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Filename Latest commit message Latest commit date
Jann Horn 0a7e658102 random: don't reset crng_init_cnt on urandom_read()
commit 6c8e11e08a5b74bb8a5cdd5cbc1e5143df0fba72 upstream.

At the moment, urandom_read() (used for /dev/urandom) resets crng_init_cnt
to zero when it is called at crng_init<2. This is inconsistent: We do it
for /dev/urandom reads, but not for the equivalent
getrandom(GRND_INSECURE).

(And worse, as Jason pointed out, we're only doing this as long as
maxwarn>0.)

crng_init_cnt is only read in crng_fast_load(); it is relevant at
crng_init==0 for determining when to switch to crng_init==1 (and where in
the RNG state array to write).

As far as I understand:

 - crng_init==0 means "we have nothing, we might just be returning the same
   exact numbers on every boot on every machine, we don't even have
   non-cryptographic randomness; we should shove every bit of entropy we
   can get into the RNG immediately"
 - crng_init==1 means "well we have something, it might not be
   cryptographic, but at least we're not gonna return the same data every
   time or whatever, it's probably good enough for TCP and ASLR and stuff;
   we now have time to build up actual cryptographic entropy in the input
   pool"
 - crng_init==2 means "this is supposed to be cryptographically secure now,
   but we'll keep adding more entropy just to be sure".

The current code means that if someone is pulling data from /dev/urandom
fast enough at crng_init==0, we'll keep resetting crng_init_cnt, and we'll
never make forward progress to crng_init==1. It seems to be intended to
prevent an attacker from bruteforcing the contents of small individual RNG
inputs on the way from crng_init==0 to crng_init==1, but that's misguided;
crng_init==1 isn't supposed to provide proper cryptographic security
anyway, RNG users who care about getting secure RNG output have to wait
until crng_init==2.

This code was inconsistent, and it probably made things worse - just get
rid of it.

Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-06-22 14:11:07 +02:00
arch random: remove unused irq_flags argument from add_interrupt_randomness() 2022-06-22 14:11:06 +02:00
block block: fix bio_clone_blkg_association() to associate with proper blkcg_gq 2022-06-14 18:11:50 +02:00
certs
crypto crypto: cryptd - Protect per-CPU resource by disabling BH. 2022-06-14 18:11:41 +02:00
Documentation x86/speculation/mmio: Add sysfs reporting for Processor MMIO Stale Data 2022-06-16 13:23:32 +02:00
drivers random: don't reset crng_init_cnt on urandom_read() 2022-06-22 14:11:07 +02:00
fs compat_ioctl: remove /dev/random commands 2022-06-22 14:11:03 +02:00
include random: early initialization of ChaCha constants 2022-06-22 14:11:06 +02:00
init Kconfig: add config option for asm goto w/ outputs 2022-06-14 18:11:50 +02:00
ipc ipc/mqueue: use get_tree_nodev() in mqueue_get_tree() 2022-06-14 18:11:41 +02:00
kernel random: remove unused irq_flags argument from add_interrupt_randomness() 2022-06-22 14:11:06 +02:00
lib lib/crypto: sha1: re-roll loops to reduce code size 2022-06-22 14:11:03 +02:00
LICENSES
mm hugetlb: fix huge_pmd_unshare address update 2022-06-14 18:11:48 +02:00
net tcp: fix tcp_mtup_probe_success vs wrong snd_cwnd 2022-06-14 18:12:03 +02:00
samples
scripts scripts/gdb: change kernel config dumping method 2022-06-14 18:12:02 +02:00
security efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs 2022-06-14 18:11:44 +02:00
sound ALSA: hda/conexant - Fix loopback issue with CX20632 2022-06-14 18:12:02 +02:00
tools netfilter: nat: really support inet nat without l3 address 2022-06-14 18:11:57 +02:00
usr
virt KVM: Prevent module exit until all VMs are freed 2022-04-15 14:18:27 +02:00
.clang-format
.cocciconfig
.get_maintainer.ignore
.gitattributes
.gitignore
.mailmap
COPYING
CREDITS
Kbuild
Kconfig
MAINTAINERS MAINTAINERS: co-maintain random.c 2022-06-22 14:11:05 +02:00
Makefile Linux 5.4.199 2022-06-16 13:23:32 +02:00
README

Linux kernel
============

There are several guides for kernel developers and users. These guides can
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Documentation/admin-guide/README.rst first.

In order to build the documentation, use ``make htmldocs`` or
``make pdfdocs``.  The formatted documentation can also be read online at:

    https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/

There are various text files in the Documentation/ subdirectory,
several of them using the Restructured Text markup notation.

Please read the Documentation/process/changes.rst file, as it contains the
requirements for building and running the kernel, and information about
the problems which may result by upgrading your kernel.