[ Upstream commit 86ab3e55673a7a49a841838776f1ab18d23a67b5 ]
Sashiko AI-review observed:
In ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach(), the skb is an outer IPv4 ICMP error packet
where its cb contains an IPv4 inet_skb_parm. When skb is cloned into skb2
and passed to icmp6_send(), it uses IP6CB(skb2).
IP6CB interprets the IPv4 inet_skb_parm as an inet6_skb_parm. The cipso
offset in inet_skb_parm.opt directly overlaps with dsthao in inet6_skb_parm
at offset 18.
If an attacker sends a forged ICMPv4 error with a CIPSO IP option, dsthao
would be a non-zero offset. Inside icmp6_send(), mip6_addr_swap() is called
and uses ipv6_find_tlv(skb, opt->dsthao, IPV6_TLV_HAO).
This would scan the inner, attacker-controlled IPv6 packet starting at that
offset, potentially returning a fake TLV without checking if the remaining
packet length can hold the full 18-byte struct ipv6_destopt_hao.
Could mip6_addr_swap() then perform a 16-byte swap that extends past the end
of the packet data into skb_shared_info?
Should the cb array also be cleared in ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach() and
ip6ip6_err() to prevent this?
This patch implements the first suggestion.
I am not sure if ip6ip6_err() needs to be changed.
A separate patch would be better anyway.
Fixes: ca15a078bd ("sit: generate icmpv6 error when receiving icmpv4 error")
Reported-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260326155138.2429480-1-edumazet%40google.com
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Oskar Kjos <oskar.kjos@hotmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260326202608.2976021-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit c438ba010171b70bad22fc18b1d5bdc3627476e8)
Orabug: 39300930
CVE: CVE-2026-43038
Change-Id: I07e2f318a3c835d56aae6b5e68d8e8e3c7e4c493
Signed-off-by: Alok Tiwari <alok.a.tiwari@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Tashfin Shakeer Rhythm <tashfinshakeerrhythm@gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit 98d0912e9f841e5529a5b89a972805f34cb1c69d ]
pskb_carve_inside_header() and pskb_carve_inside_nonlinear() both copy
the old skb_shared_info header into a new buffer via memcpy(), which
includes the destructor_arg pointer (uarg) for MSG_ZEROCOPY skbs.
Neither function calls net_zcopy_get() for the new shinfo, creating an
unaccounted holder: every skb_shared_info with destructor_arg set will
call skb_zcopy_clear() once when freed, but the corresponding
net_zcopy_get() was never called for the new copy. Repeated calls
drive uarg->refcnt to zero prematurely, freeing ubuf_info_msgzc while
TX skbs still hold live destructor_arg pointers.
KASAN reports use-after-free on a freed ubuf_info_msgzc:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in skb_release_data+0x77b/0x810
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88801574d3e8 by task poc/220
Call Trace:
skb_release_data+0x77b/0x810
kfree_skb_list_reason+0x13e/0x610
skb_release_data+0x4cd/0x810
sk_skb_reason_drop+0xf3/0x340
skb_queue_purge_reason+0x282/0x440
rds_tcp_inc_free+0x1e/0x30
rds_recvmsg+0x354/0x1780
__sys_recvmsg+0xdf/0x180
Allocated by task 219:
msg_zerocopy_realloc+0x157/0x7b0
tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x2892/0x3ba0
Freed by task 219:
ip_recv_error+0x74a/0xb10
tcp_recvmsg+0x475/0x530
The skb consuming the late access still referenced the same uarg via
shinfo->destructor_arg copied by pskb_carve_inside_nonlinear() without
a refcount bump. This has been verified to be reliably exploitable: a
working proof-of-concept achieves full root privilege escalation from
an unprivileged local user on a default kernel configuration.
The fix follows the pattern of pskb_expand_head() which has the same
memcpy/cloned structure. For pskb_carve_inside_header(), net_zcopy_get()
is placed after skb_orphan_frags() succeeds, so the orphan error path
needs no cleanup. For pskb_carve_inside_nonlinear(), net_zcopy_get() is
placed after all failure points and just before skb_release_data(), so
no error path needs cleanup at all -- matching pskb_expand_head() more
closely and avoiding the need for a balancing net_zcopy_put().
Fixes: 6fa01ccd88 ("skbuff: Add pskb_extract() helper function")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-4-6
Signed-off-by: Minh Nguyen <minhnguyen.080505@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260526041240.329462-1-minhnguyen.080505@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8dbed691e43a50903658130bde0fcb5abc425b37)
Orabug: 39619389
CVE: CVE-2026-52943
Change-Id: I594313483c8e53caaf6012c5c16a645b3f223b58
Signed-off-by: Harshit Mogalapalli <harshit.m.mogalapalli@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Samasth Norway Ananda <samasth.norway.ananda@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Alok Tiwari <alok.a.tiwari@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Tashfin Shakeer Rhythm <tashfinshakeerrhythm@gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit 42156f93d123436f2a27c468f18c966b7e5db796 ]
`packet_release()` has a race window where `NETDEV_UP` can re-register a
socket into a fanout group's `arr[]` array. The re-registration is not
cleaned up by `fanout_release()`, leaving a dangling pointer in the fanout
array.
`packet_release()` does NOT zero `po->num` in its `bind_lock` section.
After releasing `bind_lock`, `po->num` is still non-zero and `po->ifindex`
still matches the bound device. A concurrent `packet_notifier(NETDEV_UP)`
that already found the socket in `sklist` can re-register the hook.
For fanout sockets, this re-registration calls `__fanout_link(sk, po)`
which adds the socket back into `f->arr[]` and increments `f->num_members`,
but does NOT increment `f->sk_ref`.
The fix sets `po->num` to zero in `packet_release` while `bind_lock` is
held to prevent NETDEV_UP from linking, preventing the race window.
This bug was found following an additional audit with Claude Code based
on CVE-2025-38617.
Fixes: ce06b03e60 ("packet: Add helpers to register/unregister ->prot_hook")
Link: https://blog.calif.io/p/a-race-within-a-race-exploiting-cve
Signed-off-by: Yochai Eisenrich <echelonh@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260319200610.25101-1-echelonh@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit ee642b1962caa9aa231c01abbd58bc453ae6b66e)
Orabug: 39250953
CVE: CVE-2026-31504
Change-Id: I002fefc6bd0bbe09ed5e2ad13009c783609ec04a
Signed-off-by: Alok Tiwari <alok.a.tiwari@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Tashfin Shakeer Rhythm <tashfinshakeerrhythm@gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit 2edfa31769a4add828a7e604b21cb82aaaa05925 ]
Oskar Kjos reported the following problem.
ip4ip6_err() calls icmp_send() on a cloned skb whose cb[] was written
by the IPv6 receive path as struct inet6_skb_parm. icmp_send() passes
IPCB(skb2) to __ip_options_echo(), which interprets that cb[] region
as struct inet_skb_parm (IPv4). The layouts differ: inet6_skb_parm.nhoff
at offset 14 overlaps inet_skb_parm.opt.rr, producing a non-zero rr
value. __ip_options_echo() then reads optlen from attacker-controlled
packet data at sptr[rr+1] and copies that many bytes into dopt->__data,
a fixed 40-byte stack buffer (IP_OPTIONS_DATA_FIXED_SIZE).
To fix this we clear skb2->cb[], as suggested by Oskar Kjos.
Also add minimal IPv4 header validation (version == 4, ihl >= 5).
Fixes: c4d3efafcc ("[IPV6] IP6TUNNEL: Add support to IPv4 over IPv6 tunnel.")
Reported-by: Oskar Kjos <oskar.kjos@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260326155138.2429480-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit ea9f65b27c8404e164848ebff1443310fd187629)
Orabug: 39300926
CVE: CVE-2026-43037
Change-Id: I03aec3d53f61119bc726073dd91c17cc5a31dfd3
Signed-off-by: Alok Tiwari <alok.a.tiwari@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Tashfin Shakeer Rhythm <tashfinshakeerrhythm@gmail.com>
Two frag-transfer helpers (__pskb_copy_fclone() and skb_shift()) fail
to propagate the SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG bit in skb_shinfo()->flags when
moving frags from source to destination. __pskb_copy_fclone() defers
the rest of the shinfo metadata to skb_copy_header() after copying
frag descriptors, but that helper only carries over gso_{size,segs,
type} and never touches skb_shinfo()->flags; skb_shift() moves frag
descriptors directly and leaves flags untouched. As a result, the
destination skb keeps a reference to the same externally-owned or
page-cache-backed pages while reporting skb_has_shared_frag() as
false.
The mismatch is harmful in any in-place writer that uses
skb_has_shared_frag() to decide whether shared pages must be detoured
through skb_cow_data(). ESP input is one such writer (esp4.c,
esp6.c), and a single nft 'dup to <local>' rule -- or any other
nf_dup_ipv4() / xt_TEE caller -- is enough to land a pskb_copy()'d
skb in esp_input() with the marker stripped, letting an unprivileged
user write into the page cache of a root-owned read-only file via
authencesn-ESN stray writes.
Set SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG on the destination whenever frag descriptors
were actually moved from the source. skb_copy() and skb_copy_expand()
share skb_copy_header() too but linearize all paged data into freshly
allocated head storage and emerge with nr_frags == 0, so
skb_has_shared_frag() returns false on its own; they need no change.
The same omission exists in skb_gro_receive() and skb_gro_receive_list().
The former moves the incoming skb's frag descriptors into the
accumulator's last sub-skb via two paths (a direct frag-move loop and
the head_frag + memcpy path); the latter chains the incoming skb whole
onto p's frag_list. Downstream skb_segment() reads only
skb_shinfo(p)->flags, and skb_segment_list() reuses each sub-skb's
shinfo as the nskb -- both p and lp must carry the marker.
The same omission also exists in tcp_clone_payload(), which builds an
MTU probe skb by moving frag descriptors from skbs on sk_write_queue
into a freshly allocated nskb. The helper falls into the same family
and warrants the same fix for consistency; no TCP TX-side in-place
writer is currently known to reach a user page through this gap, but
a future consumer depending on the marker would regress silently.
The same omission exists in skb_segment(): the per-iteration flag
merge takes only head_skb's flag, and the inner switch that rebinds
frag_skb to list_skb on head_skb-frags exhaustion does not fold the
new frag_skb's flag into nskb. Fold frag_skb's flag at both sites
so segments drawing frags from frag_list members carry the marker.
Fixes: cef401de7b ("net: fix possible wrong checksum generation")
Fixes: f4c50a4034e6 ("xfrm: esp: avoid in-place decrypt on shared skb frags")
Suggested-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Suggested-by: Sultan Alsawaf <sultan@kerneltoast.com>
Suggested-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Suggested-by: Lin Ma <malin89@huawei.com>
Suggested-by: Jingguo Tan <tanjingguo@huawei.com>
Suggested-by: Aaron Esau <aaron1esau@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hyunwoo Kim <imv4bel@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Rajat Gupta <rajat.gupta@oss.qualcomm.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/ageeJfJHwgzmKXbh@v4bel
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 48f6a5356a33dd78e7144ae1faef95ffc990aae0)
Orabug: 39368828
CVE: CVE-2026-46300
Conflicts:
- net/core/gro.c - Not present in UEK6U3
- net/core/skbuff.c UEK6U3 doesn't have commit: 06b4feb3
("net: group skb_shinfo zerocopy related bits together.") so
used skb_shinfo(nskb)->tx_flags
- net/ipv4/tcp_output.c - net/ipv4/tcp_output.c - UEK6U3 doesn't
have commit: 73601329 ("tcp: let tcp_mtu_probe() build
headless packets") so we need not take the hunk corresponding
to tcp_clone_payload()
Change-Id: I19fe41c96158d2614b04d4593083826135418615
Signed-off-by: Harshit Mogalapalli <harshit.m.mogalapalli@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Salisbury <joseph.salisbury@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Alok Tiwari <alok.a.tiwari@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Tashfin Shakeer Rhythm <tashfinshakeerrhythm@gmail.com>
skb_try_coalesce() can attach paged frags from @from to @to. If @from
has SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG set, the resulting @to skb can contain the same
externally-owned or page-cache-backed frags, but the shared-frag marker
is currently lost.
That breaks the invariant relied on by later in-place writers. In
particular, ESP input checks skb_has_shared_frag() before deciding
whether an uncloned nonlinear skb can skip skb_cow_data(). If TCP
receive coalescing has moved shared frags into an unmarked skb, ESP can
see skb_has_shared_frag() as false and decrypt in place over page-cache
backed frags.
Propagate SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG when skb_try_coalesce() transfers paged
frags. The tailroom copy path does not need the marker because it copies
bytes into @to's linear data rather than transferring frag descriptors.
Fixes: cef401de7b ("net: fix possible wrong checksum generation")
Fixes: f4c50a4034e6 ("xfrm: esp: avoid in-place decrypt on shared skb frags")
Signed-off-by: William Bowling <vakzz@zellic.io>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Tested-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260513041635.1289541-1-vakzz@zellic.io
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit f84eca5817390257cef78013d0112481c503b4a3)
Orabug: 39368828
Clean cherry-pick build needs a build fixup, on uek6/u3, shared-frag
state is carried in tx_flags(SKBTX_SHARED_FRAG), so propagate it when
frag ownership moves, and it doesn't have skb_shared_info.flags
SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG so accordingly adapted the patch. This is due to
missing 06b4feb37e64 (net: group skb_shinfo zerocopy related bits
together.) commit in UEK6U3.
Change-Id: I71564bc3a42d7523011705022a49393b63070fd5
Signed-off-by: Harshit Mogalapalli <harshit.m.mogalapalli@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Salisbury <joseph.salisbury@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Alok Tiwari <alok.a.tiwari@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Tashfin Shakeer Rhythm <tashfinshakeerrhythm@gmail.com>
syzbot triggered the following splat in remove_waiter() via
FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE_PI:
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000a88-0x0000000000000a8f]
class_raw_spinlock_constructor
remove_waiter+0x159/0x1200 kernel/locking/rtmutex.c:1561
rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock+0x103/0x120
futex_requeue+0x10e4/0x20d0
__x64_sys_futex+0x34f/0x4d0
task_blocks_on_rt_mutex() does not arm the waiter upon deadlock detection,
leaving waiter->task nil, where 3bfdc63936dd ("rtmutex: Use waiter::task instead
of current in remove_waiter()") made this fatal.
Furthermore, rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock() should not be calling into remove_waiter()
upon a successfully grabbing the rtmutex. 1a1fb985f2 ("futex: Handle early deadlock
return correctly"), moved the remove_waiter() out of __rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock()
(where 'ret' was only ever 0 or < 0) into the wrapper. Tighten this check to
account for try_to_take_rt_mutex().
Fixes: 3bfdc63936dd ("rtmutex: Use waiter::task instead of current in remove_waiter()")
Change-Id: Ib19a2f223ba67d20496c0ae95096747f5350c520
Reported-by: syzbot+78147abe6c524f183ee9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/69f114ac.050a0220.ac8b.0003.GAE@google.com/
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260507112913.1019537-1-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Tashfin Shakeer Rhythm <tashfinshakeerrhythm@gmail.com>
remove_waiter() is used by the slowlock paths, but it is also used for
proxy-lock rollback in rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock() when invoked from
futex_requeue().
In the latter case waiter::task is not current, but remove_waiter()
operates on current for the dequeue operation. That results in several
problems:
1) the rbtree dequeue happens without waiter::task::pi_lock being held
2) the waiter task's pi_blocked_on state is not cleared, which leaves a
dangling pointer primed for UAF around.
3) rt_mutex_adjust_prio_chain() operates on the wrong top priority waiter
task
Use waiter::task instead of current in all related operations in
remove_waiter() to cure those problems.
[ tglx: Fixup rt_mutex_adjust_prio_chain(), add a comment and amend the
changelog ]
Fixes: 8161239a8b ("rtmutex: Simplify PI algorithm and make highest prio task get lock")
Change-Id: I3ff8da2830773e04f55828b11c9d461ab6ee57c5
Reported-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Yifan Wu <yifanwucs@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Juefei Pu <tomapufckgml@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Xin Liu <bird@lzu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Keenan Dong <keenanat2000@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
[Tashar02: Open-code scoped_guard() on msm-5.4]
Signed-off-by: Tashfin Shakeer Rhythm <tashfinshakeerrhythm@gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit e0f25b8992345aa5f113da2815f5add98738c611 ]
The capability CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE was introduced to allow non-root
users to checkpoint and restore processes as non-root with CRIU.
This change extends CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE to enable the CRIU option
'--shell-job' as non-root. CRIU's man-page describes the '--shell-job'
option like this:
Allow one to dump shell jobs. This implies the restored task will
inherit session and process group ID from the criu itself. This option
also allows to migrate a single external tty connection, to migrate
applications like top.
TIOCSLCKTRMIOS can only be done if the process has CAP_SYS_ADMIN and
this change extends it to CAP_SYS_ADMIN or CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE.
With this change it is possible to checkpoint and restore processes
which have a tty connection as non-root if CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is
set.
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Change-Id: I079e010f7ab7c1dc2e829bfa4023405efd5aada8
Signed-off-by: Adrian Reber <areber@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231208143656.1019-1-areber@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: ralph950412 <ralph950412@gmail.com>
This adds a test that changes its UID, uses capabilities to
get CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE and uses clone3() with set_tid to
create a process with a given PID as non-root.
Change-Id: Iac62e21213ad1bd04f5a2762255fc924c3830ea6
Signed-off-by: Adrian Reber <areber@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200719100418.2112740-8-areber@redhat.com
[christian.brauner@ubuntu.com: use TH_LOG() instead of ksft_print_msg()]
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: ralph950412 <ralph950412@gmail.com>
This brings consistency with the rest of the prctl() syscall where
-EPERM is returned when failing a capability check.
Change-Id: I1b27a485d4ca9dd99376c6628572509835aabaf3
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Viennot <Nicolas.Viennot@twosigma.com>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Reber <areber@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200719100418.2112740-7-areber@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: ralph950412 <ralph950412@gmail.com>
Originally, only a local CAP_SYS_ADMIN could change the exe link,
making it difficult for doing checkpoint/restore without CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
This commit adds CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE in addition to CAP_SYS_ADMIN
for permitting changing the exe link.
The following describes the history of the /proc/self/exe permission
checks as it may be difficult to understand what decisions lead to this
point.
* [1] May 2012: This commit introduces the ability of changing
/proc/self/exe if the user is CAP_SYS_RESOURCE capable.
In the related discussion [2], no clear thread model is presented for
what could happen if the /proc/self/exe changes multiple times, or why
would the admin be at the mercy of userspace.
* [3] Oct 2014: This commit introduces a new API to change
/proc/self/exe. The permission no longer checks for CAP_SYS_RESOURCE,
but instead checks if the current user is root (uid=0) in its local
namespace. In the related discussion [4] it is said that "Controlling
exe_fd without privileges may turn out to be dangerous. At least
things like tomoyo examine it for making policy decisions (see
tomoyo_manager())."
* [5] Dec 2016: This commit removes the restriction to change
/proc/self/exe at most once. The related discussion [6] informs that
the audit subsystem relies on the exe symlink, presumably
audit_log_d_path_exe() in kernel/audit.c.
* [7] May 2017: This commit changed the check from uid==0 to local
CAP_SYS_ADMIN. No discussion.
* [8] July 2020: A PoC to spoof any program's /proc/self/exe via ptrace
is demonstrated
Overall, the concrete points that were made to retain capability checks
around changing the exe symlink is that tomoyo_manager() and
audit_log_d_path_exe() uses the exe_file path.
Christian Brauner said that relying on /proc/<pid>/exe being immutable (or
guarded by caps) in a sake of security is a bit misleading. It can only
be used as a hint without any guarantees of what code is being executed
once execve() returns to userspace. Christian suggested that in the
future, we could call audit_log() or similar to inform the admin of all
exe link changes, instead of attempting to provide security guarantees
via permission checks. However, this proposed change requires the
understanding of the security implications in the tomoyo/audit subsystems.
[1] b32dfe3771 ("c/r: prctl: add ability to set new mm_struct::exe_file")
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/292515/
[3] f606b77f1a ("prctl: PR_SET_MM -- introduce PR_SET_MM_MAP operation")
[4] https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/479359/
[5] 3fb4afd9a5 ("prctl: remove one-shot limitation for changing exe link")
[6] https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/697304/
[7] 4d28df6152 ("prctl: Allow local CAP_SYS_ADMIN changing exe_file")
[8] https://github.com/nviennot/run_as_exe
Change-Id: I44b78ea8000443bc862178aae3f847e86785a1a1
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Viennot <Nicolas.Viennot@twosigma.com>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Reber <areber@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200719100418.2112740-6-areber@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: ralph950412 <ralph950412@gmail.com>
Opening files in /proc/pid/map_files when the current user is
CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE capable in the root namespace is useful for
checkpointing and restoring to recover files that are unreachable via
the file system such as deleted files, or memfd files.
Change-Id: I6ec3846f81a5208b66ef41e00229b7535e1e6668
Signed-off-by: Adrian Reber <areber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Viennot <Nicolas.Viennot@twosigma.com>
Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200719100418.2112740-5-areber@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: ralph950412 <ralph950412@gmail.com>
Use the newly introduced capability CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE to allow
writing to ns_last_pid.
Change-Id: I95727c385f136818553260db0e9edfa654f7907e
Signed-off-by: Adrian Reber <areber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Viennot <Nicolas.Viennot@twosigma.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200719100418.2112740-4-areber@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: ralph950412 <ralph950412@gmail.com>
Use the newly introduced capability CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE to allow
using clone3() with set_tid set.
Change-Id: Ifc86c455e500e59a62f9960ba094c4f9973891ff
Signed-off-by: Adrian Reber <areber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Viennot <Nicolas.Viennot@twosigma.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200719100418.2112740-3-areber@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: ralph950412 <ralph950412@gmail.com>
This patch introduces CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE, a new capability facilitating
checkpoint/restore for non-root users.
Over the last years, The CRIU (Checkpoint/Restore In Userspace) team has
been asked numerous times if it is possible to checkpoint/restore a
process as non-root. The answer usually was: 'almost'.
The main blocker to restore a process as non-root was to control the PID
of the restored process. This feature available via the clone3 system
call, or via /proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid is unfortunately guarded by
CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
In the past two years, requests for non-root checkpoint/restore have
increased due to the following use cases:
* Checkpoint/Restore in an HPC environment in combination with a
resource manager distributing jobs where users are always running as
non-root. There is a desire to provide a way to checkpoint and
restore long running jobs.
* Container migration as non-root
* We have been in contact with JVM developers who are integrating
CRIU into a Java VM to decrease the startup time. These
checkpoint/restore applications are not meant to be running with
CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
We have seen the following workarounds:
* Use a setuid wrapper around CRIU:
See https://github.com/FredHutch/slurm-examples/blob/master/checkpointer/lib/checkpointer/checkpointer-suid.c
* Use a setuid helper that writes to ns_last_pid.
Unfortunately, this helper delegation technique is impossible to use
with clone3, and is thus prone to races.
See https://github.com/twosigma/set_ns_last_pid
* Cycle through PIDs with fork() until the desired PID is reached:
This has been demonstrated to work with cycling rates of 100,000 PIDs/s
See https://github.com/twosigma/set_ns_last_pid
* Patch out the CAP_SYS_ADMIN check from the kernel
* Run the desired application in a new user and PID namespace to provide
a local CAP_SYS_ADMIN for controlling PIDs. This technique has limited
use in typical container environments (e.g., Kubernetes) as /proc is
typically protected with read-only layers (e.g., /proc/sys) for
hardening purposes. Read-only layers prevent additional /proc mounts
(due to proc's SB_I_USERNS_VISIBLE property), making the use of new
PID namespaces limited as certain applications need access to /proc
matching their PID namespace.
The introduced capability allows to:
* Control PIDs when the current user is CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE capable
for the corresponding PID namespace via ns_last_pid/clone3.
* Open files in /proc/pid/map_files when the current user is
CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE capable in the root namespace, useful for
recovering files that are unreachable via the file system such as
deleted files, or memfd files.
See corresponding selftest for an example with clone3().
Change-Id: Ia9ae3fc9a698e37774be945bac5a7d2a0d640cbc
Signed-off-by: Adrian Reber <areber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Viennot <Nicolas.Viennot@twosigma.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200719100418.2112740-2-areber@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: ralph950412 <ralph950412@gmail.com>
This tests clone3() with *set_tid to see if all desired PIDs are working
as expected. The tests are trying multiple invalid input parameters as
well as creating processes while specifying a certain PID in multiple
PID namespaces at the same time.
Additionally this moves common clone3() test code into clone3_selftests.h.
Change-Id: Ic30e083c2b8c3e5c1fe9adff28387e84431f4c71
Signed-off-by: Adrian Reber <areber@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191115123621.142252-2-areber@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: ralph950412 <ralph950412@gmail.com>
The main motivation to add set_tid to clone3() is CRIU.
To restore a process with the same PID/TID CRIU currently uses
/proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid. It writes the desired (PID - 1) to
ns_last_pid and then (quickly) does a clone(). This works most of the
time, but it is racy. It is also slow as it requires multiple syscalls.
Extending clone3() to support *set_tid makes it possible restore a
process using CRIU without accessing /proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid and
race free (as long as the desired PID/TID is available).
This clone3() extension places the same restrictions (CAP_SYS_ADMIN)
on clone3() with *set_tid as they are currently in place for ns_last_pid.
The original version of this change was using a single value for
set_tid. At the 2019 LPC, after presenting set_tid, it was, however,
decided to change set_tid to an array to enable setting the PID of a
process in multiple PID namespaces at the same time. If a process is
created in a PID namespace it is possible to influence the PID inside
and outside of the PID namespace. Details also in the corresponding
selftest.
To create a process with the following PIDs:
PID NS level Requested PID
0 (host) 31496
1 42
2 1
For that example the two newly introduced parameters to struct
clone_args (set_tid and set_tid_size) would need to be:
set_tid[0] = 1;
set_tid[1] = 42;
set_tid[2] = 31496;
set_tid_size = 3;
If only the PIDs of the two innermost nested PID namespaces should be
defined it would look like this:
set_tid[0] = 1;
set_tid[1] = 42;
set_tid_size = 2;
The PID of the newly created process would then be the next available
free PID in the PID namespace level 0 (host) and 42 in the PID namespace
at level 1 and the PID of the process in the innermost PID namespace
would be 1.
The set_tid array is used to specify the PID of a process starting
from the innermost nested PID namespaces up to set_tid_size PID namespaces.
set_tid_size cannot be larger then the current PID namespace level.
Change-Id: I21a8a13c5a794b2a788f3e647fd639b5ae313ebf
Signed-off-by: Adrian Reber <areber@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191115123621.142252-1-areber@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: ralph950412 <ralph950412@gmail.com>
This adds tests for clone3() with different values and sizes
of struct clone_args.
This selftest was initially part of of the clone3() with PID selftest.
After that patch was almost merged Eugene sent out a couple of patches
to fix problems with these test.
This commit now only contains the clone3() selftest after the LPC
decision to rework clone3() with PID to allow setting the PID in
multiple PID namespaces including all of Eugene's patches.
Change-Id: I32fecd920f7a820c0ca7869a70a8c5b34af583dd
Signed-off-by: Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Reber <areber@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191112095851.811884-1-areber@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: ralph950412 <ralph950412@gmail.com>
Test that CLONE_CLEAR_SIGHAND resets signal handlers to SIG_DFL for the
child process and that CLONE_CLEAR_SIGHAND and CLONE_SIGHAND are
mutually exclusive.
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: libc-alpha@sourceware.org
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Change-Id: I07ebb8cb2e741cf1a6a43ff4dbe6ee489636f506
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191014104538.3096-2-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Signed-off-by: ralph950412 <ralph950412@gmail.com>
Reset all signal handlers of the child not set to SIG_IGN to SIG_DFL.
Mutually exclusive with CLONE_SIGHAND to not disturb other thread's
signal handler.
In the spirit of closer cooperation between glibc developers and kernel
developers (cf. [2]) this patchset came out of a discussion on the glibc
mailing list for improving posix_spawn() (cf. [1], [3], [4]). Kernel
support for this feature has been explicitly requested by glibc and I
see no reason not to help them with this.
The child helper process on Linux posix_spawn must ensure that no signal
handlers are enabled, so the signal disposition must be either SIG_DFL
or SIG_IGN. However, it requires a sigprocmask to obtain the current
signal mask and at least _NSIG sigaction calls to reset the signal
handlers for each posix_spawn call or complex state tracking that might
lead to data corruption in glibc. Adding this flags lets glibc avoid
these problems.
[1]: https://www.sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2019-10/msg00149.html
[3]: https://www.sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2019-10/msg00158.html
[4]: https://www.sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2019-10/msg00160.html
[2]: https://lwn.net/Articles/799331/
'[...] by asking for better cooperation with the C-library projects
in general. They should be copied on patches containing ABI
changes, for example. I noted that there are often times where
C-library developers wish the kernel community had done things
differently; how could those be avoided in the future? Members of
the audience suggested that more glibc developers should perhaps
join the linux-api list. The other suggestion was to "copy Florian
on everything".'
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: libc-alpha@sourceware.org
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Change-Id: Iced02ef93ed4dcda5ca5d3bd475cbfcae928fb19
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191014104538.3096-1-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Signed-off-by: ralph950412 <ralph950412@gmail.com>
In async invoke path, fastrpc_update_invoke_count is called at
invoke_end with perf_counter pointing into ctx->perf.
After fastrpc_invoke_send returns, the async response thread may
call context_free(ctx), freeing ctx->perf before invoke_end.
This causes a use-after-free write that corrupts the SLUB
freelist and may trigger a kernel panic on next allocation.
Fix by storing submission timestamp in ctx->invoke_start_time
before send, removing unsafe call from invoke_end, and moving
fastrpc_update_invoke_count to fastrpc_wait_on_async_queue.
There, ctx is guaranteed valid before context_free. This also
aligns async perf->invoke with sync, measuring full end-to-end
latency instead of submission-only latency.
Acked-by: Sharad Kumar <sharku@qti.qualcomm.com>
Change-Id: I91f2a2479b508fde2fe7c26783ee56dc9391eb17
Signed-off-by: Santosh Sakore <ssakore@qti.qualcomm.com>
There is an issue in clang's ThinLTO caching (enabled for the kernel via
'--thinlto-cache-dir') with .incbin, which the kernel occasionally uses
to include data within the kernel, such as the .config file for
/proc/config.gz. For example, when changing the .config and rebuilding
vmlinux, the copy of .config in vmlinux does not match the copy of
.config in the build folder:
$ echo 'CONFIG_LTO_NONE=n
CONFIG_LTO_CLANG_THIN=y
CONFIG_IKCONFIG=y
CONFIG_HEADERS_INSTALL=y' >kernel/configs/repro.config
$ make -skj"$(nproc)" ARCH=x86_64 LLVM=1 clean defconfig repro.config vmlinux
...
$ grep CONFIG_HEADERS_INSTALL .config
CONFIG_HEADERS_INSTALL=y
$ scripts/extract-ikconfig vmlinux | grep CONFIG_HEADERS_INSTALL
CONFIG_HEADERS_INSTALL=y
$ scripts/config -d HEADERS_INSTALL
$ make -kj"$(nproc)" ARCH=x86_64 LLVM=1 vmlinux
...
UPD kernel/config_data
GZIP kernel/config_data.gz
CC kernel/configs.o
...
LD vmlinux
...
$ grep CONFIG_HEADERS_INSTALL .config
# CONFIG_HEADERS_INSTALL is not set
$ scripts/extract-ikconfig vmlinux | grep CONFIG_HEADERS_INSTALL
CONFIG_HEADERS_INSTALL=y
Without '--thinlto-cache-dir' or when using full LTO, this issue does
not occur.
Benchmarking incremental builds on a few different machines with and
without the cache shows a 20% increase in incremental build time without
the cache when measured by touching init/main.c and running 'make all'.
ARCH=arm64 defconfig + CONFIG_LTO_CLANG_THIN=y on an arm64 host:
Benchmark 1: With ThinLTO cache
Time (mean ± σ): 56.347 s ± 0.163 s [User: 83.768 s, System: 24.661 s]
Range (min … max): 56.109 s … 56.594 s 10 runs
Benchmark 2: Without ThinLTO cache
Time (mean ± σ): 67.740 s ± 0.479 s [User: 718.458 s, System: 31.797 s]
Range (min … max): 67.059 s … 68.556 s 10 runs
Summary
With ThinLTO cache ran
1.20 ± 0.01 times faster than Without ThinLTO cache
ARCH=x86_64 defconfig + CONFIG_LTO_CLANG_THIN=y on an x86_64 host:
Benchmark 1: With ThinLTO cache
Time (mean ± σ): 85.772 s ± 0.252 s [User: 91.505 s, System: 8.408 s]
Range (min … max): 85.447 s … 86.244 s 10 runs
Benchmark 2: Without ThinLTO cache
Time (mean ± σ): 103.833 s ± 0.288 s [User: 232.058 s, System: 8.569 s]
Range (min … max): 103.286 s … 104.124 s 10 runs
Summary
With ThinLTO cache ran
1.21 ± 0.00 times faster than Without ThinLTO cache
While it is unfortunate to take this performance improvement off the
table, correctness is more important. If/when this is fixed in LLVM, it
can potentially be brought back in a conditional manner. Alternatively,
a developer can just disable LTO if doing incremental compiles quickly
is important, as a full compile cycle can still take over a minute even
with the cache and it is unlikely that LTO will result in functional
differences for a kernel change.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: dc5723b02e52 ("kbuild: add support for Clang LTO")
Reported-by: Yifan Hong <elsk@google.com>
Closes: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/2021
Reported-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220327115526.cc4b0ff55fc53c97683c3e4d@kernel.org/
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Change-Id: I5e416fd740e48f2e3920d9d6917a600f179e4885
When doing non-clean builds and switching between CONFIG_LTO=n and
CONFIG_LTO=y, the build system (correctly) didn't notice that assembly
and LTO-excluded C object files were rewritten in place by objtool (to
add the .orc_unwind* sections), since their build command lines were the
same between CONFIG_LTO=y and CONFIG_LTO=n. The objtool step would fail:
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: file already has .orc_unwind section, skipping
make: *** [Makefile:1194: vmlinux] Error 255
Avoid this by making sure the build will see a difference between an LTO
and non-LTO build (by including "-fno-lto" in KBUILD_*FLAGS). This will
get ignored when CC_FLAGS_LTO is present, and will not be included at
all when CONFIG_LTO=n.
Change-Id: I7b6a3221d0972ad13db0d138c66f3789eec60062
Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Commit 27f2a4db76e8 ("Makefile: fix GDB warning with CONFIG_RELR")
added --use-android-relr-tags to fix a GDB warning
BFD: /android0/linux-next/vmlinux: unknown type [0x13] section `.relr.dyn'
The GDB warning has been fixed in version 11.2.
The DT_ANDROID_RELR tag was deprecated since DT_RELR was standardized.
Thus, --use-android-relr-tags should be removed. While making the
change, try -z pack-relative-relocs, which is supported since LLD 15.
Keep supporting --pack-dyn-relocs=relr as well for older LLD versions.
There is no indication of obsolescence for --pack-dyn-relocs=relr.
As of today, GNU ld supports the latter option for x86 and powerpc64
ports and has no intention to support --pack-dyn-relocs=relr. In the
absence of the glibc symbol version GLIBC_ABI_DT_RELR,
--pack-dyn-relocs=relr and -z pack-relative-relocs are identical in
ld.lld.
GNU ld and newer versions of LLD report warnings (instead of errors) for
unknown -z options. Only errors lead to non-zero exit codes. Therefore,
we should test --pack-dyn-relocs=relr before testing
-z pack-relative-relocs.
Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1057
Link: https://sourceware.org/git/?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=commit;h=a619b58721f0a03fd91c27670d3e4c2fb0d88f1e
Signed-off-by: Fangrui Song <maskray@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Change-Id: Ib4ca450ed863e16651a8725c721e7e0389c992ae
