454,6 +454,7 @@ static int bcm5421_init(struct mii_phy* phy) int can_low_power = 1; if (np == NULL || of_get_property(np, "no-autolowpower", NULL)) can_low_power = 0; + of_node_put(np); if (can_low_power) { /* Enable automatic low-power */ sungem_phy_write(phy, 0x1c, 0x9002); From 558a2949608faf5aaf764e5374ab8bb7ca3ac143 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Wed, 20 Jul 2022 09:50:22 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 1054/1091] tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_min_tso_segs. [ Upstream commit e0bb4ab9dfddd872622239f49fb2bd403b70853b ] While reading sysctl_tcp_min_tso_segs, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader. Fixes: 95bd09eb2750 ("tcp: TSO packets automatic sizing") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c index 99e077422975..ef749a47768a 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c @@ -1761,7 +1761,7 @@ static u32 tcp_tso_segs(struct sock *sk, unsigned int mss_now) min_tso = ca_ops->min_tso_segs ? ca_ops->min_tso_segs(sk) : - sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_min_tso_segs; + READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_min_tso_segs); tso_segs = tcp_tso_autosize(sk, mss_now, min_tso); return min_t(u32, tso_segs, sk->sk_gso_max_segs); From e02c7ee5a4308027baf24e3334e69e07ad5bad3d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Wed, 20 Jul 2022 09:50:24 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 1055/1091] tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_min_rtt_wlen. [ Upstream commit 1330ffacd05fc9ac4159d19286ce119e22450ed2 ] While reading sysctl_tcp_min_rtt_wlen, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader. Fixes: f672258391b4 ("tcp: track min RTT using windowed min-filter") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index a8d8ff488281..b760ad0b16d9 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -2914,7 +2914,7 @@ static void tcp_fastretrans_alert(struct sock *sk, const u32 prior_snd_una, static void tcp_update_rtt_min(struct sock *sk, u32 rtt_us, const int flag) { - u32 wlen = sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_min_rtt_wlen * HZ; + u32 wlen = READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_min_rtt_wlen) * HZ; struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); if ((flag & FLAG_ACK_MAYBE_DELAYED) && rtt_us > tcp_min_rtt(tp)) { From 5d235c2fc295e56398b724f9e5add3d9377fd3a8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Wed, 20 Jul 2022 09:50:25 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 1056/1091] tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_autocorking. [ Upstream commit 85225e6f0a76e6745bc841c9f25169c509b573d8 ] While reading sysctl_tcp_autocorking, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader. Fixes: f54b311142a9 ("tcp: auto corking") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/ipv4/tcp.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c index 4b31f6e9ec61..0a570d5d0b38 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c @@ -697,7 +697,7 @@ static bool tcp_should_autocork(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, int size_goal) { return skb->len < size_goal && - sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_autocorking && + READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_autocorking) && !tcp_rtx_queue_empty(sk) && refcount_read(&sk->sk_wmem_alloc) > skb->truesize; } From 2d30375343b60be9666b2388a10a0c589e13d73d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Wed, 20 Jul 2022 09:50:26 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 1057/1091] tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_invalid_ratelimit. [ Upstream commit 2afdbe7b8de84c28e219073a6661080e1b3ded48 ] While reading sysctl_tcp_invalid_ratelimit, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader. Fixes: 032ee4236954 ("tcp: helpers to mitigate ACK loops by rate-limiting out-of-window dupacks") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index b760ad0b16d9..7af5e6acf41a 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -3436,7 +3436,8 @@ static bool __tcp_oow_rate_limited(struct net *net, int mib_idx, if (*last_oow_ack_time) { s32 elapsed = (s32)(tcp_jiffies32 - *last_oow_ack_time); - if (0 <= elapsed && elapsed < net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_invalid_ratelimit) { + if (0 <= elapsed && + elapsed < READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_invalid_ratelimit)) { NET_INC_STATS(net, mib_idx); return true; /* rate-limited: don't send yet! */ } From c2b57a4d3ff6ba2298db974c4e9c35fc9b18db17 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xin Long Date: Thu, 21 Jul 2022 10:35:46 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 1058/1091] Documentation: fix sctp_wmem in ip-sysctl.rst [ Upstream commit aa709da0e032cee7c202047ecd75f437bb0126ed ] Since commit 1033990ac5b2 ("sctp: implement memory accounting on tx path"), SCTP has supported memory accounting on tx path where 'sctp_wmem' is used by sk_wmem_schedule(). So we should fix the description for this option in ip-sysctl.rst accordingly. v1->v2: - Improve the description as Marcelo suggested. Fixes: 1033990ac5b2 ("sctp: implement memory accounting on tx path") Signed-off-by: Xin Long Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt | 9 ++++++++- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt b/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt index 787a9c077ef1..5cf601c94e35 100644 --- a/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt +++ b/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt @@ -2284,7 +2284,14 @@ sctp_rmem - vector of 3 INTEGERs: min, default, max Default: 4K sctp_wmem - vector of 3 INTEGERs: min, default, max - Currently this tunable has no effect. + Only the first value ("min") is used, "default" and "max" are + ignored. + + min: Minimum size of send buffer that can be used by SCTP sockets. + It is guaranteed to each SCTP socket (but not association) even + under moderate memory pressure. + + Default: 4K addr_scope_policy - INTEGER Control IPv4 address scoping - draft-stewart-tsvwg-sctp-ipv4-00 From d42f68a9ceb45023484a2ce11a7f4b9ba1cc4ac2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Fri, 22 Jul 2022 11:22:01 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 1059/1091] tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_comp_sack_delay_ns. [ Upstream commit 4866b2b0f7672b6d760c4b8ece6fb56f965dcc8a ] While reading sysctl_tcp_comp_sack_delay_ns, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader. Fixes: 6d82aa242092 ("tcp: add tcp_comp_sack_delay_ns sysctl") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index 7af5e6acf41a..f8fa036cfae2 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -5326,7 +5326,8 @@ send_now: if (tp->srtt_us && tp->srtt_us < rtt) rtt = tp->srtt_us; - delay = min_t(unsigned long, sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_comp_sack_delay_ns, + delay = min_t(unsigned long, + READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_comp_sack_delay_ns), rtt * (NSEC_PER_USEC >> 3)/20); sock_hold(sk); hrtimer_start(&tp->compressed_ack_timer, ns_to_ktime(delay), From 46462e26e65f4ab46e554a228996cc1dc0e71141 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Fri, 22 Jul 2022 11:22:03 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 1060/1091] tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_comp_sack_nr. [ Upstream commit 79f55473bfc8ac51bd6572929a679eeb4da22251 ] While reading sysctl_tcp_comp_sack_nr, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader. Fixes: 9c21d2fc41c0 ("tcp: add tcp_comp_sack_nr sysctl") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index f8fa036cfae2..f4e00ff909da 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -5303,7 +5303,7 @@ send_now: } if (!tcp_is_sack(tp) || - tp->compressed_ack >= sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_comp_sack_nr) + tp->compressed_ack >= READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_comp_sack_nr)) goto send_now; if (tp->compressed_ack_rcv_nxt != tp->rcv_nxt) { From bc135e464dee5746db81851df1ad3efca2a6cdf8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michal Maloszewski Date: Fri, 22 Jul 2022 10:54:01 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 1061/1091] i40e: Fix interface init with MSI interrupts (no MSI-X) [ Upstream commit 5fcbb711024aac6d4db385623e6f2fdf019f7782 ] Fix the inability to bring an interface up on a setup with only MSI interrupts enabled (no MSI-X). Solution is to add a default number of QPs = 1. This is enough, since without MSI-X support driver enables only a basic feature set. Fixes: bc6d33c8d93f ("i40e: Fix the number of queues available to be mapped for use") Signed-off-by: Dawid Lukwinski Signed-off-by: Michal Maloszewski Tested-by: Dave Switzer Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220722175401.112572-1-anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c index 0610d344fdbf..637f6ed78b48 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c @@ -1821,11 +1821,15 @@ static void i40e_vsi_setup_queue_map(struct i40e_vsi *vsi, * non-zero req_queue_pairs says that user requested a new * queue count via ethtool's set_channels, so use this * value for queues distribution across traffic classes + * We need at least one queue pair for the interface + * to be usable as we see in else statement. */ if (vsi->req_queue_pairs > 0) vsi->num_queue_pairs = vsi->req_queue_pairs; else if (pf->flags & I40E_FLAG_MSIX_ENABLED) vsi->num_queue_pairs = pf->num_lan_msix; + else + vsi->num_queue_pairs = 1; } /* Number of queues per enabled TC */ From 8e0ed463dbd5c065a5c65c517d424a17e25b8679 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Duoming Zhou Date: Sat, 23 Jul 2022 09:58:09 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 1062/1091] sctp: fix sleep in atomic context bug in timer handlers [ Upstream commit b89fc26f741d9f9efb51cba3e9b241cf1380ec5a ] There are sleep in atomic context bugs in timer handlers of sctp such as sctp_generate_t3_rtx_event(), sctp_generate_probe_event(), sctp_generate_t1_init_event(), sctp_generate_timeout_event(), sctp_generate_t3_rtx_event() and so on. The root cause is sctp_sched_prio_init_sid() with GFP_KERNEL parameter that may sleep could be called by different timer handlers which is in interrupt context. One of the call paths that could trigger bug is shown below: (interrupt context) sctp_generate_probe_event sctp_do_sm sctp_side_effects sctp_cmd_interpreter sctp_outq_teardown sctp_outq_init sctp_sched_set_sched n->init_sid(..,GFP_KERNEL) sctp_sched_prio_init_sid //may sleep This patch changes gfp_t parameter of init_sid in sctp_sched_set_sched() from GFP_KERNEL to GFP_ATOMIC in order to prevent sleep in atomic context bugs. Fixes: 5bbbbe32a431 ("sctp: introduce stream scheduler foundations") Signed-off-by: Duoming Zhou Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220723015809.11553-1-duoming@zju.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/sctp/stream_sched.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/sctp/stream_sched.c b/net/sctp/stream_sched.c index 99e5f69fbb74..a2e1d34f52c5 100644 --- a/net/sctp/stream_sched.c +++ b/net/sctp/stream_sched.c @@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ int sctp_sched_set_sched(struct sctp_association *asoc, if (!SCTP_SO(&asoc->stream, i)->ext) continue; - ret = n->init_sid(&asoc->stream, i, GFP_KERNEL); + ret = n->init_sid(&asoc->stream, i, GFP_ATOMIC); if (ret) goto err; } From 52be29e8b6455788a4d0f501bd87aa679ca3ba3c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Westphal Date: Tue, 26 Jul 2022 12:42:06 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 1063/1091] netfilter: nf_queue: do not allow packet truncation below transport header offset [ Upstream commit 99a63d36cb3ed5ca3aa6fcb64cffbeaf3b0fb164 ] Domingo Dirutigliano and Nicola Guerrera report kernel panic when sending nf_queue verdict with 1-byte nfta_payload attribute. The IP/IPv6 stack pulls the IP(v6) header from the packet after the input hook. If user truncates the packet below the header size, this skb_pull() will result in a malformed skb (skb->len < 0). Fixes: 7af4cc3fa158 ("[NETFILTER]: Add "nfnetlink_queue" netfilter queue handler over nfnetlink") Reported-by: Domingo Dirutigliano Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Reviewed-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c index 7d3ab08a5a2d..581bd1353a44 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c @@ -846,11 +846,16 @@ nfqnl_enqueue_packet(struct nf_queue_entry *entry, unsigned int queuenum) } static int -nfqnl_mangle(void *data, int data_len, struct nf_queue_entry *e, int diff) +nfqnl_mangle(void *data, unsigned int data_len, struct nf_queue_entry *e, int diff) { struct sk_buff *nskb; if (diff < 0) { + unsigned int min_len = skb_transport_offset(e->skb); + + if (data_len < min_len) + return -EINVAL; + if (pskb_trim(e->skb, data_len)) return -ENOMEM; } else if (diff > 0) { From 388b3f14ff60c419019b07275201c1530380acc8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jason Wang Date: Mon, 25 Jul 2022 15:21:59 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 1064/1091] virtio-net: fix the race between refill work and close [ Upstream commit 5a159128faff151b7fe5f4eb0f310b1e0a2d56bf ] We try using cancel_delayed_work_sync() to prevent the work from enabling NAPI. This is insufficient since we don't disable the source of the refill work scheduling. This means an NAPI poll callback after cancel_delayed_work_sync() can schedule the refill work then can re-enable the NAPI that leads to use-after-free [1]. Since the work can enable NAPI, we can't simply disable NAPI before calling cancel_delayed_work_sync(). So fix this by introducing a dedicated boolean to control whether or not the work could be scheduled from NAPI. [1] ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in refill_work+0x43/0xd4 Read of size 2 at addr ffff88810562c92e by task kworker/2:1/42 CPU: 2 PID: 42 Comm: kworker/2:1 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc1+ #480 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events refill_work Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x44 print_report.cold+0xbb/0x6ac ? _printk+0xad/0xde ? refill_work+0x43/0xd4 kasan_report+0xa8/0x130 ? refill_work+0x43/0xd4 refill_work+0x43/0xd4 process_one_work+0x43d/0x780 worker_thread+0x2a0/0x6f0 ? process_one_work+0x780/0x780 kthread+0x167/0x1a0 ? kthread_exit+0x50/0x50 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 ... Fixes: b2baed69e605c ("virtio_net: set/cancel work on ndo_open/ndo_stop") Signed-off-by: Jason Wang Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin Reviewed-by: Xuan Zhuo Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/virtio_net.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/virtio_net.c b/drivers/net/virtio_net.c index e14842fbe3d6..579df7c5411d 100644 --- a/drivers/net/virtio_net.c +++ b/drivers/net/virtio_net.c @@ -213,9 +213,15 @@ struct virtnet_info { /* Packet virtio header size */ u8 hdr_len; - /* Work struct for refilling if we run low on memory. */ + /* Work struct for delayed refilling if we run low on memory. */ struct delayed_work refill; + /* Is delayed refill enabled? */ + bool refill_enabled; + + /* The lock to synchronize the access to refill_enabled */ + spinlock_t refill_lock; + /* Work struct for config space updates */ struct work_struct config_work; @@ -319,6 +325,20 @@ static struct page *get_a_page(struct receive_queue *rq, gfp_t gfp_mask) return p; } +static void enable_delayed_refill(struct virtnet_info *vi) +{ + spin_lock_bh(&vi->refill_lock); + vi->refill_enabled = true; + spin_unlock_bh(&vi->refill_lock); +} + +static void disable_delayed_refill(struct virtnet_info *vi) +{ + spin_lock_bh(&vi->refill_lock); + vi->refill_enabled = false; + spin_unlock_bh(&vi->refill_lock); +} + static void virtqueue_napi_schedule(struct napi_struct *napi, struct virtqueue *vq) { @@ -1388,8 +1408,12 @@ static int virtnet_receive(struct receive_queue *rq, int budget, } if (rq->vq->num_free > min((unsigned int)budget, virtqueue_get_vring_size(rq->vq)) / 2) { - if (!try_fill_recv(vi, rq, GFP_ATOMIC)) - schedule_delayed_work(&vi->refill, 0); + if (!try_fill_recv(vi, rq, GFP_ATOMIC)) { + spin_lock(&vi->refill_lock); + if (vi->refill_enabled) + schedule_delayed_work(&vi->refill, 0); + spin_unlock(&vi->refill_lock); + } } u64_stats_update_begin(&rq->stats.syncp); @@ -1508,6 +1532,8 @@ static int virtnet_open(struct net_device *dev) struct virtnet_info *vi = netdev_priv(dev); int i, err; + enable_delayed_refill(vi); + for (i = 0; i < vi->max_queue_pairs; i++) { if (i < vi->curr_queue_pairs) /* Make sure we have some buffers: if oom use wq. */ @@ -1878,6 +1904,8 @@ static int virtnet_close(struct net_device *dev) struct virtnet_info *vi = netdev_priv(dev); int i; + /* Make sure NAPI doesn't schedule refill work */ + disable_delayed_refill(vi); /* Make sure refill_work doesn't re-enable napi! */ cancel_delayed_work_sync(&vi->refill); @@ -2417,6 +2445,8 @@ static int virtnet_restore_up(struct virtio_device *vdev) virtio_device_ready(vdev); + enable_delayed_refill(vi); + if (netif_running(vi->dev)) { err = virtnet_open(vi->dev); if (err) @@ -3140,6 +3170,7 @@ static int virtnet_probe(struct virtio_device *vdev) vdev->priv = vi; INIT_WORK(&vi->config_work, virtnet_config_changed_work); + spin_lock_init(&vi->refill_lock); /* If we can receive ANY GSO packets, we must allocate large ones. */ if (virtio_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_NET_F_GUEST_TSO4) || From 7799f742f24b0e72c770361d75ecdccbe36ea530 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Leo Yan Date: Sun, 24 Jul 2022 14:00:12 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 1065/1091] perf symbol: Correct address for bss symbols [ Upstream commit 2d86612aacb7805f72873691a2644d7279ed0630 ] When using 'perf mem' and 'perf c2c', an issue is observed that tool reports the wrong offset for global data symbols. This is a common issue on both x86 and Arm64 platforms. Let's see an example, for a test program, below is the disassembly for its .bss section which is dumped with objdump: ... Disassembly of section .bss: 0000000000004040 : ... 0000000000004080 : ... 00000000000040c0 : ... 0000000000004100 : ... First we used 'perf mem record' to run the test program and then used 'perf --debug verbose=4 mem report' to observe what's the symbol info for 'buf1' and 'buf2' structures. # ./perf mem record -e ldlat-loads,ldlat-stores -- false_sharing.exe 8 # ./perf --debug verbose=4 mem report ... dso__load_sym_internal: adjusting symbol: st_value: 0x40c0 sh_addr: 0x4040 sh_offset: 0x3028 symbol__new: buf2 0x30a8-0x30e8 ... dso__load_sym_internal: adjusting symbol: st_value: 0x4080 sh_addr: 0x4040 sh_offset: 0x3028 symbol__new: buf1 0x3068-0x30a8 ... The perf tool relies on libelf to parse symbols, in executable and shared object files, 'st_value' holds a virtual address; 'sh_addr' is the address at which section's first byte should reside in memory, and 'sh_offset' is the byte offset from the beginning of the file to the first byte in the section. The perf tool uses below formula to convert a symbol's memory address to a file address: file_address = st_value - sh_addr + sh_offset ^ ` Memory address We can see the final adjusted address ranges for buf1 and buf2 are [0x30a8-0x30e8) and [0x3068-0x30a8) respectively, apparently this is incorrect, in the code, the structure for 'buf1' and 'buf2' specifies compiler attribute with 64-byte alignment. The problem happens for 'sh_offset', libelf returns it as 0x3028 which is not 64-byte aligned, combining with disassembly, it's likely libelf doesn't respect the alignment for .bss section, therefore, it doesn't return the aligned value for 'sh_offset'. Suggested by Fangrui Song, ELF file contains program header which contains PT_LOAD segments, the fields p_vaddr and p_offset in PT_LOAD segments contain the execution info. A better choice for converting memory address to file address is using the formula: file_address = st_value - p_vaddr + p_offset This patch introduces elf_read_program_header() which returns the program header based on the passed 'st_value', then it uses the formula above to calculate the symbol file address; and the debugging log is updated respectively. After applying the change: # ./perf --debug verbose=4 mem report ... dso__load_sym_internal: adjusting symbol: st_value: 0x40c0 p_vaddr: 0x3d28 p_offset: 0x2d28 symbol__new: buf2 0x30c0-0x3100 ... dso__load_sym_internal: adjusting symbol: st_value: 0x4080 p_vaddr: 0x3d28 p_offset: 0x2d28 symbol__new: buf1 0x3080-0x30c0 ... Fixes: f17e04afaff84b5c ("perf report: Fix ELF symbol parsing") Reported-by: Chang Rui Suggested-by: Fangrui Song Signed-off-by: Leo Yan Acked-by: Namhyung Kim Cc: Alexander Shishkin Cc: Ian Rogers Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Jiri Olsa Cc: Mark Rutland Cc: Peter Zijlstra Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220724060013.171050-2-leo.yan@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- tools/perf/util/symbol-elf.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/perf/util/symbol-elf.c b/tools/perf/util/symbol-elf.c index 2ec0a32da579..0b185b1090ff 100644 --- a/tools/perf/util/symbol-elf.c +++ b/tools/perf/util/symbol-elf.c @@ -230,6 +230,33 @@ Elf_Scn *elf_section_by_name(Elf *elf, GElf_Ehdr *ep, return NULL; } +static int elf_read_program_header(Elf *elf, u64 vaddr, GElf_Phdr *phdr) +{ + size_t i, phdrnum; + u64 sz; + + if (elf_getphdrnum(elf, &phdrnum)) + return -1; + + for (i = 0; i < phdrnum; i++) { + if (gelf_getphdr(elf, i, phdr) == NULL) + return -1; + + if (phdr->p_type != PT_LOAD) + continue; + + sz = max(phdr->p_memsz, phdr->p_filesz); + if (!sz) + continue; + + if (vaddr >= phdr->p_vaddr && (vaddr < phdr->p_vaddr + sz)) + return 0; + } + + /* Not found any valid program header */ + return -1; +} + static bool want_demangle(bool is_kernel_sym) { return is_kernel_sym ? symbol_conf.demangle_kernel : symbol_conf.demangle; @@ -1091,6 +1118,7 @@ int dso__load_sym(struct dso *dso, struct map *map, struct symsrc *syms_ss, sym.st_value); used_opd = true; } + /* * When loading symbols in a data mapping, ABS symbols (which * has a value of SHN_ABS in its st_shndx) failed at @@ -1127,11 +1155,20 @@ int dso__load_sym(struct dso *dso, struct map *map, struct symsrc *syms_ss, goto out_elf_end; } else if ((used_opd && runtime_ss->adjust_symbols) || (!used_opd && syms_ss->adjust_symbols)) { + GElf_Phdr phdr; + + if (elf_read_program_header(syms_ss->elf, + (u64)sym.st_value, &phdr)) { + pr_warning("%s: failed to find program header for " + "symbol: %s st_value: %#" PRIx64 "\n", + __func__, elf_name, (u64)sym.st_value); + continue; + } pr_debug4("%s: adjusting symbol: st_value: %#" PRIx64 " " - "sh_addr: %#" PRIx64 " sh_offset: %#" PRIx64 "\n", __func__, - (u64)sym.st_value, (u64)shdr.sh_addr, - (u64)shdr.sh_offset); - sym.st_value -= shdr.sh_addr - shdr.sh_offset; + "p_vaddr: %#" PRIx64 " p_offset: %#" PRIx64 "\n", + __func__, (u64)sym.st_value, (u64)phdr.p_vaddr, + (u64)phdr.p_offset); + sym.st_value -= phdr.p_vaddr - phdr.p_offset; } demangled = demangle_sym(dso, kmodule, elf_name); From a49282eca8ab3affdb24076487a354a91a041297 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alejandro Lucero Date: Tue, 26 Jul 2022 08:45:04 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 1066/1091] sfc: disable softirqs for ptp TX [ Upstream commit 67c3b611d92fc238c43734878bc3e232ab570c79 ] Sending a PTP packet can imply to use the normal TX driver datapath but invoked from the driver's ptp worker. The kernel generic TX code disables softirqs and preemption before calling specific driver TX code, but the ptp worker does not. Although current ptp driver functionality does not require it, there are several reasons for doing so: 1) The invoked code is always executed with softirqs disabled for non PTP packets. 2) Better if a ptp packet transmission is not interrupted by softirq handling which could lead to high latencies. 3) netdev_xmit_more used by the TX code requires preemption to be disabled. Indeed a solution for dealing with kernel preemption state based on static kernel configuration is not possible since the introduction of dynamic preemption level configuration at boot time using the static calls functionality. Fixes: f79c957a0b537 ("drivers: net: sfc: use netdev_xmit_more helper") Signed-off-by: Alejandro Lucero Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220726064504.49613-1-alejandro.lucero-palau@amd.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/ptp.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/ptp.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/ptp.c index 1fa1b71dbfa1..ed1140ecca60 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/ptp.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/ptp.c @@ -1093,7 +1093,29 @@ static void efx_ptp_xmit_skb_queue(struct efx_nic *efx, struct sk_buff *skb) tx_queue = &ptp_data->channel->tx_queue[type]; if (tx_queue && tx_queue->timestamping) { + /* This code invokes normal driver TX code which is always + * protected from softirqs when called from generic TX code, + * which in turn disables preemption. Look at __dev_queue_xmit + * which uses rcu_read_lock_bh disabling preemption for RCU + * plus disabling softirqs. We do not need RCU reader + * protection here. + * + * Although it is theoretically safe for current PTP TX/RX code + * running without disabling softirqs, there are three good + * reasond for doing so: + * + * 1) The code invoked is mainly implemented for non-PTP + * packets and it is always executed with softirqs + * disabled. + * 2) This being a single PTP packet, better to not + * interrupt its processing by softirqs which can lead + * to high latencies. + * 3) netdev_xmit_more checks preemption is disabled and + * triggers a BUG_ON if not. + */ + local_bh_disable(); efx_enqueue_skb(tx_queue, skb); + local_bh_enable(); } else { WARN_ONCE(1, "PTP channel has no timestamped tx queue\n"); dev_kfree_skb_any(skb); From 8d6dab81ee3d0309c09987ff76164a25486c43e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xin Long Date: Mon, 25 Jul 2022 18:11:06 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 1067/1091] sctp: leave the err path free in sctp_stream_init to sctp_stream_free [ Upstream commit 181d8d2066c000ba0a0e6940a7ad80f1a0e68e9d ] A NULL pointer dereference was reported by Wei Chen: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid+0x26/0x80 Call Trace: sctp_sched_dequeue_common+0x1c/0x90 sctp_sched_prio_dequeue+0x67/0x80 __sctp_outq_teardown+0x299/0x380 sctp_outq_free+0x15/0x20 sctp_association_free+0xc3/0x440 sctp_do_sm+0x1ca7/0x2210 sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x1f6/0x340 This happens when calling sctp_sendmsg without connecting to server first. In this case, a data chunk already queues up in send queue of client side when processing the INIT_ACK from server in sctp_process_init() where it calls sctp_stream_init() to alloc stream_in. If it fails to alloc stream_in all stream_out will be freed in sctp_stream_init's err path. Then in the asoc freeing it will crash when dequeuing this data chunk as stream_out is missing. As we can't free stream out before dequeuing all data from send queue, and this patch is to fix it by moving the err path stream_out/in freeing in sctp_stream_init() to sctp_stream_free() which is eventually called when freeing the asoc in sctp_association_free(). This fix also makes the code in sctp_process_init() more clear. Note that in sctp_association_init() when it fails in sctp_stream_init(), sctp_association_free() will not be called, and in that case it should go to 'stream_free' err path to free stream instead of 'fail_init'. Fixes: 5bbbbe32a431 ("sctp: introduce stream scheduler foundations") Reported-by: Wei Chen Signed-off-by: Xin Long Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/831a3dc100c4908ff76e5bcc363be97f2778bc0b.1658787066.git.lucien.xin@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/sctp/associola.c | 5 ++--- net/sctp/stream.c | 19 +++---------------- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/sctp/associola.c b/net/sctp/associola.c index fb6f62264e87..f960b0e1e552 100644 --- a/net/sctp/associola.c +++ b/net/sctp/associola.c @@ -224,9 +224,8 @@ static struct sctp_association *sctp_association_init( if (!sctp_ulpq_init(&asoc->ulpq, asoc)) goto fail_init; - if (sctp_stream_init(&asoc->stream, asoc->c.sinit_num_ostreams, - 0, gfp)) - goto fail_init; + if (sctp_stream_init(&asoc->stream, asoc->c.sinit_num_ostreams, 0, gfp)) + goto stream_free; /* Initialize default path MTU. */ asoc->pathmtu = sp->pathmtu; diff --git a/net/sctp/stream.c b/net/sctp/stream.c index cd20638b6151..56762745d6e4 100644 --- a/net/sctp/stream.c +++ b/net/sctp/stream.c @@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ int sctp_stream_init(struct sctp_stream *stream, __u16 outcnt, __u16 incnt, ret = sctp_stream_alloc_out(stream, outcnt, gfp); if (ret) - goto out_err; + return ret; for (i = 0; i < stream->outcnt; i++) SCTP_SO(stream, i)->state = SCTP_STREAM_OPEN; @@ -145,22 +145,9 @@ int sctp_stream_init(struct sctp_stream *stream, __u16 outcnt, __u16 incnt, handle_in: sctp_stream_interleave_init(stream); if (!incnt) - goto out; + return 0; - ret = sctp_stream_alloc_in(stream, incnt, gfp); - if (ret) - goto in_err; - - goto out; - -in_err: - sched->free(stream); - genradix_free(&stream->in); -out_err: - genradix_free(&stream->out); - stream->outcnt = 0; -out: - return ret; + return sctp_stream_alloc_in(stream, incnt, gfp); } int sctp_stream_init_ext(struct sctp_stream *stream, __u16 sid) From d5a596c148b3e8b0781060a76fce02284536a715 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Sun, 31 Jul 2022 12:05:51 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 1068/1091] ARM: crypto: comment out gcc warning that breaks clang builds The gcc build warning prevents all clang-built kernels from working properly, so comment it out to fix the build. This is a -stable kernel only patch for now, it will be resolved differently in mainline releases in the future. Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Cc: "Justin M. Forbes" Cc: Ard Biesheuvel Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann Cc: Nicolas Pitre Cc: Nathan Chancellor Cc: Nick Desaulniers Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm/lib/xor-neon.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/lib/xor-neon.c b/arch/arm/lib/xor-neon.c index b99dd8e1c93f..7ba6cf826162 100644 --- a/arch/arm/lib/xor-neon.c +++ b/arch/arm/lib/xor-neon.c @@ -26,8 +26,9 @@ MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); * While older versions of GCC do not generate incorrect code, they fail to * recognize the parallel nature of these functions, and emit plain ARM code, * which is known to be slower than the optimized ARM code in asm-arm/xor.h. + * + * #warning This code requires at least version 4.6 of GCC */ -#warning This code requires at least version 4.6 of GCC #endif #pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wunused-variable" From 85fe8623f061679f332fb45c12e975e81092f973 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wei Mingzhi Date: Sat, 19 Jun 2021 00:08:40 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 1069/1091] mt7601u: add USB device ID for some versions of XiaoDu WiFi Dongle. commit 829eea7c94e0bac804e65975639a2f2e5f147033 upstream. USB device ID of some versions of XiaoDu WiFi Dongle is 2955:1003 instead of 2955:1001. Both are the same mt7601u hardware. Signed-off-by: Wei Mingzhi Acked-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210618160840.305024-1-whistler@member.fsf.org Cc: Yan Xinyu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt7601u/usb.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt7601u/usb.c b/drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt7601u/usb.c index 6bcc4a13ae6c..cc772045d526 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt7601u/usb.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt7601u/usb.c @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id mt7601u_device_table[] = { { USB_DEVICE(0x2717, 0x4106) }, { USB_DEVICE(0x2955, 0x0001) }, { USB_DEVICE(0x2955, 0x1001) }, + { USB_DEVICE(0x2955, 0x1003) }, { USB_DEVICE(0x2a5f, 0x1000) }, { USB_DEVICE(0x7392, 0x7710) }, { 0, } From 0b0088e475870cfc36a0762354bf224d8a1041aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ming Lei Date: Wed, 2 Dec 2020 18:04:19 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 1070/1091] scsi: core: Fix race between handling STS_RESOURCE and completion commit 673235f915318ced5d7ec4b2bfd8cb909e6a4a55 upstream. When queuing I/O request to LLD, STS_RESOURCE may be returned because: - Host is in recovery or blocked - Target queue throttling or target is blocked - LLD rejection In these scenarios BLK_STS_DEV_RESOURCE is returned to the block layer to avoid an unnecessary re-run of the queue. However, all of the requests queued to this SCSI device may complete immediately after reading 'sdev->device_busy' and BLK_STS_DEV_RESOURCE is returned to block layer. In that case the current I/O won't get a chance to get queued since it is invisible at that time for both scsi_run_queue_async() and blk-mq's RESTART. Fix the issue by not returning BLK_STS_DEV_RESOURCE in this situation. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201202100419.525144-1-ming.lei@redhat.com Fixes: 86ff7c2a80cd ("blk-mq: introduce BLK_STS_DEV_RESOURCE") Cc: Hannes Reinecke Cc: Sumit Saxena Cc: Kashyap Desai Cc: Bart Van Assche Cc: Ewan Milne Cc: Long Li Reported-by: John Garry Tested-by: "chenxiang (M)" Signed-off-by: Ming Lei Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c b/drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c index 8e6d7ba95df1..98e363d0025b 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c @@ -1719,8 +1719,7 @@ out_put_budget: case BLK_STS_OK: break; case BLK_STS_RESOURCE: - if (atomic_read(&sdev->device_busy) || - scsi_device_blocked(sdev)) + if (scsi_device_blocked(sdev)) ret = BLK_STS_DEV_RESOURCE; break; default: From 8d8935e76f6f419ef2f7617de252f258b6a597d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Wed, 3 Aug 2022 11:59:42 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 1071/1091] Linux 5.4.209 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220801114128.025615151@linuxfoundation.org Tested-by: Jon Hunter Tested-by: Florian Fainelli Tested-by: Shuah Khan Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing Tested-by: Guenter Roeck Tested-by: Sudip Mukherjee Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Makefile | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index 884a3f314baf..7093e3b03b9f 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 VERSION = 5 PATCHLEVEL = 4 -SUBLEVEL = 208 +SUBLEVEL = 209 EXTRAVERSION = NAME = Kleptomaniac Octopus From cc62c7de3d090c3c94fab89299cabc9ebb97d306 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Amit Pundir Date: Wed, 10 Aug 2022 19:41:02 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 1072/1091] ANDROID: GKI: db845c: Update symbols list and ABI android11-5.4-lts is broken on Dragonboard 845c because of a recently added symbol. So updated the symbols list by running: BUILD_CONFIG=common/build.config.db845c build/build_abi.sh -s And the abi_gki_aarch64 ABI by running: "BUILD_CONFIG=common/build.config.gki.aarch64 \ ABI_DEFINITION=abi_gki_aarch64.xml build/build_abi.sh \ --update --print-report" ======================================================== Leaf changes summary: 1 artifact changed Changed leaf types summary: 0 leaf type changed Removed/Changed/Added functions summary: 0 Removed, 0 Changed, 1 Added function Removed/Changed/Added variables summary: 0 Removed, 0 Changed, 0 Added variable 1 Added function: [A] 'function void refcount_warn_saturate(refcount_struct*, refcount_saturation_type)' ======================================================== Fixes: 0d3182fbe689 ("locking/refcount: Move saturation warnings out of line") Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir Change-Id: Ibd563488f61c14580b8241550a9ebf8428b27c35 --- android/abi_gki_aarch64.xml | 167112 +++++++++++++++--------------- android/abi_gki_aarch64_db845c | 9 +- 2 files changed, 85300 insertions(+), 81821 deletions(-) diff --git a/android/abi_gki_aarch64.xml b/android/abi_gki_aarch64.xml index 93bfcbef1b30..f47608a1721a 100644 --- a/android/abi_gki_aarch64.xml +++ b/android/abi_gki_aarch64.xml @@ -3330,6 +3330,7 @@ + @@ -5021,118 +5022,167 @@ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - + + + - - + + + + + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - + - + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + - + + + + + + + + + + + + + - + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + @@ -5330,19 +5380,53 @@ - + + + + + + + + - + - + - + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + @@ -5435,6 +5519,12 @@ + + + + + + @@ -5445,12 +5535,16 @@ + + + + - + @@ -5495,6 +5589,17 @@ + + + + + + + + + + + @@ -5634,11 +5739,17 @@ + + + + + - + + @@ -5648,7 +5759,11 @@ + + + + @@ -5832,6 +5947,7 @@ + @@ -5840,10 +5956,12 @@ + - + + @@ -6061,7 +6179,7 @@ - + @@ -6084,14 +6202,15 @@ + - + - + @@ -6099,7 +6218,7 @@ - + @@ -6165,11 +6284,6 @@ - - - - - @@ -6237,6 +6351,14 @@ + + + + + + + + @@ -6336,7 +6458,7 @@ - + @@ -6347,6 +6469,7 @@ + @@ -6392,26 +6515,7 @@ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - + @@ -6550,7 +6654,7 @@ - + @@ -6574,6 +6678,17 @@ + + + + + + + + + + + @@ -6619,14 +6734,6 @@ - - - - - - - - @@ -6635,14 +6742,6 @@ - - - - - - - - @@ -6652,9 +6751,8 @@ + - - @@ -6669,20 +6767,7 @@ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - + @@ -6750,6 +6835,17 @@ + + + + + + + + + + + @@ -6827,16 +6923,6 @@ - - - - - - - - - - @@ -6845,8 +6931,7 @@ - - + @@ -7130,7 +7215,7 @@ - + @@ -7138,7 +7223,7 @@ - + @@ -7155,8 +7240,6 @@ - - @@ -8138,8 +8221,6 @@ - - @@ -8147,7 +8228,7 @@ - + @@ -9222,6 +9303,7 @@ + @@ -9242,7 +9324,7 @@ - + @@ -9250,7 +9332,7 @@ - + @@ -9402,7 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@@ - - - - - - - - - + + + + - - + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - + - + - - - - - - - - - - + - + - + - + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - + + - + - + - + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + - + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + @@ -152229,36 +163378,33 @@ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - + + - - - - - - - - - + + + @@ -152266,174 +163412,40 @@ - - - + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 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- - - - - - - - - - - - @@ -154839,1359 +165013,13 @@ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 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- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - @@ -160739,214 +167214,106 @@ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - + + - - - - - - - - - - - + + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - + + + + + - - - + + + + - - - - + + + + - - - - + + + + - - + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - + + @@ -160955,10 +167322,29 @@ - - + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + @@ -160967,167 +167353,36 @@ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - @@ -161135,16 +167390,6 @@ - - - - - - - - - - @@ -161156,26 +167401,14 @@ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - + + + + + @@ -161183,14 +167416,18 @@ + + + + - - - + + + @@ -161198,20 +167435,9 @@ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - + + + @@ -161252,88 +167478,13 @@ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - @@ -161345,623 +167496,7 @@ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 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+ + @@ -187032,10 +190547,25 @@ - - + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + @@ -187051,6 +190581,11 @@ + + + + + @@ -187058,19 +190593,9 @@ - - - - - - - - - - - - - + + + @@ -187078,47 +190603,16 @@ + + + + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - @@ -187455,19 +190949,6 @@ - - - - - - - - - - - - - @@ -187475,6 +190956,20 @@ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + @@ -187483,15 +190978,25 @@ - - - + + + + + + - - - - + + + + + + + + + + + @@ -187502,11 +191007,6 @@ - - - - - @@ -187515,6 +191015,11 @@ + + + + + @@ -187549,52 +191054,34 @@ - - - + + + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + @@ -187610,22 +191097,29 @@ - - - - - - - - - - - + + + + + - - - + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + @@ -187633,6 +191127,26 @@ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + @@ -187643,9 +191157,19 @@ - - - + + + + + + + + + + + + + @@ -187653,38 +191177,16 @@ - - - - - - - - - + + + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - @@ -187717,13 +191219,6 @@ - - - - - - - @@ -187758,18 +191253,10 @@ - - - - - - - - - - - - + + + + @@ -187784,15 +191271,6 @@ - - - - - - - - - @@ -187878,19 +191356,34 @@ - - - + + + - - - + + + - - - + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + @@ -187898,9 +191391,29 @@ - - - + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + @@ -187909,54 +191422,9 @@ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - + + + @@ -187966,20 +191434,23 @@ - - - + + + + + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - @@ -187997,11 +191468,6 @@ - - - - - @@ -188018,6 +191484,8 @@ + + @@ -188026,6 +191494,18 @@ + + + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/android/abi_gki_aarch64_db845c b/android/abi_gki_aarch64_db845c index 898684f65cfe..4d7b436d61b4 100644 --- a/android/abi_gki_aarch64_db845c +++ b/android/abi_gki_aarch64_db845c @@ -227,6 +227,7 @@ ktime_get_mono_fast_ns __list_add_valid __list_del_entry_valid + __local_bh_enable_ip mbox_client_txdone mbox_free_channel mbox_request_channel @@ -366,8 +367,7 @@ _raw_spin_unlock_irq _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore rdev_get_drvdata - refcount_dec_and_test_checked - refcount_inc_checked + refcount_warn_saturate register_reboot_notifier __register_rpmsg_driver regmap_bulk_read @@ -584,7 +584,6 @@ __kfifo_free kmalloc_order_trace ktime_get_with_offset - __local_bh_enable_ip memmove param_ops_ulong pskb_expand_head @@ -1129,8 +1128,9 @@ usb_create_hcd # required by phy-qcom-qmp.ko - of_clk_get_by_name + devm_get_clk_from_child __of_reset_control_get + reset_control_put # required by phy-qcom-qusb2.ko devm_nvmem_cell_get @@ -1307,7 +1307,6 @@ _raw_write_lock_bh _raw_write_unlock_bh refcount_dec_and_mutex_lock - refcount_dec_checked release_sock rtnl_is_locked rtnl_register_module From 828f4c31684da94ecf0b44a2cbd35bbede04f0bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Subbaraman Narayanamurthy Date: Thu, 4 Nov 2021 16:57:07 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 1073/1091] thermal: Fix NULL pointer dereferences in of_thermal_ functions commit 96cfe05051fd8543cdedd6807ec59a0e6c409195 upstream. of_parse_thermal_zones() parses the thermal-zones node and registers a thermal_zone device for each subnode. However, if a thermal zone is consuming a thermal sensor and that thermal sensor device hasn't probed yet, an attempt to set trip_point_*_temp for that thermal zone device can cause a NULL pointer dereference. Fix it. console:/sys/class/thermal/thermal_zone87 # echo 120000 > trip_point_0_temp ... Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000020 ... Call trace: of_thermal_set_trip_temp+0x40/0xc4 trip_point_temp_store+0xc0/0x1dc dev_attr_store+0x38/0x88 sysfs_kf_write+0x64/0xc0 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x108/0x1d0 vfs_write+0x2f4/0x368 ksys_write+0x7c/0xec __arm64_sys_write+0x20/0x30 el0_svc_common.llvm.7279915941325364641+0xbc/0x1bc do_el0_svc+0x28/0xa0 el0_svc+0x14/0x24 el0_sync_handler+0x88/0xec el0_sync+0x1c0/0x200 While at it, fix the possible NULL pointer dereference in other functions as well: of_thermal_get_temp(), of_thermal_set_emul_temp(), of_thermal_get_trend(). Suggested-by: David Collins Signed-off-by: Subbaraman Narayanamurthy Acked-by: Daniel Lezcano Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki Signed-off-by: Mark-PK Tsai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/thermal/of-thermal.c | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/thermal/of-thermal.c b/drivers/thermal/of-thermal.c index 68d0c181ec7b..1f38da5da6e4 100644 --- a/drivers/thermal/of-thermal.c +++ b/drivers/thermal/of-thermal.c @@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ static int of_thermal_get_temp(struct thermal_zone_device *tz, { struct __thermal_zone *data = tz->devdata; - if (!data->ops->get_temp) + if (!data->ops || !data->ops->get_temp) return -EINVAL; return data->ops->get_temp(data->sensor_data, temp); @@ -188,6 +188,9 @@ static int of_thermal_set_emul_temp(struct thermal_zone_device *tz, { struct __thermal_zone *data = tz->devdata; + if (!data->ops || !data->ops->set_emul_temp) + return -EINVAL; + return data->ops->set_emul_temp(data->sensor_data, temp); } @@ -196,7 +199,7 @@ static int of_thermal_get_trend(struct thermal_zone_device *tz, int trip, { struct __thermal_zone *data = tz->devdata; - if (!data->ops->get_trend) + if (!data->ops || !data->ops->get_trend) return -EINVAL; return data->ops->get_trend(data->sensor_data, trip, trend); @@ -336,7 +339,7 @@ static int of_thermal_set_trip_temp(struct thermal_zone_device *tz, int trip, if (trip >= data->ntrips || trip < 0) return -EDOM; - if (data->ops->set_trip_temp) { + if (data->ops && data->ops->set_trip_temp) { int ret; ret = data->ops->set_trip_temp(data->sensor_data, trip, temp); From 8ed6e5c5e23ce3a46b84268c6520773acc6a281a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Werner Sembach Date: Thu, 7 Jul 2022 20:09:52 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 1074/1091] ACPI: video: Force backlight native for some TongFang devices commit c752089f7cf5b5800c6ace4cdd1a8351ee78a598 upstream. The TongFang PF5PU1G, PF4NU1F, PF5NU1G, and PF5LUXG/TUXEDO BA15 Gen10, Pulse 14/15 Gen1, and Pulse 15 Gen2 have the same problem as the Clevo NL5xRU and NL5xNU/TUXEDO Aura 15 Gen1 and Gen2: They have a working native and video interface. However the default detection mechanism first registers the video interface before unregistering it again and switching to the native interface during boot. This results in a dangling SBIOS request for backlight change for some reason, causing the backlight to switch to ~2% once per boot on the first power cord connect or disconnect event. Setting the native interface explicitly circumvents this buggy behaviour by avoiding the unregistering process. Signed-off-by: Werner Sembach Cc: All applicable Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/acpi/video_detect.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 50 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/acpi/video_detect.c b/drivers/acpi/video_detect.c index de4142723ff4..f2bfd335127a 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/video_detect.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/video_detect.c @@ -447,7 +447,56 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id video_detect_dmi_table[] = { DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "NL5xNU"), }, }, - + /* + * The TongFang PF5PU1G, PF4NU1F, PF5NU1G, and PF5LUXG/TUXEDO BA15 Gen10, + * Pulse 14/15 Gen1, and Pulse 15 Gen2 have the same problem as the Clevo + * NL5xRU and NL5xNU/TUXEDO Aura 15 Gen1 and Gen2. See the description + * above. + */ + { + .callback = video_detect_force_native, + .ident = "TongFang PF5PU1G", + .matches = { + DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "PF5PU1G"), + }, + }, + { + .callback = video_detect_force_native, + .ident = "TongFang PF4NU1F", + .matches = { + DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "PF4NU1F"), + }, + }, + { + .callback = video_detect_force_native, + .ident = "TongFang PF4NU1F", + .matches = { + DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "TUXEDO"), + DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "PULSE1401"), + }, + }, + { + .callback = video_detect_force_native, + .ident = "TongFang PF5NU1G", + .matches = { + DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "PF5NU1G"), + }, + }, + { + .callback = video_detect_force_native, + .ident = "TongFang PF5NU1G", + .matches = { + DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "TUXEDO"), + DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "PULSE1501"), + }, + }, + { + .callback = video_detect_force_native, + .ident = "TongFang PF5LUXG", + .matches = { + DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "PF5LUXG"), + }, + }, /* * Desktops which falsely report a backlight and which our heuristics * for this do not catch. From fa829bd4af43ac4a36fbaa38c871bf4e8c22d000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Werner Sembach Date: Thu, 7 Jul 2022 20:09:53 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 1075/1091] ACPI: video: Shortening quirk list by identifying Clevo by board_name only commit f0341e67b3782603737f7788e71bd3530012a4f4 upstream. Taking a recent change in the i8042 quirklist to this one: Clevo board_names are somewhat unique, and if not: The generic Board_-/Sys_Vendor string "Notebook" doesn't help much anyway. So identifying the devices just by the board_name helps keeping the list significantly shorter and might even hit more devices requiring the fix. Signed-off-by: Werner Sembach Fixes: c844d22fe0c0 ("ACPI: video: Force backlight native for Clevo NL5xRU and NL5xNU") Cc: All applicable Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/acpi/video_detect.c | 34 ---------------------------------- 1 file changed, 34 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/acpi/video_detect.c b/drivers/acpi/video_detect.c index f2bfd335127a..3b972ca53689 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/video_detect.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/video_detect.c @@ -387,23 +387,6 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id video_detect_dmi_table[] = { .callback = video_detect_force_native, .ident = "Clevo NL5xRU", .matches = { - DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "TUXEDO"), - DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "NL5xRU"), - }, - }, - { - .callback = video_detect_force_native, - .ident = "Clevo NL5xRU", - .matches = { - DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "SchenkerTechnologiesGmbH"), - DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "NL5xRU"), - }, - }, - { - .callback = video_detect_force_native, - .ident = "Clevo NL5xRU", - .matches = { - DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "Notebook"), DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "NL5xRU"), }, }, @@ -427,23 +410,6 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id video_detect_dmi_table[] = { .callback = video_detect_force_native, .ident = "Clevo NL5xNU", .matches = { - DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "TUXEDO"), - DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "NL5xNU"), - }, - }, - { - .callback = video_detect_force_native, - .ident = "Clevo NL5xNU", - .matches = { - DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "SchenkerTechnologiesGmbH"), - DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "NL5xNU"), - }, - }, - { - .callback = video_detect_force_native, - .ident = "Clevo NL5xNU", - .matches = { - DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "Notebook"), DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "NL5xNU"), }, }, From a8ba72bbeda5fb6b50b17faab6d15fa373132355 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tony Luck Date: Wed, 22 Jun 2022 10:09:06 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 1076/1091] ACPI: APEI: Better fix to avoid spamming the console with old error logs commit c3481b6b75b4797657838f44028fd28226ab48e0 upstream. The fix in commit 3f8dec116210 ("ACPI/APEI: Limit printable size of BERT table data") does not work as intended on systems where the BIOS has a fixed size block of memory for the BERT table, relying on s/w to quit when it finds a record with estatus->block_status == 0. On these systems all errors are suppressed because the check: if (region_len < ACPI_BERT_PRINT_MAX_LEN) always fails. New scheme skips individual CPER records that are too large, and also limits the total number of records that will be printed to 5. Fixes: 3f8dec116210 ("ACPI/APEI: Limit printable size of BERT table data") Cc: All applicable Signed-off-by: Tony Luck Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/acpi/apei/bert.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/acpi/apei/bert.c b/drivers/acpi/apei/bert.c index 76b7539a37a9..a06f35528c9a 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/apei/bert.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/apei/bert.c @@ -29,16 +29,26 @@ #undef pr_fmt #define pr_fmt(fmt) "BERT: " fmt + +#define ACPI_BERT_PRINT_MAX_RECORDS 5 #define ACPI_BERT_PRINT_MAX_LEN 1024 static int bert_disable; +/* + * Print "all" the error records in the BERT table, but avoid huge spam to + * the console if the BIOS included oversize records, or too many records. + * Skipping some records here does not lose anything because the full + * data is available to user tools in: + * /sys/firmware/acpi/tables/data/BERT + */ static void __init bert_print_all(struct acpi_bert_region *region, unsigned int region_len) { struct acpi_hest_generic_status *estatus = (struct acpi_hest_generic_status *)region; int remain = region_len; + int printed = 0, skipped = 0; u32 estatus_len; while (remain >= sizeof(struct acpi_bert_region)) { @@ -46,24 +56,26 @@ static void __init bert_print_all(struct acpi_bert_region *region, if (remain < estatus_len) { pr_err(FW_BUG "Truncated status block (length: %u).\n", estatus_len); - return; + break; } /* No more error records. */ if (!estatus->block_status) - return; + break; if (cper_estatus_check(estatus)) { pr_err(FW_BUG "Invalid error record.\n"); - return; + break; } - pr_info_once("Error records from previous boot:\n"); - if (region_len < ACPI_BERT_PRINT_MAX_LEN) + if (estatus_len < ACPI_BERT_PRINT_MAX_LEN && + printed < ACPI_BERT_PRINT_MAX_RECORDS) { + pr_info_once("Error records from previous boot:\n"); cper_estatus_print(KERN_INFO HW_ERR, estatus); - else - pr_info_once("Max print length exceeded, table data is available at:\n" - "/sys/firmware/acpi/tables/data/BERT"); + printed++; + } else { + skipped++; + } /* * Because the boot error source is "one-time polled" type, @@ -75,6 +87,9 @@ static void __init bert_print_all(struct acpi_bert_region *region, estatus = (void *)estatus + estatus_len; remain -= estatus_len; } + + if (skipped) + pr_info(HW_ERR "Skipped %d error records\n", skipped); } static int __init setup_bert_disable(char *str) From 7c1134c7da997523e2834dd516e2ddc51920699a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: John Fastabend Date: Wed, 3 Aug 2022 17:50:01 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 1077/1091] bpf: Verifer, adjust_scalar_min_max_vals to always call update_reg_bounds() commit 294f2fc6da27620a506e6c050241655459ccd6bd upstream. Currently, for all op verification we call __red_deduce_bounds() and __red_bound_offset() but we only call __update_reg_bounds() in bitwise ops. However, we could benefit from calling __update_reg_bounds() in BPF_ADD, BPF_SUB, and BPF_MUL cases as well. For example, a register with state 'R1_w=invP0' when we subtract from it, w1 -= 2 Before coerce we will now have an smin_value=S64_MIN, smax_value=U64_MAX and unsigned bounds umin_value=0, umax_value=U64_MAX. These will then be clamped to S32_MIN, U32_MAX values by coerce in the case of alu32 op as done in above example. However tnum will be a constant because the ALU op is done on a constant. Without update_reg_bounds() we have a scenario where tnum is a const but our unsigned bounds do not reflect this. By calling update_reg_bounds after coerce to 32bit we further refine the umin_value to U64_MAX in the alu64 case or U32_MAX in the alu32 case above. Signed-off-by: John Fastabend Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/158507151689.15666.566796274289413203.stgit@john-Precision-5820-Tower Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 34262d83dce1..f705d3752fe0 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -5083,6 +5083,7 @@ static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, coerce_reg_to_size(dst_reg, 4); } + __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); __reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg); __reg_bound_offset(dst_reg); return 0; From 751f05bc6f955ae3f9aa0385cf2a9a01d21117e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jakub Sitnicki Date: Wed, 3 Aug 2022 17:50:02 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 1078/1091] selftests/bpf: Extend verifier and bpf_sock tests for dst_port loads commit 8f50f16ff39dd4e2d43d1548ca66925652f8aff7 upstream. Add coverage to the verifier tests and tests for reading bpf_sock fields to ensure that 32-bit, 16-bit, and 8-bit loads from dst_port field are allowed only at intended offsets and produce expected values. While 16-bit and 8-bit access to dst_port field is straight-forward, 32-bit wide loads need be allowed and produce a zero-padded 16-bit value for backward compatibility. Signed-off-by: Jakub Sitnicki Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220130115518.213259-3-jakub@cloudflare.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov [OP: backport to 5.4: cherry-pick verifier changes only] Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 3 +- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/sock.c | 81 ++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h index 0bfad86ec960..cb0631098f91 100644 --- a/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h +++ b/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h @@ -3068,7 +3068,8 @@ struct bpf_sock { __u32 src_ip4; __u32 src_ip6[4]; __u32 src_port; /* host byte order */ - __u32 dst_port; /* network byte order */ + __be16 dst_port; /* network byte order */ + __u16 :16; /* zero padding */ __u32 dst_ip4; __u32 dst_ip6[4]; __u32 state; diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/sock.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/sock.c index 9ed192e14f5f..b2ce50bb935b 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/sock.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/sock.c @@ -121,7 +121,25 @@ .result = ACCEPT, }, { - "sk_fullsock(skb->sk): sk->dst_port [narrow load]", + "sk_fullsock(skb->sk): sk->dst_port [word load] (backward compatibility)", + .insns = { + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_1, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, sk)), + BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_1, 0, 2), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_sk_fullsock), + BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 2), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, offsetof(struct bpf_sock, dst_port)), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + }, + .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB, + .result = ACCEPT, +}, +{ + "sk_fullsock(skb->sk): sk->dst_port [half load]", .insns = { BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_1, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, sk)), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_1, 0, 2), @@ -139,7 +157,7 @@ .result = ACCEPT, }, { - "sk_fullsock(skb->sk): sk->dst_port [load 2nd byte]", + "sk_fullsock(skb->sk): sk->dst_port [half load] (invalid)", .insns = { BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_1, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, sk)), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_1, 0, 2), @@ -149,7 +167,64 @@ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 2), BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), - BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, offsetof(struct bpf_sock, dst_port) + 1), + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_H, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, offsetof(struct bpf_sock, dst_port) + 2), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + }, + .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB, + .result = REJECT, + .errstr = "invalid sock access", +}, +{ + "sk_fullsock(skb->sk): sk->dst_port [byte load]", + .insns = { + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_1, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, sk)), + BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_1, 0, 2), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_sk_fullsock), + BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 2), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_0, offsetof(struct bpf_sock, dst_port)), + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_0, offsetof(struct bpf_sock, dst_port) + 1), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + }, + .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB, + .result = ACCEPT, +}, +{ + "sk_fullsock(skb->sk): sk->dst_port [byte load] (invalid)", + .insns = { + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_1, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, sk)), + BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_1, 0, 2), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_sk_fullsock), + BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 2), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, offsetof(struct bpf_sock, dst_port) + 2), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + }, + .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB, + .result = REJECT, + .errstr = "invalid sock access", +}, +{ + "sk_fullsock(skb->sk): past sk->dst_port [half load] (invalid)", + .insns = { + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_1, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, sk)), + BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_1, 0, 2), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_sk_fullsock), + BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 2), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_H, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, offsetofend(struct bpf_sock, dst_port)), BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), }, From 9d6f67365d9cdb389fbdac2bb5b00e59e345930e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: John Fastabend Date: Wed, 3 Aug 2022 17:50:03 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 1079/1091] bpf: Test_verifier, #70 error message updates for 32-bit right shift commit aa131ed44ae1d76637f0dbec33cfcf9115af9bc3 upstream. After changes to add update_reg_bounds after ALU ops and adding ALU32 bounds tracking the error message is changed in the 32-bit right shift tests. Test "#70/u bounds check after 32-bit right shift with 64-bit input FAIL" now fails with, Unexpected error message! EXP: R0 invalid mem access RES: func#0 @0 7: (b7) r1 = 2 8: R0_w=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=8,vs=8,imm=0) R1_w=invP2 R10=fp0 fp-8_w=mmmmmmmm 8: (67) r1 <<= 31 9: R0_w=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=8,vs=8,imm=0) R1_w=invP4294967296 R10=fp0 fp-8_w=mmmmmmmm 9: (74) w1 >>= 31 10: R0_w=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=8,vs=8,imm=0) R1_w=invP0 R10=fp0 fp-8_w=mmmmmmmm 10: (14) w1 -= 2 11: R0_w=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=8,vs=8,imm=0) R1_w=invP4294967294 R10=fp0 fp-8_w=mmmmmmmm 11: (0f) r0 += r1 math between map_value pointer and 4294967294 is not allowed And test "#70/p bounds check after 32-bit right shift with 64-bit input FAIL" now fails with, Unexpected error message! EXP: R0 invalid mem access RES: func#0 @0 7: (b7) r1 = 2 8: R0_w=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=8,vs=8,imm=0) R1_w=inv2 R10=fp0 fp-8_w=mmmmmmmm 8: (67) r1 <<= 31 9: R0_w=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=8,vs=8,imm=0) R1_w=inv4294967296 R10=fp0 fp-8_w=mmmmmmmm 9: (74) w1 >>= 31 10: R0_w=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=8,vs=8,imm=0) R1_w=inv0 R10=fp0 fp-8_w=mmmmmmmm 10: (14) w1 -= 2 11: R0_w=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=8,vs=8,imm=0) R1_w=inv4294967294 R10=fp0 fp-8_w=mmmmmmmm 11: (0f) r0 += r1 last_idx 11 first_idx 0 regs=2 stack=0 before 10: (14) w1 -= 2 regs=2 stack=0 before 9: (74) w1 >>= 31 regs=2 stack=0 before 8: (67) r1 <<= 31 regs=2 stack=0 before 7: (b7) r1 = 2 math between map_value pointer and 4294967294 is not allowed Before this series we did not trip the "math between map_value pointer..." error because check_reg_sane_offset is never called in adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(). Instead we have a register state that looks like this at line 11*, 11: R0_w=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=8,vs=8, smin_value=0,smax_value=0, umin_value=0,umax_value=0, var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) R1_w=invP(id=0, smin_value=0,smax_value=4294967295, umin_value=0,umax_value=4294967295, var_off=(0xfffffffe; 0x0)) R10=fp(id=0,off=0, smin_value=0,smax_value=0, umin_value=0,umax_value=0, var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) fp-8_w=mmmmmmmm 11: (0f) r0 += r1 In R1 'smin_val != smax_val' yet we have a tnum_const as seen by 'var_off(0xfffffffe; 0x0))' with a 0x0 mask. So we hit this check in adjust_ptr_min_max_vals() if ((known && (smin_val != smax_val || umin_val != umax_val)) || smin_val > smax_val || umin_val > umax_val) { /* Taint dst register if offset had invalid bounds derived from * e.g. dead branches. */ __mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg); return 0; } So we don't throw an error here and instead only throw an error later in the verification when the memory access is made. The root cause in verifier without alu32 bounds tracking is having 'umin_value = 0' and 'umax_value = U64_MAX' from BPF_SUB which we set when 'umin_value < umax_val' here, if (dst_reg->umin_value < umax_val) { /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ dst_reg->umin_value = 0; dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; } else { ...} Later in adjust_calar_min_max_vals we previously did a coerce_reg_to_size() which will clamp the U64_MAX to U32_MAX by truncating to 32bits. But either way without a call to update_reg_bounds the less precise bounds tracking will fall out of the alu op verification. After latest changes we now exit adjust_scalar_min_max_vals with the more precise umin value, due to zero extension propogating bounds from alu32 bounds into alu64 bounds and then calling update_reg_bounds. This then causes the verifier to trigger an earlier error and we get the error in the output above. This patch updates tests to reflect new error message. * I have a local patch to print entire verifier state regardless if we believe it is a constant so we can get a full picture of the state. Usually if tnum_is_const() then bounds are also smin=smax, etc. but this is not always true and is a bit subtle. Being able to see these states helps understand dataflow imo. Let me know if we want something similar upstream. Signed-off-by: John Fastabend Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/158507161475.15666.3061518385241144063.stgit@john-Precision-5820-Tower Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/bounds.c | 6 ++---- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/bounds.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/bounds.c index 92c02e4a1b62..313b345eddcc 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/bounds.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/bounds.c @@ -411,16 +411,14 @@ BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_RSH, BPF_REG_1, 31), /* r1 = 0xffff'fffe (NOT 0!) */ BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_1, 2), - /* computes OOB pointer */ + /* error on computing OOB pointer */ BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1), - /* OOB access */ - BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, 0), /* exit */ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), }, .fixup_map_hash_8b = { 3 }, - .errstr = "R0 invalid mem access", + .errstr = "math between map_value pointer and 4294967294 is not allowed", .result = REJECT, }, { From 6a9b3f0f3bad4ca6421f8c20e1dde9839699db0f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stanislav Fomichev Date: Wed, 3 Aug 2022 17:50:04 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 1080/1091] selftests/bpf: Fix test_align verifier log patterns commit 5366d2269139ba8eb6a906d73a0819947e3e4e0a upstream. Commit 294f2fc6da27 ("bpf: Verifer, adjust_scalar_min_max_vals to always call update_reg_bounds()") changed the way verifier logs some of its state, adjust the test_align accordingly. Where possible, I tried to not copy-paste the entire log line and resorted to dropping the last closing brace instead. Fixes: 294f2fc6da27 ("bpf: Verifer, adjust_scalar_min_max_vals to always call update_reg_bounds()") Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200515194904.229296-1-sdf@google.com Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_align.c | 41 ++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_align.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_align.c index 0262f7b374f9..c9c9bdce9d6d 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_align.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_align.c @@ -359,15 +359,15 @@ static struct bpf_align_test tests[] = { * is still (4n), fixed offset is not changed. * Also, we create a new reg->id. */ - {29, "R5_w=pkt(id=4,off=18,r=0,umax_value=2040,var_off=(0x0; 0x7fc))"}, + {29, "R5_w=pkt(id=4,off=18,r=0,umax_value=2040,var_off=(0x0; 0x7fc)"}, /* At the time the word size load is performed from R5, * its total fixed offset is NET_IP_ALIGN + reg->off (18) * which is 20. Then the variable offset is (4n), so * the total offset is 4-byte aligned and meets the * load's requirements. */ - {33, "R4=pkt(id=4,off=22,r=22,umax_value=2040,var_off=(0x0; 0x7fc))"}, - {33, "R5=pkt(id=4,off=18,r=22,umax_value=2040,var_off=(0x0; 0x7fc))"}, + {33, "R4=pkt(id=4,off=22,r=22,umax_value=2040,var_off=(0x0; 0x7fc)"}, + {33, "R5=pkt(id=4,off=18,r=22,umax_value=2040,var_off=(0x0; 0x7fc)"}, }, }, { @@ -410,15 +410,15 @@ static struct bpf_align_test tests[] = { /* Adding 14 makes R6 be (4n+2) */ {9, "R6_w=inv(id=0,umin_value=14,umax_value=1034,var_off=(0x2; 0x7fc))"}, /* Packet pointer has (4n+2) offset */ - {11, "R5_w=pkt(id=1,off=0,r=0,umin_value=14,umax_value=1034,var_off=(0x2; 0x7fc))"}, - {13, "R4=pkt(id=1,off=4,r=0,umin_value=14,umax_value=1034,var_off=(0x2; 0x7fc))"}, + {11, "R5_w=pkt(id=1,off=0,r=0,umin_value=14,umax_value=1034,var_off=(0x2; 0x7fc)"}, + {13, "R4=pkt(id=1,off=4,r=0,umin_value=14,umax_value=1034,var_off=(0x2; 0x7fc)"}, /* At the time the word size load is performed from R5, * its total fixed offset is NET_IP_ALIGN + reg->off (0) * which is 2. Then the variable offset is (4n+2), so * the total offset is 4-byte aligned and meets the * load's requirements. */ - {15, "R5=pkt(id=1,off=0,r=4,umin_value=14,umax_value=1034,var_off=(0x2; 0x7fc))"}, + {15, "R5=pkt(id=1,off=0,r=4,umin_value=14,umax_value=1034,var_off=(0x2; 0x7fc)"}, /* Newly read value in R6 was shifted left by 2, so has * known alignment of 4. */ @@ -426,15 +426,15 @@ static struct bpf_align_test tests[] = { /* Added (4n) to packet pointer's (4n+2) var_off, giving * another (4n+2). */ - {19, "R5_w=pkt(id=2,off=0,r=0,umin_value=14,umax_value=2054,var_off=(0x2; 0xffc))"}, - {21, "R4=pkt(id=2,off=4,r=0,umin_value=14,umax_value=2054,var_off=(0x2; 0xffc))"}, + {19, "R5_w=pkt(id=2,off=0,r=0,umin_value=14,umax_value=2054,var_off=(0x2; 0xffc)"}, + {21, "R4=pkt(id=2,off=4,r=0,umin_value=14,umax_value=2054,var_off=(0x2; 0xffc)"}, /* At the time the word size load is performed from R5, * its total fixed offset is NET_IP_ALIGN + reg->off (0) * which is 2. Then the variable offset is (4n+2), so * the total offset is 4-byte aligned and meets the * load's requirements. */ - {23, "R5=pkt(id=2,off=0,r=4,umin_value=14,umax_value=2054,var_off=(0x2; 0xffc))"}, + {23, "R5=pkt(id=2,off=0,r=4,umin_value=14,umax_value=2054,var_off=(0x2; 0xffc)"}, }, }, { @@ -469,16 +469,16 @@ static struct bpf_align_test tests[] = { .matches = { {4, "R5_w=pkt_end(id=0,off=0,imm=0)"}, /* (ptr - ptr) << 2 == unknown, (4n) */ - {6, "R5_w=inv(id=0,smax_value=9223372036854775804,umax_value=18446744073709551612,var_off=(0x0; 0xfffffffffffffffc))"}, + {6, "R5_w=inv(id=0,smax_value=9223372036854775804,umax_value=18446744073709551612,var_off=(0x0; 0xfffffffffffffffc)"}, /* (4n) + 14 == (4n+2). We blow our bounds, because * the add could overflow. */ - {7, "R5_w=inv(id=0,var_off=(0x2; 0xfffffffffffffffc))"}, + {7, "R5_w=inv(id=0,smin_value=-9223372036854775806,smax_value=9223372036854775806,umin_value=2,umax_value=18446744073709551614,var_off=(0x2; 0xfffffffffffffffc)"}, /* Checked s>=0 */ - {9, "R5=inv(id=0,umin_value=2,umax_value=9223372036854775806,var_off=(0x2; 0x7ffffffffffffffc))"}, + {9, "R5=inv(id=0,umin_value=2,umax_value=9223372034707292158,var_off=(0x2; 0x7fffffff7ffffffc)"}, /* packet pointer + nonnegative (4n+2) */ - {11, "R6_w=pkt(id=1,off=0,r=0,umin_value=2,umax_value=9223372036854775806,var_off=(0x2; 0x7ffffffffffffffc))"}, - {13, "R4_w=pkt(id=1,off=4,r=0,umin_value=2,umax_value=9223372036854775806,var_off=(0x2; 0x7ffffffffffffffc))"}, + {11, "R6_w=pkt(id=1,off=0,r=0,umin_value=2,umax_value=9223372034707292158,var_off=(0x2; 0x7fffffff7ffffffc)"}, + {13, "R4_w=pkt(id=1,off=4,r=0,umin_value=2,umax_value=9223372034707292158,var_off=(0x2; 0x7fffffff7ffffffc)"}, /* NET_IP_ALIGN + (4n+2) == (4n), alignment is fine. * We checked the bounds, but it might have been able * to overflow if the packet pointer started in the @@ -486,7 +486,7 @@ static struct bpf_align_test tests[] = { * So we did not get a 'range' on R6, and the access * attempt will fail. */ - {15, "R6_w=pkt(id=1,off=0,r=0,umin_value=2,umax_value=9223372036854775806,var_off=(0x2; 0x7ffffffffffffffc))"}, + {15, "R6_w=pkt(id=1,off=0,r=0,umin_value=2,umax_value=9223372034707292158,var_off=(0x2; 0x7fffffff7ffffffc)"}, } }, { @@ -528,7 +528,7 @@ static struct bpf_align_test tests[] = { /* New unknown value in R7 is (4n) */ {11, "R7_w=inv(id=0,umax_value=1020,var_off=(0x0; 0x3fc))"}, /* Subtracting it from R6 blows our unsigned bounds */ - {12, "R6=inv(id=0,smin_value=-1006,smax_value=1034,var_off=(0x2; 0xfffffffffffffffc))"}, + {12, "R6=inv(id=0,smin_value=-1006,smax_value=1034,umin_value=2,umax_value=18446744073709551614,var_off=(0x2; 0xfffffffffffffffc)"}, /* Checked s>= 0 */ {14, "R6=inv(id=0,umin_value=2,umax_value=1034,var_off=(0x2; 0x7fc))"}, /* At the time the word size load is performed from R5, @@ -537,7 +537,8 @@ static struct bpf_align_test tests[] = { * the total offset is 4-byte aligned and meets the * load's requirements. */ - {20, "R5=pkt(id=1,off=0,r=4,umin_value=2,umax_value=1034,var_off=(0x2; 0x7fc))"}, + {20, "R5=pkt(id=1,off=0,r=4,umin_value=2,umax_value=1034,var_off=(0x2; 0x7fc)"}, + }, }, { @@ -579,18 +580,18 @@ static struct bpf_align_test tests[] = { /* Adding 14 makes R6 be (4n+2) */ {11, "R6_w=inv(id=0,umin_value=14,umax_value=74,var_off=(0x2; 0x7c))"}, /* Subtracting from packet pointer overflows ubounds */ - {13, "R5_w=pkt(id=1,off=0,r=8,umin_value=18446744073709551542,umax_value=18446744073709551602,var_off=(0xffffffffffffff82; 0x7c))"}, + {13, "R5_w=pkt(id=1,off=0,r=8,umin_value=18446744073709551542,umax_value=18446744073709551602,var_off=(0xffffffffffffff82; 0x7c)"}, /* New unknown value in R7 is (4n), >= 76 */ {15, "R7_w=inv(id=0,umin_value=76,umax_value=1096,var_off=(0x0; 0x7fc))"}, /* Adding it to packet pointer gives nice bounds again */ - {16, "R5_w=pkt(id=2,off=0,r=0,umin_value=2,umax_value=1082,var_off=(0x2; 0x7fc))"}, + {16, "R5_w=pkt(id=2,off=0,r=0,umin_value=2,umax_value=1082,var_off=(0x2; 0xfffffffc)"}, /* At the time the word size load is performed from R5, * its total fixed offset is NET_IP_ALIGN + reg->off (0) * which is 2. Then the variable offset is (4n+2), so * the total offset is 4-byte aligned and meets the * load's requirements. */ - {20, "R5=pkt(id=2,off=0,r=4,umin_value=2,umax_value=1082,var_off=(0x2; 0x7fc))"}, + {20, "R5=pkt(id=2,off=0,r=4,umin_value=2,umax_value=1082,var_off=(0x2; 0xfffffffc)"}, }, }, }; From 6098562ed9df1babcc0ba5b89c4fb47715ba3f72 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jean-Philippe Brucker Date: Wed, 3 Aug 2022 17:50:05 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 1081/1091] selftests/bpf: Fix "dubious pointer arithmetic" test commit 3615bdf6d9b19db12b1589861609b4f1c6a8d303 upstream. The verifier trace changed following a bugfix. After checking the 64-bit sign, only the upper bit mask is known, not bit 31. Update the test accordingly. Signed-off-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker Acked-by: John Fastabend Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_align.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_align.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_align.c index c9c9bdce9d6d..4b9a26caa2c2 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_align.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_align.c @@ -475,10 +475,10 @@ static struct bpf_align_test tests[] = { */ {7, "R5_w=inv(id=0,smin_value=-9223372036854775806,smax_value=9223372036854775806,umin_value=2,umax_value=18446744073709551614,var_off=(0x2; 0xfffffffffffffffc)"}, /* Checked s>=0 */ - {9, "R5=inv(id=0,umin_value=2,umax_value=9223372034707292158,var_off=(0x2; 0x7fffffff7ffffffc)"}, + {9, "R5=inv(id=0,umin_value=2,umax_value=9223372036854775806,var_off=(0x2; 0x7ffffffffffffffc)"}, /* packet pointer + nonnegative (4n+2) */ - {11, "R6_w=pkt(id=1,off=0,r=0,umin_value=2,umax_value=9223372034707292158,var_off=(0x2; 0x7fffffff7ffffffc)"}, - {13, "R4_w=pkt(id=1,off=4,r=0,umin_value=2,umax_value=9223372034707292158,var_off=(0x2; 0x7fffffff7ffffffc)"}, + {11, "R6_w=pkt(id=1,off=0,r=0,umin_value=2,umax_value=9223372036854775806,var_off=(0x2; 0x7ffffffffffffffc)"}, + {13, "R4_w=pkt(id=1,off=4,r=0,umin_value=2,umax_value=9223372036854775806,var_off=(0x2; 0x7ffffffffffffffc)"}, /* NET_IP_ALIGN + (4n+2) == (4n), alignment is fine. * We checked the bounds, but it might have been able * to overflow if the packet pointer started in the @@ -486,7 +486,7 @@ static struct bpf_align_test tests[] = { * So we did not get a 'range' on R6, and the access * attempt will fail. */ - {15, "R6_w=pkt(id=1,off=0,r=0,umin_value=2,umax_value=9223372034707292158,var_off=(0x2; 0x7fffffff7ffffffc)"}, + {15, "R6_w=pkt(id=1,off=0,r=0,umin_value=2,umax_value=9223372036854775806,var_off=(0x2; 0x7ffffffffffffffc)"}, } }, { From 170465715a60cbb7876e6b961b21bd3225469da8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexey Kardashevskiy Date: Wed, 1 Jun 2022 03:43:28 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 1082/1091] KVM: Don't null dereference ops->destroy [ Upstream commit e8bc2427018826e02add7b0ed0fc625a60390ae5 ] A KVM device cleanup happens in either of two callbacks: 1) destroy() which is called when the VM is being destroyed; 2) release() which is called when a device fd is closed. Most KVM devices use 1) but Book3s's interrupt controller KVM devices (XICS, XIVE, XIVE-native) use 2) as they need to close and reopen during the machine execution. The error handling in kvm_ioctl_create_device() assumes destroy() is always defined which leads to NULL dereference as discovered by Syzkaller. This adds a checks for destroy!=NULL and adds a missing release(). This is not changing kvm_destroy_devices() as devices with defined release() should have been removed from the KVM devices list by then. Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c index 287444e52ccf..4b445dddb798 100644 --- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c @@ -3329,8 +3329,11 @@ static int kvm_ioctl_create_device(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_put_kvm(kvm); mutex_lock(&kvm->lock); list_del(&dev->vm_node); + if (ops->release) + ops->release(dev); mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock); - ops->destroy(dev); + if (ops->destroy) + ops->destroy(dev); return ret; } From 17c2356e467f1382addc5522dc02073d2326bc3b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Raghavendra Rao Ananta Date: Wed, 15 Jun 2022 18:57:06 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 1083/1091] selftests: KVM: Handle compiler optimizations in ucall [ Upstream commit 9e2f6498efbbc880d7caa7935839e682b64fe5a6 ] The selftests, when built with newer versions of clang, is found to have over optimized guests' ucall() function, and eliminating the stores for uc.cmd (perhaps due to no immediate readers). This resulted in the userspace side always reading a value of '0', and causing multiple test failures. As a result, prevent the compiler from optimizing the stores in ucall() with WRITE_ONCE(). Suggested-by: Ricardo Koller Suggested-by: Reiji Watanabe Signed-off-by: Raghavendra Rao Ananta Message-Id: <20220615185706.1099208-1-rananta@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/aarch64/ucall.c | 9 ++++----- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/aarch64/ucall.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/aarch64/ucall.c index 6cd91970fbad..3b2a426070c4 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/aarch64/ucall.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/aarch64/ucall.c @@ -73,20 +73,19 @@ void ucall_uninit(struct kvm_vm *vm) void ucall(uint64_t cmd, int nargs, ...) { - struct ucall uc = { - .cmd = cmd, - }; + struct ucall uc = {}; va_list va; int i; + WRITE_ONCE(uc.cmd, cmd); nargs = nargs <= UCALL_MAX_ARGS ? nargs : UCALL_MAX_ARGS; va_start(va, nargs); for (i = 0; i < nargs; ++i) - uc.args[i] = va_arg(va, uint64_t); + WRITE_ONCE(uc.args[i], va_arg(va, uint64_t)); va_end(va); - *ucall_exit_mmio_addr = (vm_vaddr_t)&uc; + WRITE_ONCE(*ucall_exit_mmio_addr, (vm_vaddr_t)&uc); } uint64_t get_ucall(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t vcpu_id, struct ucall *uc) From 54e1abbe856020522a7952140c26a4426f01dab6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chen-Yu Tsai Date: Thu, 9 Dec 2021 17:38:03 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 1084/1091] media: v4l2-mem2mem: Apply DST_QUEUE_OFF_BASE on MMAP buffers across ioctls commit 8310ca94075e784bbb06593cd6c068ee6b6e4ca6 upstream. DST_QUEUE_OFF_BASE is applied to offset/mem_offset on MMAP capture buffers only for the VIDIOC_QUERYBUF ioctl, while the userspace fields (including offset/mem_offset) are filled in for VIDIOC_{QUERY,PREPARE,Q,DQ}BUF ioctls. This leads to differences in the values presented to userspace. If userspace attempts to mmap the capture buffer directly using values from DQBUF, it will fail. Move the code that applies the magic offset into a helper, and call that helper from all four ioctl entry points. [hverkuil: drop unnecessary '= 0' in v4l2_m2m_querybuf() for ret] Fixes: 7f98639def42 ("V4L/DVB: add memory-to-memory device helper framework for videobuf") Fixes: 908a0d7c588e ("[media] v4l: mem2mem: port to videobuf2") Signed-off-by: Chen-Yu Tsai Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab [OP: backport to 5.4: adjusted return logic in v4l2_m2m_qbuf() to match the logic in the original commit: call v4l2_m2m_adjust_mem_offset() only if !ret and before the v4l2_m2m_try_schedule() call] Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-mem2mem.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-mem2mem.c b/drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-mem2mem.c index 639dc8d45e60..d56837c04a81 100644 --- a/drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-mem2mem.c +++ b/drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-mem2mem.c @@ -460,19 +460,14 @@ int v4l2_m2m_reqbufs(struct file *file, struct v4l2_m2m_ctx *m2m_ctx, } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(v4l2_m2m_reqbufs); -int v4l2_m2m_querybuf(struct file *file, struct v4l2_m2m_ctx *m2m_ctx, - struct v4l2_buffer *buf) +static void v4l2_m2m_adjust_mem_offset(struct vb2_queue *vq, + struct v4l2_buffer *buf) { - struct vb2_queue *vq; - int ret = 0; - unsigned int i; - - vq = v4l2_m2m_get_vq(m2m_ctx, buf->type); - ret = vb2_querybuf(vq, buf); - /* Adjust MMAP memory offsets for the CAPTURE queue */ if (buf->memory == V4L2_MEMORY_MMAP && !V4L2_TYPE_IS_OUTPUT(vq->type)) { if (V4L2_TYPE_IS_MULTIPLANAR(vq->type)) { + unsigned int i; + for (i = 0; i < buf->length; ++i) buf->m.planes[i].m.mem_offset += DST_QUEUE_OFF_BASE; @@ -480,8 +475,23 @@ int v4l2_m2m_querybuf(struct file *file, struct v4l2_m2m_ctx *m2m_ctx, buf->m.offset += DST_QUEUE_OFF_BASE; } } +} - return ret; +int v4l2_m2m_querybuf(struct file *file, struct v4l2_m2m_ctx *m2m_ctx, + struct v4l2_buffer *buf) +{ + struct vb2_queue *vq; + int ret; + + vq = v4l2_m2m_get_vq(m2m_ctx, buf->type); + ret = vb2_querybuf(vq, buf); + if (ret) + return ret; + + /* Adjust MMAP memory offsets for the CAPTURE queue */ + v4l2_m2m_adjust_mem_offset(vq, buf); + + return 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(v4l2_m2m_querybuf); @@ -500,10 +510,16 @@ int v4l2_m2m_qbuf(struct file *file, struct v4l2_m2m_ctx *m2m_ctx, return -EPERM; } ret = vb2_qbuf(vq, vdev->v4l2_dev->mdev, buf); - if (!ret && !(buf->flags & V4L2_BUF_FLAG_IN_REQUEST)) + if (ret) + return ret; + + /* Adjust MMAP memory offsets for the CAPTURE queue */ + v4l2_m2m_adjust_mem_offset(vq, buf); + + if (!(buf->flags & V4L2_BUF_FLAG_IN_REQUEST)) v4l2_m2m_try_schedule(m2m_ctx); - return ret; + return 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(v4l2_m2m_qbuf); @@ -511,9 +527,17 @@ int v4l2_m2m_dqbuf(struct file *file, struct v4l2_m2m_ctx *m2m_ctx, struct v4l2_buffer *buf) { struct vb2_queue *vq; + int ret; vq = v4l2_m2m_get_vq(m2m_ctx, buf->type); - return vb2_dqbuf(vq, buf, file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK); + ret = vb2_dqbuf(vq, buf, file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK); + if (ret) + return ret; + + /* Adjust MMAP memory offsets for the CAPTURE queue */ + v4l2_m2m_adjust_mem_offset(vq, buf); + + return 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(v4l2_m2m_dqbuf); @@ -522,9 +546,17 @@ int v4l2_m2m_prepare_buf(struct file *file, struct v4l2_m2m_ctx *m2m_ctx, { struct video_device *vdev = video_devdata(file); struct vb2_queue *vq; + int ret; vq = v4l2_m2m_get_vq(m2m_ctx, buf->type); - return vb2_prepare_buf(vq, vdev->v4l2_dev->mdev, buf); + ret = vb2_prepare_buf(vq, vdev->v4l2_dev->mdev, buf); + if (ret) + return ret; + + /* Adjust MMAP memory offsets for the CAPTURE queue */ + v4l2_m2m_adjust_mem_offset(vq, buf); + + return 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(v4l2_m2m_prepare_buf); From 3a0ef79c6abe61f5cb9583ac2f5e2748291bc056 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ning Qiang Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2022 23:37:34 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 1085/1091] macintosh/adb: fix oob read in do_adb_query() function commit fd97e4ad6d3b0c9fce3bca8ea8e6969d9ce7423b upstream. In do_adb_query() function of drivers/macintosh/adb.c, req->data is copied form userland. The parameter "req->data[2]" is missing check, the array size of adb_handler[] is 16, so adb_handler[req->data[2]].original_address and adb_handler[req->data[2]].handler_id will lead to oob read. Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Ning Qiang Reviewed-by: Kees Cook Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Acked-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220713153734.2248-1-sohu0106@126.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/macintosh/adb.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/macintosh/adb.c b/drivers/macintosh/adb.c index e49d1f287a17..c37d5fce86f7 100644 --- a/drivers/macintosh/adb.c +++ b/drivers/macintosh/adb.c @@ -647,7 +647,7 @@ do_adb_query(struct adb_request *req) switch(req->data[1]) { case ADB_QUERY_GETDEVINFO: - if (req->nbytes < 3) + if (req->nbytes < 3 || req->data[2] >= 16) break; mutex_lock(&adb_handler_mutex); req->reply[0] = adb_handler[req->data[2]].original_address; From f2f41ef0352db9679bfae250d7a44b3113f3a3cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Sneddon Date: Tue, 2 Aug 2022 15:47:01 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 1086/1091] x86/speculation: Add RSB VM Exit protections commit 2b1299322016731d56807aa49254a5ea3080b6b3 upstream. tl;dr: The Enhanced IBRS mitigation for Spectre v2 does not work as documented for RET instructions after VM exits. Mitigate it with a new one-entry RSB stuffing mechanism and a new LFENCE. == Background == Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS) was designed to help mitigate Branch Target Injection and Speculative Store Bypass, i.e. Spectre, attacks. IBRS prevents software run in less privileged modes from affecting branch prediction in more privileged modes. IBRS requires the MSR to be written on every privilege level change. To overcome some of the performance issues of IBRS, Enhanced IBRS was introduced. eIBRS is an "always on" IBRS, in other words, just turn it on once instead of writing the MSR on every privilege level change. When eIBRS is enabled, more privileged modes should be protected from less privileged modes, including protecting VMMs from guests. == Problem == Here's a simplification of how guests are run on Linux' KVM: void run_kvm_guest(void) { // Prepare to run guest VMRESUME(); // Clean up after guest runs } The execution flow for that would look something like this to the processor: 1. Host-side: call run_kvm_guest() 2. Host-side: VMRESUME 3. Guest runs, does "CALL guest_function" 4. VM exit, host runs again 5. Host might make some "cleanup" function calls 6. Host-side: RET from run_kvm_guest() Now, when back on the host, there are a couple of possible scenarios of post-guest activity the host needs to do before executing host code: * on pre-eIBRS hardware (legacy IBRS, or nothing at all), the RSB is not touched and Linux has to do a 32-entry stuffing. * on eIBRS hardware, VM exit with IBRS enabled, or restoring the host IBRS=1 shortly after VM exit, has a documented side effect of flushing the RSB except in this PBRSB situation where the software needs to stuff the last RSB entry "by hand". IOW, with eIBRS supported, host RET instructions should no longer be influenced by guest behavior after the host retires a single CALL instruction. However, if the RET instructions are "unbalanced" with CALLs after a VM exit as is the RET in #6, it might speculatively use the address for the instruction after the CALL in #3 as an RSB prediction. This is a problem since the (untrusted) guest controls this address. Balanced CALL/RET instruction pairs such as in step #5 are not affected. == Solution == The PBRSB issue affects a wide variety of Intel processors which support eIBRS. But not all of them need mitigation. Today, X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE triggers an RSB filling sequence that mitigates PBRSB. Systems setting RETPOLINE need no further mitigation - i.e., eIBRS systems which enable retpoline explicitly. However, such systems (X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED) do not set RETPOLINE and most of them need a new mitigation. Therefore, introduce a new feature flag X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE which triggers a lighter-weight PBRSB mitigation versus RSB Filling at vmexit. The lighter-weight mitigation performs a CALL instruction which is immediately followed by a speculative execution barrier (INT3). This steers speculative execution to the barrier -- just like a retpoline -- which ensures that speculation can never reach an unbalanced RET. Then, ensure this CALL is retired before continuing execution with an LFENCE. In other words, the window of exposure is opened at VM exit where RET behavior is troublesome. While the window is open, force RSB predictions sampling for RET targets to a dead end at the INT3. Close the window with the LFENCE. There is a subset of eIBRS systems which are not vulnerable to PBRSB. Add these systems to the cpu_vuln_whitelist[] as NO_EIBRS_PBRSB. Future systems that aren't vulnerable will set ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO. [ bp: Massage, incorporate review comments from Andy Cooper. ] [ Pawan: Update commit message to replace RSB_VMEXIT with RETPOLINE ] Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon Co-developed-by: Pawan Gupta Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 8 +++ arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 4 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 15 +++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 61 ++++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 12 +++- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S | 1 + tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + 8 files changed, 101 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst index 6bd97cd50d62..7e061ed449aa 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst @@ -422,6 +422,14 @@ The possible values in this file are: 'RSB filling' Protection of RSB on context switch enabled ============= =========================================== + - EIBRS Post-barrier Return Stack Buffer (PBRSB) protection status: + + =========================== ======================================================= + 'PBRSB-eIBRS: SW sequence' CPU is affected and protection of RSB on VMEXIT enabled + 'PBRSB-eIBRS: Vulnerable' CPU is vulnerable + 'PBRSB-eIBRS: Not affected' CPU is not affected by PBRSB + =========================== ======================================================= + Full mitigation might require a microcode update from the CPU vendor. When the necessary microcode is not available, the kernel will report vulnerability. diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index 8c28a2365a92..a3e32bc93856 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -286,6 +286,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_LOCAL (11*32+ 3) /* LLC Local MBM monitoring */ #define X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_USER (11*32+ 4) /* "" LFENCE in user entry SWAPGS path */ #define X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL (11*32+ 5) /* "" LFENCE in kernel entry SWAPGS path */ +#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE (11*32+ 6) /* "" Fill RSB on VM exit when EIBRS is enabled */ /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:1 (EAX), word 12 */ #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_BF16 (12*32+ 5) /* AVX512 BFLOAT16 instructions */ @@ -406,5 +407,6 @@ #define X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT X86_BUG(23) /* CPU may incur MCE during certain page attribute changes */ #define X86_BUG_SRBDS X86_BUG(24) /* CPU may leak RNG bits if not mitigated */ #define X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA X86_BUG(25) /* CPU is affected by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities */ +#define X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB X86_BUG(26) /* EIBRS is vulnerable to Post Barrier RSB Predictions */ #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h index c56042916a7c..cef4eba03ff3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h @@ -129,6 +129,10 @@ * bit available to control VERW * behavior. */ +#define ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO BIT(24) /* + * Not susceptible to Post-Barrier + * Return Stack Buffer Predictions. + */ #define MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD 0x0000010b #define L1D_FLUSH BIT(0) /* diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index ece2b2c6d020..90e01a35e8a2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -63,6 +63,13 @@ jnz 771b; \ add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * nr, sp; +#define __ISSUE_UNBALANCED_RET_GUARD(sp) \ + call 881f; \ + int3; \ +881: \ + add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8), sp; \ + lfence; + #ifdef __ASSEMBLY__ /* @@ -130,6 +137,14 @@ #else call *\reg #endif +.endm + +.macro ISSUE_UNBALANCED_RET_GUARD ftr:req + ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE + ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lskip_pbrsb_\@", \ + __stringify(__ISSUE_UNBALANCED_RET_GUARD(%_ASM_SP)) \ + \ftr +.Lskip_pbrsb_\@: .endm /* diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 09d02b1f6f71..57efa90f3fbd 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -1043,6 +1043,49 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation __init spectre_v2_select_retpoline(void) return SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE; } +static void __init spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode) +{ + /* + * Similar to context switches, there are two types of RSB attacks + * after VM exit: + * + * 1) RSB underflow + * + * 2) Poisoned RSB entry + * + * When retpoline is enabled, both are mitigated by filling/clearing + * the RSB. + * + * When IBRS is enabled, while #1 would be mitigated by the IBRS branch + * prediction isolation protections, RSB still needs to be cleared + * because of #2. Note that SMEP provides no protection here, unlike + * user-space-poisoned RSB entries. + * + * eIBRS should protect against RSB poisoning, but if the EIBRS_PBRSB + * bug is present then a LITE version of RSB protection is required, + * just a single call needs to retire before a RET is executed. + */ + switch (mode) { + case SPECTRE_V2_NONE: + /* These modes already fill RSB at vmexit */ + case SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE: + case SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE: + case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE: + return; + + case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE: + case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS: + if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB)) { + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE); + pr_info("Spectre v2 / PBRSB-eIBRS: Retire a single CALL on VMEXIT\n"); + } + return; + } + + pr_warn_once("Unknown Spectre v2 mode, disabling RSB mitigation at VM exit"); + dump_stack(); +} + static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) { enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(); @@ -1135,6 +1178,8 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW); pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch\n"); + spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit(mode); + /* * Retpoline means the kernel is safe because it has no indirect * branches. Enhanced IBRS protects firmware too, so, enable restricted @@ -1879,6 +1924,19 @@ static char *ibpb_state(void) return ""; } +static char *pbrsb_eibrs_state(void) +{ + if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB)) { + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE) || + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE)) + return ", PBRSB-eIBRS: SW sequence"; + else + return ", PBRSB-eIBRS: Vulnerable"; + } else { + return ", PBRSB-eIBRS: Not affected"; + } +} + static ssize_t spectre_v2_show_state(char *buf) { if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE) @@ -1891,12 +1949,13 @@ static ssize_t spectre_v2_show_state(char *buf) spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE) return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: eIBRS+LFENCE with unprivileged eBPF and SMT\n"); - return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", + return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled], ibpb_state(), boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ? ", IBRS_FW" : "", stibp_state(), boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW) ? ", RSB filling" : "", + pbrsb_eibrs_state(), spectre_v2_module_string()); } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index 305f30e45f3d..b926b7244d42 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -1025,6 +1025,7 @@ static void identify_cpu_without_cpuid(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) #define NO_SWAPGS BIT(6) #define NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT BIT(7) #define NO_SPECTRE_V2 BIT(8) +#define NO_EIBRS_PBRSB BIT(9) #define VULNWL(_vendor, _family, _model, _whitelist) \ { X86_VENDOR_##_vendor, _family, _model, X86_FEATURE_ANY, _whitelist } @@ -1065,7 +1066,7 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = { VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT), VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_D, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT), - VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT), + VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_EIBRS_PBRSB), /* * Technically, swapgs isn't serializing on AMD (despite it previously @@ -1075,7 +1076,9 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = { * good enough for our purposes. */ - VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_TREMONT_D, NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT), + VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_TREMONT, NO_EIBRS_PBRSB), + VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_TREMONT_L, NO_EIBRS_PBRSB), + VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_TREMONT_D, NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_EIBRS_PBRSB), /* AMD Family 0xf - 0x12 */ VULNWL_AMD(0x0f, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT), @@ -1236,6 +1239,11 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) !arch_cap_mmio_immune(ia32_cap)) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA); + if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED) && + !cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_EIBRS_PBRSB) && + !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO)) + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB); + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN)) return; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S index ca4252f81bf8..946d9205c3b6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S @@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ ENTRY(vmx_vmexit) pop %_ASM_AX .Lvmexit_skip_rsb: #endif + ISSUE_UNBALANCED_RET_GUARD X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE ret ENDPROC(vmx_vmexit) diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index 4133c721af6e..59f924e92c28 100644 --- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -284,6 +284,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_LOCAL (11*32+ 3) /* LLC Local MBM monitoring */ #define X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_USER (11*32+ 4) /* "" LFENCE in user entry SWAPGS path */ #define X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL (11*32+ 5) /* "" LFENCE in kernel entry SWAPGS path */ +#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE (11*32+ 6) /* "" Fill RSB on VM-Exit when EIBRS is enabled */ /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:1 (EAX), word 12 */ #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_BF16 (12*32+ 5) /* AVX512 BFLOAT16 instructions */ From b58882c69f6633dcebd66bdb38658f688aa52ec9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pawan Gupta Date: Tue, 2 Aug 2022 15:47:02 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 1087/1091] x86/speculation: Add LFENCE to RSB fill sequence commit ba6e31af2be96c4d0536f2152ed6f7b6c11bca47 upstream. RSB fill sequence does not have any protection for miss-prediction of conditional branch at the end of the sequence. CPU can speculatively execute code immediately after the sequence, while RSB filling hasn't completed yet. #define __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(reg, nr, sp) \ mov $(nr/2), reg; \ 771: \ call 772f; \ 773: /* speculation trap */ \ pause; \ lfence; \ jmp 773b; \ 772: \ call 774f; \ 775: /* speculation trap */ \ pause; \ lfence; \ jmp 775b; \ 774: \ dec reg; \ jnz 771b; <----- CPU can miss-predict here. \ add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * nr, sp; Before RSB is filled, RETs that come in program order after this macro can be executed speculatively, making them vulnerable to RSB-based attacks. Mitigate it by adding an LFENCE after the conditional branch to prevent speculation while RSB is being filled. Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index 90e01a35e8a2..1e5df3ccdd5c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -61,7 +61,9 @@ 774: \ dec reg; \ jnz 771b; \ - add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * nr, sp; + add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * nr, sp; \ + /* barrier for jnz misprediction */ \ + lfence; #define __ISSUE_UNBALANCED_RET_GUARD(sp) \ call 881f; \ From de0cd3ea700d1e8ed76705d02e33b524cbb84cf3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Thu, 11 Aug 2022 12:57:53 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 1088/1091] Linux 5.4.210 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220809175510.312431319@linuxfoundation.org Tested-by: Florian Fainelli Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing Tested-by: Sudip Mukherjee Tested-by: Guenter Roeck Tested-by: Jon Hunter Tested-by: Shuah Khan Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Makefile | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index 7093e3b03b9f..74abb7e389f3 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 VERSION = 5 PATCHLEVEL = 4 -SUBLEVEL = 209 +SUBLEVEL = 210 EXTRAVERSION = NAME = Kleptomaniac Octopus From 297aa83408ac4316311d73c30b581f25858e9560 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tadeusz Struk Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2022 10:56:54 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 1089/1091] ANDROID: incfs: Add check for ATTR_KILL_SUID and ATTR_MODE in incfs_setattr Add an explicite check for ATTR_KILL_SUID and ATTR_MODE in incfs_setattr. Both of these attributes can not be set at the same time, otherwise notify_change() function will check it and invoke BUG(), crashing the system. Bug: 243394930 Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk Change-Id: I91080d68efbd62f1441e20a5c02feef3d1b06e4e --- fs/incfs/vfs.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/incfs/vfs.c b/fs/incfs/vfs.c index f696cf651afb..27dcdaf49347 100644 --- a/fs/incfs/vfs.c +++ b/fs/incfs/vfs.c @@ -2055,6 +2055,10 @@ static int incfs_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *ia) if (ia->ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) return -EINVAL; + if ((ia->ia_valid & (ATTR_KILL_SUID|ATTR_KILL_SGID)) && + (ia->ia_valid & ATTR_MODE)) + return -EINVAL; + if (!di) return -EINVAL; backing_dentry = di->backing_path.dentry; From 553b73b6ae612bf320294b1c22f6415cd016c746 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Srinivasarao Pathipati Date: Fri, 2 Sep 2022 17:12:28 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 1090/1091] ANDROID: ABI: Update allowed list for QCOM Update the android/abi_gki_aarch64_qcom with API refcount_warn_saturate. Bug: 244699106 Change-Id: Iee45f9e7ab3cc24b678fac28b5981c0e44745769 Signed-off-by: Srinivasarao Pathipati --- android/abi_gki_aarch64_qcom | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/android/abi_gki_aarch64_qcom b/android/abi_gki_aarch64_qcom index a2acb78eadaf..d6f756e415e4 100644 --- a/android/abi_gki_aarch64_qcom +++ b/android/abi_gki_aarch64_qcom @@ -1942,6 +1942,7 @@ refcount_dec_not_one refcount_inc_checked refcount_inc_not_zero_checked + refcount_warn_saturate __refrigerator regcache_cache_bypass regcache_cache_only From 1de735143f58b2c98206ccd46d8c40dc5a5ca4b0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Srinivasarao Pathipati Date: Fri, 14 Oct 2022 11:42:36 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 1091/1091] Revert "arm64: mm: Don't invalidate FROM_DEVICE buffers at start of DMA transfer" This reverts commit 7b9c3bfbad2510478ac29221d2c40a09184ce6a1. Change-Id: Ib18fb945b6bbdfc19e249e93a38f1979dd564626 Signed-off-by: Srinivasarao Pathipati --- arch/arm64/mm/cache.S | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/cache.S b/arch/arm64/mm/cache.S index 7b054c67acd8..db767b072601 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/mm/cache.S +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/cache.S @@ -228,6 +228,8 @@ ENDPIPROC(__dma_flush_area) * - dir - DMA direction */ ENTRY(__dma_map_area) + cmp w2, #DMA_FROM_DEVICE + b.eq __dma_inv_area b __dma_clean_area ENDPIPROC(__dma_map_area)