android_kernel_motorola_sm6375/arch
Repository files (latest commit first)
Filename Latest commit message Latest commit date
Tengda Wu 64773b3ea0 arm64/ptrace: Fix stack-out-of-bounds read in regs_get_kernel_stack_nth()
[ Upstream commit 39dfc971e42d886e7df01371cd1bef505076d84c ]

KASAN reports a stack-out-of-bounds read in regs_get_kernel_stack_nth().

Call Trace:
[   97.283505] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in regs_get_kernel_stack_nth+0xa8/0xc8
[   97.284677] Read of size 8 at addr ffff800089277c10 by task 1.sh/2550
[   97.285732]
[   97.286067] CPU: 7 PID: 2550 Comm: 1.sh Not tainted 6.6.0+ #11
[   97.287032] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
[   97.287815] Call trace:
[   97.288279]  dump_backtrace+0xa0/0x128
[   97.288946]  show_stack+0x20/0x38
[   97.289551]  dump_stack_lvl+0x78/0xc8
[   97.290203]  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x84/0x3c8
[   97.291159]  print_report+0xb0/0x280
[   97.291792]  kasan_report+0x84/0xd0
[   97.292421]  __asan_load8+0x9c/0xc0
[   97.293042]  regs_get_kernel_stack_nth+0xa8/0xc8
[   97.293835]  process_fetch_insn+0x770/0xa30
[   97.294562]  kprobe_trace_func+0x254/0x3b0
[   97.295271]  kprobe_dispatcher+0x98/0xe0
[   97.295955]  kprobe_breakpoint_handler+0x1b0/0x210
[   97.296774]  call_break_hook+0xc4/0x100
[   97.297451]  brk_handler+0x24/0x78
[   97.298073]  do_debug_exception+0xac/0x178
[   97.298785]  el1_dbg+0x70/0x90
[   97.299344]  el1h_64_sync_handler+0xcc/0xe8
[   97.300066]  el1h_64_sync+0x78/0x80
[   97.300699]  kernel_clone+0x0/0x500
[   97.301331]  __arm64_sys_clone+0x70/0x90
[   97.302084]  invoke_syscall+0x68/0x198
[   97.302746]  el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x11c/0x150
[   97.303569]  do_el0_svc+0x38/0x50
[   97.304164]  el0_svc+0x44/0x1d8
[   97.304749]  el0t_64_sync_handler+0x100/0x130
[   97.305500]  el0t_64_sync+0x188/0x190
[   97.306151]
[   97.306475] The buggy address belongs to stack of task 1.sh/2550
[   97.307461]  and is located at offset 0 in frame:
[   97.308257]  __se_sys_clone+0x0/0x138
[   97.308910]
[   97.309241] This frame has 1 object:
[   97.309873]  [48, 184) 'args'
[   97.309876]
[   97.310749] The buggy address belongs to the virtual mapping at
[   97.310749]  [ffff800089270000, ffff800089279000) created by:
[   97.310749]  dup_task_struct+0xc0/0x2e8
[   97.313347]
[   97.313674] The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
[   97.314604] page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x14f69a
[   97.315885] flags: 0x15ffffe00000000(node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0xfffff)
[   97.316957] raw: 015ffffe00000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
[   97.318207] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[   97.319445] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[   97.320371]
[   97.320694] Memory state around the buggy address:
[   97.321511]  ffff800089277b00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[   97.322681]  ffff800089277b80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[   97.323846] >ffff800089277c00: 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[   97.325023]                          ^
[   97.325683]  ffff800089277c80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3
[   97.326856]  ffff800089277d00: f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

This issue seems to be related to the behavior of some gcc compilers and
was also fixed on the s390 architecture before:

 commit d93a855c31b7 ("s390/ptrace: Avoid KASAN false positives in regs_get_kernel_stack_nth()")

As described in that commit, regs_get_kernel_stack_nth() has confirmed that
`addr` is on the stack, so reading the value at `*addr` should be allowed.
Use READ_ONCE_NOCHECK() helper to silence the KASAN check for this case.

Fixes: 0a8ea52c3e ("arm64: Add HAVE_REGS_AND_STACK_ACCESS_API feature")
Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu <wutengda@huaweicloud.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250604005533.1278992-1-wutengda@huaweicloud.com
[will: Use '*addr' as the argument to READ_ONCE_NOCHECK()]
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-06-27 11:02:58 +01:00
..
alpha alpha: replace hardcoded stack offsets with autogenerated ones 2025-03-13 12:43:18 +01:00
arc ARC: build: Try to guess GCC variant of cross compiler 2025-01-09 13:23:36 +01:00
arm ARM: dts: am335x-bone-common: Increase MDIO reset deassert delay to 50ms 2025-06-27 11:02:57 +01:00
arm64 arm64/ptrace: Fix stack-out-of-bounds read in regs_get_kernel_stack_nth() 2025-06-27 11:02:58 +01:00
c6x
csky
h8300
hexagon hexagon: Fix unbalanced spinlock in die() 2025-03-13 12:43:01 +01:00
ia64
m68k m68k: mac: Fix macintosh_config for Mac II 2025-06-27 11:02:45 +01:00
microblaze
mips mips: Add -std= flag specified in KBUILD_CFLAGS to vdso CFLAGS 2025-06-27 11:02:52 +01:00
nds32
nios2 nios2: force update_mmu_cache on spurious tlb-permission--related pagefaults 2025-06-27 11:02:54 +01:00
openrisc
parisc parisc: fix building with gcc-15 2025-06-27 11:02:51 +01:00
powerpc powerpc/eeh: Fix missing PE bridge reconfiguration during VFIO EEH recovery 2025-06-27 11:02:56 +01:00
riscv riscv: Avoid fortify warning in syscall_get_arguments() 2025-05-02 07:39:20 +02:00
s390 s390/pci: Fix __pcilg_mio_inuser() inline assembly 2025-06-27 11:02:58 +01:00
sh sh: cpuinfo: Fix a warning for CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK 2024-12-14 19:44:37 +01:00
sparc sparc/mm: disable preemption in lazy mmu mode 2025-05-02 07:39:16 +02:00
um um: let 'make clean' properly clean underlying SUBARCH as well 2025-06-04 14:32:37 +02:00
unicore32
x86 Revert "x86/bugs: Make spectre user default depend on MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2" on v6.6 and older 2025-06-27 11:02:56 +01:00
xtensa
.gitignore
Kconfig