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Merge 5.4.44 into android-5.4-stable
Changes in 5.4.44
ax25: fix setsockopt(SO_BINDTODEVICE)
dpaa_eth: fix usage as DSA master, try 3
net: don't return invalid table id error when we fall back to PF_UNSPEC
net: dsa: mt7530: fix roaming from DSA user ports
net: ethernet: ti: cpsw: fix ASSERT_RTNL() warning during suspend
__netif_receive_skb_core: pass skb by reference
net: inet_csk: Fix so_reuseport bind-address cache in tb->fast*
net: ipip: fix wrong address family in init error path
net/mlx5: Add command entry handling completion
net: mvpp2: fix RX hashing for non-10G ports
net: nlmsg_cancel() if put fails for nhmsg
net: qrtr: Fix passing invalid reference to qrtr_local_enqueue()
net: revert "net: get rid of an signed integer overflow in ip_idents_reserve()"
net sched: fix reporting the first-time use timestamp
net/tls: fix race condition causing kernel panic
nexthop: Fix attribute checking for groups
r8152: support additional Microsoft Surface Ethernet Adapter variant
sctp: Don't add the shutdown timer if its already been added
sctp: Start shutdown on association restart if in SHUTDOWN-SENT state and socket is closed
tipc: block BH before using dst_cache
net/mlx5e: kTLS, Destroy key object after destroying the TIS
net/mlx5e: Fix inner tirs handling
net/mlx5: Fix memory leak in mlx5_events_init
net/mlx5e: Update netdev txq on completions during closure
net/mlx5: Fix error flow in case of function_setup failure
net/mlx5: Annotate mutex destroy for root ns
net/tls: fix encryption error checking
net/tls: free record only on encryption error
net: sun: fix missing release regions in cas_init_one().
net/mlx4_core: fix a memory leak bug.
mlxsw: spectrum: Fix use-after-free of split/unsplit/type_set in case reload fails
ARM: dts: rockchip: fix phy nodename for rk3228-evb
ARM: dts: rockchip: fix phy nodename for rk3229-xms6
arm64: dts: rockchip: fix status for &gmac2phy in rk3328-evb.dts
arm64: dts: rockchip: swap interrupts interrupt-names rk3399 gpu node
ARM: dts: rockchip: swap clock-names of gpu nodes
ARM: dts: rockchip: fix pinctrl sub nodename for spi in rk322x.dtsi
gpio: tegra: mask GPIO IRQs during IRQ shutdown
ALSA: usb-audio: add mapping for ASRock TRX40 Creator
net: microchip: encx24j600: add missed kthread_stop
gfs2: move privileged user check to gfs2_quota_lock_check
gfs2: Grab glock reference sooner in gfs2_add_revoke
drm/amdgpu: drop unnecessary cancel_delayed_work_sync on PG ungate
drm/amd/powerplay: perform PG ungate prior to CG ungate
drm/amdgpu: Use GEM obj reference for KFD BOs
cachefiles: Fix race between read_waiter and read_copier involving op->to_do
usb: dwc3: pci: Enable extcon driver for Intel Merrifield
usb: phy: twl6030-usb: Fix a resource leak in an error handling path in 'twl6030_usb_probe()'
usb: gadget: legacy: fix redundant initialization warnings
net: freescale: select CONFIG_FIXED_PHY where needed
IB/i40iw: Remove bogus call to netdev_master_upper_dev_get()
riscv: stacktrace: Fix undefined reference to `walk_stackframe'
clk: ti: am33xx: fix RTC clock parent
csky: Fixup msa highest 3 bits mask
csky: Fixup perf callchain unwind
csky: Fixup remove duplicate irq_disable
hwmon: (nct7904) Fix incorrect range of temperature limit registers
cifs: Fix null pointer check in cifs_read
csky: Fixup raw_copy_from_user()
samples: bpf: Fix build error
drivers: net: hamradio: Fix suspicious RCU usage warning in bpqether.c
Input: usbtouchscreen - add support for BonXeon TP
Input: evdev - call input_flush_device() on release(), not flush()
Input: xpad - add custom init packet for Xbox One S controllers
Input: dlink-dir685-touchkeys - fix a typo in driver name
Input: i8042 - add ThinkPad S230u to i8042 reset list
Input: synaptics-rmi4 - really fix attn_data use-after-free
Input: synaptics-rmi4 - fix error return code in rmi_driver_probe()
ARM: 8970/1: decompressor: increase tag size
ARM: uaccess: consolidate uaccess asm to asm/uaccess-asm.h
ARM: uaccess: integrate uaccess_save and uaccess_restore
ARM: uaccess: fix DACR mismatch with nested exceptions
gpio: exar: Fix bad handling for ida_simple_get error path
arm64: dts: mt8173: fix vcodec-enc clock
soc: mediatek: cmdq: return send msg error code
gpu/drm: Ingenic: Fix opaque pointer casted to wrong type
IB/qib: Call kobject_put() when kobject_init_and_add() fails
ARM: dts/imx6q-bx50v3: Set display interface clock parents
ARM: dts: bcm2835-rpi-zero-w: Fix led polarity
ARM: dts: bcm: HR2: Fix PPI interrupt types
mmc: block: Fix use-after-free issue for rpmb
gpio: pxa: Fix return value of pxa_gpio_probe()
gpio: bcm-kona: Fix return value of bcm_kona_gpio_probe()
RDMA/pvrdma: Fix missing pci disable in pvrdma_pci_probe()
ALSA: hwdep: fix a left shifting 1 by 31 UB bug
ALSA: hda/realtek - Add a model for Thinkpad T570 without DAC workaround
ALSA: usb-audio: mixer: volume quirk for ESS Technology Asus USB DAC
exec: Always set cap_ambient in cap_bprm_set_creds
clk: qcom: gcc: Fix parent for gpll0_out_even
ALSA: usb-audio: Quirks for Gigabyte TRX40 Aorus Master onboard audio
ALSA: hda/realtek - Add new codec supported for ALC287
libceph: ignore pool overlay and cache logic on redirects
ceph: flush release queue when handling caps for unknown inode
RDMA/core: Fix double destruction of uobject
drm/amd/display: drop cursor position check in atomic test
IB/ipoib: Fix double free of skb in case of multicast traffic in CM mode
mm,thp: stop leaking unreleased file pages
mm: remove VM_BUG_ON(PageSlab()) from page_mapcount()
fs/binfmt_elf.c: allocate initialized memory in fill_thread_core_info()
include/asm-generic/topology.h: guard cpumask_of_node() macro argument
Revert "block: end bio with BLK_STS_AGAIN in case of non-mq devs and REQ_NOWAIT"
gpio: fix locking open drain IRQ lines
iommu: Fix reference count leak in iommu_group_alloc.
parisc: Fix kernel panic in mem_init()
cfg80211: fix debugfs rename crash
x86/syscalls: Revert "x86/syscalls: Make __X32_SYSCALL_BIT be unsigned long"
mac80211: mesh: fix discovery timer re-arming issue / crash
x86/dma: Fix max PFN arithmetic overflow on 32 bit systems
copy_xstate_to_kernel(): don't leave parts of destination uninitialized
xfrm: allow to accept packets with ipv6 NEXTHDR_HOP in xfrm_input
xfrm: do pskb_pull properly in __xfrm_transport_prep
xfrm: remove the xfrm_state_put call becofe going to out_reset
xfrm: call xfrm_output_gso when inner_protocol is set in xfrm_output
xfrm interface: fix oops when deleting a x-netns interface
xfrm: fix a warning in xfrm_policy_insert_list
xfrm: fix a NULL-ptr deref in xfrm_local_error
xfrm: fix error in comment
ip_vti: receive ipip packet by calling ip_tunnel_rcv
netfilter: nft_reject_bridge: enable reject with bridge vlan
netfilter: ipset: Fix subcounter update skip
netfilter: conntrack: make conntrack userspace helpers work again
netfilter: nfnetlink_cthelper: unbreak userspace helper support
netfilter: nf_conntrack_pptp: prevent buffer overflows in debug code
esp6: get the right proto for transport mode in esp6_gso_encap
bnxt_en: Fix accumulation of bp->net_stats_prev.
ieee80211: Fix incorrect mask for default PE duration
xsk: Add overflow check for u64 division, stored into u32
qlcnic: fix missing release in qlcnic_83xx_interrupt_test.
crypto: chelsio/chtls: properly set tp->lsndtime
nexthops: Move code from remove_nexthop_from_groups to remove_nh_grp_entry
nexthops: don't modify published nexthop groups
nexthop: Expand nexthop_is_multipath in a few places
ipv4: nexthop version of fib_info_nh_uses_dev
net: dsa: declare lockless TX feature for slave ports
bonding: Fix reference count leak in bond_sysfs_slave_add.
netfilter: conntrack: comparison of unsigned in cthelper confirmation
netfilter: conntrack: Pass value of ctinfo to __nf_conntrack_update
netfilter: nf_conntrack_pptp: fix compilation warning with W=1 build
perf: Make perf able to build with latest libbfd
Linux 5.4.44
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@google.com>
Change-Id: Idd547df1abb0bea116f30e3224a80387529adb0b
[ Upstream commit a4ae32c71fe90794127b32d26d7ad795813b502e ]
An invariant of cap_bprm_set_creds is that every field in the new cred
structure that cap_bprm_set_creds might set, needs to be set every
time to ensure the fields does not get a stale value.
The field cap_ambient is not set every time cap_bprm_set_creds is
called, which means that if there is a suid or sgid script with an
interpreter that has neither the suid nor the sgid bits set the
interpreter should be able to accept ambient credentials.
Unfortuantely because cap_ambient is not reset to it's original value
the interpreter can not accept ambient credentials.
Given that the ambient capability set is expected to be controlled by
the caller, I don't think this is particularly serious. But it is
definitely worth fixing so the code works correctly.
I have tested to verify my reading of the code is correct and the
interpreter of a sgid can receive ambient capabilities with this
change and cannot receive ambient capabilities without this change.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Fixes: 58319057b7 ("capabilities: ambient capabilities")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Add a flag option to get xattr method that could have a bit flag of
XATTR_NOSECURITY passed to it. XATTR_NOSECURITY is generally then
set in the __vfs_getxattr path when called by security
infrastructure.
This handles the case of a union filesystem driver that is being
requested by the security layer to report back the xattr data.
For the use case where access is to be blocked by the security layer.
The path then could be security(dentry) ->
__vfs_getxattr(dentry...XATTR_NOSECURITY) ->
handler->get(dentry...XATTR_NOSECURITY) ->
__vfs_getxattr(lower_dentry...XATTR_NOSECURITY) ->
lower_handler->get(lower_dentry...XATTR_NOSECURITY)
which would report back through the chain data and success as
expected, the logging security layer at the top would have the
data to determine the access permissions and report back the target
context that was blocked.
Without the get handler flag, the path on a union filesystem would be
the errant security(dentry) -> __vfs_getxattr(dentry) ->
handler->get(dentry) -> vfs_getxattr(lower_dentry) -> nested ->
security(lower_dentry, log off) -> lower_handler->get(lower_dentry)
which would report back through the chain no data, and -EACCES.
For selinux for both cases, this would translate to a correctly
determined blocked access. In the first case with this change a correct avc
log would be reported, in the second legacy case an incorrect avc log
would be reported against an uninitialized u:object_r:unlabeled:s0
context making the logs cosmetically useless for audit2allow.
This patch series is inert and is the wide-spread addition of the
flags option for xattr functions, and a replacement of __vfs_getxattr
with __vfs_getxattr(...XATTR_NOSECURITY).
Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Acked-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kernel-team@android.com
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
(cherry picked from (rejected from archive because of too many recipients))
Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@google.com>
Bug: 133515582
Bug: 136124883
Bug: 129319403
Change-Id: Iabbb8771939d5f66667a26bb23ddf4c562c349a1
Pull capabilities update from James Morris:
"Minor fixes for capabilities:
- Update the commoncap.c code to utilize XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN,
from Carmeli tamir.
- Make the capability hooks static, from Yue Haibing"
* 'next-lsm' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
security/commoncap: Use xattr security prefix len
security: Make capability_hooks static
Using the existing defined XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN instead of
sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1. Pretty simple cleanup.
Signed-off-by: Carmeli Tamir <carmeli.tamir@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Fix sparse warning:
security/commoncap.c:1347:27: warning:
symbol 'capability_hooks' was not declared. Should it be static?
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at
your option any later version
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-or-later
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 3029 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190527070032.746973796@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Merge tag 'audit-pr-20190305' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit
Pull audit updates from Paul Moore:
"A lucky 13 audit patches for v5.1.
Despite the rather large diffstat, most of the changes are from two
bug fix patches that move code from one Kconfig option to another.
Beyond that bit of churn, the remaining changes are largely cleanups
and bug-fixes as we slowly march towards container auditing. It isn't
all boring though, we do have a couple of new things: file
capabilities v3 support, and expanded support for filtering on
filesystems to solve problems with remote filesystems.
All changes pass the audit-testsuite. Please merge for v5.1"
* tag 'audit-pr-20190305' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit:
audit: mark expected switch fall-through
audit: hide auditsc_get_stamp and audit_serial prototypes
audit: join tty records to their syscall
audit: remove audit_context when CONFIG_ AUDIT and not AUDITSYSCALL
audit: remove unused actx param from audit_rule_match
audit: ignore fcaps on umount
audit: clean up AUDITSYSCALL prototypes and stubs
audit: more filter PATH records keyed on filesystem magic
audit: add support for fcaps v3
audit: move loginuid and sessionid from CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL to CONFIG_AUDIT
audit: add syscall information to CONFIG_CHANGE records
audit: hand taken context to audit_kill_trees for syscall logging
audit: give a clue what CONFIG_CHANGE op was involved
This should have gone in with commit
c1a85a00ea.
Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
V3 namespaced file capabilities were introduced in
commit 8db6c34f1d ("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities")
Add support for these by adding the "frootid" field to the existing
fcaps fields in the NAME and BPRM_FCAPS records.
Please see github issue
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/103
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
[PM: comment tweak to fit an 80 char line width]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch provides a general mechanism for passing flags to the
security_capable LSM hook. It replaces the specific 'audit' flag that is
used to tell security_capable whether it should log an audit message for
the given capability check. The reason for generalizing this flag
passing is so we can add an additional flag that signifies whether
security_capable is being called by a setid syscall (which is needed by
the proposed SafeSetID LSM).
Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
This converts capabilities to use the new LSM_ORDER_FIRST position.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Historically a lot of these existed because we did not have
a distinction between what was modular code and what was providing
support to modules via EXPORT_SYMBOL and friends. That changed
when we forked out support for the latter into the export.h file.
This means we should be able to reduce the usage of module.h
in code that is obj-y Makefile or bool Kconfig.
The advantage in removing such instances is that module.h itself
sources about 15 other headers; adding significantly to what we feed
cpp, and it can obscure what headers we are effectively using.
Since module.h might have been the implicit source for init.h
(for __init) and for export.h (for EXPORT_SYMBOL) we consider each
instance for the presence of either and replace as needed.
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps() never returned -EINVAL so remove the
rc == -EINVAL check.
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
The code in cap_inode_getsecurity(), introduced by commit 8db6c34f1d
("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities"), should use
d_find_any_alias() instead of d_find_alias() do handle unhashed dentry
correctly. This is needed, for example, if execveat() is called with an
open but unlinked overlayfs file, because overlayfs unhashes dentry on
unlink.
This is a regression of real life application, first reported at
https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-unionfs/msg05363.html
Below reproducer and setup can reproduce the case.
const char* exec="echo";
const char *newargv[] = { "echo", "hello", NULL};
const char *newenviron[] = { NULL };
int fd, err;
fd = open(exec, O_PATH);
unlink(exec);
err = syscall(322/*SYS_execveat*/, fd, "", newargv, newenviron,
AT_EMPTY_PATH);
if(err<0)
fprintf(stderr, "execveat: %s\n", strerror(errno));
gcc compile into ~/test/a.out
mount -t overlay -orw,lowerdir=/mnt/l,upperdir=/mnt/u,workdir=/mnt/w
none /mnt/m
cd /mnt/m
cp /bin/echo .
~/test/a.out
Expected result:
hello
Actually result:
execveat: Invalid argument
dmesg:
Invalid argument reading file caps for /dev/fd/3
The 2nd reproducer and setup emulates similar case but for
regular filesystem:
const char* exec="echo";
int fd, err;
char buf[256];
fd = open(exec, O_RDONLY);
unlink(exec);
err = fgetxattr(fd, "security.capability", buf, 256);
if(err<0)
fprintf(stderr, "fgetxattr: %s\n", strerror(errno));
gcc compile into ~/test_fgetxattr
cd /tmp
cp /bin/echo .
~/test_fgetxattr
Result:
fgetxattr: Invalid argument
On regular filesystem, for example, ext4 read xattr from
disk and return to execveat(), will not trigger this issue, however,
the overlay attr handler pass real dentry to vfs_getxattr() will.
This reproducer calls fgetxattr() with an unlinked fd, involkes
vfs_getxattr() then reproduced the case that d_find_alias() in
cap_inode_getsecurity() can't find the unlinked dentry.
Suggested-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Fixes: 8db6c34f1d ("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.14
Signed-off-by: Eddie Horng <eddie.horng@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
A privileged user in s_user_ns will generally have the ability to
manipulate the backing store and insert security.* xattrs into
the filesystem directly. Therefore the kernel must be prepared to
handle these xattrs from unprivileged mounts, and it makes little
sense for commoncap to prevent writing these xattrs to the
filesystem. The capability and LSM code have already been updated
to appropriately handle xattrs from unprivileged mounts, so it
is safe to loosen this restriction on setting xattrs.
The exception to this logic is that writing xattrs to a mounted
filesystem may also cause the LSM inode_post_setxattr or
inode_setsecurity callbacks to be invoked. SELinux will deny the
xattr update by virtue of applying mountpoint labeling to
unprivileged userns mounts, and Smack will deny the writes for
any user without global CAP_MAC_ADMIN, so loosening the
capability check in commoncap is safe in this respect as well.
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
If userspace attempted to set a "security.capability" xattr shorter than
4 bytes (e.g. 'setfattr -n security.capability -v x file'), then
cap_convert_nscap() read past the end of the buffer containing the xattr
value because it accessed the ->magic_etc field without verifying that
the xattr value is long enough to contain that field.
Fix it by validating the xattr value size first.
This bug was found using syzkaller with KASAN. The KASAN report was as
follows (cleaned up slightly):
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in cap_convert_nscap+0x514/0x630 security/commoncap.c:498
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88002d8741c0 by task syz-executor1/2852
CPU: 0 PID: 2852 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.15.0-rc6-00200-gcc0aac99d977 #253
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-20171110_100015-anatol 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
dump_stack+0xe3/0x195 lib/dump_stack.c:53
print_address_description+0x73/0x260 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline]
kasan_report+0x235/0x350 mm/kasan/report.c:409
cap_convert_nscap+0x514/0x630 security/commoncap.c:498
setxattr+0x2bd/0x350 fs/xattr.c:446
path_setxattr+0x168/0x1b0 fs/xattr.c:472
SYSC_setxattr fs/xattr.c:487 [inline]
SyS_setxattr+0x36/0x50 fs/xattr.c:483
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x18/0x85
Fixes: 8db6c34f1d ("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.14+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Pull general security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"TPM (from Jarkko):
- essential clean up for tpm_crb so that ARM64 and x86 versions do
not distract each other as much as before
- /dev/tpm0 rejects now too short writes (shorter buffer than
specified in the command header
- use DMA-safe buffer in tpm_tis_spi
- otherwise mostly minor fixes.
Smack:
- base support for overlafs
Capabilities:
- BPRM_FCAPS fixes, from Richard Guy Briggs:
The audit subsystem is adding a BPRM_FCAPS record when auditing
setuid application execution (SYSCALL execve). This is not expected
as it was supposed to be limited to when the file system actually
had capabilities in an extended attribute. It lists all
capabilities making the event really ugly to parse what is
happening. The PATH record correctly records the setuid bit and
owner. Suppress the BPRM_FCAPS record on set*id.
TOMOYO:
- Y2038 timestamping fixes"
* 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (28 commits)
MAINTAINERS: update the IMA, EVM, trusted-keys, encrypted-keys entries
Smack: Base support for overlayfs
MAINTAINERS: remove David Safford as maintainer for encrypted+trusted keys
tomoyo: fix timestamping for y2038
capabilities: audit log other surprising conditions
capabilities: fix logic for effective root or real root
capabilities: invert logic for clarity
capabilities: remove a layer of conditional logic
capabilities: move audit log decision to function
capabilities: use intuitive names for id changes
capabilities: use root_priveleged inline to clarify logic
capabilities: rename has_cap to has_fcap
capabilities: intuitive names for cap gain status
capabilities: factor out cap_bprm_set_creds privileged root
tpm, tpm_tis: use ARRAY_SIZE() to define TPM_HID_USR_IDX
tpm: fix duplicate inline declaration specifier
tpm: fix type of a local variables in tpm_tis_spi.c
tpm: fix type of a local variable in tpm2_map_command()
tpm: fix type of a local variable in tpm2_get_cc_attrs_tbl()
tpm-dev-common: Reject too short writes
...
The existing condition tested for process effective capabilities set by
file attributes but intended to ignore the change if the result was
unsurprisingly an effective full set in the case root is special with a
setuid root executable file and we are root.
Stated again:
- When you execute a setuid root application, it is no surprise and
expected that it got all capabilities, so we do not want capabilities
recorded.
if (pE_grew && !(pE_fullset && (eff_root || real_root) && root_priveleged) )
Now make sure we cover other cases:
- If something prevented a setuid root app getting all capabilities and
it wound up with one capability only, then it is a surprise and should
be logged. When it is a setuid root file, we only want capabilities
when the process does not get full capabilities..
root_priveleged && setuid_root && !pE_fullset
- Similarly if a non-setuid program does pick up capabilities due to
file system based capabilities, then we want to know what capabilities
were picked up. When it has file system based capabilities we want
the capabilities.
!is_setuid && (has_fcap && pP_gained)
- If it is a non-setuid file and it gets ambient capabilities, we want
the capabilities.
!is_setuid && pA_gained
- These last two are combined into one due to the common first parameter.
Related: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/16
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Now that the logic is inverted, it is much easier to see that both real
root and effective root conditions had to be met to avoid printing the
BPRM_FCAPS record with audit syscalls. This meant that any setuid root
applications would print a full BPRM_FCAPS record when it wasn't
necessary, cluttering the event output, since the SYSCALL and PATH
records indicated the presence of the setuid bit and effective root user
id.
Require only one of effective root or real root to avoid printing the
unnecessary record.
Ref: commit 3fc689e96c ("Add audit_log_bprm_fcaps/AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS")
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/16
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
The way the logic was presented, it was awkward to read and verify.
Invert the logic using DeMorgan's Law to be more easily able to read and
understand.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Okay-ished-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Remove a layer of conditional logic to make the use of conditions
easier to read and analyse.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Okay-ished-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Move the audit log decision logic to its own function to isolate the
complexity in one place.
Suggested-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Okay-ished-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Introduce a number of inlines to make the use of the negation of
uid_eq() easier to read and analyse.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Okay-ished-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Introduce inline root_privileged() to make use of SECURE_NONROOT
easier to read.
Suggested-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Okay-ished-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Rename has_cap to has_fcap to clarify it applies to file capabilities
since the entire source file is about capabilities.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Okay-ished-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Introduce macros cap_gained, cap_grew, cap_full to make the use of the
negation of is_subset() easier to read and analyse.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Okay-ished-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Factor out the case of privileged root from the function
cap_bprm_set_creds() to make the latter easier to read and analyse.
Suggested-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Okay-ished-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
The pointer fs_ns is assigned from inode->i_ib->s_user_ns before
a null pointer check on inode, hence if inode is actually null we
will get a null pointer dereference on this assignment. Fix this
by only dereferencing inode after the null pointer check on
inode.
Detected by CoverityScan CID#1455328 ("Dereference before null check")
Fixes: 8db6c34f1d ("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Pull misc security layer update from James Morris:
"This is the remaining 'general' change in the security tree for v4.14,
following the direct merging of SELinux (+ TOMOYO), AppArmor, and
seccomp.
That's everything now for the security tree except IMA, which will
follow shortly (I've been traveling for the past week with patchy
internet)"
* 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
security: fix description of values returned by cap_inode_need_killpriv
cap_inode_need_killpriv returns 1 if security.capability exists and
has a value and inode_killpriv() is required, 0 otherwise. Fix the
description of the return value to reflect this.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Pull namespace updates from Eric Biederman:
"Life has been busy and I have not gotten half as much done this round
as I would have liked. I delayed it so that a minor conflict
resolution with the mips tree could spend a little time in linux-next
before I sent this pull request.
This includes two long delayed user namespace changes from Kirill
Tkhai. It also includes a very useful change from Serge Hallyn that
allows the security capability attribute to be used inside of user
namespaces. The practical effect of this is people can now untar
tarballs and install rpms in user namespaces. It had been suggested to
generalize this and encode some of the namespace information
information in the xattr name. Upon close inspection that makes the
things that should be hard easy and the things that should be easy
more expensive.
Then there is my bugfix/cleanup for signal injection that removes the
magic encoding of the siginfo union member from the kernel internal
si_code. The mips folks reported the case where I had used FPE_FIXME
me is impossible so I have remove FPE_FIXME from mips, while at the
same time including a return statement in that case to keep gcc from
complaining about unitialized variables.
I almost finished the work to get make copy_siginfo_to_user a trivial
copy to user. The code is available at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace.git neuter-copy_siginfo_to_user-v3
But I did not have time/energy to get the code posted and reviewed
before the merge window opened.
I was able to see that the security excuse for just copying fields
that we know are initialized doesn't work in practice there are buggy
initializations that don't initialize the proper fields in siginfo. So
we still sometimes copy unitialized data to userspace"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities
mips/signal: In force_fcr31_sig return in the impossible case
signal: Remove kernel interal si_code magic
fcntl: Don't use ambiguous SIG_POLL si_codes
prctl: Allow local CAP_SYS_ADMIN changing exe_file
security: Use user_namespace::level to avoid redundant iterations in cap_capable()
userns,pidns: Verify the userns for new pid namespaces
signal/testing: Don't look for __SI_FAULT in userspace
signal/mips: Document a conflict with SI_USER with SIGFPE
signal/sparc: Document a conflict with SI_USER with SIGFPE
signal/ia64: Document a conflict with SI_USER with SIGFPE
signal/alpha: Document a conflict with SI_USER for SIGTRAP
Root in a non-initial user ns cannot be trusted to write a traditional
security.capability xattr. If it were allowed to do so, then any
unprivileged user on the host could map his own uid to root in a private
namespace, write the xattr, and execute the file with privilege on the
host.
However supporting file capabilities in a user namespace is very
desirable. Not doing so means that any programs designed to run with
limited privilege must continue to support other methods of gaining and
dropping privilege. For instance a program installer must detect
whether file capabilities can be assigned, and assign them if so but set
setuid-root otherwise. The program in turn must know how to drop
partial capabilities, and do so only if setuid-root.
This patch introduces v3 of the security.capability xattr. It builds a
vfs_ns_cap_data struct by appending a uid_t rootid to struct
vfs_cap_data. This is the absolute uid_t (that is, the uid_t in user
namespace which mounted the filesystem, usually init_user_ns) of the
root id in whose namespaces the file capabilities may take effect.
When a task asks to write a v2 security.capability xattr, if it is
privileged with respect to the userns which mounted the filesystem, then
nothing should change. Otherwise, the kernel will transparently rewrite
the xattr as a v3 with the appropriate rootid. This is done during the
execution of setxattr() to catch user-space-initiated capability writes.
Subsequently, any task executing the file which has the noted kuid as
its root uid, or which is in a descendent user_ns of such a user_ns,
will run the file with capabilities.
Similarly when asking to read file capabilities, a v3 capability will
be presented as v2 if it applies to the caller's namespace.
If a task writes a v3 security.capability, then it can provide a uid for
the xattr so long as the uid is valid in its own user namespace, and it
is privileged with CAP_SETFCAP over its namespace. The kernel will
translate that rootid to an absolute uid, and write that to disk. After
this, a task in the writer's namespace will not be able to use those
capabilities (unless rootid was 0), but a task in a namespace where the
given uid is root will.
Only a single security.capability xattr may exist at a time for a given
file. A task may overwrite an existing xattr so long as it is
privileged over the inode. Note this is a departure from previous
semantics, which required privilege to remove a security.capability
xattr. This check can be re-added if deemed useful.
This allows a simple setxattr to work, allows tar/untar to work, and
allows us to tar in one namespace and untar in another while preserving
the capability, without risking leaking privilege into a parent
namespace.
Example using tar:
$ cp /bin/sleep sleepx
$ mkdir b1 b2
$ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100000:1 -m b:1:$(id -u):1 -- chown 0:0 b1
$ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100001:1 -m b:1:$(id -u):1 -- chown 0:0 b2
$ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100000:1000 -- tar --xattrs-include=security.capability --xattrs -cf b1/sleepx.tar sleepx
$ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100001:1000 -- tar --xattrs-include=security.capability --xattrs -C b2 -xf b1/sleepx.tar
$ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100001:1000 -- getcap b2/sleepx
b2/sleepx = cap_sys_admin+ep
# /opt/ltp/testcases/bin/getv3xattr b2/sleepx
v3 xattr, rootid is 100001
A patch to linux-test-project adding a new set of tests for this
functionality is in the nsfscaps branch at github.com/hallyn/ltp
Changelog:
Nov 02 2016: fix invalid check at refuse_fcap_overwrite()
Nov 07 2016: convert rootid from and to fs user_ns
(From ebiederm: mar 28 2017)
commoncap.c: fix typos - s/v4/v3
get_vfs_caps_from_disk: clarify the fs_ns root access check
nsfscaps: change the code split for cap_inode_setxattr()
Apr 09 2017:
don't return v3 cap for caps owned by current root.
return a v2 cap for a true v2 cap in non-init ns
Apr 18 2017:
. Change the flow of fscap writing to support s_user_ns writing.
. Remove refuse_fcap_overwrite(). The value of the previous
xattr doesn't matter.
Apr 24 2017:
. incorporate Eric's incremental diff
. move cap_convert_nscap to setxattr and simplify its usage
May 8, 2017:
. fix leaking dentry refcount in cap_inode_getsecurity
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Instead of a separate function, open-code the cap_elevated test, which
lets us entirely remove bprm->cap_effective (to use the local "effective"
variable instead), and more accurately examine euid/egid changes via the
existing local "is_setid".
The following LTP tests were run to validate the changes:
# ./runltp -f syscalls -s cap
# ./runltp -f securebits
# ./runltp -f cap_bounds
# ./runltp -f filecaps
All kernel selftests for capabilities and exec continue to pass as well.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
The commoncap implementation of the bprm_secureexec hook is the only LSM
that depends on the final call to its bprm_set_creds hook (since it may
be called for multiple files, it ignores bprm->called_set_creds). As a
result, it cannot safely _clear_ bprm->secureexec since other LSMs may
have set it. Instead, remove the bprm_secureexec hook by introducing a
new flag to bprm specific to commoncap: cap_elevated. This is similar to
cap_effective, but that is used for a specific subset of elevated
privileges, and exists solely to track state from bprm_set_creds to
bprm_secureexec. As such, it will be removed in the next patch.
Here, set the new bprm->cap_elevated flag when setuid/setgid has happened
from bprm_fill_uid() or fscapabilities have been prepared. This temporarily
moves the bprm_secureexec hook to a static inline. The helper will be
removed in the next patch; this makes the step easier to review and bisect,
since this does not introduce any changes to inputs nor outputs to the
"elevated privileges" calculation.
The new flag is merged with the bprm->secureexec flag in setup_new_exec()
since this marks the end of any further prepare_binprm() calls.
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
When ns->level is not larger then cred->user_ns->level,
then ns can't be cred->user_ns's descendant, and
there is no a sense to search in parents.
So, break the cycle earlier and skip needless iterations.
v2: Change comment on suggested by Andy Lutomirski.
Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Mark all of the registration hooks as __ro_after_init (via the
__lsm_ro_after_init macro).
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Pull namespace updates from Eric Biederman:
"There is a lot here. A lot of these changes result in subtle user
visible differences in kernel behavior. I don't expect anything will
care but I will revert/fix things immediately if any regressions show
up.
From Seth Forshee there is a continuation of the work to make the vfs
ready for unpriviled mounts. We had thought the previous changes
prevented the creation of files outside of s_user_ns of a filesystem,
but it turns we missed the O_CREAT path. Ooops.
Pavel Tikhomirov and Oleg Nesterov worked together to fix a long
standing bug in the implemenation of PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER where only
children that are forked after the prctl are considered and not
children forked before the prctl. The only known user of this prctl
systemd forks all children after the prctl. So no userspace
regressions will occur. Holding earlier forked children to the same
rules as later forked children creates a semantic that is sane enough
to allow checkpoing of processes that use this feature.
There is a long delayed change by Nikolay Borisov to limit inotify
instances inside a user namespace.
Michael Kerrisk extends the API for files used to maniuplate
namespaces with two new trivial ioctls to allow discovery of the
hierachy and properties of namespaces.
Konstantin Khlebnikov with the help of Al Viro adds code that when a
network namespace exits purges it's sysctl entries from the dcache. As
in some circumstances this could use a lot of memory.
Vivek Goyal fixed a bug with stacked filesystems where the permissions
on the wrong inode were being checked.
I continue previous work on ptracing across exec. Allowing a file to
be setuid across exec while being ptraced if the tracer has enough
credentials in the user namespace, and if the process has CAP_SETUID
in it's own namespace. Proc files for setuid or otherwise undumpable
executables are now owned by the root in the user namespace of their
mm. Allowing debugging of setuid applications in containers to work
better.
A bug I introduced with permission checking and automount is now
fixed. The big change is to mark the mounts that the kernel initiates
as a result of an automount. This allows the permission checks in sget
to be safely suppressed for this kind of mount. As the permission
check happened when the original filesystem was mounted.
Finally a special case in the mount namespace is removed preventing
unbounded chains in the mount hash table, and making the semantics
simpler which benefits CRIU.
The vfs fix along with related work in ima and evm I believe makes us
ready to finish developing and merge fully unprivileged mounts of the
fuse filesystem. The cleanups of the mount namespace makes discussing
how to fix the worst case complexity of umount. The stacked filesystem
fixes pave the way for adding multiple mappings for the filesystem
uids so that efficient and safer containers can be implemented"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
proc/sysctl: Don't grab i_lock under sysctl_lock.
vfs: Use upper filesystem inode in bprm_fill_uid()
proc/sysctl: prune stale dentries during unregistering
mnt: Tuck mounts under others instead of creating shadow/side mounts.
prctl: propagate has_child_subreaper flag to every descendant
introduce the walk_process_tree() helper
nsfs: Add an ioctl() to return owner UID of a userns
fs: Better permission checking for submounts
exit: fix the setns() && PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER interaction
vfs: open() with O_CREAT should not create inodes with unknown ids
nsfs: Add an ioctl() to return the namespace type
proc: Better ownership of files for non-dumpable tasks in user namespaces
exec: Remove LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP
exec: Test the ptracer's saved cred to see if the tracee can gain caps
exec: Don't reset euid and egid when the tracee has CAP_SETUID
inotify: Convert to using per-namespace limits
With previous changes every location that tests for
LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP also tests for LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE making the
LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP redundant, so remove it.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Now that we have user namespaces and non-global capabilities verify
the tracer has capabilities in the relevant user namespace instead
of in the current_user_ns().
As the test for setting LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP is currently
ptracer_capable(p, current_user_ns()) and the new task credentials are
in current_user_ns() this change does not have any user visible change
and simply moves the test to where it is used, making the code easier
to read.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Don't reset euid and egid when the tracee has CAP_SETUID in
it's user namespace. I punted on relaxing this permission check
long ago but now that I have read this code closely it is clear
it is safe to test against CAP_SETUID in the user namespace.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
I am still tired of having to find indirect ways to determine
what security modules are active on a system. I have added
/sys/kernel/security/lsm, which contains a comma separated
list of the active security modules. No more groping around
in /proc/filesystems or other clever hacks.
Unchanged from previous versions except for being updated
to the latest security next branch.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Right now, various places in the kernel check for the existence of
getxattr, setxattr, and removexattr inode operations and directly call
those operations. Switch to helper functions and test for the IOP_XATTR
flag instead.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
If a process gets access to a mount from a different user
namespace, that process should not be able to take advantage of
setuid files or selinux entrypoints from that filesystem. Prevent
this by treating mounts from other mount namespaces and those not
owned by current_user_ns() or an ancestor as nosuid.
This will make it safer to allow more complex filesystems to be
mounted in non-root user namespaces.
This does not remove the need for MNT_LOCK_NOSUID. The setuid,
setgid, and file capability bits can no longer be abused if code in
a user namespace were to clear nosuid on an untrusted filesystem,
but this patch, by itself, is insufficient to protect the system
from abuse of files that, when execed, would increase MAC privilege.
As a more concrete explanation, any task that can manipulate a
vfsmount associated with a given user namespace already has
capabilities in that namespace and all of its descendents. If they
can cause a malicious setuid, setgid, or file-caps executable to
appear in that mount, then that executable will only allow them to
elevate privileges in exactly the set of namespaces in which they
are already privileges.
On the other hand, if they can cause a malicious executable to
appear with a dangerous MAC label, running it could change the
caller's security context in a way that should not have been
possible, even inside the namespace in which the task is confined.
As a hardening measure, this would have made CVE-2014-5207 much
more difficult to exploit.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Capability sets attached to files must be ignored except in the
user namespaces where the mounter is privileged, i.e. s_user_ns
and its descendants. Otherwise a vector exists for gaining
privileges in namespaces where a user is not already privileged.
Add a new helper function, current_in_user_ns(), to test whether a user
namespace is the same as or a descendant of another namespace.
Use this helper to determine whether a file's capability set
should be applied to the caps constructed during exec.
--EWB Replaced in_userns with the simpler current_in_userns.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Pull parallel filesystem directory handling update from Al Viro.
This is the main parallel directory work by Al that makes the vfs layer
able to do lookup and readdir in parallel within a single directory.
That's a big change, since this used to be all protected by the
directory inode mutex.
The inode mutex is replaced by an rwsem, and serialization of lookups of
a single name is done by a "in-progress" dentry marker.
The series begins with xattr cleanups, and then ends with switching
filesystems over to actually doing the readdir in parallel (switching to
the "iterate_shared()" that only takes the read lock).
A more detailed explanation of the process from Al Viro:
"The xattr work starts with some acl fixes, then switches ->getxattr to
passing inode and dentry separately. This is the point where the
things start to get tricky - that got merged into the very beginning
of the -rc3-based #work.lookups, to allow untangling the
security_d_instantiate() mess. The xattr work itself proceeds to
switch a lot of filesystems to generic_...xattr(); no complications
there.
After that initial xattr work, the series then does the following:
- untangle security_d_instantiate()
- convert a bunch of open-coded lookup_one_len_unlocked() to calls of
that thing; one such place (in overlayfs) actually yields a trivial
conflict with overlayfs fixes later in the cycle - overlayfs ended
up switching to a variant of lookup_one_len_unlocked() sans the
permission checks. I would've dropped that commit (it gets
overridden on merge from #ovl-fixes in #for-next; proper resolution
is to use the variant in mainline fs/overlayfs/super.c), but I
didn't want to rebase the damn thing - it was fairly late in the
cycle...
- some filesystems had managed to depend on lookup/lookup exclusion
for *fs-internal* data structures in a way that would break if we
relaxed the VFS exclusion. Fixing hadn't been hard, fortunately.
- core of that series - parallel lookup machinery, replacing
->i_mutex with rwsem, making lookup_slow() take it only shared. At
that point lookups happen in parallel; lookups on the same name
wait for the in-progress one to be done with that dentry.
Surprisingly little code, at that - almost all of it is in
fs/dcache.c, with fs/namei.c changes limited to lookup_slow() -
making it use the new primitive and actually switching to locking
shared.
- parallel readdir stuff - first of all, we provide the exclusion on
per-struct file basis, same as we do for read() vs lseek() for
regular files. That takes care of most of the needed exclusion in
readdir/readdir; however, these guys are trickier than lookups, so
I went for switching them one-by-one. To do that, a new method
'->iterate_shared()' is added and filesystems are switched to it
as they are either confirmed to be OK with shared lock on directory
or fixed to be OK with that. I hope to kill the original method
come next cycle (almost all in-tree filesystems are switched
already), but it's still not quite finished.
- several filesystems get switched to parallel readdir. The
interesting part here is dealing with dcache preseeding by readdir;
that needs minor adjustment to be safe with directory locked only
shared.
Most of the filesystems doing that got switched to in those
commits. Important exception: NFS. Turns out that NFS folks, with
their, er, insistence on VFS getting the fuck out of the way of the
Smart Filesystem Code That Knows How And What To Lock(tm) have
grown the locking of their own. They had their own homegrown
rwsem, with lookup/readdir/atomic_open being *writers* (sillyunlink
is the reader there). Of course, with VFS getting the fuck out of
the way, as requested, the actual smarts of the smart filesystem
code etc. had become exposed...
- do_last/lookup_open/atomic_open cleanups. As the result, open()
without O_CREAT locks the directory only shared. Including the
->atomic_open() case. Backmerge from #for-linus in the middle of
that - atomic_open() fix got brought in.
- then comes NFS switch to saner (VFS-based ;-) locking, killing the
homegrown "lookup and readdir are writers" kinda-sorta rwsem. All
exclusion for sillyunlink/lookup is done by the parallel lookups
mechanism. Exclusion between sillyunlink and rmdir is a real rwsem
now - rmdir being the writer.
Result: NFS lookups/readdirs/O_CREAT-less opens happen in parallel
now.
- the rest of the series consists of switching a lot of filesystems
to parallel readdir; in a lot of cases ->llseek() gets simplified
as well. One backmerge in there (again, #for-linus - rockridge
fix)"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (74 commits)
ext4: switch to ->iterate_shared()
hfs: switch to ->iterate_shared()
hfsplus: switch to ->iterate_shared()
hostfs: switch to ->iterate_shared()
hpfs: switch to ->iterate_shared()
hpfs: handle allocation failures in hpfs_add_pos()
gfs2: switch to ->iterate_shared()
f2fs: switch to ->iterate_shared()
afs: switch to ->iterate_shared()
befs: switch to ->iterate_shared()
befs: constify stuff a bit
isofs: switch to ->iterate_shared()
get_acorn_filename(): deobfuscate a bit
btrfs: switch to ->iterate_shared()
logfs: no need to lock directory in lseek
switch ecryptfs to ->iterate_shared
9p: switch to ->iterate_shared()
fat: switch to ->iterate_shared()
romfs, squashfs: switch to ->iterate_shared()
more trivial ->iterate_shared conversions
...
security_settime() uses a timespec, which is not year 2038 safe
on 32bit systems. Thus this patch introduces the security_settime64()
function with timespec64 type. We also convert the cap_settime() helper
function to use the 64bit types.
This patch then moves security_settime() to the header file as an
inline helper function so that existing users can be iteratively
converted.
None of the existing hooks is using the timespec argument and therefor
the patch is not making any functional changes.
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>,
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Cc: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linaro.org>
[jstultz: Reworded commit message]
Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
