sycamore_row_5G: checkpoint V18 stock TEE identity

Android.mk

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+LOCAL_PATH := $(call my-dir)
+
+ifeq ($(TARGET_DEVICE),sycamore_row_5G)
+
+define sycamore-recovery-binary
+include $$(CLEAR_VARS)
+LOCAL_MODULE := $(1)
+LOCAL_MODULE_STEM := $(2)
+LOCAL_MODULE_CLASS := EXECUTABLES
+LOCAL_MODULE_PATH := $$(TARGET_RECOVERY_ROOT_OUT)/$(3)
+LOCAL_SRC_FILES := recovery/root/$(3)/$(2)
+LOCAL_MODULE_TAGS := optional
+LOCAL_CHECK_ELF_FILES := false
+LOCAL_STRIP_MODULE := false
+include $$(BUILD_PREBUILT)
+endef
+
+define sycamore-recovery-library
+include $$(CLEAR_VARS)
+LOCAL_MODULE := $(1)
+LOCAL_MODULE_STEM := $(2)
+LOCAL_MODULE_CLASS := SHARED_LIBRARIES
+LOCAL_MODULE_PATH := $$(TARGET_RECOVERY_ROOT_OUT)/$(3)
+LOCAL_SRC_FILES := recovery/root/$(3)/$(2)
+LOCAL_MODULE_TAGS := optional
+LOCAL_CHECK_ELF_FILES := false
+LOCAL_STRIP_MODULE := false
+include $$(BUILD_PREBUILT)
+endef
+
+$(eval $(call sycamore-recovery-binary,sycamore_teei_daemon,teei_daemon,vendor/bin))
+$(eval $(call sycamore-recovery-binary,sycamore_keymint_service,android.hardware.security.keymint@2.0-service.beanpod,vendor/bin/hw))
+$(eval $(call sycamore-recovery-binary,sycamore_gatekeeper_service,android.hardware.gatekeeper@1.0-service,vendor/bin/hw))
+
+$(eval $(call sycamore-recovery-library,sycamore_keymint_ndk_v2,android.hardware.security.keymint-V2-ndk.so,vendor/lib64))
+$(eval $(call sycamore-recovery-library,sycamore_secureclock_ndk_v1,android.hardware.security.secureclock-V1-ndk.so,vendor/lib64))
+$(eval $(call sycamore-recovery-library,sycamore_sharedsecret_ndk_v1,android.hardware.security.sharedsecret-V1-ndk.so,vendor/lib64))
+$(eval $(call sycamore-recovery-library,sycamore_tee_common,libTEECommon.so,vendor/lib64))
+$(eval $(call sycamore-recovery-library,sycamore_tee_imsg_log,libimsg_log.so,vendor/lib64))
+$(eval $(call sycamore-recovery-library,sycamore_tee_vfs,libteei_daemon_vfs.so,vendor/lib64))
+$(eval $(call sycamore-recovery-library,sycamore_gatekeeper_impl,android.hardware.gatekeeper@1.0-impl.so,vendor/lib64/hw))
+$(eval $(call sycamore-recovery-library,sycamore_gatekeeper_tee,gatekeeper.beanpod.so,vendor/lib64/hw))
+$(eval $(call sycamore-recovery-library,sycamore_gatekeeper_soft,libSoftGatekeeper.so,vendor/lib64/hw))
+$(eval $(call sycamore-recovery-library,sycamore_gatekeeper_hidl,android.hardware.gatekeeper@1.0.so,vendor/lib64))
+
+# Keep the stock Android 16 private KeyMint C++ ABI family coherent. These are
+# selected only by the KeyMint/Gatekeeper service-specific LD_LIBRARY_PATH.
+$(eval $(call sycamore-recovery-library,sycamore_keymint_private_utils,lib_android_keymaster_keymint_utils.so,vendor/lib64))
+$(eval $(call sycamore-recovery-library,sycamore_keymaster_messages,libkeymaster_messages.so,vendor/lib64))
+$(eval $(call sycamore-recovery-library,sycamore_keymaster_portable,libkeymaster_portable.so,vendor/lib64))
+$(eval $(call sycamore-recovery-library,sycamore_keymint_private,libkeymint.so,vendor/lib64))
+$(eval $(call sycamore-recovery-library,sycamore_puresoft_keymaster,libpuresoftkeymasterdevice.so,vendor/lib64))
+$(eval $(call sycamore-recovery-library,sycamore_soft_attestation,libsoft_attestation_cert.so,vendor/lib64))
+$(eval $(call sycamore-recovery-library,sycamore_cppbor_external,libcppbor_external.so,vendor/lib64))
+$(eval $(call sycamore-recovery-library,sycamore_cppcose_rkp,libcppcose_rkp.so,vendor/lib64))
+
+# Diagnostic V8 only: observe the 64-byte STORAGE_KEY at Beanpod's final
+# userspace boundary, then tail-call the byte-identical stock A16 function.
+include $(CLEAR_VARS)
+LOCAL_MODULE := libsycamore_keytrace
+LOCAL_SRC_FILES := diagnostics/keytrace.cpp
+LOCAL_MODULE_CLASS := SHARED_LIBRARIES
+LOCAL_MODULE_PATH := $(TARGET_RECOVERY_ROOT_OUT)/vendor/lib64
+LOCAL_MODULE_TAGS := optional
+LOCAL_SHARED_LIBRARIES := libcrypto libdl liblog
+include $(BUILD_SHARED_LIBRARY)
+
+endif

AndroidProducts.mk

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+PRODUCT_MAKEFILES := \
+    $(LOCAL_DIR)/twrp_sycamore_row_5G.mk
+
+COMMON_LUNCH_CHOICES := \
+    twrp_sycamore_row_5G-eng

BoardConfig.mk

@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+DEVICE_PATH := device/motorola/sycamore_row_5G
+
+# Architecture (64-bit recovery; runtime CPU properties identify Cortex-A55/A76 cores).
+TARGET_ARCH := arm64
+TARGET_ARCH_VARIANT := armv8-a
+TARGET_CPU_ABI := arm64-v8a
+TARGET_CPU_ABI2 :=
+TARGET_CPU_VARIANT := generic
+TARGET_CPU_VARIANT_RUNTIME := cortex-a55
+TARGET_USES_64_BIT_BINDER := true
+
+# Platform and assertions.
+TARGET_BOARD_PLATFORM := mt6835
+TARGET_BOOTLOADER_BOARD_NAME := sycamore_row_5G
+TARGET_NO_BOOTLOADER := true
+TARGET_OTA_ASSERT_DEVICE := sycamore_row_5G,XT2575-4
+# Stock first API level is 35, but twrp-12.1 is an API 32 build and rejects a
+# BOARD_SHIPPING_API_LEVEL newer than its platform SDK. Keep the measured value
+# in the bring-up log rather than emitting a false API-32 build property.
+
+# The stock Beanpod KeyMint service configures its TA from these properties.
+# Pristine A16 vendor_boot supplies 2026-07-05 for both, and the live metadata
+# key blob is bound to OS patch level 202607.  Leaving the TWRP 12.1 defaults
+# (202204 / empty) makes secure world reject that newer blob as a downgrade.
+# These are exact stock inputs, not the old twrpdtgen 2099 bypass.
+PLATFORM_SECURITY_PATCH := 2026-07-05
+VENDOR_SECURITY_PATCH := 2026-07-05
+
+# Exact factory kernel, DTB, and vendor_boot v4 header addresses. These values
+# are mechanically extracted from the pristine ZUI 17.5 vendor_boot image.
+TARGET_PREBUILT_KERNEL := $(DEVICE_PATH)/prebuilt/kernel
+BOARD_INCLUDE_DTB_IN_BOOTIMG := true
+BOARD_PREBUILT_DTBIMAGE_DIR := $(DEVICE_PATH)/prebuilt/dtb
+BOARD_BOOT_HEADER_VERSION := 4
+BOARD_KERNEL_PAGESIZE := 4096
+BOARD_KERNEL_BASE := 0x40000000
+BOARD_RAMDISK_USE_LZ4 := true
+BOARD_KERNEL_SEPARATED_DTBO := true
+BOARD_MKBOOTIMG_ARGS += --header_version $(BOARD_BOOT_HEADER_VERSION)
+BOARD_MKBOOTIMG_ARGS += --kernel_offset 0x00000000
+BOARD_MKBOOTIMG_ARGS += --ramdisk_offset 0x26f00000
+BOARD_MKBOOTIMG_ARGS += --tags_offset 0x07c80000
+BOARD_MKBOOTIMG_ARGS += --dtb_offset 0x07c80000
+BOARD_MKBOOTIMG_ARGS += --vendor_cmdline "bootopt=64S3,32N2,64N2"
+
+# Preserve the pristine stock vendor ramdisk byte-for-byte as the unnamed base
+# PLATFORM ramdisk. AOSP then appends the generated TWRP RECOVERY fragment.
+# This matches the factory vendor_boot v4 layout and preserves overlay ordering.
+BOARD_PREBUILT_VENDOR_RAMDISK := \
+    $(DEVICE_PATH)/prebuilt/vendor_ramdisk/platform.cpio.lz4
+
+# Physical partition sizes measured from GPT/factory images.
+BOARD_BOOTIMAGE_PARTITION_SIZE := 67108864
+BOARD_VENDOR_BOOTIMAGE_PARTITION_SIZE := 67108864
+BOARD_INIT_BOOT_IMAGE_PARTITION_SIZE := 8388608
+BOARD_DTBOIMG_PARTITION_SIZE := 8388608
+BOARD_PREBUILT_DTBOIMAGE := $(DEVICE_PATH)/prebuilt/dtbo.img
+
+# Live liblp metadata: v10.2, 64 KiB max metadata, three slots, virtual A/B.
+BOARD_SUPER_PARTITION_SIZE := 11811160064
+BOARD_SUPER_PARTITION_GROUPS := main_dynamic_partitions
+BOARD_MAIN_DYNAMIC_PARTITIONS_SIZE := 11809062912
+# API-32 build/make cannot generate system_dlkm. It remains in recovery.fstab
+# and live liblp metadata; this recovery-only target does not build super.
+BOARD_MAIN_DYNAMIC_PARTITIONS_PARTITION_LIST := \
+    odm_dlkm product system system_ext vendor vendor_dlkm
+
+TARGET_COPY_OUT_SYSTEM_EXT := system_ext
+TARGET_COPY_OUT_PRODUCT := product
+TARGET_COPY_OUT_VENDOR := vendor
+TARGET_COPY_OUT_VENDOR_DLKM := vendor_dlkm
+TARGET_COPY_OUT_ODM_DLKM := odm_dlkm
+
+BOARD_SYSTEMIMAGE_FILE_SYSTEM_TYPE := erofs
+BOARD_SYSTEM_EXTIMAGE_FILE_SYSTEM_TYPE := erofs
+BOARD_PRODUCTIMAGE_FILE_SYSTEM_TYPE := erofs
+BOARD_VENDORIMAGE_FILE_SYSTEM_TYPE := erofs
+BOARD_VENDOR_DLKMIMAGE_FILE_SYSTEM_TYPE := erofs
+BOARD_ODM_DLKMIMAGE_FILE_SYSTEM_TYPE := erofs
+BOARD_USERDATAIMAGE_FILE_SYSTEM_TYPE := f2fs
+TARGET_USERIMAGES_USE_EXT4 := true
+TARGET_USERIMAGES_USE_F2FS := true
+
+# Recovery lives in vendor_boot. AOSP build/make emits a v4 RECOVERY ramdisk
+# fragment when both switches below are true; stock's platform fragment already
+# proves that all recovery resources belong in vendor_boot on this device.
+TARGET_NO_RECOVERY := true
+TW_HAS_NO_RECOVERY_PARTITION := true
+BOARD_EXCLUDE_KERNEL_FROM_RECOVERY_IMAGE := true
+BOARD_MOVE_RECOVERY_RESOURCES_TO_VENDOR_BOOT := true
+BOARD_INCLUDE_RECOVERY_RAMDISK_IN_VENDOR_BOOT := true
+TARGET_RECOVERY_FSTAB := $(DEVICE_PATH)/recovery.fstab
+TARGET_RECOVERY_PIXEL_FORMAT := RGBX_8888
+BOARD_HAS_NO_SELECT_BUTTON := true
+
+# V18: exact production teei_daemon domain and narrowly scoped Microtrust
+# device labels.  The platform policy already defines tee/tee_exec and its
+# init transition; this directory supplies only Sycamore-specific paths/types.
+BOARD_VENDOR_SEPOLICY_DIRS += $(DEVICE_PATH)/sepolicy/vendor
+
+# Display values measured from Android.
+TARGET_SCREEN_WIDTH := 1600
+TARGET_SCREEN_HEIGHT := 2560
+TARGET_SCREEN_DENSITY := 320
+TW_THEME := portrait_hdpi
+TW_FRAMERATE := 90
+
+# A/B, dynamic partitions, fastbootd and storage.
+AB_OTA_UPDATER := true
+TW_INCLUDE_FASTBOOTD := true
+TW_INTERNAL_STORAGE_PATH := "/data/media/0"
+TW_INTERNAL_STORAGE_MOUNT_POINT := "data"
+TW_BACKUP_DATA_MEDIA := true
+TW_USB_STORAGE := false
+# Runtime diagnostic: the initial configfs ADB gadget works, but entering the
+# GUI makes TWRP request mtp,adb.  This tree has no configfs mtp,adb property
+# action, so that transition unbinds the UDC and loses all host enumeration.
+# Keep the proven adb-only gadget until MTK configfs MTP is implemented.
+TW_EXCLUDE_MTP := true
+
+# Tree-only FBE diagnostic: avoid twrpApex::loadApexImage(), whose TWRP 12.1
+# implementation seeks an already-closed payload fd. Recovery's own crypto
+# binaries and libraries are packaged in the ramdisk, so first prove the stock
+# KeyMint/TEE chain without depending on Android's runtime APEX mounts. The
+# generic source correction is retained separately as patch 0002.
+TW_EXCLUDE_APEX := true
+
+# Stock FBE v2 + metadata encryption. Branch must provide Android 15/16 crypto.
+# Temporary first-hardware-boot diagnostic: keep /data encrypted and unmounted,
+# and bypass the synchronous Android 16 metadata/FBE decrypt path so the GUI
+# can start.  Re-enable these only after the KeyMint/Keystore2 dependency chain
+# is made compatible with the stock Android 16 vendor environment.
+SYCAMORE_DIAGNOSTIC_NO_DECRYPT := false
+ifneq ($(SYCAMORE_DIAGNOSTIC_NO_DECRYPT),true)
+TW_INCLUDE_CRYPTO := true
+TW_INCLUDE_CRYPTO_FBE := true
+TW_INCLUDE_FBE_METADATA_DECRYPT := true
+endif
+BOARD_USES_METADATA_PARTITION := true
+
+# Bring-up/debug essentials; no missing-dependency escape hatch.
+TARGET_USES_LOGD := true
+TWRP_INCLUDE_LOGCAT := true
+TW_INCLUDE_REPACKTOOLS := true
+TW_INCLUDE_RESETPROP := true
+TW_INCLUDE_LIBRESETPROP := true
+TW_EXCLUDE_DEFAULT_USB_INIT := true
+TW_DEFAULT_LANGUAGE := en
+TW_EXTRA_LANGUAGES := true
+
+# Preserve the exact factory vendor_boot AVB fingerprint independently of the
+# recovery build fingerprint.
+BOARD_AVB_VENDOR_BOOT_FINGERPRINT := Motorola/XT2575-4/XT2575-4:15/AP3A.240905.015.A2/9bdeac_017:user/release-keys
+
+# Match the stock algorithm-NONE vendor_boot hash-footer design. The salt is
+# extracted from the pristine footer; no signing key is used or invented.
+BOARD_AVB_ENABLE := true
+BOARD_AVB_VENDOR_BOOT_ADD_HASH_FOOTER_ARGS += \
+    --salt 11503e95ee971adc6c444e3ae47f564f178032ee9bbcf99d2ccfdc0895c67ed7
+
+# Removable storage filesystem support.
+TW_INCLUDE_NTFS_3G := true

CMD_0X18_INVESTIGATION.md

@@ -0,0 +1,228 @@
+# Sycamore Android 16 FBE cmd 0x18 investigation
+
+Date: 2026-08-27
+
+Baseline: hardware-tested V14 wrapped-first vendor_boot, SHA-256
+`d657365e5c14ba0bc1e93e9fc0ec38acb18f935e222d1bae66377011b96b9d15`.
+
+Evidence labels in this report are **PROVEN**, **EXPECTED**, **UNKNOWN**, and
+**EXCLUDED**.
+
+## A. Recovery state immediately before the first cmd 0x18
+
+The first V14 conversion is at `v14-native-runtime-failure/logcat-all.txt:2942-2957`,
+at 19:01:29.957-19:01:29.959. Before that point recovery had already proven:
+
+- `vendor.soter.teei.init=INIT_OK`
+- `vendor.soter.teei.km.init=config_patch_level_sucess`
+- `vendor.soter.teei.km.version=v2.0.0`
+- `vendor.soter.teei.persist=OPEN`
+- `vendor.soter.teei.rpmb.flag=ok`
+- persist selector 3
+- successful c09 TA load, secure-storage manager startup, physical RPMB commands,
+  `rpmb key is programmed`, KeyMint configuration, SharedSecret, metadata unwrap,
+  systemwide outer unwrap, and one stock-shaped Begin/Update/Finish sequence.
+
+The retained recovery property dump does not contain:
+
+- `vendor.soter.teei.googlekey.status`
+- `vendor.soter.teei.logini`
+
+Recovery later logs `logini thread failed` at 19:02:05.108, about 35 seconds after
+the first failure. This proves a final recovery-state difference, but does not prove
+that logini participates in cmd 0x18.
+
+## B. Healthy-stock Soter comparison
+
+The archived stock snapshot contains:
+
+| Property | Stock snapshot | V14 retained state before/around failure |
+|---|---|---|
+| `vendor.soter.teei.googlekey.status` | `ok` | absent |
+| `vendor.soter.teei.init` | `INIT_OK` | `INIT_OK` |
+| `vendor.soter.teei.km.init` | `config_patch_level_sucess` | same |
+| `vendor.soter.teei.km.version` | `v2.0.0` | `v2.0.0` |
+| `vendor.soter.teei.logini` | `start` | absent; later logini thread failure |
+| `vendor.soter.teei.persist` | `OPEN` | `OPEN` |
+| `vendor.soter.teei.rpmb.flag` | `ok` | `ok` |
+
+Stock `microtrust.rc:245-246` sets `vendor.soter.teei.logini=start` on the Android
+`post-fs-data` trigger. It is an init-set request to `teei_daemon`, not proof by
+itself that a secure-world transition completed. The stock property snapshot was
+captured after DE storage was available, so it cannot prove that logini preceded
+stock's first storage-key conversion. Android init describes `post-fs-data` as the
+stage at which `/data` has already been mounted; therefore forcing logini before
+conversion would not reproduce a proven stock ordering.
+
+No local rc file was found that directly sets `googlekey.status`. The value is
+therefore **EXPECTED** to be service/secure-world-derived, but its exact setter and
+pre-conversion timing remain **UNKNOWN**.
+
+Conclusion: `persist=OPEN` and `rpmb.flag=ok` are matched and correspond to observed
+real VFS/RPMB activity. `logini` and `googlekey.status` differ in final visibility,
+but neither is yet connected to cmd 0x18 timing.
+
+## C. Exact 64-byte storage-key provenance
+
+The source directory is `/data/unencrypted/key`:
+
+1. `keymaster_key_blob` is a 444-byte ordinary KeyMint AES wrapping-key blob,
+   SHA-256
+   `24449b28dedeecc82b0abfb571ef6aa93151608e841fbbf9dd9bdb907ff89c87`.
+2. `secdiscardable` contributes to the application ID computed by
+   `KeyStorage.cpp::generateAppId()`.
+3. `encrypted_key` is a 92-byte AES-GCM container: 12-byte nonce, 64-byte
+   ciphertext/plaintext length, and 16-byte tag. Its SHA-256 is
+   `7700695d0e5c1605d9d1c56669cb4130588c1054766ac735488fa76f4fd47312`.
+4. `retrieveKey()` reads the files at `system/vold/KeyStorage.cpp:630-652`.
+5. `decryptWithKeymasterKey()` authenticates and decrypts the 92-byte container.
+6. The resulting 64-byte plaintext is the proprietary `TAG_STORAGE_KEY` blob.
+7. `exportWrappedStorageKey()` at `system/vold/KeyStorage.cpp:189-197` copies it
+   without transformation into `Keymaster::exportKey()`.
+8. `Keymaster::exportKey()` at `system/vold/Keymaster.cpp:167-191` places the same
+   bytes in a `Domain::BLOB` descriptor.
+9. Keystore2 at `system/security/keystore2/src/security_level.rs:892-962` passes
+   the byte vector unchanged to `IKeyMintDevice::convertStorageKeyToEphemeral()`.
+10. Beanpod serializes the legacy export request as 12-byte empty AuthorizationSet,
+    4-byte RAW KeyFormat, 4-byte blob length, and the 64-byte blob: 84 bytes total.
+
+V14 hash-only checkpoints A, B, C, and D all report 64 bytes with SHA-256
+`3c36a06c93c07adeda069dd413b2df8f2e9b54371f3920e5de40ea6f318e8f83`.
+The complete 84-byte request SHA-256 is
+`7c4f5fdd21de15b396f5b739cbb41f32a3944046902c786ceed9a2b829e56647`.
+
+No raw key, nonce, HMAC, or credential bytes are recorded. This is intentional:
+lengths and hashes prove transport identity without exposing live key material.
+
+The 64-byte length is **PROVEN expected for this exact existing Sycamore blob**:
+stock decrypts the same key lineage, the authenticated outer container has a
+64-byte plaintext, and the TA reports `DeserializeAuthEncryptedBlob ... (64)`.
+
+## D. Recovery code path and cmd 0x18 construction
+
+`fscrypt_initialize_systemwide_keys()` at `system/vold/FsCrypt.cpp:452-495`
+retrieves `/data/unencrypted/key`, then `install_storage_key()` at lines 268-279
+calls `exportWrappedStorageKey()` when hardware-wrapped mode is selected.
+
+The request contains:
+
+- empty client/application AuthorizationSets;
+- `KeyFormat::RAW`;
+- the unmodified 64-byte opaque blob;
+- no credential, SID, auth token, application ID, or application data.
+
+Beanpod command `0x18` is its legacy Keymaster export-key command encoding. It is
+not a distinct 0x18-only userspace serializer invented by TWRP.
+
+## E. Android 16 comparison
+
+Android 16 AOSP `system/vold` retains the same architecture:
+
+- vold passes the opaque storage key as `Domain::BLOB` to Keystore2;
+- Keystore2 calls `convertStorageKeyToEphemeral()` directly;
+- only `KEY_REQUIRES_UPGRADE` invokes `upgradeKey()` and retries;
+- vold intentionally continues storing its original storage blob because its outer
+  wrapper already handles version binding.
+
+V14 follows this behavior. Beanpod returns `INVALID_KEY_BLOB`, not
+`KEY_REQUIRES_UPGRADE`, so the absent upgrade retry is correct.
+
+Material source drift found in the old tree is creation-side, not conversion-side:
+
+- the local `generateWrappedStorageKey()` requests rollback resistance through its
+  generic generator and adds private `KM_TAG_FBE_ICE`;
+- newer AOSP avoids rollback resistance for newly generated storage keys.
+
+Neither changes the already-existing 64-byte stock blob or its conversion request.
+The exact stock A16 vold binary contains `wrappedkey_v0`,
+`fscrypt_initialize_systemwide_keys`, and the same ephemeral-key path. A
+syntactically or semantically obsolete recovery request is therefore **EXCLUDED at
+the presently visible boundary**.
+
+## F. Public recovery references
+
+- Agate: credible working TWRP + Microtrust/Beanpod + FBE/metadata reference, but
+  userdata lacks `wrappedkey_v0`; it does not exercise cmd 0x18.
+- Pissarro: useful Beanpod/TEEI startup ordering, but no proven hardware-wrapped
+  storage-key decryption.
+- Air: closest MT6835 architecture reference, but crypto flags are disabled and the
+  tree is explicitly WIP.
+- Dew: modern AIDL KeyMint/Keystore2 architecture, but WIP and no verified
+  hardware-wrapped-key decryption result.
+- TB351FU: valuable modern Lenovo Soter property control; its published recovery
+  reports encrypted internal storage inaccessible and its stock fstab does not
+  establish hardware-wrapped-key use.
+
+No verified public “unicorn” was found that simultaneously demonstrates MediaTek,
+Microtrust/TEEI, Beanpod, `wrappedkey_v0`, and successful recovery decryption.
+
+## G. Microtrust hidden state
+
+The MT6895 public driver names `boot_decryto_lock`, `boot_soter_flag`,
+`keymaster_call_flag`, `soter_error_flag`, and `teei_capi_ready`, and enforces
+`teei_daemon` identity for VFS calls. These establish that hidden kernel/secure-world
+state exists. Sycamore runtime proves VFS, TA load, RPMB, and ordinary KeyMint calls
+advance far enough to work.
+
+No local Sycamore kernel source exposes equivalent variables, and no retained trace
+connects any one of them to cmd 0x18. They remain architectural context, not a
+root-cause result.
+
+The exact Sycamore TA is a 930,857-byte signed/encrypted Microtrust container, not
+an ELF image, so normal `readelf`/`objdump` analysis cannot isolate its dispatcher.
+Runtime secure-world diagnostics nevertheless identify the decisive path:
+
+`ParseKeyBlob()` -> `DeserializeAuthEncryptedBlob()` -> `AES_decrypt_ctr()` ->
+integrity/hash comparison failure -> `-33`.
+
+This is after the 64-byte blob has reached authenticated blob decoding. It strongly
+favors a structurally recognized blob whose authentication/derivation context does
+not reproduce stock over a malformed 84-byte request.
+
+## H. Ranked remaining causes
+
+1. **Medium-high:** secure-world storage-key authentication/KDF context differs
+   between normal boot and recovery. This best matches the TA's integrity comparison
+   failure while ordinary blobs and the same session work.
+2. **Medium:** a storage-specific secure-world initialization transition occurs in
+   stock but not recovery before conversion. `googlekey.status`/logini are observable
+   leads, but their timing and causal relationship are unproven.
+3. **Medium-low:** the retained 64-byte blob depends on secure-storage lineage/state
+   not exercised by ordinary metadata keys. RPMB transport works, but that does not
+   prove every SST namespace/derived key is identical.
+4. **Low:** userspace serialization or Android-version drift. A16 and recovery paths
+   match, and A/B/C/D plus the complete request hash exclude mutation.
+5. **Low:** malformed length/version presented by vold. The outer container
+   authenticates, 64 bytes is the actual stored object, and TA reaches integrity
+   comparison rather than rejecting request structure.
+
+Root-of-Trust/device-lock state remains a possible input to item 1, not a proven
+cause. Current-stock success under the same raw unlocked/orange boot properties
+prevents asserting a simple property-level ROT mismatch.
+
+## I. Best next controlled experiment
+
+The smallest justified next artifact is diagnostic-only: snapshot the seven Soter
+properties inside `Keymaster::exportKey()` immediately before the first
+`convertStorageKeyToEphemeral()` call. This proves exact boundary-time recovery
+state without setting properties, changing service order, exposing secrets, or
+altering the request.
+
+Do **not** set `logini=start` yet. Stock sets it on `post-fs-data`, and available
+evidence does not prove that doing so before cmd 0x18 is stock-equivalent or safe.
+
+The stock-side unresolved requirement is a trustworthy early-boot timing capture.
+The existing post-DE stock property dump cannot answer it, and invasive stock
+instrumentation could invalidate the control.
+
+## J. Exact proposed change
+
+One diagnostic addition in `system/vold/Keymaster.cpp`, immediately before
+`securityLevel->convertStorageKeyToEphemeral(...)`:
+
+- read and log only the seven public `vendor.soter.teei.*` property strings;
+- keep the existing 64-byte length/SHA-256 checkpoint;
+- do not set any property or alter control flow.
+
+No TA, Beanpod, Keystore2, KeyStorage, init, fstab, DTB, PLATFORM fragment, or key
+file would change functionally.

README.md

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+Device configuration for Motorola Moto Pad 2026 (codenamed "sycamore_row_5G")
+=========================================
+
+The Motorola Moto Pad 2026 / XT2575-4 (codenamed _"sycamore_row_5G"_) is an Android tablet from Motorola Mobility based on the MediaTek MT8755 platform.
+
+This device tree is intended for building Team Win Recovery Project (TWRP).
+
+## Device specifications
+
+Basic   | Spec Sheet
+-------:|:-------------------------
+Model   | Motorola XT2575-4
+Codename | sycamore_row_5G
+SoC     | MediaTek MT8755 (MT6835 platform)
+CPU     | 64-bit ARM, Cortex-A76 / Cortex-A55
+GPU     | ARM Mali
+Shipped Android Version | Android 15
+Tested Stock Firmware | Android 16 / ZUI 17.5
+Storage | UFS
+Display | 2560 x 1600 pixels, 90 Hz
+Partition Scheme | A/B, Virtual A/B, Dynamic Partitions
+Encryption | File-Based Encryption (FBE v2) with metadata encryption
+Filesystem | F2FS userdata, EROFS/EXT4 dynamic partitions
+Recovery Layout | TWRP recovery ramdisk stored in `vendor_boot`
+Vendor Boot Header | Version 4
+
+## Device picture
+
+![Motorola Moto Pad (2026)](https://fdn2.gsmarena.com/vv/bigpic/motorola-moto-pad-2026-.jpg)
+
+## Device reference
+
+[Motorola Moto Pad (2026) - GSMArena](https://www.gsmarena.com/motorola_moto_pad_(2026)-14582.php)
+
+# Status
+
+Current state of features:
+
+- [x] Correct screen/recovery size
+- [x] Working display
+- [x] Working touch
+- [x] Screen brightness control
+- [x] Power off
+- [x] Reboot to system
+- [x] Reboot to bootloader
+- [x] Reboot to recovery
+- [x] Fastboot / fastbootd
+- [x] ADB
+- [x] Internal storage detected
+- [x] External SD card detected
+- [x] exFAT external storage
+- [x] F2FS userdata support
+- [x] EXT4 support
+- [x] EROFS support
+- [x] Dynamic partition support
+- [x] A/B slot handling
+- [x] `vendor_boot` v4 support
+- [x] Stock PLATFORM vendor ramdisk preserved
+- [x] TWRP RECOVERY vendor ramdisk fragment
+- [x] Metadata encryption successfully decrypted
+- [x] `/data` block device successfully decrypted and mounted
+- [x] KeyMint service
+- [x] Gatekeeper service
+- [x] Keystore2 service
+- [ ] Full FBE decryption
+- [ ] User PIN/password decryption
+- [ ] Decrypted `/data/media`
+- [ ] MTP
+- [ ] Vibration / haptics
+- [ ] USB mass storage export
+- [ ] TWRP native `vendor_boot` installation from pristine stock image
+- [ ] All commonly modified partitions exposed for image flashing
+
+## Encryption status
+
+Metadata encryption is working and TWRP successfully creates and mounts the decrypted userdata block device.
+
+Current testing reaches the Android hardware-wrapped storage key path but fails during system-wide fscrypt key initialization.
+
+The current failure occurs in the MediaTek Beanpod KeyMint trusted application while processing storage-key conversion:
+
+```text
+cmd 0x18 / cmd 24
+km_error = -33
+
+AES_decrypt_ctr:
+decrypt keyblob compare hash failed
+
+DeserializeAuthEncryptedBlob:
+decrypt keyblob failed (-33)
+
+**Copyright (C) 2023 A-Team Digital Solutions**

V15_SOTER_PRE_0X18_STATIC_AUDIT.md

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+# V15 Soter pre-0x18 state snapshot
+
+Date: 2026-08-27
+
+Result: **PASS — diagnostic-only one-variable build; not flashed.**
+
+Artifact SHA-256:
+`d2f542f8d475bc3699487647a041e16235f20847ee43d23e5545b55e6f2b8b1c`
+
+Artifact size: 67,108,864 bytes.
+
+## Hypothesis and change scope
+
+The retained V14 property dump did not prove the exact values of seven public
+Microtrust/Soter properties at the instant immediately before the first cmd 0x18.
+
+The only functional source delta from V14 is in
+`system/vold/Keymaster.cpp::Keymaster::exportKey()`: immediately after the existing
+length/SHA-256 checkpoint B and before
+`securityLevel->convertStorageKeyToEphemeral()`, recovery reads and logs:
+
+- `vendor.soter.teei.googlekey.status`
+- `vendor.soter.teei.init`
+- `vendor.soter.teei.km.init`
+- `vendor.soter.teei.km.version`
+- `vendor.soter.teei.logini`
+- `vendor.soter.teei.persist`
+- `vendor.soter.teei.rpmb.flag`
+
+The marker is `SYCA_SOTER_PRE_0X18`. The patch sets no property, changes no
+service ordering, changes no request bytes, and exposes no key material.
+
+## Final-image differential
+
+Against the preserved pre-V15 current recovery fragment, complete unpacked-file
+SHA-256 manifests differ only at:
+
+- `system/bin/recovery`
+  - before: `439d1fa5a5080e3ff5f293d18deb1e34aa21b48dc9ba9fd01e7e982fa83840e3`
+  - V15: `53683ad4e34ffb6ebe4ffb705037f224f62334d2e355b5359230cc60e106077a`
+- `ramdisk-files.sha256sum`
+- `ramdisk-files.txt`
+
+The final recovery binary contains `SYCA_SOTER_PRE_0X18`, the requested property
+names, and the existing `SYCA_DEKEY_A/B` diagnostics.
+
+## Frozen final-image hashes
+
+- PLATFORM:
+  `06738f638a745075511c571347c5511331dda16b84d1ee88cda160c2dc7ebb14`
+- DTB:
+  `0e93b71aacf707a5fbb7a58eff73995b92d766a31a98d8d70e91f548c9e1d5af`
+- Beanpod:
+  `e066ff6e4f0aaa803e6633aa8fad1f54335e5b969f6422fedc44f77b033851e9`
+- `libTEECommon.so`:
+  `d700e663bd3f68611cadef9bfc929aeb819e199cc9ef3f61a9c8d0afc2bed5b0`
+- KeyMint TA:
+  `af4d1dc971c80b539de9e73ee792285944dd9b132d267be3bb0496bd82bb75ab`
+- `teei_daemon`:
+  `fb79a0c59dab04edbf5ff4cd10af601c4d3dba5378b5ba3d981553f818fbb014`
+- `libteei_daemon_vfs.so`:
+  `6012c5ccb298a411c8f7c0572b26ca237c3209ad348cd6e509a2cf71f4fccc13`
+- Keystore2:
+  `31a9f7d9de497e06c465343ddb4d3aa3e8064c3051059c206b53d061d59f6256`
+- `libkeystore2_crypto.so`:
+  `6e46dbfbf135c41131d64b91ce93fedf7c62077059fdbc24a5ca62b94e195132`
+
+## vendor_boot audit
+
+- header v4; page size 4096
+- cmdline: `bootopt=64S3,32N2,64N2`
+- fragment 0: exact stock PLATFORM, 27,422,144 bytes
+- fragment 1: RECOVERY named `recovery`, 31,678,798 bytes
+- total vendor ramdisk: 59,100,942 bytes
+- stock DTB exact
+- bootconfig empty
+- PLATFORM first, RECOVERY second
+- all board_id words zero
+- recovery fragment `.ko` count: zero
+- only five expected module metadata files retained
+- algorithm-NONE AVB footer and vendor_boot hash verify
+- post-AVB image re-unpacks successfully
+- final size exactly 67,108,864 bytes
+
+Static audit: **PASS. Stop before flashing.**

V16_BOOT_DECRYPT_UNLOCK_STATIC_AUDIT.md

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+# V16 boot-decrypt-unlock static audit
+
+Date: 2026-08-27
+
+Result: **PASS — one-variable boot-decrypt lifecycle experiment; not flashed.**
+
+Artifact SHA-256:
+`1fe86baa602403638e2f0c0b2b7a29bc4cd768ec2bed9256b12aa92c8ca81e09`
+
+Artifact size: 67,108,864 bytes.
+
+## Hypothesis
+
+The exact stock `teei_daemon` snapshots `ro.crypto.state` and
+`ro.crypto.type` in its boot-decrypt thread.  With `ro.crypto.type=file`, it
+logs `fbe mode late` and issues the `/dev/teei_config` boot-decrypt-unlock
+ioctl.  V15 did not expose that initial FBE state and never set
+`vendor.soter.teei.logini=start`; consequently it showed neither the daemon
+unlock message nor a boot-decrypt-lock result before cmd 0x18.
+
+V16 tests whether reproducing those stock lifecycle inputs before the first
+storage-key conversion changes cmd 0x18 from `KM_ERROR_INVALID_KEY_BLOB`.
+
+## Exact source changes
+
+- `device/motorola/sycamore_row_5G/device.mk:16-22`
+  - adds `ro.crypto.state=encrypted` and `ro.crypto.type=file` through
+    `PRODUCT_SYSTEM_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES`, placing both in the initial recovery
+    `prop.default` before `teei_daemon` starts.
+- `device/motorola/sycamore_row_5G/recovery/root/init.recovery.crypto.rc:69-73`
+  - sets `vendor.soter.teei.logini=start` once the existing Soter init,
+    persist-VFS, and RPMB health properties simultaneously report their stock
+    terminal values.
+- `system/vold/Keymaster.cpp:187-213`
+  - adds the secret-free `SYCA_V16_PRE_0X18` state snapshot immediately before
+    `convertStorageKeyToEphemeral()`; V15 tracing remains present.
+
+No other functional source was changed for V16.  Cmd 0x18 serialization,
+wrapped-key bytes, Beanpod, TA, private libraries, SharedSecret, patch levels,
+DTB, PLATFORM, and kernel modules are unchanged.
+
+## Implemented ordering
+
+1. Initial property load exposes the real recovery FBE mode:
+   `ro.crypto.state=encrypted`, `ro.crypto.type=file`.
+2. `on init` prepares the existing TEE device nodes and starts the exact stock
+   `teei_daemon`.
+3. `init.svc.teei_daemon=running` starts Beanpod and Gatekeeper as in V15.
+4. Once `vendor.soter.teei.init=INIT_OK`,
+   `vendor.soter.teei.persist=OPEN`, and
+   `vendor.soter.teei.rpmb.flag=ok` are all true, init sets
+   `vendor.soter.teei.logini=start`.
+5. Existing vold flow reaches the first storage-key conversion, where V16 logs
+   the complete pre-0x18 public-state snapshot.
+
+No sleep or repeated trigger was added.  `vold.post_fs_data_done` and
+`vendor.soter.teei.crypto.state` were not set: the exact daemon does not
+reference the former, and its `ro.crypto.type=file` startup branch does not
+require the latter.
+
+## Final recovery-fragment differential against archived V15
+
+Complete relative-path SHA-256 manifests differ only at:
+
+- `init.recovery.crypto.rc` (intentional logini trigger)
+- `prop.default` (intentional two FBE defaults)
+- `system/bin/recovery` (intentional V16 marker)
+- `ramdisk-files.sha256sum` and `ramdisk-files.txt` (generated inventory)
+
+There are no added or removed payload paths.
+
+## Frozen binary/content verification
+
+- stock PLATFORM:
+  `06738f638a745075511c571347c5511331dda16b84d1ee88cda160c2dc7ebb14`
+- stock DTB:
+  `0e93b71aacf707a5fbb7a58eff73995b92d766a31a98d8d70e91f548c9e1d5af`
+- exact stock `teei_daemon`:
+  `fb79a0c59dab04edbf5ff4cd10af601c4d3dba5378b5ba3d981553f818fbb014`
+- Beanpod:
+  `e066ff6e4f0aaa803e6633aa8fad1f54335e5b969f6422fedc44f77b033851e9`
+- KeyMint TA:
+  `af4d1dc971c80b539de9e73ee792285944dd9b132d267be3bb0496bd82bb75ab`
+- Keystore2:
+  `31a9f7d9de497e06c465343ddb4d3aa3e8064c3051059c206b53d061d59f6256`
+- `libkeystore2_crypto.so`:
+  `6e46dbfbf135c41131d64b91ce93fedf7c62077059fdbc24a5ca62b94e195132`
+
+All nine stock KeyMint private-library hashes and the V15 keytrace library hash
+match the frozen V15 family.  The recovery fragment contains zero `.ko` files
+and only the same five module metadata files.
+
+## Final vendor_boot audit
+
+- header version 4; page size 4096
+- command line `bootopt=64S3,32N2,64N2`
+- bootconfig empty
+- fragment 0: unnamed PLATFORM, type 1, 27,422,144 bytes, exact stock hash
+- fragment 1: `recovery`, RECOVERY type 2, 31,679,640 bytes
+- total vendor ramdisk size: 59,101,784 bytes
+- all board IDs zero; PLATFORM first and RECOVERY second
+- exact stock DTB, 192,119 bytes
+- algorithm-NONE AVB footer verifies
+- final image re-unpacks successfully
+- final partition-padded size exactly 67,108,864 bytes
+
+## Expected hardware-test markers
+
+- `SYCA_V16_PRE_0X18`
+- `daemon unlock keymaster signal to tz-driver`
+- `keymaster unlock boot_decrypt_lock success` or `failed!`
+- existing `SYCA_SOTER_PRE_0X18`, `SYCA_DEKEY_A/B/C/D`, `SYCA_TA_TRACE`,
+  cmd 0x18 hashes, and cmd result
+
+Static audit: **PASS. Stop before flashing.**

V17_STOCK_THH_IDENTITY_STATIC_AUDIT.md

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+# V17 stock THH identity static audit
+
+Date: 2026-08-27
+
+Result: **PASS — controlled stock-THH/product-identity experiment; not flashed.**
+
+Artifact SHA-256:
+`f23330a09d0b0ea4a7c902342dd62f36dcf5179cd72ed40d316819deb7c9ec50`
+
+Artifact size: 67,108,864 bytes.
+
+## Hypothesis
+
+V16 initialized Microtrust with an incomplete `/vendor/thh/ta` namespace and
+the recovery codename as `ro.product.device`.  The exact signed stock model
+configuration recognizes `platform=mt8755`, `model=XT2575-4`, while V16 secure
+world logged `model:sycamore_row_5G`, model verification failures, and TA load
+error 18.  V17 tests whether presenting the complete exact-stock THH payload
+and production Microtrust-facing identity before the first `teei_daemon`
+launch restores cold TA/model validation and changes cmd 0x18 behavior.
+
+All V16 FBE/logini behavior and crypto diagnostics are retained unchanged.
+
+## Exact stock source
+
+The files were copied from the preserved exact-firmware vendor extraction:
+
+`/home/nicholas/Downloads/sycamore-twrp-info/first-hardware-boot/fbe-a16-v3/ta-forensics/stock-vendor-thh/ta`
+
+This extraction belongs to factory baseline
+`XT2575-4_ROW_OPEN_USER_M1317.3_W_ZUI_17.5.10.017_ST`.  Both the staged source
+tree and the final unpacked recovery fragment were compared byte-for-byte with
+all 15 source files.  Both comparisons pass.
+
+## Stock THH manifest
+
+| File | Bytes | SHA-256 |
+|---|---:|---|
+| `0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10.ta` | 20,777 | `19a5e15a2f17a6c1418c5edc6fc63a3ddd279966540930b2e97f227ce0d897ae` |
+| `020f0000000000000000000000000000.ta` | 22,649 | `aba910dfbdccbf177eb107853669c6eff689b4f36e9afb2f8e04e30d8e97108b` |
+| `06090000000000000000000000000000.ta` | 6,953 | `2d5cd2e906a1dab1636c59bbe037f8502aec7c25edc9172cba8da158fc6d8c36` |
+| `08030000000000000000000000000000.ta` | 24,393 | `ba29286b7d24edc04275b195db120032e116828ff73241241d6d8c40855b4f03` |
+| `08110000000000000000000000000000.ta` | 72,073 | `0fb3e0b70a972d4a58088978aec706399009f32f5133061efe6b7033f1ae9f17` |
+| `40188311faf343488db888ad39496f9a.ta` | 9,177 | `5cb79b594721523700fe4708ea764c80144979dc698db27a18a2383159028a1c` |
+| `5020170115e016302017012521300000.ta` | 10,393 | `0865a891c965a201d4e64f3b9e2f4a3f0fe899f80ff24ab88cf75b1622dc5d40` |
+| `5f7a5b3b29b041bca249524a031a00e3.ta` | 32,737 | `2911bd3726ae4110877409d501329f36f5958a6686262b93814d8bb89fdb629c` |
+| `8888c04fc30c4dd0a319ea29643d4d4c.ta` | 32,129 | `5b812b524f5eea79c1bc944b06d00cddc8738274166d888bf255080ab0feab09` |
+| `abcd270ea5c44c58bcd3384a2fa2539e.ta` | 39,833 | `c4d5811efd695ba0550960f9c5649e6476289cbb00cb8c9d7f5cb11b7a2e2f18` |
+| `c09c9c5daa504b78b0e46eda61556c3a.ta` | 930,857 | `af4d1dc971c80b539de9e73ee792285944dd9b132d267be3bb0496bd82bb75ab` |
+| `c1882f2d885e4e13a8c8e2622461b2fa.ta` | 55,537 | `0a5f34be1d73535c563aaece231b2e93193ae5f2c69b8050e71b14f48956081d` |
+| `d91f322ad5a441d5955110eda3272fc0.ta` | 22,177 | `4432d3f85370e41f57bf5fb6b5945326c441a394d0cbe298be5c29b2b056b954` |
+| `e97c270ea5c44c58bcd3384a2fa2539e.ta` | 447,769 | `c76352a8115aba85e963d2e39466530daa8ac5db411ccea403eaf84d2c308e96` |
+| `isee_model.json` | 2,794 | `67c019209942f9a68408d998e5d478b0dba5e3f5dbbc6582b146af8aaa05e3c6` |
+
+## Source/change scope
+
+- `device/motorola/sycamore_row_5G/device.mk`
+  - packages all 15 stock THH files and the early diagnostic script;
+  - adds only global `ro.product.device=XT2575-4` to the existing V16 initial
+    system-default property set.
+- `build/make/core/Makefile`
+  - recovery-only, target-gated, fail-closed replacement of the two generated
+    vendor device/name values in final `prop.default`; vendor model was already
+    stock-correct.
+- `device/motorola/sycamore_row_5G/recovery/root/init.recovery.crypto.rc`
+  - synchronously executes the readiness diagnostic immediately before the
+    existing first `start teei_daemon`.
+- `device/motorola/sycamore_row_5G/recovery/root/system/bin/syca_v17_thh_ready.sh`
+  - logs only public properties, four existence results, and total file count.
+- fourteen stock THH files were added under
+  `device/motorola/sycamore_row_5G/recovery/root/vendor/thh/ta`; the fifteenth,
+  the KeyMint TA, was already present and byte-identical.
+
+## Final initial properties
+
+- `ro.product.device=XT2575-4`
+- `ro.product.vendor.device=XT2575-4`
+- `ro.product.vendor.name=XT2575-4`
+- `ro.product.vendor.model=XT2575-4`
+- `ro.build.product=sycamore_row_5G` (preserved)
+- `ro.crypto.type=file` (V16 preserved)
+- `ro.crypto.state=encrypted` (V16 preserved)
+
+`PRODUCT_DEVICE=sycamore_row_5G`, the TWRP product name, target assertions, and
+`ro.twrp.target.devices` behavior were not changed.
+
+## Cold-boot ordering
+
+1. Recovery ramdisk, all 15 THH files, production identity, and V16 FBE
+   properties exist before init actions.
+2. Existing TEE/RPMB nodes and read-only persist mount are prepared.
+3. Init synchronously runs `syca_v17_thh_ready.sh` and emits
+   `SYCA_V17_THH_READY`; expected `thh_file_count=15`.
+4. Init launches the unchanged exact-stock `teei_daemon` for the first time.
+5. The daemon performs cold secure-world TA/model validation.
+6. Existing `init.svc.teei_daemon=running` action starts Beanpod/Gatekeeper.
+7. Existing V16 healthy-state conjunction sets `logini=start`.
+8. Existing vold/Keystore2 path reaches the first cmd 0x18.
+
+No sleep, restart, bind mount, or post-initialization substitution was added.
+
+## V16-to-V17 final-image differential
+
+Complete unpacked relative-path SHA-256 manifests show only:
+
+- modified: `init.recovery.crypto.rc`, `prop.default`, and generated ramdisk
+  inventory files;
+- added: readiness script and the 14 THH files absent from V16;
+- unchanged: `system/bin/recovery`, existing KeyMint TA, all secure binaries,
+  private libraries, Keytrace, and every other ramdisk payload.
+
+## Frozen architecture/binary verification
+
+- stock PLATFORM:
+  `06738f638a745075511c571347c5511331dda16b84d1ee88cda160c2dc7ebb14`
+- stock DTB:
+  `0e93b71aacf707a5fbb7a58eff73995b92d766a31a98d8d70e91f548c9e1d5af`
+- exact stock `teei_daemon`:
+  `fb79a0c59dab04edbf5ff4cd10af601c4d3dba5378b5ba3d981553f818fbb014`
+- Beanpod:
+  `e066ff6e4f0aaa803e6633aa8fad1f54335e5b969f6422fedc44f77b033851e9`
+- KeyMint TA:
+  `af4d1dc971c80b539de9e73ee792285944dd9b132d267be3bb0496bd82bb75ab`
+- Keystore2:
+  `31a9f7d9de497e06c465343ddb4d3aa3e8064c3051059c206b53d061d59f6256`
+- `libkeystore2_crypto.so`:
+  `6e46dbfbf135c41131d64b91ce93fedf7c62077059fdbc24a5ca62b94e195132`
+- Keytrace:
+  `0642e36b25589ebdf16423cb3a81c8ba5dab3ffc0dcb32a58386efa8b2d7293d`
+
+The final recovery has zero `.ko` files and the same five module metadata
+files.  V16 `SYCA_V16_PRE_0X18`, `SYCA_SOTER_PRE_0X18`,
+`SYCA_DEKEY_A/B/C/D`, and `SYCA_TA_TRACE` markers remain present.
+
+## Final vendor_boot audit
+
+- header v4; page size 4096
+- cmdline `bootopt=64S3,32N2,64N2`; bootconfig empty
+- fragment 0: unnamed PLATFORM/type 1, 27,422,144 bytes, exact stock hash
+- fragment 1: `recovery`/type 2, 32,078,301 bytes
+- total vendor ramdisk: 59,500,445 bytes
+- stock DTB exact; all board IDs zero
+- PLATFORM first, RECOVERY second
+- algorithm-NONE AVB footer and vendor_boot hash verify
+- final image re-unpacks successfully
+- final partition-padded size exactly 67,108,864 bytes
+
+Static audit: **PASS. Stop before flashing.**

V18_STOCK_TEE_IDENTITY_STATIC_AUDIT.md

@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
+# V18 stock tee identity static audit
+
+Date: 2026-08-27
+
+Result: **PASS — controlled teei_daemon execution-identity experiment; not flashed.**
+
+Artifact SHA-256:
+`7c6817d5b29055ac337b26a87e3c29281e8ff2df2209521546c75bb8064642ac`
+
+Artifact size: 67,108,864 bytes.
+
+## Hypothesis
+
+V17 fixed cold THH/model validation but still ran the unchanged stock
+`teei_daemon` as root in `u:r:recovery:s0`. V18 tests whether the missing
+boot-decrypt-unlock transition and cmd 0x18 key-blob failure depend on the
+daemon's production process identity: UID/GID 1000, no supplementary groups,
+only `CAP_SYS_RAWIO`, and enforcing `u:r:tee:s0`.
+
+No KeyMint, wrapped-key, FBE, secure-storage, vendor_boot, kernel, or binary
+behavior was otherwise changed.
+
+## Service declaration differential
+
+V17:
+
+```rc
+user root
+group root system
+capabilities SYS_RAWIO
+seclabel u:r:recovery:s0
+```
+
+V18:
+
+```rc
+user system
+group system
+capabilities SYS_RAWIO
+seclabel u:r:tee:s0
+```
+
+The complete 21-entry `-r`/`-t` UUID argument sequence is byte-for-byte
+unchanged. A single `group system` entry establishes the primary GID only; no
+supplementary group is declared. `SYS_RAWIO` is the sole capability token.
+
+## SELinux audit and implementation
+
+The pre-V18 platform policy already defined:
+
+- `tee` with the `domain` attribute;
+- `tee_exec` as an executable vendor-file type;
+- `init_daemon_domain(tee)`, producing
+  `type_transition init tee_exec:process tee`.
+
+V17 lacked a `tee_exec` path label for `/vendor/bin/teei_daemon`, so merely
+changing `seclabel` could not prove a valid launch environment.
+
+V18 adds the exact executable context and the narrowly scoped stock Microtrust
+device contexts under `device/motorola/sycamore_row_5G/sepolicy/vendor`. The
+final combined policy:
+
+- compiles successfully;
+- passes neverallow checks;
+- contains `tee` in the `domain` attribute;
+- contains the init→`tee` transition;
+- permits `tee` to use only the declared Microtrust node types;
+- permits `tee` `sys_rawio` capability use;
+- does **not** mark `tee` permissive.
+
+Final policy SHA-256:
+`0b23e52b72848a03649e78fe005b88827d35a37bcab2ce8d394fc6d395fd94d3`
+
+## Exact node contexts
+
+These are copied from the exact stock vendor_boot `vendor_file_contexts`:
+
+| Path | Final type |
+|---|---|
+| `/dev/isee_tee0` | `teei_client_device` |
+| `/dev/teei_client` | `teei_client_device` |
+| `/dev/teei_config` | `teei_config_device` |
+| `/dev/tz_vfs` | `teei_vfs_device` |
+| `/dev/teei_fp` | `teei_fp_device` |
+| `/dev/ut_keymaster` | `ut_keymaster_device` |
+| `/dev/0:0:0:49476` | `teei_rpmb_device` |
+| `/dev/rpmb0` | `teei_rpmb_device` |
+| `/dev/utr_tui` | `utr_tui_device` |
+| `/vendor/bin/teei_daemon` | `tee_exec` |
+
+No non-Microtrust device path was relabeled. These labels are required for the
+enforcing `tee` domain to use the same interfaces that V17 accessed from the
+permissive recovery domain.
+
+## Removed failed V17 diagnostic
+
+The packaged `syca_v17_thh_ready.sh` and its synchronous init `exec` were
+removed. This eliminates the known invalid-domain exec failure and does not add
+a replacement delay or process. V16/V17 crypto diagnostics remain intact.
+
+## Frozen V17/V16 state
+
+- all 15 stock THH files: byte-identical to the exact stock extraction;
+- `isee_model.json`: unchanged;
+- `ro.product.device=XT2575-4`;
+- all three vendor product identity fields: `XT2575-4`;
+- `ro.build.product=sycamore_row_5G`;
+- `ro.crypto.type=file` and `ro.crypto.state=encrypted`;
+- healthy-state `vendor.soter.teei.logini=start` ordering;
+- `SYCA_V16_PRE_0X18`, `SYCA_SOTER_PRE_0X18`,
+  `SYCA_DEKEY_A/B/C/D`, and `SYCA_TA_TRACE`.
+
+## Frozen hashes
+
+- stock PLATFORM:
+  `06738f638a745075511c571347c5511331dda16b84d1ee88cda160c2dc7ebb14`
+- stock DTB:
+  `0e93b71aacf707a5fbb7a58eff73995b92d766a31a98d8d70e91f548c9e1d5af`
+- exact stock `teei_daemon`:
+  `fb79a0c59dab04edbf5ff4cd10af601c4d3dba5378b5ba3d981553f818fbb014`
+- Beanpod:
+  `e066ff6e4f0aaa803e6633aa8fad1f54335e5b969f6422fedc44f77b033851e9`
+- KeyMint TA:
+  `af4d1dc971c80b539de9e73ee792285944dd9b132d267be3bb0496bd82bb75ab`
+- Keystore2:
+  `31a9f7d9de497e06c465343ddb4d3aa3e8064c3051059c206b53d061d59f6256`
+- Keytrace:
+  `0642e36b25589ebdf16423cb3a81c8ba5dab3ffc0dcb32a58386efa8b2d7293d`
+
+## V17-to-V18 final-image differential
+
+Complete unpacked relative-path SHA-256 manifests differ only at:
+
+- `init.recovery.crypto.rc` — intended service identity and failed-diagnostic
+  removal;
+- `sepolicy`, `vendor_file_contexts`, and `file_contexts.bin` — intended narrow
+  tee-domain implementation;
+- removal of `system/bin/syca_v17_thh_ready.sh`;
+- generated ramdisk inventory files.
+
+No secure binary, THH payload, property file, kernel module, or crypto
+diagnostic binary changed.
+
+## Final vendor_boot audit
+
+- header v4; page size 4096
+- cmdline `bootopt=64S3,32N2,64N2`; bootconfig empty
+- fragment 0: unnamed PLATFORM/type 1, 27,422,144 bytes, exact stock hash
+- fragment 1: `recovery`/type 2, 32,078,200 bytes
+- total vendor ramdisk: 59,500,344 bytes
+- exact stock DTB; all board IDs zero
+- PLATFORM first, RECOVERY second
+- recovery `.ko` count: zero; same five module metadata files
+- algorithm-NONE AVB footer and vendor_boot hash verify
+- final image re-unpacks successfully
+- final partition-padded size exactly 67,108,864 bytes
+
+Static audit: **PASS. Stop before flashing.**

VENDOR_BOOT_FRAGMENT_AUDIT.md

@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+# Sycamore stock-vs-TWRP vendor_boot fragment audit
+
+Date: 2026-08-27
+
+## Inputs
+
+- Factory: `/home/nicholas/Downloads/sycamore-twrp-info/vendor_boot_a.img`
+  - SHA-256: `e542af82e8bb153faa96a44ec480548b21ac99abf7ca26ffca0eafcc9b6a9fe`
+- Hardware-tested V14: `/home/nicholas/Downloads/sycamore-twrp-info/first-hardware-boot/fbe-a16-v14-wrapped-first/vendor_boot.img`
+  - SHA-256: `d657365e5c14ba0bc1e93e9fc0ec38acb18f935e222d1bae66377011b96b9d15`
+- Current untested output: `out/target/product/sycamore_row_5G/vendor_boot.img`
+  - SHA-256: `eb3388b6da20ce487976e40ff1a30ca8ee488680f01aeaaedb483e0aed555d18`
+
+All images are exactly 67,108,864 bytes.
+
+## Common header and retained sections
+
+The local AOSP `unpack_bootimg.py` reports these identical values for all three:
+
+- magic: `VNDRBOOT`
+- header version: 4
+- header size: 2,128
+- page size: 4,096
+- kernel load address: `0x40000000`
+- ramdisk load address: `0x66f00000`
+- tags load address: `0x47c80000`
+- DTB load address: `0x47c80000`
+- vendor cmdline: `bootopt=64S3,32N2,64N2`
+- product name: empty
+- bootconfig: empty (0 bytes; SHA-256 of empty content
+  `e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855`)
+- DTB: 192,119 bytes; SHA-256
+  `0e93b71aacf707a5fbb7a58eff73995b92d766a31a98d8d70e91f548c9e1d5af`
+
+## Factory fragment table
+
+| Index | Name | Type | Table offset | Image offset | Compressed size | Compression | board_id |
+|---:|---|---|---:|---:|---:|---|---|
+| 0 | empty | PLATFORM (1) | 0 | 4,096 | 27,422,144 | LZ4 legacy | 16 zero words |
+
+Compressed payload SHA-256:
+`06738f638a745075511c571347c5511331dda16b84d1ee88cda160c2dc7ebb14`
+
+Uncompressed CPIO: 67,875,584 bytes; SHA-256
+`cdf1d9fd1658989a4c198ca889802660f3a2d52a8fc527e40013c35da917642c`
+
+Factory total vendor ramdisk size is 27,422,144 bytes. Its table is 108 bytes
+with one entry. There is no RECOVERY entry and no DLKM entry.
+
+## Hardware-tested V14 fragment table
+
+| Index | Name | Type | Table offset | Image offset | Compressed size | Compression | board_id | Compressed SHA-256 | Uncompressed size | Uncompressed SHA-256 |
+|---:|---|---|---:|---:|---:|---|---|---|---:|---|
+| 0 | empty | PLATFORM (1) | 0 | 4,096 | 27,422,144 | LZ4 legacy | 16 zero words | `06738f638a745075511c571347c5511331dda16b84d1ee88cda160c2dc7ebb14` | 67,875,584 | `cdf1d9fd1658989a4c198ca889802660f3a2d52a8fc527e40013c35da917642c` |
+| 1 | `recovery` | RECOVERY (2) | 27,422,144 | 27,426,240 | 31,391,394 | LZ4 legacy | 16 zero words | `ae0c2ab5adba18a2a5bdaa79760b4d8aa474bd2de9f82ba25a1a343e6d810467` | 69,037,312 | `9c3945cd24333659f8aea5bc78a01bd5d9c4762603ad4a943be4cb62a874d01f` |
+
+Total vendor ramdisk size is 58,813,538 bytes. Its table is 216 bytes with
+two entries, ordered PLATFORM then RECOVERY.
+
+## Current output fragment table
+
+| Index | Name | Type | Table offset | Image offset | Compressed size | Compression | board_id | Compressed SHA-256 | Uncompressed size | Uncompressed SHA-256 |
+|---:|---|---|---:|---:|---:|---|---|---|---:|---|
+| 0 | empty | PLATFORM (1) | 0 | 4,096 | 27,422,144 | LZ4 legacy | 16 zero words | `06738f638a745075511c571347c5511331dda16b84d1ee88cda160c2dc7ebb14` | 67,875,584 | `cdf1d9fd1658989a4c198ca889802660f3a2d52a8fc527e40013c35da917642c` |
+| 1 | `recovery` | RECOVERY (2) | 27,422,144 | 27,426,240 | 31,677,990 | LZ4 legacy | 16 zero words | `b4e9de040d9d1c4e78a4fa8ab056a6bb7a42fafff6f99303f08fb43c54aa76ca` | 69,607,424 | `a1401628c4ca65d2fe1ab267e049d40c5e3a0c4d91187ad44d14b46808d2c001` |
+
+Total vendor ramdisk size is 59,100,134 bytes. Its table is 216 bytes with
+two entries, ordered PLATFORM then RECOVERY.
+
+## Differential conclusion
+
+- **A. Stock multi-fragment:** NO. It has a valid v4 table but only one entry.
+- **B. Stock PLATFORM:** entry 0, unnamed, type 1.
+- **C. Stock RECOVERY:** none. Stock recovery content is contained in PLATFORM.
+- **D. Stock PLATFORM preserved by TWRP:** YES, byte-for-byte in both V14 and
+  current output, for both compressed and uncompressed payloads.
+- **E. Stock non-recovery fragment regenerated/replaced:** NO. PLATFORM is the
+  only stock fragment and is exact. Stock has no DLKM or other fragment.
+
+The hybrid principle is already implemented by
+`tools/assemble_vendor_boot.sh`: the exact stock PLATFORM archive is entry 0 and
+the generated TWRP ramdisk is appended as entry 1/RECOVERY. A new “hybrid” build
+would not change this variable. PLATFORM preservation is therefore **PROVEN**
+and is not a remaining explanation for the V14 cmd `0x18` failure.
+
+The required aggregate/table changes are limited to total ramdisk size, table
+size/count, downstream aligned section positions, and the AVB hash/footer.
+V14 and current output retain the stock DTB, cmdline, bootconfig, core header
+values, fragment-0 metadata, and fragment-0 bytes.
+
+## Dynamic-partition corroboration
+
+Read-only live recovery inspection showed liblp/TWRP preparing logical
+partitions from `super` and mapping:
+
+- `odm_dlkm_a` -> `dm-0`
+- `product_a` -> `dm-1`
+- `system_a` -> `dm-2`
+- `system_b` -> `dm-3`
+- `system_dlkm_a` -> `dm-4`
+- `system_ext_a` -> `dm-5`
+- `vendor_a` -> `dm-6`
+- `vendor_dlkm_a` -> `dm-7`
+
+The active-slot convenience links resolve `system`, `system_ext`, `product`,
+`vendor`, `vendor_dlkm`, `odm_dlkm`, and `system_dlkm` to those mapper nodes.
+Any resulting `/dev/block/by-name/<logical>` links are runtime-created links to
+`dm-*`, not physical GPT partitions. The existing `recovery.fstab` correctly
+uses `logical,first_stage_mount`; no invented physical by-name paths are needed.
+
+No image was built, flashed, booted, or otherwise written to hardware during
+this audit.

device.mk

@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+DEVICE_PATH := device/motorola/sycamore_row_5G
+
+PRODUCT_USE_DYNAMIC_PARTITIONS := true
+ENABLE_VIRTUAL_AB := true
+
+# This is the exact list exposed by ro.product.ab_ota_partitions on the live build.
+AB_OTA_PARTITIONS := \
+    init_boot \
+    product \
+    system \
+    system_ext \
+    vendor
+
+PRODUCT_SOONG_NAMESPACES += $(DEVICE_PATH)
+
+# V16 boot-decrypt-unlock: expose the real FBE mode before teei_daemon starts.
+# The stock daemon snapshots these read-only properties in its startup thread;
+# setting them later from TWRP's partition scan leaves that thread waiting on
+# the legacy vold.decrypt fallback instead of issuing the FBE unlock ioctl.
+PRODUCT_SYSTEM_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES += \
+    ro.product.device=XT2575-4 \
+    ro.crypto.state=encrypted \
+    ro.crypto.type=file
+
+PRODUCT_COPY_FILES += \
+    $(DEVICE_PATH)/recovery.fstab:$(TARGET_COPY_OUT_RECOVERY)/root/system/etc/recovery.fstab \
+    $(DEVICE_PATH)/recovery/root/init.recovery.mt6835.rc:$(TARGET_COPY_OUT_RECOVERY)/root/init.recovery.mt6835.rc \
+    $(DEVICE_PATH)/recovery/root/init.recovery.mt8755.rc:$(TARGET_COPY_OUT_RECOVERY)/root/init.recovery.mt8755.rc \
+    $(DEVICE_PATH)/recovery/root/init.recovery.crypto.rc:$(TARGET_COPY_OUT_RECOVERY)/root/init.recovery.crypto.rc \
+    $(DEVICE_PATH)/recovery/root/system/etc/vintf/manifest.xml:$(TARGET_COPY_OUT_RECOVERY)/root/system/etc/vintf/manifest.xml \
+    $(DEVICE_PATH)/recovery/root/system/etc/vintf/manifest/android.hardware.health-service.example.xml:$(TARGET_COPY_OUT_RECOVERY)/root/system/etc/vintf/manifest/android.hardware.health-service.example.xml \
+    $(DEVICE_PATH)/recovery/root/vendor/manifest.xml:$(TARGET_COPY_OUT_RECOVERY)/root/vendor/manifest.xml \
+    $(DEVICE_PATH)/recovery/root/vendor/etc/vintf/manifest/android.hardware.health-service.example.xml:$(TARGET_COPY_OUT_RECOVERY)/root/vendor/etc/vintf/manifest/android.hardware.health-service.example.xml \
+    $(DEVICE_PATH)/recovery/root/vendor/thh/ta/0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10.ta:$(TARGET_COPY_OUT_RECOVERY)/root/vendor/thh/ta/0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10.ta \
+    $(DEVICE_PATH)/recovery/root/vendor/thh/ta/020f0000000000000000000000000000.ta:$(TARGET_COPY_OUT_RECOVERY)/root/vendor/thh/ta/020f0000000000000000000000000000.ta \
+    $(DEVICE_PATH)/recovery/root/vendor/thh/ta/06090000000000000000000000000000.ta:$(TARGET_COPY_OUT_RECOVERY)/root/vendor/thh/ta/06090000000000000000000000000000.ta \
+    $(DEVICE_PATH)/recovery/root/vendor/thh/ta/08030000000000000000000000000000.ta:$(TARGET_COPY_OUT_RECOVERY)/root/vendor/thh/ta/08030000000000000000000000000000.ta \
+    $(DEVICE_PATH)/recovery/root/vendor/thh/ta/08110000000000000000000000000000.ta:$(TARGET_COPY_OUT_RECOVERY)/root/vendor/thh/ta/08110000000000000000000000000000.ta \
+    $(DEVICE_PATH)/recovery/root/vendor/thh/ta/40188311faf343488db888ad39496f9a.ta:$(TARGET_COPY_OUT_RECOVERY)/root/vendor/thh/ta/40188311faf343488db888ad39496f9a.ta \
+    $(DEVICE_PATH)/recovery/root/vendor/thh/ta/5020170115e016302017012521300000.ta:$(TARGET_COPY_OUT_RECOVERY)/root/vendor/thh/ta/5020170115e016302017012521300000.ta \
+    $(DEVICE_PATH)/recovery/root/vendor/thh/ta/5f7a5b3b29b041bca249524a031a00e3.ta:$(TARGET_COPY_OUT_RECOVERY)/root/vendor/thh/ta/5f7a5b3b29b041bca249524a031a00e3.ta \
+    $(DEVICE_PATH)/recovery/root/vendor/thh/ta/8888c04fc30c4dd0a319ea29643d4d4c.ta:$(TARGET_COPY_OUT_RECOVERY)/root/vendor/thh/ta/8888c04fc30c4dd0a319ea29643d4d4c.ta \
+    $(DEVICE_PATH)/recovery/root/vendor/thh/ta/abcd270ea5c44c58bcd3384a2fa2539e.ta:$(TARGET_COPY_OUT_RECOVERY)/root/vendor/thh/ta/abcd270ea5c44c58bcd3384a2fa2539e.ta \
+    $(DEVICE_PATH)/recovery/root/vendor/thh/ta/c09c9c5daa504b78b0e46eda61556c3a.ta:$(TARGET_COPY_OUT_RECOVERY)/root/vendor/thh/ta/c09c9c5daa504b78b0e46eda61556c3a.ta \
+    $(DEVICE_PATH)/recovery/root/vendor/thh/ta/c1882f2d885e4e13a8c8e2622461b2fa.ta:$(TARGET_COPY_OUT_RECOVERY)/root/vendor/thh/ta/c1882f2d885e4e13a8c8e2622461b2fa.ta \
+    $(DEVICE_PATH)/recovery/root/vendor/thh/ta/d91f322ad5a441d5955110eda3272fc0.ta:$(TARGET_COPY_OUT_RECOVERY)/root/vendor/thh/ta/d91f322ad5a441d5955110eda3272fc0.ta \
+    $(DEVICE_PATH)/recovery/root/vendor/thh/ta/e97c270ea5c44c58bcd3384a2fa2539e.ta:$(TARGET_COPY_OUT_RECOVERY)/root/vendor/thh/ta/e97c270ea5c44c58bcd3384a2fa2539e.ta \
+    $(DEVICE_PATH)/recovery/root/vendor/thh/ta/isee_model.json:$(TARGET_COPY_OUT_RECOVERY)/root/vendor/thh/ta/isee_model.json \
+    $(DEVICE_PATH)/recovery/root/vendor/etc/vintf/manifest/android.hardware.security.keymint-service.beanpod.xml:$(TARGET_COPY_OUT_RECOVERY)/root/vendor/etc/vintf/manifest/android.hardware.security.keymint-service.beanpod.xml \
+    $(DEVICE_PATH)/recovery/root/vendor/etc/vintf/manifest/android.hardware.security.secureclock-service.beanpod.xml:$(TARGET_COPY_OUT_RECOVERY)/root/vendor/etc/vintf/manifest/android.hardware.security.secureclock-service.beanpod.xml \
+    $(DEVICE_PATH)/recovery/root/vendor/etc/vintf/manifest/android.hardware.security.sharedsecret-service.beanpod.xml:$(TARGET_COPY_OUT_RECOVERY)/root/vendor/etc/vintf/manifest/android.hardware.security.sharedsecret-service.beanpod.xml \
+    $(DEVICE_PATH)/recovery/root/vendor/etc/vintf/manifest/android.hardware.gatekeeper@1.0-service.xml:$(TARGET_COPY_OUT_RECOVERY)/root/vendor/etc/vintf/manifest/android.hardware.gatekeeper@1.0-service.xml
+
+PRODUCT_PACKAGES += \
+    sycamore_gatekeeper_impl \
+    sycamore_gatekeeper_hidl \
+    sycamore_gatekeeper_service \
+    sycamore_gatekeeper_soft \
+    sycamore_gatekeeper_tee \
+    sycamore_keymint_ndk_v2 \
+    sycamore_keymint_private_utils \
+    sycamore_keymaster_messages \
+    sycamore_keymaster_portable \
+    sycamore_keymint_private \
+    sycamore_puresoft_keymaster \
+    sycamore_soft_attestation \
+    sycamore_cppbor_external \
+    sycamore_cppcose_rkp \
+    sycamore_keymint_service \
+    sycamore_secureclock_ndk_v1 \
+    sycamore_sharedsecret_ndk_v1 \
+    sycamore_tee_common \
+    sycamore_tee_imsg_log \
+    sycamore_tee_vfs \
+    sycamore_teei_daemon \
+    libsycamore_keytrace
+
+PRODUCT_VENDOR_PROPERTIES += \
+    ro.vendor.mtk_ufs_support=1 \
+    ro.vendor.mtk_boot_devices=soc/112b0000.ufshci \
+    ro.hardware.gatekeeper=beanpod \
+    ro.crypto.volume.filenames_mode=aes-256-cts

diagnostics/keytrace.cpp

@@ -0,0 +1,298 @@
+// Diagnostic-only Beanpod STORAGE_KEY boundary tracer.
+// Logs only length and SHA-256, then calls the stock A16 implementation.
+
+#include <atomic>
+#include <cstddef>
+#include <cstdint>
+#include <cstdio>
+#include <cstring>
+#include <dlfcn.h>
+#include <string>
+
+#include <android/log.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+
+namespace {
+
+constexpr const char* kSetKeyMaterialSymbol =
+        "_ZN9keymaster16ExportKeyRequest14SetKeyMaterialEPKvm";
+constexpr const char* kGetPropertySymbol =
+        "_ZN7android4base11GetPropertyERKNSt3__112basic_stringIcNS1_11char_traitsIcEENS1_9allocatorIcEEEES9_";
+
+// Microtrust uses the GlobalPlatform client ABI, but its headers are not
+// shipped in this recovery tree.  These declarations contain only the stable
+// ABI prefix needed to inspect the four operation parameters.  The 24-byte
+// parameter union and 112-byte operation layout are also verified against the
+// exact stock libTEECommon.so used by Beanpod.
+struct TEEC_Context;
+struct TEEC_Session;
+
+struct TEEC_SharedMemory {
+    void* buffer;
+    size_t size;
+};
+
+struct TEEC_TempMemoryReference {
+    void* buffer;
+    size_t size;
+};
+
+struct TEEC_RegisteredMemoryReference {
+    TEEC_SharedMemory* parent;
+    size_t size;
+    size_t offset;
+};
+
+union TEEC_Parameter {
+    TEEC_TempMemoryReference tmpref;
+    TEEC_RegisteredMemoryReference memref;
+    uint8_t abi_size[24];
+};
+
+struct TEEC_Operation {
+    uint32_t started;
+    uint32_t paramTypes;
+    TEEC_Parameter params[4];
+    void* session;
+};
+
+static_assert(sizeof(TEEC_Parameter) == 24);
+static_assert(sizeof(TEEC_Operation) == 112);
+
+using TEEC_Result = uint32_t;
+using InvokeCommand = TEEC_Result (*)(TEEC_Session*, uint32_t, TEEC_Operation*, uint32_t*);
+
+constexpr uint32_t kTeecSuccess = 0;
+constexpr uint32_t kTempInput = 0x5;
+constexpr uint32_t kTempOutput = 0x6;
+constexpr uint32_t kTempInout = 0x7;
+constexpr uint32_t kWhole = 0xc;
+constexpr uint32_t kPartialInput = 0xd;
+constexpr uint32_t kPartialOutput = 0xe;
+constexpr uint32_t kPartialInout = 0xf;
+
+struct ByteRange {
+    const uint8_t* data = nullptr;
+    size_t size = 0;
+    bool found = false;
+};
+
+uint32_t ParamType(const TEEC_Operation* operation, size_t index) {
+    return (operation->paramTypes >> (index * 4)) & 0xf;
+}
+
+ByteRange FindInput(const TEEC_Operation* operation) {
+    if (operation == nullptr) return {};
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
+        const uint32_t type = ParamType(operation, i);
+        if (type == kTempInput || type == kTempInout) {
+            const auto& ref = operation->params[i].tmpref;
+            return {static_cast<const uint8_t*>(ref.buffer), ref.size, true};
+        }
+        if (type == kWhole || type == kPartialInput || type == kPartialInout) {
+            const auto& ref = operation->params[i].memref;
+            if (ref.parent == nullptr) return {};
+            const size_t offset = type == kWhole ? 0 : ref.offset;
+            const size_t size = type == kWhole ? ref.parent->size : ref.size;
+            return {static_cast<const uint8_t*>(ref.parent->buffer) + offset, size, true};
+        }
+    }
+    return {};
+}
+
+ByteRange FindOutput(const TEEC_Operation* operation) {
+    if (operation == nullptr) return {};
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
+        const uint32_t type = ParamType(operation, i);
+        if (type == kTempOutput || type == kTempInout) {
+            const auto& ref = operation->params[i].tmpref;
+            return {static_cast<const uint8_t*>(ref.buffer), ref.size, true};
+        }
+        if (type == kWhole || type == kPartialOutput || type == kPartialInout) {
+            const auto& ref = operation->params[i].memref;
+            if (ref.parent == nullptr) return {};
+            const size_t offset = type == kWhole ? 0 : ref.offset;
+            const size_t size = type == kWhole ? ref.parent->size : ref.size;
+            return {static_cast<const uint8_t*>(ref.parent->buffer) + offset, size, true};
+        }
+    }
+    return {};
+}
+
+void DigestHex(const uint8_t* data, size_t size, char (&hex)[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1]) {
+    static constexpr uint8_t empty = 0;
+    uint8_t digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+    SHA256(size == 0 ? &empty : data, size, digest);
+    static constexpr char digits[] = "0123456789abcdef";
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH; ++i) {
+        hex[i * 2] = digits[digest[i] >> 4];
+        hex[i * 2 + 1] = digits[digest[i] & 0x0f];
+    }
+    hex[sizeof(hex) - 1] = '\0';
+}
+
+bool HasKeymasterError(uint32_t command) {
+    switch (command) {
+        case 0x04:
+        case 0x08:
+        case 0x0c:
+        case 0x18:
+        case 0x48:
+        case 0x4c:
+        case 0x50:
+        case 0x84:
+        case 0x340000:
+            return true;
+        default:
+            return false;
+    }
+}
+
+void LogDigest(const void* data, size_t size) {
+    if (size != 64) return;
+
+    static std::atomic_flag logged = ATOMIC_FLAG_INIT;
+    if (logged.test_and_set()) return;
+
+    uint8_t digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+    SHA256(static_cast<const uint8_t*>(data), size, digest);
+    char hex[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1];
+    static constexpr char digits[] = "0123456789abcdef";
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH; ++i) {
+        hex[i * 2] = digits[digest[i] >> 4];
+        hex[i * 2 + 1] = digits[digest[i] & 0x0f];
+    }
+    hex[sizeof(hex) - 1] = '\0';
+    __android_log_print(ANDROID_LOG_INFO, "SYCA_DEKEY",
+                        "SYCA_DEKEY_D len=%zu sha256=%s", size, hex);
+}
+
+}  // namespace
+
+// Diagnostic V13: interpose the single GlobalPlatform boundary used by both
+// Beanpod request wrappers.  This observes the registered-memory ranges but
+// never writes to the operation, shared memory, result, or return-origin.
+extern "C" TEEC_Result TEEC_InvokeCommand(TEEC_Session* session, uint32_t command,
+                                           TEEC_Operation* operation, uint32_t* return_origin) {
+    static const InvokeCommand original =
+            reinterpret_cast<InvokeCommand>(dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, "TEEC_InvokeCommand"));
+    if (original == nullptr) {
+        __android_log_print(ANDROID_LOG_FATAL, "SYCA_TA_TRACE",
+                            "stock TEEC_InvokeCommand symbol unavailable");
+        __builtin_trap();
+    }
+
+    static std::atomic<uint64_t> next_sequence{0};
+    const uint64_t sequence = next_sequence.fetch_add(1, std::memory_order_relaxed) + 1;
+    const ByteRange input = FindInput(operation);
+    const ByteRange output_before = FindOutput(operation);
+    const uint8_t* input_data = input.found ? input.data : nullptr;
+    const size_t input_size = input.found ? input.size : 0;
+    char input_hash[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1];
+    DigestHex(input_data, input_size, input_hash);
+
+    __android_log_print(ANDROID_LOG_INFO, "SYCA_TA_TRACE",
+                        "SYCA_TA_SEQ=%llu session=0x%llx cmd=0x%x in_len=%zu "
+                        "in_sha256=%s out_capacity=%zu",
+                        static_cast<unsigned long long>(sequence),
+                        static_cast<unsigned long long>(reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(session)),
+                        command, input_size, input_hash,
+                        output_before.found ? output_before.size : 0);
+
+    const TEEC_Result result = original(session, command, operation, return_origin);
+
+    const ByteRange output_after = FindOutput(operation);
+    // A failed TEEC transport did not return a serialized TA response.  The
+    // memref can still retain its pre-call capacity, which must not be logged
+    // or hashed as though it were returned data.
+    const bool has_response = result == kTeecSuccess && output_after.found;
+    const uint8_t* output_data = has_response ? output_after.data : nullptr;
+    const size_t output_size = has_response ? output_after.size : 0;
+    char output_hash[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1];
+    DigestHex(output_data, output_size, output_hash);
+    char origin[16];
+    if (return_origin == nullptr) {
+        memcpy(origin, "NA", 3);
+    } else {
+        snprintf(origin, sizeof(origin), "%u", *return_origin);
+    }
+
+    if (result == kTeecSuccess && HasKeymasterError(command) && output_size >= sizeof(int32_t)) {
+        int32_t keymaster_error;
+        memcpy(&keymaster_error, output_data, sizeof(keymaster_error));
+        __android_log_print(ANDROID_LOG_INFO, "SYCA_TA_TRACE",
+                            "SYCA_TA_RET_SEQ=%llu cmd=0x%x teec_ret=%u origin=%s out_len=%zu "
+                            "out_sha256=%s km_error=%d",
+                            static_cast<unsigned long long>(sequence), command, result, origin,
+                            output_size, output_hash, keymaster_error);
+    } else {
+        __android_log_print(ANDROID_LOG_INFO, "SYCA_TA_TRACE",
+                            "SYCA_TA_RET_SEQ=%llu cmd=0x%x teec_ret=%u origin=%s out_len=%zu "
+                            "out_sha256=%s",
+                            static_cast<unsigned long long>(sequence), command, result, origin,
+                            output_size, output_hash);
+    }
+    return result;
+}
+
+namespace android::base {
+
+// V10-IDENTITY one-variable experiment.  Beanpod obtains these two fields
+// through android::base::GetProperty() while constructing BPConfigureRequest
+// for command 0x48.  Override only these Beanpod-facing lookups and delegate
+// every other property unchanged.
+std::string GetProperty(const std::string& key, const std::string& default_value) {
+    if (key == "ro.product.name" || key == "ro.product.device") {
+        constexpr const char* kStockIdentity = "XT2575-4";
+        __android_log_print(ANDROID_LOG_INFO, "SYCA_IDENTITY",
+                            "%s=%s", key.c_str(), kStockIdentity);
+        return kStockIdentity;
+    }
+
+    using Original = std::string (*)(const std::string&, const std::string&);
+    static const Original original =
+            reinterpret_cast<Original>(dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, kGetPropertySymbol));
+    if (original == nullptr) {
+        __android_log_print(ANDROID_LOG_FATAL, "SYCA_IDENTITY",
+                            "stock GetProperty symbol unavailable");
+        __builtin_trap();
+    }
+    return original(key, default_value);
+}
+
+}  // namespace android::base
+
+namespace keymaster {
+
+// V9-OSVERSION one-variable experiment.  Beanpod dynamically imports this
+// helper when building BPConfigureRequest for command 0x48.  Keep recovery's
+// global Android 12 properties intact and change only the value observed by
+// this Beanpod process.
+uint32_t GetOsVersion() {
+    constexpr uint32_t kAndroid16OsVersion = 160000;
+    __android_log_print(ANDROID_LOG_INFO, "SYCA_OSVERSION",
+                        "Beanpod ConfigDeviceInfo os_version=%u",
+                        kAndroid16OsVersion);
+    return kAndroid16OsVersion;
+}
+
+class ExportKeyRequest {
+  public:
+    void SetKeyMaterial(const void* key_material, size_t length);
+};
+
+void ExportKeyRequest::SetKeyMaterial(const void* key_material, size_t length) {
+    using Original = void (*)(ExportKeyRequest*, const void*, size_t);
+    static const Original original = reinterpret_cast<Original>(
+            dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, kSetKeyMaterialSymbol));
+
+    LogDigest(key_material, length);
+    if (original == nullptr) {
+        __android_log_print(ANDROID_LOG_FATAL, "SYCA_DEKEY",
+                            "stock SetKeyMaterial symbol unavailable");
+        __builtin_trap();
+    }
+    original(this, key_material, length);
+}
+
+}  // namespace keymaster